Calcidius

CALCIDIUS ON FATE
CALCIDIUS ON FATE
HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES
PROEFSCHRIFT
TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE
GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN
AAN DE RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT TE LEIDEN,
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS DR. J. GOSLIN GS,
HOOGLERAAR IN DE FACULTEIT DER GENEESKUNDE,
TENOVERSTAANVAN EENCOMMISSIE UIT DE SENAAT
TE VERDEDIGEN OP DONDERDAG 25 JUNI 1970
TE KLOKKE 16.15 UUR
DOOR
JAN DEN BOEFT

Geboren te Rotterdam in 1935
LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1970
Promotor
Prof. Dr. J. H. WASZINK

Aan mijn ouders
A an mijn vrouw
CONTENTS
Introductory Notes 1
Introduction . . . 7
A. The fund.aments of the Platonic doctrine of fate 8

1. Fate and Providence . . . . 8
2. Fate taken as act . . . . . 20
3. Other notions related to fate 37
B. Refutation of Stoic arguments . 47

1. Four Stoic objections . . . 47
2. Calcidius' answers . . . . . 52
3. A fresh Stoic objection: peruersio 58
4. Calcidius' reaction to the contents of eh. 165-167 65
5. Calcidius' answer to the Stoic argument about divina-
tion . . . . . . 67
6. The problem of evil 72
7. Conclusion . . . . 82
C. Renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate. 85

1. Fate as part of the metaphysical hierarchy . . . 85
2. Fate rules all things in a different way . . . . . 98
3. Freedom has its seat in the )..oyLaTLx6vof the soul 106
4. Summary. 118
Epilogue. 125
Conclusion 127
Indices . . 138
Samenvatting . 147
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
unde est haec, inquam, fatis auulsa uoluntas?

(Lucretius, De rerum natura II 257)
The problem of fate and fatality has greatly occupied the minds
of the Ancients, philosophically as well as in other ways. Already
in Homer we find this problem, centered in the µ.o'i:pot,
about whose
puzzling and inescapable power Hector says:
µ.o'i:potv
8'ou 't'LVIX
cpYjµ.L
m:cpuyµ.evoviµ.µ.e:votL
ocv8pwv,
OUXotx6v,ou8e:µ.e:via6Mv, E7t~V't'OC
1tpW't'ot
YEV'Yj't'otL.
(Z 488/9)
In this sphere the µ.o'i:pot has a special relation to the span of life
allotted to man. Pre-Socratic philosophy, too, paid attention to
fate. In Heraclitus' doctrine of the cosmic process fatality certainly
plays an important part: 1tocv-rot 8e:ylve:a8ottxoc8'e:lµ.otpµ.ev'Y)v
was what
he taught, according to Diogenes Laertius IX 7 (= Diels-Kranz
fr. A 1, pag. 141,10). The ix1tupwmc;,too, is regulated by fate:
7tOLe:'i:
8e:xott 't'IX~LV
't'LVot
xott xp6vovwptaµ.evov-rijc;'t'OUx6aµ.ouµ.e:-rot~OA~c;
xot-roc-rtvote:tµ.ocpµ.ev'Y)v
ocvocyx'Y)v
(fr. A 5, pag. 145, 15-16). In the
combination e:tµ.ocpµ.ev'YJ ocvocyx'Y)
we meet a second important term
in this field. According to Empedocles (fr. B n5) the exile of the
soul is due to 'Avocyx'Y) and Parmenides says about the immutability
of Being:
xpot-re:p~
yocp'Avocyx'YJ
1te:Lp0t-roc;
EV8e:aµ.ofotvixe:L,-r6 µ.tv ocµ.cptc;Eepye:t(fr. B 8, 30-31).
All these doctrines are first and foremost concerned with the
physical world as a whole and with the cosmic order. When by the
Sophists and Socrates man was placed in the centre of philosophy,
the related question of human freedom, which, although hitherto
not neglected, had not been treated thoroughly, came into promi-
nence. Plato, however, did not give an explicit elucidation of the
question. He uses the word e:tµ.0tpµ.ev1j only sparingly and at times,
so it seems, not wholeheartedly, cf. e.g. iµ.e:8e:vuv ~8'YJ xotAe:'i:,
cpotll)
(Phaed. II5 a 5) and 7tLG't'E:UGotV't'ot
&v ocv~p't'potytx6c;,~ e:lµ.otpµ.ev'Yj
't'ot'i:c; ou8' &ve:tc;hcpuyot. (Gorgias512 e 3-4).
yuvott~tvlht ~v e:tµ.otpµ.eV'YjV
A full-scale treatment of the relation of human freedom and fate
can be found in the great myth of Er at the end of the Politeia
2 INTRODUCTORY NOTES
(614 b sqq.), where human responsibility is emphasized in the

famous words othlote1.oµev01)• (617 e 4).
8e:oc;a.vot(·noc;
Aristotle uses the word e:tµotpµtVl) very rarely. But it is important
that he is a champion of human freedom and responsibility; a very
clear testimony of his standpoint can be found in Ethica Nicomachea
r 5, e.g. ecp'~µi:v8eXotl~ a.pe:'M),oµo(<uc;8eXotl~ XotX(ot.EVo!c;yixp ecp'
~µi:v't'O1tpixne:LV, xotlev o!c;'t'Oµ~. xotl't'OVotl(III3 b
xotl't'Oµ~ 1tp!X't"t'E:LV,
6-8). Man is responsible for his moral state; even ignorance is no
excuse, if this ignorance results from carelessness. This state of
affairs has its consequences for punishment, blame, reward, law-
giving etc. (cf. I. During, Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1966, pag. 461).
An exhaustive treatment of the problem of fate was, however,
not given by Aristotle; for this the Peripatos had to wait for the
great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. He wrote a fine
polemical monograph Ile:pl e:tµotpµtvl)c;. Alexander's own view can
be found in eh. 1-6. His conclusion is as follows: e:lvotL -rotu-rovdµotp-
µtvl)v -re:Xotlcpuow.'t'O-re:yixp e:tµotpµevov Xot't'IXcpucnvxotl 't'OXot't'IX
cpuow
e:tµotpµevov(pag. 169. 19-20 Bruns). For the rest Alexander fully
agrees with Aristotle's views on human freedom. We shall have
many occasions to return to Alexander's monograph in the course
of this book.
The Stoa is the first philosophical system of antiquity which
has given an elaborate doctrine of fate. Indeed the Stoics, with a
variation on Quintilian's statement about Roman satire, might
have said doctrina de Jato tota nostraThe est.Stoa tried to free this
doctrine from any notion of fate as a blind and irrational force.
They more or less identified dµotpµtvl) and 1tp6v0Lot, both of which
were considered to be aspects of the Logos. "Als die vernunftgemass
gestaltende und erhaltende Kraft ist die Pronoia mit dem Logos
und mit der Physis identisch. Sie ist die Gottheit, von einer bestimm-
ten Seite her gesehen. Unter anderem Gesichtspunkt erscheint
diese als Heimarmene." (Pohlenz, Die Stoapag. IOI}. The dµotpµtvl)
directs all things, even the smallest details. The truth of this is
proved by divination and astrology. When we also bear in mind
the Stoic doctrine of a periodical repetition of history, the a.1toxot-
which extends to all details in the life of each individual,
-rixcr-rotcrLc;,
we can understand that the Stoa got into great difficulties concern-
ing human freedom, both theoretically and logically and with
respect to the ethical consequences. The latter were especially
put in the forefront by the Sceptic philosopher Carneades, who was
INTRODUCTORY NOTES 3
a fierce adversary of the Stoa. Certainly Chrysippus, the second

founder of the school, who wrote a treatise fle:pl.e:tµ.ocpµ.ev11c;,had
done his utmost to save human freedom, but his arguments failed
to impress his opponents. For a long time, however, the Stoa kept
the initiative in this field, because the other schools did not so
much develop their own doctrine as confine themselves to attacks
on the Stoa. This state of affairs was of course somewhat unsatis-
factory and in Middle-Platonism a Platonic theory of fate was
developed, based on wholly different metaphysical presuppositions,
which could challenge the Stoa much more fundamentally. This is
the doctrine of fate as a law, working l~ u1to8foe:(J)c;, regulating
consequences of free-chosen actions. At the moment we shall
refrain from a full-scale description of this doctrine, because that
would go beyond the bounds of this introduction. Besides, we shall
have to pay considerable attention to these views in the course of
our investigation, as Calcidius in his tractatus de Jato sticks fully
to the relevant traditions of Platonism.
In view of the fact that the Stoa had made fate one of the main
subjects of philosophical speculation and that new life was breathed
into the discussion by Middle-Platonism, it is not surprising to find
such a large place in Calcidius' commentary allotted to the treat-
ment of this subject. The mere expression v6µ.ouc;-.e:-.ouc;e:tµ.ocpµ.~vouc;
(Tim. 41 e 2) was sufficient to start a profound examination of
the doctrine of fate.
One thing should be emphasized. Although Calcidius' tractatus
is many-sided and views the problem from more than one angle,
his main concern is with human freedom.
The following investigation is based on Waszink's edition of

Calcidius' Commentarius in the series Corpus Platonicum Medii
Aevi of the Warburg Institute (London-Leiden 1962). This edition
provides a fine starting-point for further research by the many
notes and parallel texts printed at the foot of each page. Even if
I sometimes disagree with the contents of the notes, I must express
the greatest respect for this very valuable collection of materials.
Apart from the cases where this was indispensable I have not
repeated the fully quoted parallel texts which were already inserted
in the exegetical apparatus of the edition. For this reason I kindly
ask the reader to consult that apparatus.
The tractatus has three main parts:

A. The fundaments of the Platonic doctrine of fate (eh. 143-159),
B. Refutation of some Stoic arguments (eh. 160-175),
C. Renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate (eh. 176-190).
A further division results in the following outline of the whole

treatise:
chapter
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A. The fundaments of the Platonic doctrine of fate
I. Fate and Providence
a. The main principle: Providence ranks above
fate ................. .
b. The two aspects of fate . . . . . . . . .
c. The relation between Providence and fate
according to the Stoics and Plato . . . . .
d. The sacred text of the Timaeus shows that
Providence is prior to fate . .
2. Fate taken as act
a. Fate is not chaotic, but limited 148 -149a
b. Fate is a law . . . . . . . . 149b-15oa
c. This law has a hypothetical character 150b
d. Choice is in our power, fate causes the conse-
quences ............... .
e. Phaedrus 248 c 3-5 proves the correctness of
this principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. The cases of Laios, Achilles and Adam also
prove man's free choice . . . . 153 -154
3. Other notions related to fate
a. The possible and its two species . . . . . 155
b. The contingent and its relation to free will 156
c. Divination . . . . 157
d. Fortune and chance . . 158 -159
B. Refutation of Stoic arguments

I. Four Stoic objections . . . 160 -161
INTRODUCTORY NOTES 5
2. Calcidius' answers
a. God's prescience does not jeopardize man's
freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 -163
b. An appendix: The correct use of praise and
blame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3. A fresh Stoic objection: peruersio
a. Introduction . . . . . . . .
b. Peruersio ex rebus
IX. In the case of newborn babies 165b
~. In the case of adults . . . . 166
c. Peruersio ex diuulgatione . . . . 167
4. Calcidius' reaction to the contents of eh. 165-167 168
5. Calcidius' answer to the Stoic argument about
divination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 -171
6. The problem of evil
a. Fate is not responsible for evil . . . . . . 172 -173
b. The stars are not responsible for evil 174
c. Refutation of some other pretended causes of
evil .. 175a
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175b
C. Renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate
I. Fate as part of the metaphysical hierarchy 176 -177a
2. Fate rules all things in a different way
a. Frequent events . . . . . . 177b
b. Digression . . . . . . . . . . . 178
c. Rare events and human choice . . 179 -18oa
3. Freedom has its seat in the 1.oyur·nx.6vof the soul
a. Short statement of the axiom . . 180b
b. Relation between body and soul . . . . . 181 -182
c. Disagreement within the soul
IX. Dispute of the lower parts with the 1.oyL<ITL-
,
KOV •••.. , , ••. , , , • , , • 183
~- Dispute of the l1tL8uµ1J·nx6v and the 8uµo-
e:L8e:t;• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
y. These disputes prove our freedom
d. Divination and astrology never concern the
AOYL<ITLx6v 185 -186
e. Appendix 187
4. Summary
a. Fate's relation to the metaphysical hierarchy r88
b. Fate rewards human choice r89a
c. Fate and Providence r89b
Epilogue ......... . I90
A paraphrase kept as close as possible-not a literal translation-

of the Latin text precedes the notes to each paragraph.
INTRODUCTION
[142] "He taught the laws of unalterable destiny". Here he

now commences an important and difficult subject, about which
the ancient thinkers started a debate, which is still being con-
tinued. A perfunctory treatment of this question in accordance
with Platonic doctrine is therefore appropriate; for it would
take too long to describe the doctrine of the other philosophers.
Many of those think that nothing happens by fate, some hold
the opposite view, not attaching any influence to free will,
others take it that some things happen by fate, other things
by free will.
In this introductory chapter Calcidius clearly states his subject.

Starting from his translation of Timaeus 41 e 2-3 (v6µou; Te Tou;
etµocpµevou;efoev) he will deal with destiny and its relation to free
will. It is remarkable that nothing is said here about any of the
other entities related to fate, among which providence takes such
a prominent place, especially in the very first chapters. Of course
this omission may be of no importance, but it should be noted
that also in the closing chapter (190) it is only fate and free will
or human power which are mentioned. The last words of that
chapter are: Sola igituruera illa ratio est Jixaque et stabilis sententia,
quae docet quaedam Jato Jieri, porro alia ex hominum arbitrio et
uoluntate proJicisci(214.14-16). They form an obvious counterpart
to the opinion of the quidam in eh. 142 : alia esse quae Jato nihiloque
minus alia esse quae uoluntate Jiant (181.18-19). Strictly speaking
this opinion ought not to have been included in ceterorum, quorum
(181.16), for this point of view, which the author will prove to be
the correct one, is Platonic.
A. THE FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC
DOCTRINE OF FATE
1. FATE AND PROVIDENCE
a) The main principle: Providence ranks above fate
[143a] Now according to Plato providence precedes, destiny

follows. For he says that "God after establishing the world
divided the souls equal in number with the stars and provided
each soul with a separate star and showed them the nature of
the universe and revealed the complete chain of destiny. "For
the first part of this text indicates providence, the second the
laws of destiny and therefore according to Plato providence
was born first; therefore we say fate is in accordance with
providence, but not providence in accordance with fate.
DEVM POST O'UO"'t'~O"IX<; 8e 't'O 1tocv8Le:The:v ljJuxcxi;to-ixp(eµou<;'C'OL<;
lve:Lµev8' EXCXO"TIJV
otO"'t'flOL<;, 1tpo<;~XIXO"'t'OV,
xixt eµ~L~CXO"IX<; W<;E<;lSxYJµIX
't"Y)V
'C'OU7tlXV't'O<;
cpuo-LV
g8e:L~e:v,
v6µou<;'C'E'C'OU<;
e:tµixpµevou<; (41
e:fae:vIXU'C'IXL<;
d 8-e 2). Two things attract attention here. (1) The words v6µou<;
'C'OU<;
e:tµixpµevou<; are rendered by uniuersam Jatorum
e:!1te:v&.u-rixi:i;
seriem reuelasse.This differs from the expression used in the trans-
lation proper and its quotation a&the starting-point of the treatise
(legesque immutabilis decreti docuit, 36. 21; 181.13). The use of
the term series is striking. It is the Latin rendering of e:tpµ6i;,which
word the Stoics connected etymologically with e:tµixpµtvYJ, expla:ned
by them as a "chain of causes". 1 It should be remembered that
the Stoics were the first to elaborate a doctrine about fate and thus
put their stamp on any discussion of this subject. All other systems
are more or less a critical answer to their doctrine. (2) More interesting
is a mistake made by the author: O'Uo-~o-ix<; -ro 1tocvis wrongly
translated by post mundi constitutionem, a somewhat simpler version
of coagmentata mox uniuersae rei machina (36.18) in the translation
proper. To 1tocvdoes not signify mundus or uniuersae rei machina
at all. It is just "the whole" of the ingredients poured into the
mixing-bowl by the Demiurge for the making of souls. This mistake
is quite important, for it is part of an argument, repeated in eh. 147
1 Cf. SVF II 914, 915, 917, 918, 921 and Pohlenz, Die Stoap. 102.
[143b] FATE AND PROVIDENCE 9
(Mundi quippe machinam absoluere etc., 184.19). Establishing

the universe, joining together its machinery is the work of provi-
dence. The laws of destiny do not come until after this. The meaning
of the passage itself, which has been discussed very briefly in eh. 141,
does not concern the author here. It is merely used as a proof
of the precedence of providence, a point on which the author
lays much stress.
b) The two aspects of fate

[143b] Now fate according to Plato has two meanings and
names, one, when we contemplate its essence, the other, when
we recognize its being and the kind of power it has from its
acts. This same fate in the Phaedrus (248 c 2) he calls "an
inevitable decree", in the Timaeus (41 e 1) "the laws God
taught the heavenly souls about the nature of the universe",
in the Republic (617 d 6) "the speech of Lachesis", not taken
in a dramatic, but in a theological sense. [144a] Now we can
explain "inevitable decree" as a law unchangeable because of
its inevitable cause, "the laws about the universe" as the law
accompanying the nature of the world and by which all things
in the world are ruled, "the speech of Lachesis, daughter of
Necessity" as divine law, by which the future is connected
with the past and present. Fate taken as an essence, on the
other hand, is the World-Soul, divided into three parts, an
unerring sphere, a sphere considered to be erratic and a sublunar
one. The highest of these is called Atropos, the middle Clotho,
the lowest Lachesis: Atropos, because the unerring allows of no
deflection; Clotho on account of the variously intricate and
tortuous whirling, by which comes to pass that which is intro-
duced by the devious motion of the Different; Lachesis, because
to her was allotted the task to take up the workings of her
sisters.
This paragraph bears a close resemblance to the first chapter of

