The Transition From Development and Disaster Risk Red

doi:10.1111/disa.
12521
The transition from development and

disaster risk reduction to humanitarian
relief: the case of Yemen during high-
intensity conflict
Rodrigo Mena Assistant Professor, International Institute of Social Studies,
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands, and Dorothea Hilhorst
Professor, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
Discussions on how humanitarian aid and disaster responses can link better with development
and disaster risk reduction (DRR) have occurred for decades. However, the reverse transition,
from development to relief, is still poorly understood. Using the case of Yemen, this study analy-
ses whether and how development and DRR activities adapted to the emerging humanitarian
crisis when conflict escalated in the country. It concentrates on governance strategies, actors, chal-
lenges, and opportunities at the nexus of development, disaster, and humanitarian responses.
Semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions with aid and societal actors were con-
ducted remotely and in Jordan. The findings show gaps in knowledge and coordination in the
movement from development and DRR to relief, but also reveal spaces and opportunities to
advance towards enhanced integration of action before, during, and after an emergency. This
paper contributes to the literature on this nexus and critically argues for a more integrated approach
to conflicts and disasters.
Keywords: development, disaster response, disaster risk reduction, high-intensity

conflict, humanitarian aid, relief, Yemen
Introduction
Places affected by high-intensity conflict (HIC)1 present complex scenarios for aid
interventions. In addition to low levels of effective governance, the provision of goods
and services is scattered, and territorial governance is divided between multiple fac-
tions, of which the government is only one (Mena, 2018; Hilhorst et al., 2019). In
many cases, crises multiply during natural hazard-related disasters such as droughts,
earthquakes, and floods, compounding the HIC. Between 1960 and 2018, an average
of 67 per cent of countries were affected each year by armed conflict and these types
of disaster (Caso, 2019). HIC also can foster disaster by ‘diverting national and
international financial and human resources that could be used for development and
for mitigation of natural hazard risk’, which may turn into a disaster (Wisner, 2012,
p. 69). As a result, HIC and disasters combine to result in significant humanitarian
crises, with the presence of a variety of actors providing relief.
Disasters, 2022, 46(4): 1049−1074. © 2021 The Authors Disasters © 2021 ODI
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1050 Rodrigo Mena and Dorothea Hilhorst
As relief mainly focuses on the conditions of conflict, it often disregards two per-
tinent conditions. First, countries embroiled in HIC usually have a long history of
development programmes, as they drift between periods of higher and lower levels
of conflict. How to achieve a harmonious and efficient transition between humani-
tarian aid and development programmes has been discussed for more than 30 years
by policymakers, practitioners, and academics. Ideas about linking relief, rehabilita-
tion, and development (LRRD), the continuum, or about their nexus have dominated
analyses (Macrae, 2019). This literature generally presents a movement from human-
itarian aid to development; in contrast, surprisingly little work has explored the shift
from development to humanitarian aid. Those deploying humanitarian aid and relief
tend to ignore the prior history of development, frequently adopting a tabula rasa
approach (Cramer, 2006; Hilhorst, 2007). Even though current resilience approaches,
as we elaborate below, are more conscious of the different transitions, there is a lack
of research on to what extent previous development programmes relate to, inform,
or are considered by those providing humanitarian aid in times of HIC.
Second, humanitarian aid and development do not usually incorporate disaster
response and prevention, as these actions are often treated as a separate domain. In
reality, these processes intertwine, and disaster-related activity can be part of both
development and humanitarian interventions. Despite advances in policy recognis-
ing the importance of disaster risk reduction (DRR), humanitarian action in conflict
areas tends to assume that DRR is not feasible and so focuses on relief instead (Mena
and Hilhorst, 2021a). Development, DRR, reconstruction, and rehabilitation all seek
to reduce people’s vulnerability, recover and strengthen deteriorated livelihoods,
and increase human resilience, yet remain separate in practice. Hence, this paper asks
how much DRR informs disaster response, particularly in places affected by violent
conflict. By scrutinising the transition from development to relief, while incorporating
concerns of DRR, it contributes to insights into and reflections on the relationship
among development, humanitarian aid, and disaster-related actions during conflict,
and illuminates how these fields can build on and incorporate lessons learned from
past development efforts.
In Yemen, a large number of development-related projects existed prior to 2015,
many of which centred on reducing the risk of water-related disasters. In 2015,
however, most of these interventions shifted from development to humanitarian and
emergency aid in response to the outbreak of civil war. Today, the ongoing conflict,
compounded by droughts and floods in particular, dominates the assistance agenda.
Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), historically among the most critical sectors
of the response in Yemen, is now seen as only one component of the broader humani-
tarian response (OCHA, 2018a; CARE International, 2020). Water issues are not
new in Yemen: ‘years of underdevelopment, extensive damage from conflict, unstable
fuel imports and natural disasters have left water and sanitation systems struggling
to uphold minimum services’ (OCHA, 2018a, p. 35). Our focus on DRR, water-
related disasters, and WASH permitted an in-depth investigation of the relations
among development, prevention, and relief.
The transition from development and disaster risk reduction to humanitarian relief 1051
Linking relief and preparedness in development,

humanitarian aid, and disasters
Development, humanitarian aid, and disaster-related actions have usually been treated
as separate processes, and a great deal of attention has been directed at the differences
between them (Frerks, Hilhorst, and Moreyra, 1999; Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri,
2005). Even though policy may evolve and become more integrated, these distinc-
tions continue to play a part in practice. This section reviews, therefore, how ideas
of linking humanitarian aid and development have evolved historically, and how
disaster-related actions are associated with humanitarian and development ones.
The humanitarian–development nexus

Traditionally, whereas humanitarian aid is concerned with saving lives and alleviating
the suffering of crisis-affected populations (Relief Web, 2008), development focuses
more on medium- to long-term systemic change, seeking improvements in quality of
life and well-being (Gasper, 1996). Humanitarian aid and development also differ in
terms of coordination strategies, budget lines, the types of needs they seek to address,
and the approaches taken to meet those needs. Importantly, development strategies
typically seek to strengthen institutions and work directly through the national gov-
ernment, whereas humanitarian assistance centres on (international) emergency
responses. The perception that humanitarian aid and development aid connect sequen-
tially also contributed to the view that these are separate processes, blinding observ-
ers to the history of development that generally precedes moments of crisis.
Table 1 separates relief and development for analytical purposes, although, again,
these two bodies of practice have increasingly become intertwined (Apthorpe, 1997;
Hilhorst and Pereboom, 2015). Humanitarian actions have significant development
components and, conversely, many development-related interventions include elements
traditionally seen as humanitarian aid (Frerks, Hilhorst, and Moreyra, 1999; Wood,
Apthorpe, and Borton, 2001). Similarly, there is a vast assemblage of approaches build-
ing on awareness that conflict and peace are not entirely separate realities; in many
countries that are neither fully in conflict nor at peace, violent conflict regularly spikes,
creating a pool of important operational capacities, personnel, and local knowledge
(Demmers, 2012). Moreover, disaster response can be analytically incorporated into
the distinction between relief and development by distinguishing immediate response
from DRR and preparedness. DRR has become engrained in international coop-
eration since the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 and the Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, even though practice and funding streams
are still uneven in their realisation of this.
Initial attempts to systematise ideas on how to improve the transition from humani-
tarian aid to development emerged in the late 1980s as LRRD. The latter sought
to identify strategies to provide humanitarian relief in a way that linked well with
sustainable medium- and long-term development initiatives (Otto and Weingärtner,
2013; Mosel and Levine, 2014; Stevens et al., 2018).
Table 1. Ideal–typical comparison between relief and development
Dimensions Relief/immediate disaster response Development/disaster risk reduction,

