Chapter 13

Disaster Management and Corruption: Issues,

Interventions and Strategies

Vikas Saharan

13.1 Introduction

Disasters occur due to the interaction between natural events that cause them
and social, political and economic vulnerabilities that structure the lives and the
livelihoods of different groups of people (Pielke 2006). Disaster causes massive
disruption of community functions involving large-scale human, economic, material
and environmental losses. It surpasses the existing coping capacity of the affected
community; due to this situation, intervention in the form of disaster-related aid
is provided to people to reduce their suffering by ensuring their immediate needs.
Disaster management is cyclic in nature as it involves pre- and post-disaster
activities; during an emergency situation, there is a national and international
response leading to urgent relief activities on recovery and rehabilitation measures.
The initial response to natural disaster at the local and national level is led by
the government and civil society of the affected country; appeals for international
assistance are made when local and national capacities are overwhelmed. Disaster-
related aid originates from different sources, i.e. local, regional, national and
international, and it comes out from public, private and corporate purses. It is the
nature and magnitude of emergency which decide the role of the government. Nature
of emergencies also differs ranging from natural disaster to war; along with this,
they are differentiated on the basis of their intensity: sudden events, i.e. earthquake,
tsunami, floods, etc., and slower events, i.e. drought.
After a natural disaster, the role of the government becomes important both
in the countries affected by disaster and in aid-originating countries. During an
emergency situation, the government’s first priority is to provide disaster-related
aid to victims and also to minimise losses. The initial relief is in the form of

V. Saharan ()
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer India 2015 193

H. Ha et al. (eds.), Strategic Disaster Risk Management in Asia,
DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-2373-3_13
194 V. Saharan

rescue and recovery (emergency services, dispatching rescue teams, searching

missing people, identifying and treating casualties), material relief assistance and
services (shelter, medicines, water and sanitation), emergency food aid (obtaining,
transporting and delivering basic supply of food and setting up alternative feeding
centre) and coordinating relief and support services (re-establishment of basic
logistics, infrastructure and communication). Humanitarian aid is given to assist
those affected by natural disasters, human conflict or other forms of severe political,
economic or social breakdowns. Its aim is to prevent and alleviate human suffering
in the context of life-threatening situations. During disaster, humanitarian aid
agencies’ role includes direct project implementation, cash or in-kind contributions,
project funding, direct budget support and debt relief (Willitts-King and Harvey
2005).
An important determinant of aid effectiveness is the ability of humanitarian
agencies to accurately target beneficiary groups and distribute aid accordingly.
The entire global humanitarian aid system is both extensive and complex. Despite
serious efforts to rectify its weakness, certain existing and functioning patterns of
the system provide scope for corruption in humanitarian aid. In humanitarian aid,
usually there is transfer of resources from a developed nation to a deprived nation.
This donation of aid is a voluntary act, and this external assistance is very crucial for
disaster-affected countries. This imbalance of power between recipient and donor
countries leads to different patterns of accountability especially in terms of sanction
and spending of money for relief measures. Disaster and its related rescue and
rehabilitation operations create condition for profit, legitimate or otherwise. The
manner in which humanitarian aid is given can also influence opportunities for
corruption. Humanitarian emergencies generally create condition for corruption to
flourish in affected countries, for example, urgency to reach affected communities
leads to non-bureaucratic procedures.
Corruption is also aided by relaxed procedures to ensure speedy aid delivery,
Aid given in the context of humanitarian relief can assume a number of forms.
Most of the resources during humanitarian aid relief process are from unknown
sources and through unusual channels which gives chances for corruption to those
who desire to exploit it; one of the glaring example of this is the reconstruction
of physical infrastructure during disaster rehabilitation process which gives an
opportunity for misuse of power and resources. Kickbacks and cuts have emerged
as a common corrupt practice during disaster procurement of items as logisticians
and warehouse managers during this time have discretionary power to influence
purchasing and contracting decisions (Cremer 1998). This diversion of resources
not only puts extra burden on humanitarian aid agencies but also causes mistrust
among employees. Things are further compounded by poor infrastructure, weak
public services and legal systems, non-transparent systems including collusion of
staff with third parties, less qualified staff, staff that are no longer independent
but owe obligation to other people and decline in public image. Corruption is a
complex phenomenon with its root in bureaucratic and political institutions. It acts
as an important obstacle to development and growth in disaster-affected countries
as disaster-related aid may be corruptly diverted during the whole of the disaster
13 Disaster Management and Corruption: Issues, Interventions and Strategies 195