1 wrongly ascribed to Plutarch. 2
the small work Ile:pt e:lµ.otpµ.evl)c;,
Indeed for a great part both texts run exactly parallel to one
1 The most recent edition is: Ps. Plutarco, De Fato, Introduzione testo
commento traduzionedi E. Valgiglio, Roma 1966.
1 For the arguments, which are largely of a linguistic and stylistic char-
acter, cf. Valgiglio p. XXXI sqq.
IO FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE [143b]
another, the literal correspondences outnumbering the differences,

as the quotations in Waszink's edition clearly show. Although
nothing is known concerning the author of Ilept elµcxpµtvY)c;, there
are sufficient clues for a useful hypothesis as regards the time and
the philosophical school, to which the treatise could be attributed.
Gercke 1 thought it might be the work of a young pupil belonging
to the school of Gaius. Schmertosch in his short article 2 about the
work, having reviewed the philosophical systems which supply
the materials for the treatise, concludes opusculi auctorem philo-
sophorum praecepta undique furatum esse, without putting forward
any suggestions about the author or the date of composition.
Valgiglio finds the tone of the work more self-assured. He detects
a certain "indipendenza di pensiero" and rates the originality of the
author higher than Gercke. For the rest he thinks the writer
belongs to Middle-Platonism, putting the date sometime in the
second half of the second century A.D. In his commentary he
goes even further, identifying Ilelawv, the adressee (568 c), with
L. Calpurnius Piso, consul in 175.
In addition to Ilept etµcxpµevY)c; there is another text providing
a clear parallel to this paragraph, namely eh. 38 of Ilept cpuaewc;
&.v8pw1tou, 3 a work of Nemesius of Emesa, who probably was a
Christian bishop living in the 5th century. The first lines of the
chapter mentioned run as follows: IIM:rwv 8& 8Lx.wc;i..eyeL't'YJV et-
µcxpµtvY)V • 't'YjV
µev, KCX't.'OUO'(cxv,
't'YJV
8e, KCX't.' evepyeLCXV.
XCX't'
1
OUO'(otv
µev,
't'YJV't'OU7t(XV't'Oc;
1Jiux.1iv
· xcx-r' evepyeLCXV 8e, 8ei:ov v6µov &.1tcxpcx~CX't'OV
8L' cxMcxv &.vcx1t68pcxO"t'ov. 8&-roti-rov8eaµov &.8pcxa-re£cxc;.
xcxi..ei: Obviously
this is a shorter version of the same doctrine as is found in the
texts of Calcidius and pseudo-Plutarch.
IDEM FATVM Calcidius first speaks about fate in actu, as he
should have stated explicitly, in the way he does further on, when
starting to speak about fate in substantia. SCITVM INEVITABILE
This is Calcidius' translation of 8eaµoc; 'A8pcxa-re£cxc; found both in
pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius. Somehow he took 'A8pcxO"t'e£cxc;
as an adjective meaning "inevitable". This can be explained by
taking into account the expression ex ineuitabili causa (182.12).
1 A. Gercke, Eine Platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus (Rh. Mus. 41
(1886) p. 277).
1 R. Schmertosch, De Plutarchi qui fertur 1tepl elµcxpµtv1)~libello ('epi-
metrum' of his dissertation De Plutarchi sententiarum quae addivinationem
spectant origine, Leipzig 1889).
3 Ed. C. F. Matthaei, Halle 1802 (repr. Hildesheim 1967).
FATE AND PROVIDENCE II
The parallel words in pseudo-Plutarch are llL' cxt-.(cxv iiveµ1t63La-rov,

but in Nemesius we read llL' cxMcxviivcx1t68pcxa-rov. Evidently ineui-
tabilis is a better translation of iivcx1t61lpcxO"t'oc;than of iiveµ1t68LO"t'oc;,
which word means "unhindered". It is interesting that in the last
sentence of the text just quoted Nemesius seems to have connected
iivot1t68potO"t'oc;
with 'AllpotO"t'&Lot,
which of course is quite a possible
connection. Somehow Calcidius has done this too, even over-
doing it by rendering both iivot1t68pota-roc; and 'Allpcxan(cxc;by
ineuitabilis. POSSVMVS With admirable and clear brevity the
three texts quoted are explained as indicating the inevitability
of destiny (Phaedrus) in all places (mundana omnia)and all time
(praeteritis etc.). In Ilept etµcxpµevl)c; 568 d this is much less plain,
which may also well result from a textual lacuna, as Drexler has
indicated. 1 The fact that in all three cases the quotation is inter-
preted as a law, is very notable. The full significance of this em-
phasis will become clearer in eh. 150 sqq. NON TRAGICE About
the parallel words ou -rpotyLx&c; iiJJ..a:8eo1,.oyLxwc;
in pseudo-Plutarch
Valgiglio notes: "L'autore mette in rilievo che l'espressione solenne
'Av&.yxl)c;
... Myov non vale per il suo aspetto stilistico-formale,
che le conferisce una tinta solenne da tragedia, ma per il suo
contenuto filosofico-teologico, cioe Platone non ha voluto scrivere
una bella frase, ma esprimere il suo pensiero con una nozione teo-
logica". AT VERO Further on the equating of fate and the
World-Soul will take a prominent part in Calcidius' description
of the hierarchical order of divine beings. ATROPON • • . CLOTHO •••
LACHESIN Plato mentions the three Moirai in the famous Er-myth.
In Resp. 617 c he allots different tasks to them: uµve!v 1tpoc;'")V
't'6>V
l:eLp~vc.>v&.pµovCotv,
A&.x.eaLV µev 't'(Xyeyov6-rot,KA.c.>8w lle 't'OC
6v-rcx,
In 620 d-e he again mentions them, this
"A-rpo1tovlle -rocµeJJ..ov-rcx.
time hinting at an etymological explanation of their names. At
least this seems to be the case with Atropos: iiµe-ra.O"t'pocpcx -roc
lmx1,.c.>a8mcx In Leg. 960 c iiµe-ra.O"t'pocpoc;
1t0Louv-rcx. is used once more
in connection with Atropos' name. Xenocrates (fr. 5 H.) links the
Moirai with the three kinds of knowledge distinguished by him:
l58ev xcxt -rpe!c;Molpotc;1tcxpot8e86a8cxL, "A-rpo1tovµev '")V -r&v vo1J-r&v,
iiµe-r&.8e-rovooacxv,KAc.>86> lle '")V 't'6>Vcxl0"81J't'6>V,
A&.x.eaLV lle '")V 't'6>V
1 De Lacy and Einarson in their Loeb-edition (Plutarch's Moralia vol. VII

p. 303-359) have suggested the following addition based on Calcidius:
~t; 3' iv IIo>.LTe:£q;,
v6µoi; 8e:!ot;xct8' &vauµx).£xe:TctL
Toit; ye:yov6c:nxctl.Toit; yLVo-
µevoLt;'t'ti ye:v7Ja6µe:vct,
12 FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE [144a]
8o~oco-Twv. Here again only Atropos' name is explained etymolo-

gically. Moreover we notice that the sisters are put in a hierarchical
order, the VOlJ't'OC being allotted to Atropos. For a full-scale etymo-
logical elucidation we have to turn to the Stoics, great lovers of
that pastime. In SVF II 913 and 914 we find some ideas elaborated
by Chrysippus. The explanations are rather as expected, but it
is noteworthy that the Moirai are not put in a hierarchical order.
In three works of Plutarch we find the Moirai connected with
different parts of the universe: De gen. Socr. 591 b, De Jae.945 c and
Quaest. conv.745 b. Though the substance of these texts is by no
means identical, the order always puts Atropos highest and Lachesis
lowest. The closest parallel isQuaest. conv.745 b, quoted by Schmer-
tosch: 1 Toti x6aµou 't'PLXTI 7t0CV't'(X
ve:ve:µl)µ.evou,
1tpW't'l)V µev e:!vocL 't'YjV
't'WVCX.7tAOCVWV µe:p£8oc, 8e:u't'epocv
8e 't'YjV't'WV7tAOCVWµevwv, EO':J(OC't'l)V
8e
't'YjV't'WVU7t0 O'EA~VlJV ... btOCO''t'l)t;
(()UA(X)((X
Mouaocve:!vocL, -rijc; µev
7tpW't'l)t;
'Y1tOC't'l)V,
-rijc;8' EO':J(OC't'l)t;
Ne:OC't'l)V,
MeO'l)V 8e 't'YjV (l,E't'(X~\)
auve-
:J(OUO'OCV&µocxoct O'UVE7tLO''t'pE(()OUO'OCV,we;CX.VUO''t'6v
EO''t'L,'t'IX8Vl)'t'IX't'O!t;
8e:£ott;xoct 't'IX1te:p(ye:toc
't'OLt;oupocv(oLt;.'Qi; xoct IlAOC't'WV 71v£~ot't'O
't'OLt;
't'WVMotpwvov6µ.ocow 't'YjV
µev"A't'p07tOV, 8e KAw6w>,'t'YjV
<'t'YjV 8e A&.ze:atv
1tpoaocyope:uaocc;. Here we encounter the hierarchical order and also
hints at an etymological explanation. In comparing pseudo-Plut-
arch with Calcidius we find two notable differences: (1) Calcidius
has the Moirai in the "right" order, like Xenocrates and Plutarch,
whereas in Ile:pte:lµocpµevl)t; Clotho is wrongly put highest. 2 Of course
Atropos ought to have been connected with the cx.1tAocv~c; µo!pocas
Calcidius says disertis uerbis: quod aplanes in nulla sit deflexione
(183.3). (2) pseudo-Plutarch only explains Lachesis' name, Cal-
cidius explains all three, the most interesting being the elaborate
elucidation of Clotho, where the words ea quae diuersae naturae
deuius motus importat(183.4-5) are quite striking. There is not the
slightest trace of these words in pseudo-Plutarch. They can only
be used by someone who is well informed about the Timaeus and
who also has that dialogue in mind. Perhaps Calcidius after all
realizes quite well he is commenting upon the Timaeus, a fact he
1 o.c. p. 32.
1 Valgiglio, however, quotes Proclus, in Plat. Remp.II 94.20 (Kroll):
~ µev K:>..00600 "L"l)V
cbt:>..cr.v'ij
:>..cr.xouacr.
acpcr.!pcr.v,
~ 3e "A-rpOTCO\; T7)VTCActVWµEVljV, ~
3e Acxxe:CJL\; "L"OV6:>..ovoupcr.v6v.On the other hand Maximus Tyrius has the
same order as Calcidius: -roLou-ro xp'ijµcr.~ e:lµcr.pµev7j,
~ "A-rpoTCoi;,
xcr.l~ K:>..006«:>,
xcr.l ~ Acxxe:CJL\;,&-rpe:1t-rov,xcr.l tTCLl(e:l(A(J)CJµevov,
xcr.l 3Le:LA7j)l'.O\;
"L"OU\;a.v6pw1tlvoui;
~loui; (Philos. V 5).
FATE AND PROVIDENCE 13
seemed to have forgotten, when he wrote in Timaeo(182.8) instead

of in hoe ipso Timaeo, as he correctly says in eh. 73 (121.6). LACHE-
SIN VERO These words are rather strange; pseudo-Plutarch
writes: Acx.xeaLc;,8exoµ&VYJ µe:v "C'(Xc;
oUp(XVL(Xc;
"C'WV cx.8eAcpwv
evepyd(Xc;.
Calcidius' suscipiat must stand for 8exoµev1J,which is not incorrect.
Yet at first it seems as if he is going to explain the name Lachesis
by using the verb sortiri, which is much closer to the Greek A(XY):CX.VeLv.
Somehow Calcidius seems to have been confused by his source.
At this point the parallel with Ilept etµ(XpµevYJc; is broken off, only
to be resumed in eh. 148, where Calcidius deals with fate in actu.
c) Relation between Providence and fate according to the Stoics

and Plato
[144b] Now some think it a mistake to assume a difference
between providence and fate, as in reality they are one. In fact
providence is God's will and His will is a train of causes and
because His will is providence, it is called by that name, and
because it is a train of causes, it is called fate. Hence what is
according to fate is also in conformity with providence and in
the same way what is according to providence is also in conform-
ity with fate. This is the opinion of Chrysippus. Others however
are of the opinion that what is in accordance with the authority
of providence also takes place in conformity with fate, but that
the reverse is not true. Cleanthes is one of these.
[145] But Plato adheres to the principle, that neither are all
things according to providence nor< according to fate>, for the
nature of regulated things is not uniform; thus some things result
from providence alone, some from destiny, some from our free will,
some also from the vicissitudes of fortune, while a great many things
happen by chance. Now divine and intelligible things and those
near to them are ruled by providence alone, the natural and
corporeal things are according to fate; things belonging to our
free will and right happen at our initiative; things outside the
scope of our influence, happening without reason and unex-
pectedly, are said to take place fortuitously, when having their
starting-point in our arrangement of matters, casually, when
this is not the case.
Before we deal with this paragraph it may be useful to recapit-

ulate what the author has said up to this point. In eh. 142 he gave
14 FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE [144b]
a brief and incomplete introduction, speaking only about fate

in relation to free will. After that he started his treatise by imme-
diately setting fate against providence and stating the basic rule:
"providence before fate". This same rule is to be found in pseudo-
Plutarch and Nemesius (cf. Waszink's note ad 182.4-5), but
Calcidius stresses this point much more, as will be seen in eh. 146
and 147. Next the author spoke about fate itself, dividing it into
two aspects and discussing both of these. He now first records
the Stoic point of view concerning the relation of fate and provi-
dence, answered next by Plato's opinion, stated in eh. 145, which
in fact is a much more adequate table of contents of the tractatus
than eh. 142.
ITAQVE Von Arnim has included 183.6-14 in his Stoicorum
Veterum Fragmentain Vol. II pars II cap. VI, the second paragraph
of which chapter is entitledfatum divinum and contains a few texts
about the equalization of e:lµocpµevl)and God, e.g. 931: ol l::'t'wLxot
ElµocpµevljxocLZe:u;. Fr. 932, taken from Augus-
WI;'t'OCU't'OV
8e c:poccnv
tine's De civitate Deiprovides a very close parallel to Calcidius:
ipsum causarum ordinem et quandam conexionem Dei summi tribuunt
uoluntati et potestati.It is worth remarking that Calcidius and
Augustine do not say fate is equated to God Himself, but to His
will. This way of presenting matters tells less about the Stoic
doctrine, for which such a distinction does not really have much
meaning, than about the authors. For in later Platonic philosophy
it is by no means uncommon to distinguish the Highest Being from
His will. In Ile:pLe:lµocpµevl)t;
573 b we find: ~ 8l &vw't'cx't'Cu
1tp6v0Loc
1tpe:a~U't'OC't'OV
IX7tCXV't'C.<lV,
7tA~V001tep &a't'LVe:he: ~OUA1)<1LI;
e:t't'E v61j<1LI;
which at least implies the possibility of such
e:t't'e:xocLe:xcx't'e:pov,
a distinction, and in Calcidius eh. 176, where the hierarchical
order of metaphysical entities is described, prouidentia or dei
uoluntas takes the second grade after the highest God himself.
PRAESVMI Van Winden 1 in commenting upon eh. 321 (316.23)
deals with this verb and its corresponding noun praesumptio:
"The verb praesumere with its fairly wide meaning should here
be translated by 'to grasp', 'to acquire the knowledge of' . " About
praesumptio he says (o.c., p. 49): "Praesumptio seems to be a
Calcidius uses the term frequently. From
translation of 1tp6t..1j\jlL1;;
1 J. C. M. van Winden O.F.M., Calcidius onMatter, His Doctrine and

Sources (Leiden 1965), p. 174.
[r45] FATE AND PROVIDENCE r5
345.3-5 1 it is evident that, to him, it has the general meaning of