preparedness
Objectives Meeting immediate basic needs Improvement of standard of living
Nature of needs Physical, psychological Economic, social, political
Types of intervention Delivery of materials, provisions, Quantitative and qualitative changes in

and construction ongoing socioeconomic processes
Aid characteristics Short term, temporary (external) Long term (embedded)
Incident-related Structural
Relief of acute needs Changes in vulnerability and entitlements
Management Donor-driven Recipient-focused

characteristics
Top-down, directing Bottom-up, participation
Main foci Delivery, speed, logistics, and output Underlying processes, causalities,
long-term impact
Key context variables Lack of infrastructure and counterparts Infrastructure and counterparts available
(failed states)
Lack of knowledge and documentation Knowledge and documentation available
Media attention, fundraising Less public attention
Source: authors, adapted from Frerks, Hilhorst, and Moreyra (1999).
LRRD has been criticised in three key ways for presenting a linear progression
between phases (Harmer and Macrae, 2004; Hinds, 2015; Gómez and Kawaguchi,
2016). First, viewing humanitarian projects as disconnected and lacking capacity to
progress to long-term development, some have asserted that there is a gap between
humanitarian aid and development that prevents a proper transition between the two
domains (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). The second contention is that the long-term
and protracted crises seen in recent decades mean that humanitarian aid has also
become protracted, and that the boundaries between humanitarianism and develop-
ment blur (Hilhorst, 2007; Mosel and Levine, 2014). A third argument states that
the notion of LRRD views humanitarian aid as top-down and external, although
such aid could be delivered in ‘smarter’ ways (Richards, 1996), and more in sync with
development, such as by building on local capacities and reinforcing people’s coping
abilities (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Hilhorst, 2018).
Supporters of ‘smart relief ’ (Richards, 1996), introduced in the 1990s to make
humanitarian aid more development-oriented, draw attention to the fact that coun-
tries are rarely totally immersed in war. Pronk (1996),2 for example, appealed to
the donor community to finance development to create ‘pockets of development’
within larger conflict-affected contexts. Hilhorst (2007) presented a more system-
atic approach to smart relief with the distinction between classic and developmental
relief. Developmental relief entails a preference for working through local partners
and has the aim of overcoming the difference between relief and development, seek-
ing to protect livelihoods and saving lives. These ideas later evolved into resilience
humanitarianism (Hilhorst, 2018), which considers the humanitarian–development
relationship as ‘a continuous cycle where populations are constantly moving from relief
to development or from development to relief in chaotic and unexpected progressions’
(Humanitarian Coalition, 2015). Another relevant contribution was the ‘contiguum’
model, reflecting the view that ‘operations in relief, rehabilitation and development
may all be ongoing simultaneously within any given country’ (Commission of the
European Communities, 1996, p. ii).
The previous ideas have been translated into programmes implemented in coun-
tries experiencing ‘chronic crises’. For instance, the Netherlands-based international
non-governmental organisation (INGO) Cordaid,3 works with a model of ‘drought
cycle management’ that aims to move interventions ‘away from [the] traditional
approach of separating relief activities from development work’, positing that devel-
opment agencies need to be prepared for possible stages of emergency and to plan
relief measures to respond to them (IIRR, Cordaid, and Acacia Consultants, 2004,
p. 41). The model has been described as the ‘accordion model’,4 since it depicts
development and relief as needing to expand and contract depending on the context,
‘doing the right thing, at the right time’ (IIRR, Cordaid, and Acacia Consultants,
2004, p. 44). This means that interventions in these areas are as development-oriented
as possible and as relief-oriented as necessary (Hilhorst, 2005, p. 365).
More recently, efforts to bridge the two domains have been revived, for example,
in the idea of the nexus and the ‘new way of working’, a United Nations (UN) call
for humanitarian and development actors to collaborate (Harmer and Macrae, 2004;
ICVA, 2017; OCHA, 2017; Gómez and Kawaguchi, 2018; OCHA, 2019a; Poole
and Culbert, 2019) and to integrate humanitarian and development efforts into the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (OCHA, 2017, 2018b).
These approaches reveal the multidimensional nature of the linkages. First, they
pertain to overcoming the separation of activities and phases through time. Second,
they require coordination across different types of agencies and agendas, such as the
SDGs. Third, they call for more flexibility in programming. Fourth, they aim for
nuanced geographical consideration, with different approaches applied in different
parts of a country.
Advancing the nexus

Overcoming the divide between development and humanitarianism has thus been
on the agenda for quite some time. Apart from the LRRD discussions elaborated
above, increasing attention is now being paid to the triple nexus, resilience approaches,
and human security.
The triple nexus concerns linkages between peace (peacebuilding), humanitarian
aid, and development. It arose from recognition that development, peace, and stability
happen in non-linear and context-specific ways and, importantly, that communities do
not have isolated or one-dimensional needs (IASC, 2020). In addition, this approach
explores how peacebuilding can inform or bridge the transition from development to
humanitarian aid (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1993; Slim, 2017). Similarly,
peacebuilding also seeks to advance early warning indicators of conflict to facilitate
early responses to a crisis (van de Goor and Verstegen, 1999); and many approaches
acknowledge that conflict and peace are not entirely separate realities (Frerks, 2013;
IASC, 2020).
Resilience is a concept that was discussed as long ago as the 1960s, but which has
been a solid component of agendas since 2008 (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013). Depicted
as a broader concept than LRRD, resilience can bring together different sectors, people,
and agendas beyond humanitarian and development ones (Otto and Weingärtner,
2013; Mosel and Levine, 2014). The European Commission (2013, p. 3) has advocated
resilience-building on the grounds that ‘[a]ligning humanitarian and development
aid to national resilience strategies and frameworks is a precondition for sustainable
results’. This is consistent with Oxfam’s (2013, p. 28) invitation to donors, the UN,
and INGOs to break down institutional barriers and ‘work across the humanitarian–
development divide, strategically linking or integrating humanitarian and devel-
opment work’. The main idea behind resilience is that fostering people’s capacities
during crises can reduce the need for emergency relief while creating long-term
opportunities to resist and recover from shocks (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Mosel
and Levine, 2014). However, as Mosel and Levine (2014, p. 5) emphasise, ‘[r]esilience
in crises, as opposed to resilience to crises, is not yet high enough on the agenda’.
Lastly, the human security approach can also generate relevant insights. In a vari-
ety of scenarios, paying attention to ‘vulnerabilities, risks, and forces of disruption
and destruction’ (Gasper and Gómez, 2014, p. 2) allows for the study of the evolu-
tion of crises and how they are (or are not) addressed in terms of the development–
humanitarian continuum. Many policies have progressed, yet there is little empirical
evidence on how the transition from development to relief is dealt with in practice,
and crisis response rarely seeks to build explicitly on previous development efforts.
From DRR to disaster response