management cycle. Therefore, disaster preparedness and response is a continuous

process of education as it involves awareness building, resource planning, sharing
information and flow of communication at all levels, i.e. from the village level to
the regional and national level, and to international coordinating bodies. Among
many things, disaster management and mitigation also include adoption of low-
cost disaster mitigation measures, leadership training and exchange and establishing
communication linkages that cut across geographical and political boundaries.

13.2 Research Questions

During disaster, international humanitarian aid organisations along with local aid
community continuously inject resources into the affected area. This study identifies
how disaster affects a wide segment of the population which in turn demand
mitigation, rehabilitation and relief process through food aid, shelter and health.
The study examines the role of various organisations in providing humanitarian
relief to the affected population and vulnerability of these organisations in terms
of corruption. This study also identifies factors that cause corruption at the cutting-
edge level during humanitarian assistance to people affected by sudden extreme
events and measures adopted by humanitarian aid organisations to minimise risk
of corruption and diversion in relief responses. The study explores the role of the
government in providing relief and participation of disaster-affected community in
the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of relief process.

13.3 Literature Review

There are very few studies on linkages between corruption and disaster management
across the world. Disaster occurs when ecological relationship between man and
his immediate environment is disrupted; this disruption comes in a sudden or
slow manner that it needs extraordinary external effort for the affected community
(Gunn 1994). Disaster results from environmental phenomena or armed conflict,
and it causes stress, personal injury, physical damage and economic disruption
of great magnitude (Cuny 1992). Emergency management has always been the
important component of governance, and it always assumes importance whenever
there is natural or man-made disaster. Limitations and shortcomings of public
administration always come to the limelight during incidents of natural disaster.
This put more serious pressure on public officials and policymaker to focus their
attention on policy domain of disaster management. There is less study on the role
of organisations in dealing with disaster management across the world (McEntire
1997).
During disaster, people, infrastructure and environment become vulnerable due
to the insensitive system of the state, and people are compelled to live in hazard-
196 V. Saharan

prone places due to poverty, oppression and lack of choice (Lewis and Kelman
2010). Chances of corruption during disaster increase due to ineffective and insuffi-
cient supervision mechanism, and things become more complex when resources are
captured by local powerful forces (Treisman 2000). Linkage between corruption
and disaster becomes more visible during post-disaster phase; this hierarchical
greed increases the cost of goods and services (Ambraseys and Bilham 2011).
Extensiveness and spread of corruption is always linked to the political context
of the affected country (Golden and Picci 2005). Turkish earthquake disasters of
1999 and 2003 were less the products of violent seismic events and much more
the result of corrupt political decisions and negligent government. The human
catastrophe which followed each of these earthquakes can be attributed in large
part to government and industry corruption, gross negligence and state links to
organised crime or to state-orchestrated organisational deviance. It is a community
political system that decides authoritatively through the public policy process who
will get how much life safety and who will pay for it (Olson et al. 1999). Poorer
countries with weaker institutions and governance are the places where global
disaster risk is highly concentrated (UNISDR 2009). The Turkish disaster of 1999
is generally used as a great reminder of the role of corruption and its association
with weak enforcement of building codes (Kreimer et al. 2003; Özerdem 2003).
Green and Ward (2004) pointed six types of state organisational deviance relevant
to understanding natural disasters, i.e. state crimes: systemic corruption, state
collusion with corporate crime, government collusion in the illegal activities of its
own elites, war crimes, negligence and post-disaster cover-ups. Natural disasters
are breeding grounds for fraud and corruption as services are provided quickly.
Extreme weather triggers an infusion of reconstruction cash from federal, state
and local governments (Sorensen 2014). Corruption, conflict and their interactions
should seriously be addressed in disaster risk reduction policies as there is a direct
linkage between disaster risk and different levels of conflict (Le Billion 2003).
The study of disaster relief and corruption in the United States found positive and
direct relationship between disaster relief amount received through FEMA (Foreign
Exchange Management Act 1999) and corruption by public officials (Leeson and
Sobel 2008).

