Joint Doctrine

JP-01/2017
JOINT DOCTRINE INDIAN ARMED FORCES
JOINT DOCTRINE
INDIAN ARMED FORCES

Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff
Ministry of Defence
JOINT DOCTRINE
INDIAN ARMED FORCES
ILLUSTRATION
All photographs (unless otherwise specified) are collected from Headquarters Integrated
Defence Staff records, unclassified military publications.
Compilation of Data : Inputs compiled from Indian National Constitution, Annual

Reports of Ministry of Defence, various Defence publications, journals and military pamphlets,
Service Headquarters, War Colleges, etc.
Comments to :
Directorate of Doctrine
Doctrine, Organisation and Training (DOT) Branch
Room No 55, South Hutments
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg
New Delhi-110 011
Printing : 53 Printing Press, E-in-C’s Branch, New Delhi-110 011
Type Setting and Design : Directorate of Doctrine & 53 Printing Section, New Delhi -110 011
Second Edition : April 2017
No parts of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or
any other means without written permission of the publisher.
Published by Directorate of Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff

CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
eDimarla saunaIla laanbaa saonaaQyaxa saimait saicavaalaya
pI vaI esa ema, e vaI esa ema, e DI saI 263 DI, saa}qa blaa^k
Admiral Sunil Lanba na[- idllaI - 110 011
PVSM, AVSM, ADC COSC Secretariat
263D, South Block
New Delhi - 110 011
Foreword
Military doctrine provides a framework for understanding ''an approach'' to
warfare. Universally seen as a set of principles that guide the Armed Forces in
support of our National objectives, it does cater for future conflicts and co-
opts available and future technology. 'Joint' military doctrine on its part,
provides foundations for greater integration and interdependence, to achieve
higher inter-operability and compatibility within the Armed Forces. The
rapidly changing character of conflict is constantly throwing up new
challenges thereby, behoving on the Indian Armed Forces to remain
operationally current, agile, efficient and utilise scarce resources in an
optimised manner.
Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence

has been a shining example of ''Jointness'' and ''Integration'' in the Armed
Forces. The fact that the organisation has made strides in the Structures of
Jointness and Integration in the varied fields of Operations, Intelligence,
Technology Management, Human Resources Development, Operational
Logistics, Diplomacy etc bears ample testimony to this fact. These have been
adequately highlighted in the Doctrine, which is only in keeping with the
commitment of the Government of India to 'Integrate' in all the fields, to the
hilt. The experience gained has been leveraged to create new
structures/consolidate the existing ones to meet more challenges that will
emerge in the future. An assessment of these challenges have yielded the need
to have centralised policy structures, coordinated operational planning and
control in certain common functions in the three Services’.
This 2nd Edition of Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces – 2017
(JDIAF-2017) elaborates on the basic fundamentals of power and excellence
in war-fighting across the full spectrum of conflict. It has been ensured that
this edition remains aligned with the existing Service Doctrines. As is the
case with all Doctrines, the document draws on past experiences, original
thinking, existing geo-strategy, threat perceptions, policies etc. It puts out in
its narrative the best way to execute anything in an optimised manner with
existing capabilities, capacities, concepts, structures, mechanisms, practices
and crucial availability of resources. It freshly looks at new
dimensions/domains in the spectrum of conflict, described as a 'triad' 'while
underlining the importance of orchestrating technology in force structuring.
This Doctrine, pitched at the Military Strategic level, is meant to

guide all members of the Indian Armed Forces, on the necessary concepts,
principles, and ideals under which to achieve the higher goals set upon by the
Political Leadership as deemed in the Indian Constitution. This Doctrine is to
be a part of the initial training curriculum and be re-visited at subsequent
stages of training and education, to extend our understanding and collative
competence. The Doctrine is a reference for the policy makers, bureaucrats,
technocrats, diplomats, defence industry in public/private sector, academia,
fourth/fifth estate, our citizens etc.
This doctrine remains a guide – a judgement in application and on

''how to think along with enterprise'' by leaders at all levels.
Jai Hind !
(Sunil Lanba)
Admiral
Apr 2017 Chairman COSC &
New Delhi Chief of the Naval Staff
THE JOINT INDIAN ARMED FORCES DOCTRINE
CODE OF WARRIOR
I am a Warrior. Defending my Nation is my Dharma. I will train

my mind, body and spirit to fight. Excel in all devices and
weapons and war, present and future. Always protect the weak.
Be truthful and forthright.
Be humane, cultured and compassionate !
Fight and embrace consequences willingly !
God give me strength that I ask nothing of you !
- Bhagawad Gita
“Either I will come back after hoisting the tri-colour, or
I will come back wrapped in the tri-colour”
- Captain Vikram Batra, PVC
Indian Army, Kargil Operations
“To me, the Defence Services are the finest examples of

brotherhood, family spirit and nation building. Thank you
for making me a part of this great Defence family”
- Sudha Mulla, widow of Captain (IN) MN Mulla, MVC
Commanding Officer, INS Khukri, 1971 Operations
“My mental boundaries expanded when I viewed the Earth

against a black and uninviting vaccum, yet my country’s
rich tradition had conditioned me to look beyond man-made
boundaries and prejudices. One does not have to undertake a
space flight to come by this feeling”.
- Wing Commander Rakesh Sharma, Ashoka Chakra,
Indian Air Force, First Indian Astronaut
INDEX
Ser
Contents From To
No
1 Chapter 1 – National Security – A Perspective 01 06
2 Chapter 2 – Spectrum of Conflict 07 16
3 Chapter 3 – Military Instrument of Power 17 30
4 Chapter 4 – Higher Defence Organisation 31 38
5 Chapter 5 – Integrated and Joint Structures 39 50
6 Chapter 6 – Tech Orchestration &

Capability Development 51 55
7 Appendices
’A’ – Doctrine in Perspective 56 58
‘B’ – Civil Military Relations 59 61
8 Citations and References 62 62
9 Record of Amendments 63 63
10 Abbreviations 64 65
11 Bibliography 66 67
12 Acknowledgment 68 68
National Security - A Perspective
Section I
National Values, Aim and National Interests
National Values
National Aim
Chapter 1
National Interests
Section II
National Security and Military Strategies
National Security
National Security Objectives
National Security Policy
National Security Strategy
National Military Objectives
Armed Forces Doctrine
Section III
Constituents of National Power
National Power
Hard, Soft and Smart Powers
Components of National Power
Military Instrument of National Power
CHAPTER -1
NATIONAL SECURITY - A PERSPECTIVE
National Security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political

resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity;
technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural
resources and finally the military might !
A definition propagated by the National Defence College,

New Delhi, India
SECTION I - NATIONAL VALUES, AIM AND NATIONAL

INTERESTS
National Values
1. India's National Values are our enduring beliefs reflected in the ideals
of our society. National Values evolve from our Nation's culture and history,
and are based on our enduring social, religious, moral and ideological
principles. There is a co-relation between and among all values, no value
stands alone and each contributes to the other. Our core National values are
best reflected in the Preamble of our Constitution, which are; sovereignty,
socialism, secularism, democracy, republican character, justice, liberty,
equality, fraternity, human dignity, unity and integrity of our Nation, respect
for our diversity, peaceful co-existence, pluralism, tolerance and international
i
peace defined by a just international order .
National Aim
2. The National Aim, as gleaned from our Constitution and strategic

vision enunciated by our leadership over the years, is directed towards
'Comprehensive National Development'. Our National Aim is to create a
conducive external and internal security environment for unhindered and
inclusive socio-economic development.
1
NATIONAL SECURITY – A PERSPECTIVE
National Interests
3. India's National Interests are derived from the need to protect and
preserve our core values as enshrined in our Constitution which are
summarised as followsii :-
(a) To preserve the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of

India.
(b) To preserve the democratic, secular and federal character of

the Indian Republic.
(c) To safeguard India's existing and emerging strategic, political,

economic and military goals in consonance with the National Aim.
(d) To ensure a stable, secure and peaceful internal and external

environment conducive to unhindered economic growth and
prosperity.
(e) To contribute towards promotion of international peace and

stability.
SECTION II - NATIONAL SECURITY & MILITARY

STRATEGIES
National Security
4. National Security to us implies the protection, preservation and

promotion of our National Interests against internal and external threats and
challenges. Maintenance of our National Security is critical as it provides us
the necessary freedom, and removes all fear and hindrance in our pursuit of
prosperity and happiness. India's security is an integral component of its
development process. National Security and the underpinning strategies have
both National and International dimensions. National Security not only
entails Military Security but also influences our Politico - Diplomatic
structure, Water, Economy, Energy, Food, Health, Education, Technology,
Cyber, Space, Nuclear deterrence and Environment.
2
National Security Objectives
5. National Security Objectives flow from and are designed to safeguard

our National Interests. National Security Objectives, like interests, influence
our political, military, and economic dimensions. They provide a framework
for the formulation of National Security Policy and ensuing Strategies. India's
National Security Objectives are :-
(a) Maintain a credible deterrent capability to safeguard National

Interests.
(b) Ensure defence of national territory, air space, maritime zones

including our trade routes and cyber space.
(c) Maintain a secure internal environment to guard against

threats to our unity and development.
(d) Expand and strengthen ''Constructive Engagement'' with

other Nations to promote regional, global peace and international
stability.
National Security Policy

6. National Security Policy is based on our National Security Objectives
and the components of National Power, weighed against the prevailing and
assessed future domestic and global environment. It shall entail inherent right
of self-defence, possession of deterrence capability, strategic autonomy, self-
reliance, cooperation, security and friendly relations with countries.
National Security Strategy

7. Our National Security Strategy (NSS) primarily revolves around
safeguarding our Nation from any type of internal and external
threats/aggression. In addition, our NSS encompasses preservation
and strengthening of India's democratic polity, development process, internal
stability and unity in its unique multi-cultural settings. Our NSS also
addresses the general well-being of our vast population, the vitality of our
economy in context of globalisation and the rapidly advancing technological
world. A regional and an international environment of peace and cooperation
3
NATIONAL SECURITY – A PERSPECTIVE
will facilitate the safeguarding of our interests. Even though we have no

formally articulated National Security Policy and Strategy, it does not imply
that they do not exist or are not sufficiently understoodiii .Central to our NSS is
to maintain an effective conventional and nuclear deterrent capability.
National Military Objectives
8. National Military Objectives (NMOs) accruing out from National

Security requirements are as follows :-
(a) Prevent war through strategic and conventional deterrence

across the full spectrum of military conflict, to ensure the defence of
India, our National Interests and sovereignty.
(b) Prosecute military operations to defend territorial integrity

and ensure a favourable end state during war to achieve stated/implied
political objective (s).
(c) Provide assistance to ensure Internal Security, when called

upon to do so.
(d) Be prepared for contingencies at home and abroad to render

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Aid to Civil
Authority and International Peacekeeping, when called upon to do so.
(e) Enable required degree of self-sufficiency in defence

equipment and technology through indigenization to achieve desired
degree of technological independence by 2035.
Armed Forces Doctrine
9. Armed Forces Doctrine flows from our NMOs. The Armed Forces
Doctrine provides a foundation upon which the three Services must operate in
synergy. The Armed Forces Doctrine underpins the development of
Service specific strategies which must complement the former. Doctrine is
not a strategy and to understand the subtle nuances of such aspects explanatory
notes are as at Appendix 'A'.
4
SECTION III - CONSTITUENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
National Power
10. Power has always been an integral constituent of inter - state relations.
Kautiliya defined it as the possession of 'Might and Strength'. In the present
day global environment, our National Power gives us the ability and capability
to secure our National Interests. These would include capacities in military,
economic, science and technology, leadership, National character, education
and influence (Diplomacy).
Hard, Soft and Smart Powers
11. Hard Power facilitates India's use of military, economic and political
means to influence other States; Soft Poweriv has, through our cultural or
ideological means the ability to indirectly influence the behaviour of other
States. 'Soft Power' also enables us to distinguish the subtle effects of our
culture, values, societal ideas, developmental assistance programs and other
forms of influence on the behaviour of other States, from the more direct
coercive measures such as, military action or economic incentives or
sanctions. A potent form of soft power is 'intellectual power', which entails 'the
knowledge and insight of the populace and their leaders'. The strength of
India's soft power has been the power of assimilation. India's unique ability to
embrace different cultures and the philosophy of tolerance and peaceful co-
existence continues to be a source of strength for our Nation and a shining
example to the world community. Smart Powerv would be our evaluative
ability to combine Hard and Soft Power resources into effective strategies.
Components of National Power
12. Components of National Power as a concept is an extension of

