ART

23,
FAMILY
CODE;
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE

PROOF

OF

MARRIAGE;

PEOPLE v. BORROMEO
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court,
Fourteenth Judicial District, Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court),
finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo,
in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old
niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada,
mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help
because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada
told the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then
working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report of the
child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to
Susana's hut. The windows and the door were closed and
Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall
where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead
beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo
was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few
minutes, police officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen
arrived. The peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the
door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he
would open the door. When he did, the peace officers found
Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side.
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble
incoherent words.
Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his
necropsy report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause
of death was "stab wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left

supraclavicular region and left shoulder." There were five (5)

incised wounds and six (6) stab wounds on the deceased.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred
(1) in holding as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the
deceased) were legally and validly married in a church wedding
ceremony, when the officiating priest testified otherwise and
there was no marriage contract executed on the occasion or later
on; hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide; (2) in
failing to appreciate in favor of appellant the mitigating
circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same; and, (3) in convicting appellant of the crime of parricide
and in imposing upon him the penultimate penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's
finding to the effect that he killed Susana Taborada (the
deceased) without legal justification" The main issue raised by
him is that he and Susana were not legally married and therefore
the crime committed is not parricide, but homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence
of marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable
upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the
deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his
testimony on this point:
Q Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?
A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer, resident of
Putingbato, Babag Cebu City.
The COURT: t.hqw
Q You say you are married, who is your wife?
A Susana Taborada.
Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada?
A I forgot.

Q Where did you get married?

A Near the RCPI station in Babag.
Q There is a church there?
A There is a chapel.
Q Were you married by a priest or a minister?
A By a priest.
Q Who is this priest?
A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.
Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada?
A We have one.
Q How old is the child?
A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long time already.
(pp. 4-5, tsn., December 12, 1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the
accused of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras,
122 SCRA 525).
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco,
22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the
strongest known in law. The law presumes morality, and not
immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not
bastardy. There is the presumption that persons living together as
husband and wife are married to each other. The reason for this
presumption of marriage is well stated in Perido vs. Perido, 63
SCRA 97, thus:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that

of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legal matrimony. ...
And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the
registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as
in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present.
The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the
registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA
849).
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that
the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article
246, Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, provides that where the law prescribed a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties and the commission of the
act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, with no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Thus, assuming the presence of the mitigating circumstances of
provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the penalty is still
reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to
P30,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.

knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown

holding the baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and
Arturios filiation are sufficient.
Held

TRINIDAD v. CA (Case Digest)

Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who
together with Felix and Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four
parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the
following evidence.
a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited
and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of
Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been
destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with
Lourdes, until he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence
to refute Arturios claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she
claimed that Arturio was simply a neighbor. She denied

Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can

be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open
cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other
documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the
birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without
objection is also presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of

the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to
World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3
was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot
four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March
1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A.
Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on
15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family
and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her
children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living
with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who
later died in 1977 without any issue.

MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. AVENIDO

(VDA means VIUDA )

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to

another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the
properties acquired by Eustaquio.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe

Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed
the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with

counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving
spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao
City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at
St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case
was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her
own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

The Facts

Trial ensued.

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to

have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting

of:

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11

November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged
that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September
1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the
said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco

Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged
prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from

1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence

to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for
damages, to wit:

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage

to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio

showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and

marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of
1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla
issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September
1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were
destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the
Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as
requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on
30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio
and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her
marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March
1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when
he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is
not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring

himself as single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner
although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia
with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio,
Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed
to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del
Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in
her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that
the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio;
hence, her entitlement to damages and attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Teclas
petition, as well as Peregrinas counter-claim. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against
respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA
against
petitioner TECLA
HOYBIA
AVENIDO
is hereby
DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial
courts alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her
marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by
declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while

pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina

and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA
ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded
(1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942
at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among
others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008, raises
the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption
of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or
taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence
and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
original document; and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church
has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage
without the priest who issued the same being presented to the
witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence
presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of
Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid
marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure to present her
certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of
marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was
said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics
Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar
General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B")
stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed
during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are
presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of
1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952.
Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as
requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th
September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not
give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it
considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even
produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on
Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the
first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a

presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial
court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient
proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial courts ruling,
the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by
Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court.
Quite recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of
a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage
certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been
aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were
shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have
thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as
"secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the
Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol
evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court
confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is
the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary
evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the

execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of

the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,
necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is
actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all,
determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the
evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its
stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.
The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in
the place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the
testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of
the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of

the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence

presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentary
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla]
and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the
marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to
the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the
NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v.
TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage
has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The
person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded
(1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942
at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court

has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage.1wphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was
completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The
marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ART 26, FAMILY CODE; FOREIGN LAWS RELATING TO
MARRIAGE; RELATIVE DIVORCE PROOF REQUIRED
BARNUEVO v. FUSTER (CASE DIGEST)
Facts:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez
were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of
Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the

Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal

property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to
Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with him
in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th
day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a public
document, by which they resolved to separate and live apart,
both consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the
husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in
such place as the said lady pleases. In the same document, the
husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas
monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the
month of June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with
this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to
make further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the
Philippines, but the husband had absented himself therefrom in
the early days of February of the same year. On the 11th of
March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against
her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed
by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she
named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and
cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that
she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the
separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to
date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society
be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal
property had been determined, that one-half thereof be
adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension
owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be
ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is,
7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at
the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to
P12,959.90.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of
life in common between the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the
latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal
property be divided between the parties, with costs against the

defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to the
division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding
the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of
commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after various
vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to
the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also,
both parties appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the case and
partition of property as decided by the court should be affirmed.
Held:
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from
of the 9th of September, 1911, should be and is hereby
confirmed.
The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without
special pronouncement of costs in this instance.
Ratio:
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce
is not comprised within the personal status of the husband and
wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the
rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere
of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are
not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or
political law of the nation. The jurisdiction of courts and other
questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public
nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial
principle. . . . All persons that have to demand justice in a case in
which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a
simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of
the state which have coercive means (property situated in the
territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one
would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures
which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure

his rights because of the courts lack of means to enforce them.

(Torres Campos, Elementos de Derecho International Privado, p.
108.) Justice, says the same professor, is a principle superior
to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without
taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the
litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop
their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing
justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who
contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in
some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its
courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its
territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their
jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the
personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given
case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation?
This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding
the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and
domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law
in favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil
Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does
not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he
may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan,
in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the
dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject
to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the
said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of
jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law
of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial
courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their
nation.
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of
the Supreme Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34,
and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the
litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were
residents of this city and had their domicile herein.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the
Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2]
dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph
of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies
to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to
the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law

Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code,
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a

deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance

with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to
a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying
for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about
in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?
Brief Historical Background

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum,
that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying

the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2.
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus

Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be
a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15]
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare
that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American

citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an

American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines

sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
petition for review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party
to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article
26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were

solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this

country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party,
vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there
is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the

right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a

foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage.
Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family
laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in
the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,

EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo
that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has
to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still
subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for

recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino

spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right
that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a

judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)
In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and
(b)
In case of a judgment or final order against a person,
the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared,
no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This

Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)

copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City

Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in
the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)

births;

(b) deaths;
(c)

marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e)

divorces;

(f)

legitimations;

(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i)

naturalization; and

(j)

changes of name.

xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2)
Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name
and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given
res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does

not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil

registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38]
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that
the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009
order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be

construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial

CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals

(CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of
letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging

that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite
having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December
1959.

The facts are as follows:

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3]

The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced
American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized
under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
petitioner was not valid.

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After

allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first
wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with
petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of
the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending,
respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the
ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228
covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case
for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the
RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.
2699-A.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity

then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by
Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the
guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had
never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan
dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held
that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without
expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous
bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via
her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by
respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of
administration may have been filed by an uninterested person,
the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-

interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better

right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should have
first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled
on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision.
First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She
should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a
petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for
Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for
filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed
the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case.
Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the
case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such
as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special
proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And,
in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding
involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind
of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its
nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can
hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate
of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same
person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the
petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that
the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former.
The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of
the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would
render nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner
for letters of administration to be an interested party, inasmuch
as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid

interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be

appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition
ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her
petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner
would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public
document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with
bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the
petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting
a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper
proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of
the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her
subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been
disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the
petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore
no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an
interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration
by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She
alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on
the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the
other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was

invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy,
the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their

national law.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of

Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from him.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings
failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the
trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed
and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both
the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in
the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled
that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This
doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to
wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by

the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we
have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment
is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson

appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked
in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have

the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint

when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to
prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the
United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of
divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the
subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued
the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly
the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in
which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and

divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce

decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for

further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the
validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued
the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and
the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.