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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 11895 December 20, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEODORA TOPIÑO and GABRIEL GUZMAN, defendants. GABRIEL
GUZMAN, appellant.

F. Sanchez for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

Teodora Topiño and Gabriel Guzman were charged with the crime of
adultery. The former was acquitted and the latter found guilty and sentenced
to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to
the accessory penalties provided by law, and to the payment of one-half of
the costs of the cause. Gabriel Guzman appealed.

It is urged that the trial court erred (1) in holding that it had jurisdiction to try
this case; (2) in admitting Exhibit C presented by the prosecution; (3) in
finding that Exhibit C was conclusive proof of the guilt of Gabriel Guzman;
and (4) in not acquitting the appellant.

The trial court found that the complaint presented by the offended husband
against Teodora Topiño and Gabriel Guzman, charging them with the crime
of adultery formed a part of the record of the case. In the preparation of the
record to be sent to this court that complaint was omitted, but it has since
been sent up by order of this court. So it is quite clear that the first alleged
error is without foundation.

The prosecution offered in evidence Exhibits B and C, which read as follows:

I, Teodora Topiño, wife of Pedro Mateo, 23 years of age, a

resident of Hacienda de San Antonio, Isabela, after being duly
sworn, freely and voluntarily declare that the following facts are
true:

That about six years ago in cabeceria No. 22 of the Hacienda de

San Antonio, Ilagan, I left my husband Pedro Mateo's control in
order to join my elder relatives who also then lived in the
said cabeceria; that about five years ago Gabriel Guzman invited
me to live in his house on the same hacienda where, owing to a
woman's weakness and the fact of his being a single man, we
lived together conjugally, and so he possessed me, enjoying my
favors. As the fruit of our amorous relations two children were
born, Josefina and Homobono.

In testimony whereof I hereunto affix a cross beside by name, in

the presence of two witnesses, this 4th day of September, 1915.
(Cross) Teodora Topiño. -- Cross affixed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) A. Medel. — Teo. M. Cumagun. — Subscribed and sworn
to before me this 4th day of September, 1915. — (Sgd.)
Francisco Taccad, clerk of the Court of First Instance, Isabela.
I, Gabriel Guzman, of age, single, and a resident of the Hacienda
de San Antonio, Ilagan, after being duly sworn, freely and
voluntarily declare as follows:

That in or about the year 1912 I became acquainted with Teodora

Topiño, by reason of her having offered to wash my clothes; that
sometime afterwards, being ignorant of her situation, I succeeded
in obtaining her favors and as the result of our carnal relations,
she began to show signs of pregnancy; that in view of those
symptoms Mr. Orros, the manager of the hacienda on which I
was living, warned me that the woman with whom I sustained
these relations was married, but was only separated from her
husband on account of certain differences and questions with
him; that notwithstanding his warning and in view of the fact that
my paternity of the fetus which she was already carrying in her
belly was incontrovertible, and swayed by the sentiment natural to
and innate in every father, I nevertheless continued my carnal
relations with her, waiting for her husband who might consider
himself aggrieved to appear; that up to the present time I have
had two children by the said woman Teodora Topiño. I also here
record that if I consented to live with her in marital relations, it
was owing to what she told me, to wit, that the then justice of the
peace said that if she did not wish to join her husband she was
not obliged to do so, and from that moment she was free. In my
ignorance and believing that she was again single and free, I did
 not think it dangerous to sustain those relations with her.

In witness of al the foregoing, I sign the present affidavit, in

Ilagan, this 22d day of September, 1915 — (Sgd.) G. Guzman. —
Subscribed and sworn of before me, this 22d day of September,
1915. — The affiant exhibited to me his cedula F-233292, issued
in Ilagan, Isabela, March 15, 1915. — (Sgd.) Ramon Crisologo,
provincial fiscal, Isabela.

Francisco Taccad, clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of

Isabela, testified that Exhibit B was sworn to and signed by Teodora Topiño
before him on the 4th day of September, 1915; that Teodora signed the
document by a cross because she did not know how to write; and that before
she signed Exhibit B in this manner it was read to her in his own dialect by
the provincial fiscal.

Teodorico M. Cumagun testified that the appellant himself prepared the

rough draft of Exhibit C; that he (the witness) then copied the rough draft on
the typewriter; that after the document had been copied the appellant read
and signed it; that he saw the appellant sign the document; that in the
preparation and signing of it there were no threats, intimidation or force used
whatever; and that the appellant voluntarily and of his own volition prepared
and later signed Exhibit C after it had been copied from the rough draft on the
typewriter.

Pedro Mateo, the offended husband, testified that he and Teodora Topiño
were legally married about ten years ago; (Exhibit A, the certificate of
marriage, was presented in evidence without objection) that he filed the
complaint against his wife because she had committed adultery with Gabriel
Guzman; that he and his wife separated about seven years ago; that in less
than one year thereafter she commenced living in adultery with Guzman; that
he (the witness) had no children by Teodora; and that the two accused had
been living together less than six years on the Hacienda of San Antonio.

Remigio Barcena testified that he knew Teodora Topiño because they

worked on the same hacienda; that he knew that she was married to Pedro
Mateo, with whom she lived for about three years; that after she left her
husband she went first to live with her father and then with Gabriel Guzman;
that she had been living with Guzman for about six or seven years on the
Hacienda of San Antonio; that he knew that Teodora and Guzman were living
together because the house in which they live is on the side of the road
which leads to the barrio of San Antonio; that every time he goes to town he
sees them; and that Teodora and Guzman are living as man and wife
because they have two or three children.

Vicente Constantino testified that he knew Teodora Topiño; that she was
married to Pedro Mateo; that they lived together about three years; that after
they separated Teodora went to look for another place to live; that Teodora
had been living with Gabriel Guzman in the latter's house for more than six
years; that they had been living during this time as man and wife because
Teodora has children; that he knows this to be a fact because every time he
goes to the Hacienda of San Antonio or returns from that place he sees the
two accused; and that it is true that he has never seen the two accused have
illicit relations, neither has he seen Teodora give birth to a child, but he
knows that Teodora has three children because the neighbors say so.

The foregoing is all of the testimony presented by the prosecution. The

defense offered no witnesses, counsel saying, "The defense presents no
proof and asks the dismissal of the case because there has been presented
no complaint of the offended party."