'intellect' or 'knowledge'." In our context however these signifi-
cations are impossible. The non nulli,who of course are the Stoics,
are obviously of the opinion that it is wrong to create a difference
between fate and providence. One can solve this problem by assuming
that a word like /also has dropped out. Yet this is not necessary, for
it is possible that praesumere has a more special meaning. For this we
first tum again to Van Winden. In his remarks on eh. 325 he says
concerning praesumere (320.20): "this 'use without further reflec-
tion' is the rendering of praesumere, so the meaning of this verb
here is quite different from that found in most other places (see
ad 345.5, p. r74), but it has a parallel in ut libet exagitata praesumptio
(327.2 2 )". Further help is provided by Index C of Waszink's
edition. In eh. 346 (338.ro) v66o~ is rendered by praesumptus. As
regards praesumptio, apart from the text quoted by Van Winden
(ut libet exagitata praesumptio) the following instances are most
interesting: error praesumptioque (r25.r5), which must be an exam-
ple of a Calcidian doublet, and si quis nominis praesumptione
inductus ... , errat in nomine(239.r3). About this last text Waszink
in his index remarks: i.q. error. This may be a little too emphatic,
but it seems perfectly possible to interpret praesumere in this
direction, awarding it a more special sense, viz., 'to grasp mistaken-
ly', 'to be mistaken in thinking'. That would suit the context
very well.3
ET DIVINA QVIDEM In the Timaeus the Demiurge himself
takes care of the creation of the World-Soul, the heavenly gods and
the divine part of the human soul. After that the lower gods have
to fashion both the mortal bodies and the part of human soul
that still had to be added. In pseudo-Plutarch, Apuleius and Neme-
sius this state of affairs has been transformed into a curious doctrine
of three providences, viz., of the highest God, the second gods and
the daemons. Pseudo-Plutarch has developed this idea most fully.
In the beginning of eh. 9 (572 f) he says: "E<mv ouv 1tp6voL<X~ µe:v
, ' )((XL' 7tp6>'t"1j
<XV6>'t'<X't'6) ' - 1tpc.>-rou
't'OU ' 6eou- V01jO'L~
' ,, )((XL
eL-re ' Rt"OUl\1jO'L~
... OUO'(X
T
euepye-rL~ CX7tCXV't'6>V,
x<X6' ~v 1tpw-rc.>~fX(XO"t'(X't'WV 6e(c.>v 8La 7t(XV't'O~
1 Van Winden, whose book was originally published in 1959, quotes the
pages of Wrobel's edition of 1876. Waszink's edition appeared in 1962.
345. 5 is 316. '.23 in the new edition.
I = 300. II.
8 Tertullian, too, sometimes uses praesumere and praesumptio in a com-
parable meaning, e.g. Apol. 8.1, 16.3, 38.5, 49.1, De anima4.2.
16 FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE [145]
&pLa't'cx't'e: xatt XOCAALO''t'Ot Further on, having quoted

xe:x6aµ'1)'t'OtL.
Timaeus 29 d-30 a, he says: 't'OtU't'Ot µev oov XOtL't'IX't'OU't'WVex.6µe:v0t
µex_pLi.j)ux_&v &.v6pw1tlvwvXOt't'IX 1tp6voL0tV voµLO"t'toV 't'TJVye: 1tpW't"1)V
auve:a't"1)x&v0tL (573 d). About the second providence he says: x0t6' '9jv
't'CX.
't'E 6V'1)'t'IX
j'LVE't'OtL
't'E't'Otj'µ&vwi;
XOtLOO'Ot 1tpoc;8L0tµov~vXOtLO'W't"1)pLOtV
excxO"t'wv 't'&vye:v&v(573 a) and in 573 f, having quoted Tim. 42 d-e
he says: ~ 8e 't'&v vewv 6e:&v't'CX~Lc; xatt 81JµLoupyl0t
~v 8e:u't'&p0tv 1tp6voL0tv
8'1)Aoi:.Apuleius, within the framework of his short introduction
to Platonic philosophy, treats this subject of the three providences
much more briefly, 1 though with obvious similarity apart from one
notable difference: he seems to attribute the creation of mankind
to the highest God.2 Otherwise even in Apuleius' short paragraph
there are some verbal resemblances to the Timaeus-chapters just
mentioned. 3 In Nemesius finally the task of the first providence
has been somewhat enlarged and now includes the care of the
ideas and other universals. With him we are much farther removed
from the Timaeus than was the case with pseudo-Plutarch and
Apuleius.
In Calcidius we do not find such a partition of providences.
The same Timaeus-chapters are the basis, but with a different
result. Divine and intelligible things are committed to the care
of a single providence. The nearest parallel is presented by the
tasks of the first providence in Nemesius. The most important
difference, however, is the fact that the tasks which pseudo-Plu-
tarch, Apuleius and Nemesius, in close adherence to the Timaeus,
allotted to the gods, with Calcidius are taken up by fate. NA-
TVRALIA VERO Waszink refers to Ile:pt e:lµ0tpµ&v1Jc; 573 d, a passage
which to my opinion offers no parallel to the present text. Pseudo-
Plutarch first quotes Tim. 41 d 8-e 3 (the same text is quoted
by Calcidius 181.20-182.2) and then continues: 't'0tu't'0t8e 't'Lc;oux
1 Apuleius, De PlatoneI 12.

a Non solum deos caelicolas ordinauit, quos ad tutelam per et omnia
decus
mundi membra dispersit, sed natura etiam mortales eos, qui praestarent sapientia
ceteris terrenis animantibus, ad aeuitatem temporis [s]e<di>dit. However,
no stress is laid on the creation of man's totality. The emphasis seems to be
on 'sapientia', which makes the transformation less notable.
3 quos ad tutelam et decus per omnia ve:tµor.i;
1te:pl.1tcxvTor.
xux'.>.
Tov oupor.v6v,
mundi membra dispersit x6aµov a.),,i6Lvovor.uTij>1te:1toLxL'.>.µevov
e:Ivor.L
xor.6'15:>.ov
(40a)
diis ceteris tradidit 't"OLi;
vemi; 1tor.pe8wxe:v 6e:o!i; (42d)
fundatisque legibus dc1tor.vTor.
Tor.ihor. (42 e)
8Lor.Tcx~or.i;
ordinationis paternae nJV 't"OU7tot't"poi; (42 e)
't"CX~LV
FATE AND PROVIDENCE 17
&v 8Lixpp~811v
xixt 0'1Xcpea-rix-rix
ot118e:t11
niv e:lµ.ixpµ.ev11v V algiglio
8111.ouv.
correctly translates these words as follows: 'Chi potrebbe mettere
in dubbio che queste parole indichino in modo esplicito e chiarissimo
il fato'. Indeed -rixu-rix
which of course refers to the whole quotation
is object and 8111.ouvmeans 'to reveal',
is subject, niv e:tµ.ixpµ.ev11v
'to indicate'. Waszink says in his note, that this text and the words
naturalia uero et corporea iuxtafatum (183.20), to which it provides
a parallel, differ from eh. 147, where it is said, that one of the
tasks of providence is leges immutabilis decreti docere (184.21). I
cannot understand how this statement contradicts the quotation
from Ile:pt e:tµ.ixpµ.bJ11c;,
Besides, I fail to see any special connection
between these two passages and the words naturalia uero et corporea
iuxta fatum. These words merely restrict the authority of fate to
a certain sphere, whereas in the texts quoted and also in eh. 143
we find an exegesis of the words niv -rou 1tixv-roc; cpuGLVv6µ.ouc;-re:
which are taken to be a description of fate, which
-rouc;e:tµ.ixpµ.evouc;,
is at the same time proved to be posterior to providence.
EA PORRO, QVAE This is treated in eh. 155 and 156. PORRO,
QVAE EXTRA This is the subject of eh. 158 and 159.
d) The sacred text of the Timaeus shows that Providence

is prior to fate
[146] All this he explains more clearly in the Timaeus by these
words: "When the creator of the universe, having thus arranged
these things, persisted in his manner of life". Now what things
had he arranged? Evidently he means his connecting the World-
Soul and its body in an appropriate euphony. "Understanding
the order from their father, the sons, according to the ordinance
enjoined upon them, having received the immortal principle of
a mortal creature, borrowed from the materials of the world-
fire, earth, air and water-the "elementary" capital to be repaid
when necessary, and cemented together what they took, though
not with the indissoluble bonds whereby they were connected
themselves". Truly the order from God, obeyed by the second
gods, is Reason, containing the perpetual ordinance, which is
called fate and this derives its origin from providence. [147]
He further says: "Having cemented together the engine of the
universe he chose the souls in equal number to the stars and
arranged them each to a separate star and having mounted them
in appropriate chariots he told them to observe the nature of
a
18 FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE
the universe and taught them the laws of unalterable decree."

For completing the engine of the world, choosing souls in equal
number to the stars, mounting them in appropriate chariots,
showing them the nature of the universe, teaching the laws
of unalterable decree, all these are duties of providence. The
laws themselves however, which were mentioned, are fate, and
that is a divine law penetrated into the World-Soul, a salutary
guidance of all things. This fate is in accordance with providence,
but not providence in accordance with fate.
The main argument in both these chapters is the principle of

the priority of providence, proved from two texts of the Timaeus.
SCILICET QVOD VNIVERSAE REI This is a much too wide ex-
planation of &1tixv-.ix (42 e 5). These words refer
-.ixu-.ix8Loc't"oc~ixt;
only to the immediately preceding paragraph about the souls.
But, exactly as in the translation of -.o1tocv(41 d 8), the correct
exegesis is too simple for Calcidius' line of thought: in fact, he
wants to see these words as a summary of the whole work of
providence, which is prior to the work of fate. ETENIM This
sentence gives a concise summary of the contents of the words
quoted. Although he does not quote this passage, pseudo-Plutarch
certainly would have ascribed it to the second providence. Calcidius
however takes the words to refer to fate, for he wants to prove from
the sacred text the truth of naturalia uero et corporea iuxta f atum
(183.20). DII SECVNDI Waszink regards this as a trace of the
doctrine of three providences. This may indeed be possible, but
it is by no means necessary. For it should once more be stressed
that the sentence etenim iussum dei etc. only summarizes the
quotation. Now in that quotation Plato mentioned "God's sons".
Calcidius refers to these beings as dii secundi.To me there seems
to be no need to read much more in the use of this appellation,
for Calcidius does not include these gods in his hierarchical system.
A different entity takes their place. For this we have to turn to
eh. 177, where fate in the hierarchy comes after providence:
sequitur hanc prouidentiam Jatum (206.1). Next it is stated: huic
obsequitur ea quae secunda mens dicitur, id est anima mundi tripertita
(206.3). This is a striking parallel to cui parent dii secundi. Now
the relation between fate and anima mundiis not completely clear.
The reason of this is Calcidius' failure to make full use of the
distinction made in eh. 143 and 144 between fate as an essence
[r47] FATE AND PROVIDENCE rg
and fate as an act. Therefore in eh. r44 he says: "fate is the World-
Soul", whereas in eh. r77 we read: "the World-Soul obeys fate".
This difference should not be emphasized too much, because it is
only the result of two different points of view. It therefore seems
admissible to say that in the system presented by Calcidius the
World-Soul takes the place of the gods and, by implication, of
any providence of the second gods which Calcidius, or rather his
source, may have found. In Nemesius eh. 38, quoted by Waszink,
we also find the World-Soul taking orders from the highest God.
For although by the law, given by God to the World-Soul, Nemesius
means the 6eaµo<;'A8pota't'eLot<;, this law can safely be identified
with the leges immutabilisdecreti, as Calcidius has stated in eh. r43:
Idem Jatum in Phaedro quidem scitum ineuitabile, in Timaeo leges
quas deus de uinuersae rei natura dixerit (r82.7-9).
IDQVE TRAHIT This is the most momentous statement of chapter
r46: the quotation from the Timaeus has again proved the sub-
ordination of fate to providence. Calcidius wants to hammer home
the truth of this dogma. MVNDI QVIPPE MACHINAM After the
same quotation as at the start of eh. r43 Calcidius more clearly
defines the respective texts instead of the vague prima and secunda
of that chapter. IPSAE VERO Note the verbal resemblances in
this sentence to the text Waszink quotes from Nemesius. SALVBRE
Van Winden (o.c. p. 36-37) has some interesting things to say
concerning this adjective. In his notes on eh. 270 he says with
reference to salubri persuasione (275.r): "One is also struck at
once by the epitheton salubris to persuasio. Plato simply writes
T<j>1tet6eLv.Although Calcidius' style is usually on the florid side,
this salubris seems to be more than just a epitheton ornans.For
though Calcidius uses this adjective frequently, it also occurs in
the passage translated from Numenius, which, moreover, ~hows
a striking resemblance to the present one. There we read: ex
prouidentiae consultis salubribus. The further wording of this phrase
also shows similarity to the passage from Numenius, e.g., providis
auctoritatibus, minus consulta parentia, provida parentia. Hence
salubris seems to come from Numenius. However, the occurrence
of the same word in the translation points toan influence of Numeni-
us rather than to verbal adoption". The cautiousness of the last
sentence may also be applied in our case.
SIC FATVM This conclusion ends the first part of the treatise
which started with the statement of the same principle: praecedit
prouidentia, sequitur Jatum(181.20). The essence of the argument

of eh. 143-147, apart from 182.5-183.6, means to emphasize the
metaphysical relation of providence and fate.
2. FATE TAKEN AS ACT
a) Fate is not chaotic, but limited
[148] Now we shall speak about fate taken as function and
act, for about this many discussions of an ethical, physical and
logical character are held. For although all things happening
are infinite and take place from boundless eternity throughout
immeasurable time, fate itself, enclosing all this from all sides,
is limited and determined-for no law or reason or anything
at all provided with divinity is unlimited-and thb fact is made
clear from the state and constellation of heaven at that moment,
which they call the perfect year. About this Plato says: "It is
easy to understand, that the perfect number of time fulfils the
perfect year only, when the courses of all eight revolutions after
their completion will return as it were at the origin and head of
another revolution, which will be measured by the ever-identical
motion". In fact, all this time being limited, because its deter-
mination can be contemplated by the measure of a fixed revo-
lution, everything taking place in heaven or on earth must return
to its former condition, as for instance the constellation of this
moment will after a long stretch of time be renewed and in the
same manner any constellation following after this.
[149a] From this it is clear that, in spite of the infinite variety
of events which take place from infinity to infinity, fate taken as
an act is itself determined. For as circular motion and also time
measuring are both circles, thus all these things going round in
circuits necessarily are circles.
In this paragraph the very close resemblance to the treatise

which was interrupted half-way eh. 144 at 183.6,
Ile:pt e:lµocpµevY)t;
is resumed. When we compare ps. Plut. 568 f-569 b with our
paragraph, the similarities are again obvious, even at a first glance.
In this case we get no support from Nemesius.
QVIPPE DE HOC The division of philosophy into ethics, phy!>ics
and logic is of course the normal one since Hellenism. Both the
Stoics and Epicurus agreed on this point and in Platonic philos-
ophy we find a similar tripartition, e.g. in Albinus' Epitome
FATE TAKEN AS ACT 2I
eh. 3. Still there is a great difference, as for the former schools

ethics is the all-important department and the Platonists are chiefly
interested in physics or, as it should rather be put, metaphysics
or theology. It is easy to understand that in the discussion about
fate quite a few problems of an ethical and logical character have
been raised. We shall find traces of this discussion in the tractatus.
In all these cases the Stoic ideas about fate are, in one way or
another, attacked by referring to the impossible implications in
the field of either logic or ethics. Now it is evident that such
strictures, owing to their partial character, never strike the
Stoic tenets to the heart. For that purpose a more fundamen-
tal point of departure is needed. In Platonic philosophy this
could only be found within the scope of physics, taken of
course in the ancient sense of the word. Just as Platonic thinking
as a whole is fundamentally opposed to the Stoa, concerning this
special subject, too, a really fundamental starting-point had to
be found, from which both Stoicism could be criticized and Platon-
ism could develop its own tenets. In this chapter, as in its counter-
part ps. Plut. 568 f sqq., this is definitely the case. For although
many other arguments, traditional quotations etc., may have
played a prominent part in shaping Platonic doctrine, the real
foundation of the latter consists in the reflections reported in our
chapter. NAM CVM OMNIA These words summarize the point
of departure. Calcidius' reasoning is as follows: "If fate would
completely regulate all events, determining the infinite, unlimited
quantity of incidents, it would be unlimited itself. It would thus
have a chaotic character, lacking order, and therefore be completely
excluded from the divine sphere of limitation, order and form".
It seems to me that in this line of thought the general antithesis
between the monistic system of the Stoa and Platonic dualism,
which totally separates rational order from chaotic, ungodly
capriciousness, has rightly been transferred to the special domain
of the fatum-doctrine. If fate is divine, if it is a law, then it cannot
be formless, hence must be limited. Only then it is a diuina lex.
Neither pseudo-Plutarch nor Calcidius seem to realize quite fully
the importance of this basic point.
The weight of this argument is also shown in the very short
summary of Platonic e:lµ1Xpµ&v1J-doctrine in Albinus' Epitome. In
the beginning of eh. 26 he says: 'H ycltpe:lµCtpµ~'Y)
v6µou-rcx~Lve1tex.oua1X
OU:J(.otov i..eye:L,
8L6TLIS8e:µev -rcx8e:
7tOL1J(jE:L,
IS8e:8e -rcx8e: · e:£c;
1te:lae:T1XL
«7t'etpovya:p TOUTO, &1telp6>V

µev 15VT6>V TWVyew6>µtv6>V,&1teEp6>V 8e
Twv 1tept cxuTou;auµ~cxtv6vT6>v.This is obviously in the same strain
as Calcidius and pseudo-Plutarch. 1 At the moment we limit
ourselves to the statement that the philosopher who originally
designed this argument and developed a Platonic theory of fate,
as will be unfolded in the next chapters, must have been an impor-
tant thinker. PERFECTVM ANNVM The limited nature of fate is
now illustrated by a reference to Plato's doctrine of the perfect
year, which is completed, when all heavenly bodies come back to
the same relative positions. To that end he quotes Tim. 39 d 2-7,
translated quite correctly apart from TcxuTouxcxt oµoE6><:; t6vTo<:;,
where the genitive has wrongly been rendered by two adjectives.
The passage itself has already been treated in eh. II8. At the end
of that chapter a brief rejection of the Stoic ex1tup6>ati;-doctrine
has been added. In his edition Waszink suggested a Numenian
origin of that rejection, but he now 2 prefers to refer it to Adrastus.
In the present context Plato's description of the great year has
only been adduced as an illustration of fate's limitation. FINITO
VT CVIVS Time is limited and can therefore be grasped by reason
using the measure of a fixed period. OMNIA QVAE With these
words Calcidius comes very near to the Stoic doctrine of a repetition
of World-periods, a new 8tcxx6aµl)<rL<:; taking place after each ex1tu-
p6>at<:;.Yet this similarity must not be stressed, for actually only
the words in terrisgo into this direction. When we leave these
words out of consideration, there is nothing un-Platonic, because
the passage would only bear upon the phenomena of the sky.
The example too (ut puta etc.)speaks precisely about the sky.
In pseudo-Plutarch the resemblance to Stoic doctrine is much
closer, for that author continues his reflections somewhat further:
foT6>8e 1tpo<:;TOacxcpe<:;
TWV1tept ~µii<;vuv 15vT6>V, lht OUauµ~cxEveL IX7t'O
TWVoupcxvE6>v 6><:;
7t'IXVT6>V
cxhtwv 15vT6>V xcxt TO eµe yptfcpetvvuvt TIX8e
xcxt&>8(,ae Te 7tp1XT't'&LV
&1tepxcxt61t6><:;
't'IJ')'XIXV&L<:;
1tp1X't"t'6>V.
7t'IXALV
ToEvuv
1 In his comments on 569 a Valgiglio says: "La frase appartiene agli