13.4 Theoretical Framework

Theoretical framework provides a base for research. During disaster, the biggest
challenge for the government is to restore normalcy by acting fast in search, rescue
and evacuation operation with collaboration with other institutions, but during this
entire process, institutions are prone to external forces which may divert the goal
of relief operation. Therefore, understanding roles of institutions and governance
in dealing with disaster risk assumes greater importance. The organisational state
deviance theory states that disasters are a direct result of wrong decision made by
corrupt politician under a negligent government with linkage of state to systematic
13 Disaster Management and Corruption: Issues, Interventions and Strategies 197

crime because decisions are made by the existing political system which selectively
decides the distribution of resources during relief operation. These omission and
commission by the state directly lead to human rights violation which tantamount
to state crime (Green and Ward 2000).
Broadly, there is supposed to be six types of state organisational deviance, i.e.
systemic corruption, collusion of state with corporate crime, government collusion
in the illegal activities of its own elites, war crimes, negligence and post-disaster
cover-ups. Rational decision theory suggests that during decision-making of the
political process, there should be transparency. Rational choice theory explains the
ideal condition of disaster management cycles which has to be adopted during
disaster risk ranging from mitigation to rehabilitation. But this theory suffers
from limitation because each individual has limited rationality due to several
factors which leads them to commit mistakes. Public choice theory highlights that
government disaster relief activities are prone to serve the wants and needs of
politicians rather than those of disaster victims, i.e., elected decision-maker’s pursuit
of self-interest is dependent on their ability to gain and remain in office. This reality
creates strong incentives for the politician to be most responsive to those individuals
and groups with the greatest ability to affect their political tenure. Thus, when
government relief efforts extend beyond the immediate emergency, they tend to be
politically allocated. During disasters, public goods may include search and rescue
operations, evacuation and coordination. For this, government institutions are well
suited to provide public goods that form the infrastructure of a community. This non-
exclusive characteristic of public goods makes them non-profitable for the private
producer, i.e. private firms unlikely to produce it.
The government’s poor performance in disaster relief is best explained not
by reference to incompetent officials but instead by the centralised nature of
the government and the incentives that accompany government decision-making.
Public choice economists have identified certain factors that explain why the
government cannot be expected to perform well during relief and rebuilding tasks
that have been assigned to it, i.e. bureaucratic institutional structure, lack of
effective feedback mechanism, moral hazards, etc. Jane Addams social democratic
theory (1909) focuses on solidarity, participatory democracy, action orientation,
flexibility and education for disaster planning and preparedness. However, tenets
of this theory again suffer from lack of applicability. New institutional economics
theory points that incentive or disincentive structure of a society is controlled by
the institution because institutions provide incentives that may influence actors’
decisions and preferences to reduce or produce or amplify or attenuate disaster
risk. Therefore, disaster risk reduction is heavily dependent on institutional regimes
(old/new, formal/informal) or the enforcement of existing formal/informal rules.
Self-organisation theory focuses on a reallocation of resources on the spot in order to
achieve common goals during disaster relief process, but this theory fails to address
a long-term goal. These theoretical frameworks fall short of methods that reduce
vulnerability of different institutions during disaster relief measure, and they do
not provide theoretical guidance on how to design and implement broader recovery
programmes in response to sudden events.
198 V. Saharan

There is a need to evolve a theoretical framework to understand institutional

vulnerability during relief operations at the global and local level which takes into
account institutional arrangements, political systems, cultural values and numerous
other idiosyncratic factors which pose a serious challenge to stakeholders. This type
of theoretical framework improves and strengthens state vulnerability capabilities
for handling issues of corruption during planning, preparedness and long-term
disaster recovery process. For the planning, design and implementation of all
types of social service programmes being carried out by the government and
other network institutions, it is necessary to devise a theoretical framework which
provides organising principle for the institution, which in turn helps administrators
in designing programmes, implementing policy and evaluating current efforts. The
theoretical framework should also focus on a specific disaster risk management
policy and mainstreaming disaster risk management and reduction into development
policy and planning. This type of framework helps in avoiding the creation of
parallel structures and ensures that development does not construct new risks;
thereby, it reduces disaster vulnerability and risks and strengthens key capacities
by ensuring effective participation and engagement of different sectors of society
ranging from the government to the civil society and the private sector.

