A320/321 FLEET

From: Fleet Management Team

To: All Pilots
Date 15/09/2024 No: 08
Sub: FLEET BULLETIN AUGUST 2024.

Dear all,
1. SAFETY OCCURRENCES:

1.1 FLEET DATA ANALYSIS, NOTICE RELATING VIOLATION, AND

MANAGEMENT TEAM’S RECOMMENDATION FOR MITIGATION
ACTIONS:
- During August of 2024, A320/1 fleet had 01 case of violation in event Firm/Hard
Landing. However, there were a total of 18 flights performed missed approach. 5 cases
with root cause of flight crews’ mismanagement during approach and landing, 12 cases
were caused by bad weather conditions (Windshear alert, Poor visibility, Tailwind, …) and
other one was by ATC’s request.
- All pilots are strongly requested to strictly follow SOP, concentrate more during all
phases of flight, especially during critical phase: Take-off, Approach and Landing.
- TEM briefing must be conducted thoroughly: Identify all potential threats could affect
flight operation, mitigate actions to handle those identified threats and ensure safety
margin. Especially with repeated events such as: “Firm Landing, Unstable Approach,
Un-necessary Ground/Air turnback due to technical, Un-necessary diversion,
Overspeed event”.

- Additional prevention and intervention method to avoid Firm/ Landing event:

Captain is required to take over flight control to land the aircraft in all case if it is deemed
necessary. However, take over action will be mandatory in case of:
+ From 500AGL or below: The aircraft having tendency or significant deviation out of
stabilization criteria in pitch as well as in roll.
+ From flare height or 30ft: If aircraft’s attitude with external cues requires further
control input to maintain normal trajectory prepares for touch down.

A321 FLEET RECOMMENDATION FOR MITIGATION ACTIONS OF

FOLLOWING EVENTS:
• Firm Landing Avoidance: A321 NOTICE: FIRM LANDING AVOIDANCE
(click to get the notice).
• Prevention and Intervention Methods to avoid Firm Landing: A321
TRAINING NOTICE FOR ENHANCED AWARENESS AND INTERVENTION
METHODS (click to get the notice).
 • Operation recommendation for Rainy season: A321 NOTICE: RAINY
SEASON OPS (click to get the notice).
• The use of Weather Radar: A321 NOTICE: USE OF WEATHER RADAR (click
to get the notice).
• Flight crew’s abnormal handling procedure and decision making to avoid un-
necessary return/ diversion: A321 NOTICE: ABN HANDLING PROCEDURE
(click to get the notice).
• Overspeed prevention for all phases of flight: A321 NOTICE: OVERSPEED
PREVENTION (click to get the notice).

1.2 PITCH LOW DURING INITIAL CLIMB:

OCCURRENCE:
HVN1422, SGN-PXU operated with an A321CEO, had the Captain as PF and the First
Officer as PM. The aircraft was fully ready for pushback and engine start at 08:50 UTC
but was delayed by 10 minutes by ASOC due to poor weather conditions. The flight crew
was then requested by ATC to wait for an additional 10 minutes at the holding point
because of heavy thunderstorms, rain, and windshear warnings at departure. The flight
crew decided to use TOGA thrust and FAST wipers for take-off due to the adverse weather.
During the take-off roll, when the thrust levers were set at the TOGA detent without the
FDs armed, the FMA indication did not display as expected by the flight crew. Despite not
identifying the cause of the issue, the Captain decided to continue with the take-off. As the
IAS passed 60 knots, the Captain recognized the problem and immediately activated FD1.
The First Officer also activated FD2 on his side when the aircraft passed 160 knots. The
aircraft rotated normally at VR.
At 300 feet, the Captain reduced the thrust levers to the CLIMB detent for two seconds and
then re-selected TOGA thrust. This action, combined with unstable wind conditions,
resulted in the aircraft's pitch attitude decreasing from 11° to 6°. The First Officer called
out the low pitch, and the Captain corrected the attitude as advised. According to AGS
data, HVN1422 violated Safety Level 3 of "Pitch Low During Initial Climb”.
After the flight, the flight crew submitted a report to AQD however failed to mention the
root cause, which was the omission of arming the FDs before take-off.