National Power. It encompasses a wide range of means available to us
through our economy, geography, natural resources, human capital, military,
internal social harmony, knowledge, information, science, technology,
governance, leadership, national will, foreign policy and diplomacy etc.
It is defined as the, 'comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its
strategic objectives by taking the necessary actions internationally', or
'mobilisation and utilisation of strategic resources of a country, to realise
5
NATIONAL SECURITY - A PERSPECTIVE
National Objectives'. Components entail synergistic application of all

instruments of National Power to safeguard our National Interests.
vi
13. The key constructs of National power are :-
Military Instrument of National Power
14. Military instrument of National Power is employed by us, both as a

means of deterrence and conflict resolution, in support of National Security
goals. Our Military instrument is not an independent phenomenon. In the
words of Carl von Clausewitz, “War is a continuation of politics by other
means''. The ultimate purpose of our Military Instrument is to deter
aggression and, when required, to fight and win our Nation's wars.
Fundamentally, our Military instrument is coercive in nature; however, our
military has various capabilities and can be gainfully employed during non-
conflict situations and natural disasters too.
6
Spectrum of Conflict
Section I
Strategic Environment Scan
Chapter 2
General
India's Geography
Security Threats and Challenges
Section II
Nature and Character of Conflict/ War
General
What Influences Conflict/War?
Purpose of War
Levels of War
Generations of War
India in Conflict / War
Conflict Prevention
Use of Force
Conflict Termination
CHAPTER 2
SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
"The existing State-centred approach to National Security, confined to the

defence of a country against territorial aggression, has been widened to the
idea of Security inclusive of a larger set of threats to the people of the State"
- Lt Gen VR Raghavan (Retd)
SECTION I - STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT SCAN
General
1. As a Nation aspiring for a greater role, in the new World order, India
cannot remain detached from global developments. India has to be prepared to
influence the world with its geography and all elements of National Power.
'The size of our Nation, our continental relevance as well as our strategic
location at the "head and heart" of the Indian Ocean gives us tremendous
leverage to preserve peace, promote stability, and maintain security'.
2. Whilst conflict and war for territory is diminishing around the globe,
in our context it continues to remain significant because of our disputed
borders and the requirement to safeguard our territorial integrity. Strategic
interests in regions along our Northern, Western and Eastern borders and
sensitivities along the Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control
(LAC) are to be protected with effective deterrent capabilities.
3. India's security environment is impacted by a number of global and

regional issues and challenges. These are currently manifesting as geo-
political re-balancing, increasing assertiveness by emerging powers, regional
instabilities and spread of radicalism. The need to address consequences of
instability and volatility in parts of our extended and immediate
neighbourhood, hence remains a priority.
India's Geography
4. India is a large sub-continent with about 33,00,000 sq km territory,

land frontiers running of over 15,000 km and a coastline of over 7,516 km.
71
The National air space spans a much larger sphere and is estimated to be over
approximately 40 million cu kmvii .
5. Our land borders and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) remain central
to India's growth and security. By virtue of this geo-physical configuration as
well the resultant strategic and economic imperatives, India looks to the land
trade routes and the seas to engage freely in trade and commerce, on the
foundation of equality, mutual benefit and respect. Amidst ongoing efforts to
impart fresh dynamism to strengthen our strategic partnerships and relations
with our neighbours in a comprehensive manner, Cooperativeviii Security
approaches remain relevant to us. India is committed to building such strong
partnerships around the globe and in our neighbourhood.
Security Threats and Challenges
6. India's security environment is defined by a complex interplay of

regional and global imperatives and challenges. It is impacted concurrently by
the positive forces of global connectivity like economic and social integration,
on one side, and on the other by the obstructive consequences of
unpredictability, instability and volatility that connectivity brings.
7. India's pursuit of transformative national growth and development

necessitates a peaceful environment across the security spectrum. However,
unique threats and challenges related to inherited fault lines adversely affect
the security situation of our Nation that are manifesting along within
increasingly blurring lines between traditional and non-traditional challenges.
8. External Threats and Challenges. Our external threats and challenges

comprise 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' challenges. They are enumerated
below :-
(a) Traditional. India's threats primarily emanate from

the disputed land borders with our neighbours. Maintaining territorial
integrity and preserving National sovereignty continues to remain a
major strategic challenge for India. The intensifying competition for
natural resources adds an overlay of volatility to existing fault lines
and pose challenges that have potential to germinate conflict. Further,
transnational threats posed by the activities of State and Non-State
sponsored terrorist organisations are exacerbated by the dynamics of
intra and inter-State conflicts which pose a danger to regions beyond
8
our primary theatres. India remains concerned about the presence and
role of external powers in the IOR, as global geo-politics shifts from
the Atlantic Ocean to the Asia-Pacific.
(b) Non-Traditional. The challenges posed by non-traditional

security threats range from proxy war to ethnic conflicts, illegal
financial flows, small arms transfers, drugs/human trafficking,
climate change, environmental disasters, security of energy/resources
etc. These challenges are exacerbated by several countries vying to
acquire Weapons of Mass Destructionix (WMD) and by the
competition for natural resources. Their effects on regional stability
and the geo-strategic environment are areas of immediate concern.
Further, security of our diaspora, resources and establishments
abroad, especially in the Middle East / North African regions, which
are home to millions of Indians, remain central to our external security
paradigm.
9. Internal Threats and Challenges. Our internal threats manifest

in different dimensions, and are briefly described below :-
(a) India's multifaceted internal security challenges include an

ongoing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgencies in some
States and organised crime. Left Wing Extremism remains an
important challenge that is sapping our National resources, while also
impacting the pace of economic development of affected regions.
Illegal cross border migrations due to poor socio-economic conditions
and/or law and order situations in their home States is another
challenge.
(b) Terrorism supported from outside is resulting in the loss of

innocent lives. The fragile security environment in the Af-Pak region
and neighbouring support to proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir, lends a
possibility of it being a conduit for eastward spread of fundamentalist
and radical ideologies. Manifestations of these include an engineered
radicalised tilt towards such ideology amongst India's youth.
Mitigating it requires a multi-faceted approach facilitated by a robust
intelligence network.
(c) The easy access to high end technology has increased the
threats, making it multi-dimensional. Ensuring sanctity of our land
9
borders, protection of our airspace and long coastline is imperative

and remains our priority.
(d) Radicalisation of youth in some States by suspected social

media platforms is also a contemporary challenge to National
Security. The management of digital environment, which has the
ability to manage conflicts through social media, merits high priority
in our National Security calculus.
SECTION II - NATURE AND CHARACTER

OF CONFLICT/WAR
General
10. Conflict is as old as the existence of mankind x . The structures and

processes for conflict execution have differed over the ages, impacted by
prevailing cultural, social, economic and technological positions. However, at
its core, is politics and the need to rationalise conflict and its objectives.
Regardless of occurrence, conflict is incontestable, however its external
manifestations may vary.
11. The character of conflict has varied with time, yet it has endured.
Technology has been a major driver to the evolution of the character of
conflict. Today's stand-off precision munitions with satellite control systems
have altered the physical component of conflict. The character of future wars
is likely to be ambiguous, uncertain, short, swift, lethal, intense, precise, non-
linear, unrestricted, unpredictable and hybrid.
What Influences Conflict/War?
12. Politics. Political influences stem from political-ideological factors.

Fundamental forces in the local, regional and global security constructs also
influence conflict.
13. Economy. Economic security revolves around economic growth and

is a determinant of State power. The sub-constructs involve security of
resources, supply and fears of economic loss in global markets. The economic
influences could accrue from attempts to balance the divergent issues that are
inherent in achieving Economic security.
10
14. Environment. Environment has emerged as a critical area of the

security paradigm. Changes in environment can result in extinction of certain
States. On the other hand, soil erosion, forest cover depletion and loss of
agricultural land are dominant factors for human migrations across national
and international borders. Such events heighten security risks and lead to
responses from States in the military dimension. Environmental security has
always been dealt with by the State and eco-system disruption, energy issues,
population issues, food related problems, economic issues of unsustainable
modes of production and civil strife related to Environment. The fallout at
times requires security responses from the State.
15. Society. Societal security is related to but is distinct from political and
military security. The boundaries of the State and society are not always co-
terminus. Societal identities consisting of large, small and ethnic segments
also have serious security ramifications. Migration, social-ethnic cleansing,
economic competition amongst societal groups also impact State security.
Society remains an essential element of the security paradigm.
Purpose of War/Conflict
16. The purpose of war/conflict and use of military force is always

"political" in naturexi .The political objectives of war are set in accordance
with the National Security Policy. Military objectives are defined in support of
these political objectives.
Levels of Warxii
17. Military activities are conducted at different levels involving different

people, from the senior political leadership of the State to the soldiers, sailors
and air-warriors. There are four levels of War; Political/ Grand Strategicxiii,
Military Strategic, Operational and Tactical; each level being deftly twisted to
the other. The levels of Command within these are however not hierarchical.
The complexity of modern warfare makes it difficult to separate one from the
other; even a Platoon Commander may encounter situations which have
strategic implications. The different levels are as follows:-
(a) Grand Strategic level, is to do with the full range of issues
associated with the maintenance of political independence and
territorial integrity in the pursuit of wider National Interests. It is
11
about the co-ordinated use of the three principal instruments of

National Power; Diplomatic, Economic and Military under the
common influence of Information. It is as much concerned with the
avoidance of war as with its conduct. Achieving these goals at this
level usually requires collaboration with other Nations'
governments, international organisations and agencies. Success at
this level requires foresight, patience, endurance, tenacity and the
ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The Grand Strategic level
is probably the most important, as any decision at this level
affects the other three.
(b) Military Strategic level is the military component of Grand

Strategy level. This level of warfare is defined by National level
operations which are planned, conducted and sustained, to
contribute to achieving National strategic aims, as well as
synchronising action, within areas of operations. It is concerned w i t h
identification of Military Strategic objectives and is the art of
developing and employing military forces consistent with these
objectives. It defines the desired end state which will constitute
victory. Planning is carried out by the Service Headquarters (SHQs)
and Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS).
(c) The Operational Level is the level of war at which campaigns

are planned by Command HQs/Corps HQs and equivalent level HQs
in the Navy and Air Force. Operational art - the skilful employment of
military forces to attain strategic goals through the design,
organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns or major
operations. This levels links military strategy to tactics which consists
of a series of tactical battles. The Operational Level employs Land;
Air; Maritime; Cyberspace; Space; and Special Forces to jointly
deliver a range of effects that together contribute to success in
operations.
(d) Tactical level, is the level at which war fighting actually takes
place in order to achieve operational objectives. Tactics is the art of
deploying Land, Air, Maritime, Special Forces and Logistic elements
to achieve success in battle. Success at tactical battles is the means
towards achieving operational and strategic objectives.
12
NATIONAL SECURITY STRAT & POLICY
Strat CCS DIRECTIONS TO COSC
MIL STRATEGIC - SERVICE Hqs & IDS
THEATRE/OP PLANS
COMD/ CORPS
Op EQUILVALENTS OF OTHER SERVICES
MAJOR OPS
Tac BATTLES/ TAC ENGAGEMENT
Levels of War
18. Generations of Warxiv. The first Generation lasted long but the
transition from the second to the current fifth generation has been rapid. It laid
the foundation for Hybrid Warfare, including supporting chaos, psychological
and media warfare, cyber warfare, economic warfare etc. It is a conflict
characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants
and civilians. Simply put, it is a war in which one of the major participants is
not a State but rather a violent non-state actor or non-state actor sponsored by a
State.
India in Conflict/War
19. India has moved to a pro-active and pragmatic philosophy to counter
various conflict situations. The response to terror provocations could be in the
form of 'surgical strikes’ and these would be subsumed in the sub-
conventional portion of the spectrum of armed conflict. The possibility of sub-
conventional escalating to a conventional level would be dependent on
multiple influences, principally: politically-determined conflict aims;
strategic conjuncture; operational circumstance; international pressures and
military readiness. Conflict will be determined or prevented through a
process of credible deterrence, coercive diplomacy and conclusively by
punitive destruction, disruption and constraint in a nuclear environment
across the Spectrum of Conflict. Therefore, undertaking 'Integrated Theatre
xv
Battle' with an operationally adaptable force, to ensure decisive victory
12
13
in a network centric environment across the entire spectrum of conflict in

varied geographical domains, will be the guiding philosophy for evolution of
force application and war fighting strategies.
Conflict Prevention
20. Wars lead to loss of men and material. In some cases it can lead to
destruction of a Nation. They also slow down if not completely stop
developmental activities. Strategists throughout history have sought to
prevent war and settle disputes through peaceful means. Thus, the dictum
'prevention is better than cure', finds its application in conflict prevention and
seeks to address the root causes of conflicts. Apart from other measures, wars
can be prevented through show of force, mutual confidence building or
military activities under United Nations (UN) mandate.
21. Deterrence. States are normally restrained by their mutual fear of

each other's war-waging potential. War-waging potential is therefore, a
credible threat to discourage a potential aggressor. The policy of deterrence
aims to present the potential belligerent with an unacceptable degree of
damage in proportion to his potential gains. A credible deterrence capability
strengthens a Nation's diplomatic leverage and is a major factor in the 'test of
wills' between countries.
22. Coercive Diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is another option of

maintaining peace through show of force. It aims at applying or threating to
apply military force in support of diplomatic, economic and other. pressures,
to force the belligerent to comply with the conditions, thereby preventing war.
Instruments used for coercive diplomacy are diplomatic isolation and
economic sanctions backed by projection of military force with a threat
to use it.
23. Coercion and Deterrence. Coercion and Deterrence aim to counter

threats to our security by communicating to potential adversaries the
consequences of their anticipated action or inaction. Deterrence and coercion
are ways by which our government might seek to secure policy ends.
Deterrence and Coercion will be contested; opponents will assess how they
value the interests of their State or group, compared to the coercer's interests;
their perception of the balance of power; the bargaining space : whether there
are alternative acceptable outcomes available; and their expected gains and
14
losses. Therefore, it is crucial and essential to fully understand the framework,

including the cultural, institutional, ideological, motivational factors and the
prevailing political, economic and strategic situation - as an opponent
perceives.
24. Deterrence and Coercion strategies will only succeed if an opponent

understands that the threats (or incentives) are crediblexvi . Effective deterrence
and coercion strategies comprise four principles: credibility; communication;
comprehension; and capabilityxvii.
25. Confidence Building Measures. Confidence Building Measures

(CBMs) allow adversaries to communicate and exchange information in
ways, which reassure each other and obviate the need for a military aggression
or escalate an ongoing war to a higher level. Mutually agreed treaties with
provisioned clauses for disclosing troop movements, exercise schedules and
even supervision in certain cases form the basis of CBMs.
Use of Force
26. In case conflict prevention is not successful through deterrence or

coercion, military force must be used to compel the adversary to submit.
Military force can be used in the following ways :-
(a) Destruction. Destruction seeks to annihilate the adversary.