Stoici, e precisamente a Crisippo, secondo il quale la 3tolx71cn~'t'ou 1t1X11't'6~
si
(SVF II 945)".
compie !!; &.m:lpouEl~ &m:tpov ~e:pyw~ n xixl cx.xlX't'IX<J't'p6q,w~
If this reference is right, which seems likely, one should not overlook the
tacit polemic with the Stoa. Instead of saying that the phrase belongs to
the Stoics it would be more correct to consider it as directed against them,
though making use of their own tenets.
1 J. H. Waszink, Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius. I. Die erste
Halfte des Kommentars {Leiden 1964) p. 33.
FATE TAKEN AS ACT 23
1>7t&LoOtV
1. t\\ YJ
• OtU.
•~ 'l Ot<pLXYJ't'OtL
• I OtL't'LOt,
! I 't'Ot
' OtU't'Ot
' ' XOtL
' wcr0tu-rwc;
' 1
OL' Lyev6µ.evOL
OtU't'O
'
It: " t\l. \ 1! 8 \ •t:- \ \

1tp0tc,,oµ.ev,OU't'W01> XOtL7t0tV't'ec;r1.Vpw7tOL" XOtL't'Ot 't'E E<,Y)c;
I I
XOt't'Ot
't'Y)V
e~Yjc;0tM0tv yev~cr&'t'OtL
XOtL1tp0tx8~cr&'t'OtL
XOtL1tocv8' 1Scr0t
XOt't'CX
µ.l0tv nJV
ISAYJV1tep(o8ov XOtL x0t8' eXOCCf't'Y)V
't'WV ISi..wv WcrOtU't'Wc;
<X.1to808~cre't'0tL.
(569 b-c) One can see from these words that, on the one side,
pseudo-Plutarch is extremely near to the Stoic doctrine, but on
the other, probably realizing the danger of determinism, explicitly
states that the constellations are not responsible. Be that as it may,
in any case it is clear that Calcidius does not at all expound a
theory of an oc1tox0t-roccr-r0tcrLc;. Besides, he has turned down the idea
of an ex1tupwcrLc;at the end of eh. n8. The all-important factor in
his introduction of the perfect year is the limitedness of the latter.
No other special doctrine qua talisis derived from the idea of the
great year. In contrast to pseudo-Plutarch only the words in terris
give a Stoic flavour to the text. This may perhaps be regarded as
a somewhat careless addition, quite natural after in caelo.Hence
the views of Gercke 1 and Schmertosch 2 , who in the passage from
Ilepl. dµ.0tpµ.eVY)c; found respectively a Stoicizing and a Pythagorizing
tendency, cannot be applied to Calcidius. In my opinion they also
err concerning pseudo-Plutarch, laying too much stress on the
individual paragraph instead of following the line of thought.
APPARET This is obviously the equivalent of <p0tvep6v(ps. Plut.
569 c), but Ex quo apparetrefers much more clearly to the quotation
from the sacred text. The structure of the paragraph is simple
and easy to understand. First the thesis is stated (Nam cum omnia
etc., 185.5), next in support of this thesis the sacred text is quoted
and briefly explained, and finally the thesis, which has now been
proved, is repeated. We find exactly the same structure in the
short paragraph in eh. 143 a. VT ENIM The reason why C. writes
enim here is very obscure. It does not explain the preceding
sentence at all. Fortunately this text is very close to pseudo-
Plutarch and when we turn to his argument, we find Calcidius
has omitted an important passage: x0tl. -.6 ye pYJ8ev,IS-rLxuxi..oc; -rlc;
When he continues with we;
Ecr't'L,µ.e-rplwc; 7t0U XOt't'W7t't'OtL. yocp, the
equivalent of Calcidius' ut enim,there is no problem at all, for he
wants to illustrate the statement "fate is a circle". So in pseudo-
Plutarch there are two things stated about fate: (1) it is limited
(2) it is circular. Now Calcidius has either failed to understand
1 O.c. p. 289-291.
1 O.c. p. 32.
this or not regarded these statements as essentially different.

Although the former possibility is obviously the more probable one,
the latter is not completely absurd, as circle and sphere in Greek
thought are regarded as perfect and implicitly limited forms.
SIC EA OMNIA Instead of -rwv xoc-rocxuXAov y,voµ,veuv o A6yo<;
xuXAo<;ocvvoµ,a8e:(1)Calcidius has ea omnia quae in gyros circum-
Jeruntur circuli sint necesse Soest.he leaves out the very important
word Myoi:;, which pseudo-Plutarch uses as a description of fate.
The conclusion must be that Calcidius has not fully understood
the idea of the circle, which is somehow the quintessence of the
example of the perfect year, the argument being: "as time is a
circle, so is reason, which reveals itself in the events happening
in time".
b) Fate is a law
[149b] So he calls fate 'the inevitable decree', regarding its
inevitable force and power as the principle cause of everything
in the world that enacts itself in an uninterrupted continuity.
This, moreover, is the tripartite World-Soul, which, as we said
above, is fate taken as an essence. Further the 'decree' is the
law of God, which we declared to be inexorable because of its
inevitable cause.
[150a] Moreover this law is both the 'speech' and the 'ordi-
nance' which God ordained to the World-Soul for the perpetual
management of all things, for he had taken care, not only that
the world should be, but also that it should be eternal and
indissoluble.
Having established the fact that fate as a divine being is limited,

Calcidius now returns to the argument of eh. 144, where a division
was made into fate in its actuality, principally taken as divine
law, and fate as an essence, viz., the tripartite World-Soul. In this
paragraph the two aspects are brought together again. The reason-
ing is rather clumsy; the train of thought seems to be: "fate is
the inevitable decree, fate is the World-Soul, the inevitable decree
is divine law, as I told you in eh. 144. So there is a connection
between this law and the World-Soul." HAEC PORRO LEX These
words are reminiscent of the whole passage 41a-42e, though
perhaps not very clearly. The word oratio seems a reminiscence of
Mye:, (41 a 5), while sanctio is a satisfactory rendering of T~L<;in
[150b] FATE TAKEN AS ACT
42 e 7. Besides, aeturnus et indissolubilis is strongly reminiscent of

&8cx.v0t-roL
and £)..u-roL
in 41 b 2-3. Once more this is a hint that the
World-Soul has taken the place of the gods of the Timaeus. This
impression is confirmed, when we take into account the chapters
of Apuleius, pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius concerning the different
providences. All these authors attribute to second providence, i.e.
the providence of the gods, the task of preservation, whereas the
first providence is at work in the creation of the world. Although
there are no exact parallels, it is clear that according to the authors
mentioned the second gods must so to speak keep the world going
forever. Apuleius: reliquarum dispositionem ac tutelam rerum, quas
cotidie fieri necesse est, diis ceteris tradidit (De Platone I 12, 206);
pseudo-Plutarch: x0t8'~v't'IX-re:8V'Y)'t'ot
y(ve:'t'OtL
't'E't'atyµevwc;xatt lScrat
1tpoc;
8LOt(LOV1jVXOtLO'W't"Y)p£0tv
eXIXO"t'WV
't'WVye:vwv (573 a); Nemesius: 'tijc;
8eye:vfoe:wc; 't'WV&-r(µwv~wwv-re:xatt <pU't'WV XOtL 7tlXV't'WV
't'WV&Vye:vfoe:L
xatt <p8opi, 't'OUt;8e:u-repouc;
8e:ouc;,'t'OUt;'t'OVoupatvov1te:pL1tOAOUV't'Ott;,
1tpovoe:!v(eh. 44, p. 345 Matth.). Although not in the same manner,
in Calcidius, too, we find the task of preservation, but this time
it is ordained to the World-Soul.
c) This law has a hypothetical character

[150 b] As this ordinance contains everything within itself,
some things should be considered as a starting-point, others as
resulting from that point, as in geometry the first principles are
the starting-point, the propositions its consequences; for when
the principles have been granted (for instance the origins and
elements of point, line and so on), the propositions are laid bare as
the result, being as it were the consequences of the starting-point
granted. In the same way the decree, existing as an ordinance
and law containing all things, has the causes issuing beforehand
from our merits as certain principles; what takes place next, bound
by necessity, is happening as a consequent result of its starting-
point and necessity.
In this chapter Calcidius starts his exposition of the most charac-

teristic contribution of Platonism to the discussion of the problems
of fate. The doctrine expounded here and in the next chapters
may indeed be regarded as the culmination-point reached from
metaphysical premisses which are diametrically opposed to Stoicism.
Put very briefly: fate is regarded as an&~ 1'.mo8foe:w,-law,a law
with an "if ... " -formula, in Calcidius' own words: si hoe erit,
sequetur illud. (187.16). This same doctrine is enunciated in eh. 4
and 5 of Ile:pl. e:tµocpµbnJ,; and Nemesius eh. 38. Pseudo-Plutarch
starts from a comparison with the law of the state. This law does
not speak about any particular deserter or war-hero; it has general
regulations, according to which we either punish or honour such
persons. Law takes the lead by issuing universal rules, special
cases subject to this law follow next: -ra;µev xoc661.ou 1tpo1JyouµevCt.1,;,
-ra; 8' u1to1tC7t"t'ov-roc
-rou-roL,;
e1toµ~Ct.1,;(569 d). In medical and gym-
nastic law we have the same state of affairs: the law potentially
includes all details together with the general rules: 8uvaµe:L-ra
xoc6'~xocMoc -rot,; 61.oL,; (569 e). Exactly the same can
cruµ1te:pLAocµ~ave:L
be said about fate: fate too concerns universal rules. Pseudo-
Plutarch explicitly states the foundation of this truth. It is pre-
cisely what is found in the principle on which so much stress was
laid: "fate is limited, not boundless". Now limitedness corresponds
much better with anything universal than with details, which
belong rather to boundlessness: -ro µev yap c!>pLaµ~ovotxe:°Lov -r7i
6e:Cqtcppov~ae:L ev -rcj>xoc661.ouµii,J,.ov 6e:Ct.1pe:°L-rocL
(-roLoi:i-roi;
µ~-roL ye:
o6doi; v6µoi;xocl.o7t'OAL't'Lx6,;),-ro 8' &.1te:Lpov
ev -rcj>
xoc6'~xoca't'oc(570 a).
The first words of this quotation sum up briefly the typical character
which Platonism ascribed to fate.
Anything arising from something decided beforehand as its
starting-point is subject to that decision, taking its guidance and
following in its steps. Plato has spoken about it in the law of
Adrasteia: "Whatsoever soul has followed in the train of a god, and
discerned something of truth, shall be kept from sorrow until a
new revolution shall begin; and if she can do this always, she shall
remain always free from hurt". 1 This corresponds well with its
general character: -roLou-rov µev 8~ -ro e~ u1to6foe:Ct.1,;
&.µocxocl.xoc661.ou
(570 b). The appellation e:tµocpµ~YJ also makes this clear; it is
indeed something connected, strung together (e:£poµevYJ). This last
point is a fine example of the use of a Stoic argument in a Platonized
way.
Next in eh. 5 we find a treatment of the question, if the statement:
"all things according to fate" is true. This proves to be the fact
only in so far as fate encompasses all things. When we use more
precision we cannot say that all things take place according to
fate, but only those "following" in the sense explained in eh. 4.
1 Phaedrus 248 b, translation R. Hackforth.
[r5ob] FATE TAKEN AS ACT 27
For comparison we may again take political law. Not all things
covered by the law are legal in the sense of 'according to law'.
Treason, desertion, adultery are covered by law, yet not legal.
We should reserve the term 'legal' for commandments and provi-
sions made by law. In the same way fate embraces everything, yet
strictly speaking we cannot say that everything takes place accord-
ing to fate, when we bear in mind all preceding decisions.
This short summary of eh. 4 and 5 of Ile:pl e:tµocpµevlJ~ can give
a good idea of the doctrine under consideration, as these chapters
contain the most complete account of the e~ uno8foe:w~-doctrine
that has reached us. Apart from pseudo-Plutarch the brief exposi-
tion of Nemesius is also of great value, as we shall presently see.
QVAE SANCTIO CVM The contents of this sentence can indeed,
as Waszink remarks, be compared with speudo-Plutarch's argument
in 570 a-b, yet more important still is the fact that the wording
is parallelled exactly by Nemesius 38, quoted by Waszink: ocu-ro~
8eo 8e:!o~v6µo~... 7t0CV't'OC ev tocu-r<j>
7tEpLEXEL,'t'IXµev xoc8'un68e:ow,
-rix8ee~ uno8foe:w~.(p. 304 Matth.) Instead of the one expression
e~ uno8foe:w~used by pseudo-Plutarch, both authors make use of
two prepositions. At first sight they seem to be exactly the same
in the two languages: ex corresponding with e~ and secundum with
xoc-roc. But this is not true: e~ is rendered by secundum, which is
quite correct, because according to the argumentation of ne:pl
e:lµocpµevlJ~the facts in question result from, follow (cf. the ex-
pressions ixxo)..ou8w~ and tnoµevw~); xoc-rocmight perhaps more
justly have been rendered by peror the sole ablative. 1 Some things
belong to the domain of a person's resolution and intention: these
things are xoc8' un68e:owor ex praecessione. Other things are the
results which through the influence of fate originate from one's
resolution: those things are e~ uno8foe:w~or secundum praecessionem.
SCILICET VT As we have seen, pseudo-Plutarch took the law
of the state as the clearest parallel. Calcidius also uses that example
in eh. 179. Here in its stead he takes his first illustration from
geometry, which indeed is rather removed from the sphere of
human action, but lays more emphasis on the strict necessity of
the consequences. This last point of course is the only tertium
comparationis.
1 The rendering of xcmx by ex is of course quite normal, e.g., xcmi: vouv
(Tim. 36 d 8) in Cicero's translation becomes ex sua mente et uoluntate
(Cicero Tim. 26).
FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE [151]
d) Choice is in our power, fate causes the consequences

[151] So the origin of divine law, which is fate, is providence;
fate, on the other hand, is that which contains both the obedient
yielding and the disobedient arrogance as by an ordinance. Next
punishments or rewards originate according to the preceding
merit. Now the preceding merit which can take one of two direc-
tions is caused by a motion of our mind and a judgment and an
agreement and desire or avoidance, things put within our power,
because these things as well as their contraries are for us to choose.
So in this ordinance of things and according to a most ancient
law some things are said to result from a preceding decision and
are in our power; what comes after them, however, is the result,
bound by necessity. And as the law differs from what follows the
law, viz., legal things, thus differ fate and things following fate
from inevitable necessity, viz., fatal things.
ERGO INITIVM Once more this principle, which was fully

treated in eh. 143-147, is emphasized. PARENDI SIBI This is a
strange statement, for it is not clear, how one can obey fate, like
the law of the state. In the latter case there is always a rule, which
is either obeyed or neglected, rewards and punishments being
the consequences of our obedience or disobedience. When a person
commits desertion in time of war and capital punishment is inflicted,
the execution can indeed be called a consequenceof such an action.
Put this way the example affords an acceptable parallel to fate,
where according to Platonic thought we keep finding consequences
of actions. Here lies the tertium comparationis. But at the same
time the execution of the deserter is a punishment. The law is not a
neutral apparatus linking consequences with causes. But when we
turn to the explanation of 186.19-22, fate, strictly speaking, is such
a thing; our deeds precede and fate only puts the machinery of
consequence into action, according to the adage si hoeerit, sequetur
illud (187.16). Here, however, that neutral way of speaking is
silently and suddenly changed. Instead of cause and consequence,
merit and reward, crime and punishment are introduced. In this
way fate is indeed spared the indignity of being regarded as a mere
robot, producing certain effects, when a certain button is pressed,
but now fresh difficulties arise, which can be illustrated by the
examples Calcidius himself uses in the next chapter. It is, for
instance, difficult to understand how Laios' begetting a son is
something punishable. In the case of Achilles, who could choose

between two possible ways of life, this is even less clear. In any
case there is a discrepancy between the two ways in which Calcidius
speaks about fate, a discrepancy which is not solved and which,
besides, can hardly admit of a solution. For no matter what kind
of law is taken as an example, all these laws cover only one portion,
one aspect of reality and somehow the special limitation of the
example finds its way into the description of fate itself.
QVAEQVE This, as it stands, is hardly explicable. When one
takes the word in its normal meaning, viz., 'each', 'every', it makes
no sense at all. For it cannot be true, that all things are said to be
ex praecessione.Such a statement would be in flat contradiction
with the argument. Another possibility is to take quisque for the
equivalent of quicumque, which according to Leumann-Hofmann-
Szantyr, Lateinische Grammatik II. Syntax und Stilistik § 108 c
is in fact quite possible. As a consequence, et in 187.8 should mean
'also'. The translation of quaeque ex praecessione dicuntur Jore et
sunt nostrae potestatiswould be: "all things that are said to be
ex praecessioneare also in our power. "This is rather unsatisfactory,
as such a statement would be completely unnecessary. Moreover
it seems much more likely that et in line 8 has the same function
as in line 9. Now there would not be any difficulty, if instead of
quaeque we had a word, meaning 'some things'. In view of this
an alteration in the text seems justified. I propose the conjecture
quaedam. This same word is used in a similar context in eh. 145 :
quaedam ex prouidentia tantum, quaedam ex decreto. Finally attention
must be payed to a very close similarity in Nemesius: 't'ocµe:v
~youµevix xixt ecp' ~µi:v xix6' u1t66eow· Ta. 8e: e1t6µevixe~u1to6foewc;
xixt oux ecp' ~µi:v, a.tJ..'e~a.vcx.yxY)c;
(eh. 38, quoted by Waszink). 1
ATQVE VT ALIVD In 570 c-e pseudo-Plutarch is also speaking
about the difference between v6µoc;and v6µ~µoc;.In his argument
that was an important distinction, for it illustrated the difference
1 It is also possible to take antiquissima as a nom.pl.neut. and to assume
that antiquissima quaequeare the antithesis of quae post illa sunt. In my

opinion this explanation, although simple, is not satisfactory. The only
meaning in the Thesaurus which in that case could be taken into account
for the present context is qui antefertur, gravis, laudabilis. This is best
illustrated by Nonius' lemma antiquior melior (Nonius 425.36). Such a
meaning does not seem plausible, for the things which are ex praecessione
simply come first in the order without deserving any special praise. Besides,
it seems unlikely that after the expression in hac rerum ordinatione the word
lege is deprived of any further qualification.
30 FUNDAMENTS OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE [r52]
between etµocpµtv1)and etµocpµevoc(things decreed by etµocpµevYJ),