CONCLUSION:
The flight crew must strictly comply with SOP during the cockpit preparation phase and
improve situational awareness by enhancing the monitoring of flight instruments and
parameters.
The flight crews should review the "No Flight-Director Take-Off" procedure outlined in
FCTM to ensure better procedural application.
The flight crew should closely monitor their schedules and report any signs of fatigue to
OCC, especially when minimum rest periods are involved. All reports must be submitted
in a timely manner with complete information to support a thorough safety investigation.

1.3 FIRM LANDING IN DA LAT AIRPORT:

OCCURRENCE:
Flight HVN1955 from DAD to DLI was operated with an A321CEO (VN-A610). The
flight crew had to delay the approach for 18 minutes due to poor weather conditions at the
airport. Eventually, they were cleared for ILS-X runway 09. Captain as PF maintained a
high rate of descent until reaching flare height and initiated a late flare at 8 ft. The First
Officer as PM provided a warning of an excessive sink rate, but due to inexperience, was
unable to offer effective intervention.
As a result, the aircraft's trajectory could not recover for a normal touchdown. According
to the AGS, the maximum landing g-load recorded was 2.1G.

CONCLUSION:
Due to the upslope of runway 09 at Da Lat airport, combined with the high elevation of the
airfield, flight crews must perform an early flare in such cases.
The PM must pay close attention during critical phases like landing and be prepared to
execute the correct technique for flight control intervention to avoid a firm landing.

2. OTHER OCCURRENCES:

2.1 FORWARD CABIN DOOR’S COVER DAMAGED AFTER LANDING DUE TO

CABIN TROLLEY WAS NOT PROPERLY SECURED:

OCCURRENCE:
HVN9825, a ferry flight from SGN to PQC (operated without cabin crew), was conducted
by A321CEO, registration VN-A614. After completing all ground preparations, the
Captain performed the required cabin security check. All cabin equipments were verified
as locked and secured. The flight crews then armed the doors as per arming procedure.
During the flight, no abnormalities were detected in the back of the cabin. However, after
the aircraft touched down and decelerated to taxi speed, the flight crew heard a strange
noise coming from the rear of the cabin. Upon completing the flight, the crew returned to
the cabin and discovered that the cover of door 1L had been damaged by an unsecured
trolley that had moved from the aft cabin.
The flight crew reported the situation to a ground engineer in Phu Quoc. After a thorough
inspection, the aircraft was cleared and released for normal operations.

CONCLUSION:
When conducting a ferry flight without cabin crew, the Pilot in Command (PIC) must
carefully ensure that all cabin equipment is properly secured before departure, during the
cruise, and before landing, as outlined in SOP 2.1.7.1 Flight Deck Security.
All flight crews are requested to review notices regarding ferry flights prior to commencing
operations.
A320/1 NOTICE SLIDE ARMING PROCEDURE (click to get the notice).

2.2 AIRCRAFT DRIFTED FORWARD 11 METERS AT PARKING BAY:

OCCURRENCE:
HVN270, operating the SGN-HAN route with an A321CEO, registration VN-A358, was
in serviceable condition (no defect was recorded regarding the parking brake).
After landing on runway 11L at Noi Bai Airport, the flight crew was cleared to taxi to stand
82 in the remote parking area. The aircraft was guided to the correct position, and the
Captain set the parking brake. The flight crew then proceeded with the rest of the parking
procedures. However, after 10 seconds, the flight crew noticed that the aircraft was moving
forward. The Captain immediately pressed the brake pedals to stop the aircraft from
moving further. At that moment, the parking brake pressure was recorded as inactive, and
the accumulator system pressure was below the required indication.
The Captain then activated the Yellow Electrical Pump to increase accumulator pressure,
and the aircraft eventually came to a complete stop, with the parking brake set to the ON
position. As a result, the aircraft overshot the stop line by 11 meters and ended up 6 meters
away from another aircraft parked at stand 86 (opposite direction).
The Captain promptly submitted a report to the AQD system after the flight.

CONCLUSION:
An investigation by VAECO is still ongoing regarding the aircraft's parking brake system
malfunction.
The flight crew did not properly comply with the procedure when setting the parking brake.
Accumulator and brake pressures were not carefully checked before the crew released the
brake pedals.
Flight crews must use external references to ensure the aircraft is not moving and confirm
that chocks are in place before proceeding with the rest of the parking procedure.

All flight crews are requested to review the correct procedure for setting the parking brake
after landing.
A320/1 NOTICE HOW TO SET PARKING BRAKE (click to get the notice).

2.2 FAILED TO COMPLY ATC INSTRUCTION FOR TAXI-IN TWICE AFTER

LANDING IN CAM RANH AIRPORT:

OCCURRENCE:
HVN1340, SGN-CXR with an A321CEO registration VN-A608, encountered no NOTAM
information affecting the taxiway and runway at Cam Ranh Airport during the time of
operation.
After landing on runway 20L, the flight crew was cleared to hold short of runway 20R at
the G3 holding position. ATC then cleared HVN1340 to cross runway 20R at G3 and
vacate the runway via the W3 taxiway. While the First Officer was reading back the
clearance, the Captain mistakenly made a right turn onto runway 20R, as he was unable to
identify the W3 taxiway at that time. Observing this from the tower, ATC realized the error
and provided a new clearance for taxi: “HVN1340, CLEARED FOR BACKTRACK TO
VACATE RUNWAY 20R VIA W5”. The First Officer correctly read back the clearance;
however, both flight crews misunderstood it as an instruction to continue to the end of the
runway and backtrack, instead of making a left turn at W5. As a result, HVN1340 missed
the W5 turn and was given another new clearance to vacate via W6 and proceed to the
apron.
After the flight, the flight crew held a debriefing meeting with the airport authority and
submitted a voyage report to the AQD system.

CONCLUSION:
The flight crew did not comply with SOP 2.10 Taxi-in procedures and was unaware of the
correct taxi route after landing. The Captain did not stop the aircraft when unsure about the
taxi route, and the First Officer did not offer adequate support in route guidance.
Additionally, the flight crew did not use headsets during the flight.
The TEM briefing was ineffective, as both crew members were overconfident due to their
familiarity with the sector to Cam Ranh Airport.

3. OPERATION NOTICE:

3.1 DIRECTIVE FROM CHIEF PILOT FOR SUSTAINING AVIATION

SECURITY DURING THE INDEPENDENCE DAY 02/09/2024:
In accordance with Document number 1208/TCTHK-DB dated 29/08/2024 and directive
No.1212/CT-TCHK-ANHK dated 26/08/2024 relating to maintain a high level of aviation
security during the Independence Day Anniversary Celebration 02/09/2024, CHIEF
PILOT issues a new directive as below. All pilots are requested follow these regulations:
1. All fleets, departments are required to preserve a good amount of human resource to
meet the operational demand during the Anniversary. Avoid scheduling training and
experience cumulating flights in this period to ensure the safety and quality. Pilots
resource for VIP flights should also be prepared in advance.
2. While performing flight duty, all pilots are compulsory to:
◦ Briefing procedure before flights should be highly respected besides thoroughly
conduct security check to timely figure out any abnormality in normal operation.
◦ Flight preparation procedures must be cautiously conducted, all relating documents
such as weather information enroute, destination, alternates, etc. should also be
examined without carelessly before flight to cover and minimize all risks. On the
other hand, operating regulations in unfavorable conditions should be respected and
applied if needed.
◦ All pilots are strongly advised to pay high attention while communicating with air
traffic controller. All clearance must be copied and readback clearly and correctly
especially contents associating with altitude, heading, runway in use. Cross check
procedure between 02 pilots is mandatory.
◦ Captain of each flight must be more critical on his/her role. Specifically, he/she
must thoroughly inform all crew members to strictly adhere to security regulations
including cockpit and aircraft check before flight. Moreover, all crew members
should also raise selves' awareness and be prepared for any extreme situations
happening during normal operations.
◦ In case of abnormal weather situation, PA should be announced to all passengers to
explain current situation as well as enhance passengers' satisfaction.
3. Departments and fleets:
◦ Safety and Quality Department together with fleets: Positively monitor and
regularly perform uniform and luggage check with all crew operating both domestic
and international flights. Ensure that all pilots are informed and acknowledged all
safety and anti-smuggling information.
o Cooperate with Aviation Security Department to cope with any abnormality
happening.
o The result of conducting security level 01 should be report to Aviation Security
Department on time.
◦ Medical department: Increase the frequency of alcohol and addictive substance test
for pilots before flights.
◦ Leader of each fleet and departments oversees informing to all staffs under his/her
management to seriously comply to this directive. An individual who violates would
be severely punished as regulated.
4. All staffs are required to:
◦ Comply to all aviation safety and security regulations while on duty; internal
security, informative security protection protocol should be efficiently enhanced.
Selves' consciousness should always be at high level to be ready for any abnormality
happening in normal operation.
◦ Remain a certain number of staff on duty and frequently make report during the
holiday; Carefully inspect the fire protection conditions for the purpose of securing
the head quarter, workshops, warehouses and areas gathering vehicles and
equipment; timely detect and prevent all intruding and disruptive activities.
5. Severe penalty as regulated would be imposed on any individual who violates.
6. Duration: 31/08/2024 - 03/09/2024.