It involves employment of military forces to secure National
objectives by direct application of force. It will be a well-calibrated
conventional response. The most obvious use of military force is to
destroy the adversary's military resources to prevent him from using it
for his own purposes, thereby bringing about his defeat.
(b) Disruption. Whereas Destruction seeks to annihilate the

adversary, Disruption is a lower form of armed conflict designed to
shatter the cohesion of an adversary's military force to prevent it from
functioning effectively in combat. It may be achieved by destroying
elements essential for cohesion, such as the command and control
(C2) systems. It may also be achieved by degrading the morale of the
enemy or disrupting the decision making ability of the adversary
without use of force.
15
(c) Constraint. Constraint is a type of denial, which involves

the use of force to deny something without destroying it; for example,
blockade or economic sanctions imposed against a Nation.
Conflict Termination
27. Conflict termination is a strategy to bring war to a most favourable

conclusion. Military plans and operations serve to support the attainment of
political objectives. Therefore, these should focus on achieving the political
objective by establishing conditions necessary to sustain the objective
following conflict termination. The terms and conditions under which a
conflict is terminated must address our underlying cause(s) of war. This calls
for planning based on the desired end state, ensuring that the long-term
political objective of the post - conflict environment is preserved following
conclusion of conflict. It should ensure that the terms and conditions imposed
on the adversary to cease hostilities are enduring.
28. Conflict termination is a facet of operational art. However, if the

duration and cost of war escalates, termination assumes strategic proportions.
Timing of terminating a military operation and to preserve achieved
advantage is a component of both strategy and operational art.
16
Military-An Instrument of
National Power
Section I
Military Instrument and Roles
Section II
Functions of Military Power
Conventional
Sub-Conventional
Non-Combat
Section III
Chapter 3
International Defence Cooperation & Diplomacy

Section IV
Application of Military Power
Section V
Direction of Military Instrument of Power
Section VI
Concepts of Military Power Application
Land Force Power
Sea Power
Air Power
Cyber Power
Space Power
Special Forces Operations
Section VII
Joint Operations
Air-Land Operations
Air Transport Operations
Air Borne Operations
Maritime-Air Operations
Amphibious Operations
Battle Space Awareness
CHAPTER 3
MILITARY - AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER
One must be clear when Diplomacy of persuasion must end and Diplomacy of
threat of force and force itself should be considered !
- K Subrahmanyam
Strategic Affairs Analyst
1. "Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for

defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its
prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilization" is given in
the Seventh Schedule (Article 246) List I of the Union List. The "Deployment
of any Armed Force of the Union or any other force subject to the control of the
Union, …" is also given in the Seventh Schedule. The spirit for employment of
the Armed Forces (Military Power) of the Union is towards the Defence of the
Union. Manifestations of the term 'Defence of India' are manifold,
elucidations of which are being translated into the employment of the Armed
Forces of the Union as described in this Chapter.
2. At any given point in time, India will be in one of the 'states' along the
spectrum of conflict ie peace, conflict or war or a combination thereof. When
we act in our National Interest, it involves the pursuit of political, economic,
ideological or cultural objectives. When the interests of India or its strategic
partners are in harmony, or are posed with no real or perceived threat from
adversaries, there is peace. However, when the actions or policies of an
adversary become a threat to our National Interests, a condition of conflict
arises.
3. 'Military Power' is one of the most versatile, flexible and adaptable

tool available with the Nation in such 'threat' situations and needs to be
employed correctly. It's employment must provide requisite options to
achieve the desired outcomes by our political leadership.
4. The nature of future warfare requires harmonious and synergistic

application of land, air and sea forces. Joint operations are the most essential
17
MILITARY – AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER
requirement of future wars and have to focus on the seamless application of

all available resources to shock, dislocate and overwhelm the belligerent. This
necessitates an intimate understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
each Service by the other two. An optimal impact is achieved by evolving a
Joint operational plan which effectively integrates all allocated resources.
Joint operations encompass all actions required to successfully achieve a
designated Joint objective(s) and involves activities relating to marshalling,
deploying and employing the allotted forces. It also includes the intelligence,
communication and logistic functions in support of such operations.
SECTION I - MILITARY INSTRUMENT AND ROLES
5. The Military Instrument consists of the three Armed Forces of the

Union - Indian Army (IA), Indian Navy (IN) and Indian Air Force (IAF) and
elements in support. The Military Instrument is characterised by two
fundamentals i.e. providing Insurance and Assurance to the Nation and its
employment towards these purposes. The Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India is about 'Defence of India'. 'Insurance' is towards that
purpose and embodies its people, territory and wealth in all forms. The second
fundamental - 'Assurance' is towards engagement in our current external and
internal challenges. To ensure these two fundamentals, the Military
instrument must remain razor sharp, lethal and precise.
6. The Armed Forces serve as the ultimate instrument for maintaining

the unity and the integrity of the Nation in the face of external threats and
internal unrest and disturbances. The major roles of the Armed Forces,
encompassing both domestic and international responsibilities are as follows : -
(a) Safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India

and preserve National Interests against any threat in the entire
spectrum of conflict by possessing and projecting a robust
deterrence capability or by application of force, as required.
(b) Assist civil authorities to cope with internal threats/

contingencies and provide necessary aid, when requested.
18
(c) Participate in peacekeeping operations and protect the global

commons under UN charter.
(d) Render military assistance including HADR to friendly

foreign countries, when requested.
(e) Progress military diplomacy to constructively engage with

defence forces of friendly foreign countries.
SECTION II - FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY POWER
Conventional
7. Conventional War will fall under the "Military Role'' and

encompasses the following operations :-
(a) Offensive Operations. The purpose of offensive operations

is to attain the desired end state and achieve decisive victory.
Offensive operations aim at addressing the adversary's centre of
gravity. This is achieved by attacking enemy's criticalities, either
simultaneously or sequentially. In the prevailing geo-political
environment, some critical planning parameters are maintaining a
perennially high degree of operational preparedness; capability to
mobilise swiftly for an early launch to rapidly achieve tangible gains.
Offensive operations will seek to seize the initiative from the enemy,
retain it and exploit the dividends accruing from such actions. These
operations will end when laid down objectives are achieved.
(b) Defensive Operations. A philosophy of pro-active defence

is most suited for India, considering its geo-political imperatives.
Defensive operations are necessary to guard territorial integrity and
vulnerabilities, ensure the security of own forces, secure bases for
launching strike forces and create favourable conditions for offensive
operations to be undertaken. It enables us to optimise time, hold
critical geographical space, facilitate other operations, hold, degrade
and destroy the enemy resources. Defensive operations will be
intrinsically aggressive in design and offensive in conduct.
19
Sub Conventional
8. Low Intensity Conflict Operations /Low Intensity Maritime

Operations. Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO)/ Low Intensity
Maritime Operation is a politico-military confrontation between contending
States or groups, below conventional war and above routine peaceful
competition among States. Proxy war is being waged against India, by an
inimical adversary, engineered through hybrid elements. Countering this
proxy war mandates concomitant capabilities and establishment of a robust
Counter Infiltration and Counter Terrorism Grid. Counter Proxy war is being
waged through a number of means viz political, economic, social, cultural,
psychological, informational and military. In combating Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC), the Military dimension is not dominant, as in conventional
war, but supportive - it is low profile, restrained and people-friendly nature. At
the tactical level, Military operations in LIC may include direct actions such as
raids, cordon and search, show of force etc. At operational and strategic level,
these operations are conducted for creating a situation conducive for
implementation of political, economic and psychological actions. The key
planning parameters for conduct of Joint operations in LICO would entail
joint planning, intelligence, communications, authority and utilisation of
assets.
Non-Combat
9. Aid to Civil Authority. Non-combat operations are conducted

primarily to assist the civil administration to meet sudden challenges to
internal peace and tranquillity, caused by local disturbances initiated through
a segment of population or due to natural or man-made calamities. Defence
Crises Management Group (DCMG) is the apex body to coordinate response
of the Armed Forces for all crises situations. The constitution of DCMG and
its mandate provides for and facilitates a well conceived and coordinated
response from the Indian Armed Forces. While the Armed Forces will be able
to deploy speedily, provide relief and bring the situation to a state manageable
by the civil administration, it must be noted that management of disasters is
primarily a State subject and the Armed Forces only assist the process of
stabilisation.
20
10. Maintenance of Law and Order. Amongst all the duties generally
performed by the Armed Forces in aid to civil authority, maintenance of law
and order is the most important and sensitive one. The levels of violence
encountered in such commitments have been progressively escalating. Under
such conditions, deployment and conduct of the Armed Forces has to be
thought through and planned meticulously bearing in mind prevailing
sensitivities. The Armed Forces work on the well established principles of
good faith, use of minimum force and prior warning to the people whenever
they are compelled to take action.
11. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. The Indian sub-

continent is home to 70% of the world's natural disasters like floods, droughts,
cyclones, earthquakes etc in addition to man-made. Man-made disasters
include global warming, wildfires, epidemics, etc. The impact of these
disasters is more pre-dominant in under-developed and remote areas, where
facilities to handle such calamities do not exist. Succour needs to be provided
to the affected population/people during disasters/distress situations by
rendering necessary assistance keeping in mind the following:-
(a) Humanitarian assistance should enhance National Security

Interests and therefore the operational readiness of the Armed Forces
performing such missions should be optimum at all times.
(b) The readiness will entail provisioning of medical care, basic

sanitation facilities, repair of public amenities and facilities,
education, training and technical assistance. This function will also be
performed by the Armed Forces (DCMG) in close coordination with
the National Disaster Response Force. It may be utilised in an
international situation, as also to address the needs of the Indian
diaspora abroad.
SECTION III – INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE COOPERATION &

DIPLOMACY
12. International Defence Cooperation. We will need to reach out and

build defence partnerships with countries, big and small. It is a vital element
for evolving extensive common standards in military terminology to military
equipment to operating standards to ensure complete and effective inter-
operability. It remains essential for us to also contribute to the security of other
States and the international system as a whole. International Defence
21
Cooperation is an imperative for building our capabilities to deal with our

envisaged current and emerging role in the international arena. Our military
representation at our Missions abroad need to be progressively enhanced to
make them consistent with our current and future objectives. Long-term and
annual objectives, for international cooperation/defence diplomacy, must be
drawn up in close consultation with Heads of Missions, Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD). Our military capabilities and
diplomacy should be leveraged towards achievement of our National Security
Objectives and the Armed Forces of the Union must remain essential to that
endeavour.
13. United Nations Operations. India's Armed Forces are an active

participant in UN peacekeeping missions and have earned the respect and
admiration of the world for being an impartial and professional Force.
Peacekeeping missions are formally established after a resolution is adopted
by the Security Council of the UN and a mandate to that effect is issued. Based
on the mandate, missions can be classified as peace-keeping (Chapter VI) or
peace-enforcement (Chapter VII) as spelt out in the UN Charter. Indian
Government directives and policies govern execution of this function by the
Armed Forces.
14. Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy is gaining increasing
importance in the modern day geo-political environment. It has emerged as an
effective option for both power projection and conflict resolution, albeit with
military power to back it up with deterrence and coerciveness. Defence
Diplomacy serves specific National foreign and security policy objectives.
Defence Diplomacy achieves foreign policy objectives by leveraging the
synergy in the Armed Forces. It promotes India's soft power and enhances
Nation's reputation as a responsible power. The emerging relationship
between military power and political purpose in our global strategy must be
contextualised to regional /international demands for our Military Services.
SECTION IV - APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER
15. Military Power will be applied whenever the designated roles of the
Armed Forces have to be fulfilled, at a place and time of our choosing. The
application of Military Power should be in continuation and through
integration with the other instruments of National Power (Diplomatic,
Economic, Information, etc). The application should reflect our National
values and beliefs conjoined with international norms and underpinned by our
National Interests.
22
16. Military Power should not be used - if the situation does not threaten
our National Interest; if it is not whole-hearted with adequate force level and
resource; have clearly defined political and military objectives; if we are
unwilling to re-assess at any stage, the balance between our committed forces
and objectives; the support of the Nation is absent and finally it should always
be an instrument of last resort.
SECTION V - DIRECTION OF MILITARY INSTRUMENT