Indeed, as we have seen, the whole of eh. 5 is concerned with the
problem, whether it is correct to say: "all things are according
to fate". The answer to this problem is to be found in the distinc-
tions just described, which consequently are part and parcel of the
reasoning of eh. 5. They are not made just for their own sake, but
for another purpose, namely to find an answer to the problem we
have just mentioned. In Calcidius these distinctions have no such
end in view and thus appear to have little meaning. In the next
chapter, however, more use is made of this point.
e) Phaedrus 248c3-5 proves the correctness of this principle

[r52] So the World-Soul is fate as a substance. It has also
been provided, as an instruction 1 to rule the universe rightly, with
a law which contains fate as an act, and which has the following
structure and succession: "if this will be, that will follow".
Now what precedes in this rule is in our power, what follows
is according to fate. This with another name is called 'fatal',
which is something greatly differing from fate, so that there
are three things: (r) that which is in our power, (2) fate iself,
(3) that which according to the law of fate repays our merits.
Thereafter he states the words of the law itself: "The soul that
has followed in the retinue of a god and discerned something
of truth, will be kept from sorrow until the time of a new revo-
lution and if she will do this always, she will always keep free
from hurt". The words just quoted are the law and ordinance,
which is properly called fate; when Socrates, following the
ordinance of the law, joined God's retinue, that was Socrates'
own work; in turn the fact that, because Socrates' life was such,
his soul continues to be free from sorrow until the time of the
next revolution, is a product of destiny, and provided he will
always do that, which is in Socrates' power, he will always be
free from sorrow according to fate.
EST IGITVR Like eh. r5r this chapter too is opened by a repe-
tition of an important principle. ERGO QVOD The meaning of
1 In giving this translation of informatio I base myself on the Thesaurus.
The passage in question reads as follows (TLL VII 1474): b de animo el'u-
diendo, imbuendo Jere i.q. instructio, doct,-ina: °' in univ... CHALC. transl.
p. 42 E iuxta mandatam -em (antea: iussionem, gl'. 8LiiT°'~Lv) ... 13acced.
gen. explic .... CHALC. comm. 152 -o rem ... recte regendi. 157 fati.
this distinction between fatum and fatale, made somewhat abrupt-

ly in eh. 151, is easier to understand now. Calcidius and pseudo-
Plutarch have different reasons for this distinction. The author
wanted to show that fate rules all things without
of Ile:pt e:lµatpµtv1)c;
determining them in the rigid way of Stoicism, whereas Calcidius
is much more interested in human freedom. PRO MERITIS Already
in eh. 150, after the example of geometry, use was made of this word
(exmeritis nostris,186.20), but there the context was quite 'neutral',
although the use of the word in itself pointed into a certain direction.
This came to light very clearly in the animaduersiones and praemia
of eh. 151, which presented something of a problem. How could
that highly special way of speaking be reconciled with si hoe erit,
sequetur illud,the most general and neutral rule one can imagine?
A solution for this discrepancy cannot be found, but the reason
why Calcidius lays emphasis on merit and subsequent requital is
now brought to light. It is to be found in Calcidius' use of the famous
law of Adrasteia. QVAE SE COMITEM This is a correct translation
of Phaedrus 248 c, also quoted by pseudo-
of the 6e:aµoc;'A8pat<rre:(ixc;
Plutarch 570 a. It is one of the proof texts of the e~u1to6foe:wc;-
doctrine. Another such text is the well-known ixh·(ixe).oµevou·
6e:oc;a.vix(·noc;(Resp. 617 e 4-5), which is actually quoted in eh. 154.
The great importance of these texts is perhaps best illustrated
by the fact that they are both mentioned in the very short summary
of Platonic doctrine in Hippolytus' Refutatio omnium haeresium.
The entire paragraph about fate (I 19,19) runs as follows: e:tµixpµtVYJV
8e q>YJGLV e:!vixL,OUµ~v 1tOCVTIXxix6' e:lµ.ixpµ.tVYJV
y(ve:a60tL,a.A).'dvix( TL
xixt ei:p'~µ!v, EVotc; q>YJGLV 'ixMix &Aoµevou, 6e:oc;a.vix(TLoc;'
xixt '6e:aµ6c;
-re: 'A8p0t<rre:(0tc;
88e:'.OUT<.t>
TO xix6' e:tµ.ixpµtVYJVot8e: xixt TO ei:p'~µ.!v.
Evidently these texts were considered to be fundamental and to
offer a good summary of Platonic thought on this subject. Both of
these texts are indeed comer-stones of the e~u1to6foe:wc;-doctrine.
In Middle-Platonic doctrine about fate Plato's mythical picture
of human responsibility through the free choice of the rational
&oulis used in a completely new way, stripped of the garb of myth
and cl&a rule without relation to the dogma of reincarnation. The
rational choice in the other world is replaced by an empirical
choice in our world. Plato's myths have been secularized. The
combination of personal choice and necessary consequences is
also found in a quite unexpected place, viz., Tacitus, Annales
VI 22, 2: ac tamen electionem uitae nobis relinquunt, quam ubi
elegeris, certum imminentium ordinem. Theiler, who has devoted

a special study to this chapter of Tacitus 1, thinks Tacitus' remarks
ought to be related to pseudo-Plutarch, Calcidius and Albinus.
The last-mentioned in his short chapter on Elµ.cxpµ.ev11 remarks:
ix")..")..oc.
8L6·n ~-rLc;ixv &A1J't'CXLl)iux.~-roLou-rov~(ov xcxl.-ra.8E -rLvoc.
1tpa.~7i,
-ra.8E -rLvcxcxu-tjj eljiE-rctL.(Epit. c.26). This is a most remarkable
and important piece of information. It can serve as an exact illus-
tration of what was said a moment ago about the secularization of
Plato's words. For it is easy to see that Albinus' terms are an
adaptation of the law of Adrasteia, which is thus brought down
to earth from the mythical sphere. 2
Now we turn to the other great pillar of the doctrine, viz. the
word of Lachesis (Resp. 617 d-e). This is the heart of the great
myth of Er, which concludes the Politeia. It was indeed to be
expected, that this myth, in which the choice of life is des-
cribed, should also be used to prove the correctness of the doctrine
under discussion. Thus, for instance, Porphyry has dealt with
this myth in his book IlEpl. -rou ecp' ~µ.i:v,excerpts of which have
been preserved by Stobaeus (II 5, 39-42). In par. 42 we find
the following passage: 0( TE yoc.pv6µ.oL,oux ixvcxyxa.~ov-rEc;,8Lcxyo-
pEuouGLv,we;eoc.vA1JG't'EUG7Jc;, -ra.8E 1tE(G7J • eoc.v8e: 1XpLG't'EUG7)c;, 't'WV8E
't'EU~TI" ot 't'E xcx8' EL!J.ctpµev11v 8EGIJ.OL, eoc.v~(ov &/\7lixv8p6c;,ou-rwc;~~GTI,
OUµ.~v ~'t'Lxcxl. E/\OUex 7tctV't'Oc; ixvcxyxa.~OUGL • xcxl.eoc.v< ev > ixv8pa.GL
yEv6µ.Evo;~(ov &A7lG't'pct-rLw-rou, -ra.8E GE 1tct8Ei:vxcxl. 8pifoctL ixva.yx1J,
OU ' IJ.1JV
' 11.
1:;TL (JJ
l"'LOV GE ctVCX"'(X1J
' 1 El\f:;G
•~L 8CXL G't'pct't'LW't'OU
1
XctL' 't'ctoE
1~
7tct8ELV
- < XctL '
8pifoctL> e~ IXVCX"'(X1Jc;. ~L· 8 XE'i:-rctL µ.e:v't'ot7tctpct8E(yµ.cx-rct xcxl.'t'WV1tp6>'t'WV
xcxl.8Eu-repwv• e1tl. 8e: 't'cti:c;IJiux.cxi:c; EG't'L,-rouc;'t'E 1tpw-rouc;eA&a8ctL ~(ouc;
XctL ' "o1)GCXL,
y- Cj)EpE,
' l"'LOV
A' ' 8pc..>7tOU,
CXV ' - 't'E oEU't'i:;pc..>v
't'(J)V ~ L El\i:;cructL
·~ L ...ll l"'LOV
A' 't'LV(lt.
'
EI\O~VCf>
·~ •• J. oi:; XctL ,._wv't'LXct't'ct't'OU't'OV,
~l. ' y- ' - ctVCX"'(X1J
' ' ' 6~ 8 '
't'OtX/\OUet XctLopctGctL ~ -
xcxl. 1tct8Ei:v· (Wachsmuth 2, 169, 8-20). Theiler, who also refers
briefly to this passage, remarks: "er ist da offenbar von Gaios
abhangig". Be that as it may, these words of Porphyry belong
1 W. Theiler, Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre in Forschungen zum

Neuplatonismus (Berlin 1966) p. 46-103.
1 Concerning Albinus Theiler (o.c. p. 85) remarks: "Es ist also selbst
hier zunachst an eine empirische Lebenswahl gedacht. Es ist nun wichtig
zu beobachten, dasz diese Wenn-form, nur leicht verkappt, auch bei Albinos
in dem schon zitierten Satz vorkommt, ja im Grunde bei Tacitus ubi elegeris,
aber bei Plato fehlt siel" This is obviously a mistake. Platotoo, likeAlbinus,
has ~-rti; &v cJiux.7J,
The adaptation of the text calls for attention; the tone of
the sentence is more important than its structure.
[152] FATE TAKEN AS ACT 33
certainly to the same sphere as the expositions of thee~ uno8foe:c.>c;-

doctrine. Porphyry, however, did not so much secularize the
Er-myth as add the more empirical 1 choice.
A brief word may be added about the probable designer of this
doctrine. In the introduction to his edition Waszink suggested
Numenius as the auctor intellectualisbut he now 2 subscribes to
the opinion of Theiler, who has put forward Gaius as the author.
Theiler's arguments are indeed rather strong. In the first place
one can point to Albinus, who is known to have been Gaius' pupil.
But Theiler also attaches great importance to Tacitus, whose chapter
Ann. VI 22, as we have mentioned, is the subject of his enquiry. Ac-
cording to Theiler, this chapter is a summary of a polemical disser-
tation of Gaius. He even adds a dash of romance by making the
suggestion that Tacitus may have met this philosopher during
his proconsulate in Asia in u2/3. However that may be, the fol-
lowing points concerning the e~ u1to8eae:c.>c;-doctrine are certain:
(1) It was known about u5 A.D., when Tacitus wrote his Annals,
and it has not been attested before that date, unless one has to
assume that pseudo-Plutarch's Ile:pte:tµ.(Xpµ.tv'Y)t:;
was written earlier.
(2) It belongs to Platonic thought and it is opposed to the Stoa.
(3) Within the framework of ancient philosophy it is an admirable
theory, well founded on metaphysical premisses (cf. the &ne:~poc;-
argument, above p. 22), so that the designer must have been a
philosopher of quite high accomplishments. All these indications
indeed fit Gaius. In the absence of another hypothesis it seems
reasonable to regard pseudo-Plutarch as having received his
philosophical training in a Medio-Platonic school-perhaps as a
disciple of Gaius himself. 3
EST IGITVR TOTVM As in eh. 146 and 147 the quotation of the
sacred text is followed by a clarifying summary, this time by way
of an example. It is striking that Calcidius keeps very close to the
literal text of the Phaedrus, even using the same words, yet at the
same completely alters it by adding cum ita uiueret Socrates. Evi-
dently these words mean a radical change, for now the text is
explicitly made to refer to earthly life and thus is secularized. On
the other hand this faithful adapatation of Plato's words makes
it more understandable that Calcidius insists on merits and reward
1 This is the term used by Theiler.
1 o.c. p. 22, note 2.
8 Gercke, o.c., p. 279 has also tentatively suggested Gaius' name.
3
or punishment, for these are implied in the original law, and in

spite of the secularization this element has been preserved. There
is therefore a certain difference from the way in which Albinus
and pseudo-Plutarch make use of the contents of the 8e:o-µo<;
'A8pcxa-re:(cx<;.
f) The cases of Laios, Achilles and Adam also prove man's free
choice
[153] In this way Apollo has prophesied to Laios: "Take
care not to sow in forbidden furrows: the son you beget will
wickedly slaughter you and the whole palace will be besprinkled
with blood". For by this oracle he showed that it was in the
power of Laios not to sow. That is the preceding decision; what
followed next, was no longer in Laios' power, but lay rather in
the necessity of fate according to the merit of the preceding
decision. But if it would be necessary that Laios fell a victim
to the destiny we all know of, or if that disaster threatened
him long before as a result of inevitable destiny, the inquiry
would be void and so would be the prediction. But the god, as
he knew beforehand what was to follow, forbade him to sow,
knowing it was in his power to abstain, but Laios, as a human
being who did not know the future, asked from him who knew,
what he had to do, yet he sowed, though not because fate enticed
him, but as he was defeated by his own intemperance.
[154] In the same way Thetis had predicted to her son that,
if he would take part in the Trojan war, where his friendship
would lead to his death, he would meet an early end of life com-
bined with enormous glory, but that, if he would return home,
a long life lay in store for him, though without glory. All the same
Achilles chose war, doing so without any violent compulsion
by fate, since he was not confronted with any doubtful choice;
no, he acted thus as it were by the violence of his fury, and
because his sympathy inclined towards glory. With this also
harmonizes Plato's saying: "The blame is his who chooses; God
is blameless" and also "virtue is independent and not subject
to any necessity" or when Lachesis says to the souls "that none
of them would come under the authority of daemons by lot,
but that they would freely and personally choose the daemon,
whom each thought he ought to choose". And according to Moses
God forbade the first-born men to eat food from the trees, from
[r54] FATE TAKEN AS ACT 35
which the knowledge of good and bad might take hold of their
souls. Since the ability to abstain or not was within their own
power, God, who wanted to take care of them, showed them what
they had to avoid, and He would not vainly have tried to keep
them away, if it had to take place of necessity.
The case of Laios had drawn the attention of the Stoics. They
considered prognostication to be a proof of the rigid necessity of
fate, Laios providing a fine example. Von Amim has called par. 4
of the testimonia about Stoic fate-theory Vaticinatio probat Jati
necessitatem and among other things Laios' case is mentioned.
SVF II 94r is taken from Alexander Aphrodiensis' Ile:pt e:tµocpµevljc;
eh. 3r, which chapter concerns µocv-rLx~. Alexander thinks oracles
are useful by their advice, so that people can be on the alert. About
Stoic doctrine he says: 61teuc;oov 1tocv-roc -rocu-rocaeu6jj xoct 1t11.7Jpeu67i
't'O-rijc;e:tµocpµ&v7Jc; o 6e:oc;8Lix't'OUXPlJ<rfJ,OU
8piiµot, cpotV't'ota(ocv -r<jlAott
7totpeaxe:vwe;8uvocµev cpuM~ota6otL (202.2r-23 Bruns).
't'IX11.e:y6µe:vot
This doctrine he finds horrible, for in this way Apollo would not
be the prophet, but the originator (1toL7J~c;), which is a most unholy
thought. The story of Laios also plays a part in another chapter
of Stoic fate-doctrine, viz., the confatalia. This aspect is put forward
in the passages Waszink has quoted from Cicero and Origen.
For Calcidius the oracle given to Laios proves the personal
freedom and responsibility of man and so the story is another
argument for the e~ u1to6foe:euc;-doctrine.In about the same vein
it is used by Albinus: Oiheu yixp xocto 'A1t6AAeuv -r<jlAoc(1tpoe:i:1te:v
·
Et yixp nxv&>ae:Lc; a' b cpuc;
1toti:8',IX7tOX't'EVEL · ev -r<jl6e:aµ<jl8~ 1te:pL&XE't'otL
µev XotLo AocLoc; XotL't'OcpuaotLottl't'OV7tot'i:8ot,
xoc6e:Cµotp't'otL
8e 't'O&1t6µe:vov
(Epit. 26.2). Strangely enough, Calcidius in his translation has not
kept e:t, which would have agreed very well with the si-formula.
Throughout the chapter there is an indirect, though evident
polemic with the Stoa, which is perhaps best illustrated by non
Jato eliciente.This corresponds very well with the quotation from
Alexander.
EODEMQVE MODO For the details of this story cf. Waszink's
notes in the edition. NVLLA QVIPPE This is rather difficult,
as quippe somehow indicates a reason. Yet it is incomprehensible
how the fact that Achilles is not in doubt about his choice can
illustrate the absence of any constraint by necessity. Maybe
Calcidius has abbreviated the argument too much, the original
line of thought being: "There is no necessity, for the fact that

