2018
2018
2018
HONOUR
RESPECT
CORE VALUES
DECORUM
EXCELLENCE
INNOVATION
PUNCTUALITY
PROFESSIONALISM
MISSION COMMAND
PRISTINE ENVIRONMENT
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ISSN 2536-8745
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CONTENTS
Foreword
Collaboration between Sri Lanka Navy and the National Aquatic Resources
Research and Development Agency: Challenges and the Way Ahead ....... 58
Lieutenant Commander (BH) Saliya Hemachandra
It is with great pleasure and delight that I present the third issue of the Defence and
Security Journal, which the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC)
launched in 2016. The journal covers a plethora of areas, under the broad theme
of defence and security. The journal was launched with a view to provide a window
for new scholarship to analyse and present key issues confronting defence and
security studies with special emphasis on Sri Lanka’s national security.
As we move into another issue, I am glad to observe that the journal has gained
repute among security professionals, academics and researchers as a platform to
present well-positioned solutions through an analytical and interpretive lens which
enables a better understanding of policy on defence and security in a dynamic
world. Despite growing interest and impressive advancements in the field of
security worldwide, gaps continue to remain at the national level in understanding
and applying vital aspects of security from a variety of perspectives.
Thus, the third issue of the journal is composed of two types of papers: the first
category provides an overall perspective of the contemporary security environment,
whilst the second type looks into core components of national security by analysing
the most recent dynamics influencing Sri Lanka’s scope of national security. In doing
so, the current issue of the journal features an array of papers ranging from regional
security, nuclear deterrence, the changing nature of religion in the contemporary
world, economic benefits of peacekeeping, maritime cooperation in the Indian
Ocean, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among military personnel, and
avenues for collaborative research for Sri Lanka Navy. As the DSCSC is celebrating
its 20th anniversary in the year 2018, a feature article tracing the history of the
College is also included to provide a glimpse of the steady and successful journey
the College has taken over the years.
While welcoming the third issue of the journal, my appreciation is due to the
editorial board headed by Professor Emeritus Amal Jayawardane for their expertise
and efforts rendered in bringing out this publication.
I sincerely hope that this issue of the Defence and Security Journal would be
beneficial to all readers. I also welcome insightful and refreshing content for our
future issues.
Gamini Keerawella
ABSTRACT
South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world. In order to unpack South
Asian regional security, it is necessary to trace the polysemy of the term ‘South Asia’
and its multi-layered construction. Regionalism is a process as well as an outcome of
the process. Regionalism cannot be imposed; it should be evolved. As far as South Asian
regional security is concerned, three references can be identified: the South Asian Region
as a whole; the states in the region and more importantly; people in the region. Lack
of trust among states in South Asia cannot be attributed wholly to the Indo-Pakistan
conflict. The trust-deficit in the region is also an outcome of some architectural realities
of South Asian states. The paradoxical impact of the rise of India to a status of global
power on regional bonding should also be noted. In the new millennia, there is a growing
tendency towards regional economic integration in the world, but South Asia remains
outside the tendency. South Asia is a region where the highest interstate barriers exist
to trade and it suffers from prohibitive tariffs. Gains of deeper economic integration in
South Asia are not unknown. But, the region still falters in making a breakthrough due to
trust deficit, insufficient policy-relevant analytical work on gains of regional integration
to make informed policy decisions, limited logistics and regulatory impediments and
cross-broader conflicts. These impediments come to the forefront when regionalism is
projected from the state-centered formula. We need an alternative approach, focusing on
the people-to-people interaction based on common belonging and shared interests.
Keywords: Regionalism; Regional Security; South Asia
INTRODUCTION
South Asia, home to a fifth of humanity, is one of the least integrated regions in
the world. The intra-regional trade in South Asia accounts for only 5 percent of its
total trade, manifesting a low degree of economic bonding in the region. Two main
states in South Asia were born into an environment marred by mutual antagonism
and it continues to remain so as they got locked into a multiple-level conflict as to
the dispute over territory, balance of power, threat perceptions, mutual accusation
of interference in each other’s domestic affairs and rival foreign policy approaches.
The relationship between India and its other neighbours constantly fluctuates in an
environment of mutual fear and suspicion. The faltering SAARC process appears to
be in limbo since 2016 after India’s boycott of the Islamabad Summit, in retaliation
to the Uri attack in Kashmir. Against these ground realities, what is really meant by
2 Gamini Keerawella
‘regional security’ and ‘regionalism’ in South Asia? Firstly, to unpack these issues,
it is important to raise some fundamental questions pertaining to the construction
of the term, ‘South Asian region’, and of the concept, ‘regional security of South
Asia’. The polysemy of the term ‘South Asia’ and processes of its multi-layered
construction will be traced. What exactly is the reference point of regional security?
It must be made clear that ‘regional security’ and the ‘regional security complex’
are not the same; the first is a reference point and the latter is an analytical tool.
Regionalism is a process propelled by multi-faceted regional bonding. Later, the
issues and processes of South Asian regional security and insecurity in the 21st
century will be unpacked with the help of these analytical insights.
The term South Asia bags different notions, depending on the context of its use
and the underlying stake of its construction. The term has been presented as a
civilisational entity, a geographical description and also as a political idea. The shared
cultural heritage in South Asia is a historical fact but culture is a constantly evolving
phenomenon. The existence of different religions and paths of civilisations in South
Asia also contests the idea that South Asia forms a single cultural region. Many
states in South Asia are post-colonial entities and they possess a similar colonial
experience; unification and division. However, the geographical description of
South Asia does not correspond with any sense of political belonging. Against this
backdrop, what is meant by the South Asian region? To answer this question, it is
necessary to trace the genealogy of the concept of ‘region’ in international studies
and the evolution of regional security studies.
The concept of region entered into the academic realm of international studies as
a unit of analysis only after the Second World War; but its ideological roots can
be traced in the geo-political writings in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In
the early Cold War years, an analytical category of region, located in between the
individual state and the global system, was recognised in line with global strategic
projections of the superpowers.
relations exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a
change at one point in the subsystem affect other points, (2) the actors are generally
proximate, (3) internal and external observers and actors recognise the subsystem
as a distinctive ‘theatre of operation’, and (4) the subsystem logically consists of at
least two or, quite probable, more actors.
In the Cold War context, regions were identified mainly in terms of the importance
given to the region in global strategic calculations of the Superpowers. South Asia as
a region was not considered vital to their central strategic balance. However, India
and Pakistan as individual states figured to some extent in the containment and
de-containment strategies of superpowers. The commonly used term in academic
parlance at that time was the Indian Sub-continent, and it’s attention was mainly
on the Indo-Pakistan rivalry.
It should also be noted that in the deliberations of the Asian Relations Conference
in 1947 or Colombo Powers Meeting in 1954, the term South Asia was not used
at all. It was in the late 1950s, that the US State Department and the World Bank
used the term South Asia. In 1959, the US State Department published a briefing
document entitled ‘Subcontinent of South Asia’. It was believed that the term South
Asian region is politically neutral, compared to the term Indian Sub-continent (Arif,
2014).
It is with the establishment of SAARC in 1985 that the term South Asia received
a new currency. Since then, various agreements were signed and initiatives
were launched with South Asian regional focus. The achievements of SAARC in
promoting regional cooperation, especially in some functional areas should not
be discounted. However, progress in achieving goals and objectives of regional
cooperation in key political and economic domains is far from satisfactory.
In this situation, what is meant by South Asian regional security? If security is defined
as the pursuit of freedom from threat and fear, i.e., a process then, whose security
are we talking of when it comes to South Asia? In this regard, three references need
to be taken into consideration: the South Asian Region as a whole, the states in
the region and more importantly, people in the region. South Asia’s position in the
global system and region-wide security issues that demands regional approach and
action constitute the first level. The reduction of adversarial environments linked
with fear and suspicion in relations among South Asian states and promotion of
trust and confidence through economic interaction and political dialogue would be
the concerns under the second level of reference. Security concerns of the individual
citizen in the region can be included in regional security as many of them are more
or less common irrespective of state boundaries. Threats to human security can be
cited as a case in point. The discourse on Peoples’ SAARC represents this tendency.
4 Gamini Keerawella
In addition, the term regional security can be used to explain the present state of
security conditions, i.e., an analysis. A rich body of literature is available in South
Asian regional security and in particular the contributions of the Copenhagen
School must be noted. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, in their highly influential work
published in 2003, Regions and Power: Structure of International Security, developed
the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). They argue that security is clustered
in geographically shaped regions because threats travel more easily over short
distances than over long ones. Furthermore, threats are most likely to be in the
region and security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of other actors
in the region. They observe “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation,
de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, 2002, p.2). In
analysing the Regional Security of South Asia from the perspective of RSCT, they
observed two points. First, the South Asian regional security complex was slowly
moving towards an internal transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity as India
got stronger and Pakistan weaker. Second, the rise of China was creating a center
of gravity that was slowly drawing South Asia into closer security interaction with
the East Asian regional security complex. In his article on the South Asian Security
Complex published in 2011, Barry Buzan argued that despite many events in South
Asia, there is “little in the way of structural change from the analysis in Power and
Region” (Buzan, 2011, p.11).
Thus, it is useful to bring to focus the difference between two contexts in which the
term regional security is employed: process and description. According to Earnest
B. Hass, “the phenomenon of regionalism is sometimes equated with the study of
regional integration. Regionalism can be a political slogan; if so, it is ideological data
that the student of integration must use. Regionalism can also be an analytical devise
suggesting what the world’s ‘natural’ regions are (or ought to be)” (Hass, 1971, p.8).
Regionalism is a process as well as an outcome of the process. Regionalism cannot
be imposed; it should be evolved. The primary condition of regionalism would
be a common regional identity that is determined by a number of factors. Having
common socio-cultural traits and values does not necessarily generate regionalism.
The perception of having a common regional attribute must set in motion a process
of regional bonding. Political and economic dynamics in operation at different
levels are critical factors that promote or hinder regional bonding despite the fact
that the region claims common regional attributers.
It should be pointed out that fundamental to the conflict between India and
Pakistan is the contradictory ideologies upon which the two states are based. The
ideological rationale of the state of Pakistan has been the homeland for Muslims
in the Indian sub-continent while founders of the Indian state asserted multi-
ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic character of the state based on a federal
constitution to maintain the unity of India’s diverse social patchwork of collective
identities. The idea that Hinduism and Islam formed two separate civilisations, a
view that is shared by Hindu nationalists in India as well, sets roadblocks to the
growth of regionalism with regional bonding.
The chronic rivalry between India and Pakistan is just one dimension of the pervasive
trust deficit in South Asia. Incidents reported from time to time on both sides of the
boarder keep the pot boiling at all times. It has now become a socially constructed
phenomenon. Lack of trust among states in South Asia cannot be attributed wholly
to the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The trust-deficit in the region is also an outcome of
some architectural realities of South Asian states. The unchangeable and undeniable
regional reality in South Asia, the term used by late Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar
(1996), is the central and asymmetrical presence of India in various domains. India’s
preponderance over all others in South Asia is based on its size, power, resources
and development. Further, India’s centrality in South Asia is geo-political. None
of the South Asian countries interact with another without touching or crossing
Indian land, sea or air space. In addition, India has special ties with each of its
neighbours with regards to language, religion, ethnicity, kinship, economic nerves
or common historical experience. The states around India fear that India could use
some of these ties and cross-border linkages to interfere in the internal affairs of its
neighbours. Sir Ivor Jennings vividly captured this love-hate relationship between
India and its neighbors in 1951 when he wrote, “India thus appears as a friendly but
potentially dangerous neighbor to whom one must be polite but a little distance.
It is not because that India and Indians are unpopular, but that the Ceylonese [Sri
6 Gamini Keerawella
Lankans], while admiring much that is Indian, and feeling themselves racially akin
to Indian have a sensation of living under a mountain which might send down
destructive avalanches” (Jennings, 1951, p.113). This is more relevant today.
The paradoxical impact of the rise of India to a status of global power on regional
bonding should also be paid attention. In the last decade India consistently
maintained one of the highest GDP growth rates in the world. India was able to take
impressive strides in the area of knowledge industry and research and development.
India is now ranked fourth in the Global Fire Power (GFP) ranking. Today, India’s
military is the third largest and its air force the fourth largest with 2,185 aircrafts
(Fighter Aircraft, Attack Aircraft, Transport Aircraft, Trainer Aircraft and Attack
Helicopters). Its navy is the fifth largest in the world (Global Fire Power, 2018).
These developments have compelled India, as an aspirant global power, to extend
its strategic perspective beyond South Asia. At the same time, it exacerbates the fear
of Indian ‘bogey’ among its small neighbors as they feel they are becoming more
and more Lilliputian before the Indian Gulliver.
This is only one aspect of the changing scenarios. It must not be forgotten that South
Asia became the fastest growing region in the world in 2016 and solidified its lead
in 2017 due to solid economic performance by India. Still the South Asian region
is home to 40 percent of the world poor. The challenge before India’s neighbors in
South Asia is how to leverage their special links with India to become an integral
part of South Asian growth engine. Nevertheless, stunned and threatened by
economic and scientific advances achieved by the Indian industrial and commercial
establishment, some sections of weak and backward industrial and commercial
middle class of South Asian neighbours seek state protection to remain within their
own comfortable cocoon. In contrast, general public in these countries experience
cross border dividends generated by the growth of Indian economy and by other
advances in scientific and medical research. The economies of other countries also
benefit from the renewed Indian economic dynamism. For example, the Colombo
Port has emerged as a major international transshipment hub for Indian goods. In
1915, 42 percent of India’s transshipment was handled by Sri Lanka.
In order to go forward as a global power, India needs a stable and friendly South
Asian environment. It is a fact that insecure and discontented neighbours around
her in South Asia would not augur well for India, having millstones around her
neck. In the changed constellation of power in South Asia, what needs today
is a ‘new Gujral Doctrine’ on the part of India to allay the perceived fears of its
neighbours. In the long run, it will enhance its soft power in global politics. At the
same time, it would give a kick-start to the stalled SAARC process. The small states
of South Asia also need to recognise evolving geo-political realities in the region.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 7
CONCLUSION
All the issues and impediments come to the forefront when regionalism is projected
from the state-centered formula. The trust deficit exists mainly among states and not
among people in South Asia. It must be noted that there can be two approaches to
regionalism. The first is the top-down approach, which aims to foster collaboration
between the states in the region. The issues of regional power politics come forward
to hamper the process of regionalism when it is pursued through the top-down
approach. The second is the bottom-up approach, focusing on the people-to-
people interaction based on common belongings and shared interests. In the
bottom up approach, the reference point of regional security, hence the driving
force of regionalism is the people in the region that counts on their community
of interests cutting across state boundaries. Therefore, the possible way out of the
present imbroglio of SAARC is to redefine and re-chart regionalism from bottom-
up approach. In such an endeavor, the human security in South Asia becomes a
priority in regional security. The two approaches are not alternatives to each other.
In an ideal situation, both could proceed simultaneously. Hence, South Asian
regionalism must be a multilayered process and a political discourse. Who sets the
agenda of the discourse is the critical issue here. It is too serious an issue to leave in
the hands of demagogues, a common breed in South Asia
REFERENCES
Binder, L. (1958) The Middle East as a Subordinate International System. World Politics, pp.
408-429.
Brecher, M. (1963) International System and Asian Studies: Subordinate State System of
South Asia. World Politics, pp. 213-235.