13.5 Research Methodology

In order to address the question related to corruption and disaster management,

this study is based on qualitative research methods, and for the purpose of this
study, secondary sources in the form of documents and reports of government
and nongovernment organisations and institutions have been used along with this
interaction with various experts working as serious actors in the field of corruption,
and disaster management during national and international conferences has also
facilitated this study.

13.6 Findings and Discussion

Every year, millions of people are affected by natural disasters; this brings a
number of institutions together to work for humanity by helping affected people
and recreating their infrastructure. Ewins et al. (2006) highlighted that the risk of
corruption during humanitarian aid depends on the type of the assistance, i.e. relief,
rehabilitation or reconstruction. Whether it is in developing or developed countries,
it is the public works, procurement, construction contract and later rehabilitation
programmes that are a major part of the disaster response programme, and these
programmes are most vulnerable to corruption. Things become more complex when
such disaster relief programmes are carried in a condition which lacks monitoring,
transparency and accountability (Galtung 2005). Along with siphoning of funds
13 Disaster Management and Corruption: Issues, Interventions and Strategies 199

during humanitarian aid relief programme, insecurity of staff also plays a major
role in precipitating corruption as staff members are unable to visit field for direct
supervision or monitoring. This atmosphere of insecurity acts as an obstacle for
auditors to visit construction sites and monitor results (Nawa 2006).
The 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake and floods in Pakistan are
some glaring examples of sudden tragic events which led to massive donations for
relief efforts. But this strong philanthropic gesture fails to deliver the anticipated
result at grass-roots level due to corruption (Nadgrodkiewicz 2013). In the era of
climate change, there is a strong acknowledgement of the relationship between
corruption and natural disaster, and it has to be addressed at all levels of the
government. Regular and increased instances of extreme weather are unavoidable,
but it is not possible to ignore corresponding epidemic of fraud and waste. It is
imperative for the state and local executive to include issues of fraud and corruption
in their disaster preparedness law and policies because in the modern age, public
safety demands no loss. A dynamic relationship exists between state power, corrup-
tion and corporate power especially in the context of natural disaster-precipitated
catastrophe. This relationship plays an important role in creating man-made natural
disaster through network and chair of responsibilities, opportunities and pressure
which indirectly tantamount to a crime committed by the state in the form of human
rights violations.
There are more chances of corruption, when an organisation or person has
monopoly over the goods or service, i.e. discretionary power to decide and
unaccountability. Natural disasters are massive breeding grounds for fraud and
corruption because during an emergency situation, services, i.e. water, electricity,
gas, restoration of infrastructure and public transport, are provided speedily leading
to siphoning of funds. The large interjection of resources, speedy activities and quick
delivery of aid during disaster put tremendous pressure on already damaged or weak
institution and on human resources. Disasters also aggravate pre-existing weakness
in affected countries such as an inadequate internal control system and weak or
vulnerable political and legal system along with huge humanitarian inequality; the
situation is further compounded when issues of corruption and fraud activities are
seen as routine and common business practices in the disaster-affected country.
Humanitarian aid is vulnerable to corruption in countries where there are low
levels of transparency and accountability (Polzer 2001). In order to tackle corruption
during disaster, institution plays an important role, and failure of institution during
the crisis phase dramatically increases disaster risk and corruption. In contrast,
if these issues are addressed, then risk can be reduced and human development
is protected (UNISDR 2009). UNDP (2004) defines vulnerability as a condition
resulting from physical, social, economic and environmental hazards that determine
the likelihood and scale of damage. Many established aid agencies have developed
sophisticated mechanisms that have greatly improved their capacity for financial
accountability. Corruption in aid programming, especially in the construction sector,
acts detrimental to addressing the requirements of most vulnerable sections of
the population. The compelling situation to deliver quickly leads to a poor and
substandard quality of assignment which fails to meet the required standard,
200 V. Saharan