Achilles so resolutely made his choice was only a result of his
character". VIOLENTIA . • . VIOLENTIA Mark the parallelism.
There is no question of any vehemence of fate: the only vehemence
to be noted lies in Achilles' own character. QVIBVS CONCINIT
Calcidius began the illustrations of the e~u1to6foewi;-lawand the
reality of human freedom by quoting the 6&GfLOt;'A8potO"'t'etoti;.
He now concludes these proofs by the second great pillar of the
doctrine, namely Lachesis' speech in Politeia 617 d-e, of which he
quotes some words, which at the same time wind up the whole
paragraph on this subject. CAVSA PENES OPTANTEM Most of all
these words (otE-r(ot
EAOfL&vou· 6eoi;&.votl-rLot;)
are quoted, e.g. Hippo-
lytus I 19, 19 (cf. above page 31), Justin I Apol. 44, Ma:ximus
Tyrius XLI 5a, Nemesius c. 38 (p. 306 Matthaei). LIBERAM
ESSE &.peni8e &.8fo1to-rov. As in the case of the law of Adrasteia
Albinos has made a variation: &.8fo1to-rov ouv ~ ljiux_~.(Epit. 26.2).
IVXTAQVE MOYSEA This is a remarkable sentence. The strangeness
does not regard its content, which clearly refers to Genesis 2, 17:
God's interdiction to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil. It is understandable that this text could catch the eye of
a Platonist as suitable in this connection. The striking fact is,
however, that the example is somehow added as an afterthought.
With the quotation from the Politeia the treatment of the law
was fittingly concluded and indeed in eh. 155 a new subject calls
for attention. There are a few more examples in Calcidius' com-
mentary, where Plato's doctrine receives a supplementary proof
from the Old Testament. In eh. 130, which deals with daemonology,
we read: Cui quidem rei Hebraeorum quoque sententia concinit
(172.24-173.1) and in eh. 300 about the doctrine of matter: Quibus
Hebraei concinunt (302.n). In both cases a text from Genesis is
quoted or hinted at. According to van Winden (o.c. pag. 123) a
definite Numenian influence can be established in eh. 300. Numeni-
us was a great connoisseur of Jewish doctrine, to which he attached
great value. The authority of this doctrine, together with that of
the Magi, Brahmans and Egyptians was to him very high. 1 In
fact he was of the opinion that it was necessary to "find the way
back" to these doctrines and to call them to witness (cf. fr. 9a
Leemans). Regarding this "&.votx_wp'r)O'Lt;-doctrine" cf. Waszink's
1 Cf. E. A. Leemans, Studie over den wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea
(Brussels 1937), p. 32 sqq.
[155] OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE 37
Praefatio XLII-XLIII and note. Concerning Moses Numenius'

most famous saying was: -rEycxpfo-rLID..cx-rwv ~ Mwucnjc;ocnLxE~wv;
His high regard for Moses is also testified by the fact that he seems
to have referred to him simply as o 1tpocp~TIJc; (test.46 Leemans=
Porphyr. De Antro Nymph. 10). In view of this, the reference to
Genesis as an extra piece of evidence for the e~ 1'.mo6foewc;-doctrine
might be considered as a hint of Numenian influence.
3. OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE
a) The possible and its two species
[155] Now we shall speak about the things within human
power. The ancients divided all things into three parts: the
possible, the necessary and the contingent. The possible is a
genus, the other two are species. So everything possible is either
contingent or necessary. Now the necessary is called by that
name, because it is bound by necessity, and as most possible
things cannot be prevented from taking place, some are prevented
and averted by human measures, their outlines are drawn by
the following definitions: the necessary is the possible of which
the contrary is impossible, e.g. all things that have come into
being will perish and after having grown they will wane. For
everything that is born will inevitably die and having reached
old age it will decay and there is no room for the contrary,
namely, that a thing which has come into being will not perish.
The definition of contingent things on the other hand is as
follows: the contingent is the possible of which the contrary
is also possible, e.g.: today after sunset it is going to rain. For
this is possible, but its contrary 'it will not rain' is equally
possible.
NVNC 1AM Having spoken about fate and providence and the
relation between these two, Calcidius turns to the problem of
human will. In order to mark out its domain, some preliminary
distinctions have to be made. Here again there is a close parallel
to pseudo-Plutarch, starting about halfway the 6th chapter of
Ilepl d!J,otpµ.&VYJc;
at 571 b. VT GENVS Although this is reminiscent
of 1tecpuxe8e 't'O8uvot't'OV
&c;yevoc;1tpoucpea't'CXVotL
't'OUev8exofLtVOU
(570 f),
there is nothing in Calcidius resembling the argument which
immediately follows this statement and which concerns the distinc-
tion of 8uvot(J,Lc;,8uvot-r6vand 8uvcx(J,Evov.
So it is perhaps better to
put the beginning of the parallel at Necessarium porro(189.16), from

which point onwards there are some very close verbal resemblances,
as can easily be seen from the quotations in Waszink's edition.
However, we must not overlook the strong resemblances to Neme-
sius that are found in this chapter and the next. In fact, these
parallels are hardly less striking. GENVS ••• SPECIES These terms
herald the much more Aristotelean colour of the next chapters in
contrast to the typically Platonic atmosphere of the chapters we
have examined up till now. Aristotle himself has not made a dis-
tinction between ev8e:x6µe:vov and 8uvot-.6v,at least not explicitly.
Bonitz (Arist. Metaph.rec. et en. H. Bonitz, 386-387) thinks that
these words, when taken in their strict sense, have a different
meaning. According to Ross, however, Aristoteles has made no
such difference. (W. D. Ross, Aristotle, Metaphysics II p. 245).
b) The contingent and its relation to free will
[156] Now there are further differences between contingent
events: some have a certain frequency, of others the frequency
is quite evenly matched, e.g. wearing a beard and knowing
how to write and pleading a cause. Things taking place frequently
are opposed by those of rare occurrence, those of which the fre-
quency is evenly matched by those of which this is not so.
Therefore the choice of things evenly contingent is in the power
of man, who, being a rational animal, refers all things to reason
and deliberation. Now these two are the innermost motion
of that which has a ruling function in the soul; this moves of
itself and its motion is approval or desire. So approval and desire
move of their own accord, yet not without imagination, called
'phantasia' by the Greeks. From this it follows that quite often,
when the imagination deceives us, that motion of the soul's
leading power, or rather its approval, is distorted and chooses the
wicked instead of the best. The reason of this is manifold, either
a coarse carelessness in deliberation or a want of knowledge or
a mind too much devoted to dangerous acclamation or a pre-
conception of a false opinion or a perverse habit, in any case a
certain tyrannical despotism of some fault; for that cause we are
said to offend by force or forcible allurements rather than by
free will.
QVAEDAM ENIM This rather clumsily put statement would be
unintelligible but for the parallels in pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius,
[156] OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE 39
to which can be added the following words from Ammonius in

A rist. de interpr.
9: 001tep (i.e. -rou ev8exofLtvou) etc; -rp£0t8LTIPYJfLtvou
we;€7tL't'O7tOAU,o!ov 't"Oyevfo80tL&v8pc,mov1tev-r0t8cxX't'UAOV
't'O(LEVAtye't'OtL
••• 't'O 8e we;e1t' &AOt't"'t"OV,
o!ov 't'O 't"OVGXOC7t't"OV't"Ot
8YJO'OtUpcj}
1tepL-ruxei:v,
't'O8E e1t' (O'Y)c;,
otov 't'OAOU0'0t0'80tL
XOtL!L~ AOU0'0t0'80tL (142. 1-5 Busse)1.
In 190.9/requentia stands for 't"OfLEVwe; e1tl.'t"O1toM (that which takes
place for the most part), 't"O8' we; e1t' &1..0tnov(that which happens
less generally) is rendered by quae quidem rari exempli sunt (190.
ro-rr). Calcidius, who wants to hurry on to his elucidation of
human power, fails to tell that these things belong mainly to the
domain of nature (x0tl. -r0tu't"0tfLEVe1tl.'t'7icpuaeL't"O1tMi:O"Tov)and to
give an example (after the dog-star's appearance heat is more likely
than cold). HIS PORRO this is wrong; the right point of view
can be found in pseudo-Plutarch (0tu-ro0tu-rcjla.V't"L't't't'0tXT0tL}. ERIT
ERGO cf. pseudo-Plutarch: ecp'~!Li:v8E 't"Oe1t£0'Y)c; (571 c), Nemesius:
1tepl.'t'OU't'WV OOV,'t"WV&7t(O'Y)c;ev8eXOfLt'VWV, !J,6VOV (c. 34,
~OUAeU6!J,e80tL
p. 288 Matth.). An even better parallel is to be found in Ammonius
in Arist. de interpr. 9: 1tepl.8e ye 't'Oe1t' (O'Yjc;
ev8ex6fLeVOV ~ 1tpo0tlpeaLc;
exeL !J.6VYJ (143. 1-2). Indeed optio is the rendering of 1tpo0t£peaLc;.
That notion has been examined by Aristotle in the first chapters
of book III of the Nicomachean Ethics.First he eliminates the wrong
answers to the problem: 1tpo0tlpeaLc; is not the equivalent of exouaLov,
which is a wider notion (e1tl. 1t1..tov-ro exouaLov) rrrr b 8). It is
neither em8ufL£0tor 8u!J.6c;,nor is it ~ouAYJO"Lc;, which is something
quite different, for one wants to reach a certain -re1..oc;, whereas
1tpo0t£peaLc; is concerned with the means by which this -re1..oc; can
be reached (ofov uyL0t£veLV ~0UA6!J,e80t, 1tp00tLpOt1(Le80t
8E 8L' 6>VuyLOt-
VOUfLeV, lIIl b 27-28). That needs thinking: ~ yixp 1tpo0tlpeaLc; !J.e-rix
Myou x0tl. 8L0tvol0tc; (rr12 a 15-16). So finally we discover that the
essence of the notion under discussion must be found in deliberation
and counsel, in ~ou)..euea80tL: ~ 1tpo0tlpeaLc; cxv e(YJ~ou1..eu't"LX~
i5pe~Lc;
-rwv ecp'~!Li:v (1rr3 a ro-rr). Aristotle's argument in these chapters
evidently provided the substance of Nemesius' treatment of human
free will, especially in eh. 33 and 34. Even at first glance one is
struck by the very strong similarity, which emerges in many
verbal parallels. The mere titles of these chapters are an indication
1 The same distinctions can be found in Philoponus, In Arist. Anal.

Priora 151. 27-152. 4 (Wallies), Alexander Aphr., In Arist. Topica177.
22-27 (Wallies), Alexander Aphr., InArist. Anal.Priora 162. 1 sqq. (Wallies).
of this: eh. 33 is called 1te:pl1tpocxLpfoe:wc;, eh. 34 1te:pl-.Evwv~ou)..e:u-

6µe:8cx.Alexander Aphr. uses this capacity for deliberation as a strong
weapon against Stoic determinism. Man would vainly have received
this gift, if everything went according to fate. But man is a ~ou)..e:u-
't'Lxov ~cj>ov(178.12) and he has e~ouaCcxv njc; cxtpfoe:wc;(179.9). 1
The Aristotelean colour of Calcidius' words is especially evident
in the combination rationem atque consilium, which strongly reminds
of µe:-.a:Myou xcxl 8LcxvoEcxc;, just quoted from Aristotle. In Ile:pl
e:tµcxpµbl1jc;this has been changed slightly into the expression
e~ em)..oyLaµou~ 8LcxvoCcxc;. In the next part of the argument about
human freedom Calcidius has Stoic philosophy in mind, though
he does not mention this disertis verbis.It is an anticipation, put
in very mild terms, of the explicit polemic with the Stoa, to which
the second part of the tractatus is devoted. The purport of these
words is easy to see. Put briefly Calcidius says: "man's reason and
reasonable choice are often deceived by all kinds of things. In view
of this one can say that man sins involuntarily, but that is only
a way of speaking to emphasize the sinister influences to which
we are exposed. In reality we act by our free will." A similar
argument can be found in eh. 157, which we will examine presently.
IN ANIMO PRINCIPALE 't'O ~ye:µovLXOV ASSENSVS auyxcx-.ti8e:aLc; APPE-
TITVS opµ~ The juxtaposition of the last two terms in this context
is after the manner of Chrysippus. In contrast to Zeno and Clean-
thes Chrysippus concentrated everything in the ~ye:µovLx6v: opµC>µe:v
XIX't'(X
't'OU't'O
't'O µepoc;xcxl <7U'(XIX't'IX't'L8eµe:8cx (SVF II 896) and
't'OU't'Cf>
't'O~ye:µovLxov ev -.cxu-.cj>
cpcxv-.cxaEcxv,
auyxcx-rti8e:aLv,
opµ~v,Myov auve:EAYJcpe:
(SVF II 826). 2 ANTICIPATIO 1tp6AYJ~Lc; PROPTEREAQVE VI The
most important word in this sentence is dicimur: it is only a way
of speaking, to which in itself no exception needs to be taken.
c) Divination
[157] These things being so, divination stays unimpaired,
so that no authority is being withdrawn from prognostication;
in fact, someone who knows beforehand, can, when fate has
instructed him in such a way, give advice either to undertake
something or not to do so and the astrologer will correctly and
1 This same notion plays an important part in his short paragraph -rwv
xor.pa.'Apuno-rif:>.oui;xe:pl -rou itp' ~µ°Lv,part of De anima lil»-i Mantissa (p.
172-175, Bruns).
• Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die StoaI p. 91.
[157] OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE
rationally try to catch the right moment to undertake an act

according to the favourable position of stars and constellations,
so that, if this will happen, that will be the result. Now these
and similar things are the medicines in doubtful cases, in which
the salutary character of deliberation is the medical art. The
sciences also have their place and especially the proposal of laws;
for what else is law but command ordaining decent things and
preventing their opposites? Therefore, as the choice of these
is within our power, the honour of praise, the reproach of censure,
and the punishment of penalties, likewise the remaining encour-
agements of virtue and curtailments of malice are rightly pro-
vided for.
QVAE To what does this word refer? One might say to the whole
of the argument of eh. 155 and 156 and especially to human free
will. But perhaps it is better to regard quae as a summary of what
immediately precedes, namely the dangers involved in free choice.
In that case the train of thought gains even more clarity. Having
spoken about the dangers menacing the right judgment of human
freedom, Calcidius in this chapter deals with the different kinds
of support, to which man can turn. SALVA EST It should be noted
that here the author is not proving the possibility of divination.
The word salua does not concern its existence, but its full authority.
So on second thoughts we had better translate: "divination is
spared any danger to its authority". It is one of the useful acquire-
ments to lead man on the right path. Both prognostication and
astrology (cf. eh. 174) can supply advice to people not knowing
how and when to act. In a somewhat comparable manner Alexander
Aphr. has spoken about µ«v-.Lx~,though in a context, where he
polemizes vehemently with Stoic views on divination. (Ilept
elµ«pµev'1)c;eh. 31, see above p. 35). NE In non-classical Latin
ne can be the equivalent of ut nonin consecutive clauses. (Leumann-
Hofmann-Szantyr, Lateinische Grammatik II. Syntax und Stilistik
§ 347 y). However, the possibility should not be excluded, that
ne has its normal meaning as a final conjunction. In that case the
train of thought would be as follows: "Our argument in the preceding
chapter has saved divination, in order to warrant the authority of
prognostication". CONSILII SALVBRITAS The use of the word salu-
britas according to Waszink points in the direction of Numenius,
who seems to have had a special liking for this notion, as Van
Winden has shown (o.c. 36-37). To me, however, this clue seems
to be too small to be of any importance, unlike the use of this
term in 185.1 (see above, p. 19). In contrast to the passages Van
Winden is speaking about, the word is used here only metaphori-
cally. The imagery can be made clear in this way: "healthy delib-
eration is like a surgeon, who makes use of medical methods."
The methods at the service of deliberation are such things as
divination, law, praise, punishment. SCISCENS HONESTA, PROHI-
BENS CONTRARIA This is a Stoic definition of law: 1tpOG"C'otX"C'LXOVµev
WV 7t0Ll)"C'toV,CX.1totyope1mxov 8e WV OU 7t0Ll)'t'EOV(SVF III 314) and
lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda
sunt prohibetque contraria (SVF III 315). The text which Waszink
quotes from Alexander Aphr. is also Stoic, because it is taken from
a paragraph, where Alexander is reporting a Stoic argument. It
is not the only place in the tractatus, where a Stoic tenet is used to
prove a Platonic point of view. LAVDISQVE HONOR One of the
main moral objections to Stoic doctrine about fate was the fact
that praise and punishment and the like were made impossible,
for, when everything is fully determined, man is neither to be
blamed nor to be praised. 1 1tw<;h' &v euMy<.,)<;ot µev elev ev e1toc(voL<;,
ot 8e ev lj,6yoL<;; asks Alexander Aphr. (c. 16, 187. 26). Aristotle
himself had already raised this point in his argument in the above-
mentioned chapters of Eth. Nie.: x.01.oc~ouaL yocp xoct -rLµwpouv-rocL
't'OU<;8p&v-rot<;µox8lJpOC ••• "C'OU<;
8e 't'OCXOCAOC
1tpcx-r't'OV't'ot<; ≤
't'LfLW<rLV,
't'OU<;
µev 1tpo-rpelj,ov-rec;, 8e xwMaov-re<; (II13 b 23-26).
't'OU<;
As was the case with divination, here too there is no question
of a polemic with the Stoa. Calcidius is far from using the existence
of praise etc. as a weapon against Stoic doctrine; instead he points
out that these things are the expedients to be used by human
freedom. Whereas usually in anti-Stoic criticism praise etc. are
important proofs for the doctrine of free will, here their function
is only to act as instruments of free will, which has been proved
to exist in a quite different, more Platonic and metaphysical
way.
1 Cf. Dom David Amand, Fatalisme etLiberti dans l'Antiquite grecque

(Louvain 1945), p. 576 sqq. The aim of Amand's voluminous book can be
seen from the sub-title: Recherches sur la survivance l' argumentation
de morale
antifataliste de Carneade chez les philosophes etgrecs les theologiens chretiens
des quatre premiers siecles.In the pages referred to he gives a Reconstitution
conjecturale de l'argumentation Carneade.
de
OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE 43
d) Fortune and chance