For several decades, the dominant method of modelling disaster action has been in
reference to the disaster cycle, a comprehensive approach that includes the ‘sum total
of all activities, programmes and measures which can be taken up before, during and
after a disaster with the purpose to avoid a disaster, reduce its impact or recover from
its losses’ (Vasilescu, Khan, and Khan, 2008, p. 44). The thinking behind the cycle is
that after responding to a disaster, processes of reconstruction and rehabilitation occur
in ways that reduce the risk of disasters in the future (Wisner, Gaillard, and Kelman,
2012). These processes and all activities to learn, anticipate, mitigate, and prepare for
a forthcoming disaster are part of the broader DRR approach. This has been described
as a strategy to prevent disasters and a component of the response to them, since the
ways in which a disaster is addressed can affect the potential for recurrence of a dis-
aster and the creation of new ones (Blaikie et al., 1994; UNDRR, 2019).
Disaster governance goes beyond the cycle and incorporates the management of
and responsibilities for disasters, including DRR, disaster response, disaster knowl-
edge production, and related policies and normative frameworks, with multiple actors
focusing on social, economic, and political dimensions (Tierney, 2012; Field and
Kelman, 2018; Hilhorst et al., 2019; UNDRR, 2022). Disaster governance and actions,
therefore, integrate efforts to reduce vulnerability into relief efforts to save lives, com-
bining work that can be seen as part of development and humanitarian assistance.
DRR initiatives are expected to prevent disasters or to prepare societies to respond
better to them. One example of this is early warning mechanisms, which are imple-
mented during the prevention stages and can significantly reduce the impact and
risk of disasters. For instance, in the ‘seamless’ approach of the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA, 2015), a more prepared response comes from early stage
prediction of the occurrence of a disaster, timely dissemination of warnings, effective
alerting or evacuating of residents, and immediate relief provision to affected areas
when a disaster occur. Another DRR strategy that informs and supports disaster
response is capacity strengthening or sharing—specifically, non-structural capacity
development, such as training community-level first responders to help people living
in disaster-prone areas to respond adequately in the aftermath of a disaster. Despite
more DRR in development, ODA (official development assistance) donors are still
not allocating significant components of their budget to DRR (Sparks, 2012). Our
own calculations show that between 2016 and 2019, for instance, only 0.7 per cent
of total ODA-committed funds were for disaster prevention and preparedness.5
While recognising the complications of advancing the agenda of DRR in develop-
ment, we nonetheless bring DRR into the analysis of development because both can
be similarly marked by disruptions to activities, coordination, and flexible program-
ming amidst conditions of escalating conflict.
One setback with capacity sharing and early warning mechanisms, particularly in
places affected by HIC, is that they assume the presence of governmental structures
that can initiate and coordinate these endeavours. The Sendai Framework states that
‘[d]isaster risk reduction requires that responsibilities be shared by central Govern-
ments and relevant national authorities, sectors and stakeholders, as appropriate to
their national circumstances and systems of governance’ (UNISDR, 2015, p. 13).
However, in HIC scenarios, national and local governance structures are significantly
fractured, resulting in dependency on the promotion and coordination of disaster-
related actions by international actors (Macrae, 2019; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, 2019;
Mena and Hilhorst, 2021a).
Transitioning from development and DRR to relief and creating a better link to
previous development efforts are especially important in the context of disasters
(Macrae, 2019). This movement, however, needs to overcome the sequential and
linear approach to it (owing to the critiques presented above), and one way of doing
so is to see the process as a balancing act. This idea aligns with the resilience, triple
nexus, and LRRD approaches, which all acknowledge that at times, development will
be more significant, whereas at other points, more humanitarian aid will be needed,
Figure 1. Integration of development, prevention, and relief
Source: authors.
yet both types of assistance are essential for dealing with disasters and conflicts and
for supporting peace and stability. Figure 1 proposes a way to illustrate this balanc-
ing act between the types of assistance during times of prolonged crisis, and how
different policy approaches increasingly seek to integrate flexibly development, DRR,
and humanitarian action. This paper explores how the transition between develop-
ment and relief takes shape in an actual situation of conflict escalation, that of Yemen.
Research questions and methods

Based on the arguments above, we used the case of Yemen to investigate the transi-
tion from development to humanitarian aid in a HIC setting affected by disasters.
Questions guiding the research process were:
• What happened to the development and DRR actors working in this context and
what happened to their programmes after the conflict erupted?
• Were these actors able to remain in Yemen, and have they found alternative ways
of working in the country?
• Were the programmes able to continue with modifications, or were they cancelled,
paused, or completely overhauled?
• What scenarios did humanitarian actors find when they responded to the crisis
and disasters?
• Which coordination mechanisms were in place for the shift from development to
humanitarian aid actors and actions?
To answer these questions, we designed a qualitative case study comprising both

remote research and fieldwork phases. While the project had a special focus on WASH
programmes and water-related disasters, it aimed to learn more broadly about disaster
and the general transition process from development to relief.
After an extensive literature review, the first author conducted fieldwork in Jordan
in November and December 2019. The impossibility of gaining access to Yemen
drove the decision to use remote research techniques, mostly from Amman, Jordan,
the main city used to fly into and out of Yemen by international and Yemeni aid,
Table 2. In-depth interview and focus-group participants
Participant type Number Description
Yemeni NGO representatives 7 Managers, country directors, and staff members of local and
national NGOs
International NGO 6 Managers, country directors, and staff members