The trial court, in finding the defendant Guzman guilty of the crime charged,
said:lawphi1.net

By this confession, freely and voluntarily made by this defendant

(a person of sufficient education), not challenged during the trial,
the rough draft of which was prepared by himself, being
corroborated by other evidence (such as that of his having lived
with his codefendant, Teodora Topiño, for six years and that of
her being a married woman, as shown by the certificate Exhibit A
of the prosecution, the authenticity of which was admitted by the
defense and accepted in evidence without objection) the court is
convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that the said defendant
did lie with a married woman, knowing her to be such.

Teodora Topiño was, as we have indicated, acquitted. The findings of fact

with reference to this accuse are as follows:
 The other defendant Teodora Topiño, also swore before the clerk
of the court to the contents of an affidavit (the prosecution's
Exhibit B), the translation of which into Spanish is as follows
(Exhibit B, supra):

But the prosecuting attorney has not proved this confession to be

free and voluntary, wherefore it cannot be considered in this
case. (U. S. vs. De Leon and De Leon 27 Phil. Rep., 506.) This
confession being stricken out, there only remains against this
defendant the circumstantial evidence of her having lived with
Gabriel Guzman for six years, which is insufficient to sustain a
conviction for adultery. The witnesses for the prosecution
testified, indeed, that she lived conjugally with the said Guzman,
and that, as a consequence thereof, she had two children; but on
these witnesses being asked how they knew, they said that it was
by deduction or by hearsay.

When Exhibits B and C were formally offered in evidence by the fiscal,

counsel for the defendant objected, saying:

I object to the admission of the document Exhibit B, because it

has not been proven that the defendant made the said
declaration voluntarily, because it is drawn up in the Ilocano
dialect, and, furthermore, because it has not been ratified by the
person who made or signed it.
 With regard to Exhibit C, the same objection is offered, to wit, that
it has not been ratified by the affiant. . . .

By the court: Exhibits B and C are admitted, on condition that

they be accompanied by a translation of Exhibit B.

The second and third assignments of error relate to the admissibility and
probative force of Exhibit C. The sole objection made in this court to the
competency of Exhibit C is that it was subscribed and sworn to before the
provincial fiscal, an officer not authorized to administer oaths under section
349 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads: .

An affidavit to be used before any court, judge, or officer of the

Philippine Islands may be taken before any judge or clerk of any
court, or any justice of the peace, or any notary public in the
Islands.

Section 2012 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, enacted March 11,
1872, in the exact language of the Practice Act, section 424, is as follows:

An affidavit to be used before any court, judge or officer of this

State may be taken before any judge or clerk of any court, or any
justice of the peace, or notary public in this state.

This section of the California Code was subsequently amended to read:

 An affidavit to be used before any court, judge, or officer of this
State may be taken before any officer authorized to administer
oaths.

The section, as thus amended, was declared unconstitutional.

(Lewis vs. Dunne, 134 Cal., 291.)

The Supreme Court of California in Haile vs. Smith (128 Cal., 415), in
construing section 2012 of 1872, held that the section did not exclude all
officers, except those herein mentioned, from taking affidavits to be used
before courts and that affidavits taken before any officer of the state
authorized to administer oaths may be thus used. Consequently, section
349, supra, of our Code is not exclusive. Affidavits taken before officers other
than those mentioned in the section, if such officers are authorized to
administer oaths, may be used in the courts in this country.

Section 2 of Act No. 302 provides that "For the purposes named in this
section each provincial fiscal is hereby authorized to administer oaths." The
section refers to preliminary investigations. Section 2 of Act No. 302 was
repealed by Act No. 2657, known as the Administrative Code, and the
reenactment (section 1306) wholly omitted that part of section 2 above
quoted. But the affidavit had been sworn to long before the passage of the
Administrative Code. Therefore, the repeal of the provisions authorizing
provincial fiscal to administer oaths did not destroy or render inadmissible
Exhibit C upon this ground. But if the repeal of the statute did render the
affidavit as such inadmissible, it would still be competent evidence as a
voluntary confession. The result is that there cannot be the slightest doubt
about the correctness of the trial court's findings of fact to the effect that the
appellant had carnal intercourse with Teodora Topiño after he knew that she
was a married woman. The appellant himself made the rough draft of the
affidavit wherein this fact is fully set forth and the record shows, as we have
indicated, that the same was made voluntarily, without the use of coercion,
threats, promises or intimidation. Furthermore, the contents of Exhibit C are
corroborated by the testimony of the above named witnesses.

Counsel in his argument in support of the fourth alleged error insists that the
acquittal of Teodora Topiño must necessarily result in the acquittal of her
codefendant, the appellant, We think that the premises upon which this
proposition rest are not well founded in law.

Articles 433, 434, and 435 of the Penal Code read:

ART. 433. The penalty for adultery shall be prision correccional in

its medium and maximum degrees.

Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall lie with a

man who is not her husband and by a man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void.

ART. 434. No penalty shall be imposed for the crime of adultery,

 except upon a complaint filed by the injured husband.

The husband cannot institute a prosecution without including

therein both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any
case, if he shall have consented to the adultery or pardoned
either of the adulterers.

ART. 435. The husband may at any time remit the penalty
imposed upon his wife.

In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall
also be deemed remitted.

Adultery is now, and has been since the passage of Act No. 1773 on October
11, 1907, a public crime and must be prosecuted in the same manner as are
all other crimes defined by the Penal Code or by the Acts of the Philippine
Commission, but no prosecution for the crime of adultery can be instituted
except upon the complaint of the aggrieved party, and condonation, pardon,
or remission of the penalty for adultery by the aggrieved person can in no
way extinguish the liability of the guilty persons or operate to dismiss or
suspend any prosecution once commenced in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 1773. To this extent the above provisions of the Penal
Code have been repealed.

If a man lies with a married woman, knowing her to be married, he commits

the crime of adultery. If a married woman lies with a man who is not her
husband, she likewise commits the crime of adultery. In order to constitute
adultery in either instance, there must be a joint physical act. Both bodies —
that of the man and the woman — must concur in the act. Must there also be
in every case a joint criminal intent? We think not. While the criminal intent
may exist in the mind of one of the parties to the physical act, there may be
no such intent in the mind of the other party. One may be guilty of the
criminal intent, the other innocent, and yet the joint physical act necessary to
constitute adultery may be complete. Thus, if one of the parties was, at the
time of committing the physical act, insane, certainly such party has
committed no crime; but it certainly cannot be contended that the other party
who was sane, committed no crime. So, if the man had no knowledge that
the woman was married, he would be innocent, in so far as the crime of
adultery is concerned, and the woman guilty. The one would have to be
acquitted and the other found guilty, although they were tried together. Or in
other words, the act of sexual intercourse with a married or an unmarried
man, other than her husband, is adultery in the woman without regard to the
guilt of the man.