[158] Now, having described providence, fate both as an essence
and in its actuality, the things within human power and those
which occur according to fate's decree, we shall examine for-
tune and chance. He says that the full power of fortune is in
the affairs of man, chance being competent in another domain.
All that befalls things lifeless or living beings devoid of
reason, not through nature or art, is said to have happened by
chance; things befalling men, either favouring their affairs or
hindering them, are regarded as fortuitous and as ruled by
fortune.
Now of causes one is principal, the other incidental. The
principal cause of undertaking a journey is some business or the
inspection of an estate or anything of this kind, the incidental,
e.g. when the sun and heat burn those departed on a journey,
the tanning of the face, which follows. So we shall say that both
fortune and chance are causes incidental to the principal cause,
so that the principal cause is in fate, the accidental causes are
in fortune and chance. And because things happening partly
obey necessity, partly take place ordinarily and frequently,
partly occur seldom, fortune as well as chance belong to those
occurring seldom; fortune's irrational and surprising event
originates from human design, chance however stands apart
from this, since what happens by chance belongs to the domain
of lifeless things or dumb animals.
[159] To recapitulate briefly: when two causes originating from
an intention of ours meet in such a way, that not our intention,
but something quite different and unexpected is actualized,
that is a jest of fortune, e.g. when someone secretly buries a
treasure and afterwards a farmer intending to propagate a vine
or some other plant, while digging a trench, finds it; certainly
neither did he who buried the treasure take this trouble in order
to have it found by someone else, but to fetch it back, when he
would need to bring it forth, nor had the farmer been working
to find a treasure, but to dig a trench, and yet both experienced
an unexpected fortune. For that reason fortune may rightly
be defined as follows: fortune is the meeting of two simultaneous
causes originating from an intention, from which meeting some-
thing unexpected and amazing results, for instance if a creditor
tired of reclaiming a debt, appears on the forum to provide
himself with advocates and the debtor comes to the same place
on some errand, and next the debtor accosted in the presence of
the advocates pays out the long-standing debt; for both men had
a different reason to appear on the forum and that which was
not intended was done rather than that which was already on
the point of being done.
So in the same way chance will be the meeting of two simul-
taneous causes not connected with reason in lifeless things or
dumb animals, for instance when wild beasts locked in an enclo-
sure after breaking out return of themselves to the same enclo-
sure or when we say a stone fell of itself.
About fate and that which is within human power, also about
fortune and chance, enough has been said.
NVNC The parallel with pseudo-Plutarch, broken off at

190.13 is once more resumed. The 7th chapter of Ile:pt e:tµocpµl:vlJ<;
starts with these words: 1te:pt8e 'tij<; TUXlJ<; xoct -rou ocu-roµi-rouxoct
e:t 't'L1totpix-rocu-roc vuv l)µ'i:v).e:x-rl:ov(571 e). But although
6e:wpe:'i:-rocL,
there are some obvious correspondences in that chapter with
Calcidius eh. 158 and 159, the parallel is by no means as close as
in preceding chapters. There is in fact a striking difference. As we
have seen in former capita, the doctrine is occasionally supported
by a quotation from the sacred text. Now pseudo-Plutarch 572 b-c
quotes a passage from the beginning of the Phaedo (58 a) and then
enlarges on the use of the word cruvl:~lJ(58 a 6) : e.v yixp -rou-roL<; -ro
> > \ - c L > >
CJUVl>t"lJ
• L~ J
oux otV't'L
't'OU yi;;yove:v
I
otXOUcrt'l>OV,
L
<1./V\ot
.!.'\ '\ \
7t0/\U
'\ I
µot/\1\0V
-'\ '\
e:x cruvopo-
'I>
µ'lj<;-rLvo<;ocMwv ix1tE~lJ,cliJ.ou 1tpo<;/t.).).oye:yov6-ro<;. This use of a

Platonic text would have suited Calcidius' argument in eh. 159
extremely well; its omission is therefore quite remarkable. FOR-
TVNA ••• CASV The elucidation of these notions has a Peripatetic
background, just as in the preceding chapters. In fact Aristotle
himself has dealt with these problems in Physics B eh. 4-6. He
confines TUXlJto the sphere of human action, whilst he considered
as the wider idea (e.1tt1tM'i:ov197 a 36). As can be seen
-rocu-r6µoc-rov
in Waszink's notes, this is faithfully repeated by Aetius and
pseudo-Plutarch. For Calcidius, however, the two notions are of
equal status, each being kept to its own sphere. This corresponds
with the statement of Nemesius, of whom there are more remark-
able echoes in these chapters. QVAE ENIM VEL This sentence,
up to dicuntur verbally resembles the text of Nemesius: -rou 8e
OTHER NOTIONS RELATED TO FATE 45
CXU't'O(LCX.'t'OU,
't'IX 't'W\I (X~UX,6>\I
~ &:>.6y6>v
GU!J,7t't'6>(LCX't'CX,
&veu cpuae6>c;
xrxl.
-rex_vljc;.(eh. 39 p. 313 Matth.).
CAVSARVM VERO Pseudo-Plutarch starts his treatment of the
a~-rL~ TUX.lJ·
subject with these words: rxt-rLov!J.&V Calcidius, however,
before the actual explanation first wanted to clarify the distinction
betweenfortuna and casus, which he had already mentioned briefly
in his summary in eh. 145: si quidemex nostro disposito coepta erunt,
(184.2-3).
fortuita, si sine nostra institutione, casu prouenire dicuntur.
Having made this distinction he now starts the explanation proper,
which is a shortened version of pseudo-Plutarch's argument in
eh. 7, which ultimately goes back to Aristotle's doctrine in Physics
B 4-6. Unfortunately, this abbreviation is no change for the
better. The omission of pseudo-Plutarch's rxfoov TL ~ TUX.lJ is a
mistake; this principle should have been stated clearly. Besides
Calcidius might have done better by first giving some examples
of principal and incidental causes in general, as Aristotle and
pseudo-Plutarch do. ACCIDENS It is surprising that the tanning
of the skin is called causa accidens.Obviously this tanning should
rather be called the incidental consequence than the incidental
cause of what happens, so that we have to assume a mistake by
Calcidius. If he had argued correctly, he would have stated that
the journey, of which negotiatio, not coloratio, is the causa princi-
palis (or causa finalis), might itself be called the causa accidensof
the coloratio. COMMVNITER ERGO This sentence up to dicemus
is a clear reminiscence, indeed almost a translation of Phys. 197 a 32:
fo-rL !J.&Vouv &!J.cp6>
rxforx, xrx8ocm:pe!plj't'CXL,xrx-rix <ru!J.~e~1jx6c;.ET
QVIA Here we are strongly reminded of Phys. 197 a 33-35 (imme-
diately following the last quotation) :-xrxl. ~ TUX.lJ xrxl.1 -ro rxu-r6!J.rx-rov-
y(yvea8rxL !L~ tX7tAWc;
ev -rote; ~8ex_O(LCVOLc; !J,1j8' 6>c;e1tl. 't'O 7t0AU2 and
Phys. 196 b I0-13: e1teL8~ opW(LeV't'IX !J,&V&el. 6>GCXU't'6>c; yw6(LeVrx,
't'IX8e 6>c;e1tl.7tOAU,cprxvepov rxMrx ~ 't'UX,lj)..eye-rrxL
<)'t'Lou8e't'tpou 't'OU't'(l)\I
ou8e 't'O OC7t0't'UX,ljc;,Ot>'t'e't'OUe~ &vocyxljc;xrxl. &el. Ot>'t'e't'OU6>c;e1tl.7tOAU.
RARO ACCIDVNT The classification of chance and fortune in the
sphere of rare occurrences is normal in Aristotelean thinking. In
Aristotle's words which were just quoted this was indeed implied
1 Note the remarkable similarity between et fortuna et casus and xd

7l't'UJ(ljxcd 't'Ootu't'6µot't'OV.
8 The consequence can be found in Ammonius, In Arist. de interpr.,
142. 13-15: 1tepl 3i: 't'Oen' i!Aot't''t'OV
ev3ex6µevov Mo 't'otU't'ot
ixou«nv, "Vi't'E 't'UJ(ljXotl
't'Ootu't'6µot't'ov.
and it is explicitly said in the texts quoted by Waszink and in the

words of Ammonius quoted in note 2 on p. 45. As can be seen from
rari exempli (190.10-n), rarus is indeed used to render t1t' ~AotT't'ov.
However, one should also take notice of the term <rnocvLot; which
is used by some of the authors quoted.
ET FORTVNAE QVIDEM Aristotle defines 't'U):'1j as follows: oth·(ot
XotTocauµ~e~Y)XOt; ev To!t; XotToc Twv EvexocTou (197 a 5-6).
1tpooc(peaLv
This is faithfully repeated by pseudo-Plutarch 572 b. Obviously
propositum must be regarded as the rendering of 1tpooc(peaLt;.THE-
SAVRVM This example devised by Aristotle has often been repeated.
Some instances are to be found in the notes in Waszink's edition.
NEQVE QVI CONDIDIT cf. Nemesius eh. 39: OUT& yocp o 8ett; o(JT(I)
eupe!v, OUT&o eupwv o(JT(l)t;C>pu~ev.Wt; eupe!v
-d8eLxev, Wt; 't'OU't'OV
81Jaotup6v(p. 313 Matth.). Apart from Calcidius' greater verbosity
there is again a remarkable similarity in the structure of the
sentence. QVARE SIC ETIAM Again this corresponds almost ex-
actly with the text of Nemesius: opt~ovTotL yocpniv T0):1JV 0"0µ1tTwaLv
xoct auv8poµ~v 800 otMwv, OC'TCO 7CpOotLpfoewt;
niv ocpx~vex6vT(l)V,xoct
't'L7Cotp'8 1tecpuxevOC'TCO't'&AOOV't'(l)V
/1)..)..o (p. 313 Matth. ). VT CVM The
examples Calcidius puts forward do not clarify the simultaneity
of more causes. VLTRO This word is a much better translation
of otUToµocTOVthan casus.
Calcidius' discussion of fortune and chance in these chapters
owes very much to Aristotelean philosophy, especially to Aristotle's
handling of the problem in Physics B 4-6. Yet in all respects
pseudo-Plutarch provides a much stronger echo of Aristotle:
eh. 7 of Ilept etµocpµtv'Y)t;
might almost be called a paraphrase of
the chapters from the Physics. In fact Calcidius' argument, espec-
ially in eh. 159, shows a stronger resemblance to Nemesius, as
was shown in some striking examples.
B. REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF FATE
1. FOUR STOIC OBJECTIONS
[160] But because there are several arguments which are
put forward against this doctrine, these must be set forth and
refuted; for only then Plato's doctrine will have been put on
firm foundations. They say: "So, if God knows all things from
the beginning, before they happen, and not only the phenomena
of heaven, which are bound by a fortunate necessity of unbroken
blessedness as by a kind of fate, but also those thoughts and
desires of ours; if he also knows that, which is contingent by
nature, and controls past, present and future and that from the
beginning, and if God cannot be mistaken, the conclusion must
be that all things are arranged and determined from the begin-
ning, things said to be within our power as well as fortuitous
and chance events".
Next they infer that, because all these things have been deter-
mined long before, all things taking place take place according
to fate, and that also laws, exhortations, reprehensions, instruc-
tions and the like are all bound by the stipulations of fate, be-
cause, if it is decreed that something is to befall a person, at the
same time also that is determined, through the power or service
of which it is bound to take place; so that, if to someone is to
befall safety during a voyage, that will befall him, not when any
other pilot, but when that particular pilot is guiding his ship, or
if it is to befall some state to enjoy good institutions and customs,
e.g. Sparta, this is bound to happen by the laws of Lycurgus.
Likewise, if someone is bound to become righteous like Aristides,
the education by his parents will give assistance to him in obtain-
ing righteousness and fairness.
[161] They say it is clear that the arts, too, are subject to
the decree of fate, for from this cause it has been arranged long
before, which patient will become well again by whose medical
help; that, in fact, it happens frequently that a sick person is
cured, not by a doctor, but by an unskilled person, when fate's
stipulation is such. There is a similar state of affairs in the case
of praises, censures, punishments and rewards; for it frequently
REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS [16o]
happens that because of the obstruction of fate noble acts not

only fail to produce any praise, but even lead to censure and
punishments.
Now they say that divination shows clearly that events are
decreed long before; for that, if the decree would not precede,
prophesiers could not have had access to its plan.
They say that, however, the motions of our souls are only
functioning as servants of the decrees of fate, since actions
take place necessarily through us by fate's acting; that, in this
way, man has the status of those things of which it is said 'with-
out them no action can take place', just as motion or rest cannot
exist without space.
SED QVIA In a not dissimilar way Alexander Aphr., after his

concise synopsis of the Peripatetic view of fate in eh. 7 of his Ilepl.
starts the refutation of the Stoic ideas: -rn'rWV3o~wv
elµotpµev11i;,
7totp' ocll~Aoti; 6eaeL yvwpLµw-repov'r<X.Al)6ti;
7tOL~aoµev (171.20-21,
Bruns). But whereas Alexander proceeds to an extensive examina-
tion of Stoic doctrine, Calcidius confines himself to a few important
points. We must bear in Inind, that in the positive part of the
tractatus some important details of Stoic theory have already
been criticized between the lines. Now, however, the refutation
becomes explicit, for it is only when the last annoying obstacles
to Platonic doctrine have been cleared, that the latter may be
considered to be well founded.
Now Theiler (o.c. p. 92) says: "Auch Chalcidius hat einen pole-
Inischen Teil, der nun nicht der platonischen Losung, die der Ti-
maioskommentar zu vertreten hat, vorangestellt ist, sondern
Initten hinein 193.15-204.2 Init darauf sichtlich miihsamem Zuriick-
greifen auf den friiheren Zusammenhang". In my opinion this
assertion of Theiler's betrays the fact that he has overlooked an
important aspect of Calcidius' poleinic: indeed this poleinic is not
so much an attack on the Stoa, but rather, as the author says
himself, a defence against some Stoic objections to the Platonic
doctrine of fate, which has just been elucidated. This matters very
much, for the Stoic attack is aimed at some of the theories expound-
ed in the first part of Calcidius' treatise. So it is only natural that
Calcidius reverts to these theories. Indeed, his argument is con-
sistent with the latter. There can of course be difference of opinion
about the quality of the argument, which has some weak parts,
[I6o] FOUR STOIC OBJECTIONS 49
but I cannot see any motive to speak about "miihsamem Zuriick-

greifen".
AIVNT Though not sharply divided, four Stoic arguments can
be distinguished in eh. 160 and 161. They are: (1) God's prescience,
193.17-194.4; (2) The doctrine of the conjatalia, 194.4-13; (3)
Unexpected experiences, 194.14-20; (4) Prophecy, 194.20-22.
In the last part of eh. 161 (194.22-25) we find the conclusion to
be drawn concerning human freedom of action.
SI DEVS The same problem is raised by Alexander Aphr. Ilept
elµotpµtvYji:;c. 30: 't'O 8e Atyew eiS')..oyove!votL 't'OU<:;
6eoui:; 't'OCfo6µevot
1tpoeL8evotL {ft't'07tOVyocp 't'O MyeLV exdvoui:; cxyvoei:v't'L 't'&v fooµevwv)
xott 't'OU't'OAotµ~&.vov't'oti:;
xot't'otcrxeu&.~eLv
1teLpoca6otL8L' otu't'ou 't'O 1t&.v't'ot
e~ cxv&.yx1ji:;'t'e ytvea6otLxott xot6' elµotpµtVYJVOt,'t'eCXA1j6ei:;Ot,'t'eeiS1.oyov
(200.12-15). It is also found in Boethius' Consolatio Philosophiae
V 3: "Nimium, "inquam, "aduersari ac repugnare uidetur praenoscere
uniuersa deum et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta
prospicit deus neque jalli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod
prouidentia futurum esse praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non fact a
hominum modo sed etiam consilia uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla
erit arbitrii libertas... " (3-5). NECESSITATE ••. DVBIAM These
two terms refer to eh. 155, where necessarium and dubium or
ambiguum were defined as species of the possibile. QVASI QVODAM
These words are the translation of otov, as is proved by 46.20,
where quasi quaedam nutriculais the rendering of otov 't'L6~v1lv
(Timaeus 49 a 6). The vague expression is somewhat surprising,
but perhaps Calcidius wants to add a touch of authenticity to
the objections of his opponents, who thus are represented as arguing
very cautiously: "In the regularity of the phenomena of heaven
there must be something at work, which for instance could be called
fate". DECRETA This word is adequate, because in Calcidius'
terminology it is specially used in the domain of fate. In the trans-
lation of the Timaeus the words immutabilis decreti(36.21) are the
Latin equivalent for elµotpµevoi:;(Tim. 41 e 2) and in eh. 145 decretum
is used as a substantive synonymous with jatum. NOSTRA POTES-
TATE ••• FORTUITA ••• CASIBVS Here again Calcidius carefully
sticks to the terms which he has explained in the first part of eh. 158
(191.20-21).
LEGES This passage, up to suppliciaque afferant in the next
chapter, is the Stoic attack on the remarks in the second part of
eh. 157 (191.13-17). As stated above (p. 41), that chapter deals
4
50 REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS [161]
with the support to which man's freedom can turn in order to keep
on the right path. All these things, as law, exhortation, blame,
are remedia (191.12). They are also, as it were, supplements to
human freedom, with which they are firmly connected. The point
of view of the Stoics is represented as diametrically opposed to
these tenets, for, according to them, all these things are completely
governed by fate. Two arguments are put forward to prove this,
viz., the conception of confatalia and, in the next chapter, the
irregularity of events in this domain. VNA This is the crucial
word, summarizing the essence of the doctrine of confatalia. Testi-
monia for this doctrine can be found in SVF II 956-958. It is the
Stoic answer to the so-called &.pyoi;t..6yoi;,the reasoning of which
can be illustrated by fr. 957, taken from Origenes, Contra Celsum
II 20: "If fate decrees that a sick person will recover, this will
happen, whether he calls for a doctor or not. The same holds, when
it is fated that he will not recover; in that case, too, the calling
for a doctor is superfluous. So the conclusion is: ~-roL8e:e:tµ.cxp-rcxl
ex-riji; v6aou ~ &tµ.cxp-rcx(
aoL &.vcxa-rijvcxL aoL µ.~ &.vcxa-rijvcxL
• µ.ixniv &pcx
-rov £cx-rp6v".With such arguments the opponents of Stoic
&taixye:Li;
doctrine wanted to show that the Stoa condemned men to inactivity,
all endeavour towards a certain goal being useless. What did the
Stoa answer in defence? Chrysippus' answer can be found in Cicero's
De JatoXIII 30 ( = SVF II 956) : Quaedam enim sunt, inquit, in
rebus simplicia, quaedam copulata. Simplex 'Mest: orietur illo die
Socrates'; huic siue quid fecerit, siue non fecerit, finitus est moriendi
dies. At si ita Jatum est: 'N ascetur Oedipus Laio', non poterit dici: 'siue
juerit Laius cum muliere, siue non ;Juerit' copulata enim res est et
confatalis: sic enim appellat, quia ita f atum sit et concubiturum cum
uxore Laium et ex ea Oedipum procreaturum. In the passage which
we are now discussing this defensive argument is turned into an
offensive one, directed against the Platonic point of view, which
Calcidius elucidated in eh. 157. Perhaps a real Stoic opponent
would have reasoned with greater subtlety, but of course it is not
unusual to represent arguments of an opponent as a little weaker
than they really are.
ARTES QVOQVE At first sight it seems that the argument con-
cerning the conjatalia is carried on, but with denique fieri frequenter
in l.16 the argumentation is changed and a fresh point is raised,
viz., the fact, that things often happen contrary to expectation
and calculation. This argument can be summed up in the words
[161] FOUR STOIC OBJECTIONS 51
Sed praeter spem aiunt aliquanta prouenire, which constitute the

opening sentence of eh. 172, where Calcidius will try to answer this
particular objection. REPREHENSIONEM SVPPLICIAQVE In eh. 172
Socrates and Aristides are mentioned as examples. DIVINATIONEM
This indeed was an important proof for Stoic doctrine. In SVF
the relevant texts (II 939-944) are headed by the title Vaticinatio
probat Jati necessitatem.
1 Fr. 939, taken from Diogenianus (apud
Euseb. prep. Ev.) is a good parallel to Calcidius: µ~ yocp &v -roci;