Buzan, B. (2011) The South Asian Security Complex in a Decentring World Order:
Reconsidering Regions and Powers. International Studies, 48 (1), pp. 1-19.
Buzan, B. and Ole W. (2003) Regions and Power: Structure of International security. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Economy Watch (2016) Intra-Regional Trade Lagging in South Asia. Economy Watch
[online]. Available from: http://www.economywatch.com/features/Intra-Regional-Trade-
Lagging-in-South-Asia0511.html [Accessed 20th September 2018].
GFP strength in Numbers (2018) 2018 India Military Strength. Global Fire Power
[online]. Available at: https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.
asp?country_id=india#overview [Accessed 20th September 2018].
8 Gamini Keerawella
Hass, E. B. (1971) The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of
Pre-theorizing. In: Lindberg, Leon N. and Stuart A. Scheingold. (eds.) Regional Integration-
Theory and Research. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p.8.
Jennings, S. I. (1951) The Commonwealth in Asia. London: Oxford University Press, p.113.
Kadirgamar, L. (1996) Regional co-operation and security: A Sri Lankan perspective. The
Krishna Menon Memorial Centenary Lecture delivered by Lakshman Kadirgamar , Kota,
Rajasthan, India, 15 December.
The World Bank (2016) The Potential of Intra-regional Trade for South Asia. The World Bank
[online]. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/24/the-
potential-of-intra-regional-trade-for-south-asia [Accessed 20th September 2018].
ABSTRACT
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a leading morbidity among combat military
personnel globally. It affects their well-being and leads to hindering the overall military
capability, the combat effectiveness of armed forces and the national security of a country.
Prevalence of PTSD had been reported as high as 17.1 percent among post-conflict
settings. Depression, substance abuse, suicidal ideation and personality disorders are
known to be associated with combat-related PTSD. The primary aim of this study was to
determine the prevalence of PTSD among combat military personnel currently serving
in the Sri Lanka Army. It also sought to identify psychological, occupational and social
issues faced by them as well as to determine their impacts on PTSD in a post-conflict
setting. A cross-sectional descriptive study was conducted in the year 2017, to determine
the prevalence of combat-related PTSD among 871 combat soldiers who are presently
serving in the Sri Lanka Army using a structured questionnaire with PTSD Check List-
Military Version (PCL-M). In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted by using a
semi-structured questionnaire, among soldiers who were reporting ‘sick’ to the psychiatric
clinic at Army Hospital in Narahenpita.
The prevalence of PTSD among combat soldiers in the Sri Lanka Army was 8.7 percent.
The length of service at Sri Lanka Army being less than 20 years, the presence of a family
member with psychological illness, consumption of alcohol and cannabis were having a
statistically significant high level of PTSD among the combat military personnel with
P-values <0.05. The prevalence of PTSD and addiction to alcohol, smoking and cannabis
were high among the combat military personnel in the Sri Lankan Army. A large-scale
screening programme for PTSD among the Sri Lanka Armed Forces should be conducted
to identify individuals with PTSD and appropriate treatment should be provided while
maintaining a robust system of enhancing the physical and mental standards of soldiers
in the Sri Lanka Army.
Keywords: psychological disorders, PTSD, Sri Lanka Army
INTRODUCTION
The Ceylon Army was inaugurated on 10 October 1949, under the Army Act
No.17 of 1949. It was renamed as Sri Lanka Army, after the country became an
independent republic on 22 May 1972. Since then, the Sri Lanka Army has greatly
10 Captain Thushantha Jayawardane
contributed to protecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country.
It comprises of a regular force, regular reserve, volunteer force and the volunteer
reserve. Later, it was expanded in terms of manpower, equipment, logistics and
training in order to meet the challenging requirements of varying circumstances.
It is virtually impossible to set an exact date for the origin of the Tamil militancy
in Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka Army had a pivotal role to play in the 30 years
of prolonged armed conflict with the LTTE which was militarily defeated in May
2009. Thus, combat military personnel of the Sri Lanka Army were exposed to
the protracted war, and experienced various stressful events being away from their
loved ones for a long period of time. Therefore, the prevalence of PTSD among
combat military personnel of the Sri Lanka Army is expected to be higher than the
general population.
As specified in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), PTSD is an anxiety
disorder that can occur when a person is exposed to an event that is life threatening
to self or others and feels intense fear, helplessness, or horror. The classical signs
of PTSD are re-experiencing of the stressful event, avoidance of reminders, hyper
arousal and cognition or mood symptoms. If a person is to be diagnosed with PTSD,
s/he has to report one or more re-experiencing symptoms, three or more avoidance/
numbing symptoms, and two or more arousal symptoms. The symptoms have to
be present for more than one month and cause significant distress or impairment
in important areas of functioning.
PTSD and the military are closely linked. The first instance that PTSD was
recognised and systematically diagnosed was among Vietnam veterans (Hapke et
al., 2006). Acute responses reported by soldiers who fought in the First and Second
World Wars included re-experiencing symptoms and dissociative responses such
as numbing, amnesia and depersonalisation. A variety of labels have been used to
describe these reactions including ‘fright neurosis’, ‘combat/war neurosis’, ‘shell
shock’, and ‘survivor syndrome’ (Ehlers and Harvey, 2000).
Whether the traumatic event can be considered a major cause of these psychological
symptoms has been the subject of considerable debate. There were attempts to
attribute them to pre-existing psychological dysfunctions. It was the recognition of
the long-standing psychological problems of many war veterans, especially Vietnam
veterans, that changed this view and convinced clinicians and researchers that even
people with sound personalities can develop clinically significant psychological
symptoms if they are exposed to horrific stressors (Ehlers and Harvey, 2000). This
prompted the introduction of PTSD as a diagnostic category in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM- III) developed
by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980. It was thus recognised that
traumatic events such as combat, rape, man-made or natural disasters give rise to a
characteristic pattern of psychological symptoms.
The prevalence rate in the military is significantly higher than the general population
due to their high risk in experiencing unusually stressful traumatic events. During
the past few years, a number of studies have reported prevalence rates between 15.6
percent and 17.1 percent for PTSD among those who have returned from the Persian
Gulf War and the Iraq War respectively (Hans and Stephanie, 2007). Prevalence of
PTSD among a randomly selected community sample of New Zealand veterans was
10 percent (Long et al., 1996). Most of the studies have been conducted among
veterans whereas this study focused on currently serving combat soldiers.
Many studies have established that the children of combat veterans with PTSD
have more frequent and more serious developmental, behavioural, and emotional
problems than the children of combat veterans without PTSD. Further, some
of them also have specific psychiatric problems (Klaric et al., 2008). Therefore,
combat-related PTSD can affect the soldiers individually as well as at their family
level and society as a whole, endangering military preparedness. Hence, PTSD can
considerably hamper the military preparedness of defence forces posing a threat to
national security. Therefore, accurate research evidence and effective mental health
services are imperative to mitigate this military specific health burden in order to
maintain the optimum military preparedness in any defence force.
12 Captain Thushantha Jayawardane
The military needs to maintain robust physical and mental fitness of both officers
and soldiers in order to face any security challenge to the country. Military
commitment in warfare can have dramatic consequences for the mental health
and well-being of military personnel hindering the overall military capability and
combat effectiveness of the armed forces of a country. PTSD contributes to a major
share in mental health morbidity among military personnel. It does not stop at
the military level, but propagates into society as well, because the combat military
personnel are not an isolated entity, but they also have interpersonal relationships
within a given society (Hans and Stephanie, 2007).
The Ceylon Army was a relatively small entity, less professional and regarded
as a ceremonial army from its inauguration in 1948 until 1971. The Sri Lanka
Armed Forces were mobilised for combat operations for the first time during the
JVP insurrection in 1971. Subsequently, the Sri Lanka Army expanded to a great
extent; in terms of manpower, equipment and logistics as the situation demanded
to defeat the most ruthless terrorist group. Towards the latter stage of the battle, the
Sri Lankan Armed Forces had to deploy its total bayonet strength to face the LTTE
strategies ranging from guerrilla tactics to conventional and multifaceted threats.
According to Fernando and Jayatunga (2013), the 30-year prolonged war has
produced a new generation of veterans at risk for chronic mental health issues.
Further, over 100,000 members of the Sri Lanka Army had been directly or indirectly
exposed to the war where many soldiers underwent traumatic battle events which
were beyond the usual human experiences. They had been exposed to traumatic
battle events such as witnessing fellow soldiers being killed or wounded and the sight
of unburied decomposing bodies, and hearing screams for help from the wounded,
etcetera. Following the combat trauma, a significant number of combatants of the
Sri Lanka Army were clinically diagnosed with PTSD. Moreover, they also revealed
that when the battle developed to a high intensity level, the psychological trauma
experienced by the soldiers became colossal and there had been suicidal attempts
and self-inflicted casualties. It was apparent that the prevalence of PTSD as high
as 6.7 percent among the soldiers and officers of the Sri Lanka Army from August
2002 to March 2006 according to their epidemiologic study.
Panduwawala and Jayatunga (2016) in a similar study show a low PTSD prevalence
rate (6.5 percent) among the Sri Lankan combatants when compared to Vietnam,
Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. According to them, there could be several reasons
including cultural and religious factors that may have acted as buffers in protecting
the soldiers developing PTSD. Although the situation was such, Jayatunga (2006)
suggested that many military leaders did not have a clear idea about psychological
traumatic reactions or sometimes they were disregarded as acts of cowardice
and some even argued that there was no condition as PTSD or combat trauma.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 13
Unfortunately, the psychological aftermath of the war in Sri Lanka is not well
addressed so far and only a few studies have been conducted in this regard; thus,
undetected and undiagnosed number of victims could be higher than the present
estimates.
Almost 150 out of 871 had reported a sudden act or feeling as if a stressful military
experience was happening again and in a similar proportion, felt as if their future
will somehow be cut short. According to the findings, 9.6 percent moderately felt
very upset when they were reminded of a stressful military experience. Another
4.7 percent people were being ‘super alert’ or watchful and on guard. The majority
of them (13 percent) in the moderate category had lost interest in things they
used to enjoy. An interviewee mentioned that they are not actively involved in any
work activities. The main reason was lack of energy to engage in challenging tasks
and also due to the medication taken for the treatment of PTSD. Unfortunately,
most of the soldiers who are being diagnosed with PTSD had problems in their
sexual functions too, which had created another psychological burden on them.
This could have a major implication on the family and the caregivers. Therefore,
prevention of such PTSD is vital in this scenario.
The level of probable PTSD was high (8.7 percent) in the study population. This
finding is comparable to the studies conducted among the Vietnamese. Another
study in New Zealand showed that PTSD is as high as 10 percent among the
community exposed to war (Long et al. 1996). Furthermore, a study conducted
by Wolfe (1999) had demonstrated that PTSD had increased over a period of
time. On the other hand, a hospital-based study in Sri Lanka by Fernando and
Jayathunge (2004) had recorded the prevalence of PTSD at 6.7 percent. Therefore,
the findings from the present study indicate an increase in PTSD when compared
to the previous studies. The real magnitude of PTSD among the military personnel
in the country could be even higher. Lack of attention to PTSD conditions and
limitation of resources and skills to handle it might have led to a higher number of
undetected PTSD individual among the armed forces.
8.7%
Symptomatic
Non-Symptomatic
91.3%
Figure 1: Level of PTSD among the Combat Military Personnel in the Army
(Source: Author)
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 15
OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS
The service duration of the combat military personnel was high and majority of the
population under study have been serving for more than ten years. This reflects
the stability of the job they hold. Most of them had performed field duties whilst
in service. The level of job satisfaction was very high among the combat military
personnel. These findings reflect on the stability of their job and good facilities
provided by Sri Lanka Army.
Sexual harassment among the combat military personnel was moderate and the
occurrence of physical assault was also not high. However, preventive strategies
should be developed to reduce these unpleasant incidences in a working
environment.
The level of education and marital status of the combat military personnel, were
influenced by the prevalence of PTSD among the study population. However, those
16 Captain Thushantha Jayawardane
differences observed were not statistically significant as the p-value was more than
0.05. The study participants who had good job satisfaction, having less PTSD
symptoms when compared to the population with a low level of job satisfaction.
The duration of the service at Sri Lanka Army showed a statistically significant
impact on the level of PTSD among the study population. The influence of aging
and other comorbid factors need to be assessed to conclude the influence of service
duration and its association with PTSD.
The prevalence of PTSD was high among the combat military personnel in Sri
Lanka Army. The level had reduced a little over the past years. This indicates a
need for assessing the combat military personnel with PTSD. The psychological,
occupational and social issues among military personnel in Sri Lanka were high;
high levels of divorce, a high proportion of physical and sexual abuse, imprisonment
rate and substance abuses were present. The length of service at Sri Lanka Army
being less than 20 years, the presence of a family member with mental illness,
consumption of alcohol and cannabis were having an impact on the high level of
PTSD among the combat military personnel. The education level, marital status,
job satisfaction, participation in training activities, history of physical, sexual and
mental abuse was not having a statistically significant association with PTSD.
The suffering and impact of traumatic events in the life of combat military personnel
is complex and the consequences are seen even after many years of traumatic
events. The psychosocial support provided to the combat military personnel was
weak and most of them had to rely on their personal resources, support from family
and friends to overcome the challenges. However, those who are diagnosed with
PTSD and undergoing treatment at the Army Hospital in Narahenpita, were happy
about the treatment and the facilities. Most of them had work-related issues and
social issues at the family front at the beginning of those with PTSD symptoms.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 17
Undoubtedly, this situation could adversely affect the national security of the country.
An army’s ability to fight should not be measured only in terms of manpower,
equipment and the logistic support, as the psychological well-being of the men
are as equally important. Therefore, it should be carefully examined, analysed and
reviewed not only during or post-conflict situations, but also as an on-going process
to harness the military preparedness of the country and its national security.
Further, it is apparent that the psychological and occupational issues faced by the
soldiers of Sri Lanka Army had direct impact on developing PTSD in post-conflict
and those issues should be clearly identified in order to formulate long-term policies
and strategies to mitigate problems in the future. Finally, there should be a proper
healthcare system to contain the prevalence of PTSD with medical treatment.
Since PTSD is high among the combat military personnel studied in this study,
a large-scale screening programme for PTSD among the armed forces should be
conducted to identify the victims with PTSD and appropriate treatment should be
provided. This will help minimise the consequence of PTSD among the combat
military personnel and lead to better preparedness of the army. It will thus enable to
maintain the required combat power while maintaining a robust national security.
High levels of addiction to substances were seen among this study population.
Therefore, a detailed risk assessment of these risky behaviours should be done
among the military personnel at the national level. The prevalence of PTSD should
be assessed in terms of officers of the Sri Lanka Army as well, because officers
played a vital role in leading the men in the battlefront during the war.
exposed to direct battle should be regarded with due respect; giving them more
opportunities and welfare facilities to bring back their aggressive minds to peaceful
conditions. Moreover, after conducting a proper screening, army personnel with
PTSD or adjustment disorders should be treated accordingly and proper awareness
programmes to be launched at national level. Moreover, due respect should be paid
to those who are diagnosed with PTSD to mitigate this problem in the future. They
should also be included in compensation programmes implemented by Sri Lanka
Army, several governmental and non-governmental institutions/organisations.
In addition, while understanding the other factors influencing the level of PTSD
among the combat military personnel, a proper yardstick or mechanism should
be included in the planning process of military operations to lower the soldiers’
threshold for tolerance of mental casualties.