It is quite true that the husband cannot institute a prosecution for the crime of
adultery without including therein both of the guilty parties, if they are both
living (article 434, supra), but the statute does not require that both must
necessarily be tried together. The force of the article is spent when the
husband institutes the prosecution against both or includes both in his
complaint. It is not for the husband to determine the question of the guilt or
innocence of the paramour of the crime of adultery. That question must be
left to the court. (U. S. vs. Asuncion, 22 Phil. Rep., 358.) When the complaint
is filed by the offended husband against both of the guilty parties, the
proceedings then pass into the hands of the prosecuting officer, who may
move for a dismissal of the complaint as to the paramour, if he is satisfied
that he cannot establish guilty knowledge on the part of the man of the fact
that the woman was married, and such dismissal would not of itself require
the court to acquit the woman. Nor would the death of the woman during the
pendency of the action defeat the trial and conviction of the man. (U.
S. vs. De la Torre and Gregorio 25 Phil. Rep., 36.) Nor would the fact that the
man had left the country and could not be apprehended defeat the trial and
conviction of the woman. Again, if both were brought before the court to be
tried jointly and one should claim a separate trial, which the court would have
to grant (section 33, General Orders No. 58), the acquittal of the one would
not necessarily bar a prosecution and conviction of the other. But it is said
that in the instant case the woman was acquitted upon the ground that the
proof as top her was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
the fact that she had illicit intercourse with the man or that the joint physical
act did, in fact, occur, and therefore the acquittal of the man must follow as a
necessary consequence. If this be true, it would work a strange result if the
male defendant, Gabriel Guzman, could openly admit, as he did, habitual
illicit intercourse with Teodora Topiño after he knew she was a married
woman and then defy the law because there was no competent evidence
against her. The mere fact that the trial judge was of the opinion that the
evidence of record was insufficient to establish the guilt of Teodora beyond a
reasonable doubt does not necessarily establish the fact, in so far as the
other was concerned, that the two did not have illicit intercourse. The case at
bar establishes this proposition beyond question.

In its decision of January 17, 1889, the supreme court of Spain had the
following case under consideration: The offended husband presented a
complaint against his wife, charging her with the crime of adultery as defined
and penalized by article 449 of the Penal Code (article 433 of the Philippine
Code), without including therein the paramour, because he was unknown.
The trial court acquitted the defendant upon the ground that under the law
relating to adultery one of the guilty parties alone could not be prosecuted
and punished unless it be shown that the other was dead. On appeal this
judgment was reversed, the court saying,

In defining the said crime the Penal Code requires, in order that
the man who lies with a married woman may incur the penal
sanction provided therein, that he must know that she is married;
this circumstance clearly shows that occasions may arise wherein
a penalty may be imposed upon one of the guilty parties and on
the other.

It was suggested during the consideration of this case that, as the appellant
did not know that Teodora was married for sometime after the
commencement of their illicit relations, the continuance of such relations after
he was informed of that fact might not constitute adultery. In determining this
question it must be borne in mind that this is not a case where the woman is
a common prostitute. There is no evidence in the record of unfaithfulness on
the part of Teodora except with any other man since she left her husband.
Prior to the date on which Act No. 1773 became effective, adultery was
considered a private crime in the sense that the prosecution could only be
instituted upon the complaint of the injured husband and that the husband
could pardon the guilty parties and remit the penalty imposed upon his wife,
which had the effect of also remitting the penalty imposed on the paramour.
The husband being the head of the family and the only person who could
institute the prosecution and control its effects, it is quite clear that the
principal object in penalizing the offense by the state was to protect the purity
of the family and the honor of the husband, but now the conduct of the
prosecution, after it is once commenced by the husband, and the
enforcement of the penalties imposed is also a matter of public in which the
Government is vitally interested to the extent of preserving the public peace
and providing for the general welfare of the community. That the defendant's
conduct in continuing to live in adultery with Teodora, after he found out that
she was married, endangered the public peace and the general welfare of
the community there can be no doubt. Article 433, supra, makes no such
exceptions as the one here presented, and we can make none. For the
foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:

The court holds that, of two persons charged with adultery and tried at the
same time, the same court, in the same trial, and upon the same evidence,
may, without error, find that the woman did not have carnal relations with the
man but that the man did have carnal relations with the woman; and that,
upon those findings, the court may legally convict the man although he
acquits the woman. This is equivalent to holding that a conviction is legal
without a corpus delicti.

The defendants in this case were jointly charged with adultery and tried
together. The trial court found upon the evidence — this may be difficult to
believe but it is the fact — that the prosecution had failed to prove that the
woman had carnally known the man, but, on the other hand, that the
evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the man had carnally
known the woman; and, upon the findings, acquitted the woman and
convicted the man. The man appealed.

I regard it impossible, under the law of the Philippine Islands, or the common
sense of mankind, to convict a man of adultery when the woman with whom
he is alleged to have had carnal relations charged is acquitted on the ground
that she did not sustain such relations with him. Adultery is a crime which, by
its very nature, is committed by a single act, notwithstanding two persons
cooperate .Although in committing the crime of adultery, two persons must
act together, nevertheless, neither can commit the crime alone. It belongs to
that class of crimes in which the wrongdoers act not upon the person or
property of a third person but upon each other. The two together are a single
operating cause. So far as the crime is concerned they are one in fact and in
law. Separate them and the commission of the crime is impossible. Disunite
them and the agency which committed the crime ceases to exist — the
operating cause disappears. As to them the crime is indivisible; and the
agency committing it is also indivisible. For this reason the death of the
woman prior to a conviction of the man discharges him on principle from all
responsibility. The French courts have so held. The reason given is "that the
action against the woman for adultery and against her paramour
is indivisible "and that the action against the paramour must follow the same
fortunes as that against the woman, and that, therefore, when the action
against the woman abates by reason of her death, the action against the
paramour abates also.: If this is correct doctrine how much more strongly
must the principle be applicable if the woman is acquitted? The principle
involved in this argument is none the less existent by reason of the fact that,
in the Philippine Islands, there is a provision of statute to the effect that the
death of one of the parties shall not prevent the prosecution of the other. That
such a provision was considered necessary argues powerfully in favor of the
position I am taking. It indicates that but for the express provision the result I
contend for would follow.

This same theory is at the bottom of all the provisions of the Penal Code
dealing with this crime. Article 434 provides that no prosecution can be taken
except upon the complaint of the husband; and that, if he does institute it, it
must be against both guilty parties. It provides that "the husband cannot
institute a prosecution without including therein both the guilty parties." (U.
S. vs. Asuncion, 22 Phil. Rep., 358.) This strongly emphasizes the indivisible
character of the responsibility as well as the singleness of the agency
committing the crime, although the agency is two persons.