3.2 CAAV AUDIT FINDING:

During CAAV’s annual MARI audit, auditor created a finding about A320/1’s pilot not
adhering to A320/1 SOP Chapter 13 - Task Sharing.
All pilots must strictly adhere to SOP especially during critical phases of flight such as
during departure and arrival.
“New briefing” is implemented by the A320/1 fleet since May 2024. All pilots are required
to conduct the “New Briefing” as standard during all phases of flights.
The "Briefing Framework" in the MO is solely being used for reference only. The briefing
is to be conduct based on crew's assessment of actual condition of the flight and the SOP,
not by reading the "Briefing Framework" on a checklist manner.

3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF LIDO DATA (UPDATED):

Starting from 1st September 2024, aeronautical data (both EFB and NavDB) will be
provided by LIDO only. Pilots are required to follow instructions as:
- EFB: mPilot application.
- NavDB ID: VN1 (A320); VN4 (A321 Honeywell FMS); HVN2 (A321 Thales FMS).
(example: VN12409.001 NavDB A320, cycle 2409, eff 05SEP-02OCT24)
Notes: “LIDO data READY” in Notes to Crew in Techlog will be cancelled.
- 02 iPads with mPilot are required for each flight, in which 01 company iPad and 01
personal iPad. VIAGS will provide 01 company iPad with mPilot before flight. Pilots have
to handover company iPad to VIAGS right after the last flight and returning to main bases
(HAN, SGN). Pilots are encouraged to use personal iPad with mPilot.
- Only pilots who have completed all LIDO CBT training and differences training courses
are authorized to use LIDO data (mPilot on iPad and NavDB).
- LIDO terminal charts and Enroute charts are on MO/2.01 TERMINAL CHART/LIDO &
2.02 ENROUTE CHART/LIDO, General Regulations and Rules are on MO/2.07
FOM/Part C for back-up of mPilot.
- LIDO User Guides are available on MO/2.14 EFB GUIDE/REF DOC. Pilots ensure
strictly compliance with these guidelines to maintain safety and operational standards.
For JEPPSEN: Please be informed that from 01st September 2024, Jeppesen data will be
no longer provided. FDPro accounts for A320/A321 pilots will be deactivated.
During this transition phase if any difficulties/ abnormalities are encountered, pilots are
requested to submit a report to AQD system or providing information to relevant
department.
3.4 SPECIAL REQUIREMENT FROM WUX & CZX LOCAL AUTHORITY
(UPDATED):
According to document No.121/TCTHK-ATCL dated 19/01/2024, all aircraft when
operating at WUX(ZSWX) & CZX (ZSCG) airport are requested to keep window shade
closed during taxi, take-off and landing. It is because WUX & CZX are combination
airports for both civil and military purpose. Military activities usually occur at WUX &
CZX and in the vicinity of the aerodromes. The requirement mentioned above is to mitigate
the potential of passenger taking photo/ video clip of the military vehicles and activities in
this area.
All pilots are strongly advised to thoroughly brief with cabin crew strictly follow WUX
& CZX authority requirement while performing duty there.
This notice was published on FCD919 application since 01/2024, however, still has not
been respected and complied by some crews. Severe penalty would be imposed by airport
authority on crews who do not adhere to this regulation.