It is high time for the Government of Sri Lanka, together with its armed forces, to
establish a National Centre for PTSD. At the same time, the number of qualified
military counsellors and psychiatrists should be increased; and they have to provide
their service in a decentralised system where everyone gets an equal opportunity.
Finally, a comprehensive cohort analysis with adequate samples size should be
conducted to identify the actual association and impact of these risk factors with
PTSD among combat military personnel at the national level.
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Sanath De Silva
ABSTRACT
Deterrence is an evolving concept which has many facets. Out of all the concepts on
deterrence, nuclear deterrence is the most significant because it was able to transform
the objective of warfare from winning to prevention of all-out conflict. The main purpose
of nuclear deterrence is not to fight but to achieve peace and stability through coercion.
Nuclear deterrence was useful to prevent wars among major powers during the Cold
War period. After the end of the Cold War, the politics among nations took a different
shape. Due to the complexities in the international system, scholars have argued that the
contemporary deterrence relations among states are producing uncertainty and are more
prone to produce conflict. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the 21st century
deterrence behaviors of nuclear powers that are playing a key role in shaping the security
atmosphere of different geographical regions. This paper attempts to trace the salient
features that contribute to uncertain deterrence relations among nuclear nations.
Keywords: Deterrence, Instability, War
INTRODUCTION
Warfare is as old as human history. However, this paper is not about investigating
the history of warfare. Instead, the author wants to scrutinise the concept of
deterrence and its utility in preventing warfare. If the sheer destructive capacity of
the conventional weapons possessed by states were proven an effective deterrent
during the first half of the 20th century, the two world wars would not have taken
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 21
place. The invention of nuclear weapons transformed the objective of warfare from
winning to prevention of all-out war. After the nuclear attacks in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, states realised that it is difficult to fight with a nuclear power and win
without incurring considerable damage to the aggressor. The destruction caused, led
to the pause of warfare among great powers after the end of the Second World War.
This understanding can be illustrated as the psychological foundation of modern
day nuclear deterrence. Deterrence further modified the behaviour of the militarily
strong states against each other. During the Cold War period super powers fought
proxy wars but avoided direct confrontation. The stability or absence of direct
war between super powers due to deterrence was later conceptualised as ‘negative
peace’ by IR scholars (Galtung, 1996).
Deterrence was a state-to-state equation during the Cold War period (1945-
1991) and non-state actors hardly figured in this equation. The collapse of the
Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in
the international system. The political atmosphere of the 21st century is volatile,
uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). In this backdrop, the credibility
of rational deterrence between states is no longer stable. The interest shown by
non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons has made the situation even worse.
International Relations analysts raise the question as to whether the concept of
deterrence has the desired credibility of stabilising power rivalries and preventing
war within the contemporary international system.
Deterrence has its roots in the Realist School of political thought. The Realist School
of scholars promote Balance of Power (BoP) as the key requirement for peace.
Deterrence by virtue of nuclear weapons grabbed more attention of IR scholars
during the Cold War period. “Deterrence was first explicitly formulated as a strategic
concept during the Cold War because defense against nuclear weapons appeared
futile” (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2014, p.1). The core logic of functional deterrence
during the 20th century evolved around Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD),
the First Strike Capability and the maintenance of Minimum Credible Deterrence
(Kapur, 2007). As technology advanced, the second strike capability supported by
the idea of massive retaliation emerged as a vital component of a nuclear strategy.
No rational leader would think of using a nuclear weapon if there is a possibility of
the adversary using another nuclear weapon in retaliation. The 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis was a classic example of Cold War deterrence functionality. Even though the
nuclear threshold was not crossed during the Cuban Missile Crisis, many argued
that it was the narrowest margin of a nuclear war. The uncertainty and the able
diplomacy signified the credibility of the deterrence matrix of that era. The Cold
War ended thirty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but nuclear proliferation did
not recede as many had expected. Instead the second nuclear age emerged as a
persistent reality.
22 Sanath De Silva
The 21st Century has presented us the most complicated deterrence relations. Cross-
domain deterrence is such a concept. The inventions of new military technology
and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) such as cyber warfare or anti-satellite
and space-based weapons have made drastic changes in the traditional domains
of deterrence (Manzo, 2012). These domains could apply across deterrence since
they are overlapping with each other and connected with civilian infrastructure.
Therefore, deterrence is not a ‘fit-for-all-framework’. In deterrence analysis, every
region and actor should be regarded as a special entity which possesses its own
strategic characteristics. The United States Nuclear Posture Review (USNPR,
2018), identifies this new development under the concept of ‘tailored deterrence’.
1 As per UNDP definition the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are a universal call to
action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity.
2 As per the UN definition the UN regular budget provides funding for the General Assembly,
the Secretariat, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the International
Court of Justice. Additionally, the regular budget provides partial funding for certain
UN agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN
Environment Programme.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 23
Therefore, our subject matter, the nature and uncertainty of nuclear deterrence in
the 21st century, is different from region to region and actor to actor. The following
map on world nuclear forces clearly depicts that, except Russia and the United
States, others possess comparatively small nuclear weapon stockpiles. The concept
of balance of power postulates that the nuclear power is equally distributed among
rivals so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. The existence
of two states with an enormous stockpile of weapons and many others with a few,
shows an imbalance rather than a balance of power.
USA is the strongest member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NATO also has two other nuclear powers – the United Kingdom and France – as
prominent members. USA and NATO always operated hand-in-hand in achieving
their common security goals. Both parties are capable of practicing the concept of
‘extended deterrence’ which is the capability of NATO nuclear forces to deter attack
on their allies and thereby reassure them with security (Bush et al., 2010).
24 Sanath De Silva
Senior and experienced diplomats of the USA and USSR were instrumental in
developing a mature diplomatic culture in the realm of nuclear weapons during
the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Americans helped the
Russians to dismantle a portion of their nuclear weapons stockpile. That was
a good example of the responsible behaviour of two powers in order to ensure
nuclear security during the winds of change (US Department of State Archive,
2001-2009).
However, the power rivalry between the USA and Russia did not disappear with the
end of the Cold War. After a few years of rapprochement particularly under Yeltsin,
Russia began to reassert itself and the old rivalry resurfaced. The resurgence of new
Russia under Vladimir Putin was able to hold the fort against USA-led NATO. In this
new context, Russians considered NATO’s extended role in the European Union
as a factor that threatens Russia’s sphere of influence in the Eastern Europe (Colby,
2016). USA has the global military superiority of conventional forces. Russia is the
only nuclear power that can have an equal status-quo against the nuclear strength
of the USA. The USA backed 1999 expansion of the NATO forces in Eastern Europe
was seen as a grave threat against the security of the Russia. Since the Russian
deterrence thinking is guided by its defensive mentality, this move by NATO made
Russia believe it is surrounded by enemies. The establishment of nuclear defence
systems close to the Russian border by NATO forces created a further anxiety in the
minds of Russian strategic elites.
Ukraine’s role is very crucial in shaping the behavior of the Russian nuclear
deterrence. Since Ukraine is geographically located as a buffer state between Russia
and Eastern Europe, Russians were very eager to have a pro-Russian regime in
Ukraine. When Ukraine started aligning more towards NATO, Russia became
nervous. The forceful annexation of Ukrainian territory, “Crimea”, by Russia in
2014, escalated the tension within the strategic circles of Europe and the USA.
The USA established an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system ‘Aegis Ashore’ in 2016
in Eastern Europe. As per USA's strategic justification, it was placed to protect
the European allies against new nuclear perpetrators such as Iran. However, it
is obvious that this new ABM system is located too close to Moscow. It has the
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 25
Another disturbing factor for Russia is that the NATO nuclear defence site will be
commanded by an American military officer. It was seen as a humiliating threat
against Russia’s national interest. It is also observed that the Russian political
leadership uses this NATO threat to boost nationalism within Russia. Further,
the existing situation was used to justify the recent increase of Russia’s defence
allocation to modernise its nuclear forces.
Both USA and Russia are presently engaged in a nuclear weapons modernisation
programme which is aimed at increasing the delivery capacity of the nuclear
weapons. (USNPR, 2018). Along with NATO’s expansion in the European Union,
both USA and Russia have shown an interest in deploying more tactical weapons to
deter each other that makes a nuclear war more plausible. If the situation escalates to
the level of triggering the conflict at the conventional level, they might not hesitate
to use the tactical nukes against each other’s strategic targets as super artillery. The
US Ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, warned Russia about violating
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement of 1987. She further
3 A long-range, all-weather, guided missile, which uses low speed aerodynamics and aims
terrestrial targets that remains in the atmosphere.
26 Sanath De Silva
stated, “we would be looking at the capability to take out a (Russian) missile that
could hit any of our countries,” (Marcus, 2018, para 07). Rhetoric of this nature
could pass the nuclear threshold between the two countries. Only a carefully and
professionally maintained credible deterrence strategy will be able to prevent such
a global catastrophe.
China is a nuclear power that is rapidly developing its nuclear capabilities. Chinese
President Xi Jinping has stated that China will complete the modernisation of its
armed forces by 2035 under the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) initiative.
He further stated that the Chinese military will be a first tier military force by the
year 2050 (Peng, 2017). The new road-mobile strategic Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) and the new multi-warhead version of its DF5 silo-based ICBM are
modern inventions of Chinese missile capability. China has also developed a state-
of-the-art ballistic missile with submarine-launched ballistic capability (SLBM) and
the air launch capability with new strategic bombers. This has established China’s
three-pronged military force structure of land-sea and air launched ‘triad’ capability
(Copp, 2017).
If China would be able to increase its control over the disputed Paracel and Spratly
islands in the future, it would also enable her to increase her capacity to counter-
attack US submarines. China wishes to develop a bastion of its nuclear-armed
submarines in the South China Sea. China has also announced the intention of
an ‘Underwater Great Wall’4 project. The China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC),
4 This is the advanced version of the Sound Surveillance System that USA used against the
Soviet submarines during the cold war.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 27
which is the establishment responsible for designing and building PLAN warships,
is working hard to lay a network of ship and subsurface sensors in order to support
this idea (Bana, 2016).
China is also on the verge of unleashing its modern state-of-the-art ‘Hong-20’ nuclear
bomber with the capacity of carrying over 20 tons of nuclear weapons and also
capable of flying more than five thousand miles without refueling. This Aircraft has
the ability to penetrate the US anti-aircraft defence systems. The launching of this
aircraft will give a new strategic dimension for China’s nuclear triad (Akbar, 2018).
The Chinese nuclear programme has always been responsive to nuclear developments
of the USA. It has also shown an interest in accelerating the nuclear weapons
programme in the recent past. The new Chinese technological developments in the
maritime and air domains will pose a significant threat to US nuclear power in the
Pacific Ocean.
NORTH KOREA
Even before the dust settled after the negotiations in June 2018, US spy agencies have
revealed that Pyongyang is displaying clear signs of resuming its nuclear weapons
programme. (Telegraph, 2018, para 1). The question arises whether North Korea
is negotiating with the United States to genuinely give up its nuclear weapons or
to achieve recognition from the USA as a nuclear power. According to the recently
published US Nuclear Posture Review, it is clear that the US deterrence strategy
on North Korea is to react with maximum clout if North Korea happens to be the
first user of nuclear power against the USA or its allies and partners. According
to the strategic community of the US, such aggression from North Korea will be
unthinkable and would result in the end of the North Korean regime (USNPR,
2018). There exists ambiguities among strategic analysts as to whether the USA
could effectively deter the North Korean regime at the negotiation table.
The provocative rhetoric exchanged between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un
escalated to such an extent that both leaders indicated that they would not hesitate
to use their nuclear capabilities against each other, regardless of the consequences. If
USA’s nuclear deterrence is not effective enough to meet the new nuclear threats that
are more complex and demanding (Kühn, 2018), what constitutes the ineffective
deterrence relations between North Korea and USA? It is evident that North Korea’s
behaviour does not fit into the framework of rational deterrence and therefore, it
will seriously affect North Korea’s nuclear relations with other states. The odds are
created due to different strategic cultures and multitudes of other factors. One of
them is the long prevailing internal military structure of North Korea which is called
‘Songun’ or military first doctrine. It has become North Korea’s central strategic
doctrine under the autocratic regime. Under this notion, instability in the minds
of the citizen is a necessary condition of the state’s military strength. Military is the
organisation that will rescue the state from any crisis. Therefore, the military needs
everything that a society could offer in order to protect North Korea from external
threats. Civilians’ sacrifices are necessary to preserve the state that protects them.
In this backdrop it does not make any sense for the military to espouse the idea of
denuclearisation by abandoning the ‘Songun’ doctrine. On the other hand, the USA
does not want to recognise the nuclear weapons capability of a dictatorial regime
as ‘acceptable’ (USNPR, 2018). Such an acceptance would have adversely affected
the super power status of the USA. Therefore, deterring the unacceptable was out
of the picture until North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that had
the capacity of reaching Washington DC. Some scholars argue that the possibility
of using cross-deterrence domains of nonmilitary tools which has a bearing on
rational deterrence by the USA is a credible option against North Korean tenacious
nuclear behavior. The nuclear rhetoric exchanged between the two countries in
the recent past has tested the ‘strategic patience’ of the superpower. However, the
decision of the two countries to resort to diplomacy, and come to the negotiation
table was helpful in reducing the tensions of the Korean peninsula.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 29
The nuclear deterrence in South Asia in the 21st century between India and Pakistan
is known to be the most volatile and vulnerable of all the situations. Both India and
Pakistan have rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime based on the favoritism
bestowed upon great states who already possessed the nuclear weapons by the time
of the launch of the treaty. Both countries are of the opinion that the present nuclear
non-proliferation regime is “morally bankrupt and strategically unsound” (Kapur,
2007, p. 4).
James Woolsey, Director of the CIA from 1993 to 95, has predicted that the arms
race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for the
future use of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons (Bhaskar,
2015). The close proximity and the border dispute over Kashmir between the
two states have made their relations more complex and volatile. According to
a quantitative study carried out by Paul Kapur, it is revealed that the advent of
nuclear weapons have significantly destabilised the subcontinent. His research
findings further reveal that “military disputes were nearly four times common after
India’s and Pakistan’s achievement of nuclear capability than they were when South
Asia was non-nuclear, and progressing proliferation was positively co-related with
increasing levels of conflict through 1972-2002” (Kapur, 2007, p. 33).
India and Pakistan havetepped in to conflict in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999.
However, the two countries were able to avoid war under the nuclear shadow of
the 21st century. It can be observed that the evolving strategic cultures and nuclear
command philosophies of the two states are showing hostile characteristics against
each other. The ‘No First Use policy’ (NFU) that has been the basis of deterrence
relationship between the two states has been put under a litmus test in the recent
past. The evolving nature of nuclear command structure is one such threat to NFU.
Due to the dominance of the military in politics, the Pakistani nuclear command
has shown more militarily influence than India. Despite the commitment towards
the NFU, the Indian command structure has also shown signs of favoring more
military involvement. M.V. Ramana (2013) argues that since the first nuclear test,
code named ‘Smiling Buddha,’ Indian military has acquired a gradual control over
the nuclear programme. This may be to ensure rapid response to an enemy attack.
Even though both countries keep their weapons stockpiles not deployed,5 rapid
response is a must to ensure credible deterrence. Therefore, the military involvement
is needed in order to increase the operational value of the weapons if the need for
a retaliation arises. In case of such a situation, only the military knows how to
effectively place nuclear weapons in war plans in order to take accurate targets. As
the tension develops, militaries might prefer to adapt ‘Launch on Warning’ (LOW)
doctrine as their retaliation principle in the absence of a second strike capability.