This characteristic of the crime of adultery under the Spanish law is still
further emphasized by article 435. It provides that the husband may pardon
his unfaithful wife and remit the penalty which may have been or might be
imposed for her unfaithfulness; but it also declares that, if he does, the
penalty imposed on her companion in crime shall be remitted also. This again
draws attention to the indivisibility of responsibility. Whatever happens to the
woman must happen to the man. Article 436 adds its weight to this
interpretation. It says that — "a final judgment in favor of a defendant in an
action for divorce upon the ground of adultery shall be conclusive in a
criminal prosecution for the same offense."

It should be noted that, in an action by a husband against his wife for a

divorce on the ground of adultery, the wife is the sole defendant. The
adulterer is not a party. Nevertheless, such is the nature of the crime of
adultery that the success of the woman in the civil action is a complete bar to
a criminal action against her for adultery. But if it is a bar as to her, it certainly
is as to the correspondent. If such is the case in an action in which the
correspondent is not a party, and with respect to a civil action, how much
more certainly would an acquittal of the woman in a criminal action in which
he was a party be a bar to his conviction?

The general provision of the Penal Code defining the crime of adultery itself
furnishes grounds to support the proposition that the responsibility as well as
the action is indivisible, and that the producing cause is single. Article 433
reads:

Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall lie with a

man who is not her husband and by a man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void.

Under this article two elements are essential to the conviction of either party,
assuming for the moment that they can be convicted separately: (1) the
woman must be married and (2) the carnal relation with a man not her
husband must exist. If either of these is not present a conviction of either
party is impossible. But note that another element is necessary to convict the
man. It must be shown that he knew the woman was married. Mere carnal
relations with a married woman is not adultery as to the man whether he is
married or single. A man married or single cannot commit adultery. A married
man may sustain relations with an unmarried woman and be guilty of no
crime so long as he does not commit concubinage. Groizard says in the 5th
volume of his commentaries on the Penal Code at page 17:

To our legislators adultery is not a violation of the laws relating to

marriage. It is a violation of those laws only when it is committed
by a woman. The husband can break those laws without
committing the crime of adultery.
The husband may lie with a woman not his wife without committing adultery.
Not so the wife. When she lies with a man not her husband she is guilty of
adultery. She, in other words, is, in reality, the only person capable of
committing the crime of adultery under the law of the Philippine Islands.
Remove the wife from the action by whatever means, and the crime of
adultery disappears. If it disappears no one can be convicted of it. The
reason for this has been given by the French courts as we have already
seen. The action is indivisible; the responsibility is indivisible. Being founded
solely upon the act of the woman, when she disappears there remains no
foundation to the action.

Therefore, whether the man and the woman are together considered a single
agency, a single operating cause, one and indivisible, or whether it be
considered that the woman is the only one in reality capable of committing
adultery, the result is the same. When the woman disappears from the action
the case is ended.

The fact that the male defendant in a prosecution for adultery may be
acquitted under article 433 and the woman still be convicted does not
interfere in any way with the conclusions already reached. The reason for this
is that there is one element necessary to be present to convict the man which
is not necessary to convict the woman. He must know the woman was
married. This proposition is quite different from that presented when one
attempts to argue that the same court in the same trial and on the same
evidence may find that the man had carnal relations with the woman but that
the woman did not have such relations with the man. Where the man is
acquitted and the woman convicted, the acquittal results not because there
was no sexual relation proved, not because there was no adultery, no corpus
delicti, but because, admitting the existence of the sexual act, the man was
ignorant that the woman was married. The defense of ignorance is an
admission of the illicit relation. If the man could defend on the other ground
the defense of ignorance would be unnecessary — indeed would be in
contradiction to his other defense.

There are several arguments in the opinion of the court offered to show that,
in a prosecution for adultery, the woman may be acquitted on the ground of
innocence of the act charged and, nevertheless, the man convicted, as
occurred in the case at bar. The court, making one of these arguments, says:

In order to constitute adultery in either instance, there must be

jointly physical act. Both bodies — that of the man and the
woman — must concur in the act. Must there also be in every
case a joint criminal intent? We think not. While the criminal intent
may exist in the mind of one of the parties to the physical act,
there may be no such intent in the mind of the other party. One
may be guilty of the criminal intent, the other innocent, and yet
the joint physical act necessary to constitute adultery may be
complete. Thus, if one of the parties was, at the time of
committing the physical act, insane, certainly such party has
committed no crime; but it certainly cannot be contended that the
other party who was sane, committed no crime.
I confess I do not understand the argument. I suppose the court puts the
question "Must there also be in every case a joint criminal intent?" not only
for the purpose of answering it "We think not," but also for the purpose of
presenting an argument, which it does in effect, by which it would attempt to
show that its answer to its own question is correct. I shall consider the points
brought out in the quotation. In the first place, what has a "joint criminal
intent" to do with the matter before us? The question in hand is whether, in
the same trial, before the same judge, and upon the same evidence, the
male defendant in prosecution for adultery may be convicted in spite of the
fact that the female defendant is acquitted on the ground that she had
sustained no illicit relations with him. What has intent to do with such a
question; and, above all, what has a "joint criminal intent" to do with it? The
obvious purpose of the court is to demonstrate that, in spite of its statement
that "there must be a joint physical act" and that "both bodies . . . must
concur in the act," which would naturally, if not necessarily, point to the
indivisibility not only of the action but of the responsibility and thus militate
strongly against the general argument of the opinion, the effect of jointness of
the act could be overcome by showing that the parties to the illicit act
have separate intents. In other words, the purpose is to destroy the inference
naturally to be drawn from the nature of the sexual act by playing upon
the intent of the parties as a separating force. The idea was that, if it could be
shown that a "joint criminal intent" was not necessary but, on the contrary,
that each party defendant had his own separate and individual intent, that
would serve to divide the sexual act which otherwise would be indivisible,
and that division would justify separate trials, and therefore, a conviction of
the man although preceded by an acquittal of the woman on the merits. In
attempting to accomplish this purpose the court has fallen into statements
and arguments that to me mean little. I am not sure that I know what a "joint
criminal intent" is. I am aware that the same intention may be common to two
or more persons; but I have been unable to conceive of a joint intent of two or
more persons. There may be joint action and joint interests; but when it
comes to intentions and purposes they are, as I understand
it, common not joint. Being common they are alike: but, while they are alike,
they are, nevertheless, personal to each party. But, it should be noted, this is
not exclusive to adultery. It is so in every crime, whether it be adultery, or a
crime against person or property. The fact that intention is individual and not
"joint" is common to all crimes does not mean that all crimes are alike; and,
particularly, it does not make adultery like every other crime to the extent of
requiring or permitting the same treatment or procedure either in the
indictment or on the trial. A single characteristic in common does not make all
animals the same. When we wish to classify an animal we note not only its
similarity to other animals but its dissimilarity also; and
the ultimate classification is determined not by the similarity to other animals
but by the dissimilarity. So the legal nature of the crime of adultery is
determined by those characteristics which distinguish and separate it from all
other crimes and which give it its name. We do not get far by noting only
those elements of the crime of adultery which are common to all crimes.
Simply because adultery has one element in common with other crimes it
cannot be argues that it is to be treated as other crimes. It does not mean
that the parties may be considered as two separate individuals each of which
commits the crime independently of the other; that their joint act may be
divided, and one half of it tried when the woman is tried and the other half
tried with the man; that the woman may be acquitted of one half and the man
convicted of the other; or that the patent absurdity may be committed of
putting a man in jail because he carnally knew a woman while the woman
goes free on the sole ground that she did not carnally know the man.

