EVIDENCE Rule 128- Quantum of Evidence

Case title: Tan, Jr. v. Hosana G.R. No. 190846

Date: February 3, 2016
Ponente: BRION, J
Petitioner: TOMAS P. TAN, JR Respondent: JOSE G. HOSANA

DOCTRINE: A mere allegation is not

evidence, and the person who alleges has
the burden of proving his or her
allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence, which in civil cases is
preponderance of evidence.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Jose and Milagros are married and they bought a house and lot located in Naga City. While
Jose was in Japan, Milagros sold the property to petitioner Tomas, as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed by Jose in her favor.
The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00. A new title
over the property was issued in the name of Tomas.

Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and

Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. He averred that
he never authorized the sale and his signature in the SPA was forged.

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before
he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-
friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order. Tomas filed
a cross-claim against Milagros.

During the pre-trial, Jose presented his brother Bonifacio as sole witness which testified
that the claims of Jose were true and that that the signature of Jose was forged in the SPA.
He presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison such as
Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA, etc.

The RTC ruled in favor or Jose and nullified the sale. The CA affirmed with modification
RTC’s decision. The CA deleted the temperate damage and directed Jose and Milagros to
reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000, despite Tomas’ allegation that he paid
P700,000 for the subject property. Tomas questions the purchase price alleging that his
testimony establishing actual purchase price of 700,00 was uncontroverted. He alleged
that the lower purchase price reflected in the Deed of Sale was intended to save on taxes.
His subsequent MR was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether Tomas’ uncontroverted testimony as to the purchase price of P700,00.00 can be
considered as proof of payment. Or;
Whether the deed of sale can be used as basis for the amount of consideration paid. (Note:
Again, in the deed of sale, the purchase price was 200,000)
HELD
No.
Tomas’ claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property was unsubstantiated as he
failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
It means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered
as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim.

Tomas’ bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given
weight and credence. It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove non-payment.

A mere allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his
or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is
preponderance of evidence.

An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to
determine the presence of the essential elements of the sale, including the consideration
paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence
Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the
regularity of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the
amount paid by the petitioner. The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein.

RULING
Wherefore, the Supreme Court DENIED the petition for review on certiorari. The decision
dated August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
EVIDENCE Rule 128 – Quantum of Evidence (General
Provisions) ; Sec. 3
Case title: Tolention vs. Mendoza G.R. No. A.C. No. 5151
Date: October 19, 2004
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
Petitioners: Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Respondent: Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza
Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D.
Evangelista, Sr., & Nelson B. Melgar
DOCTRINE: Substantial evidence is defined as the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction.
Nature: administrative case for grossly immoral conduct and gross misconduct
FACTS
An affidavit-complaint was filed by the petitioners alleging that respondent committed acts
constituting grounds for his removal as a member of the bar. First, acts that betray his lack of
good moral character when respondent abandoned his lawful wife, FelicitasValderia, to cohabit
with his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who was also legally married. Respondent and dela
Fuente have 2 daughters. Second, acts constituting falsification of public documents, when
respondent declared in the birth certificates of his daughters that he was married to dela Fuente;
and respondent declared in his 2 Certificate of Candidacies that his wife was Felicitas Valderia and
his civil status as separated, respectively. Respondent alleges that the petitioners, his political
rivals, filed the case only for revenge. He claims that the birth certificates are inadmissible in
evidence since petitioners illegally procured the same in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1 (s. 1993).

While the petitioners offered documentary evidence consisting of (1) Letter of Luis Bermudez -
informing Nelson Melgar of immoral acts; (2) Marriage Certificate of respondent; (3) Marriage
Certificate of dela Fuente; (4) Birth certificates; (5) Certificate of Candidacy (1995 and 1998); and
(6) Editorial page of the Naujanews – stated that respondent has 2 daughters with his wife, dela
Fuente, respondent on the other hand offered no evidence. He alleges that testimonies of
witnesses of petitioners were mere hearsay and their documentary evidence had no probative
weight.