The LOW doctrine enables a state to launch a preemptive nuclear attack just after
receiving a definite warning of an enemy nuclear attack. In such a scenario the
retaliation launch will be executed, while the enemy missiles are in the air, before it
detonates on the target. If the information of the first strike is not reliable or if the
decision makers had to act on unreliable rumors, South Asia could end up in an
unnecessary nuclear catastrophe. According to Ramana (2003) it is revealed by the
late Indian president Abdul Kalam that during operation ‘Poorna Vijay’ the armed
forces were training to use nuclear weapons. He further stated that Raj Chengappa,
a senior journalist at India Today has written that during the Kargill War, a partial
control of the nuclear weapons were handed over to the military (Ramana, 2003)
The Indian ‘Cold Start’ strategy has also put NFU in danger and it has made Pakistan
seek tactical nuclear weapons to counter such a threat. The idea of the ‘Cold Start’
doctrine was launched by operation Parakram, after the terrorist attack on Indian
Parliament on December 2001. ‘Cold Start’ is a strategy that enables the Indian Army
to develop a credible retaliatory option along the Indo-Pakistani border by using the
conventional military capability. Cold Start operations will deploy a division-sized
formation that is capable of short-noticed operations against the terrorist targets in
the Pakistani territory (Ladwig III, 2017). Pakistan, by adopting the ‘full spectrum
deterrence policy’ has shown very clearly that it will choose to adopt the first use
of the nuclear option against India in escalation of such a conventional military
environment. Pakistan has already developed a tactical nuclear weapon called Haft
IX or Nsar. As the pressure mounts between the two camps, some Indian security
elites have questioned the credibility of the use of NFU as a stabiliser. The former
Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, expressing his personal view has stated
that the NFU is not useful to deter Pakistan anymore (Singh, 2016).
Kapur (2007) argues that, in a way, Pakistan wants to maintain the uncertainty of
nuclear attacks against India in order to make the nuclear deterrence more credible
since it prevents India from launching a full scale conventional attack against
Pakistan. It is not a very encouraging sign for the rest of the region to see the
nuclear powers signaling of their preparedness to cross the nuclear threshold.
The Jewish state has not officially declared the possession of nuclear weapons.
However, it is a well-known fact that Israel is in possession of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the deterrence policy of Israel is called ‘ambiguous retaliation’. Israel
is heavily threatened by the surrounding Arab states. If the state has to face a
significant conventional attack from the neighbours, it is likely that the nuclear
card will be played by Israel.
Iran is also seeking nuclear weapons since it sees Israel as a threat to its national
interest. The US-Iran nuclear deal which was initiated by Barrack Obama was
a commendable initiative to curb the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
However, the incumbent US President, Donald Trump has withdrawn from the
nuclear deal. He believes that unsanctioned Iran would strengthen the status of anti-
American actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. However, with the US withdrawal
from the treaty, the restrictions on the nuclear non-proliferation commitment and
taboo on weapon grade enrichment of nuclear substance have been removed. In
the new circumstances Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has ordered the Iran’s
atomic energy authority to be prepared to start their industrial enrichment without
limitations (CNN, 2018). There is a danger of Iran re-starting the nuclear weapons
program. In such a scenario, other states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia will also
seek for the absolute weapon, to safeguard their national interest, which will further
result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
The latest Russian establishment of S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system in
Syria has also created tension in the Middle East. Especially the USA and Israeli
camps are expected to counter this missile threat sooner or later. This system has the
launching power of 400kms and proved to be one of the most efficient long-range
anti-aircraft SAMs in present times. These unfolding events show that Middle East is
more prone to nuclear proliferation in the future than any other geographic region.
32 Sanath De Silva
TERRORIST THREAT
Terrorists have not been able to deter states by using a nuclear option so far.
However, the grave danger of terrorist organisation acquiring a nuclear weapon
cannot be totally ruled out. Religious fundamentalism of terrorist groups defies the
rational thinking behind terrorism. Some fundamental terrorist organisations want
to portray that acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction against capitalists
as an Islamic religious duty. “Al Qaeda’s leaders yearn to acquire and use the WMD
against the United States. If they acquired a nuclear bomb, they would not hesitate
to use it. Indeed, such an attack would be meant to serve as a sort of sequel to the
9/11 plot” (Larssen, 2010, para 2).
The terrorist threat looms large especially in the context of South Asian nuclear
weapons. The “Trump administration is worried that nuclear weapons and material
in Pakistan could end up into the hands of terror group and the concerns are
aggravated by the development of tactical weapon” (Economic Times, 2017, Para
01). Neither India nor Pakistan are parties to the IAEA-NPT safeguards. There
are many cases of nuclear theft reported in both India and Pakistan. Pakistani
media points out that “according to international media reports there are 25 cases
of ‘missing’ or ‘stolen’ radio-active material reported in India. Fifty-two per cent of
the cases were attributed to theft and rest is a mystery” (Dawn, 2018 July 16, Para,
02). If these stolen material have gone into the hands of terrorists it will increase
the danger of a terrorist inventing a nuclear weapon. The non-state actors obtaining
the nuclear capability will change the dynamics of deterrence and further increase
uncertainty. If a terrorist organization acquires nuclear capability, how they would
apply the rational thinking to the deterrence matrix is still an unsolved puzzle.
CONCLUSION
Even though nuclear weapons helped prevent major wars among great powers for
decades after the Second World War, the context of contemporary deterrence seems
uncertain. The present context has become more complex with the increasing
danger of nuclear proliferation among developing states and unpredictability of the
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 33
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SUSTAINABLE FINANCIAL PRODUCTIVITY
OF SRI LANKA AIR FORCE IN UN
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
ABSTRACT
Continuous improvement in the quality of the peacekeeping missions is one of the main
aims of United Nations (UN) as well as the Troop Contributing Country (TCC) where
developing countries like Sri Lanka has extra concern about the financial aspect of
taking part in peacekeeping missions. Hence, this paper examines whether Sri Lanka Air
Force Aviation Contingents deployed in the United Nations peacekeeping missions have
utilised the resources committed for these missions in the most productive way in the
process of achieving the interests of three parties involved in this endeavor i.e. for UN,
Host Country and the TCC or if not, to figure out the reasons and make recommendations
for the way forward.
Keywords: Financial Productivity, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS),
UN Mission in Republic of Central Africa (MINUSCA)
INTRODUCTION
Under these circumstances, the deployment of military aviation assets can contribute
decisively towards successful achievement of the Mission’s mandate. Apparently, to
fulfil the above requirements, UN has no standing military or police force of its own.
Member states are asked to contribute military and police personnel and equipment
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 37
required for each operation (UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Aviation Manual,
2015). This service provision takes place on two documents called ‘Memorandum
of Understanding’ (MOU) and ‘Letter of Assist’ (LOA) that includes terms and
conditions which the UN and Troop Contributing Country (TCC) shall agree upon.
Sri Lanka being a member of the UN has been playing a pivotal role in contributing
troops for UN peacekeeping missions since 1960. With the conclusion of three-
decade long conflict, there has been a significant increase of commitment towards
UN peacekeeping by Sri Lankan Armed Forces. Sri Lanka deployed troops for UN
peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, and gradually expanded its
support to UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2005, UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2010, UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
(UNISFA) in 2012, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014 and UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2017. Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF)
first deployed personnel to serve the UN peacekeeping missions with MINUSTAH
in year 2005 and presently operates its aviation contingent in MINUSCA since
September 2014 and UNMISS since June 2015. The SLAF contingents in South
Sudan and Central Africa consist of 35 Officers and 179 other ranks which provide
long term helicopter services to the UN peacekeeping activities.
UN peacekeeping missions are becoming one of the major sources of foreign income
generators, especially to developing countries in the South Asian region. During the
period from 2004 to 2012, it was estimated that the earnings of UN peacekeeping
missions of Sri Lanka exceeds 161 million USD (Sri Lanka Army, 2018). The
Government of Sri Lanka is keen on expanding its contribution more towards UN
peacekeeping missions as it is a considerable contribution to the foreign income
(President’s Office, 2015).
Sri Lanka, being an active member of the UN, contributes its troops to the UN
peacekeeping missions with the broad objective of using this as a platform to
keep the image of the country high in international arena as the consequences of
the three-decade long conflict Sri Lanka had experienced still raises a number of
38 Squadron Leader Nuwan Premarathne
questions on the credibility and accountability of our Armed Forces (Providing for
Peacekeeping, 2017). Therefore, this is an opportunity for Sri Lanka to convince
the world that its Armed Forces possess a wealth of experience in war fighting and
they are professional and credible in conflict management.
Sri Lanka, like many other Troop Contributing Countries, consider UN Peacekeeping
Missions a win-win situation for the UN, TCC and the Host Country since careful
management of resources would enhance economic benefits to the TCC while
assisting the UN to demonstrate its mandate. Since this is one of the major sources
of foreign exchange, the Government of Sri Lanka expects more contributions in
the future for UN peacekeeping missions (President’s Office, 2015).
Moreover, these benefits are felt in the short-term, the mid-term and the long-term.
For example, the financial gains to individual soldiers or the TCC as a whole are
short-term benefits, while the reputation earned through praiseworthy engagement
and demand generated through such background for more deployments is a mid-
term benefit. Besides, working with the UN entails exposure to an environment
where maintenance of globally accepted standards is expected. By engaging in
UN peacekeeping missions on a regular basis, troops would be exposed to an
environment where they value and instil those standards (Best Practices) in their
personal and professional lives, which intern would create long-term advantages in
uplifting Sri Lanka’s domestic conditions to globally accepted levels. Therefore, it is
an opportunity Sri Lanka has to repeatedly capitalise on.
However, when the TCC is deploying its contingents far away outside its territory,
they have to face numerous challenges which impede achieving the expected
objectives. As the contingent is operating in an unknown hostile terrain, which is
located more than 5,000 kilometres away from the TCC, maintenance of effective
lines of communication has become a difficult task. Hence, these difficulties have
affected the productivity of those missions in a negative way that could in turn
create a deficiency in financial gains for the Government of Sri Lanka. Besides,
countries like Sri Lanka cannot negate the financial aspect of engaging in UN
missions, as it is the most decisive factor in determining the country’s long-term
sustainability in these missions. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate how best
such resources could be utilised to maximise financial gains from UN peacekeeping
missions. Therefore, Sri Lanka Air Force being a prominent actor in this effort, has
the responsibility of conducting a proper evaluation and identifying pros and cons
of the prevailing system in order to ensure the sustainability of these missions.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 39
UN peacekeeping missions have become one of the most lucrative foreign currency
earning platforms for most South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India and
Pakistan. As per the official website of UN Peacekeeping, presently Bangladesh
remains within the top most contributors (fourth) of troops and police (6,772) for
UN peacekeeping missions and its annual earnings for 2012-13 is 72 million USD
(Providing for Peacekeeping, 2017). According to the 2014 report by the Asian
Centre for Human Rights, at the UN standard rate, Bangladesh Army personnel
earned upwards of USD 2,200 for an officer and USD 1,100 for a soldier per
month in addition to other allowances and perks in the year 2013. During the
period 2001 to 2010, Bangladesh received USD 1.28 billion as compensation for
its peacekeeping operations (Providing for Peacekeeping, 2017). Furthermore, the
income over expenditure of Bangladesh UN Peacekeeping missions during the last
five years depicted a balance of USD 755.10 million according to the Bangladesh
Armed Forces Division.
Sri Lanka remained as the 39th contributor to UN missions and the total number
of peacekeepers inclusive of staff officers, deployed as at December 2017 is 563.
However, proper evaluation on the expenditure on UN missions and income
generated through the same has not been published by the government to date.
By contrast to the Bangladesh military, the strength of Sri Lankan armed forces are
higher and it shows the potential Sri Lanka has in this field as a means of generating
foreign income. Hence, optimum use of this opportunity will be a definite advantage
in time to come since UN requires more troops for its peacekeeping missions due to
on-going crises in various regions in the world. Optimum utilisation of opportunity
would be feasible only if the resources are managed productively. Therefore,
identifying parameters affecting financial productivity is of utmost importance to
gain maximum output from the inputs/investments for future UN peacekeeping
missions.
The reputation of defeating one of the world’s most ruthless terrorist outfits and the
experience of Sri Lankan armed forces in combating counter insurgency situations
is a unique advantage that no other Troop Contributing Country can match in the
present context. In addition, UN peacekeeping missions are an excellent platform
for SLAF pilots, crew and the supporting troops to demonstrate their domestic
experience with confidence at the international level.
Further to the above, the enthusiasm and the encouragement given by GOSL in
contributing more peacekeepers to UN missions is also a plus point in the present
context. Accordingly, at the time of writing, SLAF is in the process of deploying
Aviation Contingents consisting of four Mi 17 aircraft with 162 troops in MINUSMA
in 2018 and has the potential of committing more troops for these missions (SLAF
UN Missions Cell, 2018). With special reference to participation of women soldiers
for UN deployments, SLAF is yet to exploit the opportunities bridging the gap of
equal participation of women in UN peacekeeping missions (UN Resolution 1325;
United Nations).
The contribution of troops for UN missions is being done through a unique system
which was adopted as per the UN charter by the United Nations Department for
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) with a mutual agreement between the TCC
and the UN which is identified as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or
Letter of Assist (Shameem, 2007).
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 41
Lease of major equipment for UN has two categories namely; Dry Lease and
Wet Lease (Shameem, 2007). Dry Lease means a contingent owned equipment
reimbursement system where the troops/police contributor provides equipment to
the mission and the UN assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment. The
troop/police contributor is reimbursed for the unavailability of its military resources
for its national interest of deployed major and associated minor equipment.
SLAF has earned 38.7 million USD through flying hours and 30.17 million USD
as the reimbursement for major equipment while earning 30.41 million USD for
maintaining self-sustainment equipment of its aviation contingents in UNMISS
and MINUSCA from their inception to September 2018 (SLAF UN Missions Cell,
2018).
7%
7%
Flying Income
Major Equipment
Self Sustainment
86%
SLAF being one of the service providers of aviation contingents to the UN, has
flown 4084.51 flying hours in UNMISS (from June 2015 to September 2018)
generating an income of 17.40 million USD (see Figure 2 below) and 4994.83
flying hours in MINUSCA (from September 2014 to September 2018) generating
an income of 21.28 million USD (see Figure 3 below) only by utilising six Mi 17
utility aircrafts. SLAF has contributed 454 troops to MINUSCA and 312 troops to
UNMISS, generating an income of 11.22 million USD since the inception of these
two missions.
In addition to the above, the income earned through COE and self-sustainability of
these two Aviation Contingents amounts to 27.27million USD as at September 2018.
In comparison to the income, the total expenditure incurred on SLAF contingents
from their initial deployment (excluding cost of aircraft), COE equipment and troop
rotation amounts to 29.10 million USD as at September 2018. Therefore, these
statistics indicate that the SLAF is reaching the breakeven in terms of its financial
inputs and outputs where careful analysis is required on the resources committed
for these missions as well as the future of UN peacekeeping involvements.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 43
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
2015 2016 2017 2018
(Jun) (Sep)
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(Sep) (Sep)
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(Sep) (Sep)
Besides, there are several factors that have negative impacts when taking advantage
of the potential Sri Lanka has which in turn affect the SLAF as one of the major
contributors from Sri Lanka towards UN Peacekeeping Missions.