But we may assume as true that the court contends for in its argument and
still its conclusion remains without foundation. Let us assume that adultery is
in every respect like every other crime, homicide, for example. Let us assume
that A and B are being jointly tried for the death of C. B is acquitted by the
court on the ground that, under the evidence, there had been no homicide,
no death, no corpus delicti; and that, at the time of the trial, the person
alleged to have been killed by A and B was alive and well and at that very
moment present in court. Would the conviction of A of homicide by the same
court at the same time and upon the same evidence stand either in law or
common sense? The Supreme Court says "Yes," because, as it argues in
this case, there was no "joint criminal intent" between A and B, that they
could have been tried separately and one convicted while the other was
acquitted, and that, while one may have had a criminal intent, the other may
not, etc. In the case before us where they were tried jointly for adultery the
woman was acquitted by the court on the ground that, under the evidence,
she had not had carnal relations with her codefendant; that there had been
no adultery no corpus delicti, and that she, at the very moment of her trial,
stood before the court a pure woman, without stain or blemish on her
character or honor. Would the conviction of the man by the same court at the
same time and on the same evidence stand either in law or common sense?
The Supreme Court says "Yes" and for the reasons stated in connection with
the supposed homicide.

Thus, even though we accept the theory of the court that adultery is in every
respect like other crimes, the conclusion reached upon that hypothesis is
erroneous as applied to the case at bar. The real difficulty with the
contention, and that difficulty is present in a trial for any crime, is that, as to
one of the joint defendants, the court finds that no crime was committed, that
there was no corpus delicti; but as to the other defendant, on the same
evidence, the same court finds that a crime had been committed, that there
was a corpus delicti. No such absurdity can be permitted. The proposition
that the same court in the same trial, on the same evidence, may be
permitted to find that a man on a given occasion had illicit relations with a
woman, but that the woman did not on the occasion named have such
relations with the man, does not, it seems to me, merit serious consideration.
Such a result as this is reached by the argument of the court based on the
assumption that there was no "joint criminal intent."

In the second place, what does the court mean when it says "while the
criminal intent may exist in the mind of one of the parties . . . there may be no
such intent in the mind of the other party;" and what effect can that fact, if it is
a fact, have on the question before us? No criminal intent is required in the
crime of adultery except that which necessarily springs from the voluntary
commission of the sexual act. No specific or special intent is necessary. To
the law the intent of a person who voluntarily shoots another in the back with
a gun and kills him is immaterial if it is alleged to be different from that which
is naturally inferred from the nature and result of the act. Indeed, he will not
be heard to say that he had no intent to do the very thing he did or to
accomplish the very result effected. 1 A married woman voluntarily having
illicit relations with a man not her husband will not be permitted to offer a lack
of criminal intent as a defense. She will be conclusively deemed to have the
intent which her acts naturally and necessarily manifest. The statement of the
court, therefore, that in adultery "one may be guilty of a criminal intent, the
other innocent" is misleading. The woman who lies with a man not her
husband cannot in law lack a criminal intent or be innocent. She acts
voluntarily and her act conclusively established her criminal intention. On the
other hand, the man who voluntarily sustains illicit intercourse with a married
woman not his wife is legally in the same position, so far as intent is
concerned. The shield of ignorance, which the law places before him, does
not affect the intent. It is an element of the crime as essential to his
conviction can be had. The law declares that the man shall be acquitted if the
sexual act is not proved; but that does not mean that failure to prove that acts
shows a lack of intent on the part of either defendant. It is simply a failure to
prove an act, not a state of mind. So the law declares that he shall be
acquitted if knowledge is not proved; but that does not mean that the failure
to prove knowledge establishes a lack of criminal intent on his part; for no
man who holds no sexual relations with a woman not his wife can be said to
be innocent whether he knows she is married or not. It is simply a failure to
prove a material fact, not a failure to prove an evil mind.

We, therefore, see that the discussion of the court of the intention of the
parties has doubtful significance. The intent carries no weight or influence
when opposed to that manifested by the act itself; and if there was ever an
act which shows what the parties intended it is the act on which the crime of
adultery is founded. The statement that, "while the criminal intent may exist in
the mind of one of the parties to the physical act, there may be no such intent
in the mind of the other party" is, therefore, misleading and brings nothing of
value to the discussion.

In the third place, to clinch the argument that there may be separate or
different intentions on the part of the two defendant, and that, therefore, one
may be convicted while the other is acquitted, the court says:

Thus, if one of the parties was, at the time of committing the

physical act, insane, certainly such party has committed no crime;
but it certainly can not be contended that the other party who was
sane, committed no crime.

