Aircraft Towing

Article Information

Category: Ground Operations

Content source: SKYbrary

Content control: SKYbrary

Contents
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 1 Description
 2 The Procedure
 3 The key threat to aircraft flight safety
 4 Risk Management
 5 Accidents and Incidents
 6 Related Articles
 7 Further Reading

Description
The forward movement of an aircraft, usually with engines off, using the power
of a specialised ground vehicle attached to or supporting the nose landing
gear. It may occur for the movement of both in service and out of service
aircraft. This will affect the promulgation of procedures and the required
qualification for those occupying the flight crew seats on the aircraft during the
manoeuvre. As part of out of service repositioning of aircraft supervised by
maintenance personnel, it may follow the Pushback from a nose-in gate of an
empty aircraft with engines off.

The Procedure
Once the person in charge on the flight deck of the aircraft has given their
confirmation of ‘brakes released’ to the person in charge of the ground crew
vehicle who are to carry out the tow, the ground crew become responsible for
the safe manoeuvring of the aircraft in accordance with any ATC clearance
which may be required and as may have been specifically agreed beforehand.

Unless the manoeuvre is taking place outside the movement area controlled
by ATC, an RTF clearance to carry it out will be required. If the aircraft is
being towed to a start position or to a Push and Hold location, this normally
will be obtained by the aircraft commander or other person on the flight deck.
If an out of service aircraft is being repositioned, the clearance will normally be
obtained by the operator of the tow vehicle. The prescribed RTF phraseology
for obtaining clearance to tow is contained in ICAO PANS-ATM (Doc 4444)
and ICAO Manual of Radiotelephony (Doc 9432).

Formerly, almost all aircraft types required that the ground locking pin be
installed in at least the nose landing gear during any towing operation but this
is no longer always the case. If a gear ground lock pin is installed for the tow,
it may need to be removed after the completion of the manoeuvre. When any
ground locking pins are fitted to an aircraft for towing (or any other purposes)
or when they are subsequently removed, it is usual to require the recording of
such action in the Aircraft Technical Log

The ‘traditional’ method of allowing the ground vehicle to move an aircraft is to

attach it to the aircraft nose landing gear by means of a towbar. These must
be approved for use with a particular aircraft type and clearly marked as such
since there is no universal towbar specification. An alternative method which
is becoming more common for towing is the use of a specialised vehicle called
a ‘towbarless tug’. This positions two low level ‘arms’ either side of the aircraft
nose landing gear and these are used to engage with the aircraft gear leg and
raise it slightly off the ground.

All towing is subject to the observance of any AFM limits for maximum nose

landing gear steering angle.

The responsibilities of a ground crew team carrying out an aircraft tow include
ensuring that no part of the aircraft structure will impact any fixed object,
vehicle, or other aircraft. The ground crew should have intercom
communication with the personnel on the flight deck and both parties should
be able to listen to communications with ATC. In the absence from the flight
deck of a pilot qualified on the aircraft type, The person in charge of the
ground vehicle carrying out the tow will usually be responsible for obtaining
any necessary ATC aircraft movement clearances.
The function of any flight deck occupant(s) is likely to be the appropriate
operation of the aircraft braking system and the provision of sufficient aircraft
electrical power to operate the radio and appropriate external and internal
lighting. It is likely that where available, an APU will be running to provide
electrical power and that hydraulic accumulator pressure for braking will be
achieved by use of an electrical pump.

The key threat to aircraft flight safety

The key threat to aircraft flight safety consequent upon towing operations is
collision between the aircraft under tow and another aircraft. Two 'types' of
collision with potentially high risk outcomes exist:

 a collision with a moving aircraft taking off or landing on an active

runway whether or not the aircraft under tow has a valid ATC runway
occupancy clearance.
 impact damage to another, usually stationary and unoccupied, aircraft
caused by undetected relatively minor impact which is then not detected
prior to either damaged aircraft departing on a flight.
Ground Crews must be specifically made aware of both these risks and must
be fully trained on both ATC practices and the towing of the particular aircraft
type involved. The later should include awareness of aircraft dimensions and
turning arcs.

Risk Management
The evidence of accidents and incidents is that there are a number of
recurrent factors leading to aircraft damage during towing:

 A failure to maintain overall situational awareness of other traffic

regardless of whether a required ATC clearance is held
Inadequate RTF skills on the part of the persons responsible for
communicating with ATC from the towing team.

 Inadequate awareness of aircraft dimensions and turning arcs by the

ground crew towing
 Lack of clearance between horizontal stabilisers of a towed ‘T’ tail
aircraft when it is turning in proximity to another similar ‘T’ tail type.
 Failure to keep towed aircraft on the taxiway centreline or other taxi
guidance line.
 Inadvertent or otherwise inappropriate brake application during
towing by personnel ‘riding the brakes’
Towing collision risk is exacerbated by the conduct of such operations during
the hours of darkness or in poor ground visibility and procedures should
effectively address and/or constrain such operations.