Haque (2001), further points out that maintenance also plays a vital role in reaching
the optimum level of productivity in UN missions. On the other hand, income
earned through the conducting of flying missions is the main portion of income that
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 45
represents 86.06 percent of total revenue earned by the SLAF through UN missions.
Terrain conditions, extensive flying etcetera are the main reasons which demands
a higher level of maintenance standards in UN peacekeeping missions. Therefore,
the achievement of flying hours depends on the serviceability of the helicopters
where maintenance plays a key role in this aspect. However, unavailability of repair
and overhaul facilities within the African Region has become a major setback in the
efficient and effective maintenance of aircrafts.
Administrative procedures and the application of local rules and regulations for
SLAF UN deployments will also have a direct bearing on the smooth functioning of
the mission. Procedures to be followed must be flexible and convenient to handle
due to the length in the lines of communication and field conditions. Strict and
lengthy procedures adopted in normal government procurement systems would
create unnecessary delays that would result in more financial losses. Introducing
novel systems suitable to the nature of these missions through the careful analysis
of critical incidents will be highly effective in future deployments.
Another factor that affects the financial productivity is the strength of troops/COE
in a mission area and the number of deployments within a region. Increasing
personnel/COE in a mission area would affect mainly at the initial deployment.
Hence, it can be considered as a fixed cost. However, the income generated through
increased strength will continue to generate income for a longer period. Hence,
input to output ratio will decline gradually as time passes. Similarly, if SLAF can
increase the number of missions deployed within a particular region, that would
result in reducing the maintenance cost significantly. For example, if SLAF uses its C
130 aircraft for replenishment purposes of SLAF UN missions in the African Region,
when the number of deployments within the region increases, arrangements can be
made to cater to the requirements of the number of deployments with one sortie
rather than conducting a number of sorties, thereby reducing the cost per unit.
In addition to the above, the following issues have also been identified as major
barriers in achieving financial productivity in SLAF UN peacekeeping missions;
with damages which can be rectified in the mission area. However, complexity and
duration of the prevailing government procurement procedures have caused delays
in repairing of this aircraft, thereby resulting considerable losses of revenue that
could have been earned through flight hours. As per the report on Experts Visit to
Bangladesh 2018 published by the SLAF UN Missions Cell, Bangladesh Air Force
(BAF) has addressed this issue by establishing a separate Directorate of Overseas
Air Operations that will coordinate and carry out all the functions relating to BAF
UN peacekeeping missions.
The dearth of pilots and crew is another major issue which cannot be effectively
solved within a short span of time. As a result, pilots and members of aircrew
have to engage in UN peacekeeping missions on a regular basis, thereby generating
unintended problems in their family lives and in their domestic frontier. This leads
to a loss of motivation which in turn affects the output of individuals. This aspect
was especially highlighted by experts and participants of SLAF UN peacekeeping
missions during their interviews.
The paper evaluated key areas that needed to be addressed in maximising the
financial productivity of SLAF UN missions with special emphasis on SLAF UN
peacekeeping mission in South Sudan and Central African Republic. The topic
was chosen to identify the factors affecting the financial productivity of SLAF UN
peacekeeping missions and identifying avenues to maximise the financial return
by minimising cost and maximising the income within the framework set by the
MOU/LOA.
It is also important to enter into agreements with nations in close proximity to the
mission area or having aviation contingents capable of carrying out major repair
and overhaul work which are operating within the same region in order to obtain
repair and overhaul services for SLAF aviation contingents.
Conducting schedule flight using aircraft such as C 130 in fixed periodical stages
would reduce the cost of delivering items in an ad hoc manner. On the other hand,
it would increase the promptness in logistical support to the mission area.
Giving due consideration to the make of items which are available in both the
host country and Sri Lanka will enable speedy acquisition of spares and to get the
repairs done and to reduce the cost incurred on transportation as well.
Making brand new quality items available for new deployments is important in
determining the quality of a contingent. When analysing the UN peacekeeping
missions, most of the missions continue for a long period. Therefore, deployment
of worn out/obsolete vehicles and other major equipment would incur losses on
reimbursement due to frequent unserviceabilities and non-conformity to agreed
standards in MOU/LOA.
Increasing the number of helicopters deployed in the mission area was another
recommendation that was unearthed. It would benefit in multiple ways as
the operational cost of an aircraft will be reduced while it increases the income
generated. However, it should be subjected to the availability of pilots, crew and
other staff.
A proper needs assessment and a system to purchase required items such as spare
parts of vehicles and other major equipment through local agents of the host
country would reduce unnecessary delays in getting serviceable items and reducing
the cost involved in transporting them from Sri Lanka.
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Contingent Owned Equipment Manual of United Nations (2015) United Nations Dag
Hammarskjold Library [online]. Available from: https://bit.ly/2RmxYyb [Accessed 05th
March 2017].
Global Peace Operations Review Annual Compilation (2016) Global Peace Operations Review
[online]. Available from: https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
data_Current-UN-PKO-Durations-11-April-Update_1000x623.png [Accessed 16th April
2017].
Haque, R. (2001) Research on UN Peacekeeping Mission Logistic Planning & Source. Google
Books [online]. Available from https://books.google.lk/books [Accessed 02nd August 17].
MOU on United Nations Mission in South Sudan - UNMISS (2016). Sri Lanka Air Force,
UN Missions Cell.
Presidential Secretariat, Sri Lanka (2015) Sri Lanka reiterates continued commitment to
UN peacekeeping. Presidential Secretariat, Sri Lanka [online]. Available from http://www.
presidentsoffice.gov.lk/?p=1400 [Accessed 05th June 2017].
Shameem, M. (2007) Evolution of the contract management process in the United Nations for
acquiring peacekeeping operations/services. Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 49
Sri Lanka Army (2018) Directorate of Overseas Operations in the Army Established to
Overcome All Issues & Challenges. Sri Lanka Army: Defenders of the Nation [online]. Available
from: http://www.army.lk/news/directorate-overseas-operations-army-established-
overcome-all-issues-challenges [Accessed on 05th May 2018].
United Nations (2002) Women Peace and Security. United Nations [Online]. Available from:
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/womenpeaceandsecurity.pdf [Accessed 21st August
2017].
United Nations (2008) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.
United Nations [online]. Available from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/
capstone_eng_0.pdf [Accessed 10th February 2017].
United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Aviation Unit Manual (2015). [online]
Available from: http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89591/United%20
Nations%20Peacekeeping%20Missions%20Military%20Aviation%20Manual.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 26th March 2017].
United Nations Peacekeeping (2017) Troops and Police Contributors. United Nations
Peacekeeping [online]. Available from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/
summary_of_troop_contributing_countries_by_ranking.pdf [Accessed 10th June 2017].
Ashan Wickramasinghe
ABSTRACT
The dawn of the new millennium, when the calendar changed from the year 1999 to
2000, the entire world celebrated with a rather substantial religious undertone. For much
of the world with any semblance of Christian heritage, the New Year was a celebration of
the birth of a 2000 year-old messiah. A cursory analysis of the last few decades will show
groups of varying religions having similar outpourings of religious sentiments throughout
the world. However, an investigation of literature from the 17th century to the early
part of the 20th century would indicate concerted efforts on the part of the academic
and political establishments to consign God, and any other notion of a higher power
or supernatural reality, to the depths of human memory. Thus, modern day religious
beliefs should have joined Zeus, Thor and Ra in the Cemetery for Dead Religions, with
humanity entering a post-religious era of reason and enlightenment. Instead, religion is
resurgent. Consequently, this paper studies the nature of this religious renaissance and
the impact it is having in undoing centuries of international efforts to segregate faith from
State affairs.
Keywords: Religion, Secularism, State
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1960s, sociologist Peter Berger (1968) predicted that ‘religious believers
are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide
secular culture’. Similarly, in 1966, the TIME magazine printed on its cover, ‘Is God
Dead?’ echoing German philosopher Friedrich Nietzche’s sentiment that ‘God is
dead. God remains dead, and we have killed Him’ (Rothman, n.d.). Looking back,
global trends seemed to support the above assertions that religion was, in fact, in
decline. Every religion on every continent seemed to be rapidly losing its influence
on politics, economics, and culture. In religion’s place, ideologies and doctrines that
sought to replace people’s loyalties surged forward with apparently unstoppable
momentum, with ideas of nationalism, socialism and modernism being preached
by personalities such as Fidel Castro, David Ben-Gurion, Gamel Abdel Nasser and
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, with mullahs, monks and priests, with their dogmas,
rites and hierarchies being seemingly relegated to an irrelevant history.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 51
As Linda Woodhead and David Robertson (2012) points out, this perceived
replacement of religion with non-religious ideals, was aptly named the
“Secularisation Thesis” where science or empirical thought would expose the
supernatural as superstition. It was believed that democracy, free thought, free
will, and open expression would allow the ordinary citizen to contest the myths
and doctrines of religious institutions and authorities (Finnis, 2011). But, most
importantly, it was the belief of the secular, that by removing or challenging the
influence of the religious over the political establishment, people would be able to
break the favourite past-time of the powerful: war and violence (Toft, Philpott &
Shah 2011).
Stemming from the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, the 1950s and
60s saw the peak of the Secularisation Thesis with the universities, particularly
in the West, being dominated by the anti-religious intellectual movement. Ideas,
theories and teachings of personalities such as Thomas Jefferson (who edited his
own version of the New Testament by removing any reference to the supernatural
such as Heaven, Hell, Cross and Resurrection), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (who
sought to kill off the French monarchy and the Catholic Church to replace them
with a system of secular thought and culture centred upon the nation) were used to
propagate this mission. Added to this mix were the thoughts of Friedrich Nietzche,
Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber and many others. Secular
thinking dominated the elite sectors in the West and the Western educated elites in
Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
DEFINING RELIGION
The primary focus of this paper is centred on ‘religion’. Scholars and theologians
have debated the issue of defining religion for centuries – and seemingly without
reaching much consensus. ‘Does religion mean the belief in God?’ That would imply
Buddhism, which does not incorporate such a belief, is not a religion. Similarly,
there have been debates on whether religion is only limited to the “big five” global
religions: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. This leaves the
question about what status should be given to Confucianism or the Baha’i faith.
This further adds to the confusion about modern and non-traditional religions
such as Scientology and New Age Spirituality.
4. A distinction between the sacred and the profane, and between ritual acts
and sacred objects.
5. A view that explains both the world as a whole and humanity’s proper
relation to it.
6. A code of conduct in line with that worldview.
7. A temporal community bound by its adherence to these elements.
Though not all religions would share all of the characteristics listed above, all
religions include most of them, such that religion is understood as involving a
combination of belief, behaviour and belonging (to a community).
The similarities notwithstanding, nationalism and religion are not the same. There
are vast and significant differences ranging from helping people to reach their
perceived transcendent realities to answering universal questions about the origins
of existence or life after death. Thus, religion embodies an element that is uniquely
distinct from other ideologies.
RESILIENT RELIGION
The World Network of Religious Futurists (2015), a think tank focusing on the
future of religion, illustrates the world population adhering to Christianity, Islam
and Hinduism increased from 46 percent at the beginning of the 20th century to 65
percent by the beginning of the 21st century. That too, a sharp rise since the 1970s.
It is projected that these religious groups would further increase to 75 percent of
the global population by 2050.
Thus, over the past few decades, religion’s influence on politics has reversed its
decline and become more potent on every continent spanning every major religion.
Breaking the confines to the home, the family, the village, and the place of worship,
religion has come to exert its influence in legislatures, presidential palaces, political
campaigns, military camps, protest rallies, and even jail cells. Once private, religion
is now public. Once passive, religion is now assertive and engaged. Once local, it
is now global.
RESURGENT RELIGION
Considering events in the recent past, religion has resurged, becoming publically
expressive and accepted, shedding centuries of effort to dethrone or dispatch
faith as a source of political authority: be it a resurgent Islam since the Iranian
Revolution; or a Hindu nationalist revival trying to forge the identity of India
as a Hindu nation; or ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel attempting to reshape the
sense of what it means to be a Jew (and impacting the prospects of peace with
Palestine); or the Catholic Church, using its influence throughout the world to
redesign the debate on a woman’s right to choose; or Buddhism, once a religion
of inward spirituality, personal transcendence and political indifference, now on a
domineering nationalist trend with the clergy becoming closely intertwined with
the State and politics (Juergensmeyer, 1993).
A noteworthy condition about all the specimen scenarios described above is that all
these major religions of the world have resurged in their political influence with the
help, rather than the opposition, of the same forces that aimed to secularise them:
democracy, open debate, rapid progress in communication and technology, and the
flow of people, ideas and commerce around the world. For example, media outlets
such as Al-Jazeera help spread doctrines of radical revivalism throughout the Arab
Muslim world (Abdelmoula, 2012). The Internet, the most commonly used tool by
almost every faction, enables religion-inspired ideas about politics to crisscross the
world at lightning speed. Today’s most influential religious groups combine aspects
of modernity and religious orthodoxy to create a new and extremely effective blend.
Religion is, and will continue to be, a vital element in shaping war, peace, terrorism,
democracy, theocracy, authoritarianism, national identities, economic growth and
development, productivity, the rise and contraction of populations, and cultural
54 Ashan Wickramasinghe
values regarding sexuality, marriage, family, the role of women, loyalty to nation and
regime, and the character of education. Religion can be violent and repressive, the
source of civil war, terrorism, and laws that oppress women and minorities. But the
last few decades have shown that religion can also be a destroyer of dictatorships,
an architect of democracy, a facilitator of peace negotiations and reconciliation
initiatives, and a warrior against disease and a defender of human rights. These
many faces of religious politics not only elude simple description, but reveal the
broader reality that religion’s political influence is extremely complex.
ASSERTIVE RELIGION
Flowing from the concepts and ideas discussed above, and looking across history,
major religions and their associated actors have experienced two kinds of shifts
that have brought them great political power (Toft, Philpott & Shah, 2011). The
first is that religious actors have come to enjoy greater institutional independence
from political authorities. In achieving this independence from the structure of
the State, many religious actors have attained greater leverage over the State. The
second shift is where many religious actors have exchanged their relatively passive
political theologies for activist and engaged political theologies. Rather than simply
acquiesce with the ‘powers-that-be’, religious actors have adopted postures that
prescribe divine obligation or to mould politics, and, where necessary, challenge
political authorities to do religiously validated work. Thus, religious actors have
experienced a shift in their proximity to political power and a shift in their theology
of political power.
On the other hand, the 1960s and 70s were also significant since many religious
movements on the side-lines or discredited by political secularism began a political
retaliation. The Roman Catholic Church was rejuvenated with social and political
self-confidence through the Second Vatican Council between 1962-1965, which
led the Church to affirm democracy and religious freedom for all, and to operate as
a legitimate and autonomous actor in the international stage rather than through
pacts with individual governments. Added to this was the charismatic, dynamic
and politically engaged papacy of John Paul II, which amplified the new look of the
Church to the world (Philpott, 2004). Hindu Nationalism, the object of constant
contestation by the secular Congress Party, played a largely assertive and influential
role in politics, winning a considerable portion of the national vote in the 1967
General Election, and helping the coalition in 1977 to defeat Indira Gandhi’s
Congress Party which held power in India since independence (Graham, 1990).
The formation of an Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, inspired Muslim movements
around the world to believe that it was possible to Islamise politics and society
(Geddis, 1990).
