BEFORE THE

HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA

UNDER SECTION 379 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Criminal Appeal No…./2021

(CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

IN THE MATTER
OF

JAYAMMA
&ANR

(PETITIONER)

VERSUS

STATEOFKARNATAKA
(RESPONDENTS)

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE

PETITIONER
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:
KAVYA N.P. (Roll no.64) & KARTHIKA A.S. (Roll no. 63)
(TEAM NO. 10)

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………….4

I. TABLE OF CASES…………………………………………..4
II. BOOK REFERRED ………………………………….............5
III. STATUTES REFERRED…………………………………….5
IV. WEBSITES REFERRED……………………………………5

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION …………………………………….6

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………7

5. ISSUES RAISED……………………………….……………………….10

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………..11

7. ARGUMENTSADVANCED…………………………………………...13

8. PRAYER………………………………………………………………..21

2
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1 & And

2 Ex. Exhibit

3 Govt. Government

4 Hon’ble Honorable

5 HC High Court

6 No. Number

7 Ors. Others
Primary Healthcare
8 P.H.C.
Center
9 PW Prosecution Witness

10 SC Supreme Court
Supreme Court
11 SCC
Cases
12 V. Versus

13 DD Dying Declaration

3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CASES

1. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka(2007)4 SCC 415,

2. Perla Somasekhara Reddy and Ors v. State of A.P.(2009)16 SCC 98
3. State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram (2012)1 SCC 602
4. Shyam Babu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012)8 SCC 651
5. Murugesan v. State(2012)10 SCC 383
6. Mookkiah v. State (2013)2 SCC 89
7. Shivasharanappa v. State of Karnataka(2013)5 SCC 705
8. Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra(2006)13 SCC 165
9. Paparambaka Rosamma & Ors v. State of A.P(1999)7 SCC 695
10. Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.(1974) 4 SCC 264
11. State of M.P v. Bacchudas AIR 2007 SC1236, 2007
12. Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana (2011) 10 SCC 173
13. Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958) AIR 22, 1958 SCR 552
14. Sampat Babso Kale vs State of Maharashtra AIR 2019 SC 1852
15. Laxman v. State of Maharashtra 2002,6,SCC,710
16. Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police Krishnagiri, 2012 ALL SCR 972

4
BOOKS REFERRED

1. Criminal Procedure(R.V.Kelkar)
2. The Code Of Criminal Procedure (Ratanlal&Dhirajlal)3.IndianPenalCode
(S.N. Misra)
4. Text book On Indian Penal Code (KD Gaur)
5. Principles Of Law Of Evidence(Avtar Singh)
6. The Law Of Evidence(S.D.Basu)

STATUTES

1. THE CODE O F CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,1973

2. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,1860
3. THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT,1872
4. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1950

WEBSITES REFERRED
1.www.scconline.com
2.www.indiankannon.org
3. www.casemine.com
4. www.livelaw.org
5. www.awaenindiamovement.com
6. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
7. www.scconline.com
8. www.researchgate.net
9. www.amikusqriae.com
10. www.blog.ipleaders.in

5
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner has filed a criminal appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in
the matter of Jayamma & Anrs v. State of Karnataka under section 379 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The respondent reserves the right to challenge the same.

The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments.

6
 THE FACTS OF THE CASE

1)The parties in the present case are closely related. The case of the prosecution is that there
was a long-standing animosity between the families of Jayamma wife of Reddinaika
(Appellant No.1) and Jayamma wife of Sanna Ramanaika (deceased) and in connection
thereto, a quarrel took place on 10.09.1998 in which, Thippeswamynaika son of the deceased
assaulted and injured Reddinaika (Husband of AppellantNo.1). Thereafter the appellants
allegedly went to the house of the deceased on 21.09.1998 and confronted her about the
assault on Reddinaika. The appellants demanded Rs. 4,000/- for the cost incurred on the
medical treatment of Reddinaika. After a heated exchange of words, the appellants allegedly
doused the deceased-Jayamma in kerosene and set her on fire. Specific roles have been
attributed to all the appellants in respect thereto. Upon hearing the wails of Jayamma, her
other son Ravi Kumar (PW-2) and daughter-in-law Saroja Bai (PW-5;wife of Thippeshi or
Thippeswamynaika) came to the spot and tried to extinguish the fire. The appellants
meanwhile ran away from the spot. Since Jayamma was seriously injured, PW-2 sought help
from Kumaranaika (PW-3) to shift Jayamma to the hospital. PW-2 and PW-3then took the
injured-Jayamma on a bullock cart to Primary Health Centre (P.H.C.), Thalak and there Dr.
A. Thippeswamy (PW-16) provided primary treatment to the injured-Jayamma, including,
administering her certain pain killers. Dr. A. Thippeswamy (PW-16) sent medico-legal case
information to the Thalak Police Station, and on receipt there of, SHO
K.V. Mallikarjunappa (PW-11) reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the
injured Jayamma (Ex. P5) in the presence of PW-16.Jayamma in her statement implicated
all the appellants. On the basis of the said statement, Crime No. 101 of 1998 was registered
at the Thalak Police Station under Sections 504, 307, 114 read with Section 34 of IPC. Owing
to the seriousness of injuries, the victim was later shifted to Government Hospital,
Chitradurga. However, on 23.09.1998 at 5:30 AM, Jayamma succumbed to her injuries.

2)Upon being notified about the death of Jayamma, the Police sent a requisition to the Court,
requesting that offence under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC be altered to offence

7
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. ASI J. Sanjeeva Murthy (PW-14) thereupon
visited the Hospital and conducted the inquest. The body was sent for post mortem
examination and a report was made by Dr.Sunil Chowhan(PW-19),wherein, it was opined
that Jayamma died of shock due to extensive burn injuries. Thereafter, the police visited the
spot, drew the mahazar and made certain seizures in the presence of Rameshnaika (PW-1)
and Eshwarnaika (PW-15). During the course of further investigation, PSI Chandrahas Naik
(PW-13) and CPI Shankar (PW-18) recorded the statements of witnesses and arrested the
appellants. Appellant No.1,however, was able to obtain anticipatory bail and was, thus,
released after her arrest.

3)After the completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, the case was committed
to the court of Additional Sessions Judge at Chitradurga.Charges were framed under Sections
504, 302, 114 read with Section 34IPC against the appellants, to which they pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined nineteen witnesses and thirteen
documents to establish the guilt of the accused. The case of the appellants, as recorded in
their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) was
one of total denial. No defense evidence was led by them.

4)During the course of trial, several prosecution witnesses turned hostile.PW-2, son of the
deceased, put forward an alternative chain of events wherein he claimed that the deceased
committed suicide because she couldn’t bear the fact that her son Thippeswamy naika was
arrested and sent to jail for beating husband of the 1st appellant. PW-2 further stated that the
deceased was unable to speak after the incident. In a similar vein, daughter-in-law of the
deceased (PW-5) also contradicted the prosecution version and denied any knowledge as to
how the deceased died. Regarding the arrest of her husband Thippeswamynaika, PW-5
disputed the fact that any quarrel had taken place on 10.09.1998 and claimed that she was
not aware of the reason behind her husband’s arrest. PW-1 and PW-15 who are mahazar
witnesses also did not support the prosecution case; they denied being called by the Police
and stated that nothing was seized in their presence. The only material witnesses who
supported the prosecution version were PW-11 (K.V.Mallikarjunappa) and PW-16 (Dr. A.
Thippeswamy). They deposed that the statement of the deceased (Ex.P-5), accusing the
appellants for the murderous attack on her was genuine and voluntary.

8
5)The trial Court noted that the sole material on record to connect the accused persons
with the offence of murder was the statement of the deceased Ex.P5, which was being
treated as a dying declaration. Upon considering the mitigating circumstances such as
testimonies of the hostile witnesses, nature of burn injuries of the victim, and the lack
of any corroborative evidence, the trial Court was of the opinion that the prosecution
had failed to prove the genuineness of Ex.P5 beyond all reasonable doubt. The
evidence of PW-11 and PW-16 who had supported the prosecution case was found to
be vague and unsatisfactory. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution had
failed to discharge its onus and acquitted the appellants.