Let us admit all the court here contends for and still we advance not a pace in
the resolution of the question before us. A lunatic can have no intention one
way or the other, because ha has no will, no mind. Having no mind, no
governing or controlling power, he can have no purpose, good or bad.
Insanity does not raise a question of intent but
agency — a question concerning the force committing the act. If there is
insanity the agency is not responsible; it is not a person in the eye of the law.
It is an ungovernable force born of no mind, the product of no reason, the
result of no intention. Besides, the defense of insanity admits the
performance of the act charged — concedes the guilt of the defendant, but
seeks to avoid the effect of the admission by pleading irresponsibility, by
declaring that the law should not punish a person without a mind. Insanity
affects the responsibility, the punishment. The question whether one may be
punished or not has no relation to the question whether certain alleged illicit
relation existed. The fact that a murdered person was insane in no way
lessens the responsibility of the murderer; and the fact that the murderer was
insane in no evidence that the murdered man is not dead. Insanity affects
neither the act nor the result of the act. Nor does it in any way whether it be
held to affect one party or the other, prove or tend to prove that the
murdering and the being murdered were separate acts each capable of being
looked at separate and apart from the other and of being recognized
separately. It is no more possible to separate the act of the parties to sexual
relation than it is to separate the act of killing from the act or state of being
killed. Both are, by the very nature of things, inseparably joined together. To
argue, because a woman charged with and convicted of adultery may escape
punishment by pleading insanity, that, therefore, the sexual act is divisible to
the extent that the absence thereof may be found as to the woman but the
presence thereof found as to the man, is, it seems to me, straining logic,
common sense and the law beyond all precedent.

I have already referred to the argument contained in the later part of the
quotation from the court's opinion, that relating to the acquittal of the man and
the conviction of the woman, and shown that that fact furnishes no ground for
the contention that the sexual act is divisible, that is, that it may be divided
into two parts, that, therefore, the parties may be tried separately, and that,
while the woman may be acquitted of one-half on the ground that the carnal
act had not been performed, the alleged correspondent may, at the same
time and on the same evidence, be convicted of the other half on the ground
that the carnal act had been performed.

There is in the opinion a further statement sustaining the proposition that the
woman may be acquitted on the ground that there was no illicit relations and
the man convicted on the ground that there was. It is as follows:

When the complaint is filed by the offended husband against both

of the guilty parties, the proceedings pass into the hands of the
prosecuting officer, who may move for a dismissal of the
complaint as to the paramour, if he is satisfied that he cannot
establish guilty knowledge on the part of the man of the fact that
the woman was married, and such dismissal would not of itself
require the court to acquit the woman. Nor would the death of the
woman during the pendency of the action defeat the trial and
conviction of the man. (U. S. vs. De la Torre and Gregorio, 25
Phil. Rep., 36.) Nor would the fact that the man had left the
country and could not be apprehended defeat the trial and
conviction of the woman.

The court puts several example which, it thinks, illustrates favorably the
proposition stated. It is to be noted, however, that it does not submit the very
case in hand to the test of similar examples. The court contends that, if the
prosecuting officer "is satisfied that he cannot establish guilty knowledge on
the part of the man," he may move for a dismissal of the complaint as to him.
Let us assume this to be true, and still we may fairly ask the question: What
effect has that fact on the question at issue? Whether or not the man had
knowledge that the woman was married does not prove anything one way or
the other with respect to the existence of the illicit relations. I make no
question that any defense which either defendant may make which is not
connected with the existence of the illicit relations may be offered and the
party in whose behalf it is tendered may properly be acquitted, if it is
sustained. The contention which I make is, and this refers to the question
presented by this case, that it is not legally possible that the woman may be
acquitted on the ground that the evidence did not prove the illicit act and the
man convicted on the ground that the evidence did prove the illicit act. Now,
whether or not the man knew that the woman was married has nothing to do
with that contention.

The court also says that the death of the woman during the pendency of the
action would not cause the abatement of the action against the man. That is
true not on principle but by reason of a specific provision of the Penal Code
designed to change the principle.

It is also stated that if the man had left the country and could not be
apprehended the trial against the woman might still continue. That is true for
the same reason. But why not put the case and see what would be the result.
What would the trial court say of a prosecuting official who would make a
motion in an adultery action to dismiss the complaint against the woman on
the ground that he could not prove the illicit relations charged, and, at the
same time, move the trial of the man upon the ground that he could prove the
illicit relations? Yet the Supreme Court would have us hold that, because the
prosecuting attorney may move for dismissal of the complaint as to the man
on the ground that he had knowledge that the woman was married and still
go on with the trial of the woman, he may also move for the dismissal of the
complaint against the woman on the ground that he could not prove the illicit
relations and, at the same time, move the trial of the action against the man
on the ground that he could prove those relations.

The court continues its argument saying:

Again, if both were brought before the court to be tried jointly and
one should claim a separate trial, which the court would have to
grant (section 33, General Orders No. 58), the acquittal of the one
would not necessarily bar a prosecution and conviction of the
other.

This statement assumes much. It assumes that a separate trial would have to
be granted. I deny that that is true. Section 33 of General Orders No. 58 does
not apply to an adultery action. It applies only to those actions where a
number of persons combine in the commission of a crime against the person
or property of another. It provides that "when two or more defendants are
jointly charged with a felony, any one of the defendants demanding it must be
tried separately." Defendants in an adultery action are not "jointly charged."
They are charged as one person, one agency, one operating force as
complete and perfect as if only one person had committed the criminal act.
As already stated, every provision of the Penal Code touching the subject
shows clearly that that is so. I have already shown the nature of the act
charged, that the complaint must be laid against both of them; that it cannot
be filed against them separately. It necessarily follows that if they must
be charged together they must be tried together. It would, of course, strongly
tend to defeat the purpose of the provision requiring a charge against both if,
after the charge was made, they should be tried separately. Indeed, it would
defeat the main purpose of the Penal Code in so far as it deals with adultery.
That purpose is to punish both or neither; to prevent the husband from
selecting his victim either for punishment or blackmail; to prevent his
exploiting the adulterer and still cohabit with the adulteress; to prevent one
defendant from being tried by one judge and another defendant by another;
and to prevent the absurdity which has occurred in the very case at bar of a
conviction of the man after the acquittal of the woman. All or any of these
results, which the lawmakers tried their best to prevent, might occur if
separate trials were permitted. Indeed, the separation of the two defendants
by means of separate trials would tend to work every mischief which the
lawmakers foresaw when they required that the complaint should be made
against both. They knew the indivisible character of the offense; they knew
the singleness of the operating or producing cause; they knew that the
agency was a single agency and that it was as impossible logically to divide it
as it was to divide a single force or a single individual — as impossible to
separate the man from the woman as to separate the murderer from the man
he murdered; they knew that, if there were separate trials, a conviction might
occur in case of the man and an acquittal in case of the woman; and no
legislator desired to assume the responsibility of having created a condition
where such an absurdity could be perpetrated. They knew that separate trials
would deny the indivisible character of the action, the oneness of the agency
committing the crime, the inseparableness of the criminal responsibility. They
knew that, in law, the woman is the only person who commits adultery; and
they knew that, in cases where they were jointly tried, that which would
require the acquittal of the woman would require also the acquittal of the
man.