Accidents and Incidents

A selection of events that involved an aircraft being towed:

 A320, Dublin Ireland, 2017 (On 27 September 2017, an Airbus A320

being manoeuvred off the departure gate at Dublin by tug was being
pulled forward when the tow bar shear pin broke and the tug driver lost
control. The tug then collided with the right engine causing significant
damage. The tug driver and assisting ground crew were not injured. The
Investigation concluded that although the shear pin failure was not
attributable to any particular cause, the relative severity of the outcome
was probably increased by the wet surface, a forward slope on the ramp
and fact that an engine start was in progress.)
 A343 / RJ1H, Copenhagen Denmark, 2016 (On 26 December 2016,
the wing of an Airbus A340-300 being repositioned by towing at
Copenhagen as cleared hit an Avro RJ100 which had stopped short of its
stand when taxiing due to the absence of the expected ground crew. The
RJ100 had been there for twelve minutes at the time of the collision. The
Investigation attributed the collision to differing expectations of the tug
driver, the Apron controller and the RJ100 flight crew within an overall
context of complacency on the part of the tug driver whilst carrying out
what would have been regarded as a routine, non-stressful task.)
 A388, Changi Singapore, 2008 (On 10 January 2008, an Airbus A380
was damaged during push back at Singapore Changi International airport
when the aircraft right wing undercarriage became stuck in soft ground
adjacent to the taxiway.)
 B735, Newark NJ USA, 2006 (On 21 August 2006, a Boeing 737-500
suffered a nose landing gear collapse during towing at the Newark
Liberty International Airport. A technical crew was repositioning the
aircraft in visual meteorological conditions during the occurrence. No
persons were injured and minor aircraft damage occurred.)
 B738, London Stansted UK, 2008 (On 13 November 2008, a Boeing
737-800 with an unserviceable APU was being operated by Ryanair on a
passenger flight at night was in collision with a tug after a cross-bleed
engine start procedure was initiated prior to the completion of a complex
 aircraft pushback in rain. As the power was increased on the No 1 engine
in preparation for the No 2 engine start, the resulting increase in thrust
was greater than the counter-force provided by the tug and the aircraft
started to move forwards. The towbar attachment failed and
subsequently the aircraft’s No 1 engine impacted the side of the tug, prior
to the aircraft brakes being applied.)
 B744 / A321, London Heathrow UK, 2004 (On 23 March 2004, an out
of service British Airways Boeing 747-400, under tow passed behind a
stationary Airbus A321-200 being operated by Irish Airline Aer Lingus on
a departing scheduled passenger service in good daylight visibility and
the wing tip of the 747 impacted and seriously damaged the rudder of the
A321. The aircraft under tow was cleared for the towing movement and
the A321 was holding position in accordance with clearance. The towing
team were not aware of the collision and initially, there was some doubt
in the A321 flight deck about the cause of a ‘shudder’ felt when the
impact occurred but the cabin crew of the A321 had felt the impact
shudder and upon noticing the nose of the 747 appearing concluded that
it had struck their aircraft. Then the First Officer saw the damaged wing
tip of the 747 and informed ATC about the possible impact. Later another
aircraft, positioned behind the A321, confirmed the rudder damage. At
the time of the collision, the two aircraft involved were on different ATC
frequencies.)
 B763, Luton UK, 2005 (On 16 February 2005, at Luton Airport, a
Boeing B767-300 collided with the tug pulling it forward when the shear
pin of the unserviceable tow bar being used to pull the aircraft broke. The
aircraft ran onto the tug when the ground crew stopped the tug suddenly.
As result of the collision with the tug the aircraft fuselage and landing
gear was damaged.)
 B773, Lisbon Portugal, 2016 (On 13 January 2016 ice was found on
the upper and lower wing surfaces of a Boeing 777-300ER about to
depart in the late morning from Lisbon in CAVOK conditions and 10°C.
As Lisbon had no de-ice facilities, it was towed to a location where the
sun would melt the ice more quickly but during poorly-planned
manoeuvring, one of the wingtips was damaged by contact with an
obstruction. The Investigation attributed the ice which led to the
problematic re-positioning to the operator’s policy of tankering most of
the return fuel on the overnight inbound flight where it had become cold-
soaked.)
 JS41, Birmingham UK, 2007 (On 26 June 2007, at Birmingham
Airport UK, a BAe Jetstream 41 started an engine running pushback
without using intercom between ground crew and flight crew. The
pushback could not be completed as the towbar could not be
disconnected and confusion over a decision to return the aircraft to the
gate resulted in an attempt to do so with the aircraft brakes selected
which caused the aircraft nose landing gear to collapse.)