representatives
UN managers and staff 5 Programme managers and directors in Yemen and at the interna-
tional level
Internationally recognised 2 Yemen’s internationally recognised government

government representatives
Donors 5 Interviews with representatives of two national donors and one

intergovernmental donor
Academics 3 Academics conducting research about and in Yemen
Private sector actors 2 Private sector actors associated with aid provision
Total 30
Source: authors.
development, and societal actors. This made it possible to interview people during
flight layovers and between meetings. Jordan also hosts the offices of multiple non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), donors, UN agencies, and other organisations
working in or on Yemen. In cases where it was not possible to reach an individual by
other means, interviews were conducted using video conferencing. These remote
interviews lasted for one hour on average. Table 2 provides an overview of the par-
ticipants in the research.6
We also explored the possibility of working with a local researcher. However,
after talking to key informants and other researchers in Yemen, it was determined that
local researchers would be exposed to multiple risks. The research design and ques-
tions were revised accordingly, so that they could be answered via remote research.
The main change was to the level of our analysis. Local perspectives were difficult
to garner, leading our analysis to focus more on international development and
humanitarian assistance efforts. Despite this limitation, we were able to include in
our study Yemeni NGOs (YNGOs), government officials, academics, and the private
sector in Yemen. Another modification involved the use of a disaster lens to concen-
trate more on the general transition process from development to relief, producing
a more detailed account of the WASH sector and water-related disasters.
For data analysis, we used thematic analysis techniques informed by three pre-
determined main themes:
• development and DRR initiatives before and during the crisis;

• coordination and transition strategies and processes; and
• individual actors and organisations before and during the crisis.
The case of Yemen: conflict, disaster, and a major

humanitarian crisis
Civil war broke out between the Houthis, members of an Islamic political movement,
and Yemen’s internationally recognised government in the second half of 2014
(Edwards, 2019), leading to the collapse of essential services and institutions and a
state of fragile governance and socioeconomic catastrophe (World Bank, UNCT, and
European Union, 2015; OCHA, 2018a). The situation was described as the ‘largest
humanitarian crisis’ worldwide in 2017 and 2018 (Al Jazeera, 2017; United Nations,
2018). By 2019, more than 24 million people (three-quarters of the population) were
in need of humanitarian assistance and 3.4 million people were internally displaced
(OCHA, 2018a; IMDC, 2019; UNHCR, 2019). As a result, aid agencies launched
an appeal for more than USD 4.1 billion.
Adding to the social crisis, the National Report on Disaster Risk Reduction notes that
Yemen is also vulnerable to hazards such as ‘flash floods, earthquakes, technological
hazards, civil conflict, population growth, urban migration, extreme climate events,
desertification, soil erosion, landslide, mudflow, locust invasions, depletion of ground-
water aquifers and disease epidemics’ (Ministry of Water and Environment, 2005,
p. 1). Yemen was previously ranked among the most disaster-prone countries in the
Middle East and North Africa region (World Bank, 2014). However, specific up-to-
date information about disasters affecting the country and detailed historical data
are scattered. The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)7 provides one of the few
statistical accounts of Yemen’s disaster history, but it lacks information on droughts
in 2018 and 2019 (see Table 3).
Water-related disasters (that is, droughts, floods, and landslides), including water-
borne (bacterial) diseases such as cholera, have had the greatest impact on Yemen in
terms of casualties and economic losses (PreventionWeb, 2014; World Bank, 2014;
GFDRR, 2015). The causes of drought in Yemen, such as rampant groundwater
exploitation and ‘a framework that has promoted expansion rather than efficient use
and sustainable management’ (2015, p. 251), are shared with other Middle Eastern
countries, but Yemen, in particular, is considered to be ‘one of the most water-scarce
countries in the world’ (Varisco, 2019, p. 1). In addition, as noted by Weiss (2015,
p. 252), ‘the depletion of Yemen’s aquifers is especially problematic since Yemen has
no perennial rivers and is forced to rely for its daily water needs on groundwater and
other sources of water that ebb and flow according to the season’.
Drought also induces local conflicts in the country, particularly over the control
of groundwater sources (Weiss, 2015), and plays a role in internal migration (Ismail,
2009). As a consequence of the water crisis, including a lack of access to drinkable
water, reduced or failed crop production, and land degradation, food insecurity in
Yemen has reached severe levels, intensifying the risk of famine (FAO, 2018; OCHA,
2018a; IPC, 2019). Heavy rainfall and flash floods have also affected humanitarian aid
and relief provision, as these events have ‘damaged shelters, clinics, child friendly
spaces and classrooms, and spoiled stocks of food rations and hygiene kits, and flooded
Table 3. Number of casualties and people affected by disasters in Yemen (1900–2019)
Disaster type Total number of deaths Total number of people

affected by disasters
Bacterial disease 759 462,020
Riverine flood 596 347,839
Tropical cyclone 75 140,939
Flash flood 274 137,678
Earthquake 10 40,039
Flood 64 23,458
Viral disease 35 3,494
Landslide 96 31
Volcanic ash fall 6 15
Storm 30 0
Drought* – –
Note: * EM-DAT does not provide statistical accounts of droughts in Yemen in 2018 and 2019.
Source: authors, using information from EM-DAT (downloaded in December 2019).
WASH facilities’ (OCHA, 2019b, p. 2). As stated by a UN climate change specialist,

not only has the war affected the country, ‘[b]ut climate change and disasters have
been an important “threat multiplier” over many years, exacerbating food insecu-
rity, decimating water reserves, expanding drylands and creating underlying levels
of social vulnerability’ (Walid, 2017, p. 1).
Findings
This section presents the results on the transition from development to humanitarian
aid in Yemen, with a focus on water-related disasters. It includes findings concern-
ing which actors were present, their coordination mechanisms, and the objectives of
development and humanitarian aid in the country before and during the crisis. It also
highlights important limitations of knowledge and challenges that prevent better
coordination and enhanced movement from development to humanitarian relief.
The turn from development to humanitarian aid for water-related