Furthermore, if they may be tried separately then it necessarily follows that

they may be charged separately. It is impossible to escape that conclusion.
Every case to which section 33 of General Orders No. 58 refers is one in
which the persons could be separately charged; that is, a separate complaint
could be lodged against each one. That is to say, that section refers
exclusively to those case in which the parties could have been separately
charged. It should need no argument to demonstrate that, if parties may be
separately tried, they may be separately charged. A mere statement of the
proposition is enough to show its correctness. Likewise it should take no
argument to demonstrate that, the law requires two persons to be charged
together, the persons thus charged must be tried together. Otherwise, the
requirement that they be jointly charged is valueless and without force or
effect. To admit that two persons must be charged together and then deny
that they must be tried together presents a contradiction so open as to need
no argument to demonstrate the unsoundness of the contention which it is
adduced to support and without which it would fall.
The court further states:

But it is said that in the instant case the woman was acquitted
upon the ground that the proof as to her was not sufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that she had illicit
intercourse with the man or that the joint physical act did, in fact,
occur, and therefore the acquittal of the man must follow as a
necessary consequence. if this is true, it would work a strange
result if the male defendant, Gabriel Guzman, could openly admit,
as he did, habitual illicit intercourse with Teodora Topiño after he
knew she was a married woman and then defy the law
because there was no competent evidence against her. The mere
fact that the trial judge was of the opinion that the evidence of
record was insufficient to establish the guilt of Teodora beyond a
reasonable doubt does not necessarily establish the fact, in so far
as the other was concerned, that the two did not have illicit
intercourse. The case at bar establishes this proposition beyond
question.

This argument, it will be observed, is founded on a false conception of the

effect of an acquittal and gives no consideration or effect to the principle that
a person in deemed to be innocent until guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court bases its whole argument in the quotation upon the
proposition that there is a difference between finding that the evidence is not
sufficient to sustain the charge and a finding that the accused is innocent.
The court says that, inasmuch as the trial court found only that "the proof as
to her was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that
she had illicit intercourse with the man," which is not a finding that no illicit
relations existed, that, therefore, the prosecution has still a right to show, so
far as the man is concerned, that those relations did exist. This is a complete
misconception of the result of acquittal in a criminal action. When the
evidence is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the woman she stands before
the world innocent; that is, in law, she never committed the act charged.
If she never committed it then, of course, the man never committed it. The
question whether the illicit act occurred is, under the circumstances set out,
closed by a finding of a court of competent jurisdiction incorporated in a final
judgment.

The misconception of the court with regard to the result of an acquittal of the
woman appears with striking clearness in this portion of the quotation:

The mere fact that the trial judge was of the opinion that the
evidence of record was insufficient to establish the guilt of
Teodora beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessary
establish the fact, in so far as the other was concerned, that the
two did not have illicit intercourse.

The finding of the judge that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
woman's guilt was in law declaration of the woman's innocence — was in law
a declaration that no such relation ever existed; and gave her the right, which
she had always enjoyed, to stand before the world a clean woman. If, after
she has been acquitted, her purity and innocence may be again dragged into
question simply and solely because the man is separately tried, the
protection which the law gives her by this declaration is withdrawn and she is
again subject in effect to be tried for the very offense of which she was once
acquitted. It boots little to say that she cannot be imprisoned having been
once acquitted. The refuge is of little protection to a woman of decency and
of honor when, by virtue of the subsequent trial and conviction of her
codefendant, she may again be subject to the accusation of her husband and
friends that she was guilty of illicit relations in spite of the fact that she had
once been acquitted of them. The court says that, to permit the acquittal of
the man "would work a strange result." I ask if a far stranger and far more
serious result would not be worked if, after a declaration of innocence by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the character of the woman might
nevertheless be blackened by the evidence in another case where the man
was on trial for the very acts, not the acts of some other person, but the very
acts of which she had already been declared innocent. This class of
argument disregards every element which distinguishes adultery from other
crimes. It completely obliterates every distinguishing characteristic of the
crime of adultery puts it on the same footing as other crimes. It gives no
consideration to the nature of the sexual act. It destroys the fundamental
difference between that crime and crimes against persons and property. It
disregards the legislative requirement that that crime shall be dealt with
differently from other crimes. It prevents the results which the legislature
intended to secure and it brings into existence every evil which the legislature
intended to prevent. It wipes out the distinction made by the Spanish
legislator between adultery and other crimes, which has been expressly
recognized in statutes passed since the American occupation, notably Act
No. 1773, which, while it makes adultery a public crime, does so only to the
extend of requiring the prosecution to be conducted by a public official. In
every other respect it is at present a private crime and that Act itself, in
express terms, requires that the complaint shall not only be made against
both of them but it shall be made by the husband of the guilty woman. (U.
S. vs. Narvas, 14 Phil. Rep., 410; U. S. vs. Poquis, 14 Phil. Rep., 261.)

In the case of United States vs. Bacas (14 Phil. Rep., 308), the court says:

Paragraph 2 of article 434 of the Penal Code provides that the

injured husband can not enter a complaint for adultery except
against both guilty parties, and in the present case the complaint
has only been entered against the adulterers, but not against the
other guilty party.

Although Act No. 1773 of the Commission authorizes the

prosecuting attorney to the file charges for this crime, yet, the
conditions established in chapter 1, title 9, book 2 of the Penal
Code which deals with the crime of adultery have not been
altered thereby, because the real and the main object thereof was
no other than that the prosecuting attorney shall in such cases.

Therefore, in the absence of a complaint in accordance with the

provisions of the law, the case herein is dismissed, and the
 judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs de officio.

The last argument in the opinion of the court to which I desire to refer is a
continuation of that just dealt with. Speaking of the evidence with regard to
the existence of the illicit relations introduced against the man in the case at
bar, the court said that "the case at bar establishes this proposition beyond
question;" that is to say, that, in the case at bar, the guilt of the man was
established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Why, then, did it not
also establish the guilt of the woman beyond a reasonable doubt? And why
was the woman acquitted? Every bit of evidence which is proof against the
man must necessarily be proof also against the woman; and if the illicit
relations of the man with the woman were established beyond question, then
the illicit relations of the woman with the man must have been established
beyond question also. This style of argument, as I have before indicated,
completely loses sight of the invisible nature of the action. It follows from the
nature of the act that what is proof against one is proof against the other; and
that when the court seeks to tear them apart and to introduce evidence
against the one which will not be evidence against the other, it attempts to do
an impossible thing. It is a plain contradiction of speech as well as of sense
to assert that the evidence may show the guilt of the man without also
showing the guilt of the woman.