thereby making affected people more vulnerable. The existence of corruption in

the construction industry is an open secret because everything about these from
design, foundation and occupancy permission is decided by local authorities and
municipalities. Corruption during disaster is evident by severely damaged roads
and bridges. In the Philippines, in order to give kickback to government officials,
contractors deliberately lowered construction standards. In 2008, the Sichuan
earthquake of China that killed 75,000 people brought destruction to a number
of schools including the death of 900 children in one school and was a result of
corruption in the construction sector (Lewis 2008). Corruption continues abated
despite a lot of investigations, and it has emerged as the most potent source of public
resentment (Branigna 2011).
In some African countries, millions of dollars of international aid have been
sent to private external bank accounts, most of which are located in aid origin
countries; had these funds been used properly internally, then it could have
boosted development, poverty alleviation and alleviation of other disaster-related
risks (Baker et al. 2008). In Tajikistan, available funds disappear due to leader
corruption; in spite of that, it has high disaster vulnerability and needs serious
disaster risk reduction measures (Harding 2010). In poorer countries with weak
governance institution, corruption aids in increasing poverty making communities
more vulnerable (Lewis 2011). In Italy, all the four mafias are based in the southern
part known as Mezzogiorno which has more numerous and larger earthquakes with
high illiteracy and lower income and standard of living (Alexander 2005).
In Iraq, large proportions of post-conflict US-funded reconstruction budgets
disappeared due to corruption (Glanz 2006). The geography of natural disasters in
the United States maps the geography of corruption; throughout America, there is a
positive relationship between public corruption and natural disaster, i.e. more natural
disaster-hit states are more corrupt. In the United States, more than 10,000 public
officials were convicted of corruption-related crime in 1990 and 2002 (Lesson and
Sobel 2008). During the 1999 earthquake of Turkey, corrupt construction practice
was identified as the main reason for the collapse of buildings. During the 2005
earthquake of Japan, numerous buildings and hotels were declared dangerous as the
architect has submitted false earthquake resistance data due to pressure from the
client during the preconstruction phase.
In Haiti, due to earthquake, 100,000 buildings collapsed; this reflects that a
state with low regulatory quality, ineffective government, lack of rule of law and
endemic corruption makes institution vulnerable, thereby creating condition for
higher disaster risks. Therefore, it reflects a clear relationship between disaster
risk, disaster mitigation and corruption in the implementation of building codes
(Ahrens and Rudolph 2006). Corruption causes serious social and ecological
imbalance, and diversion of fund along with inside dealing, cartels, price fixing
and substandard construction, contributes to vulnerability of health, agriculture,
construction, commerce and industry by denying their share in the development
process (Salih 2010). A survey in Nairobi, Kenya, revealed that people are more
concerned about corruption and poverty in comparison to flooding, El Niño rainfall
and global warming (Shisanya and Kyayesi 2007).
13 Disaster Management and Corruption: Issues, Interventions and Strategies 201