disaster management
To understand the transition from development to humanitarian aid using a disaster
lens, it is necessary to clarify how and by whom disaster issues were addressed prior
to and during the crisis. Both the interviews and the literature review showed that
beforehand, most programmes in Yemen working to reduce the risk of water-related
disasters were part of general WASH projects focusing on access to sanitation ser-
vices in urban areas (Moore and Fisher, 2012; World Bank, 2017; Abu-Lohom et al.,
2018). These development programmes were actively organised or funded by the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food
Programme (WFP), the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and NGOs, working in partnership with the Government of Yemen, local
organisations, and private companies (GFDRR, 2015).
The few DRR activities that have been implemented also aligned with develop-
ment schemes and included rural areas and the agricultural sector. For instance, in
2009, multiple projects seeking to address drought and floods were developed by
FAO and WFP in partnership with Yemen’s Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
and local authorities. The programmes included the delivery of subsidised seeds, edu-
cational components, and initiatives to introduce integrated water resources manage-
ment practices. As noted by WFP’s Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East,
Central Asia, and Eastern Europe, Philip Ward, these programmes were ‘designed to
support a developmental process rather than a dependency on food aid’ (Ismail, 2009).
Since mid-2014, the World Bank (2017, p. ix) pointed out, ‘not only have advances
in WASH provisions made over the last decade been halted but also the country has
experienced wholesale physical destruction, institutional degradation, and movement
of internally displaced people (IDPs) that have contributed to an alarming deterio-
ration in WASH service’. Similarly, the GFDRR’s (2015) Country Profile stated that the
country’s disaster risk management plan, updated and ratified in 2010, was suspended
due to political unrest. Consequently, from 2014, water issues have transitioned from
being seen as part of long-term development to being addressed and framed as part
of the ‘general humanitarian response’, as expressed by an INGO member of staff.
Regarding drought and water scarcity, after the onset of the crisis, the solution was
delivering water by tanker trucks (YNGO, UN, and INGO interviews; see also
Whitehead, 2015). A former Yemeni government official working on water-related
programmes mentioned in an interview that water scarcity measures revealed a prob-
lematic emergency mentality, as ‘they [UN agencies and INGOs] just give water
to people without thinking that there might [be] better solutions. This can create
more problems.’
Hence, if water problems were addressed before the crisis by organisations devel-
oping infrastructure for water access, it is valid and important to ask what happened
to these programmes and the implementing actors. Most interviewees responded to
this question by saying ‘the crisis happened’ and underlined that Yemen is now a
conflict-affected place with new actors involved in tackling water-related disasters.
Actors, coordination, and information before, during, and after the

transition from relief to development
A similar number of INGOs and YNGOs were working in the country in 2013 and
2014, supported by multiple UN agencies, while a growing number of governmental
institutions were acting as partners and implementers (see Figure 2). Many of these
organisations were addressing water-related disaster risk (interviewees from YNGO,
UN, and two donors). However, in June 2015, because of the escalating conflict, the
scenario changed radically and the number of YNGOs started to mount, doubling
between 2017 and 2019 (as seen in Figure 2).8
Two main explanations for the rising number of YNGOs emerged from docu-
ments and interviews. First, during the transition from development to humanitarian
aid from late 2014 to early 2015, many INGOs continued to work in the country but
with minimal staff, implementing projects via partnerships with YNGOs. Second,
the crisis offered a business opportunity for local and national actors in the sense that
it created new needs and left some demands unmet by development actors or INGOs.
This second point was also mentioned in a focus group with YNGO representa-
tives, in which some participants also shared how they participated in the formation
of new YNGOs or the rebranding of old ones, to apply for funds and tackle the
‘new’ needs. Many stressed that multiple ‘old’ problems (from before the current civil
war), such as water-related disasters, were still present and even worsening in Yemen,
but the aid sector was not concentrating on them anymore or it was doing so using
a different strategy, including the delivery of water by tanker trucks.
Figure 2 illustrates a gap in information in terms of which organisations were present
and working in Yemen from August 2014 to June 2015. Little is known about which
activities and programmes were implemented in Yemen during these months. The
interviewees from all sectors noted that, when the civil war started, many organisations
stopped or paused their interventions, only restarting certain activities after July 2015.
A Yemeni staff member of an INGO stated: ‘Almost everyone left; the foreigners out
of the country and most of us to our houses. There was no job; the projects stopped’.
A Situation Report produced by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) pointed out that ‘[m]any international humanitarian
staff have been temporarily relocated outside of Yemen due to growing insecurity.
Humanitarian operations continue to be implemented and coordinated in-country
with remaining international and national staff ’ (OCHA, 2015, p. 6). Activities were
carried out on a smaller scale, with many programmes assuming a ‘skeleton operation’,
maintaining core activities and minimising the presence of personnel.
When we asked the interviewees about this, most indicated that it was because
they were in a HIC setting; levels of violence and avoiding putting people at risk
were the main reasons given. They mentioned, too, the impossibility of implement-
ing projects, considering that they would not be sustainable, and that project partici-
pants would be displaced. INGOs and UN interviewees added that before the crisis,
most of the projects were implemented jointly with civil actors and the govern-
ment, but that was not possible during a HIC. Expanding on the previous point,
they said that development-related activities, including preventing the risk of water-
related disasters, are tasks that involve the government. This idea echoes the call in the
Sendai Framework regarding the role of governments in disaster-related actions and
the challenges posed during a HIC.
Figure 2. Numbers of organisations operating in Yemen, 2013–19
Source: authors, using information derived from Yemen: Monthly Organizations Presence Who, What,
and Where (3Ws) reports published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/yemen (2013–18) and https://reliefweb.
int/ (2018 and 2019)). All reports downloaded in December 2019.
Development-related organisations, including donors, worked remotely to con-

tinue operations in Yemen, described as ‘resilience programmes’ by donors and UN
actors. They tried not to transition fully to humanitarian relief, instead carrying out
interim projects to, in the words of a UN development manager, ‘try to help beyond
just saving lives, but . . . [they are] not [as] sustainable as we would like them to be’.
This gap in knowledge is also illustrated by the United Nations Information Centres,
which started publishing a monthly newsletter detailing UN activities in Yemen in
2014, but paused all news production from May 2015 to May 2018,9 and by OCHA,
whose country reports were interrupted from October 2014 to March 2015. The
latter generally came out monthly before the crisis, but they have been less regular
since resuming production in March 2015.
Not surprisingly, the transition from more developmental activities to those aimed
at relief was described as uncoordinated. A ‘Consultative Meeting for Yemen’, which
took place in Larnaca, Cyprus, on 6–8 October 2015, concluded that ‘[t]here is a need
for better coordination across all actors’ (World Bank et al., 2015, p. 13).
Before the crisis, development activities were mainly coordinated by UNDP, as
the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) was also the Resident Representative of UNDP
(United Nations, 2015). General aid governance was organised under the Cluster
System; however, as one interviewee put it, ‘[b]efore 2015, the clusters were there,
but there was no coordination between them. The main activity for [the] clusters was
to avoid any duplication of projects.’
As humanitarian needs were also present in the country, working closely with the
RC was the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for Yemen. The HC ‘coordinates the
urgent and lifesaving assistance in the country [. . . and] collaborate[s] closely with
the Yemeni people, the Government and other International and Yemeni partners,
to ensure that the support of the United Nations in Yemen best serves to realize the
future Yemenis want’ (United Nations, 2014, p. 2).
This statement shows that although the focus in Yemen was on development-related
activities, some international humanitarian actors were present, such as OCHA, which
had been in the country since 2010, primarily to support the HC. This reinforces
our main research question on why the transition and coordination presented impor-
tant gaps, especially knowing that there was a humanitarian actor in Yemen. In a
second round of interviews, UN and INGO participants said that the fundamental
reason is that although there were humanitarian institutions, their mandate was to
support the HC and the people in those positions had expertise in doing so. It is for
the same reason that the governance of the response changed in 2016, when a newly
appointed RC also assumed the role of HC, and made strengthening humanitarian
aid the primary assistance objective in the country.
From a societal coordination and governance perspective, although all interviewees
mentioned the authority of the Houthis and the internationally recognised govern-
ment in their territories, they also described this duality of power as a significant
issue. The two entities had limited governance capacity and differing (and sometimes
unknown) agendas and procedures. This added a north–south geographical divide
and a coordination challenge to the problematic division between development and
humanitarian aid.
Objectives, main foci, and types of interventions

Two crucial dimensions shown in Table 1 are objectives and main foci. Although
some NGOs and other organisations working on water-related disasters before the
crisis were able to continue to address the same topics as part of WASH schemes
during the HIC, they mentioned having to change their focus when funding and
support from donors and other organisations were no longer available. As a YNGO
manager stated: ‘We tried to keep doing it [development-related WASH programmes],
but the problem is that donors do not support us anymore, so we had to change to
emergency [such as to food assistance]’.
An in-depth analysis of the Yemen: Monthly Organizations Presence Who, What, and
Where (3Ws) reports published by OCHA10 (see Figure 2) confirmed this situation.
In May and June 2016, 14 YNGOs working on early recovery, protection, WASH,
or education ceased operations, and 14 new YNGOs emerged in the following month,
working on shelter, non-food items, and camp coordination and management.
Similarly, about one-half of the development actors interviewed cited funding and
donor agendas as the principal reasons for cancelling development programmes.
Whereas YNGOs described how funds were cancelled or money ‘stopped flowing’,
INGOs and UN agencies reported having to return donor funding. Most donors
highlighted that the priority in Yemen was responding to the humanitarian crisis
and that insufficient resources and capacities made it unfeasible and unsustainable to
pursue other non-emergency initiatives. In comparison with other HICs around the
world, the interviewed donors noted that the same dilemma always materialised:
HIC scenarios present levels of humanitarian need that mean that other priorities have
to be postponed until lower levels of conflict are present.
An important nuance here is that, although there were reduced programmes with
development aims during the crisis, many YNGOs continued to conduct development-
like activities by adapting or disguising these projects. For instance, a WASH project
financed by humanitarian aid funds from the UN’s Country-based Pooled Funds
scheme11 sought to improve water treatment to reduce cholera and other water-related
diseases. While this part of the project was not included in the formal log frame or
officially reported by the implementing NGOs, some project funds were used for
educational activities associated with personal hygiene and reproductive health. An
aid actor involved in the project explained why they carried out these endeavours
without support from donors or government authorities: ‘We had experience [of ]
working on these topics in the past, and we know they are important for long-term
and forever problems’. When asked about projects centred around water-related disas-
ters, the research participants said that the vast majority of them are based on emer-
gency solutions, in part because long-term recovery and DRR work ‘require that you
know much more [in comparison with the logistics of delivering water by truck],
for example, about agricultural things, water management, and climate things’ (INGO
interviewee). Similar ideas were reinforced in a focus group with YNGO participants.
Limited knowledge to guide the transition and to manage

different interventions
Transitioning from development to relief meant a change in the type of interven-
tions conducted, requiring the managerial knowledge and capacities necessary to
carry out the new activities. Despite the presence of the development organisations
that remained in Yemen (albeit with minimal capacity), the humanitarian actors newly
active in the country were unable to manage their actions in a way that reflected learn-
ing from or connected with development projects. A UN manager emphasised:
It would be great to arrive and have someone inform me about all that is happening on
the ground and how we connect with those efforts. UNDP and some people I know here
helped me a lot, but there is a lot left out of what they do or managed.
Besides UNDP, other actors expected to know about development initiatives are
the Government of Yemen and the HC. However, the research participants were
notably silent regarding their knowledge of the roles of the HC and OCHA before
the crisis, and even more so about past activities in relation to water-related disasters.
This highlights the lack of information and knowledge transferred before and during
the crisis. In combination with Yemen’s fractured governance, this lack of knowl-
edge indicates a failure to connect with previous projects, as well as insufficient aware-
ness of the continuation of projects and the implementation of new ones.
Another relevant gap, mostly mentioned by YNGO and government representa-
tives, involved a lack of knowledge of managing large-scale humanitarian aid inter-
ventions and the loss of on-the-ground development expertise. In the interviews,
local and national NGO representatives expressed two main ideas. First, although
they lacked capacity in and knowledge of how to run large-scale humanitarian pro-
jects, no other work was available for them. This matter was presented as more acute
in relation to addressing water-related disasters in HIC scenarios because, accord-
ing to interviewees, it is an area that requires specialised knowledge. Second, these
actors had expertise in development-related interventions in times of crisis, but their
experience of these programmes was lost because donors did not allow them to inte-
grate this approach, or they did not have the necessary resources or time to do so. A
Yemeni INGO manager explained: ‘We didn’t know what to do. It’s similar to what
I was doing, so I could improvise, but it was not the same’. This kind of improvisa-
tion was referred to multiple times by different actors, who underscored that they had
to respond using their experience of development.
The claim about the underutilisation of development-related expertise has two
caveats. First, many aid actors said that they included some development elements
in their emergency interventions. They drew on their experiences, knowing ‘that
implementing the project as it is mandated will only bring short-term solutions’, in
the words of one YNGO manager. These changes were sometimes discussed with
and approved by donors, but usually were not formalised, as was the case in the
example of the informal education element of the WASH project presented above.
Implementing projects in this way was also seen as a strategy to work in conflict-
affected settings because many development actions were considered to be in line with
the agenda of one of the warring parties. Second, multiple interviewees working in
the country mentioned that development interventions preceded the start of ‘official
development’: ‘Development starts earlier in the country than from outside’ (YNGO
manager). One reason for this is that, in many places, the macro conflict did not
directly affect the local population, leaving spaces (or ‘pockets of development’) open
for the implementation of development projects. Conversely, before the conflict inten-
sified, ‘pockets of emergency’ in Yemen were already receiving humanitarian aid
(OCHA, 2014).
Challenges and ways of moving forward

The development–humanitarian transition presents multiple challenges and opportu-
nities, many of which are similar to the obstacles facing the transition from humani-
tarian aid to development (Macrae et al., 1997; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Hinds,
2015). For instance, for both humanitarian aid and development actors, naming
organisations with the expertise or knowledge to work in both domains was diffi-
cult, meaning that there were no organisations to act as bridges during such a tran-
sition. This is an interesting finding given that most organisations have multiple
mandates: they have a humanitarian mandate and one or more other mandates,
such as development or peacebuilding (Hilhorst and Pereboom, 2015). However, as
noted, interviewees pointed out that the organisations can be multi-mandate, but
specific projects or their individual expertise are not. Similarly, these organisations
often work with different mandates and even under different funding schemes, which
present the challenge of finding a mechanism for evaluating programmes during

protracted transitions—recognised as an issue in LRRD as well (Buchanan-Smith
and Fabbri, 2005; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013).
The case of Yemen also demonstrates the complexity of linking interventions
across different regions of a country affected by a HIC, especially if they have dif-
ferent needs. This relates to the LRRD literature on the sustainability problem of
implementing long-term development projects among populations that may return
to their hometowns during the recovery phase (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005;
Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Mosel and Levine, 2014). Some research participants
expressed the opposite concern: that trying to enhance the link between development
and humanitarian aid might lead to investing in programmes and projects that would
have to be cancelled because of the conflict, which is also a concern of triple nexus
initiatives (CIC, 2019). LRRD and the development–humanitarian nexus also
share ‘the two-world challenge’ of finding commonalities and coordinating despite
different mandates, principles, partner strategies, imperatives, languages, speeds, time
frames, and funding mechanisms.
Another major difficulty pertains to the fractured governance systems in HIC con-
texts, resulting in the absence of bodies to manage the transition from development
to humanitarian aid. Many of the interviewees pointed to the lack of coordination
between departments with different mandates within a single organisation. Further-
more, the budget and funds for humanitarian aid in Yemen were perceived to be,
in the words of one INGO representative, ‘too much and unmanageable’. In relation
to the transition from development to relief, this presents accountability-related issues,
particularly when large amounts of funding come from multiple sources.
The challenges shared by LRRD and the development–humanitarian nexus also
suggest opportunities. For example, learning how to overcome ‘the two-worlds’
problem will benefit both approaches and provide an opening to join efforts centred
on this task. The continued presence of many organisations working on develop-
ment in Yemen during the crisis can be seen as a chance to design better transition
strategies within each organisation, which some interviewees described as easier to
implement than such efforts between organisations. The existence of ‘pockets of
development’ raises the possibility for the development–humanitarian nexus to be a
process in which the two domains of assistance complement each other during vari-
ous moments of the crisis (as Figure 1 illustrates).
The case of Yemen, aligning with the research participants’ statements, also sug-
gests that the existence of ‘pockets of (conflict-related) emergency’ may play an
important role in moving the development–humanitarian nexus forward. First, this
situation may serve to indicate that a more significant crisis might arise, allowing
preparations to be made in advance. Our literature review revealed that this strat-
egy is already used by peacebuilding actors (Vivekananda, 2011; Frerks, 2013), who
see such events as warning signs to prepare early responses or as part of the cycle
described by the ‘accordion model’. Second, relatedly, these ‘pockets’ of crisis can be
seen as instances in which the development–humanitarian nexus can begin to be put
into action on a relatively small and manageable scale, preparing the arrangements,
negotiations among actors, and procedures to support better the transition when the
crisis intensifies.
The research participants from INGOs and YNGOs underlined that this prepa-
ration and pre-transition work would require that interventions and programmes
have a certain degree of flexibility so that they can change their projects, actions, and
responses. Support from organisational headquarters and donors is essential for aid
actors to achieve this flexibility, which might involve temporarily combining pro-
grammes. It will also necessitate the continued availability of funding during times
of crisis. As described above, the ability to achieve this transition and to allow pro-
grammes to adapt needs commitment by the donor community to continue to pro-
vide funding and to find a way for it to reach implementing actors. All of the efforts
described here will entail consistent preparation and coordination work that begins
well in advance of a crisis.
Conclusion
Disasters related to hazards such as droughts, earthquakes, and floods frequently occur
in conflict-affected areas. In light of shifting levels of conflict, a large body of research
and policy literature has promoted the relevance of examining how humanitarian aid
and disaster response can be linked with future development and DRR initiatives,
and how these actions can be better integrated throughout different conflict phases.
Yemen is a country beset by war and disaster. After more than a decade of crises
and multiple development-related programmes, Yemen saw its conflict attain such
high levels of violence and intensity at the end of 2014 that a humanitarian crisis
ensued. This study has analysed the subsequent transition from development to
humanitarian aid in Yemen with a focus on disaster-related actions. Special attention
is accorded to water-related hazards such as drought and water scarcity, since they
constitute a severe risk in the country. Before the actual humanitarian crisis, pro-
grammes to address water problems in Yemen were part of general WASH and
development initiatives, and endeavours to reduce the risk of drought were not
always framed as DRR strategies. These programmes had commonly been developed
in partnership with the Government of Yemen and sought long-term solutions. Since
2015, water-related problems have been tackled as part of the general humanitarian
response, focusing on delivery by tanker trucks.
Analysing the general transition from development to humanitarian aid projects
has generated important results. Notably, many international organisations (that is,
INGOs, UN agencies, and other developmental organisations) scaled down their
operations after the start of the crisis, and most international staff left the country.
While they maintained a presence in Yemen, they did so with a reduced operating
capacity, leading to the exponential growth of YNGOs, which have implemented
specific aspects of the projects. Most development-related programmes shut down,
leaving Yemeni staff members unemployed or redirected to humanitarian aid activi-

ties. In the case of drought responses, this was significant, as delivering water by truck
requires less staff and expertise than agriculture or sustainable livelihoods management.
Our findings also indicate that, during the HIC period, most crisis responses were
carried out by YNGOs; however, many of these organisations were not well-prepared
and did not know how to lead a large-scale humanitarian response. Although some
development projects continued in a modified form, the lack of financial support
from donors forced a shift to emergency aid. When development-like aspects of
projects were implemented during the HIC period, this was usually done on the ini-
tiative of local actors who had worked in development and appreciated the need to
continue them. However, the expertise required to address severe droughts impeded
the implementation of non-emergency water solutions, except for a few projects in
‘pockets of development’. Identifying such needs was closely related to the notion
that, in many areas of Yemen, the conflict would not directly impede interventions,
making development-related, long-term initiatives possible. These opportunities also
emerged from the development project expertise that existed in the country before
the crisis.
Consequently, almost every research participant highlighted the importance of
working towards better integration of pre-crisis development projects and humani-
tarian aid interventions, as well as continuing to conduct as much development work
as possible during the crisis. A similar idea was acknowledged by humanitarian and
development actors working in Yemen at a technical meeting on 6–8 October 2015:
‘Humanitarian assistance is critical but it is not the only need. Yemen requires a
broader approach that allows for support for people to cope and build resilience to
recover from the crisis’ (World Bank, UNCT, and European Union, 2015, p. 13). The
participants in our study asserted that this is not happening yet because conflict de-
escalation is seen as a prerequisite for development. Likewise, there are still open
questions regarding what level of government stability is needed to link develop-
ment, humanitarian, and disaster interventions successfully and sustainably. Without
some level of peace and stability, these efforts are at risk of failure. The localisation
agenda can also play a part in supporting them by linking development actors to key
humanitarian sectors, better equipping them for transitioning between assistance
domains and responding to needs when conflicts intensify.
Many of the challenges encountered in the transition from development relate to
a lack of flexibility in programming and of space for national actors to set the agenda
for interventions. YNGOs pointed to changing donor policies, a response to the
escalation of conflict, as a major reason why certain development-related activities
had to be suspended, rather than limitations owing to conditions on the ground.
Moreover, they signalled that the requests and suggestions that they made to donors
to continue with certain activities fell on deaf ears. As a result, they had to resort
to a certain level of informal, hidden action, continuing these activities within the
framework of new programmes.
The findings suggest that international actors and donors involved in DRR and
development should consider the continuity of their actions during times of HIC
and avoid adopting an emergency mentality. Humanitarian aid actors can take a more
flexible approach, building in opportunities for development-related and DRR ini-
tiatives, even during acute emergencies, as identified by national partners
These advancements are crucial because, despite the usefulness of the humanitarian–
development distinction for crisis management and analysis, ‘for those affected by
crisis, the difference between humanitarian and developmental aid makes no sense’
(Gómez and Kawaguchi, 2016, p. 4).
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the numerous people and institutions that shared their knowl-
edge and experiences with us. Special thanks go to Yousef Qutary, for his support
during the whole research process and for feedback provided on this paper. This
work was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grant
number 453-14-013).
Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding
author upon reasonable request.
Correspondence
Dr Rodrigo Mena, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX, The Hague, The Netherlands.
E-mail: [email protected]
Endnotes
1
HIC scenarios are usually defined as moments in protracted crises when general violence occurs
and casualties owing to violent conflict surpass 1,000 (Mena, 2018).
2
Politician and Minister for Development Cooperation (1989–98) in the Netherlands.
3
Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid. For more information, see https://www.
cordaid.org/en/ (last accessed on 18 July 2022).
4
Initially described inadvertently as the ‘harmonica model’ (Hilhorst and Pereboom, 2015, p. 33).
5
Calculated by the authors using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (OECD, 2021). The calculation compared
all commitment flows of the five categories of ODA donors (official donors, total DAC (Develop-
ment Assistance Committee) countries, total non-DAC countries, total multilateral agencies, and
total private donors) to all recipients and all sectors, for the years 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019, with
the commitment flows of the five categories of ODA donors, to all recipients for the ‘disaster pre-
vention and preparedness’ sub-sector, for the years 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.
6
Ethical considerations were taken into account, and ethical clearance obtained. See Mena and
Hilhorst (2021b) for a reflection on the ethical considerations and strategies involved when research-
ing disasters in conflict-affected areas.
7
For more information, see https://www.emdat.be/ (last accessed on 19 July 2022).
8
These data do not represent the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Médecins
Sans Frontières, or development-related actors such as the World Bank.
9
For more information, see https://sanaa.sites.unicnetwork.org (last accessed on 19 July 2022).
10
These reports provide information on organisational presence and activities in a particular place.
Information is usually presented by cluster and type of actor: INGO, national NGO, UN, and
government.
11
The Country-based Pooled Funds system is a mechanism that allows ‘donors to pool their con-
tributions into single, unearmarked funds to support local humanitarian efforts. This enables
humanitarian partners in crisis-affected countries to deliver timely, coordinated and principled
assistance’ (OCHA, 2019c, p. 1).
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The Transition From Development and Disaster Risk Red

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doi:10.1111/disa.

The transition from development and

Keywords: development, disaster response, disaster risk reduction, high-intensity

Linking relief and preparedness in development,

The humanitarian–development nexus

Table 1. Ideal–typical comparison between relief and development

Dimensions Relief/immediate disaster response Development/disaster risk reduction,

Objectives Meeting immediate basic needs Improvement of standard of living

Nature of needs Physical, psychological Economic, social, political

Types of intervention Delivery of materials, provisions, Quantitative and qualitative changes in

Aid characteristics Short term, temporary (external) Long term (embedded)

Relief of acute needs Changes in vulnerability and entitlements

Management Donor-driven Recipient-focused

Lack of knowledge and documentation Knowledge and documentation available

Media attention, fundraising Less public attention

Source: authors, adapted from Frerks, Hilhorst, and Moreyra (1999).

Advancing the nexus

From DRR to disaster response

Figure 1. Integration of development, prevention, and relief

Research questions and methods

To answer these questions, we designed a qualitative case study comprising both

Table 2. In-depth interview and focus-group participants

Participant type Number Description

International NGO 6 Managers, country directors, and staff members

Internationally recognised 2 Yemen’s internationally recognised government

Donors 5 Interviews with representatives of two national donors and one

Academics 3 Academics conducting research about and in Yemen

• development and DRR initiatives before and during the crisis;

The case of Yemen: conflict, disaster, and a major

Table 3. Number of casualties and people affected by disasters in Yemen (1900–2019)

Disaster type Total number of deaths Total number of people

Bacterial disease 759 462,020

Riverine flood 596 347,839

Tropical cyclone 75 140,939

Flash flood 274 137,678

Viral disease 35 3,494

Volcanic ash fall 6 15

Source: authors, using information from EM-DAT (downloaded in December 2019).

WASH facilities’ (OCHA, 2019b, p. 2). As stated by a UN climate change specialist,

The turn from development to humanitarian aid for water-related

Actors, coordination, and information before, during, and after the

Figure 2. Numbers of organisations operating in Yemen, 2013–19

Development-related organisations, including donors, worked remotely to con-

Objectives, main foci, and types of interventions

Limited knowledge to guide the transition and to manage

Challenges and ways of moving forward

present the challenge of finding a mechanism for evaluating programmes during

leaving Yemeni staff members unemployed or redirected to humanitarian aid activi-

Data availability statement

Demmers, J. (2012) Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction. Routledge, London.

OCHA (2019b) Yemen: Flash Floods. OCHA, Sana’a.

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