3.5 35’ GROUND TIME FOR DOMESTIC FLIGHTS:

From 15/07/2024, all domestic flights operated by A321 aircraft will have ground time
adjustment, shortened to 35'.
The ground time will be counted from the time at which aircraft being chocked-in
completely to the time when all ground handling procedure finished (all doors closed and
nose chock removed).
All A321 pilots are strongly advised to notice the change and well-cooperated with all
ground staff to fulfill the requirement.
Report and feedback from pilots of any difficulties are highly recommended during shorten
ground time operation.

3.6 MANDATORY REPORT PROCEDURE FROM CAAV:

A. FOLLOWING A GROUND TURN BACK, AIR TURN BACK, REJECT
TAKEOFF, DIVERSION:
According to document No.3245/CHK-TCATB dated 02/07/2024, to enhance the
efficiency of monitoring, detecting and evaluating risk, CAAV requires that all occurrences
including Ground turn back, Air turn back, Reject takeoff, Diversion must be reported.
Therefore, all pilots are required to acknowledge and make a report via AQD following the
occurrence as listed above.
B. FOLLOWING SAFETY OCCURRENCE:
According to document No.1243/TCTHK-ATCL dated 08/08/2024, to comply with
CAAV reporting requirements, it is strongly stated that all safety events/occurrences must
be reported within 24h from the time it happens. This regulation has also been issued in
SMSM 8.2 so that all pilots are required to strictly follow. The timely reports from crew
enable Vietnam Airlines to make abnormal safety
report (MOR) to CAAV on time (in reference to VAR19.011 and VAR19.015).

3.7 NOTICE RELATING COMPANY COCKPIT’S HEADSET AND

MICROPHONE CONDITION:
Many aircraft in the A320/1 fleet have cockpit headsets and microphones showing
significant wear and tear after years of service. Some of these devices are even becoming
difficult to use. To ensure all equipment remains in good working condition and to prevent
communication issues during operations, pilots are strongly encouraged to make an entry
in the technical logbook if they encounter any equipment showing signs of wear and tear
or operational difficulties. This allows the technical department to repair or replace the
inoperative equipment promptly.

Our contact:
1. Capt Nguyễn Như Ngọc. Fleet Manager.
Email: [email protected]
2. Capt Hoàng Đình Trang. Deputy Fleet manager (In charge of Training).
Email: [email protected]
3. Capt Nguyễn Đình Long. Deputy Fleet Manager (In charge of Flight operation
& Technique).
Email: [email protected]
4. Capt Đỗ Văn Thức. Deputy Fleet Manager (In charge of Flight operation &
Technique).
Email: [email protected]
5. Capt Hoàng Minh Tuấn. Deputy Fleet Manager (In charge of Safety).
Email: [email protected]

Training team:
1. Capt Vũ Hồng Nhật. Email: [email protected]
2. Capt Hoàng Nhật Tân. Email: [email protected]
3. Capt Hoàng Đức Anh. Email: [email protected]
4. Capt Lê Xuân Lộc. Email: [email protected]

Safety team:
1. Capt Nguyễn Thế Anh. Email: [email protected]
2. Capt Đình Khánh Duy. Email: [email protected]
3. Capt Nguyễn Quốc Linh. Email: [email protected]
4. Capt Ngô Đại Huy. Email: [email protected]
5. Capt Nguyễn Thanh Tùng. Email: [email protected]
6. Capt Viên Trương Việt Quang. Email: [email protected]

Thanks for your Co-operation.

A321 FLEET
DEPUTY MANAGER

HOANG MINH TUAN