Energy Policy 73 (2014) 815–819

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Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Viewpoint

New perspectives on nuclear power—Generation IV nuclear energy

systems to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and support
nuclear disarmament
Sophie Grape n, Staffan Jacobsson Svärd, Carl Hellesen, Peter Jansson, Matilda Åberg Lindell
Department of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala University, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden

H I G H L I G H T S

Generation IV systems are developed for long-term sustainable electricity production.

New perspectives are capabilities to manage nuclear waste from nuclear power and aid disarmament.

Simulations show how a country can launch fast reactors to control and reduce plutonium stocks.

Safeguards-by-Design principles should be deployed, facilitating effective nuclear safeguards.

art ic le i nf o a bstract

Article history: Recently, nuclear power has received support from environmental and climate researchers emphasizing
Received 6 May 2014 the need to address factors of global importance such as climate change, peace and welfare. Here, we add
Received in revised form to previous discussions on meeting future climate goals while securing safe supplies of energy by
17 June 2014
discussing future nuclear energy systems in the perspective of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation
Accepted 24 June 2014
and aiding in the process of reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons materials.
Available online 11 July 2014
New nuclear energy systems, currently under development within the Generation IV (Gen IV)
Keywords: framework, are being designed to offer passive safety and inherent means to mitigate consequences of
Nuclear energy nuclear accidents. Here, we describe how these systems may also be used to reduce or even eliminate
Generation IV
stockpiles of civil and military plutonium—the former present in waste from today's reactors and the
Nuclear safeguards
latter produced for weapons purposes. It is argued that large-scale implementation of Gen IV systems
Nuclear non-proliferation
Disarmament would impose needs for strong nuclear safeguards. The deployment of Safeguards-by-Design principles
in the design and construction phases can avoid draining of IAEA resources by enabling more effective
and cost-efficient nuclear safeguards, as compared to the current safeguards implementation, which was
enforced decades after the first nuclear power plants started operation.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Perceived roles of nuclear power climate – of global threats – think about this: terrorism, epidemics,
poverty, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – all
Recently, leading climate researchers have stated in an open challenges that know no borders – the reality is that climate change
letter (Caldeira et al., 2013) that, “There is no credible path to ranks right up there with every single one of them.”
climate stabilization that does not include… nuclear power.” Failing In World Energy Outlook 2013, The International Energy Agency
to address the issue of climate change because of the drawbacks of (IEA) (2013) predicts considerable growth in primary energy
nuclear power is not an option. The US secretary of state, John demand until 2035. With fossil fuels predicted to dominate energy
Kerry, recently stated, “When I think about the array of global supplies in 2035, there is great concern regarding climate change,
especially in light of The International Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (2013) report, which describes unprecedented atmospheric
Corresponding author. Tel.: þ 46 18 471 58 42.
n
concentrations of greenhouse gases, increased temperatures, melt-
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Grape),
[email protected] (S. Jacobsson Svärd),
ing glaciers and elevated sea levels, and in which the IEA acknowl-
[email protected] (C. Hellesen), [email protected] (P. Jansson), edges severe threats to the ‘21 Carbon budget’. In the newly released
[email protected] (M. Åberg Lindell). summary report, The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.06.026
0301-4215/& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
816 S. Grape et al. / Energy Policy 73 (2014) 815–819