6) The High Court in appeal reversed the findings of the trial Court and held that the evidence
consisting of dying declaration was clinching and sufficient to bring the guilt home. While
several arguments appear to have been raised on behalf of the appellants, the High Court
brushed aside the same, plainly stating that no credence could be attached to the testimonies
of the hostile witnesses. The High Court instead placed emphasis on the testimonies of PW-
11and PW-16 who had corroborated the contents of the dying declaration (Ex.P-5). The High
Court found no good ground to disbelieve either the testimonies of PW-11 and PW-16, or the
contents of the dying declaration (Ex.P-5), and reversed the acquittal awarded by the trial
court. The appellants were consequently convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34
IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment.

7)Discontented with the order of the High Court, the appellants have assailed their
conviction and sentence through these two criminal appeals.

9
 STATEMENTS OF ISSUES

1. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the findings of the trial Court in exercise
of its powers under Section 378 of the CrPC?

2. Has the prosecution successfully established beyond a reasonable doubt that the
appellants are responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased?

10
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the High Court’s decision to overturn the trial court’s
acquittal is flawed and cryptic. Citing numerous precedents including Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka and Ors, the Appellant argues that the High Court has a duty to meticulously
examine the evidence before reversing an acquittal, Providing clear and substantial reasons for
its decision. The crux of the Appellant’s argument revolves around the dying declaration (Ex.
P-5), which they assert cannot be the sole basis for conviction due to doubts surrounding its
authenticity. They highlight contradictions in witness testimonies regarding the victim’s mental
state at the time of the declaration, especially noting her substantial burn injuries and the
administration of painkillers, which they argue could have affected her coherence.
Additionally, the Appellant points out discrepancies between th testimonies of the doctor (PW-
16) and the police officer (PW-11) regarding the extent and location of the victim’s injuries,
which they believe were crucial aspects overlooked by the High Court. They emphasize that
the High Court’s reliance on Ex. P-5 without adequate corroboration from other evidence is
erroneous, citing legal precedents that caution against relying solely on suspicious dying
declarations.
Furthermore, the Appellant argues that the absence of any established motive by the
prosecution further weakens their case. They invoke principles that uphold the presumption of
innocence and the benefit of doubt to the accused, asserting that the trial court’s decision to
acquit should have been respected unless clearly untenable.
In conclusion, the Appellant urges that the appeal should be allowed, leading to their acquittal,
based on the failure of the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the
High Court’s failure to properly evaluate all evidence and findings of the trial court as
mandated by Section 378 of the CrPC.
In this legal context, the defense argues that the prosecution has not convincingly proven the
guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt in the alleged homicidal death of Jayamma.
The prosecution relies heavily on a dying declaration from Jayamma, despite discrepancies in
its recording and concerns about her physical and mental condition at the time. According to
Indian legal standards, a dying declaration must be credible and corroborated by other evidence
to be admissible. The defense cites precedents like Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay and
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra to emphasize the necessity of corroborative evidence. They
argue that without such evidence linking the appellants to the crime, the prosecution’s case

11
lacks strength. Ultimately, the defense asserts that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden
of proof, and therefore, the charges against the appellants should be dismissed.

12
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the findings of

the trial Court in exercise of its powers under Section 378 of th e CrPC?
The Appellant submits the contentions that the High Court’s order is totally cryptic and it
erroneously reversed the well-reasoned order of acquittal passed by trial Court. Appellant
rely upon a catena of decisions of this Court including in the cases of Chandrappa v.
State of Karnataka (2007)1 4 SCC 415, Perla Somasekhara Reddy and Others v. State
of A.P. (2009)2 16 SCC 98, State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram (2012)3 1 SCC 602 ,
Shyam Babu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012)4 8 SCC 651 , Murugesan v. State
(2012)5 10 SCC 383 , Mookkiah v. State (2013)6 2 SCC 89, and Shivasharanappa v.
State of Karnataka (2013)7 5 SCC 705, which states that the High Court while
interfering with an order of acquittal is under an onerous duty to scrutinize the evidence on
record, and should return a categorical and cogent finding as to why it was impossible to
sustain the order of the trial Court or why it deserved interference. To substantiate this, I
would like to bring the scenario of this case that is here the High Court didn’t even look at
oral evidence of the close relatives like the son and daughter-in law and other witness and
convicted the appellant to life imprisonment.

The appellant submits that in Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra

(2006)8 , it was stated that the dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and
must like any other evidence satisfy the Court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed
truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. Hence the Appellant contends that neither
did the High Court evaluate the entire evidence nor it dealt with the specific findings of the
trial Court, and 1as such, the High Court failed to discharge its obligation under Section
378 CrPC.

The Appellant further argues that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, Ex. P-
5 i.e., the purported dying declaration cannot form the sole basis to convict the appellants.
Relying upon the decision of this Court in Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana (AIR

1
1.(2007) 4 SCC 415 2. (2009) 16 SCC 98 3. (2012) 1 SCC 602 4. (2012) 8 SCC 651
5. (2012) 10 SCC 383 6. (2013) 2 SCC 89 7. (2013) 5 SCC 705 8. (2006) 13 SCC 165

13
2012 SC (CRIMINAL) 276 (Page-9 last paragraph), it is stated that “it is the duty of the
court to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is
not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where a dying declaration is
suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.” Appellant also
wants to drew the attention of the court regarding the case law of Paparambaka
Rosamma & Ors v. State of A.P (1999)9 7 SCC 695 (Page no. 5) where the court said
“its not just necessary the dying declaration be made in conscious mind but should also be
in a fit state of mind.” And hence the appellant argue that in the absence of a medical
certificate attesting to mental fitness of the deceased before recording of the dying
declaration, the High Court ought not to have placed any reliance upon Ex.P-5.

The appellant wants to bring to the courts notice that on PW­16’s cross­examination, he
has admitted that painkillers were given immediately after admission to the P.H.C
owing to 80% burn injuries suffered by the victim on all vital parts of the body. He has
acknowledged that in a case of fourth degree burns the patient will be “delirious and in a
period of confusion”. He has not denied that due to painkillers there was bound to be
drowsiness. And the endorsement made by the doctor that the victim was in a fit state of
mind to make the statement has been made not before the statement but after
the statement was recorded. Normally it should be the other way around.” Hence here
the dying declaration is at suspicion the appellant contends. And according to Rasheed
Beg v. State of M.P. 10 [(1974) 4 SCC 264)]; Where dying declaration is suspicious, it
should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
2

The appellant relies on State of M.P v. Bacchudas11; which says the order of acquittal
shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further
strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration
of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the
case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view
which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
The appellant wants to bring the courts notice that it may be seen that the High Court dealt
with the appeal against acquittal summarily and did not even discuss the ocular evidence,
especially of the son and daughter-in-law of the deceased, who have, to some extent,

2
9. (1999) 7 SCC 695 10. [(1974) 4 SCC 264] 11. AIR 2007 SC 1236 or 2007 (9) SCC 135

14
belied the version of the doctor (PW-16) or the investigating officer (PW-11). We say so
for the reason that according to Ravi Kumar (PW-2), son of the deceased, the victim
Jayamma had lost consciousness and was unable to speak at the time when she was rushed
to the hospital in a bullock cart arranged by Kumaranaika (PW-3). Without discarding or
disbelieving such statement(s), it is difficult to accept that injured — Jayamma was in a fit
state of mind at 1:15 a.m. when the alleged dying declaration was recorded. Her state of
mind can be well imagined due to the combined effect of the trauma and the administration
of painkillers. The High Court, on the other hand, relied upon the dying declaration (Ex.P-
5) as the same was purportedly corroborated by the statements of doctor (PW-16), and the
police official (PW-11) who authored the document (Ex.P-5). Such a conclusion, is totally
erroneous and based upon misreading of the evidence on record. It has already been
noticed that according to the doctor (PW-16), the victim had suffered 80% injuries
including on 3her hands. As against it, the Police Officer (PW-11) claims that there were
no burn injuries on the hand of the victim, hence she could put her left thumb impression
on the dying declaration (Ex.P-5). These glaring contradictions should not have gone
unnoticed by the High Court.

In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 22) 12, Observations of The Supreme
Court was:

After reviewing of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and having a view on the
decided cases, the Court has given certain guidelines as to the validity or admissibility of
dying declarations (DD). These are:

1. It can not be said as an absolute rule of law or as a rule of prudence that a Dying
Declaration can not form the only basis of the conviction of the accussed unless such DD
is corroborated.
2. In keeping in view the facts of the each case, it should be decided by examining the
circumstances in which the DD was made.

3. DD is a weaker kind of evidence – it cannot be laid down as a general principal.

3
12. AIR 1958 SC 22

15
4. A DD has to be judged in the context of surrounding circumstances and also with the
reference to the principles governing the of the weighing of evidence and also it rests on
the same basis as any other chunk of evidence.

5. Where a DD has been recorded in the proper manner that is in question and answers
form and as far as realistic in the own words of the maker of a declaration by a competent
Magistrate, rests on a much higher basis than that of a DD which depends upon oral
statement which can also suffer from various weaknesses of the human character and his
memory.

6. The Court has to keep in view various circumstances in checking the reliability of a DD,
like the opportunity for the observation of the dying man. E.g.

a) That whether there was enough light for the deceased to see his assailants, if the crime
was committed at night.

b) That whether the ability of the man to remember the facts said, had not been harmed at
the time when he was making the statement, by state of affairs far away from his power.

c) That if he had separate opportunities to make a dying declaration, his statement has been
consistent throughout.

d) And that the statement was not the result of tutoring by interested parties and had been
at the earliest opportunity.

To pass the test of reliability, a DD has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in
view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accussed who had no
opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But in this case
the High Court didn’t even bother to notice that the Ext.P5 was not even written in the
question and answer format by the police officer (PW- 11) and attested by the deceased
thumb impression whose hands were completely burnt according to the statement of the
doctor (PW-16).

16
In exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon
fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such
matters as mentioned in ". Chandrappa & Ors vs State of Karnataka (2007)
13
4 SCC 415 :
(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact
that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any
doubt. To state this however is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal
should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized in
the administration of 4justice.
The appellant wants to bring the Hon’ble courts eyes that victim, Jayamma was brought to
the Civil Hospital at 12.30 a.m. on 22.09.1998. She succumbed to her burn injuries after
almost 30 hours later at 5:30 am on 23.09.1998. It is neither the case of prosecution nor
has it been so stated by PW-11 or PW-16 that soon after recording her statement (Ex. P-5)
she became unconscious or went into coma. The prosecution, therefore, had sufficient time
to call a Judicial/Executive Magistrate to record the dying declaration. It is common
knowledge that such Officers are judicially trained to record dying declarations after
complying with all the mandatory pre-requisites, including certification or endorsement
from the Medical Officer that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make a statement but
no such step had been taken by PW-11 which brings a doubtfulness on the narrators act.

Appellant contends that the High Court did not evaluate the entire evidence and the
findings of the Trial Court. Hence, it failed to discharge its obligation under Section 378 of
the CrPC.

The Appellant submits that the High Court overlooked the fact that the prosecution has
miserably failed to establish any motive in the present case and, thus, conviction of the
appellants was untenable.

4
13. 2007 (4) SCC 415

17
ISSUE 2. Has the prosecution successfully established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the appellants are responsible for thehomicidal death of the deceased?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that, in the pursuit of justice and truth, it is
imperative to critically assess the evidence presented by the prosecution to ascertain the guilt
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to
meet this standard, primarily relying on the dying declaration (Ex.P5) and testimonies that,
upon scrutiny, do not sufficiently establish the appellants’ guilt.
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, deals with dying declaration.
“Section 32 : Cases in which statement of relevant facts by the person who is dead or cannot
be found etc. Is relevant:-
Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot
be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be
procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case,
appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: (1)
When it relates to cause of death- When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of
his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in
cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question.”
The dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence in this case. However, the credibility of
this declaration is compromised by inconsistencies. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay
(1958)14, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles related to dying declaration:
There is no absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be the sole basis of
conviction unless corroborated. A true & voluntary declaration needs no corroboration.
Each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in
which the dying declaration was made.
As said above, a true and voluntary declaration needs no corroboration, but in this case it is
critical to assess the credibility of the dying declaration (Ex.P5) in light of the victim’s medical
condition. The victim was administered potent sedative painkillers due to extensive burn
injuries approximately 80% of her body was affected. The sedatives, coupled with such

14. Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958) AIR 22, 1958 SCR 552

18
severe injuries, likely impaired her cognitive functions and could have induced a state of
delusion or hallucination. And PW-11’s over-enthusiasm to resolve the case quickly have led
to procedural lapses and potential influence over the statement. The dying declaration cannot
be said voluntary as the narration of events in the dying declaration was so precise that it is
improbable for a witness, even in a normal state of mind, to recall such details accurately. This
level of detail suggests that the dying declaration must have external influence.
Also in Sampat Babso Kale vs State of Maharashtra (2019)15 the Supreme Court held that when
there is a doubt as to the veracity (accuracy, truthfulness, conformity of facts) of any dying
declaration, that whether the victim was in the fit state of mind to make the statement; then in
such a case, the dying declaration cannot be treated as a sole basis for conviction. It must be
corroborated with some other evidence too.
In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002)16, the Supreme Court emphasized that the mental
state of the declarant must be assessed to ensure the dying declaration’s reliability. The
appellant wants to bring the Hon’ble courts attention to note that here, the fact that the
endorsement from Dr. A. Thippeswamy (PW-16) was secured after the statement was recorded,
and not before as required, indicates a serious procedural lapse. The endorsement by the doctor
was made on the available space of the paper, which is not in line with settled legal procedure.
The appellant wants to bring the Hon’ble courts attention to note that, given the victim’s limited
literacy and age, it is highly improbable that she could narrate the incident with the detailed
accuracy described in her dying declaration. This improbability raises serious doubts about the
statement’s reliability and its admissibility as a basis for conviction.
The appellant wants to bring the courts notice that the prosecution’s narrative regarding the
motive for the alleged homicide is fraught with significant doubts and lacks substantial
evidence. The prosecution contends that the appellants set the victim on fire because of a prior
dispute involving the assault on the husband of Appellant No. 1 and a subsequent demand for
₹4,000 to cover medical expenses. However, this alleged motive is not supported by any
concrete evidence.

15. Sampat Babso Kale vs State of Maharashtra (2019)

AIR 2019 SC 1852
16.Laxman v. State of Maharashtra 2002,6,SCC,710

19
In Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri (2012)17, the Supreme Court, herein,
observed that the fact that the appellants possessed a strong motive to kill the deceased may be
an important factor, however, even such strong motive to commit the crime cannot substitute
the need for the presence of a conclusive proof. Thus, in the absence of a “conclusive proof”
that is “beyond reasonable doubt”, the existence of a strong motive, no matter how strong,
would not sustain.
Moreover, PW–2 the deceased’s own son and PW–5 daughter-in-law of the deceased have
unequivocally denied the incident as described by the prosecution. They have instead suggested
that the victim may have committed suicide. This denial by family members, who would be
expected to have first-hand knowledge, undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s motive.
Moreover, PW-1 and PW-15, the mahazar witnesses, did not support the prosecution’s case.
They stated that they were not present during the seizure of evidence, thereby questioning the
integrity of the evidence collected and the procedures followed by the police. Given the absence
of a believable motive and the refutation of the incident by those closest to the deceased, it is
clear that the prosecution has failed to prove the motive behind the alleged crime. This critical
gap in the prosecution’s case further weakens the credibility of the dying declaration and
undermines the assertion of the appellants’ guilt.
While the quest for justice is paramount, it must not be tainted by an excessive solicitude that
favours absolute certainty over fairness. As the pre eminent English jurist William Blackstone
wrote18, “Better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”
Therefore the appellant contends that, the prosecution has failed to meet the burden of proof
required for a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The dying declaration, central to their
case, is flawed due to improper procedural practices and inconsistencies. Furthermore, the
testimonies of key prosecution witnesses contradicted the prosecution’s claims, while crucial
mahazar witnesses and family members of the deceased offered alternative explanations,
including suicide. The failure to corroborate the prosecution’s version and the procedural
irregularities cast significant doubt on the evidence. The prosecution has failed to establish a
prima facie case against the appellants for the alleged homicidal death of the deceased,
Jayamma. Thus, based on established legal standards and the insufficient evidence presented,
it is respectfully submitted that the conviction should be overturned and the appellants
acquitted.

17. Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police Krishnagiri, 2012 ALL SCR 972
18. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146 (1997):

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 PRAYER

In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel for the
Appellant humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to adjudge, hold and declare:

1. That, the case filed is not maintainable in the court of law.

2. Declare and adjudge that all Appellants are not guilty of murdering Jayamma.
3. Uphold the Acquittal of the Hon’ble Sessions Court.
4. Pass any other orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit.

And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the appellant shall duty bound forever
pray.

Sd/-

(Counsel for Appellant)

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