In response to the 2004 tsunami, an expert meeting in Jakarta was convened

by the Asian Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Transparency International and Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia
and the Pacific which identified main elements to curtail corruption and reduce
waste during disaster relief operation and reconstruction phase. These elements
are country ownership; community-driven and participatory process; transparency
in aid flow; financial safeguards and administrative capacity; oversight, monitoring
and evaluation; and effective anti-corruption enforcement and complaint handling.
As millions of dollars in cash and goods come from around the world during
natural disaster, due to this, corruption emerges as a serious issue making donor and
recipient countries reform the process of donation by structure paying, increasing
or decreasing donation according to need and taking necessary step to improve the
overall level of governance.
In the Philippines, corruption was obvious whenever typhoon struck it, as a result
large sum of money meant relief and rehabilitation and was siphoned off. In order to
curb this menace of corruption and manage disaster, government launched an online
platform called Foreign Aid Transparency Hub to track donations and provide status
updates on relief and rehabilitation efforts. The result of this effort was visible when
there were no typhoon-related casualties in the place called Iloilo in the Philippines
due to serious effort of the local disaster risk reduction management council.
Apart from Transparency International, numerous institutions and organisations are
working to combat the problem of corruption in humanitarian aid. Among this, the
Institute for Solidarity in Asia has devised an innovative performance governance
system to curb corruption and to deliver action-oriented positive results.
Corruption is the most important factor in a formal system of government
which increases vulnerability to disaster risk (Peduzzi 2006). During disaster relief,
power is devolved to local authorities to make them more responsive to ground
situation, but abuse of power by them leads to poor enforcement of disaster
reduction policy; along with this, disaster mitigation suffers heavily due to official
corruption in land use, planning and building code enforcement (DFID 2006).
There are three particular reasons which make humanitarian aid more prone to
corruption, i.e. conditions inherent in humanitarian emergencies, characteristics
of the humanitarian aid system and levels of transparency and accountability in
recipient countries. Types of corruption that can potentially affect the provision
of humanitarian aid include fraud, embezzlement, misuse of aid agency assets,
diversion of aid resources and bribery.
During humanitarian aid relief, collusion between bidders or between a particular
bidder and aid agency staff and targeting, registration and distribution processes
offer numerous opportunities for corruption which includes illegitimate double
claims and levying of fees for releasing aid. Along with this, things are further
compounded by supply of lower quality of goods, staff interest in the items and
opportunity to take them away, large amounts of overspending, significant budget
adjustment, unusually large transactions and unauthorised balances or transactions,
failure to use serial numbered documents, unusual discrepancies between the
entity’s records and confirmation replies, unusual balance sheet and changes in
important financial statement ratios.
202 V. Saharan

The various approaches for tackling corruption in humanitarian aid can broadly
be grouped into preventive, enforcement and ownership-based mechanisms.
Although humanitarian aid agencies develop their own mechanism to fight
corruption during relief operation by using various means, i.e. transparency in
decision-making and recruitment procedures, publicity and openness in handling
information, a four-eye principle throughout all procedures and enforcement
mechanisms for rules and regulations, but humanitarian aid agencies have to procure
a lot of things during relief operation; as a result, there are chances of kickbacks
and cuts as suppliers and vendors with the help of insiders in the organisation find
numerous ways to cheat the system, and there are a number of external factors which
act as obstacle to humanitarian aid agencies in fighting corruption, i.e. threats to aid
personnel, the threat of legal action taken against them and the agency, worsening
of public image of agency by sensationalist media and danger of being confronted
with false allegations. This makes it imperative for humanitarian aid agencies to
remain alert in order to ensure that sensitive information is well controlled, and
tender openings must be done in public or at least by a committee of people which
includes representatives of third parties, i.e. civil society groups, churches and other
like-minded organisations.
Along with this range of enforcement mechanisms, it is required to deal with
instances of corrupt practice by keeping regular cheques on suppliers; issuing public
tender by proper advertisement; taking legal action against the guilty; blacklisting
supplier firms; evolving robust financial system by ensuring payment through
cheques which have been signed by two people; public exposure of the guilty
and exchanging experiences; sensitisation of organisation staff and information
with other agencies; transparency in setting up selection criteria and consistency
in applying them; physical controls of all stocks and equipment; buying less
valuable and minimum quantities of equipment; reducing short-term recruitment
of both expatriate and national staff; systematic involvement of communities and
the intended beneficiaries; using sophisticated budget formulation; accounting,
reporting and audit mechanisms; developing capacity of operational managers to
read, understand and act upon financial data; and post-distribution monitoring
and evaluation which are a number of precautionary measures which play an
important role not only in tackling, eliminating and avoiding the cases of diversion
and misappropriation of funds during humanitarian aid relief but also in dealing
effectively with nepotism in the allocation of public contracts. These types of
preventive mechanisms reduce opportunities for corruption and mismanagement,
and they emerge as a basic deterrent to those intending on diverting aid for corrupt
purposes and provide assurance and confidence to donors that there will be optimum
use of their funds.
Corruption in humanitarian relief programme is detrimental to address the
needs of the most vulnerable sections of the population. Therefore, minimising
corruption during humanitarian aid is important for improving efficiency and
building stability. In order to promote and develop a culture of prevention and
preparedness of disasters, it is imperative that disaster management receives the
highest priority in all planning processes. Handling of disaster rescue operation
13 Disaster Management and Corruption: Issues, Interventions and Strategies 203