OF POWER
17. The Command of the Armed Forces of the Union of India is vested
with the President of India, who is the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. Control of Military Power is exercised through the Prime Minister
(PM) and his council with specific responsibility assigned to the Defence
Minister (Raksha Mantri {RM}). The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)
which comprises the Chairman (senior most serving Chief of the three
Services) and the balance two Chiefs, exercise executive control on Joint
matters, while individual Service Chiefs exercise operational and
administrative control of their respective Services on respective Service
functioning. All executive actions of the Armed Forces are governed by
directives from the RM.
SECTION VI - CONCEPTS OF MILITARY POWER

xviii
APPLICATION
18. The concepts of Military Power application of the three Armed Forces
have congruence in the fact that manifestation of effect (consequent to force
application) ultimately has to fructify on land.
Land Force Power
19. The threat paradigm of large disputed land borders, directive to defend
territorial integrity and response options over the entire spectrum of conflict,
in the realm of defensive and offensive operations, guide the employment
philosophy of land forces.The overall force generation matrix is to be
achieved through optimum force structuring, modern equipment and
effective training across all types of terrain and climatic conditions. Land
forces can be employed singly or in conjunction with the other two Services
23
in conventional and sub-conventional role during Joint operations at a very

short notice. Capabilities through specialised forces are to be maintained to
fight persisting sub-conventional threats with timely re-orientation, for
conventional employment/deployment. Application of Land combat
potential/power by Land Forces will be aligned to the principles of war
through effective C2 on the battle field resulting in operational success.
20. Border Management. The various borders are manned on the

concept of 'one border one force'. The sanctity of international demarcated
borders is the responsibility of Central Armed Police Forces. The Line of
Control (LoC), Actual Ground Position Line and Line of Actual Control
(LAC) remain under the operational control of the Indian Army. During war,
all border guarding organisations come under the operational control of the
Army. Being the first tier of defence, their integration, training and operational
procedures must provide seamless transition to the war fighting effort. The
Indian Army consequent to its pan-India presence would also form part of the
security mechanism for coastal security.
Sea Power
21. Warfare has become exceedingly complex and includes multifarious

disciplines. The full range of operations in which a Nation's maritime forces
may be involved is extremely wide. Two specific and important concepts are
elucidated below :-
(a) Sea Control. Sea Control in single/joint operations implies, to

be in a position where one is able to use a defined sea area for a defined
period of time, for one's own purposes, and at the same time prevent an
adversary from using it for his advantagexix. Sea Control, in other
words, affords freedom of action to those who possess it but denies it
to those who do not. This is often the first step to begin, sustain and
support Joint operations like Amphibious Operations, Blockade and
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) protection/interdiction.
(b) Sea Denial. Sea Denial is a concept of denying the adversary the
use of the sea area for a certain period of time, while not attempting to
xx
control the sea itself .
24
Air Power
22. Air Power is employment of air power assets of the Nation to assert its
will through the medium of air to achieve National Security Objectives. Air
power with its intrinsic characteristics of speed, elevation and reach provides
tremendous strategic options. These strategies will be prosecuted by air
campaigns which comprise a variety of air operations. These operations will
be to deter, contain or defeat the enemy's air power. Counter air, strategic air
(including space) and counter surface force operations are the three elements
of air strategy with combat enabling operations forming the fourth pillar. The
flexibility, versatility, speed, and reach of modern aerial platforms and
weapons will allow a Commander to conduct parallel/inter-dependent
operations by prosecuting all campaigns simultaneously as also engage
enemy surface targets, within and outside the battle space. All the air
campaigns can be conducted independently, parallel with, or in support of
surface/maritime operations.
Cyber Power
23. Cyber Power is the ability to use cyberspace freely and securely to
gain an advantage over the adversary while denying the same to him in various
operational environments, and by applying the instruments of National Power.
In the globalised world economy of today, cyberspace has probably become
the single-most important factor that provides necessary linkages, stores
information, facilitates business transactions and acts as an effective medium
for instant delivery of services. Therefore, it forms an ideal platform for
expediting the development processes and proliferating the benefits to the
masses instantly. The high value cyber assets make the Critical Information
Infrastructures of the Nation, which must be protected at all costs, to enable
the core and routine state businesses function uninterrupted.
Space Power
24. Space is a medium like land, sea, air and cyber through which various
activities are likely to expand in the future. Emergence of space power is
analogous to conventional land, sea or air power that will mark it out as a
'Revolution in Military Affairs'. Space bestows immense force multiplication
25
capability on the Armed Forces, and the dependence on space assets for
military operation is rapidly increasing. Currently, India's space capabilities
are mostly driven by civil and commercial requirements, steps for exploitation
of space for military applications are being undertaken. Leveraging space
power would include protection of our National space assets and exploitation
of space to enable defence capabilities across the conflict spectrum.
Special Forces Operations
25. Special Forces operations will be conducted in support of offensive

and/or defensive operations. Operations are to be conducted by specially
selected troops of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) who are
trained, equipped and organised to operate in hostile territory in all
dimensions - land, air and sea; and can also be employed isolated from the
main combat forces. Special Forces of the - Army are designated for
operations in all dimensions; Navy are mandated for operations in the
Maritime domain; and Air Force are mandated for protection of critical air
bases/assets. Such Forces may operate independently or in conjunction with
other Forces at the Operational level. They are versatile, have a deep reach,
can make precision strikes at targets of critical importance and must be
provided access to the maximum possible intelligence inputs relevant to the
task while maintaining absolute security in respect of their intended
employment. The principles of 'direct control' and 'mission command' will be
exercised during their employment. Special Forces units will be tasked to
develop area specialisation in their intended operational theatres to achieve an
optimum effect.
SECTION VII – JOINT OPERATIONS
Air- Land Operations
26. The aim of Air-Land operations is to seek and strike deep to

destroy/degrade the adversary forces at each stage of battle. This enables own
land forces to quickly capture the designated objective(s) with the least
26
number of battle casualties. Successful prosecution of these operations

depend on the following : -
(a) Availability of real time intelligence of the adversary forces.
(b) Surprising and shocking the adversaries' forces through

concentration of firepower on the objective(s).
(c) Simultaneity and depth in operation(s).
27. Land forces will carry out offensive and defensive operations based
on the directives of the controlling authority. Speed and reach of air power will
be utilised for rapid engagement of enemy surface targets within and outside
the battle space. Air power would also be tasked to destroy/degrade the
adversaries' air power so as to remove/minimise any interference in operations
by own land forces.
Air Transport Operations
28. Air transport operations comprise of both strategic and tactical airlift.
Such operations allow for effective and timely mobilisation of Land and Air
forces where surface transportation is inadequate. Such operations are also
executed when time is limited to undertake Special Operations. Similarly air
maintenance operations by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft play a vital role
in sustenance of combat troops in areas inaccessible by surface transportation.
These also help sustain Airborne/Heliborne forces till a link up is affected. The
Air Force undertakes Special Operations whenever required for inserting
troops into enemy territory to carry out operations.
Airborne Operations
29. Airborne operations are conducted in hostile territory for executing an

assault landing from the air either independently or in conjunction with other
operations. It can be at the strategic or operational level. Airborne operations
achieve simultaneity of force application. It provides an opportunity to gain a
27
foothold across obstacle systems in conditions where other land forces will
require considerably longer time to be effective. Surprise and Deception plays
a vital role in success of airborne operations. Airborne operations could
involve one or more of the following :-
(a) Airborne Assault. Forces are para-dropped into an objective

area. These forces require specialised training for the task.
(b) Air Landed. Combat forces are landed by fixed wing/rotary

wing aircraft near the objective area.
(c) Special Heliborne Operations. These are operations

wherein helicopters are used for insertion and extraction of
combat forces, both by day and night.
Maritime Air Operations
30. The Maritime Air Operations (MAO) will be carried out based on the
requirement projected by the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence
(Navy) {IHQ-MoD (N)}, related to the operations being conducted at sea. The
IHQ-MoD (N) and Air HQ will consult each other and issue directives to their
Naval/Air Command(s). MAO will be directed against targets at sea or enemy
naval facilities ashore, as follows:-
(a) Attack against Targets at Sea. Detection and identification

of targets at sea is the responsibility of the Navy through the
Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft and other naval sensors.
The naval forces at sea will use their integral firepower including
the Air arm to destroy/neutralise the target. Based on Joint plans,
aircraft of the IAF will be tasked to attack the target in conjunction
with the ship/MR aircraft of the Navy. The aircraft could also
operate in a stand-alone mode.
(b) Attacks against Enemy Naval assets Ashore. Attacks

against enemy naval assets ashore will be coordinated with the
28
naval operations at sea. Coordinated strike along with Air Force could be
planned to bear concentrated firepower upon the enemy. Certain strategic
targets like oil terminals at sea or dockyards may also be targeted in
conjunction with Naval surface fire support to aid the overall aim.
Amphibious Operations
31. Strategic payoffs in a conflict will be predominantly influenced

through results of action on land. This is achieved jointly with other elements
of National and Military power. Amphibious operations are Joint Military
operations wherein land power is projected ashore from the sea. Amphibious
operations may be conducted in order to capture or re-capture territories,
obtain a site for an advance naval base or air base, deny the use of an area or
facilities like a port to the enemy, further land operations from ashore, or to
show presence.
Battle Space Awareness
32. Reconnaissance and Surveillance of land/maritime/air battle domains

will be conducted utilising a broad spectrum of ground, sea, air and space
based sensors. Inputs of strategic reconnaissance using aerial platforms and
satellites will also be made available/exploited. Emphasis is to be placed on
timely evaluation and dissemination of intelligence data to the concerned
agencies with an intention of shortening the observation to engagement cycle.
CONCLUSION
33. The continuum of operations in which the Nation's Armed Forces

may be deployed synergistically extends from 'war' at one end to 'aid to civil
authorities' at the other end. The application of Military Power should be
directed towards synchronization and integration of various elements of
29
combat power so that their effects complement and reinforce each other. The
force structures should cater for assurance, deterrence and war fighting in the
entire spectrum of conflict.
30
Higher Defence Organisation
Section I
Ministry of Defence
Principal Task
Role and Responsibilities
Section II
Apex Security Authority
Cabinet Committee on Security
National Security Council
Chapter 4
Section III
Chiefs of Staff Committee
Responsibility
Secretariat of Chairman COSC
Section IV
Apex Military Authorities
HQ Integrated Defence Staff
Integrated HQ of MoD (Army)
Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy)
Air Headquarters
Section V
Command and Control
Section VI
Nuclear Command Authority
Section VII
Diagrammatic Representation-Higher Defence Organisation
Conclusion
CHAPTER 4
HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION
The phrase Higher Defence Management usually conjures up images of

only the Military but this is not correct as Defence Management
encompasses much more. No doubt, the Indian Military is a significant
player in this endeavour but unless all Instruments of the Nation are
brought together, the concept of Higher Defence will remain incomplete.
- Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd)
1. The Government of India (GoI) is responsible for ensuring the

'Defence of India' and every part thereof. The Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces of the Union of India is vested with the President of India who
is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. National Defence is to be
managed through Cabinet Control which implies that PM has to get Cabinet
approval for every significant decision, both during peace and war. The
secretarial aspect for this function is discharged through the MoD which
provides the policy frame work and necessary wherewithal to the Armed
Forces to discharge their responsibilities in the Defence of the Nation. The
RM is the head of the MoD.
SECTION I - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Principal Task
2. The Ministry of Defence acts as an interface between Armed Forces

and other Ministries/Departments/ the Parliament. The principal task of the
MoD is to obtain policy directions of the Government on all defence and
security related matters and communicate them for implementation to the
Service Headquarters (SHQs), Inter-Service Organisations, Production
Establishments, Research and Development (R&D) Organisations, etc. The
MoD is accountable to Parliament for all expenditure and responds to all
debates concerning Defence. The Ministry also arranges finances and
wherewithal for the Armed Forces.
31
Roles & Responsibilities
3. The roles and responsibilities of the MoD Secretariatxxi comprising of

four Departments are defined in the Government of India (Allocation of
Business Rules - 1961) {as amended upto 01 Oct 2016}. The departments and
their responsibilities in brief are as follows :-
(a) Department of Defence. The Department of Defence or

Raksha Vibhag is responsible for the 'Defence of India' and every part
thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be
conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to
effective demobilisation.
(b) Department of Defence Production. The Department of

Defence Production or Raksha Utpadan Vibhag controls all defence
related Public Sector Undertakings like Ordnance Factories Board
and Ordinance Factories, Hindustan Aeronautical Limited, Bharat
Electronics Limited, Mazagon Docks Limited, Director General
Quality Assurance, Defence Exports etc.
(c) Department of Defence Research and Development. The

Department of Defence Research and Development or Raksha
Anusandhan Tatha Vikas Vibhag is responsible for apprising,
assessing and advising the RM on the influence of science and
technology on National Security. It also renders advice to the RM and
the three Services on scientific aspects of defence equipment.
(d) Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare. The Department of