I am rather surprised that the court did not offer an argument based on the
claim that either of the defendants in an action of adultery could plead guilty,
leaving the other to be tried alone with all the possibilities of acquittal, etc.,
which that implies. Under the Spanish law pleas in criminal cases were not
known. There might be a confession but no plea. In spite of the fact that in a
case of adultery the man confessed his guilt and refused to defend, the two,
the man and the woman were nevertheless tried; and if the woman was
acquitted the man was also acquitted in spite of his confession. That is
precisely the law in the Philippine Islands to-day. As was held in the case of
United States vs. Bacas, above, nothing substantive or fundamental in the
law of adultery has been changed since the American occupation. Neither
confessions nor pleas can alter the nature of the crime of adultery; nor can
they frustrate the purpose of the Legislature.

Footnotes

1 In the case of United States vs. Cariaga (R. G. No. 9832,

decided Nov. 24, 1914 [not published]), I said in a dissenting
opinion:

"It is no reply to assert that, in this particular case, the deceased

assented to the assault upon his person or that the accused
believed that he was invulnerable and that, therefore, he did not
intend to kill him. May one consent to be killed and thereby
relieve the one who kills him from responsibility for his act? Of
course not. Answering the other contention, we may dispose of it
by asking: "Is one to be allowed to deny the laws of nature or
plead ignorance thereof?" May knew who voluntarily shoots
another through the heart be allowed to claim that he did not
know the shot would kill him? May one who voluntarily strikes
another a fatal blow with a deadly weapon successfully plead in
this defense that he did not know the blow would kill? To all these
questions the answer is emphatically, no. The fundamental rule of
action in criminal law as everywhere else is that no man of sane
mind will be permitted to escape or elude the natural and ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts. The law, as well as reason
and common sense, refuses to permit one's intentions to
contradict his voluntary acts. If one throws a brick into the air he
cannot be heard to say that he did not intend that it should fall to
the ground. If one voluntarily sets fire to inflammable materials he
will not permitted to say that he did not intend to burn them. If one
shoots another through the heart, neither law nor common sense
will allow him to say that he did not intend to injure.

"So in this case. The accused, having voluntarily struck the

deceased a fatal blow with a deadly weapon, will not be heard to
say, in order to escape the consequences of the act, that he did
not intend to injure. And this entirely apart from his ignorance and
superstition. While ignorance and superstition will extenuate and
reduce the punishment, it never deprives the act of its criminally.
Before men may be allowed to free themselves from the natural
and ordinary consequences of their voluntary acts they must
plead insanity; for no sane person can say that he does not know
that a dagger thrust in a vital part of the body is injurious.

"From what has been said it is clear that the alleged intent of the
accused in stabbing the deceased has nothing to do with the
case so far s the criminality of his act is concerned.
His intention is derived from his act not from what he says about
it. As I have said, one's intention can not be in direct and open
contradiction of his act. If his act is voluntary and prohibited, then
his intention is criminal. Everything would soon be topsy turvy if
men were allowed to have intentions which not only have
absolutely no relation to their acts but are in open and flagrant
contradiction thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

"There has been much written by commentators, authors, jurists

and courts about the necessity of a criminal intent before an act
can constitute a crime under the Penal Code. I believe that much
of it has been due to a misunderstanding of the provisions of that
Code and the system of criminal law which it embodies. Under
that system, with the exception of a few special crimes, no
criminal intent, apart from the voluntariness of the act itself, is
required. The Penal Code is based upon the proposition that
every person is conclusively presumed to intend the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts; and, if that act is prohibited,
the act is the crime.

"Article 1 of the Penal Code reads:

"'All voluntary acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies
(delitos) or misdemeanors (faltas).

"'Acts and omissions punishable by law are always presumed to

be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.

"'Any person voluntarily committing a felony (delito) or

misdemeanor (falta) shall incur criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.'

"This article clearly demonstrates that all that is necessary for the
commission of a crime is a voluntary act which is an act punished
law. The theory of criminal jurisprudence promulgated by the
Penal Code is not materially different from that in English
speaking countries. There, as here, the law will not permit one
who performs a prohibited act voluntarily, to declare that he had
no intention to commit the act or that he did not know that the act
which he performed would produce the consequences which it
ordinarily and usually produces; and that is substantially all there
is of the question no criminal intent, except in special cases, is
required under the Penal Code except that intention which the
law indissolubly joins to the nature of the act producing the results
which such an act usually, naturally and ordinarily produces. The
only defense which a person has who has performed an act
punishable by law is to show that the act was not voluntary, or
that it was done in defense of himself or some other person., If he
is able to show that the act was not voluntary or was done in self-
defense, he may escape responsibility; but unless he shows that,
he is responsible.

"That the Penal Code requires no separate apart from the nature
and quality of the act performed is clear from articles 8 and 9
thereof. Article 8 contains the only grounds upon which a person
may be relieved from responsibility for his acts, and if he cannot
bring his case within one of the 13 paragraphs of that section, he
cannot be relieved from criminal responsibility. If he is (1) an
imbecile or a lunatic; or (2) a person under 9 years of age; (3) a
person over 9 years of age and under 15 who acted without
discernment; or (4) one who acts in defense of his person or
rights under proper circumstances; or (5) one who acts in defense
of the person or rights of his spouse or certain other relatives
specifically named; or (6) one who acts in defense of the person
or rights of a stranger under certain circumstances; or (7) one
who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
damage to the property of another under certain circumstances;
or (8) one who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it; or (9) one who acts under the compulsion or an
irresistible force; or (10) one who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury; or (11) one who
acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office; or (12) one who acts by virtue of obedience due
 another; or (13) one who fails to perform an act required by law,
when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause; unless he
can bring his case within one of these exceptions he must lie
under his criminal responsibility and his intention in committing
the act has nothing to do with it.

"That no intention is required is further shown by article 9, which

deals with extenuating circumstances. In this article every form of
excuse, apart from the voluntariness of the act, which an accused
may urge to relieve himself from responsibility for his act, has
been anticipated by the code ands has been expressly made, not
a cause for relieving the accused of criminal responsibility, but an
extenuating circumstance; and we find in article 9 a list containing
substantially every conceivable reason upon which an accused
person could rely in attempting to relieve himself from
responsibility for his voluntary acts. His attempts, therefore, to
relieve himself from criminal responsibility for any other cause
except that the act was not voluntary has been forestalled by the
provisions of the code which remove them from the category of
causes relieving from responsibility and place them in the
category of extenuating circumstances which go simply to a
modification of the penalty."

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation