Aristotle's First Philosophy and the Principles of Particular Disciplines.

An
Interpretation of "Metaph." E, 1, 1025 b 10-18
Author(s): Alfonso Gómez-Lobo
Source: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung , Apr. - Jun., 1978, Bd. 32, H. 2 (Apr.
- Jun., 1978), pp. 183-194
Published by: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH

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 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRINCIPLES
OF PARTICULAR DISCIPLINES
An Interpretation of Metaph. E, 1, 1025 b 10-18

von Alfonso Go m ez-L o b o, Washington D.C.

In this paper' I shall first present an interpretation of a passage in

E, 1 of the Metaphysics which has found fairly wide acceptance in
traditional Aristotelianism as well as among some present-day Anglo
american scholars. In the second part I shall propose a different inter
pretation and argue for it.
As will be seen, the topics under scrutiny are two central points in
Ar.'s theory of science: the attitude of different kinds of sciences
towards their principles and the meaning of the alleged subordination
of particular disciplines (P.Ds.) to First Philosophy (F. Ph.).
The passage to be examined is printed by Jaeger2 thus: 1025 b
oW6E roi Trt eaUTw ob0etva X&yop irotovvrat, d\\ bk TOVTOV, 10
at pep aiaO aet 7rotwaauat abro 65iXop al 6 'nr6O0eutw Xa
3ovaat rTo' TLErTp, OVTC) Trd KaO 'avrd v7rdpXovra T&;) 'YE VEt
7repi o etWW diro6Etiwvovutw fl dpa'yKaoTrepolp f /IaXaKC3TepoP
6toirep Pavefpo1P 6oT ObK &JTLV tL7ro6eLttt ovata( obve ToU T 'EUTL
EK TfS Totac7T?W era'ywoyt,, &XXca Ttq &XXoq rpoiroq Tflq 15
6rXCOUECs. oguotwc be Obb6'Et eUTtP 77 1i7 rnTO 7V'r y'o irept 6
lrpa7Y.aTevopoat ob6e'v XyezovnL, bta rT rTis abrTis E'tpat 6ta
votas r6 re T &JTLt 5iXoP rotwV Kata et' iurp.
For the benefit of the Greekless reader I would like to add Kirvan's
translation of this passage3, although later I shall be forced to criticize
it:
"Nor do they (sc. the P.Ds.) produce any statement of what it is; but starting
from that - having either indicated it to the senses or found a hypothesis as to
what it is - they proceed from that to demonstrate, either more or less rigorously,
the things that hold good in its own right of the genus with which they are deal
ing. For that reason it is obvious that from such an induction there is no demon
stration of substance, i.e. of what a thing is, but some other manner of indicating

1 This article was written while the author held a joint grant from the Institute for the Arts
and Humanistic Studies and the Philosophy Department of the Pennsylvania State Univer
sity. His thanks are especially due to Professor Henry W. Johnstone for constant support
and to Professor Ernst Tugendhat for valuable criticisms of an earlier draft of the present
paper.
2 I shall be using Jaeger's edition throughout (Oxford Classical Texts, 1957). Translations
are my own unless otherwise stated. The Oxford Translation will be quoted from The
Basic Works of Aristotle, edited with an introduction by R. McKeon, New York 1941.
3 Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books T, A and E, trans, with notes by Christopher Kirwan,
Oxford 1971.

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184 ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO

it. Equally, neither is anything said as to whether the genus

or is not, because it falls to the same thinking to indicate bo
whether it is."

This passage has traditionally been understood in

general interpretation of Aristotle's theory of s
which F. Ph. plays the role of a regina scientiarum w
least hands down5 principles ot the P. Ds.
Joseph Owens has held what may be called the st
the interpretation conforming to the aforesaid vie
him the text of Metaph. E, 1 states clearly that
(a) the P. Ds. do not give an account of their princ
(b) F. Ph. demonstrates those principles for them.
Lately Kirwan (pp. 183-184) has proposed a variant of the
does not demonstrate principles but at least it provides th

4 Cf. Simplicius, In Phys., C. A. G., IX, 15,29?16,2: av?ynr] towv

TTpayu?TLJV apx?? ... ano?e?KWodai ... 6irep obK ean ipvovoX?yt
ava?e?riKviac abr?v ?Trtar^/un?' ttj? ?rpcirnc <?>i\oao<?>?ac aurr? y?
ano?eiKWOL, "therefore it is also necessary to demonstrate the princ
... and this does not pertain to the physicist but rather to a scie
philosophy, because it demonstrates the principles of the other s
In Duos Aristotelis Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Commen
p. 44: notandum est Aristotelem non negare metaphysicum posse
tiarum principia, id namque non negari potest ... ex principiis eni
probari principia geom?trica, "it should be noted that Aristotle d
metaphysician can demonstrate the principles of other sciences
denied ... for the principles of geometry can be demonstrated star
principles" (I owe these two references to E. Treptow, Der Zusam
Metaphysik und der Zweiten Analytik des Aristoteles, M?nchen 19
5 Cf. Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis E
Marietti, 1950, No. 1149: aliae vero scientiae accipiunt quod qu
suppositionem ab aliqua scientia, sicut geometr?a accipit quid est
primo, "but other sciences receive the what-is-it of their subject
some science, for example, geometry receives the what-is-it of m
philosopher", and Fonseca, Commentariorum in Metaphysicoru
Libros Tomus III (1615), Hildesheim 1964, p.2: aliae ex quiditat
ab alia superiori scientia desumpta ... proprias illius affectiones au
bus demonstrationibus ostendunt, "other sciences, starting from
laid down at the outset and taken from another, higher science
weaker or stronger demonstrations its peculiar properties". Alth
here the (rather strange) example of physics providing geometry
point and line, it can be inferred from another of his comments
esse et quid res sit: quod utique proprie et a priori soli primo Ph
show that the thing is and what it is: something that strictly speak
corresponds only to the first philosopher ...") that it is ultimate
least physics, the highest of the P.Ds. in his view, with principles of
6 J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphys
287-296.

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 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY 185

wan's exegesis, however, includes a peculiar feature concerning one of t

ciples involved, viz. definition. While Owens holds that the P.Ds. define th
ject matter but do not produce "a demonstration of Entity", as he puts it,
understands Ar. to be saying here that the P.Ds. omit altogether to define
ly their subject matter. He is aware that this is 'strange', but does not att
render it palatable.
Sir David Ross in his commentary (Oxford, 1924, Vol.I, pp. 351-352) d
share either version of the view under scrutiny. He advances no definite st
as to how the relation and the difference between F.Ph. and the P.Ds. ar
understood in this passage.
Owens' reading is open, I think, to the following objections:
(1) The text certainly warrants (a) but there is nothing what
backing up (b). When Owens says that "a science that demon
Entity in regard to the things treated by the other sciences
clearly indicated" (p. 288, his emphasis), he goes far beyond the
tual evidence. The text says what the P.Ds. fail to do but it doe
say what F.Ph. does in contradistinction to them.
(2) The principles involved in 1026 b 10-18 are the answers to
questions what-is-it and if-it-is. Answering the former implies provi
a definition, answering the latter may be taken to consist in pr
either a statement of fact or a statement of existence. This poin
be discussed in part II, below. Our text does not square exactly
the wording of An. Post. 1, 2, 72 a 14-24 because there, e.g., a
tion is said to be a the'sis but not a hypo'thesis, here the accepta
the what-is-it as a hypo'thesis is explicitly admitted, but there
little doubt that in E, 1 we are dealing with starting points diff
from the "so-called common axioms" (An.Post. 1, 10, 76b 14; cf
38, 77a 26), we are dealing with principles peculiar to a given sc
((6tat hpXat, An.Post. I, 32, 88b 28)7. In An.Post. I, 9, 76a
31-32, however, Ar. rejects explicitly the conception that the p
principles of a P.D. can be demonstrated by a higher one.
(3) If we now pass from Ar.'s general rejection of the demon
bility of the peculiar principles to the specific problem of the
strability of the what-is-it, we shall observe that in the second
Chaps. 1-10, of the Posterior Analytics he argues that there is
monstration of definition (cf. An.Post. II, 4, 91 a 12-b 11).

7 The attitude of F.Ph. and the P.Ds. towards the so-called axioms (e.g. the prin
non-contradiction) and towards certain concepts that share with them the prope
being common to all genera (e.g. contrariety, completeness, unity, being, samenes
ness, prior and posterior, genus and species, whole and part, etc.) can be gathere
Metaph. T, 2?3,1005 a 11?b 2: F.Ph. argues non-demonstratively for them and the
accept them ?? bnod?oetJ?. This expression implies that they are assumed witho
certainty as to their truth (1005 a 29?30). But in view of the clear distinction be
what holds good for everything and what holds good for some special genus apar
others (1005 a 22?23), nothing can be infered from this passage about attitudes t
principles restricted to one single genus, ie. peculiar principles..

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 186 ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO

case of attributes there is a definition by means of demo

strictly a demonstration of the definition (An. Post. II,
but in the case of primitive or immediate terms (d6eEa)
approximation to a syllogism of the definition is possible
9, 93 b 21-23). One reason for this is that the choice
term for a demonstration would always beg the quest
ready be the what-is-it of the minor term (An.Post. II,
Therefore the impossibility of demonstrating the what-
stricted to the P.Ds., it holds for F.Ph. as well. It must
against J. Owens that his phrase "demonstration of E
lacks a denotation within Ar.'s thought.
(4) Furthermore, as many scholars have observed, the
Metaphysics shows no trace of attempting to prove pecu
of P.Ds.8. How could this incoherence between preaching
be explained?
If we now turn to Kirwan's interpretation we can see that it is still more diffi
cult to accept because the statement in the text that some P.Ds. "assume the
what-is-it as a hypothesis" can hardly mean anything else than explicitly putting
forward a definition to be used as a starting point. Moreover, if the particular
scientist did not have an explicit definition of its subject matter it is hard to see
how - within Ar.'s conception of demonstrative science (cf. An.Post. I, 7, 75
a 41-b 2) - he could successfully demonstrate the attributes that belong per se
to such an undefined genus. "The starting point of all demonstration is in fact the
what-is-it" (De An. I, 1, 402 b 25-26).
If in the light of these objections both J. Owens' and Kirwan's inter
pretations seem to be untenable, what should 1025 b 10-18 be taken
to mean?

II

I shall hold that the text states explicitly that:

(A) the P.Ds. do not discuss the what-is-it of their genus, and that
(B) the P. Ds. do not discuss the if-it-is question in relation to their
genus.
In opposition to (A) and (B) I take the text to be implicitly stating
that
(C) F.Ph. does discuss the what-is-it of its genus, and that
(D) F. Ph. also discusses the if-it-is of its genus.
In other words, F. Ph. and the P. Ds. are not being distinguished here
on the basis of the different attitude that the latter and the former
have towards the principles of the latter, but on the basis of the differ

8 Ross, Metaphysics, Vol. I, p. 252; Kirwan p. 183.

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 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY 187

ence between the attitude of the P. Ds. towards their peculiar starting
points and that of F. Ph. towards its own principles.
Before I can make this interpretation plausible, I have to get out o
the way an obstacle that, I think, has been the stumbling block o
both Owens and Kirwan.
The latter translates the phrase oWUe ro3 ri eUTLv obveva X&yov
rrotow3vrac (1025 b 10) by "nor do they (sc. the P.Ds.) produce any
statement of what it is". Since it is natural to think that "a statemen
of what it is" has to be a synonym of "definition", Kirwan was led t
hold that the P.Ds. do not define their subject matter. But it has bee
already indicated that this is wrong; therefore it is reasonable to su
pect that ov0e'va X0yov iroteutaat means something different.
Father Owens takes this expression to mean "not (to) render an
account" (p. 287), which puts it in close kinship with X6yov &56vaL.
The latter in Ar. is roughly equivalent to "to give reasons", "to state
the cause", and this is best done in syllogistical form. Therefore, it w
natural for Owens to think that if the P. Ds. do not give an account
i.e., demonstrate, their starting points, F. Ph. should assume the task
But, as we have seen, this contradicts Aristotelian teaching and is in
itself impossible for definitions
If we look for parralels to the expression XOyovs 7roteutOat (o
which the singular ob0eva XOyOV 7rrocuwat is the natural negation), w
find them in Plato's Republic precisely in those pages that have long
been suspected to build the background of Metaphysics E, 1: the end
of Book V19-. But there XO'yovq r7owteluat (twice in 510 d) is clearl
contrasted to X6,yov 6&66-at (510 c 7). "Not to give X6yoq" is in tur
equated with "to assume as hypothesis". Geometricians, for instance,
do not give any account of different kinds of figures; they assume
them as hypothesis as if they were evident to everybody. But when
they use visible figures and rovZ Xo67ovq 7rotovvrat about them, the
are not .rovs'q Xoyovs vrotov,evot about these but about the square itself
and the diagonal itself. This loose paraphrase of 510 c-d should make
it clear that "give accounts" in the quasi-technical sense can hardly b
a correct substitution for the words left in Greek. Hence, Xo6ov
7rotLelUta cannot be taken in any rigid, technical sense. "To make dis
courses"10, "to formulate views" are probably correct translations and
Ross is doubtless right when he renders 1026 b 10 by "nor do th
offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat"
He prints this against the authority of Bonitz who has "und (sie) ge
ben iuber das Was keine Rechenschaft'"".

9 Cf. e.g., A. Mansion, Introduction ? la Physique Aristot?licienne, 21946, pp. 127?143.

10 Cf. Oeconomica II, 1348 a 36.
11 Aristoteles, Metaphysik, ?bers, von H. Bonitz, hrsg. von E. Wellman, Berlin 1890 (21966
However, as a substitution for nenoirivrai K?yov in Phys. HI, 4, 203 a 2, Bonitz propose

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188 ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO

The direct consequence of these considerations is that t

contrast in E, 1 is that between assuming the what-is-it
discussion (by ostention or by hypothesis) and establis
perhaps lengthy discussion of different views on the sub
to say that the latter procedure recalls the upward path
dialectic, the ascension "destroying the hypotheses"
trasted to the descent of mathematical disciplines pro
wards from their hypotheses12. The traditional interpret
on the other hand betrays a certain kinship with the des
tic from the summit of the highest, non hypothetical pr
strating along the way all the starting points that had bee
assumed as hypotheses by lower forms of knowledge.
Let us now pay attention to the wording of the if-it-is
text holds that the P. Ds. "similarly do not say anything
the genus with which they deal is or is not, because it b
same kind of thinking to show what it is and if it is".
With most commentators I think that bgoio*S, "simi
that ob56ev Xe&yovac, "they do not say anything" is simpl
obOe'va X6yov irotovprat. But under the present interpre
pression "they do not say anything" does not imply that
not state the corresponding principle but rather that they
for its truth13.
I therefore take the text to be holding that if a science
what-is-it it also assumes the if-it-is, but if a science discu
is-it, then it also discusses the if-it-is14.
But how is the if-it-is question to be taken? From the te
that the it in the English formula corresponds to the genu
discipline studies15 and a genus in Aristotle's thought is

simply elp^iKaoL (Index 433 a 43). The rendering of 1025 b 10 in the Ger
of Fr. Bassenge (Aristoteles, Metaphysik, Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1960) co
ly to the one defended in this paper: "und (sie) lassen sich in keine Er?rt
Was eines Dinges) ein".
12 Rep. 509 d?511 e and 533 b?535 a. For the exact meaning of the expre
the hypotheses" cf. Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Oxfor
passim.
13 Cf. Metaph. T, 3, 1005 a 29?30: ?vonep ob?ek t&v nar? u?po? emoKoiro?vTu>v eyxeipe?
X?yeLV TL nepl abr&v, el h\r?^V f) jU7^, o?ne 7ecjju?rpn? otfr' hpiduriTucoq. Ar. refers here to
the fact that although mathematicians formulate their axioms, they certainly do not dis
cuss them. What is of interest for our purposes is the correspondence between ob?ek
hyxcLpeX \eyetv rt and obb?v X?yovai.
14 Cf. H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica, Commentarius, Hildesheim: Olms 1960, p.281:
"peculiares doctrinae utrumque, et esse genus, de quo agitur, et quid sit, simpliciter ac sine
demonstratione sumunt; utrumque investigare, to 6tl et to t? altioris est scientiae".
15 In this connection it should be emphasized that in the beginning of E,l the what-is-it and
the if-it-is questions are not extended to terms haveing a "middle" and appearing in the
derived portions of the discipline (cf. An. Post. II, 9, 93 b 25?26). When due attention is
paid to this fact, wrong applications of doctrines of the Posterior Analytics can be avoided,

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 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY 189

of thing that can exist as an individual. Hence, we have to assume t

Ar. had some, perhaps vague notion of a second order existential q
tion in mind, i.e., the type of question that would be answered in
affirmative, say, for the genus F, if and only if we can point to so
individual that is an F. In fact, as we shall presently see, not only
mathematics but also at the starting point of physics Ar. takes se
ces havini the form "this is an F" as a suitable answer to the if-it
question1.
With all these assumptions at hand and using as a framework the set
of theoretical sciences mentioned in E. 1, I shall now try to prove that
Ar. is thinking about some such difference of attitude as was expressed
in my propositions (A) through (D) above. If my interpretation is cor
rect, confirmation should be obtained from Ar.'s own thoughts on
how the two types of disciplines should be organized. I shall therefore
consider briefly some evidence relating to Ar.'s conception of (i)
mathematics and (ii) physics on the one hand and (iii) F.Ph. on the
other.
(i) Mathematics, according to Ar., does not have one genus as its
subject matter but two completely different ones corresponding to its
basic branches17. The genus of arithmetic is number, that of geometry
magnitude (An Post. I, 10, 76 b 1-2; I, 32, 88 b 28-29). Sometimes
units (Movd8eq) can do duty for number as the genus of arithmetic
(76 b 4-5), which is not at all surprising since Ar. can define number
as a plurality of units (7rXidoq pov65wv) (Metaph. I, 1, 1053 a 30).
And we also find points and lines mentioned as the genus or perhaps
genera of geometry (76 b 5).
Unfortunately there is no mathematical treatise in the Corpus that
would enable us to observe Ar. himself positing qua mathematician
the starting points of this discipline, b for that matter we possess in
the An. Post. a passage (I, 10) which contains what Heath has called
"perhaps the best and most complete statement of Aristotle's views
about the principles, necessary principles (74 b 5) or immediate pre
misses (72 a 7) on which the demonstrative sciences in general and the
science of mathematics in particular are based"".8 In it two different
attitudes towards the ingredients of a science are distinguished: as

e.g., applying to the definition of the genus the method for defining subordinate attri
butes, such as "eclipse" and "thunder", by means of demonstration. Much of what is said
in pp. 289?296 of J. Owens' book is unfortunately based on lack of awareness of the
highly restricted scope of the two questions in E, 1.
16 I have argued for this point at length in a paper read at the 1976 Meetings of the American
Philosophical Association in Boston. Cf. my article "Aristotle's hypotheses and the Eu
clidean postulates", Review of Metaphysics 30 (1977) 430-439.
17 I am disregarding here the difficulty raised by Ar.'s reference in 1026 a 27 to a universal
mathematical science. Cf. Ross ad loc.
18 Sir Thomas Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford 1949, p. 52.

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 190 ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO

sumption (Xapfkivew) and demonstration (5eLKVvvat)

corresponds closely to what would amount to accepta
discussion and is best illustrated by the definitions of ba
the beginning of each book of Euclid's Elements'9. T
mitted to the reader without any comment or attempt at
no alternative views about them are mentioned, let alo
This does not mean however that they are accepted prov
only supposing them to be true; on the contrary, what m
sion unnecessary is the fact that "the what-is-it of (mat
jects) is plain enough" (E.N. VI, 8, 1142 a 20).
The question is then whether Ar. holds that the what-i
if-it-is of the genera of mathematics are assumed because
evident or whether he thinks that they need to be argued
For the what-is-it the answer is, of course, quite clear. A
explicitly unit (76 a 34), magnitude (76 a 36), points and
as terms whose meanings, i.e., definitions, are assumed.
is slightly more complicated in the case of the if-it-is. A
example of assumptions that are not definitions (he adopt
use of the word "hypothesis" to refer to them: An. Post
is etWat7 -Tvlo,ovaSa.
I understand this expression as obtained by generalization from h
theses of the type
let A be the unit
where A is a line representing a number as, e.g., in Euclid Book V
passim2o.
Propositions of the latter type are "immediate" and cannot be de
monstrated21. Moreover they express the instantiation of a given attri
bute and therefore represent adequate answers to the if-it-is question
in relation to that attribute. If this is correct, then the inclusion of
edvaTflrl) toda6a
among the items to be assumed must be taken as an indication that
the arithmetician does not enter into a discussion or accept a demon
stration of the if-it-is of the genus of his discipline. If we further take
into consideration 76 b 5-6 where the same is hinted at for points
and lines, we can legitimately conclude that according to Ar. both
arithmetic and geometry assume without discussion not only the
what-is-it but also the if-it-is of their respective genera.

19 For the kinship between Ar. and Euclid on this point cf. H.P.D. Lee, "Geometrical method
and Aristotle's account of first principles", Classical Quarterly 29 (1935) 113?124.1 can
not agree with Lee on other points, viz. his interpretation of the Aristotelian hypotheses as
statements of existence and his claim that they correspond to the Euclidean postulates.
20 I must apologize for presenting such unorthodox views in such a dogmatic way. I have
argued for them in the article mentioned in footnote 16.
21 Cf. An. Post. II, 9, 93 b 22-25.

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 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY 191

(ii) When we turn from Ar.'s conception of the starting points o

mathematics to his conception of physics additional difficulties ari
On the one hand the boundary line between physics and metaphysi
in the actual development of both is not always easy to trace and o
the other hand the Aristotelian physics as a whole can hardly be d
scribed as a demonstrative science' . For the purposes of the presen
paper, however, it will suffice to show that at least in a programati
sense Ar. wants his physics to start, as the mathematical disciplines
from the definition and the statement of instantiation of its genus
that neither of these propositions is demonstrated by F.Ph. or nee
to be argued for by it. As will be seen, sometimes F.Ph. may argue
some point close to the assumptions of physics, but this does not a
fect physics itself.
At the beginning of Book II of the Physics, after givine the usua
signal that a fresh start, his own start, is going to be made2 , Ar. ra
both the what-is-it and the if-it-is question concerning the genus
physics. We need not dwell here on the details of his definition of
ture as an internal principle and cause of motion and rest. The imp
tant point for us is that by 193 a 1-2 Ar. takes nature to have bee
already defined in such a way that the definition has the status not
say, a conclusion from F.Ph. but of a non-discussed starting point:
"that nature is a principle of motion is a hypothesis"24. This of cou
comes very close to 1025 b 11-12. Moreover, the definition is l
down not as something provisional but rather as a statement that
been shown to be correct by reference to the difference between
objects that in ordinary Greek are called natural and those that are
not25.
That no proof is possible as regards the genus of this P. D. is still
more evident in the case of the if-it-is question. Ar. says explicitly
that "it would be ridiculous to try to prove that nature is because it is
obvious that many things are of this sort"26, i.e., having in themselves
a principle of motion and rest. As can be seen, it is by means of an
appeal to singular instances of objects that satisfy the predicate "has
an internal principle of motion", i.e., ultimately to sentences having
the form "this is an F", that the if-it-is question is considered settled.

22 Cf. Aristotle's Physics, Books I and II, trans, with intr. and notes by W. Charlton, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970, p.x. An interesting attempt to reconstruct a part of the Physics as
a demonstrative science can be found in J. Jope, "Subordinate demonstrative science in
the sixth book of Aristotle's Physics" Classical Quarterly 22 (1972) 279-292.
23 Phys. I, 8,192 b 4. Cf. De An. II, 1, 412 a 2;Metaph. Z, 17, 1041 a 7.
24 Phys. VIII, 3, 253 b 6. It should be noted that here "hypothesis" has a wider use than the
one it had in An. Post. I, 2 where it is explicitly held that definitions are not hypotheses.
25 Cf. especially 192 b 11-12.
26 Phys. II, 1, 193 a 3?4. With Charlton and against the Oxford translation I take t?v ?vt&v
with iToW? and render roiaura as the predicate. Cf. Phys. VIII, 3, 259 a 26-27.

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192 ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO

In such a way we come close to the type of ostention to sen

hinted at in 1025 b 11.
But, we may ask, what if someone defies this perceptual eviden
Eleatics did, and denies motion altogether? Ar.'s reply is that "jus
ments about mathematics objections that involve first principles do no
mathematician - and the other sciences are in a similar case - so, too
involving the point that we have just raised (sc. that all things are at
affect the physicist"27. If motion is denied, the physicist should not
produce a rejoinder28. Such a rejoinder would by no means be devo
sophical interest (185 a 20) but it does not fall within the province o
the strict sense. In fact Ar. has to excuse himself for discussing in his
problems raised by the Eleatics (185 a 17-20). The physicist qua phy
not have to wait and see the outcome of a discussion that ultimat
showing that the denial of one of his starting points is false. He is ce
truth of hi; hypothesis on other grounds: 77/lW 6VT(oKetrlaO7 Ta Opv'ue
Mvua KwOtteva dvaLu 6rXOP 8'EK f, erayyciq, "for ourselves, we m
a basic assumption, clear from a survey of particular cases, that natura
some or all of them subject to change" (185 a 12-13, Charlton trans.
Summing up: in Phys. II, 1 Ar. presents physics in such a
the what-is-it and the if-it-is of its genus are not argued fo
Both are undiscussed assumptions of the P. D.
(iii) The attitude of F. Ph. towards the definition and the
sis of instantiation of its genus is particularly difficult to gr
in this case two genera seem to be assigned to one and th
ence. The subject matter of F.Ph. is on the one hand be
studied as being) (1003 a 21) and on the other separate an
ble endities (1025 b 9, 1026 a 16). I think it is wise to study
conceptions separately without entering into the problem o
theological constitution of metaphysics.
(iiia) Ar. presents his F.Ph. as a science that lays down a g
fines it and then goes on to contemplate its necessary attrib
1003 a 21-22; E, 1, 1026 a 31-32)29. But this simple sche
runs into difficulties because "being" is an ambiguous
1003 a 33). Its meanings have to be sorted out (A, 7) bef
proach to the what-is-it question can be made. Once "be
sense implied in predications within each categorial genu
adopted as the relevant sense and oQata, "substance", has be
to be primary (Z, 1), the question what-is-it can be stated a
but it now takes the form "What is i1 obata" (Z, 1, 1028 b 4
Strictly seaking, of course, being is not a genus (B, 3, 998
and oba(a in so far as it is one of the summa genera cannot
per genus et differentiam, as Aristotelian orthodoxy would

27 Phys. VIII, 3, 253 b 2-5, Oxford translation.

28 Cf. Phys. I, 2,185 al ff.
29 This formulation reminds us of the Aristotelian description of the ingredien
demonstrative science. Cf. An. Post. I, 7, 75 a 42 ff.

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 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY 193

but what really matters for the purposes of this paper is that when
what-is-it question is in fact stated in analogy to the particular dis
plines its answer is not a statement that is adopted of and. A discu
sion of the opinions of other thinkers ensues and there is a long c
sideration of various possible answers (Metaph. Z and H). It can by
means be said that the what-is-it has been made manifest to sensat
or has been assumed as a hypothesis.
On the other hand to the if-it-is question concerning the genus o
F. Ph. as general metaphysics there seems to be no direct reference
the pertinent passages of Ar.'s Metaphysics. But it is not unreasonab
to conjecture that Ar. would have probably considered a statem
such as "this is something that is" as highly tautological and therefo
useless (cf. Z, 17, 1041 a 16-20 and also An.Post. I, 10, 76 b 16-18
The contrast between F.Ph. and the P.Ds. as regards their approac
to the problem of the instantiation of the genus is in fact relevant n
for F.Ph. as general metaphysics but for F.Ph. as theology. This I sh
presently try to show.
(iiib) The genus of F. Ph. qua the highest of the theoretical scien
is designated as "things which are separated and immovable" (10
a 16) or, as Ar. also puts it, "immovable substance" (1026 a 29), "
divine" (1026 a 20). It is obvious that for such a genus there is
simple answer of the form "this is an F" to show that there are Fs
The existence of Fs or of an F is by no means manifest. This is wh
Ar. considers explicitly in E, 1 the consequences first of there
being and then of there being an immovable substance. If there is
immovable substance then physics is the first philosophy; if there i
then there is a F.Ph. prior to it. But this clearly implies that it wo
be a petitio principii for F. Ph. simply to assume the if-it-is of its ge
taken in this sense. The existence of an eternal immovable substance
something that has to be argued for, i.e. it cannot function as a st
ing point but as a point of arrival. In fact, this is what we find in b
Lambda where the existence of the prime mover is presented as a r
sult of argumentation: ". . . therefore the first heaven must be etern
There is therefore also something which moves it"30.
Once the if-it-is of the divine has been established Ar. can attem
to state its what-is-it, but, again, as a consequence (of consideratio
on the nature of life, intellect and actuality) and not as an undiscuss
assumption: "we say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, m
good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to Go

30 Metaph. A, 7, 1072 a 23?24, Oxford translation. Scholars agree in seeing here a summ
of physics but this is irrelevant for the purposes of the present paper. What is establis
by the argument is in fact something that does not fall within the province of physics b
of F.Ph. (Phys. II, 2, 194 b 14?15) and Ar. admits that there is a certain degree of ove
lapping between his physics and metaphysics (VIII, 1, 251 a 5?8).

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194 ALFONSO GOMEZ-LOBO

for this is God"31. Ar. has in fact followed strictly a programm

assertion he makes elsewhere: "Our inquiry is whether there is
not besides the sensible substances any which is immovable and
nal, and, if there is, what it is"32.
It is interesting to observe that Ar. is here following the order of quest
which corresponds to the procedure within a science (Cf. An Post. II, 1-2
the if-it-is, then the what-is-it. This same order is followed, e.g., in the Physi
place, the void and time. But these are not the genus of physics, in the
which, as- we saw, the sequence of questions was that which is normally ex
at the beginning of a scientific exposition: first definition, then instantiatio
provides a further argument to the enemies of Natorp and Jaeger because it
to point to the fact that for Ar. theology is an achievement within ontolo
not an independent discipline juxtaposed to and in conflict with it.
I think this should suffice as a proof of the soundness of my i
pretation of Metaph. E, 1, 1025 b 10-18. It is only the com
axioms and certain other general notions that can be said to be
down by F.Ph. to the P.Ds. As regards their peculiar principles t
are autonomous. F. Ph. on the other hand cannot behave like the
in the sense of conforming itself however loosely to the mathem
model for a deductive science which implies positing undiscussed
nitions and hypotheses. The objects o F. Ph. are not truths d
from principles but first principles themselves.

31 Metaph. A, 7,1072 a 23-24 Oxford translation.

32 Metaph. M, 1,1076 a 10-12 Oxford translation.

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