IBP Board of Governors Resolution (February 27, 2004) – adopted and approved the IBP Report
and Recommendation that respondent for violating Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility
should be SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer
cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
ISSUE/S
1) The quatum of evidence in administrative proceedings
2) Whether the birth certificates are inadmissible in evidence
RATIO
The quatum of evidence in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is defined as the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conviction. The credibility of witness testimonies for the petitioners cannot
be discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which
speak for themselves.
The birth certificates are admissible in evidence. Exclusionary Rule is not applicable to the
present case. Exclusionary Rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more
appropriately to evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The violation of
Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1 results to a penalty of imprisonment or payment of a fine
but it does not make the document so issued inadmissible as evidence especially in proceedings
like the present case. Hence, the duly certified birth certificates are competent evidence to show
paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

Section 3, Rule 128 Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. The birth certificates are
relevant to the issue. Both Rule 24 Administrative Order No. 1 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates. Rule 24 -
only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth
records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. While Revised Rules of Evidence only
provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. Petitioners, as
private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
RULING
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral
course of conduct.
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EVIDENCE Rule 128 Quantum of Evidence
Case title: People vs Caranguian G.R. No. 124514
Date: 06 July 2000
Ponente: Quisumbing
Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE Accused-appellant: BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN y
PHILIPPINES PINAPIN
DOCTRINE: The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind."
Nature: On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 2, in
Criminal Case No. 2022, convicting appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs.
FACTS
On August 1, 1991, a team of Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) members, led by PO3 Birung,
proceeded to Brangay Catarauan to track down two CAFGU members. As the team was crossing
an improvised wooden bridge over a creek, Capili and Lumboy came under gunfire. The other
team members immediately returned fire hence an exchange of gunfire ensued. After about 30
minutes, the firing ceased and the gunmen withdrew. PO3 Birung ordered his men to rescue
Lumboy and Capili. Capili was still alive and was rushed to the Cagayan Provincial Hospital for
treatment. Unfortunately, Lumboy was already dead.

The following day, a civilian informer named Palos informed PO3 Birung that the two former
CAFGUs the CVOs sighted were Bernardino Caranguian and Victoriano Garcia. After preliminary
investigation, both Caranguian and Garcia were charged with the crime of murder for the killing of
Lumboy, and with frustrated murder for the wounding of Capili. Only appellant, Caranguian, was
arrested. Co-accused Garcia remains at-large to date. During trial, the prosecution presented PO3
Edwin Birung as eyewitness to the shooting incident. Appellant was acquitted of frustrated
murder but convicted of murder.

On appeal, appellant raises the sole issue that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of
the crime of murder in connection with the death of Ben Lumboy. He assails the credibility of
prosecution witness Birung since the latter did not even know the names of appellant and co-
accused at the time of the incident.

For the State, the Solicitor General contends that the sole eyewitness testified in clear and
unequivocal terms as to the identity of the assailants.
ISSUE/S
Whether there has been sufficient identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.

RATIO
The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2
of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime was committed, and
second, that accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of
the accused.

In the case before us, the prosecution presented proof that Lumboy was killed during the shooting
incident on August 1, 1991. However, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing.

On direct examination, PO3 Birung testified that Lumboy and Capili informed him that they
sighted two former CAFGUs in Catarauan. On cross-examination, PO3 Birung testified, however,
that Lumboy did not actually see the two former CAFGUs but merely heard the news from his
place. Further, Lumboy did not categorically tell PO3 Birung that the two persons sighted were
former CAFGUs, only that said persons were armed. PO3 Birung testified that he merely heard
from the people of Barangay Catarauan that there were two dismissed CAFGUs in the vicinity. PO3
Birung also testified that the day after the incident, a civilian informer named Palos told him the
names of appellant and accused. But Palos did not even witness the shooting incident. He merely
executed an affidavit during preliminary investigation but did not testify in court. Hence, his
affidavit is hearsay and has no probative value.

Clearly, the information given by either Lumboy or Palos to PO3 Birung as to the identity of
appellant is hearsay.

PO3 Birung insists that he saw the appellant and accused "walking" during the incident. After the
initial shots rang out, however, the team members immediately sought cover. Thus, it is highly
unlikely that PO3 Birung was able to sufficiently recognize the gunmen. Further, the other
members of the team, including the injured Capili, did not testify as to the identity of the
appellant.

While it is accepted that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction, it bears stressing that such testimony must be clear, positive, and
credible. Hence, an identification of the appellant as the gunman based on hearsay does not suffice
for conviction.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
BERNARDINO Y PINAPIN CARANGUIAN is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt
that he committed the crime of murder.
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EVIDENCE Rule 128, Sec.3
Case title: People vs. Del Monte y Gapay G.R. No. 179940
Date: April 23, 2008
Ponente:
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @
OBET
DOCTRINE: For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts.
Nature: Criminal Case
FACTS
Norberto del Monte – was found guilty by RTC Bulacan of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in the
buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, and a member PNP assigned with the PDEA.

Version of the prosecution:

On 10 December 2002, a confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay
Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said
information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. The team was
composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-
buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-up operative. After the briefing, the team, proceeded to
Poblacion Dike for the execution of the buy-bust operation.

During the buy-bust operation, they saw the appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The
informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to
appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00
consisting of three marked P100 bills. The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1 Tolentino’s
initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and
handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying
that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered
from the latter the marked money. The white crystalline substance in the plastic sachet which was
sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office , Malolos, Bulacan,
for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug.

Version of the defense:

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister’s house in Poblacion Dike when a
commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting because the latter, together
with appellant’s common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and kicked
by several police officers. When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask them why they
were beating up his common-law wife and other relatives, the policemen arrested him, mauled
him, punched him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo.

The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located in the middle of a
field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant was
brought to the police station. Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the
police officers who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant
could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin arrived with the
P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was detained.

The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and
straightforward. On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced by appellant’s defense of
frame-up and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping and
was awakened by the screams of his relatives who were being mauled by the police officers.

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but reduced the fine imposed on appellant to
P500,000.00.

For the first time on appeal, appellant anchors on the arresting policemen’s failure to strictly
comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 claiming that pictures of him together with
the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as shown by the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras,
the police officers who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not
conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest.
Their failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the
evidence adduced against him.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the non-compliance of Sec.21 of RA9165 or the procedure in the inventory of the
seized drugs will render the evidence inadmissible?
RATIO
NO. Non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in
evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or
rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by
the courts.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.24 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.25

All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed that the
sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and
identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu.

The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to
support his claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not to be credible. Their testimonies are
suspect and cannot be given credence without clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well
as that of appellant, that they were maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated.

RULING
WHEREFORE, Petition is denied. SC sustains the conviction of appellant Norberto Del Monte
3H 2017-2018
EVIDENCE Rule 128 sec 3
Case title: BSB GROUP, INC., represented by G.R. No. G.R. No. 168644
its President, Mr. RICARDO Date: February 16, 2010
BANGAYAN,Petitioner, Ponente: Peralta, J.
-versus-
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN,
Respondent
Petitioner: BSB GROUP, INC., Respondent: SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYA
DOCTRINE: whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of
logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue
Nature: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court
FACTS
Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein representative, Ricardo
Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-
Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged,
among others, to receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the
company.

In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified
theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representing the aggregate amount
of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys customers in payment of their obligation were, instead
of being turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to
her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in
Divisoria, Manila Branch. Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. On the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited
the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for
the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or
records custodians of Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch. The trial
court granted the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena.

Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court
that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said
bank account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account, allegedly deposited
the proceeds of the supposed checks. Petitioner argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank
account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which
respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank.

Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan
(Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to
prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc.,
was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the same,
and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security Bank. But
before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking the
exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on
the subject Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405. The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied. Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court
ISSUE/S
I.W/N the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case.
II. W/N they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence,
excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405.
RATIO
I. The Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of
the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is
the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. The prosecution of theft necessarily focuses on
the existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging to
another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent
of the owner; (d) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence. In turn, whether these elements concur
in a way that overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of
relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 3 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondents
Security Bank account are relevant, is to be addressed by considering whether they have such
direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether
they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to
the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.

The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to
establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at
several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her personal account with
Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the
Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and
deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that
there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for
theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.

In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another
with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from
such act of execution. The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence
presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging
to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between
the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by
claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of
argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission,
not of theft, but rather of some other crime probably estafa. In estafa by conversion, for instance,
whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in
an information for that offense. In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution
may establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These checks would then
constitute the best evidence to establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of
conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his
own name.

Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case
accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has
actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her
personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.

II.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically
addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our
jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this right
of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405, otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1955, which has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the
same time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be
utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic development. Owing to this
piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines. Subsequent statutory enactments have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy
yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally
recognized zones of privacy.

The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation
v. Ortega. That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an
examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that
issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank
Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at
protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit
in any given bank account. In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule,
petitioner in the instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security
Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and,
thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in said
account is the subject matter in litigation.

What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405
has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, in
which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be
premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action.
Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be
determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the
evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information
filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified
theft by abusing petitioners trust and confidence and stealing cash. The said Information makes
no factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and
documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information
make mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have
allegedly been kept.

It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of
such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at
an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is
protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was raised
before the trial court.

In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents supposed bank
account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in
support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They
are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and
reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in
and affirm respondents objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was,
therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED
3H 2017-2018
EVIDENCE Rule. 130, Sec. 3

Case title: De Jesus vs. Sanchez-malit A.C. No. 6470

Date: July 8, 2014
Ponente: Sereno, CJ.

Complainant: Mercedita De Jesus Respondent: Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-malit

DOCTRINE: Evidence obtained by a violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice is admissible

because said rules do not contain any provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof.

Nature: This is a disbarment complaint filed by De Jesus against respondent Atty. Sanchez-
Malit on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

FACTS
De Jesus filed a complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant alleging that Malit drafted and
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that named the complainant De Jesus, as
its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee charged De Jesus for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. De Jesus claimed that Malit was a consultant of the LGU of Dinalupihan,
Bataan and was aware that the public market stall was government-owned.

De Jesus also alleged that prior to the mortgage contract, respondent also notarized two contracts
(lease agreement and Certificate of Land Ownership Award) for her which caused complaint and
legal and financial problems. De Jesus offered in evidence the copies of documents notarized by
respondent.

In addition to the notarized documents presented, the complainant submitted 3 SPAs notariized
by respondent which was not signed by the principals but only by the attorneyin-fact.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial
Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation
of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had
purportedly appeared before her. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate
mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 7 and
Rule 18.03 of the CPR, thus, recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the decision of the Commissioner but amended the
suspension from the practice of law to a period of one year.

Respondent now claims that the additional documents submitted in evidence by De Jesus are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.

ISSUE/S

Are the additional documents submitted by De Jesus admissible in evidence despite being
obtained in violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice?

RATIO
Yes, the additional documents are admissible in evidence.

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible when it
is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.”

The Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized
documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

RULING

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and
Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary
public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately.
Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

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EVIDENCE Rule 128, Sec.3
Case title: G.R. No. 134530
People v. Samontañez Date: December 4, 2000
Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Roberto Samontañez y Dela Vega
DOCTRINE:
The “fruit of the poisonous tree”: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Nature: automatic review of a conviction sentencing the accused to the capital penalty of death
FACTS
On January 11, 1996, Roberto Samontañez was formally charged in court with the crime of rape
with homicide.

Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the crime. However, police investigation reveals that
Roberto Samontañez was seen at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening on November 25, 1995 while
he was in the act of coming out of the sugar cane plantation of Perino Desacola in Sitio Ilaya,
Barangay Bunducan, Nasugbu, Batangas near the place where the dead body of the victim, Lolita
delas Alas, was later found. It also appears that earlier, at around 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon,
Roberto passed by the house of Melecio Mendoza in Sitio Bulanggutan, Barangay Bunducan and
he headed eastward to the direction of the sugar cane plantation of Desacola. Thirty (30) minutes
later, Lolita was also spotted, and she was likewise heading eastward to her house in Sitio Ilaya. At
around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Roberto returned heading westward and he passed through
the same path along the cane field.

On November 28, 1995, Roberto was fetched by the police authorities of Nasugbu, Batangas from
his workplace at Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. During the
investigation at the Nasugbu Police Headquarters in Nasugbu, Batangas, Roberto admitted to the
police that the other personal belongings of Lolita delas Alas were inside his bag that was left at
his workplace in Mendez, Cavite. A follow-up investigation conducted by the Nasugbu police
authorities at Hermogenes Trading in Mendez, Cavite led to the recovery of the said personal
belongings of the victim.