Ex-Servicemen Welfare or Poorv Senani Kalyan Vibhag is
responsible for all matters relating to Armed Forces Veterans
including pensioners, matters relating to Directorate General of
Resettlement and Kendriya Sainik Board.
SECTION II - APEX SECURITY AUTHORITY
Cabinet Committee on Security
4. This is the highest body at the apex level and is responsible for
32
taking all decisions on every aspect of security. Defence policy decisions and
directives are determined by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS),
through which the GoI exercises political control over the Armed Forces.
Towards this end, it is prudent that congruence in the two time-tested
institutions exists/is built upon for a right balance of unambiguous political
control, as dwelt upon at Appendix 'B' on ''Civil-Military Relations''.
5. The Committee also decides on Defence related expenditure, matters

of National Security and approves significant appointments. The Committee
is chaired by the PM and includes the Cabinet Ministers of Defence, Home,
External Affairs and Finance. Other Cabinet ministers attend as special
invitees, whenever required. In addition, the Chairman COSC (Ch COSC) and
the Service Chiefs are in attendance, on as required basis. Similarly, the
Cabinet Secretary or any other Secretary to the GoI will attend, whenever
required. The CCS is assisted in decision making with inputs from various
agencies. Some of the important agencies are appended in the succeeding
paragraphs.
National Security Council
6. The National Security Council (NSC) is the core agency of the

Government that fuses the elements of National Power. The seven member
Council is a Cabinet level body chaired by the PM. It consists of the Ministers
of Home Affairs, Defence, External Affairs, Finance, National Security
Advisor (NSA), Deputy NSA and the Deputy Chairman of the National
xxii
Institution for Transforming India (NITI Ayog) . The NSA is the Chief
Executive of the NSC and acts as points-man to service the Council. It deals
with all issues that threaten or have the potential to threaten India's external
and internal security. NSC is in effect an advisory body. The authority for
execution of directives lies firmly with the Ministries. The Council and its
associated structures are expected to focus primarily on a multi-disciplinary
approach to security issues, long and medium range assessment of threats,
challenges and opportunities. The NSC comprises three structures - the
Strategic Policy Group (SPG), the National Security Advisory Board
(NSAB), and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), as follows :-
(a) NSCS. The NSCS is a specialised unit under the direct charge
33
of the NSA in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The NSA is the
primary advisor to the PM on National and International security
affairs and strategic issues. All Ministries/Departments consult the
NSCS on matters having a bearing on National Security. It is headed
by Deputy to the NSA, who acts as the Member Secretary to the
NSCS.
(b) Strategic Policy Group. The 16 member Strategic Policy

Group (SPG), comprising the Chiefs of the three Services, heads of
important security related Ministries, and Chiefs of the major
intelligence agencies. It is the principal mechanism for inter-
Ministerial coordination and integration of relevant inputs in the
formulation of National Security policies. The Cabinet Secretary
chairs the SPG.
(c) National Security Advisory Board. The National Security

Advisory Board (NSAB) comprises a nominated convenor and other
people of eminence outside the government with expertise in various
fields. NSAB advises the Security Council on the issues of National
Security.
SECTION III - CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
Responsibility
7. COSC is a forum for Service Chiefs to discuss matters having a

bearing on the activities of all the three Services and to advise MoD
accordingly. It is responsible for ensuring readiness of the Indian Armed
Forces, in all respects, to meet National Security Objectives as laid down by
the political authority. The COSC renders advice on all National Security
issues to the RM. The Ch COSC provides the link between the political
leadership and the Armed Forces. The senior most Chief is the Chairman and
is 'first among equals'.
Secretariat/General Assistance
8. The Ch COSC and COSC are assisted in functioning by the
34
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS), which is headed by the

Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman COSC (CISC). CISC is the
non-voting member in the COSC.
SECTION IV - APEX MILITARY AUTHORITIES
HQ Integrated Defence Staff
9. HQ IDS is a Tri-Service Organisation. The Ch COSC, supported by

the secretarial staff of HQ IDS interacts with the SHQs, other Ministries and
Departments. HQ IDS is presently functioning as staff in an advisory role to
the Ch COSC, and is headed by CISC.
Integrated HQ of MoD (Army)
10. The Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), a four-star officer in the rank of
General, commands the Indian Army (IA). As a major component of National
Power, the primary responsibility of the Army is to preserve National Interests
and safeguard our sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against
external or internal aggression through deterrence or by waging war.
Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy)
11. The Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), a four-star officer in the rank of
Admiral, commands the Indian Navy (IN). The Navy is the principal
instrument and manifestation of the maritime power of our Nationxxiii . The
raison d'être of the Navy is to safeguard our maritime frontiers, and ensure the
use of the seas for India's legitimate sovereign purposes, whilst concurrently
guarding against inimical use of the sea by others. The Navy plays a central
role in safeguarding and promoting India's security and National Interests in
the maritime domain.
Air HQ
12. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), a four-star officer in the rank of Air
Chief Marshal, commands the Air Force. The primary objective of
35
IAF is safeguarding Indian airspace and National Interests from all air threats
in conjunction with the other wings of the Armed Forces. The IAF provides
specific battlefield air support to the IA and the IN and also caters to their
strategic and tactical airlift requirements.
SECTION V - COMMAND AND CONTROL
13. Our C2 is underpinned by a philosophy of centralised intent and

decentralized execution - this enables freedom of action and initiative. The
spirit in the concept remains to describe the 'what' and not specify the 'way'.
14. At strategic level, the political leadership is expected to provide the

Higher Directive and set the overall goals for military operations and
Operations Other Than War in political terms. The CCS decides, thereupon
authorises the COSC for the use of force and providing direction on the
conditions, purpose and any constraints while applying such force.
15. At the operational level, the COSC/SHQ/HQ IDS, will translate the
higher directives from the CCS/RM into military outline plans for achieving
the military goals within the constraints specified. The Joint Operational
Directive of the Chairman COSC to the SHQs would also determine the
actions to be undertaken by the land, maritime and air forces in order to
achieve the common aim. The planning/directives in respect of the joint
conventional operations and special joint operations would be separate; the
planning process in both the contingencies would however be the same.
16. The SHQ would then allocate the resources based on aforesaid
guidelines, and issue directives to the respective Service Command HQs for
the conduct of operations. The respective Service Command HQ would plan
and coordinate Joint operations through a detailed process of planning and
integration process with available/allocated resources.
SECTION VI - NUCLEAR COMMAND AUTHORITY
17. The broad framework of India's Nuclear Doctrine drafted by the
36
NSAB has laid out our robust C2 structure to ensure our credibility in nuclear
deterrence. The framework emphasizes Nuclear weapons shall be tightly
controlled and released for use at the highest political level. An effective and
survivable C2 with requisite flexibility and responsiveness is in place. The
overall C2 structure ensures maximum restraint in employment with an
effective interface between civilian and military leaders.
18. The NCA is a two layered structure - the Political Council (PC)
assisted by an Executive Council (EC). The NCA is responsible for the
deployment, control and safety of nuclear assets. Chaired by the Prime
Minister, the PC is the only body empowered to take a decision on nuclear
issues while the ultimate decision to authorize the use of nuclear weapons rests
solely with the PMxxiv . The EC is chaired by the NSA, provides the necessary
inputs for effective decision making by the PC and is responsible for executing
directives received from the PC. The Service Chiefs are members of the EC.
Alternative chains of command for retaliatory strikes exist for all
eventualities.
19. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) manages the nuclear arsenal
and comprises representatives of the three Services besides civilian staff,
experts from Indian Atomic Energy Commission and missile experts from
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The tri-service
SFC, is the NCA's operational arm, having its own Commander-in-Chief
reporting to the COSC as well as National Security Advisor (NSA), and
controls all of India's nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
20. The defining issues for Nuclear C2 is to maintain a credible minimum

deterrence; no first use; civilian authorization; and dispersed arsenal structure
to ensure option to retaliate is available xxv.
SECTION VII - DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION -

21. Higher Defence Organisation. The Higher Defence Organisation
37
at the National level is diagrammatically represented below :-
NUCLEAR COMMAND CABINET COMMITTEE ON

AUTHORITY SECURITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RAKSHA MANTRI
HOME
NATIONAL MINISTER
NATIONAL STRATEGIC
SECURITY
SECURITY POLICY
ADVISORY
ADVISOR GROUP EXTERNAL
BOARD
AFFAIRS
MINISTER
FINANCE
MINISTER
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
COSC COAS CNS CAS
STRATEGIC FORCES HQ IDS

COMMAND
CONCLUSION
22. Reforms in HDO is an ongoing process and will foster further inter-
Service coordination in planning, execution of operations and force planning.
The system will intensify faster decision making during crises, and provide a
platform for Jointness /Integration of the Armed Forces.
23. The shapes and contours of future conflicts have undergone radical
metamorphosis and the dynamics of external and internal developments have
expanded the epicentres of our Nation's strategic concerns. Therefore, the
exercise of shaping the future calls for a blend of continuity and newer
innovation. The Higher Defence Organisation C2 therefore will need to
continually evolve and adapt to our National Security Aims, Objectives and
Interests.
38
Integrated and Joint Structures
Section I
Understanding Integration and Jointness
Section II
Integration/Joint Operations Structures
Section III
Integrated Planning Structure
Chapter 5
Section IV
Integrated Intelligence Structure
Section V
Integrated Training Structure
Section VI
Integrated Logistics Structure
Section VII
Integrated Human Resource Development Structure
Section VIII
Integrated Procurement
Section IX
Integrated Perspective Planning
Section X
Integrated Strategic Structures : Emerging Triad
CHAPTER 5
INTEGRATED AND JOINT STRUCTURES
The Bangladesh war demonstrated that the three Services working closely
together were strong and decisive in their actions. Inter-Services cooperation
was indeed the most important lesson of that war.
- Air Chief Marshal PC Lal (Retd)
1. Our growing National Security needs require a clear, unifying, and

comprehensively evaluated conceptual thought process that is agile to
respond to multi-faceted challenges. The continuous and dynamic state of
change entrusts upon our structures the need to remain constantly adaptive,
optimal and efficient. The limitation of resources and the constant restraint on
resource availability entails developing of Joint/Integrated structures. In
today's environment, there is an emphasis on cohesive operations as it is a
proven best practice in which all Services and organisations, within our
country, act in concert, facilitating cross leverage of capacities and fostering
greater inter-operability without diluting individual Service/organisational
expertise or ethos.
SECTION I - UNDERSTANDING INTEGRATION

AND JOINTNESS
2. Jointness. Jointness implies or denotes possessing an optimised

capability to engage in Joint War-Fighting and is not limited to just Joint-War
Fighting (Joint Operations). The attention to detail is in the placing of the
hyphen. It needs to be clearly understood and discerned that Jointness is a
'Concept', whereas Joint operations are evolutions. Joint operations as well as
single-Service operations are sub-sets of the larger whole of 'conceptual
Jointness'. Cooperative centralised planning enables appropriate
concentration of forces, with the right mix at the right time and place. With
Jointness, a high level of cross-domain synergy is attained and vastly
39
enhances success potential, resulting in maintenance of high morale,

camaraderie and spirit. Jointness needs active investment; Commanders need
to invest in people, time and resources to develop Jointness amongst personnel
of the Armed Forces.
3. Integration. The more common use of the term 'Integration' in

contemporary Military matters is in reference to the integration of 'processes'
across all operational domains of land, air, maritime, cyberspace and
aerospace, towards optimisation of costs and enhancing readiness. Integration
is embodied across all functions; Operations, Intelligence, Technology
Management, Perspective Plans, Logistics, Human Resources Development
(HRD). It does not imply physical integration. Such embodiment enables
common understanding leading to efficient and optimised responses. Beyond
the Armed Forces, it also requires collaboration with the Diplomatic,
Economic and Information instruments of the National Power, at all levels -
strategic, operational and tactical. An Integrated approach comprises, pro-
active engagement and shared understanding to bring distinct professional
technical and cultural disciplines of entities and sub-entities together; this
approach requires structures to be developed to further 'shared understanding'.
4. An assessment of Integrated Military Power is enabled through inter-

woven structures that are integrated and deployed viz, human, institutional
and doctrinal. Integrated structures enable optimising resources and outputs;
optimising Service expertise collectively through net assessments and
doctrinal precepts; build professionalism - right man for the job; decentralise
command and decision making; and support accountability and responsibility
through authority.
5. The foregoing necessitates that structures associated with functions

like operations, planning, intelligence, training, logistics, human resource
development, force structuring and procurement should essentially be
'Integrated' and 'Joint' in our context. Each function is being dealt with in
subsequent Sections.
SECTION II -INTEGRATED/JOINT OPERATION STRUCTURES
6. Our concept of operations is guided by a set of directives issued
40
by the COSC based on the aim(s) of war laid down by the Government.
Directions and political end-states are communicated by the CCS to the
COSC in form of RM's Operational Directive. These would be converted into
attainable Military aims and objectives. Keeping in view the role and mis
sion of each Service, the COSC will plan out an integrated course of action,
without losing the uniqueness and special attributes of each Service, to attain
the desired end-state. The COSC would decide upon Joint Military Objectives
and resource allocation for cross-domain requirements. Course(s) of Action
(CoA) will be deliberated upon and best CoA will be jointly decided by the
COSC. Decision of COSC will be promulgated as COSC Joint Operational
Directive to facilitate Joint Planning.
7. For effectiveness of Joint Operations, the concurrent need for a

detailed Joint Planning and its efficacy will need to be kept in mind. The key
facets of any Military operation are synchronisation and integration of
various elements of combat power so that their effects complement and
reinforce each other. Conceptually, Joint and Integrated Operations imply
enunciation of the 'ways' and 'means' of conducting Integrated and Joint
actions with a singular aim of synergising and enhancing the war fighting
capability of Joint Service components, so as to achieve a quick and decisive
victory with least cost to life and material.
8. The Joint Operations Committee (JOCOM) is the integrated structure

at strategic level under the COSC to conduct and plan operations. The Joint
organisation available at the Service Command HQs, Advance HQ (Air
Force), Maritime Air Operations Centre (Air Force), etc will be responsible
for the conduct of joint operations at the operational level. Interfaces for Joint
operations at the tactical level are the Tactical Air Centers , Ground Liaison
Sections and Maritime Element of Air Force.
9. The single Service planning process, detailed planning, and

execution would continue to be the responsibility of the SHQs, however they
will need to be in sync with the broad integrated plan enunciated in the COSC
Joint Operational Directive.
SECTION III - INTEGRATED PLANNING STRUCTURE
10. The planning of operations is an essential function of Command.
41
C2, through effective organisations and structures, synchronises activity.

Complex operations demand a C2 philosophy that does not rely upon precise
control, and is able to function despite uncertainty, disorder and adversity. C2
enables a Commander to identify and manage risk while exploiting
opportunity to convert 'intent' into 'effect'.
11. In light of the above, it is the Commander who must direct and guide
the planning process assisted by his staff. The planning for employment of
Joint forces commences with centralised understanding of mission, objective,
purpose, intent and the desired end state by each Service. A deliberate,
collective and conscious planning process is effected for operations across the
spectrum of conflict, for execution during war or in emergency situations
during peace.
12. The central structure responsible for planning Joint operations is the
JOCOM, under the directives of the COSC. COSC initiates the planning
process on directives from the CCS/RM. Planning for conventional
operations at the Operational Level would involve the Service Command HQs
for exercising already worked out contingencies. In case of Special Joint
Operations, the COSC issues the Joint Operational Directive to the SHQs or
HQ IDS. However the planning process in both the contingencies essentially
remains the same and is as follows : -
(a) Issue of Joint Operational Directive by COSC to SHQ/ HQ

IDS.
(b) SHQ allocates resources based on COSC directive and own

commitments.
(c) Command HQ/ C-in-Cs receive directives from SHQ based

on COSC Directive along with allocated forces.
(d) Inter-Service components work out a Joint plan for

contingencies listed in the SHQ directives.
(e) Work out plan for Joint operations for all contingencies.
(f) Planning process is designed to synergise and enhance

capability of war fighting of Joint Service Components.
42
SECTION IV – INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE
13. The principal role of intelligence agencies would be similar viz, to

support National Aims and Objectives. Before the conduct of Joint operations,
intelligence collection, collation and dissemination under a central agency
assumes greater significance. Tri-Service military intelligence organisation,
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) synergises the efforts of the intelligence
agencies of the three Services. DIA also coordinates with other National
agencies involved in gathering external and internal intelligence and provides
requisite intelligence support to the Armed Forces.
14. The DIA is responsible for providing integrated intelligence inputs on

defence issues to the RM, Chairman COSC, Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air
Staff, CISC and the NSCS. The roles of DIA are :-
(a) Acquire intelligence and prepare integrated analyses and

assessments.
(b) Manage inter-Service technological intelligence

organisations like Defence Image Processing Analysis Centre
(DIPAC) and Signal Intelligence.
(c) Provide integrated intelligence support for Joint Operations.
(d) Provide satellite imagery in support of HADR operations.
15. The three Services have their respective intelligence organisations.

These organisations collect and collate intelligence required for Service
specific operations and disseminate it to Commanders at all levels.
16. Coordination with civilian and Para-Military Agencies (PMA) like

Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau and Intelligence
organisations of the Para-Military Forces as part of the Joint Intelligence
Committee under the NSA is an imperative to our intelligence function and
structure.
43
SECTION V - INTEGRATED TRAINING STRUCTURE
17. The nature of war demands that the Services fight as an integrated
cohesive force. Rapid advances in technology necessitate forces on land, sea
and air to reinforce and complement each other to achieve the objectives set
forth. War needs to be conducted in such a manner that the Land, Air and Naval
Commanders jointly formulate, orchestrate and implement war plans. In order
to fight together they need to train jointly. Hence, there is an essential need to
have a common understanding of military history, doctrines, concepts and
contemporary conflict environment; understand each others' Service
competence, capabilities, strengths and limitations; constantly improve the
control and coordination amongst the elements of the Services at tactical,
operational and strategic levels thereby synergising the operational
capabilities of each Service to produce a "force multiplier" effect in conduct of
operations across the spectrum of conflict.
18. The structures responsible for organising Joint Training are HQ IDS,
SHQs, Service Training Commands, Joint and Single Service Training
Institutes and Operational Commands of the Services. HQ IDS is responsible
for conducting and coordinating joint training through the Joint Training
Committee (JTC). Joint training without troops is coordinated by Doctrine,
Organisation and Training Branch while training with troops to include
synthetic/simulated and live training, is coordinated by Operations Branch,
HQ IDS. In addition, each SHQ oversees conceptual, directional and
functional aspects of training in co-ordination with their Training
Directorates/Training Commands and Operational Commands. For Bi-
Service Joint training at theatre level and below, SHQs and field formations
establish linkages with each other.
19. The Armed Forces Training Institutes (AFTIs) function under the
supervision of HQ IDS, while the training institutes of the Service function
under the Training Commands/HQ of the respective Service HQ. HQ IDS
interacts with all the three Services and their Training Commands for
coordination of Joint training. In order to make the best use of existing training
institutes managed by individual Services, Joint training is to be conducted at
these institutions on the basis of a 'Lead Service' concept.
44
The COSC decides the lead service for such Joint training concepts and HQ
IDS promulgates it. The resource management and administrative cover for
such institutes is to be provided by the parent SHQ, while the training
curriculum is to be decided through mutual agreement among the Services
under the overall policy guidelines laid down by HQ IDS, duly ratified by the
JTC. The arrangement should be continuously refined and augmented
towards enhancing Joint training, qualitatively and quantitatively.
20. Joint Training Committee. The Committee comprises the heads of

the training divisions of the three Services under the chairmanship of Deputy
Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Doctrine, Organisation & Training), HQ
IDS. This committee examines and recommends policy/executive decisions
in respect of Joint training and AFTIs, for the consideration of COSC. All
major decisions requiring concurrence of the three Services with respect to
joint training are presented to this Committee.
21. Joint Strategic Military Education/Think Tanks.
(a) Indian National Defence University. Indian National

Defence University (INDU) is being set up as a fully autonomous
institution to be constituted under an Act of Parliament. The aim of
INDU is to inculcate and promote co-ordination and interaction not
just among the three Services but also between them and other
agencies of the government like civil bureaucracy, PMAs and
intelligence agencies. It would develop and propagate higher
education in defence studies, defence management, defence
technology, defence acquisition/procurements and promote policy
oriented research on all aspects related to National Security. It would
impart education to authorities/leadership related with the business of
National Security, create synergy between academic community and
government functionaries and encourage awareness of National
Security issues by reaching out to scholars and the audience beyond
the official machinery. The establishment would also be one of the
vital links inculcating Joint strategic thinking within the National
Security management machinery at all levels.
45
(b) Centre of Joint Warfare Studies. A Centre of Joint Warfare

Studies was established at HQ IDS in the year 2007. The think tank is
primarily chartered for conduct of studies and research in joint war-
fighting and promotion of Jointmanship amongst the Services,
Ministries and other agencies involved in National Security.
SECTION VI - INTEGRATED LOGISTICS STRUCTURE

22. Organisational structures need to be based on technology, concepts,
transportation, information, and logistics systems. These aspects
fundamentally shape the way the Services are supported and sustained during
operations. Application of latest technologies reduces bottlenecks that impede
fighting forces. Presently, logistics systems of the Services function
independently. Formal structures for integrated or Joint logistics are
underway and will mature in due course of time.
23. The current structure involves the Joint Operational Logistics

Committee which is responsible for progressing Joint operational logistic
issues with representatives from the Services. The Committee also provides
inputs for COSC directives on Joint operational logistics.
24. Some of the logistical functions, which are static in nature, are
integrated for providing support to the three Services viz, Medical Services,
Military Engineering Services, Postal Services, Embarkation Headquarters
and Canteen Stores Departments. The Army Central Ordnance Depots supply
common use items such as ammunition, vehicles, general stores and clothing
to the Services. This integrated logistics system has resulted in economy and
unity of effort.
SECTION VII - INTEGRATED HUMAN RESOURCE

DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURE
25. The Indian Armed Forces provide a distinctive strand in the multi-
hued fabric of our Nation through high standards of integrity, professionalism
and excellence. The core strength of the Armed Forces is 'human resource' -
the officers, men and women, who exemplify the collective ethos, 'Service
Before Self'. The aim of HRD programs (which are sequenced throughout an
individual's career) in the Armed Forces are to impart skills and
46
knowledge necessary for each progressive rank and appointment held by the
individual. The objective is to prepare officers/men for present and future
conflicts'.
26. While training institutes do provide training at various stages of career

development of an officer, Indian Armed Forces are making considerable
headway towards formalising an integrated HRD structure.
27. The personnel of the Indian Armed Forces are its most valuable asset
and the main enablers of success in all Military operations. Lessons learnt
from history indicate, without exception, that the man behind the machine is
more important. Maintenance of morale in the Armed Forces is also vital for
the Nation. In an economically flourishing India and a world that is
increasingly more transparent and shrunk in time, space and information
flow, aspirations of personnel in the Armed Forces, like the Nation at large,
need diligent consideration. There is a paramount need to factor this as part of
the overall approach to Jointness and Integration in the Armed Forces. To
achieve 'Jointness', it is essential that personnel from the three Services serve
together in organisations across the military-strategic, operational and
tactical levels in command and staff functions. Service by personnel in Joint
organisation is an essential enabler to wider understanding of 'Joint' and
'Integrated' philosophy and concepts.
28. There is a spirit inherent in the Indian Armed Forces that make its
members stand apart. This spirit typically embodies the motivation with
which citizens choose to serve in the Armed Forces. The total commitment of
Indian Armed Forces, both during peace and war is marked by military ethos,
traditions, ceremonies, and other key intangibles inherent in it. The Indian
Armed Forces personnel serve in unity and cohesively achieve the desired
effects in operations. They serve within the legislative, regulatory and societal
frameworks of the Nation, fully aligned with values and social expectations of
the people and government. An apolitical nature of the Indian Armed Forces is
revered by the Nation which often makes it the final bastion in all kinds of
crises or adversities.
29. This unflinching devotion of the Indian Armed Forces needs to be

preserved by the Nation by recognising - the extra demands of life in the
Armed Forces and sacrifices made in defending the Nation's sovereignty.
47
SECTION VIII - INTEGRATED PROCUREMENT
30. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by the RM is the

integrated structure to screen and finalise all procurements and acquisitions by
the Indian Armed Forces.
SECTION IX - INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE PLANNING
31. The Armed Forces Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan covers a
period of fifteen years. It charts the size and shape of the Forces over that
designated time period based on foreseeable strategic trends.
SECTION X - INTEGRATED STRATEGIC STRUCTURES:

EMERGING TRIAD
32. An overarching role of Information Warfare (including cyberspace),

space and special operations in support of modern day military operations at
strategic, operational and tactical levels require integrated structures to enable
calibration and coordination of operations in these domains.
33. The emerging challenges today have added a new 'triad' to the
traditional mediums of Land, Sea and Air, wherein future wars are likely to be
fought, viz in the domains of Space, Cyber and Special Operations. Towards
meeting our strategic objectives, initial steps to develop our 'triad' are already
underway, with the steps being initiated for establishment of the 'Defence
Cyber Agency', 'Defence Space Agency' and 'Special Operations Division'.
The synergy from the 'triad' is to enhance our capability, economise
expenditure and enable a harmonised,evaluated and objective Tri-Service
advice mechanism.
34. Information today is an 'overload' and is critical to all operations;

therefore emphasis on cyber including cyberspace and communication is
critical, as it is the backbone of all functions. A comprehensive Cyber force
structure drives capabilities in cyber war fighting and wins Network Centric
Wars (NCW). Exploiting information technology and Integrated
48
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Information and Intelligence systems will win battles. A
survivable secure and alternate means of communication for smooth flow of
data and information, effective networking and inter-Service integration,
automation and inter-operability is quintessential today. As part of the
military's pursuit of capacity building for NCW, the recently launched
Integrated Defence Communication Network (DCN) will enable all the stake
holders to share situational awareness for a faster decision making process.
35. Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency is the nodal

agency mandated in dealing with all cyber security needs of the Tri-Services
and MoD. Cyber defence structures envisage monitoring of own cyberspace at
the metadata level, real-time detection of threats in data flow, identifying
types and sources of threats and responding suitably to limit and mitigate the
adverse impact. The necessary crisis management plans are being
incorporated to deal with the potential fallout. The efforts undertaken by
various stakeholders are synchronised by NSCS through the National Cyber
Coordination Centre under Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology. It is entrusted with the responsibility of coordination,
identification and mitigation of cyber risks, threats and vulnerabilities.
36. The domain of Space, is critical for intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance, besides navigation and communication. Network centric
operations directly depend on this medium due to the dependence on satellite
links. The Integrated Space Cell (ISC) at HQ IDS acts as a nodal agency for tri-
services on all space related issues. The ISC inculcates inter-operability,
identifies Space military applications, imbibe modern technologies, training,
study vulnerabilities, R & D in Space and interacts with other related sectors.
DIPAC, a Tri-Service Organisation processes satellite imagery and has a data
bank to meet the imagery requirements of the Armed Forces.
37. Special operations are technologically the least complex of the 'triad';
however, the most complex in execution. As the possibility of a conventional
war under a nuclear over-hang recedes with attendant political and
international compulsions, training of ''Special Operations Division'' for
execution of precision tasks needs no reiteration.
49
38. The connect in the 'triad' makes integration essential, this flows from
the vital necessity of Cyber and Space to 'plan' and the Special Forces to
'conduct' Special operations.
50
Tech Orchestration &
Chapter 6
Capability Development
Section I
Approach to Capability Development
Section II
Components of Capability Development
Force Structuring
Force Development
CHAPTER 6
TECH ORCHESTRATION & CAPABILITY

DEVELOPMENT
Building capacity dissolves differences. It irons out inequalities.
- Dr. Abdul PJ Kalam
1. Defence planning is the process of matching futuristic threats and

National Security Objectives with Military capabilities and other constituents
of National Power. It entails futuristic threat assessment, examination of
military options and objectives, careful evaluation of desired military
capabilities to counter visualised threats and close monitoring of the entire
process throughout, taking corrective actions in accordance with changing
situations.
2. The fast pace of technological advancement precludes Military

modernisation process implying that, a constant endeavour in this direction
needs to be sustained to maintain a right balance between obsolescence and
new technology. The Military instrument of power is benchmarked by its
ability to develop, manage and use technology to maintain a competitive edge
over potential adversaries and competitors, thus lending credibility to the
National effort in the regional and global arenas. Therefore, defence
technology is a strategic resource as well as a force multiplier as it creates a
unique competitive space that enables and empowers the Nation in general
and the Armed Forces in particular.
SECTION I - APPROACH TO CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
3. In our context, the relationship between defence technology and

capability is direct. As we graduate from a 'Threat Based' approach of military
empowerment towards a more advanced 'Capability Based' approach, we
need also to synthesise the requirements of modern technology with the
financial backup that technology demands, while keeping the need of
indigenisation in mind. Our Nation has certain existing and well defined
51
TECH ORCHESTRATION & CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
threats emanating from 'State', and 'Non-State Actors' that influence our
defence planning process and remain central to our capability planning.
Besides, there are threats that are constantly emerging in the dynamic/fluid
regional and global security environment. Our capability development,
therefore, remains an iterative process between 'threat based' and 'capability
based'. However, given our regional and global aspirations and as the
economic muscle of our Nation grows stronger, the shift towards a more
'capability based' process will be an imperative.
4. If the above be our strategy, our technology development road map

reflects both the stated approaches. The existing and developing technologies,
including foreign technologies should enable our Military missions and
objectives in the short, medium and long term. Capability development shall
entail the following :-
(a) Objectively defining, both qualitatively and quantitatively,

the Tri-Service capabilities desired at specified points in time in the
future.
(b) Objectively assessing existing capabilities.
(c) Carefully ascertaining the capability deficit i.e. resultant

difference between desired and existing capabilities.
(d) Evolving long, medium and short - term plans to bridge the
capability deficit.
(e) Constantly monitoring capability development and applying

correctives, as and when required.
5. Technological and economic forecasts are central to the overall

process. Timelines, budget constraints, developmental delays, non-
realisation of plans and consequent review strategies must remain constants to
the development of a road map. Also factored in the technology development
cycle, would be acquisition, training and fielding costs. This comprehensive
approach to our technology-capability relationship will enable effective,
optimised and deliverable desired capabilities for the current and future
battlefields.
52
SECTION II - COMPONENTS OF CAPABILITY

DEVELOPMENT
6. The two major components of 'Capability Development' are 'Force

Structuring' and 'Force Development'. The process commences with the
articulation of laid down desired operational capabilities required by the
Armed Forces in the various guidelines on defence like the RM's Operational
Directive. Essentially, an effective 'Force Structuring' and 'Force
Development' process involves a comprehensive development and analysis of
plausible long term military scenarios from which would be derived long term
Military Objectives. Military objectives would help articulate the desired
military capabilities, which would be region, threat based and time sensitive.
This will enable formulation and execution of a Long Term Integrated
Perspective Plan. It would also entail appraisal and re-structuring of military
organisations at the strategic and operational levels to ensure continued
relevance and application of existing military capabilities and those being
developed. The essence of 'Force Structuring' and 'Force Development' is to
develop desired military capabilities to accomplish military strategic
objectives.
7. The capability development should not be viewed only from

equipment-weapons-technology perspective. Of equal importance are its
umbilical cords to the paradigms of policy, doctrine, strategy, training,
infrastructure, logistics, efficient management processes, organisational
structures etc. Thus the optimum amalgam of all these constituents is, in the
real sense, a more holistic perception of military capability.
Force Structuring
8. As a component of military capability building/development, Force

Structuring essentially deals with the 'Type', 'Size' and 'Structure' of the
Armed Forces. ''Force Structuring'' is a long-term process which
requires keeping pace with the dynamics of the developing strategic
environment. It is an evolving process that constantly shifts from
contemporary to the future requirements. Being a multi-faceted discipline,
53
TECH ORCHESTRATION & CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
it includes some niche subjects, depicted below : -
Force Force Right - Force Re- Optimisation Equipment

Accretions Sizing Structuring of Manpower Management
Resource Inter-Service Improved Recalibration Higher

Prioritisation Synergy Teeth-to- of Logistics Efficiencies
Tail ratio Support
Force Development
9. Modernisation is an important component in our quest to acquire

state-of-the-art technologies and weapon systems as well as meet the life-
cycle requirements of existing inventories leading to Force Development. It is
essential for closing both current and future capability gaps. 'Defence
Acquisition / Procurement' is an important component of the quest to acquire
higher / more potent capabilities leading to Force Development. Defence
Acquisitions/ Procurements could be sourced from within the country (either
from the public or private sector) or through tie-ups with foreign entities.
Military pacts, inter-governmental agreements etc are alternative means to
bridge capability/technological deficits by capability sharing and mutual
assistance partnerships.
10. Striking a balance between indigenisation and foreign purchase is

essential to ensure India's military independence and modernisation. Defence
Indigenisation is an imperative for achieving self-reliance; it is related more to
manufacturing / production, which ultimately manifests in capacity building.
It requires a 'whole of nation' approach, since no industry can survive only on
military orders/indents. Therefore, domestic defence manufacturing is a vital
component of military modernisation, sustenance and stamina. Not only
54
does it save valuable foreign exchange, it accrues multiple beneficial

dividends such as incentivising domestic industry (both publicand private
sector), promoting self-reliance, enhancing national pride and creating
avenues for defence exports. However, to be meaningful, indigenisation is to
be supported by a robust and mature R&D infrastructure, a
globallycompetitive domestic industry and a long-term production road-
map. Synergy between the MoD, SHQs, DRDO and the industry, both
private and public sector will be essential to identify and achieve the
desired results towards self-reliance.
55
DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE
Appendix A
(Refers to Para 9 of Chapter 1)
"The word "doctrine" has originated from the Latin word

"doctrina", which implies "a code of beliefs" or "a body of teachings".
- Indian Maritime Doctrine - 2009
Introduction
1. Doctrine is a codification of beliefs or a body of teachings or

instructions; taught principles in a given branch of knowledge or belief
system. Doctrine is not limited to Armed Forces only. It is used in political,
religious and other domains as well. Doctrines are enunciated to meet diverse
purposes. The enunciation of our Nuclear Doctrine reinforced India's image as
a responsible country. There are numerous other examples like Reagan
Doctrine of the cold war; Monroe Doctrine, Bush Doctrine, Gujral Doctrine
and in the military field we have Blitzkrieg, Soviet Deep Battle Doctrine etc.
2. Doctrines are generic and basic documents without going too much
into specifics. It is a set of proven concepts and principles. Doctrine is not a set
of fixed rules or a dogma. Deviations are acceptable but only after careful
consideration and appraisal by the stake-holders. Doctrines at the strategic
level are not prescriptive/directive and do not direct as to how a particular
problem is to be solved.
Military Doctrine
3. Military doctrine is a guide to action, rather than hard and fast rules.
NATO defines it as the ''Fundamental principles by which the military forces
guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgment in application." Military Doctrine defines the most effective and
efficient way of using Military assets on the basis of practical experience. A
simple yet succinct and incisive definition which explains this often
misunderstood subject is "Military doctrine is what countries believe is the
best way to conduct military affairs."
56
4. Doctrine is developed by the Services to suggest a uniform and time

tested application of resources. It is neither operations nor tactics. The
principal source of doctrine is experience. It resonates the judgment of
professional military officers and to lesser extent civilian leaders about what is
quintessentially militarily achievable. It captures the lessons of past wars,
reflects on the current nature of war and conflict, and takes into account the
current and anticipated technological and other changes that will ensure
success in future, as well. Military doctrine dwells upon and provides
guidelines for the force structuring implying organisation, equipment,
training and the methodology of employing force. A Joint Armed Forces
Doctrine will coalesce, synthesise and harmonize the tenets, beliefs and
principles of the different Services into one common, officially enunciated
and accepted guideline for carrying out Joint Operations.
5. Military doctrines are shaped by a variety of factors viz, National

goals and policies; threat perception; size of military force; technological
threshold etc. It includes the concept of future wars; use of Armed Forces for
deterrence and if required to wage wars in pursuit of National Security
Objectives; the use of Armed Forces as part of defence diplomacy and in
support of foreign policy; and the role within the country. Military doctrine
should be seen as the theoretical foundation of the way Military policy is
executed.
6. Doctrines are constantly evolving; it is a ‘work-in-progress’ and

'updated' from time to time as and when new concepts/structures take shape,
receipt of fresh policy directives, advent of new technology, any change in
geo-strategic/political environment, demography etc. They are 'progressive
tools'. Towards this end, the doctrine development process needs to be
sufficiently flexible and dynamic.
Relationship between Concept and Doctrine
7. Concepts and Doctrines are inter-related. Whilst concepts provide a

foundation for development of Doctrine, at the same time, the development of
concepts is also influenced by existing doctrines, which provide a reference
for concept development. Doctrine and Concepts are thus inter-twined and
drive each other.
57
Relationship between Doctrine and Strategy
8. The term 'doctrine' and 'strategy' are inter-related but not inter-
changeable. ''Doctrine'' is not ''Strategy''. Whilst Doctrines provide precepts
for development and employment of military power, Strategy is a plan of
action for developing and deploying military force so as to achieve National
Security Objectives by the application of force or by coercion. Doctrine shows
the 'path to be followed' while executing a chosen strategy. Doctrines form the
bedrock of any Military Strategy; Doctrine provides a knowledge base for
strategic decisions. However, doctrine is not strategy nor does it control it.
They, however run on 'parallel tracks', with feedback loops linking the parallel
tracks between them. The relationship between doctrine and strategy is a
mutual one; Doctrine influences strategy (or should influence strategy) and
the results of existing strategy either reinforces existing doctrine or initiates
the development of new/revised doctrine.
9. Doctrines do not evolve on their own; it derives from various sources

such as history, nature of threats, political decisions, technology, inter-service
relationships, as well as strategy. Without doctrine, strategists would have to
make decisions without points of reference or guidance. Doctrine brings
awareness and distilled wisdom!
58
Appendix B
(Refers to Para 4 of Chapter 4)
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
"Direction in the Civil-Military Relationship in any democracy is strictly

the right of the political leadership and not bureaucracy"
- Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja (Retd)
SECTION I- UNDERSTANDING CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS
1. Civil-Military Relations (CMR) describes the relationship between

our Civil society as a whole and the Military. More narrowly, it describes the
relationship between our Nation's civil authority and the military leadership.
The nature of the relationship between our Civilian and Military institutions is
distinct and needs to be fostered to ensure mutual trust. Given the critical role
played by these two institutions in our Nation's security paradigm, it is
essential to ensure that both institutions work seamlessly towards securing our
National Interests.
2. The functional domain of Civil and Military witness different styles of

working. The Military institutions and personnel reflect a conservative yet
professional outlook whilst the civil establishment witnesses a different pace
entwined in rules, norms and procedures. The political authority and the
civilian bureaucracy endeavours to understand the Military ethos so as to fully
grasp the unique challenges of the Military service to ensure that mutual trust
is nourished. Notwithstanding the contrasting rules, norms, values and
attitudes, the political control of the military produces a relationship that is
alive to the nuances of use of military power. There needs to be a right balance
of this unambiguous political control; it is prudent that congruence in the two
time-tested institutions exists/is built upon.
59
CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS
3. The Higher Defence Organisation provides the foundation for the

coordination and integration of the various elements of the Government in
pursuit of National Security Objectives. The layered hierarchies of the
National Security structures should integrate to get the most out of the
expertise available. The inclusivity in policy making drives better
understanding; led by integrated and responsive structural mechanisms
drawing on the collective strengths of the bureaucracy, the armed forces,
academia, the strategic community and accomplished professionals, all
working together to steer National Security discourse towards definite
objectives. These integrated systems result in natural checks and balances,
ensuring that the final authority always lies unquestionably with the civilian
institution ie, political authority. Such a system ensures organisational and
policy balance.
4. Military professionals are experts in the use of force under the

political institution of the State. Apropos, it would always be essential for the
civilian authority, in consultation with military (as part of decision making
process) to decide the Military Objective and then leave it to the military
professionals to decide upon the best way of achieving the objective.
SECTION II - FACETS OF CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS
5. The Armed Forces are increasingly operating both within and outside
the country in a wide spectrum of roles, a requirement which is only going to
increase in the years to come. Inter-agency interface forges the vital link
between the Military instrument and other instruments of National Power.
While operating in an inter-agency environment, it is essential to develop
mutual understanding, rapport and respect to achieve the common National
Security Objectives. Notwithstanding the common intent, CMR have many
facets which are very intricate and complex. These facets need to be
synchronised deftly as the sensitivity involved have implications that affect
our entire Nation. Some of these facets are discussed in this section.
60
6. Military Professionalism. Military professionalism is essentially

the process that empowers the military institution executing actions to achieve
objectives laid out by the political authority independently, with the ultimate
aim of achieving victory.
7. Connecting National Policy and War Fighting. At the Grand

Strategic level, it is essential to understand the translation of national policy
directives into war fighting. Understanding this critical translation will
resultantly ensure correct application of the Military/Military power.
8. Relationship between Political and Military Leadership. The

relationship is an enduring symbiotic relationship and Parliamentary control
over the Military is mandated in the Constitution. A robust/firm political
control and a strong military serve the National Interests best. However, to
address National Security imperatives, it is prudent that institutional and
structural mechanisms exist that facilitate free flowing communication
between the two, thereby enabling critical and timely decision making. The
functionaries in the MoD ought to be enablers of this relationship
9. Functional Essentials. National Security discourse impacts not only

the larger issues of war and peace but also the strategic decision-making
process, nuclear strategy, war fighting capabilities, conventional operational
readiness, long term defence & operational planning, procurement processes,
morale, and human resource management. It is also aimed at strengthening of
international defence cooperation/ diplomacy, media interface, psychological
warfare, intelligence etc. Allowing these functional essentials to constantly
remain inclusive and complementary is an imperative in CMR.
61
CITATIONS AND REFERENCES

i.
Constitution of India -1950
ii.
Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces - 2006
iii. Gurmeet Kanwal, , "India's National Security Strategy in a Nuclear
Environment" accessed https://www.idsa-india.org
iv. Soft Power is a term coined by Joseph Nye to distinguish it from Hard Power in
the year 1990
v.
The term '' Smart Power'' was coined by Suzanne Nossel and Joseph Nye
vi. Chapter 1 ; Abridged Report of CNP - Scenarios for 2022 by HQ IDS; p5
vii. Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja " Integrated Air Defence for the Indian Air Space "
Vol 29.4, Oct - Dec 2014
viii. Cooperative Security simply means that States will work together to solve
common problems and is often used synonymously with Collective Security -
that is, to mean simply that States work collectively together.
ix. The first use of the term WMD on record is by Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop
of Canterbury in 1937, in reference to the bombardment of Guernica, Spain
x.
Dadalos-PeaceEducation:What is Conflict ?
www.dadlos.org>grundkurs_4>konflict
xi. Clausewitz on War and Politics www.grose.us> academic > clausewitz
xii. This item originally appeared in the Australian Army's on-line journal,
Directorateof Army Research and Analysis : Newsletter of the Directorate of
Army Research and Analysis of the Directorate of Army Research aAnalysis,
10 Oct 1996
xiii. Most Indian Strategists prefer using the term ''National Security Strategy'’
instead of “Grand Strategy". We have used the word Grand Strategy because
it is widely used in the international fora
xiv. Concept of Generations in the history of modern warfare was created by a team
of United States of America, including William Lind
xv.
Integrated Theatre Battle is a battle where Services participate in a single
cohesive format during war/conflict
xvi. House of Commons Defence Committee '' Deterrence in the twenty-first
century" Eleventh Report of Session 2013-2014 Vol II, p 5.
xvii. ibid
xviii. The definitions/explanations of various concepts in the Section are derived
from a study of various publications on the subjects listed in Bibliography
xix. S Turner, " Mission of the US Navy", Naval War College Review, Mar-Apr 1974;
p7
xx.
https://definitions.uslegal.com>sea-denial
xxi. Ministry of Defence, Government of India website www.mod.nic.in
xxii. The NITI AYOG is the successor in interest to the Planning Commission
xxiii. South Asia Defence and Strategic Review Vol 9, Issue 5 , Nov-Dec 2015 -
Interview with Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy; p12
xxiv. Manpreet Sethi; Nuclear Strategy - India's March towards Credible Deterrence;
p 160
xxv.
Indian Nuclear Doctrine - 2003 (extract from open domain)
62
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Chapter/
S Authority Inserted By
Para Remarks
No
Affected
63
ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS
AFTI Armed Forces Training Institute

ARTRAC Army Training Command
C2 Command and Control
COAS Chief of the Army Staff
CAS Chief of the Air Staff
CoA Course of Action
CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CCS Cabinet Committee on Security
CMR Civil - Military Relations
COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee
Ch COSC Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee
CISC Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman Chiefs of
Staff Committee
CNS Chief of the Naval Staff
DAC Defence Acquisition Council
DCMG Defence Crises Management Group
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
DIPAC Defence Image Processing Analysis Centre
DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation
EC Executive Council
GoI Government of India
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HQ IDS Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff
HRD Human Resources Development
IHQ-MoD (N) Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy)
HQ-MoD (A) Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Army)
IA Indian Army
IAF Indian Air Force
IN Indian Navy
64
INDU Indian National Defence University

INS Indian Naval Ship
ISC Integrated Space Cell
IOR Indian Ocean Region
IW Information Warfare
JOCOM Joint Operations Committee
JTC Joint Training Committee
LAC Line of Actual Control
LIC Low Intensity Conflict
LICO Low Intensity Conflict Operations
LoC Line of Control
LTIPP Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan
MAO Maritime Air Operations
MoD Ministry of Defence
NCW Network centric Warfare
NCA Nuclear Command Authority
NSA National Security Advisor
NSAB National Security Advisory Board
NSCS National Security Council Secretariat
NSP National Security Policy
NSS National Security Strategy
PM Prime Minister
PC Political Council
PMA Para-Military Agencies
R&D Research and Development
RM Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister)
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
SHQs Service Headquarters
SLOCs Sea Lines of Communication
SPG Strategy Policy Group
UN United Nations
65
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Government of India Documents
Constitution of India - 1950

Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, 2014- 2015
Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, 2014-2015
Annual Report, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2014-15
Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 (As amended
upt o 01 October, 2016)
Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap - 2013, Ministry of
Defence
Defence Procurement Procedure - 2016, Ministry of Defence
Defence Procurement Manual - 2009, Ministry of Defence
Long Term Perspective Plan 2012-2027 (Relevant extract; in open domain)
Defence Research and Development Organisation - Guidelines for Transfer of
Technology - 2015
Manual on Office Procedure - 14th Edition, Cabinet Secretariat of India
Extant Policy Orders
Government of India Websites
Prime Minister's Office

Ministry of Defence
Ministry of External Affairs
Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Cabinet Secretariat
Doctrines / Strategies
Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces, HQ IDS, 2006

Indian Army Doctrine, 2010
Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR 8), 2009
Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, 2012
Indian Maritime Military Strategy, 2015
Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, HQ IDS, 2008
66
Joint Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, HQ IDS, 2008

Joint Doctrine for Maritime Air Operations, HQ IDS, 2009
Joint Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations, HQ IDS, 2010
Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, HQ IDS, 2010
Joint Doctrine for Air Land Operations, HQ IDS, 2010
Joint Information Warfare Doctrine, HQ IDS, 2005
Tri-Service C4I2SR Doctrine, HQ IDS, 2005
Journals
Pinnacle Vol 13 - 2014 The ARTRAC Journal, Army Training Command

Journal, India
Pinnacle Vol 14 - 2014 The ARTRAC Journal, Army Training Command
Journal, India
Books/Documents/Papers/Studies
Manual on Development of Military Strategy and Strategic Leadership, HQ

ARTRAC - 2012
Nuclear Strategy India's March towards Credible Deterrence ; Dr Manpreet
Sethi; Jun 2009
India's Comprehensive National Power - Scenarios for 2022 by
HQ IDS
Code of Conduct - 30 Dec 2014 - HQ ARTRAC
67
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The task of drafting the revision of the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed
Forces - 2006 was steered by the Directorate of Doctrine under the Training
and Doctrine Division of the Doctrine, Organisation and Training Branch at
Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence , New Delhi,
India. The project commenced on 01 Jul 2016, consequent to the directive of
Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee.
A collegiate approach was adopted which included a series of meetings and

discussions between the three Service Headquarters and all Branches and
Directorates at Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff, from time to time and
at very short notice. Their professional insights and devotion of precious time
despite hectic schedule were indeed key facilitators for the endeavour and
their significant contributions are gratefully acknowledged.
The inputs provided by Defence Services Staff College, Wellington

(Coonoor), Army War College, Mhow, Naval War College, Goa, College of
Air Warfare, Secunderabad, College of Defence Management, Secunderabad
and Flag Officer Doctrine and Concepts, Mumbai are also hereby
acknowledged.
Needless to state, the revision of the Doctrine was a ''TEAM EFFORT'' and
only speaks volumes of ''Jointmanship'' and ''Integration'' between all the
stake-holders.
The task of document design and production was undertaken by Dte of

Doctrine and 53 Printing Section, E-in-C's Branch, New Delhi. The
photographs displayed were provided by the Photography/ Sections of the
three Service Headquarters and Defence Public Relations Department.
Credit of the Document's realisation also goes to others who worked ''behind
the scenes''.
68
NOTES
69
NOTES
NOTES
70

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JP-01/2017

JOINT DOCTRINE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

INDIAN ARMED FORCES

Compilation of Data : Inputs compiled from Indian National Constitution, Annual

Printing : 53 Printing Press, E-in-C’s Branch, New Delhi-110 011

Second Edition : April 2017

Published by Directorate of Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff

Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence

This Doctrine, pitched at the Military Strategic level, is meant to

This doctrine remains a guide – a judgement in application and on

I am a Warrior. Defending my Nation is my Dharma. I will train

Be humane, cultured and compassionate !

Fight and embrace consequences willingly !

God give me strength that I ask nothing of you !

“To me, the Defence Services are the finest examples of

“My mental boundaries expanded when I viewed the Earth

1 Chapter 1 – National Security – A Perspective 01 06

2 Chapter 2 – Spectrum of Conflict 07 16

3 Chapter 3 – Military Instrument of Power 17 30

4 Chapter 4 – Higher Defence Organisation 31 38

5 Chapter 5 – Integrated and Joint Structures 39 50

6 Chapter 6 – Tech Orchestration &

8 Citations and References 62 62

NATIONAL SECURITY - A PERSPECTIVE

National Security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political

A definition propagated by the National Defence College,

SECTION I - NATIONAL VALUES, AIM AND NATIONAL

2. The National Aim, as gleaned from our Constitution and strategic

(a) To preserve the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of

(b) To preserve the democratic, secular and federal character of

(c) To safeguard India's existing and emerging strategic, political,

(d) To ensure a stable, secure and peaceful internal and external

(e) To contribute towards promotion of international peace and

SECTION II - NATIONAL SECURITY & MILITARY

4. National Security to us implies the protection, preservation and

National Security Objectives

5. National Security Objectives flow from and are designed to safeguard

(a) Maintain a credible deterrent capability to safeguard National

(b) Ensure defence of national territory, air space, maritime zones

(c) Maintain a secure internal environment to guard against

(d) Expand and strengthen ''Constructive Engagement'' with

National Security Policy

National Security Strategy

will facilitate the safeguarding of our interests. Even though we have no

National Military Objectives

8. National Military Objectives (NMOs) accruing out from National

(a) Prevent war through strategic and conventional deterrence

(b) Prosecute military operations to defend territorial integrity

(c) Provide assistance to ensure Internal Security, when called

(d) Be prepared for contingencies at home and abroad to render

(e) Enable required degree of self-sufficiency in defence

Armed Forces Doctrine

SECTION III - CONSTITUENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Hard, Soft and Smart Powers

Components of National Power

12. Components of National Power as a concept is an extension of

National Objectives'. Components entail synergistic application of all

Military Instrument of National Power

14. Military instrument of National Power is employed by us, both as a