(2014) states that necessary reductions of CO2-equivalent emissions To meet many of the concerns with current nuclear systems,
are characterized by a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the share intensive research is carried out all over the world, developing a
of zero- and low- carbon energy supply such as nuclear energy. new generation of nuclear systems, called Gen IV (Nature, 2012). An
Decarbonizing is a key component to reaching these reduced integral part of many Gen IV systems is metal-cooled reactors
emission levels, and in the IPCC models, the share of low-carbon operating with a fast neutron spectrum, or in short, “fast reactors”
electricity supply increases from the current share of approximately (FRs), in which no moderator is present to slow down the neutrons.
30% to more than 80% by 2050. Specifically, IPCC notes that nuclear These reactor concepts address central issues for nuclear power,
power could make an increasing contribution to the low-carbon such as safety, sustainability, economy and non-proliferation. The
energy supply, but that risks associated with e.g. waste manage- drawbacks include a need for a higher fraction of fissile material in
ment, nuclear weapons proliferation and public acceptance exist. the core, whereas the benefits include a possibility to fission a wide
The IEA expects the increased energy demand to be supplied by range of heavy elements. Notable is that FRs can be configured to
a combination of all primary energy sources; with fossil fuels and either create (breed) or consume (burn) heavy elements (transur-
renewables dominating the energy supply, and nuclear power anium elements), especially plutonium (U.S. DOE Nuclear Energy
being an important secondary source of energy. However, it has Research Advisory Committee and the Generation IV, 2002), which
also been suggested that nuclear power should take on a more is of particular interest for non-proliferation.
dominant role. The issue of nuclear power to counteract global Central to a Gen IV system with FRs is multiple recycling, giving
warming has been raised previously (Nature, 2004), with Gen IV a different fuel cycle than that for LWRs, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
nuclear energy systems being proposed to provide sustainability which enables the management of plutonium and other transur-
for large-scale production of nuclear energy (Nature, 2012). anium elements. However, introduction of multiple recycling also
Nuclear power opponents often raise concerns regarding waste has strong implications on the safeguards system, as further
issues and the risk for release of radioactive material associated with discussed in Section 4.
accidents, while proponents claim the benefits are larger than the When deploying the LWR fuel cycle, long-lived waste in the
drawbacks. Furthermore, the connection between nuclear power and form of spent nuclear fuel, comprising fission products, plutonium
nuclear weapons is often debated, and non-proliferation issues are and other heavy elements, will accumulate and constitute a
raised (Nature, 2004). An expansion of nuclear power and introduction proliferation hazard since it contains weapons-usable fissile mate-
of Gen IV systems to counteract global warming will add to such rial. From a states’ perspective of proliferation risk to non-state
concerns; especially since the implementation of Gen IV systems actors, this material offers some degree of self-protection due to its
requires large reprocessing and recycling capabilities, which are intense radioactivity. However, over time, the self-protecting prop-
sensitive technologies in terms of non-proliferation. On the positive erties diminish as short-lived isotopes decay, leading to an increase
side, Gen IV systems may also be a tool for disarmament, offering in the proliferation risk with time. The introduction of FRs into the
efficient reduction of the current stockpile of weapon materials nuclear power supply has the possibility to change this picture by
through its capability to convert high-enriched uranium as well as controlling the civil stockpile of plutonium instead of simply adding
plutonium to less sensitive material. This aspect also makes Gen IV to it. This is illustrated using an example based on a country with 10
systems a possible tool for managing the plutonium inventory LWRs of 1 GW each, built during 1970–1990. It is assumed that the
contained in civilian spent nuclear fuel. country wishes to maintain its electricity production capability,
There is currently a consensus that nuclear power will continue while transitioning the LWR system to a long-term sustainable Gen
to provide the world with energy, but the role and time span are IV nuclear energy system being operational from 2050 and
highly political questions. In this article, we aim to illuminate the onwards, and simulations of this scenario have been performed.
non-proliferation aspects of Gen IV systems, including their Five operational phases are illustrated in Fig. 2, showing the total
capabilities for managing civilian and military stockpiles of fissile plutonium stockpile (blue line) as a function of time.
materials and the needs and opportunities for nuclear safeguards The first phase covers the time period from 1970 to 2050, when
measures in these systems. only LWRs are in operation, adding to the plutonium stockpile
(considered as waste in this nuclear fuel cycle). During this time, we
assume that the oldest LWRs are replaced with new LWRs after 50
years life time (around 2020), and that the youngest LWRs of the first
2. Gen IV nuclear energy systems and the civilian nuclear generation have a 60 year lifetime, operating until around 2050.
stockpile The second phase starts in 2050 when the first FR is brought
into operation, replacing the last LWRs from the first generation.
The majority of the world's current fleet of commercial nuclear These first FRs are operated in burner mode and thus consume
reactors utilizes a moderating material in the reactor core to reduce plutonium. During this phase, the plutonium stockpile increases
the energy of neutrons created in fission, which enhances the ability to only marginally as the consumption in the fast reactors almost
maintain a fission chain reaction with relatively low fractions of fissile matches the production in the LWRs. Note that a fraction of the
isotopes in the core (such as uranium-235 or plutonium). In the most total plutonium inventory resides in FR cores rather than in
common group of reactors of today – light-water reactors (LWRs) – storage (red line).
water acts as both the moderator and the coolant, slowing down the The third phase starts around 2100 when the last remaining
neutrons while also transporting heat from the core to produce LWRs are replaced with FRs operating in burner mode. The
electricity. The LWRs have benefits in terms of safety and economy, plutonium stockpile now quickly decreases as no LWRs produce
but safety concerns have also been raised after e.g. the TMI (1979) and plutonium anymore.
Fukushima (2011) accidents. Other drawbacks of LWRs are their The fourth phase starts around 2200 when the plutonium
questionable sustainability because of low utilization of natural stockpile in storage starts to run out. At this stage, the FRs are
resources (the fissile isotope 235U only constitutes 0.7% of natural converted to breeders in order to be self-sustained with fissile
uranium) and the build-up of plutonium, being a man-made potential material. The only added fuel is either natural uranium or other
nuclear weapons material. Some countries recycle their fuel to make uranium types already in the system in terms of LWR spent fuel or
better use of the resources, but technical issues limit the number of depleted uranium. One may also consider fuelling the reactors
cycles and operation of recycled fuel in LWRs still leads to an increase with thorium in this phase. This self-sustaining phase of operation
in total plutonium content. can in principle be extended indefinitely.
 S. Grape et al. / Energy Policy 73 (2014) 815–819 817

Mining Storages, LWR

mining
Spent fuel
U Spent fuel
U, Pu,
U minor actinides

LWR Reprocessing

Reprocessing Fast reactor

Spent fuel U, Pu
Fission
products
Spent fuel
Fission products,
Waste minor actinides Waste

Fig. 1. The nuclear fuel cycle for the current nuclear energy systems, with once-through operation or limited recycling (left), compared to a Gen IV system with fast reactors
and multiple recycling (right).

nuclear arsenals under a bilateral treaty (The New START Treaty,

2010). However, all of the five acknowledged nuclear weapons
states (NWS) – the U.S., Russia, China, the UK and France – have
either (i) major modernization programs under way for their
4 nuclear weapons systems, (ii) are deploying new weapon systems,
1 2 3 5
or (iii) have announced to do so in the future. No immediate
changes in nuclear policy are expected for any of the five
recognized NWS, or for India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea,
who are also considered to possess nuclear weapons (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, 2013).
But can we in any way influence how disarmament policies are
made? Nuclear physicists may offer little help in the political
process, but we may assist by offering new ways to dispose of
weapons material and boost confidence in the disarmament
x x+50 process itself, thereby making it less likely for states to embark
on future armament endeavors.
Fig. 2. Plutonium inventory in the simulated example, as a function of time and With regard to fissile material, the five recognized NWS have
operation in LWRs and FRs. The blue line shows the plutonium in storage, while the red produced both high-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. India,
line shows the plutonium loaded into FR cores. (For interpretation of the references to Israel and North Korea have mainly produced plutonium and
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Pakistan mainly HEU (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, 2013). Hence, in order to safely dispose of both weapons
The fifth phase represents the phase-out of nuclear power materials, we need solutions for HEU and plutonium. One successful
where the FRs are gradually shut down, and the plutonium from example of disposing of HEU is the “Megatons to Megawatts”
all but the last reactor is burned in the remaining core. This phase project, signed in 1993 and ended in November 2013, by the
takes around 50–100 years to complete, and the only remaining Russian Federation and the United States (The Megatons to
plutonium is that from the last FR core which may be disposed of Megawatts program). The purpose was to downblend 500 mt of
in a dedicated subcritical transmutation reactor, leaving almost no HEU from Russian nuclear warheads and use it as fuel in commer-
plutonium for final storage. cial nuclear reactors in the U.S. This resulted in 10% of electricity in
In the example, the implementation of FRs operating in burner the U.S. being generated by Russian warheads, and a very successful
mode adds to the number of possibilities for the handling of spent demonstration of how political and technical tools can be combined
nuclear fuel, where the current options are either storage in a to put HEU weapons material into safe custody.
repository or limited reprocessing and associated storage of waste Regarding the disposal of plutonium, there is a bilateral treaty
products. Although placing the spent fuel in a dedicated repository between the U.S. and Russia in which each country has committed
may be a safe and reliable alternative, nuclear power opponents are to disposing of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. The
critical and point out that proliferation risks associated with such treaty, the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, was
storage facilities will increase, effectively turning them into “plutonium announced in the year 2000 and entered into force in 2011. Russia
mines,” as the radiation barrier from the fission products decays with will convert the Pu into fuel and, starting in 2018, irradiate it in
time (Lyman and Feiveson, 1998). The only way to ensure that the FRs, producing electricity. In the U.S., the surplus Pu was originally
material will not be available for weapons production is by transmut- planned to fuel civilian light water reactors (2000 Plutonium
ing it, which is precisely what Gen IV reactor systems offer to do. Management and Disposition, 2010); however, after a review of
the plutonium disposition program, alternative technologies are
currently being evaluated (Fiscal Year, 2015).
3. Military nuclear weapons materials and disarmament One may note that irradiation of plutonium in LWRs reduces its
challenges quality from a weapons perspective, but it does not decrease the
total amount in the fuel. Irradiation in Gen IV-type fast reactors
Nuclear weapons are possessed by a limited number of coun- does however offer to convert the plutonium to other elements.
tries in the world. There has been a decline in the global inventory This is in line with nonproliferation policy objectives, identified by
due to the commitment by the U.S. and Russia to reduce their the US Office of Nonproliferation and International Security
818 S. Grape et al. / Energy Policy 73 (2014) 815–819

(2008), showing that Gen IV nuclear energy systems are important facilities to a small number of states, which would limit the
for international nuclear security efforts. distribution of sensitive technology (Yudin, 2011) but at the
same time call for more transports.

4. Managing proliferation risks in Gen IV nuclear energy There is clearly a need to take nuclear safeguards of the full
systems nuclear fuel cycle system into account and we should work
towards the goal to solely promote frameworks, processes and
Proliferation risk is a notation used to describe the risk of facilities designed with an inherent high resistance to prolifera-
spreading nuclear material, nuclear technology (or nuclear weap- tion. By putting Safeguards-by-Design (The International Atomic
ons themselves) for nuclear weapons purposes. Nuclear safeguards Energy Agency (IAEA), 2009) into practice, i.e. incorporating safe-
denotes active measures taken to control and mitigate such risks guards considerations in the initial stages of designing new
by limiting the access to sensitive materials/technologies, keeping nuclear facilities and nuclear energy systems, the efficiency of
accurate and transparent accounting of materials, and performing safeguards implementation can be increased at a reduced cost and
nuclear inspections, etc. with an increased acceptance among the operators.
When nuclear safeguards was introduced, it had to be adapted In order for Generation IV nuclear energy systems to be part of the
to the present conditions of the time. With Gen IV nuclear energy solution on how to electrify the world while making it safer, we must
systems, we can do it the other way around, using appropriately ensure that nuclear safeguards is prioritized by reminding national
designed nuclear safeguards solutions as preconditions for imple- and international policymakers and research funding agencies of what
mentation. As described in Section 3, we also propose strengthen- is at stake. It should lie in the interest of all states to push these issues
ing nuclear non-proliferation by reducing stockpiles of fissile forward—they are not only an IAEA responsibility.
material in fast reactors.
The implementation of Gen IV systems with FRs and closed fuel
cycles, involves an extensive increase in recycling of nuclear fuel, 5. Looking ahead
identified as one of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel
cycle that requires significant nuclear safeguards resources, as e.g. There are many reasons to believe that nuclear power will play an
currently manifested at the Rokkasho facility in Japan. Increased important role in future society, together with a mix of other energy
transport and handling of nuclear material, which is also sensitive, sources. Nuclear power offers to deliver large, reliable quantities of
is as well expected. For these reasons, nuclear safeguards must be electricity associated with low greenhouse-gas emissions, which
an essential part in the early design phase of new nuclear energy proves more important by the day. Accordingly, current large
systems not to risk draining of IAEA safeguards resources. international efforts should be continued to develop Gen IV nuclear
FRs additionally offer a major advantage, which is not often energy systems, with the aim to provide clean, long-term sustainable,
mentioned: breeder reactors producing their own plutonium during safe, economic and efficient electricity production.
operation may eliminate the need for enriched-uranium based fuels Among the new perspectives that Gen IV systems bring are their
and hence the need for uranium enrichment facilities. In 2004, the capability to contribute to the world's security in additional, valuable
IAEA Director General El-Baradei already wanted to limit the use of ways as compared to today's nuclear power, by offering means to
this sensitive technology, acknowledging that it might be used to control and reduce the amount of nuclear waste generated, and to aid
produce HEU for non-technically advanced nuclear weapons, which the nuclear disarmament process by turning warheads into peaceful
could be attractive for low-tech states or terrorist groups (ElBaradei, electricity. In this paper, we have shown an example of how a country
2004). HEU may be produced using the same facilities and princi- with considerable use of nuclear power can launch fast reactors to
ples as those used to produce civilian nuclear fuel without requiring control and reduce the amounts of plutonium generated, and thereby
any facility modifications (Office of Nonproliferation and mitigating the proliferation hazard. The operation of these Gen IV
International Security, 2008; Implementation of the NPT, 2013), a systems can be extended until other climate-friendly, reliable energy
concern which is currently relevant in Iran. The elimination of systems are implemented, and accelerator-driven burners enable a
enrichment activities would thus constitute a big step forward for complete destruction of the country's plutonium inventory.
nuclear safeguards. There are many challenges associated with Gen IV nuclear
Still, conscious actions must be taken to mitigate proliferation energy systems; technical as well as political and social. In this
risks in the implementation of Gen IV nuclear energy systems. We context, nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation of nuclear
have selected a number of areas, where nuclear safeguards has a weapons is highly important, especially as nuclear safeguards will
key role to play: become more challenging with an envisaged expansion of nuclear
technology. Accordingly, Safeguards-by-Design principles should

Technical research on separation techniques that render the be implemented, allowing for more reliable, efficient and eco-
separated products and procedures less interesting for weap- nomic international safeguarding of sensitive materials.
ons production.

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