involves sophisticated diplomatic and political skills at all levels. The government
is responsible for organising administrative arrangements in dealing with disaster.
When disaster occurs, effective cultural and gender-appropriate measures must be
adopted by putting more emphasis on vulnerable group such as the children, women,
elderly, developmentally disabled, physically challenged, grass-roots communities
and others with special needs. The effectiveness of response depends upon the
level of preparedness at the time of disaster. Effective policies and sound building
capacities formulated by public servants play an active role in reducing loss of life
and property by mitigating the impact of disaster. Corruption during disaster phase
can be curbed by designing a better system, dismantling monopolies, regulation of
official discretion, enhancing transparency and enforcing penalties for corruption.
Reducing the risk of corruption during disaster relief not only improves efficiency,
but it also brings stability in affected areas. In order to meet all these standards,
disaster management should be planned integrally within long-term sustainable
development systems.

13.7 Conclusion

Disaster damage to society is so enormous that local resources are inadequate

to cope with the magnitude of the damage; thereby, resources from outside the
area are required to deal with the damage. The issue of corruption has emerged
as a key concern for practitioners involved in humanitarian assistance (relief and
reconstruction activities) especially on the aftermath of both natural disasters
and civil conflicts. Therefore, managing corruption during disaster needs urgent
attention. Corruption in emergency operations manifests itself in many ways and
requires differentiated means of dealing with it. There are tendencies which see
disaster in terms of profiteering, the over- or mis-supply of the aid system. There
is a need to address the issue of corruption in humanitarian aid in order to prevent
and alleviate further human suffering. There are methods and devices to address the
issue of corruption by putting the proper mechanism in place which reduces their
frequency and severity.
Humanitarian community, donor governments, United Nations agencies and
NGOs should be vigilant and active to ensure that accountability reaches to the
bottom of the supply chain through regular evaluation and monitoring. Systems
of accountability within humanitarian aid agencies and other institution should be
actively promoted by creating inter-agency monitoring and evaluation offices and
the use of common audit and logistics tracking systems along with checking fast
and furious spending. The government should ensure that funds are allocated on
the basis of the need of people, not on the basis of politics, by ensuring targeting
and timely delivery of aid and enforcing mechanism that aid is delivered to needy
people. Monitoring and evaluation during humanitarian aid should be strengthened
by promoting forwards accountability by ensuring participation of the local people
in planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting as they have the potential and
204 V. Saharan

capacity to identify malpractice in aid delivery. This empowerment of communities

to take ownership of aid efforts not only contributes in minimising corruption
by increasing beneficiaries’ awareness of their entitlements and their stake in the
success of aid programmes but also helps humanitarian aid organisation in sharing
of performance results with beneficiaries and other stakeholders.
In order to provide meaningful disaster response, an attempt should be made
not only for institutional strengthening and capacity building of human resources
but also upgrading the existing resources and facilities available with the various
agencies involved in disaster management. Traditional knowledge, practice and
values of local communities should be incorporated in disaster preparedness and
mitigation measures; early warning systems should be developed through efficient
communication and information technology to ensure coordinated and effective
response. Political commitment should be demonstrated through legislation and
policymaking; disaster risk reduction should be integrated into socioeconomic
and development planning; awareness and capacity building of community and
their participation must be encouraged to ensure accuracy and effectiveness of
humanitarian aid efforts. Documentation, identification, sharing of best practices
and addressing proper policy and practice gaps are tools for minimising the risks of
corruption and help in combating siphoning of fund. Direct citizen and community
involvement including pressure from horizontal structure, i.e. the role of academic
institutions, scientific bodies, the media and advocacy organisations, also plays an
important role in improving institutional vulnerability and preventing corruption in
humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities.

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