The accused earlier entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the Information in this case during his
arraignment on February 1, 1996. Subsequently, the appellant manifested, through his counsel de
officio, his intention to change his previous plea to that of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in
the Information. After having entered the plea of guilty on re-arraignment, the trial court
proceeded to propound questions on the appellant during which affirmative responses were
elicited from the appellant apparently to show that his subsequent plea of guilty was his own
voluntary decision. The trial court per its Decision under review, however, failed to dwell on a
significant development that transpired during the scheduled hearing on November 13, 1997
when the appellant revealed in open court, through counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was
prompted by "pressure" from a certain policeman so that he agreed to admit the commission of
the offense charged. After trial, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal, of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE/S
Are the belongings of the victim found inside the bag of the accused admissible as evidence in this
case?
RATIO
NO. The trial court lamentably considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree".

The facts show that the appellant Roberto Samontañez was actually arrested by police authorities
of Nasugbu, Batangas on November 28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez,
Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional
rights during the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of
the 1987 Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by counsel during the said
custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the
appellant during the police custodial investigation relative to the crime, including any other
evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was
not objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of
the victim namely: Omax wristwatch, gold ring and Joop cologne were recovered and found inside
the bag of the appellant when the police authorities returned to the appellant’s place of work at
the Hermogenes Trading in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite after they illegally obtained a
confession from the appellant.

Evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible.

According to the rule of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," once the primary source ( the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit")
derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the
same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito Samontañez and Melecio
Mendoza, both of which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of
the crime scene on or about the time when the crime took place. Ultimately, the conviction of the
appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar rested primarily on his plea of guilty which
appeared to have been improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section
3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the RTC convicting Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE; and the case is remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of
the accused until terminated.
3H 2017-2018
Case title: Navarro vs CA G.R. No. 121087
Date: August 26, 1999
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner: Felipe Navarro Respondent: CA and People
DOCTRINE: RA 4200 (AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER
RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION) prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
The information against petitioner alleged —
That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of
Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena Integrated
National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where
authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing
the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said
victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of
which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused
his death. --Homicide

Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI
in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following
reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After they seated and ordered beer, a
scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed
her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. The floor manager,
Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached and demanded to know why he
took a picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." When
Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
companions.

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the
policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police
station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and
went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. Liquin and Sioco arrived on a
motorcycle. They were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner.
Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to
him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba
kilala?" Petitioner then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of
Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?" Lingan intervened and said to petitioner: "Huwag
namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." Petitoner
replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and
told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. This angered Lingan, who
said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"14 Petitioner retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko." The two then had
a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at
magsuntukan na lang tayo." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?" As Lingan was about
turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow.
Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. Petitioner turned to
Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon." He
said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na
si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and
made him sign his name on the blotter. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote
his name in print. Lingan was taken to the hospital but he died from his injuries.

Unknown to petitioner, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between
petitioner and the deceased. The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the
problem.
xxx xxx xxx
Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .
Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not
fight with me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me.
I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan!
Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan: I'm brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin
dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na
may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang
minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan,
testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan,
hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta,
buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon
ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital
yan.
Petitioner claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner)
was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each
time hitting his head on the concrete.

Trial court stated: This court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more
credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that
accused herein is criminally responsible.
CA: affirmed the findings of the trial court

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of

the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in
favor of the accused.
RATIO

1) YES. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is
not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the
facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent
to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence.28 In the instant case,
petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the
testimony of Jalbuena. Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording
had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated
by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that
the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape
are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified
that he personally made the voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one
he recorded;32 and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33 A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry
against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner
Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued
the medical certificate containing the following findings:
xxx
CAUSE OF DEATH:
= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK
= BLOW ON THE HEAD
Dr. Yamamato testified:
Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which
is oozing of blood from the forehead?
A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.
Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?
A It is possible, sir.
Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?
A Possible, sir.

Xxx

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit
Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead
with his fist.

2) YES. Provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable
of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone. It must be sufficient and should immediately
precede the act. To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the
wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. And it must immediately
precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the
offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused. In the present case, the
remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient
provocation

Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The
frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who
provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be
imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent
with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the

public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated
against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the police
station where policemen were discharging their public functions.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that
petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
3H 2017-2018