In every major religious tradition, leaders and key movements have abandoned an
exclusive focus on spiritual or cultural activity and has taken up political activity
as an integral component of their religious missions. The Muslim Brotherhood
has dropped the a-politicism of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, in favour of direct
political engagement (Toft, Philpott & Shah, 2011); Hindu nationalist elements
in India are organising political parties and other political movements (Hanson,
1999); the Catholic Church is promoting robust clerical and lay activism in
defence of Christian values and conservative Protestants in the United States have
abandoned their long self-isolation and distaste for politics in favour of organised
and sustained social and political activism (Carpenter 1997, Hofstadter 1962); and
influential Buddhist priests in Sri Lanka have called for an end to inactivity on
the part of monks and lay Buddhists and to have robust engagement with politics
(Rahula, 1974).
CONCLUSION
The canvas of international politics that portrays the rise and decline of political
secularism inevitably omits and distorts important events and trends of history as
well as of those to come. The Peace of Westphalia, which brought about a long,
purposeful and dramatic ascension of political secularism, has had to witness
the unquestionable rise of Christian Democracy in the 20th century, particularly
branching off from Western Europe as the dominant world order after World War
II. In fact, since the end of World War II and the 1960s, the structural position of
religious actors vis-à-vis political authorities has undergone a dramatic epochal shift.
Religion-State arrangements have shifted away from integration towards various
forms and degrees of institutional independence, where religious actors enjoy some
de facto or de jure freedom to act independently of State authorities or ideologies.
56 Ashan Wickramasinghe
Sometimes through conflict and struggle, and sometimes through consent and
constitutional change, religious actors have secured considerable autonomy. This
institutional shift has been propelled by the attitudinal and theological changes
where religious actors across all major religious traditions have abandoned passive
obedience in exchange for involvement, mobilisation, opposition and resistance.
The latter half of the 20th century was a general reversal of political secularism,
albeit within some form of political secularism stubbornly holding on, such as
French Laïcité or the Chinese Government’s powerful and effective amalgamation
of Communism, Capitalism and Nationalism. However, the basic international
State system with political secularism, ideologies and regimes is on the defensive. A
movement that seemed to be in the frontline of modern progress at the close of the
19th century, today looks more like a declining and ideologically exhausted empire.
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DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 57
Hanson, T. B. (1999) The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India.
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thesis/.
COLLABORATION BETWEEN SRI LANKA NAVY AND
THE NATIONAL AQUATIC RESOURCES RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY:
CHALLENGES AND THE WAY AHEAD
ABSTRACT
Hydrographic survey is very important for a coastal nation as it ensures the safety of
navigation, effective management, conservation and exploitation of maritime resources.
Information provided from hydrographic surveys support legal obligations and economic
development of a maritime nation. Sri Lanka needs an effective and efficient hydrographic
service in order to fulfil the above because the country is located in a strategically and
economically important location in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Hydrographic survey
activities in the country were undertaken by the National Aquatic Resources Research
and Development Agency (NARA) for more than three decades. In 2015, Sri Lanka Navy
(SLN) and National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency collaborated
in perusing national demands of the hydrography. This study focuses on the collaboration
of Sri Lanka Navy and National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency,
challenges and the way forward in hydrographic survey of the country. The objectives of
this study include identifying national demands in hydrographic survey sector in Sri Lanka
context, examining the collaboration process between SLN and NARA and studying the
Hydrographic capabilities within SLN and NARA. The collaboration significantly influences
the performance of organisations that are in collaboration. Interpersonal relationship,
instrument of collaboration and independence of the organisation are considered as main
influential elements of the collaboration process. Therefore, the collaboration between SLN
and NARA was studied based on these elements. It is observed that collaboration of SLN
and NARA has produced positive results. However, there are few areas, which have to be
improved in order to achieve desired outcomes from a collaboration process and eventually
help in achieving hydrographic demand in Sri Lanka.
Keywords: Hydrography, National Aquatic Resources Research and
Development Agency, Sri Lanka Navy
BACKGROUND
through the southern tip of Sri Lanka that includes 4,500 oil tankers. In other
words, approximately 300 ships pass through the area in a day. Further, Sri Lanka
has a vast sea area of 437,000 sq.km, which is 7.5 times to its land area (Ministry of
Fisheries, 2002). The sea area around the country is believed to be endowed with
natural oceanic and coastal resources (Ismail et al., 1982). For these reasons, the
Government of Sri Lanka has identified the potential in developing the maritime
sector. In order to develop the maritime sector in Sri Lanka, the country must have
adequate information about its seas surrounding the island. In light of this, it is
important for the country to possess a well-established hydrographic service that
provides essential information pertaining to the safety of navigation and all other
marine activities, including economic development, security and defence, scientific
research and environmental protection.
The history of hydrography in Sri Lanka goes back to the colonial era (Sri Lanka
Navy, 2016). It was the British Royal Navy who introduced hydrography to the
country and conducted several hydrographic surveys in the seas around the island.
Some of the data collected back then are still in use when preparing Nautical Charts
by local and foreign hydrographic communities. After independence from the
British, Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) undertook the responsibility of hydrographic survey
duties in and around the country. However, with the onset of national insurgency
in the country, SLN handed over hydrographic related duties and responsibilities
vested upon it to National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency
(NARA) in 1983. Under NARA, hydrographic activities in the country gradually
progressed. NARA is considered the National Hydrographic Office (NHO), which
is the apex body for hydrographic affairs in the country (NHO, 2016). In the
meantime, SLN resumed its hydrography operations again in year 2012 (SLN,
2016). SLN and NARA conducted their hydrographic operations independently
as two entities until 2016. However, on 21 June 2016 both organisations agreed
to work in collaboration in the field of hydrography. Collaboration between these
two organisations is very important to the county because the partnership between
SLN-NARA can achieve national objectives in the field of hydrography.
It has been identified that a great variety of benefits could be received from an
effective functioning of a National Hydrographic Service. Hydrographic information
is vital for the national transport infrastructure and national spatial data structure of
a country. This adds more value to the ever-increasing volume of global maritime
trade. It has been estimated that about 40 percent of the population in the world
live within 100 km from the coast (Connon and Nairn, 2010). As the population-
density is higher in the coastal zone, economic activities are also high within
this region. Therefore, effective management and systematic development of the
coastal zone is vital for the sustainable development of a nation. It is expected
60 Lieutenant Commander Saliya Hemachandra
Most of the international trade in the world is conducted on the sea. More than 80
percent from the total volume and 70 percent of global trade by value are carried
by sea (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2015). Therefore,
maritime commerce is believed to be a potential area that a nation can boost its
economy. However, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) has found
that many areas and ports of the world are not covered by accurate and adequate
nautical charts. Ships require accurate and updated navigational charts for their
safe navigations through the waters and when entering into ports and accessing
other facilities provided by a country. Inadequate charts thus hinder or prevent
efficient and safe maritime transportation. Poorly or inadequately charted areas
cause navigators to seek longer routes or restrict optimum loading conditions of a
ship, which in turn affects overall operational cost of maritime trade (IHO, 2016).
IHO has observed that in the seas around Sri Lanka, and only 8.6 percent of the
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 61
area is adequately surveyed from the total area of waters shallower than 200m
depth contour. When considering the total area of waters deeper than 200m, only
2 Percent is adequately surveyed [Figure 1]. This shows the necessity of a well-
functioning hydrographic organization, which can fill the gap in the future.
Coverage depth less than 200m Coverage depth more than 200m
The coastline and the adjacent sea area is often a dynamic environment due the very
nature of sea wave actions with the shoreline. Frequent monitoring and surveying
of the coastal area is required in order to analyse and assess swift changes taking
place in this environment. Therefore, hydrographic information of the coastal zone,
which are provided in the present day, extends beyond its traditional navigational
purpose. It includes serving other parties like government agencies, coastal
managers, engineers, scientists and various other public and private organizations
to fulfil their specific requirements.
Sri Lanka has a 1,562 km long coastline that surrounds the island. The coast
includes a wide range of geomorphological features like headlands, bays, lagoons,
peninsulas, spits, bars, islets and vast variety of tropical ecosystems connected to
them and the coastline of Sri Lanka is more than 2000 km if the length of the
above features are also considered (Lawry and Wickremeratne, 1988). Therefore,
it is important for the country to possess a database of hydrographic information
of those features in order to manage and conserve the coastal belt effectively and
efficiently. Further, a survey of the coastline will help to reap possible economic
benefits from these areas.
The eastern coast of Sri Lanka especially from Nilaveli to Mulativu is rich in mineral
sand deposits. In Pulmudai, the richest mineral sand deposit is found. Since 1957,
Sri Lanka has been benefitting from these mineral sand deposits, which include
valuable minerals like Ilmenite, Zircon, Rutile, Monosite and Garnet. So far, Lanka
Mineral Sands Limited has produced only 3.5 million metric tons of mineral sands
and exports to Japan, UK, India, and China etcetera. It has been estimated that 12.5
million metric tons of mineral deposits are yet to be exploited in the coastline of this
area (Pieris, 2016). Apart from the eastern coast, the north western and some areas
along the southern coasts are also rich in mineral sand deposits and are considered
to be commercially viable concentrations (Ismail et al., 1982). This indicates the
presence of mineral deposits along the coastal belt of the island and in adjacent
littoral waters as well. Therefore, the country needs to focus on quantifying these
naturally occurring marine mineral deposits by conducting systematic hydrographic
and geological surveys for the country’s economic prosperity.
In November 1994, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
came into force. Article 56 of this Convention discusses the sovereign rights of a
country to explore, exploit, conserve and manage natural living and non-living
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). With this provision, Sri Lanka
has inherited a sea area of 437,000 sq.km, which is 7.5 times the land area of the
country (Ministry of Fisheries, 2002). Delineation of the EEZ is purely based on
hydrographic surveys. Further, it is impracticable for a nation to explore, exploit,
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 63
conserve or manage natural resources in the EEZ without efficient and effective
hydrographic service.
Article 76 of UNCLOS sets the right of a signatory nation to extend its continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and the right of natural resources on the seabed
and subsoil therein (UN, 1997). In order to claim the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles, hydrographic and geologic properties of the sea floor is mandatory.
Sri Lanka has already submitted its claim for the extension of the continental margin
beyond 200 nautical miles based on UNCLOS III, annex II and Article 76 para 8
(See Figure: 2). In the event of acceptance of this submission by the competent
authority, the total sea area Sri Lanka can claim for exploration and exploitation
will be around 23 times that of the total land area of the country. This emphasises
the importance of a well-equipped and potential hydrographic service within the
country in order to gain the desired benefits from the vast sea area.
Sri Lanka is a member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the
country is a signatory to the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS). SOLAS prompts safety of life at seas by a common agreement of principles
and rules among signatory states to the convention. According to revised Chapter
V of SOLAS, which came into force in 2002, the contracting governments are
obliged to provide certain hydrographic services and this provision is in effect under
international treaty law. As per the treaty, contracting governments are obliged to make
necessary arrangements to collect and compile hydrographic data and publications,
disseminate, update necessary nautical information pertaining to waters belonging
to the country in order to ensure safe navigation. This shows the requirement of an
effective hydrographic organisation to realise the legal obligation of the country.
Figure 2: Sri Lanka’s Submission for the Extension of the Continental Shelf
Source: Part I: Executive Summary of Continental Submission of Sri Lanka
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 65
As clearly spelt by the IHO, the National Hydrographic Office is entrusted with the
following:
The NHO is the national authority for hydrographic affairs in a country. The IHO
(2016) has found that in some countries the NHO functions under the state’s navy.
In contrast, in other countries the NHO is found under the ministries of transport,
fisheries, and port authority or as a part of the ministry responsible for infrastructure,
land survey and/or environment. In any circumstance, logistics, other infrastructure
requirements and long-term funding arrangements are important for the smooth
and effective functioning of a Hydrographic Service. When thoroughly examining
the potential and capabilities of SLN and NARA in the Sri Lankan context, it is
observed that both organisations have similar characteristics that is common to
other countries in the wold. NARA is a semi government organisation under the
Ministry of Fisheries and SLN, a national defence force in the country, is under the
Ministry of Defence. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the resources, capabilities
and the potential of both organisations, which will be critical in achieving national
hydrographic demands.
It is learnt that most of the international trade in the world is carried out by sea.
When considering the geographical and strategic location of Sri Lanka in the
Indian Ocean, maritime commerce has been identified as a potential area that the
nation can boost its economy in the present world. In order to develop maritime
commerce, the country needs to build new port facilities and other supporting
infrastructure that attract shipping industries in the world. Further, Sri Lanka is
to ensure the safe navigation of ships through its waters by providing accurate and
adequate nautical charts.
When considering above requirements, it is observed that Sri Lanka needs adequate
hydrographic information of its coastal area and the seas surrounding the island
that support maritime commerce and legal obligations. However, IHO observed
that only 8.6 percent of the waters which carries a depth of less than 200m have
been surveyed whereas only 2 percent of the waters deeper than 200m have been
adequately surveyed in the seas around Sri Lanka (NHO, 2016). This is a clear
indication that NHO of Sri Lanka, which was under the NARA since 1984 has not
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 67
been able to address hydrographic demands in the country to the expected level.
Therefore, the NHO, which is under NARA requires development to its capability
and capacity to a level that will meet national demands.
When analysing the above theory with respect to the SLN-NARA collaboration,
SLN possesses vast sea experiences and work force that is specialised in the field
of hydrography. The NHO in NARA possesses practical experiences as the national
authority for hydrographic survey activities in Sri Lanka. Therefore, collaboration
of these two bodies would pave the way to share resources, transfer knowledge and
produce the synergy that is required for the development of hydrographic field in
the country. In achieving the desired outcome, both organisations need to be well
embedded and actively involved in the process of collaboration by understanding
duties and responsibilities vested upon their organisations clearly.
A main difficulty encountering the NARA is that it does not possess experienced
crew to operate their only survey vessel SV Samudrika and they do not have their
own capability to maintain the survey ship. Therefore, its main survey vessel, SV
Samudrika cannot be utilised effectively and efficiently for hydrographic survey
activities. Unavailability of berthing facilities for the ship/craft around the country
has also created unnecessary delays to survey activities of NARA as it takes longer
period for them to mobilise ship, craft, men and equipment to survey areas.
It was found that prior to the collaboration, SLN has engaged in survey
activities that were related to the SLN and other organisations: the Sri Lanka
Survey Department, University of Ruhuna, University of Uva Wellassa and few
governmental organisations. SLN has not conducted any survey pertaining to
the National Charts Scheme before the collaboration, as SLN was not vested the
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 69
SLN and Indian Navy have conducted joint hydrographic surveys in the south
of Sri Lankan waters after the partnership. This survey has been requested by
SLN to expedite the hydrography survey of National Charts Scheme beyond the
200m depth contour. Further, the Indian Navy has agreed to conduct a similar
survey annually. SLN officials have been given more training opportunities by
foreign nations for capacity building of SLN hydrographic officers after SLN –
NARA collaboration because SLN has been identified as a partner of NHO by the
hydrography community of those countries.
CONCLUSION
Hydrography is important to Sri Lanka due to its geo-strategic location in the Indian
Ocean. Maritime commerce is one of the potential areas the country can focus on
to develop the economy. Improved maritime infrastructure and other peripheral
facilities are prerequisites for this. The ocean around the country is believed to be
rich in many resources and those resources can be utilised for the development of
the country. The resources that are in abundance in the ocean are to be explored
and exploited to reap the benefits from them. The initial task of this process is
to conduct a systematic study of the seas around the island. Further, Sri Lanka
is bound by international laws and regulations. Therefore, the country is obliged
to provide information for safe navigation of ships. Well-functioning hydrography
service of a country can assist the relevant authorities in fulfilling those demands by
70 Lieutenant Commander Saliya Hemachandra
RECOMMENDATIONS
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SHIFTING STRATEGIC COMPETITION INTO
STRATEGIC COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN:
SRI LANKA AS A FACILITATING HUB
Senuri Samarasinghe
ABSTRACT
The Indian Ocean (IO) has become a 21st century power centre due to its geostrategic,
geopolitical and geo-economic significance. This article emphasises the need for the
Indian Ocean to be developed into a platform of strategic cooperation, rather than
strategic competition, which ensures a win-win outcome over a zero-sum outcome for
its maritime users. As sovereign states on their own are not capable of addressing the
challenges posed by Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats, major players should shift
the prevailing strategic competition into more constructive strategic cooperation and
collaboration in mitigating them. Therefore, the article explores Sri Lanka’s potential
to serve as a hub to facilitate collaborative action in addressing NTS threats to ensure
effective rule-based maritime order and strategic cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
Keywords: Indian Ocean, Non-Traditional Security threats, Sri Lanka,
Strategic Competition, Strategic Cooperation
INTRODUCTION
“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The ocean is the key to the
seven seas.” - Alfred Thayer Mahan
The Indian Ocean (IO) remains a tremendously significant geo-strategic entity
throughout history. During the 18th and 19th centuries, it was considered a “British
Lake” as the British enjoyed naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The second half
of the 20th century further elevated the global emphasis of the importance of this
region. Since the 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union competed with each
other to establish a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, presently,
it is no longer the domain of super powers and great powers only, as it involves
multiple state actors both regional and extra-regional powers who are engaged in
strategic competition. However, the Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats posed
by non-state actors affecting the Indian Ocean security framework emphasise the
need for the ocean to be developed into a platform of strategic cooperation, rather
than strategic competition, which ensures win-win outcome for all its maritime
users. This article first discusses the nature of strategic competition in the Indian
Ocean in order to show the complexity of the IO strategic environment. Secondly,
74 Senuri Samarasinghe
the article discusses the proliferation of non-state actors and networks as well as
climate change and threats from natural disasters in the Indian Ocean to argue
that they further complicate the IO security architecture jeopardising the ocean-
bound competitive national interests of all major players in the Indian Ocean. The
objective of the article is to illustrate that the challenges posed by Non-Traditional
Security threats in the region require cooperation above competition among major
IO maritime users. Finally, the author explores Sri Lanka’s potential as a facilitating
hub for such cooperation to counter the new threats.
The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is derived from both intrinsic and
extrinsic value perspectives. The intrinsic value of the Indian Ocean is derived
from the vast spread of natural resources and industrial raw materials. Unlike
the Arctic Ocean, the Indian Ocean’s significance is not confined to its resource
oriented value. The Ocean is also an important energy highway as it is home to
strategic Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and the world’s most trafficked
energy transit choke points; Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of
Bab-el-Mandeb. Different nations understood the extrinsic value of this strategic
body of water for centuries; from the time of the Seven Voyages by the Chinese, and
through the 18th and 19th centuries when the British dominated the Indian Ocean.
For the first time in history, the British made it a mare clause (a closed sea to others
with hostile intent), as opposed to mare liberum (a sea that is open to all nations)
(Varma, 1964). Its significance as a strategic high ground of the 21st century is
increasing, and as Robert Kaplan (2010) explains, the Indian Ocean has become a
‘truly global ocean’ at present (as quoted by Attanayake & Samarasinghe, 2018).
According to the theory of sea power, expounded by the naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan, nations should gain sea power in order to gain benefits of sea-borne
trade in an atmosphere of immense conflict and competition over the sea (Athwal,
2007). The circular logic behind the theory of sea power is that foreign commerce
is sea based; therefore, overseas bases are necessary to support commerce, and a
military battle fleet is necessary to defend those bases and thereby the flow of trade.
Nations use the revenues gained from sea-borne trade to improve their militaries
(Athwal, 2007). The expectation of conflict is central to the theory of sea power and
conflict in the sea often results in a zero-sum outcome. As one of the world’s most
strategic water bodies, the Indian Ocean is not excluded from this zero-sum nature
of the power rivalry.
jurisdiction to ensure safe energy transit across the Indian Ocean. The world has
entered a geo-energy era, as such energy security has become a determinant of
the geopolitically-oriented economic security for major powers. States promote
resource nationalism in order to ensure energy security. Resource nationalism is
a concept that reflects on how the government of a state takes responsibility in
promoting the security of a country’s resources. Human and physical resources,
either within or outside the country, can be considered as a geopolitical factor
influencing that country’s behaviour. Crude oil, as an energy source, has become
a national security interest to big players in the Indian Ocean. The Sea Lanes of
Communication across the Indian Ocean facilitate the transportation of key
maritime trade including petroleum and petroleum based products from the oil
fields of the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Asian states (Nathaniel, 2018). China’s
Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI) is a mega strategy designed to realise its dream of
becoming a fully modernised nation. China has established its presence and stakes
in the key IO ports to ensure the smooth transportation of crude oil and other
resources across the Indian Ocean.
Strategic competition in the region has taken the face of strategic convergence due
to the warming of quadrilateral relations between the US, India, Japan and Australia
to keep the China factor in check. These relations mark a new geopolitical reality
which has the potential to transform Asia (Attanayake & Samarasinghe, 2018).
India was the traditional hegemon in the Indian Ocean region surrounding the
South Asian sub-continent and it now tries to reassert that dominance over the
region. India’s multi-million dollar project called “Security and Growth for All in
the Region” (SAGAR) was launched as a counterweight to China’s 21st Century
Maritime Silk Route (MSR) project. Meanwhile, Japan views India as a close ally,
a strong and reliable partner to maintain balance in the Indian Ocean. The US
joining India and Japan marks the intensified involvement of a global super power
to determine security parameters in the Indian Ocean. In addition, Australia, as an
extra regional power, is seeking to establish a strong naval presence in the region
to defend its economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Consequently, India,
Japan, the US and Australia are engaged in a soft balancing strategy in the region
against China. Soft balancing in International Relations is a concept defined as a
major power or group of major powers coordinating its/their strategic policies with
the aim of impending or frustrating the policies of another major power or super
power (Zhang, 2010). Political realists argue that states engage in power balancing
strategies with the aim of deterring rising powers and to prevent competing nations
from becoming militarily stronger and pursuing their hegemonic interests (Stafford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013).
The quadrilateral alignment between the US, Japan, India and Australia is a major
factor that has rendered the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean together
to form an emerging geopolitical construct. The littoral nations in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific regions are popularly referred to as the Indo-Pacific region (French, Michel &
76 Senuri Samarasinghe
Passarelli, 2014). In his first Presidential visit to Asia in November 2017, President
Donald Trump used the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ to replace the more familiar term
‘Asia-Pacific’. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe too has emphasised the idea of a
‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (Mohan, 2017). In addition to the elevating strategic
quadrilateral partnership, the rise of India, China’s assertiveness and its expanding
footprint in the Indian Ocean have increased the importance of the Indo-Pacific
region as an emerging Maritime Highway and a crossroad in international relations
(Mohan, 2017). The emergence of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct illustrates
the fact that the concepts of geopolitical space are never static. Due to the increased
rivalry and competition in the major power play in the region, the unipolar balance
of power has almost been replaced by a multi-polar balance of power in the Indo-
Pacific region.
As a result of the joint quadrilateral cooperation between these four states against
China, the Indian Ocean security competition has taken the phase of a ‘security
dilemma’. Security dilemma is a situation in which states feel insecure in relation
to another state or states and therefore each state initiates actions to make itself
more secure militarily or diplomatically, and these actions are interpreted as a
threat by other states (IR Theory Knowledge Base, 2014). Strategic dilemma in
the context of the Indian Ocean is two-fold. On one hand, the major powers are
faced with a security dilemma in their constant and ambitious efforts to maximise
their maritime might against each other. On the other hand, small states which are
considered as passive players in the region are increasingly getting entrapped in a
security dilemma as they are forced to choose between major powers.
Aggressive nations with similar ocean bound national interests are considered the
major rivals for each other in the competition among major IO players in their quest
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 77
The end of the cold war marked a change in the security agenda of the international
system with the shift of attention from traditional military security to non-
traditional security. With rapid globalisation and communication revolution, Non-
Traditional Security (NTS) threats spread across the world. These threats have a
few common features; they are transnational in nature as they transcend beyond
territorial boundaries, unpredictable and unprecedented, and they are frequently
inter-woven with traditional security (Craig, 2007). A vast array of NTS threats
posed by non-state actors in the Indian Ocean have the potential to destabilise the
rule-based maritime order. These new threats impact national security as well as
regional and global security at large, complicating the geo-strategic scenario of the
Indian Ocean, urging the nation states to take counter measures.
Though ecological damages due to maritime accidents and oil spills in the Indian
Ocean are not often discussed, marine pollution caused by unsafe and unstandardised
shipping has destructive impacts on the IO marine environment (Fernando, 2017).
There is a steady decline in the oil leakage incidents worldwide, yet the possibility
of maritime accidents in the IO shipping lanes remains unpredictable due to the
high volume of maritime traffic. A recent example is the collusion of two vessels,
the M.T. BW Maple and M.T. Dawn Kanchipuram outside Kamarajar harbour at
Ennore, causing an oil spillage into the sea in January 2017 (Singh, 2017). These
maritime accidents deteriorate the IO marine biodiversity and security of seafaring
78 Senuri Samarasinghe
in coastal waters, affecting the livelihoods of the fishing community in the Indian
Ocean littoral (Singh, 2017).
Piracy and maritime terrorism are two other major security challenges posed by
violent non-state actors. The Malacca Strait, Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, Arabian
Sea, and the Western Indian Ocean are major areas with intensive operations by
Somali pirates. Piracy involves multiple crimes, such as money laundering, murder,
hijacking, kidnapping, extortion, illegal arms trafficking, which are considered
criminal offences under international law and therefore is a crime of opportunity
(Colombage, 2016). Maritime terrorism poses a similar threat to Indian Ocean
security. Despite the financial repercussions, maritime terrorism has more complex
political implications as maritime terrorists seek to influence governments through
the use of threat of violence at sea. Maritime terrorists have the potential to carry
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) under their control in a commercial ship
and explode it in a commercial port of a developed country (Colombage, 2016).
There is a linkage between pirates and maritime terrorists because of their shared
interests. Pirates can become agents of extremist terrorist organisations, gain access
to maritime weapon delivery through terrorists, and tunnel their ransom in turn to
terrorist networks (Bair, 2009).
Another salient threat in the Indian Ocean is organised crime at sea including
human trafficking, drug smuggling and arms smuggling. Irregular migration is a
global concern due to its linkage with organised criminal groups. Lack of political
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 79
unity and inter-state coordination to address the issue has been a major cause for
the increased trafficking and smuggling in the region. Illegal arms trafficking is
combined with narcotics trafficking as well as maritime piracy. For example, the
LTTE maritime terrorists successfully carried out illegal arms and drugs smuggling
for several decades in order to inflict damage to Sri Lanka in the fight against
the government forces (Colombage, 2016). In addition, Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated (IUU) fishing is another NTS issue in the region. IUU fishing includes
poaching, use of destructive fishing methods and banned fishing nets, not declaring
the catch locations and details and even stealing the catch (Colombage, 2016).
Fishing is the major livelihood of the coastal community of the IO littoral states
so the threat posed by IUU fishing extends beyond traditional military security to
human security.
and academic level. Yet, the IOC too has limitations because the extra regional
representation at the conference remains low (Daily Mirror, 2018).
Though Sri Lanka is geographically a small state, it has been a proactive littoral state
in the Indian Ocean. Even though Sri Lanka has no capability to exert hegemonic
or aggressive influence in the region, it has become a key player in the Indian
Ocean politics due to its strategic location. As a nation that follows a nonaligned
foreign policy, Sri Lanka’s vision is to see that the Indian Ocean be developed on a
rule-based maritime order where trade, freedom of movement and development of
all countries are facilitated (Attanayake & Samarasinghe, 2018).
Sri Lanka has set an historical example of a facilitator for maintaining maritime
order in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka’s proposal on Declaration of the Indian Ocean
as a Zone of Peace was adopted at the 26th United Nations General Assembly in
December 1971. It called upon all maritime users in the Indian Ocean to be obliged
to maintain peace and stability in the maritime domain “in pursuit of the objective
of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances”
(as quoted in Kodikara, 1982, p.195).
However, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) on the
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace had reference only to the naval
forces of great powers (Jayawardane, 2009). It had no reference to the challenges
posed by asymmetric non-state actors in the Indian Ocean as there was no
considerable threats emanating from them at the time (Jayawardane, 2009). The
UN Declaration emphasised that if the power rivalry of the great powers in the
region is reduced, peace can be achieved in the Indian Ocean. However, in addition
to the conventional threats to maritime security like inter-state rivalries and
conflicts which still prevail in the Indian Ocean, threats posed by non-state actors
have become a major source of insecurity in the Indian Ocean today (Jayawardane,
2009). Therefore, the involvement of great powers is essential in the IO security
framework today in order to mitigate the threats posed by non-state actors and
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 81
other NTS threats like climate change and natural hazards. Nevertheless, the
involvement of great powers should not be hostile, antagonistic and competitive,
but cooperative and collaborative. Cooperation among major powers is therefore
critical for Indian Ocean maritime security, yet it cannot be achieved without a
facilitator. Sri Lanka has the immense potential to promote itself as a facilitator of
cooperation among major powers to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
If the major players in the Indian Ocean are to enhance their relations with
each other, Sri Lanka would be the most important platform to initiate strategic
cooperation. Sri Lanka maintains a relatively balanced diplomatic position with all
the major players in the Indian Ocean and thus can facilitate multilateral initiatives
between major players. Due to Sri Lanka’s central positioning in the Indian Ocean,
the country’s international importance “belies its size” despite the geographical
size and comparatively small population (Lerski, 1974). Therefore, “any power
interested in control of, or at least influence in the Indian Ocean is bound to get
involved in the affairs of this lush tropical nation” (Lerski, 1974). In this context,
Sri Lanka has the potential to play the role of a facilitator to transform strategic
competition in the Indian Ocean into strategic cooperation in a number of ways.
Firstly, apart from being a maritime transit centre, Sri Lanka’s geographically central
positioning in the Indian Ocean enables it to serve as a platform for dialogue and
discussion to enhance multilateral initiatives on maritime security and maritime
domain awareness. Sri Lanka has already served as a common venue for dialogue
between the key global players in addressing common issues in the Indian Ocean
and in searching common solutions. For example, the Galle Dialogue, an annual
meeting of IO littoral states to discuss on IO maritime governance, shows Sri Lanka’s
potential to initiate dialogue on promoting regional collaboration on maritime
governance. The Galle Dialogue predominantly focuses on NTS threats every year.
The Galle Dialogue 2018 was exclusively held under the theme of ‘Synergizing
82 Senuri Samarasinghe
for Collaborative Maritime Management’ and it emphasised the fact that one of
the approaches to avoid conflicts in the region is to make all stakeholders equal
partners in the development process of the IO region (as quoted in Nathaniel,
2018). Further the Galle Dialogue 2018 highlighted the increasing trend of the
proliferation of terrorist networks at sea due to the recovery of the ISIS controlled
areas in the Middle East (as quoted in Nathaniel, 2019). As Sri Lanka is a nation
that successfully eradicated separatist terrorism and ended three decades of brutal
war, Sri Lanka has the potential to serve as an initiator to construct a maritime
joint line of counter-terrorism with the other major powers in the Indian Ocean.
Open forums and dialogue like the Galle Dialogue facilitate collaborative maritime
engagement to address maritime issues including maritime terrorism. Thus, Sri
Lanka proves that it can serve as a platform to facilitate open multilateral dialogue
over closed-door dialogue among all state players in the Indian Ocean. In fact,
transparency of discussion guaranteed by multilateral dialogue is enormously
important to enhance relations among major IO maritime users providing them the
scope to overcome trust deficiencies.
Secondly, Sri Lanka’s largest natural port Trincomalee can be developed into a
research hub dealing on matters pertaining to environmental protection, disaster
management and climate change mitigation. Maintaining a centralised data source
in the Indian Ocean by gathering and sharing data, technology transfer and capacity
building are the key areas which can foster in the marine resources management
in the Indian Ocean through regional collaboration. Maritime research, is in fact,
a cooperative platform for the region as the issues in marine waters of the Indian
Ocean affect the whole region (Mohan, Kumara & Jayarathna, 2018). It is necessary
to engage in research beyond territorial borders to fully comprehend the complexity
of oceanic environment, climate change, monsoon patterns and natural resources in
the Indian Ocean (Mohan, Kumara & Jayarathna, 2018). In this regard, Sri Lanka
can act as a facilitator by serving as a regional forum for respective stakeholders
to initiate action and maintain collaboration. Trincomalee is an ideal location for
a Regional Maritime Research Centre. In addition to Trincomalee’s weather and
climate, blooming tourism industry, boosting infrastructure and natural resources
like mangroves in the area, it is vital for its geostrategic positioning in the Bay of
Bengal. Being the largest bay in the Eastern Coast of Sri Lanka, Trincomalee’s bay
mouth offers the opportunity to study the oceanographic environment around the
region covering India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Trincomalee can further enhance
sea and air connectivity among countries in the Indian Ocean (Fernando, 2017). Sri
Lanka’s strategic location in the Bay of Bengal as the epicenter of the Indian Ocean
amidst the vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) connects Trincomalee to
the other countries that can contribute to boost coordination among the IO littoral
states. Further, the recently opened Batticaloa Domestic Air Port will expand its
service to boost tourism industry and Trincomalee’s air connectivity with the region
(Fernando, 2017).
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 83
Thirdly, Sri Lanka can serve as a platform to foster cooperation on disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance. The Indian Ocean region is volatile to an array of natural
hazards which are caused due to anthropogenic activities. Preparedness to face
those can mitigate the catastrophic damage caused to the littoral states and oceanic
environment, while ensuring safe maritime transport. Apart from environmental
hazards and industrial accidents, mass displacement of population caused by
conflict, human rights violations and generalised violence has become a complex,
man-made hazard affecting the region. For example, the Rohingya refugee crisis has
spill-over effects across the IO littoral as the displaced cross territorial borders to
settle in other South Asian and South East Asian states. Humanitarian and disaster
relief is a great area for cooperation and to improve inter-state relations.
Fourthly, Sri Lanka has adapted an input approach which uses its resources at
present to meet goals in the future. Sri Lanka has become a platform for the major
players in the Indian Ocean to make infrastructure investment within the country.
These investments have two impacts on IO maritime governance. On one hand,
it allows Sri Lanka to be promoted as a hub of activity involved with all major
maritime users due to Sri Lanka’s significant geo-strategic positioning in the
Indian Ocean. It further broadens the scope for Sri Lanka to promote itself as a
hub facilitating strategic cooperative initiatives like maritime domain awareness,
maritime research, disaster relief, and open maritime dialogue. On the other hand,
allowing major players to invest in the country’s coastal cities opens Sri Lanka’s
coastal line for foreign maritime forces to monitor maritime governance in the
continental shelf beyond Sri Lanka’s waters.
84 Senuri Samarasinghe
CONCLUSION
The Indian Ocean is increasingly being subjected to a maritime cold war due to the
strategic competition prevailing among powers. At the same time, the multifaceted
NTS threats such as marine environmental hazards, maritime accidents, piracy,
maritime terrorism, human smuggling, arms smuggling, illegal narcotics smuggling
and IUU fishing have undermined the Indian Ocean maritime order. These threats
present not only challenges but also an array of opportunities. It is beyond the
capacity of individual states to address these issues on their own, and therefore, it
is imperative to mobilise collective and collaborative efforts on the part of all the
stakeholders in the Indian Ocean.
Small states are being increasingly entrapped into a situation of strategic dilemma
and are being courted by major powers in pursuit of their own strategic interests
in the Indian Ocean. This presents a difficult choice for a country like Sri Lanka.
However, Sri Lanka, as a country which has been traditionally following a non-
aligned foreign policy, can play a positive role in promoting strategic cooperation in
the Indian Ocean maritime politics. Sri Lanka has the potential to serve as a maritime
transit centre, common forum for open maritime discussion and dialogue, maritime
research hub and humanitarian and disaster relief centre promoting collaborative
and assertive engagement of all IO maritime users. Therefore, the most pragmatic
diplomatic approach for Sri Lanka is to gain advantage of its strategic significance
as an IO littoral state to pursue initiatives which foster cooperation among major
players in the Indian Ocean, making Non-Traditional Security threats as the tipping
point for cooperation.
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“THE HOUSE OF THE OWLS”
The Defence Services Command and Staff College was initially established as the Army
Command and Staff College (ACSC) on 16th March 1998 with the first course consisting
of 26 Army Student Officers. DSCSC was officially inaugurated on 22nd January 2007
in order to set a common stage for the three services to facilitate “joint-man-ship”. In
1999, the College started awarding the Masters Degree in Defence Studies, affiliated
with the University of Kelaniya and subsequently the affiliation changed to General Sir
John Kotelawala Defence University.
DSCSC marked yet another milestone in the year 2008, by enrolling Foreign Student
Officers, representing South Asian, Southeast Asian and African nations. It functions
directly under the Ministry of Defence and is governed by a Board of Management headed
by the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and comprising of the Chief of Defence Staff
and the Three Service Commanders.
Over hundred officers dressed in their ceremonial best, marched to the tune of their
respective service anthems to receive their parchments from His Excellency the
President. The ‘Maroon Hall’ – the main auditorium of the College – was decorated
to represent the variety of military personnel present at this momentous annual
event.
It was the graduation ceremony of the one-year academic course of the Defence
Services Command and Staff College in 2017 and the time had come for the owlets
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 89
to bid farewell to their alma mater. The Owl’s House, surrounded by the paddy
fields, and the beautiful landscape of tall coconut trees always brought them into
a tranquil environment for their studies. The Student Officers would recall their
lecturers asking them to be like the fronds of the coconut tree which bent down
when the new ones pop up from the top of the palm letting the fresh leaves to
blossom. It is a fact that everyone knows, but one needs their utmost dedication
and commitment to serve the nation. ‘Pristine environment’ starting from the
majestic entrance gate and the calm and serene environment with its sprawling
foliage blended with cleanliness appealed to their hearts and minds. The college, as
a premier military ‘learning organization’, was an inspiration for nearly a year which
appeased their hunger and quenched the thirst during the hardest period of their
military education. The video clips and photos of different events and activities
of the course displayed on the screen drew the attention of all present. Adding
quintessential value to the event, the brief documentary film gave the audience
the overall picture of the activities, course of studies, aims and objectives of the
college and the title; passed staff college “psc”. The college has gained prestige
and global reputation due to the sheer dedication and commitment of the many
individuals who contributed towards its growth. The college has so far produced
1,250 graduates since its inception in the year 1997 including approximately one
hundred foreign student officers.
GLORIOUS HISTORY
The establishment of the Staff College showcased that it catered to the Army’s need
in establishing an advanced seat of military learning for its middle-grade officers,
as there were an umpteen number of demands to be met. A tranquil environment
that provoked thought and intellect, facilities to house the demanding needs, and
the locational convenience for students, faculty, highly accomplished staff and the
resource personnel, were only a few of the criterion to be fulfilled. The pioneers
found it difficult to select a suitable location in proximity to the capital to establish
the college. The initial suggestions were Diyatalawa, the Skanaska project site at
Kotmale and the Batalanda camp complex at Sapugaskanda.
90 Lieutenant Colonel Prabhath Atapattu
Advice to formulate academic curriculum was sought from the best in the
field. Thus, Sri Lanka Army looked on to their counterparts in the UK, and the
latter gladly contributed with their expertise. It was felt to be a necessity that
an accomplished academic staff with doctrinal knowledge was a prerequisite to
fostering an institution of high academic caliber. The valuable contribution made
by the British Army continued for the first four courses by way of a few Liaisons
Officers providing a British Army Training.
Enhancing its academic-worth, the Army Command and Staff College initially
affiliated with the University of Kelaniya, giving students the opportunity to read
for a Masters Degree in Defence Studies (M Def S) whilst qualifying themselves at
the Command and Staff College. The untiring efforts of a committed and dedicated
leader together with a handpicked team of faculty and staff ensured the working of
a hectic and demanding course calendar to precision.
This great opportunity of academic advancement that had hitherto been granted for
just 58 serving officers at Staff College abroad was now to be within the reach of all
aspiring middle graders qualifying for entrance.
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 91
The wise Old Owl’s watchful eyes stood witness as batches of officers from our
nation’s three Armed Services and Police toiled day and night, as they were being
put through the paces of the most demanding and hectic programme of learning.
The ultimate result was to deliver the highest cumulative impact factor and militarily
educated officers for the motherland. They have indeed left no stone unturned in
their efforts to improve as future leaders of our militaries and are ready to spread
their wings away from their nests.
Though parting the gates had an element of sadness, absolutely overriding were the
tears of joy and the feeling of confidence in graduates who were to take challenges
as leaders and the defenders of the nation, be it in their professional or personal
lives. The nation’s strategic thinkers then thought it is opportune time, for the good
work proffered by the Army Command and Staff College to be extended to all three
services of the nation where isolated training had resulted in many a failure when
facing the internal conflict. Military experts had predicted single service operations
are not conducted in most of the countries due to limited probability of success.
Therefore, joint training in a joint service environment was given attention.
Expansion was thus contemplated, and Sri Lanka witnessed the transformation of
the establishment, into the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC).
This set the stage for “Joint–man–ship”, the sheer need of the era, where victory was
guaranteed only through a united effort under a unitary command. This measure
was taken to ensure and bring the militaries to a common platform, in all doctrinal
and strategic level planning, war fighting techniques and procedures adopted by
each of the services.
Former Secretary to the President, Mr. Lalith Weeratunga, gracing the Inauguration
Ceremony of DSCSC - 2007
92 Lieutenant Colonel Prabhath Atapattu
The Defence Services Command and Staff College enrolled its first batch of
student officers in January 2007 with the addition of the Navy and Air Wings. The
responsibility of administering the institution shifted from Army Headquarters to
the Ministry of Defence, with which the DSCSC acquired a Board of Management
of the highest profile consisting of the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, three
service commanders, Vice Chancellor of General Sir John Kotelawala Defence
University (KDU) and the Commandant of DSCSC. The number of students
expanded; not only with more officers from the defence services and the civil
services of our nation, but also with the officers of friendly foreign countries joining
the ranks.
As such, the wealth of knowledge and experience found within each course
enriched the learning environment and encouraged peer learning. One of the most
challenging and exciting events they encountered was brushing up of the Queen’s
language at Kotelawala Defence University, before they arrive at DSCSC. Crossing
the English Channel and dipping in impromptu speeches was more shocking than
the other three skills of the language; Listening, Reading and Writing. Attending
simultaneously to the assignments given in the Pre-Course Book of DSCSC which
contained assignments related to military subjects and submitting them on time;
limited their free-time. The work continued to be time-consuming with the
introduction of the course on Research Methodology by KDU. However everybody
was able to loosen their shoulders with the knowledge and techniques taught on
research counseling at KDU and was successful in producing a Research Paper. It
would have been a nightmare if not for the guidance of the Academic Supervisors.
The three-month Intensive English Language Course and Research Methodology
package at KDU inspired them and kept them alerted for the oncoming Staff
Course. Thinking that ‘well begun means half done’, all commenced their work
on their research projects with the guidance of the academic experts at KDU. Most
of the students were alien to the subject, but everybody had to dip in the sea and
swim for their own survival.
The four Academic Terms deal with Conventional War Fighting, Counter
Revolutionary Warfare, Joint Warfare and Technological Development which are
comparatively familiar to a military officer. The exchange of professional knowledge
and experiences as well as military technological progress of military establishments
of other countries were gained through interactive workshops conducted by
military training delegations visiting from friendly nations. The faculty is enhanced
by a large number of eminent local and foreign scholars as visiting lecturers. The
Student Officers were lectured on different fields by diplomats and top-level public
service officers. The Master of Science in Defence and Strategic Studies (MSc-
DSS) Degree runs concurrently by General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 93
The college social calendar consisted of a variety of activities which knit the
student officers and their families together. These activities concentrated on social
and personal development of the spouses with activities such as Ladies’ Night,
social dancing classes and capacity development workshops through a very active
Ladies’ Club. Besides that, some of the events which strengthen the acquaintances
of students are the Course Picnic, College Hash Run and the Students Pantomime.
Shortfalls in administration and academic field, humorous occurrences among the
intimates during the course are acted out at the Pantomime. Different cultures,
rituals, costumes, cuisine, exhibited at International Day celebrations by the foreign
students, create strong bonds and mutual understanding among all.
Local visits and the DSCSC Delegation Visits on International Collaboration help
students to gain in-depth knowledge about defence establishments abroad. The
opportunity reveals a bigger canvas on international governance, whilst providing
an exposure to practices of regional and friendly militaries such as Australia, China,
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Philippine, Russia, Rwanda, South Korea, Turkey and
UAE, thereby improving the exposure gained through the course.
94 Lieutenant Colonel Prabhath Atapattu
For students, the hard work put in does not go unrewarded; the investments
they make pay rich dividends throughout their professional and personal lives.
Honouring their efforts, the Staff College presents the best of the best with the
“Golden Owl” Award. This is given to the Student Officer who obtains the first in
order of merit. The “Commandants’ Honours” is awarded to Student Officers who
obtain a merit of 70 percent and above and the “Golden Pen’’ is awarded to the
Student Officer authoring the best research paper.
Defence Forces of Sri Lanka are a Joint Defence Force that provides military and
civil defence capabilities of defending Sri Lanka from external and internal violence
and to promote peace, security, economic well-being, social progress and Sri Lanka’s
regional and global recognition. The prime responsibility of the armed forces of
a country is to protect its people, infrastructure, and territory from any form of
aggression. In order to face the emerging challenges, members of the security forces
should be well-prepared to identify traditional and non-traditional security threats.
The Defence Services Command and Staff College produces qualified, broad-minded
and far-sighted military officers to secure the country. Staff qualified officers of the
Tri-services are an asset, since they are in a position to maintain an agile, high-tech
DEFENCE AND SECURITY JOURNAL 95
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Honour: DSCSC expects that all its members will strive to preserve self-respect,
honesty and honour in all their deeds. Members are encouraged to put honour to
the test by upholding the honour of the College.
Excellence: DSCSC strives for excellence in all its endeavours at all levels which
will ultimately contribute to the overall accomplishment of the College’s objectives.