't'WV µocvnwv 1tpopp~O'eLi;a.A:1j8e°Li;
e!V(XL<p1JO'LV,
et µ~ 7t(XV't'(X
U7t0 -r'iji;
1tepLe£xov-ro.Both the firm position of divination in
elµ(Xp(J,SV1Ji;
antiquity and the high value attached to it by Stoic philosophy
made it obligatory for any other thinker to pay much attention
to this subject and to develop a plausible theory within the frame-
work of his own system. Calcidius has already spoken about these
questions in eh. 153,154 and 157 and he will do so again in eh.
169-171. ANIMORUM In order to explain this sentence we must
turn to Alexander Aphr. eh. 13. Here Alexander is criticizing
Stoic doctrine in its attempt to find some corner for human free-
dom: OCV(XLpouv-rei;
yocp 't'O &~OUO'L(XV
~xeLV't'OV&v8pw1tov tji; (Xtpfoe&>i;
AtyouaLV&<p
-re X(Xt1tpoc~ewi;'t'WVOCV't'LXeLµevwv 1
~µ°Lve!V(XL't'O yLv6µevov
X(Xt3L' ~µwv. (181.13-14). In order to save human freedom Chrys-
ippus had used the example of a cylinder: Sicut lapidem cylindrum
si per spatia terrae prona atque derupta iacias, causam quidem ei
et initium praecipitantiae feceris, mox tamen ille praeceps voluitur,
non quia tu id iam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus eius et forma
uolubilitas habet: sic ordo et ratio et necessitas f ati genera ipsa et
principia causarum mouet, impetus uero consiliorum mentiumque
nostrarum actionesque ipsas uoluntas cuiusque propria et animorum
ingenia moderantur(Gellius, N.A. VII 2, n). 2 An answer to such
efforts can be found in Alexander Aphr. eh. 13 and Nemesius eh. 35.
In both cases the answer amounts to emphasizing the correct use
of some prepositions: -roci;3Loc-rwv ~CJlWV u1to tji; etµ(Xpµev1Ji;
yLvoµ.sv(Xi;
(xLv~aeLi;)e1tt -ro°Li;~CJ)oLi;e!v(XL1.eyouaLv (Alex. Aphr. 182.12-13),
oox &pa.-ro 3L' ~µwv u1totji; etµa.pµtV1)i;yLv6µevove<p'~µ°Lv&O"t'L.(Nemes.
p. 293 Matth.). 3 Both these texts are a close parallel to Calcidius'
1 Fragment 943 consists of Calcidius eh. 160 and 161. This does not do
full justice to the contents of these chapters for, as I have tried to show,
they also contain some very different arguments.
• Cf. Cicero, De Jato XIX 43.
8 Cf. Theiler, o.c. p. 78 sqq.
per nos agente Jatoin l.24. MINISTERIA In the given context

this word can almost be translated by 'slavery'. True enough,
Chrysippus had tried to spare mankind this indignity, but his
endeavour only won the ridicule of his opponents and Oenomaus
which Chrysippus had introduced
spoke about the ~µ.L8ou11.e:lot,
(SVF II 978).
2. CALCIDIUS' ANSWERS
a) God's prescience does not jeopardize man's freedom
[162] What are we to answer against these doctrines laid down
so contentiously and with even greater violence than fate itself
possesses? Our answer is: That it is true that God knows all
things, but that He knows everything according to its own
nature: that which is subject to necessity as submissive to neces-
sity, the contingent, however, as provided with such a nature
that deliberation opens a way for it. For God does not know
the nature of what is contingent in such a way as that which is
certain and bound by necessity (for in that case He will be de-
ceived and fail to know), but in such a way that he really knows
the contingent according to its nature. So what do we say? That
God knows all things and His knowledge is of all time, and further
that the things He knows are partly divine and immortal, partly
perishable and temporal; that the substance of immortal things
is immutable and immovable, that of mortal things changeable
and contingent, and that now it has this condition, now another,
because of its inconstant nature. Thus also God's knowledge of
divine things, which have a sure happiness protected by contin-
uous necessity, is sure and necessary, both because of the certain
grasp of the knowledge itself and on account of the substance
of the things He knows; on the other hand His knowledge of
uncertain things is indeed necessary, viz., His knowledge that
these things are uncertain and their course contingent-for they
cannot be different from their nature-, yet they are themselves
possible in both directions rather than subject to necessity.
[163] So contingent things are not inflexibly arranged and
determined from the beginning with the sole exception of the
very fact, that they must be uncertain and depend upon a con-
tingent course. Therefore it is completely fixed and decided from
the beginning that the nature of man's soul is such, that it now
applies itself to virtue, now shows preference for evil (exactly
[162] GOD'S PRESCIENCE AND MAN'S FREEDOM 53
as the body is sometimes nearest to health, sometimes to illness).

But it is neither decided nor commanded, which particular
person is to be good or bad, and therefore there are laws, in-
structions, consultations, exhortations, cautions, education,
strict rules for nourishment, praise, blame and similar things,
because the choice to live rightly is in our power.
These chapters are the reply to the first part of eh. 160: "God's
prescience proves that all things are completely governed by fate".
ANCEPS VERO This definition of the contingent is not the general
one given at the end of eh. 155: Dubium est possibile cuius etiam
contrarium possibile.(190.4-5). It is rather a shortened version of
the way in which the class of the so-called peraeque dubiawas
defined in the next chapter: Erit ergo eorum quae peraeque dubia
sunt optio penes hominem, qui, utpote rationabile animal, cuncta
reuocat ad rationem atque consilium. (190. 12-13).1 It is of course
quite understandable, that a definition of this special part of the
dubia has been preferred to a description of the general character
of contingent things. Human freedom remains the main object
of interest and the problem of God's prescience is not discussed
abstractly, but in close relation to man's free choice. DEi SCIENTIA
The concurrence of God's knowledge and its objects seems to be
inspired by Tim. 29 b5-c2, where Timaeus points out the similarity
of an object and the account given of it: 'C'ouµev o?iv µov(µou xixt
~e:~ixlouxixt µe:'C'oc vou XIX'C'1XCfl1XVouc;
µov(µouc; xixt &.µe:'C'IX7t'C'6>'C'ouc;-xix6'
l5aov ot6v 'C'e:xixt &.ve:t..eyx'C'oLc;
1tpoa-ljxe:LMyoLc; e:!vixLxixt &.vLX~'C'oLc;,
'C'OU'C'OU
8e:'i:µl]8ev e,.J..e:(1te:LV-'C'OUc;
8e 'C'OU1tpoc;µev exe:'i:vo&.1te:Lxixa6ev'C'oc;,
l>v'C'oc;
8e e:tx6voc;e:tx6'C'ixc;&.vocMyov 'C'E: Both Albinus and
exe:(vwvl>V'C'IXc;.
Apuleius have made use of this text. In De Platoneeh. 6 Apuleius
is speaking about the two essentiae, one of which is an object of
the intellect and the other is known by the senses. Apuleius con-
cludes this chapter as follows: intellegendi substantia quoniam
constanti nititur robore, etiam quae de ea disputantur, ratione
stabili et fide plena sunt; at eius, quae ueluti umbra et imago est
superioris, rationes quoque et uerba, quae de ea disputantur, incon-
Albinus Epitome 4.3 shows an even greater
stanti sunt disciplina.
resemblance to Calcidius. Albinus is dealing with human Myoc;.
1 This parallel seems to me much more obvious than the reference to

eh. 157 given in Waszink's edition ad p. 195.2-5.
This Myo<;is double: the emo-Tr)µovLxo<; has the VOYJ'C'CX

1,.6yo<; as its
Myo<;deals with cxlcr8YJ'C'IX.
object, the 8o~cxO"C'LXO<; This has its conse-
quences: "06e:v o µev &mO"C"YjµOVLXO<;
'C'O~e~CXLOV lx.e:Lxcxt µ6vLµov,
&n 1te:pL't'WV~e:~cx(wvxcxtµov(µwvu1tixpx.wv, o8e m6cxvo<;xcxt8o~a.O"C'LXO<;
1toAU'C'O
e:lxo<;8ux'C'Oµ~ 1te:pL
'C'CX
µ6vLµa.e:tva.L. NECESSITATE PERPETVA
MVNITA FELICITAS cf. Jelici necessitate perpetuae beatitudinis
(193.18). AT VERO This sentence is the counterpart of de diuinis
quidem etc.,but there is a remarkable difference. If the parallel
had been complete, God's scientia would here have been called
incerta. It is of course easy to understand, that this conclusion
is not drawn because of its impious consequences. Therefore in
this case, instead of God's knowledge, the contingent character
of its objects receives the main attention. This has the additional
advantage that now the transition to the next chapter is easy and
smooth. The conclusion of Alexander Aphr.: iJ>O"C'e: xa.t ot 6e:ot
'C'CX
ev8e:x.6µe:va.
clv 6.><;ev8e:x.6µe:va.1tpoyLyvW(J)(OL&V (201.16-17) is of
course fairly similar to that of Calcidius, but this conclusion has
been reached by way of a wholly different argumentation. Alex-
ander's reasoning has a strictly logical character, whereas Calcidius
turns to metaphysics and bases his case on the fundamental dif-
ference between the world of true being and the sphere of tran-
sience. IN VTRAMQVE PARTEM cf. Alexander Aphr. c. 9: 'C'O
ev8e:x.6µe:v6v
'C'e:xcxt'C'O01t6'C'e:p'
l'C'Ux.e:v
y(ve:cr8a.( (174.30-175.1).
'C'LV(X
In later Platonism the problem of God's (or the gods') knowledge
of transient things is solved in a wholly different way. In prop.
124 of his Elements of Theology (no.10-23 Dodds} Proclus deals
with this question: Ilii<; 6e:o<;&.µe:p(O"C'w<; µev 'C'CXµe:pLO"C'CX
YLVW(J)(E:L,
&.x.p6vwi;
8e 'C'cx
lyx.pova.,'C'cx8e µ~ &.va.yxa.i:a.
&.va.yxa.(wi;,xa.t 'C'cx
µe:'C'a.~AYJ'C'cx
&.µe:'C'a.~A~'t'W<;,
xa.L61,.w<;1t1Xv't'a.
xpe:L'C"C'6vw<;
~ xa.'t'cx~v a.,n-wv'C'CX~Lv.
n
El ycxp&1ta.v,6 'C'L1te:pclv 1ta.pcx'C'OL<; 6e:oi:<;,
)((X'C'CX
~v (XU'C'WV lO"C'LV
l8L6Tr)'C'a.,
81j)..ov8~1tou6e:v6.><;oux.L xcx't'cx~v 'C'WV x.e:Lp6vwv q:>uo-Lvev
'C'OL<; oifoa. ~ yvwo-L<;
6e:oi:<; (XU'C'WVfo'C'CXL,&.ua )((X'C'CX~v a.,n-wvexe:(vwv
£~7lp'YjµSV'Yjv
1J1te:pox.~v. evoe:L8~<; &pa. )((XLIX7tlX.~<; ~ yv&o-L<; lO"C'a.L'C'&v
7tE:7tAYJ6UO"µevwv xa.t 1ta.6'Yj'C'WV.e:l &pcx)((XL'C'OyvwO"C'OV e:t'Yjµe:pLO"C'6v,
&.U' ~ 6e:(a.yvwo-L<; ixµepLO"C'O<;
)((XL ~ 'C'&vµe:pLO"C'WV • xa.t e:l µe:'C'a.~A'Yj'C'6v,
• xa.t e:t ev8e:x.6µe:vov,
ixµe:'C'IX~A'YJ'C'O<; ixva.yxcx(a.
• xa.t e:t &.6pLO"C'OV,6.>pLaµSV'Yj.
OUycxp IX7t0'C'WV x.e:Lp6vwv e:lo-8ex.e:'C'(XL
'C'O6e:i:ov~v yv&o-w, tva. olhw<;
~ yv&o-L<;lx.TI,6.><;'t'OyvwO"C'ov lx.e:Lq:>uo-e:w<;.
In his commentary Dodds remarks: "This attempt to picture
a grade of intellectual knowledge higher than v6Yjo-L<;
is in the main
[162] GOD'S PRESCIENCE AND MAN'S FREEDOM 55
post-Plotinian". 1 Similar views were held in the Alexandrian

school: OU yixp 8~ GUµ1totpot8eeLV -tjj puaeL TWV1tpotyµ1hwv~v TWV
8ewv yvw,m &ve~6µe8ot,J,yew (Ammonius in Arist. de interpr. c. 9,
p. 136.17-18 Busse) and xotl foTL TO otUTO-tjj µev cpuaeL-tjj eotUTOU
tv8ex6µevov, 't] 8e yvc::iaeLTWV8ewv OUXeTL &6pLGTOV &X>..'6>pLaµevov.
(id. p. 136.30-137.1). In Boethius' Consolatio Philosophiae such
views can also be found. At V 4, 1 Philosophia is starting her
answer to the problem of God's foreknowledge. According to her
this problem is very old and obscure; cuius caliginis causa est,
quod humanae ratiocinationis motus ad diuinae praescientiae simpli-
citatem non potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil
prorsus relinquetur ambigui.(2). In this preliminary remark the
essence of the answer is already included in the word simplicitatem.
The rule is: omne quod scitur non ex sua sed ex conprehendentium
natura cognoscitur (V 6.1). 2 God's natura is aeternitas. This has
its implications for His knowledge: scientia quoque eius omnem
temporis supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae
infinitaque praeteriti ac Juturi spatia conplectens omnia quasi iam
gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. (V 6.15).
However, let us leave Boethius and rather turn to another pas-
sage in Proclus, which deserves even more attention. In his Com-
mentary on Tim.29 c-d Proclus says: otuTol8e ot 8eo1xotl To yev1JTOV
&yev~Tw; xotl TO 8LotGTotTOV &8LotGT(XTW; tyvwxotaL xotl TO µepLGTOV
&µepE<rTw; xotl TO !:y:xpovov8LotLwvEw; xotl TO tv8ex6µevov &votyxotEw;
(in Tim.I 352.5-8). Most interesting is the rejection of the opposite
view: µ~ yixp ot1j8wµev, 6TLToti:; TWVyvWGTWV cpuaeaLVotl yvwaeL;
XotpotXT1)pE~oVTotL,
µ1j8' 6TLTO µ~ cx.potpo; oux &potp6;t<JTL7totp1X 8eoi:;,
o cpLMaocpo;IlopcpupLo;-ToUTOyixp oti5txei:vo; cx.vecp8ey~otTO,
Cl; (jl1JGLV
61tepT'!pp1JTOV &µeLvov(Hom. ~ 466)-&X>..'6TLToti:;Twv yLvwax6vTwv
8Lotcpopoti:;
&X>..oi:o;
yEyveTotL nj; yvwaew; o Tp61to; (id. 352.n-16).
Summed up very briefly, the difference between the two theses
is this: the character of knowledge agrees with the object (unum-
quidque pro natura ipsorum, Cale. 195.2-3) or with the subject
(Proclus and other Platonists, cf. Boethius' ex conprehendentium
natura). The consequence of the first view, i.e., that for God too
the contingent is contingent, has perhaps been drawn more implic-
1 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, a Revised Text with Translation,

Introduction and Commentary by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1962, p. 266.
1 Cf. V 4.25: Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui uim sed secun-
dum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.
REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS [163]
itly than explicitly by Calcidius in eh. 162, but there is in any

case a very remarkable correspondence with the view, which the
shocked Proclus ascribes to Porphyry. This similarity becomes
even more striking, when we bear in mind, that Proclus is comment-
ing on the same paragraph which, as we just showed, is the ulti-
mate base of Calcidius' argument in eh. 165. Sodano in his Porphyrii
in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta 1 assumes that
the idea censured by Proclus belongs to Porphyry's commentary

on the Timaeus and indeed to the same paragraph which Proclus
himself is elucidating.
Our conclusion can therefore be that both Calcidius and Porphyry
put forward similar views about God's knowledge of transient
and contingent things and that in both authors this view is based
upon Tim. 29 b-d.
NON ERGO This sentence is a reaction to the Stoic tenet of
eh. 160 Omnia certeex initio disposita atque decreta sunt (194.2-3).
NISI FORTE A very interesting parallel is provided by Origen,
Ile:pt e:tr{tjc;6.3: Mv 3e ·nc; -rocp&:rnj't'OtL
3ux 't'O µ~ OU ljie:ua&.a6ocL
't'OV
8e:ov't'IXµtAAOV't'Ot 1tpoe:yv(J)x6-r0t,we;-r&v 1tp0tyµa.-r(J)V XOtn)VOt"(XOtO'µtV(J)V,
AE:X't'toV1tpoc;'t'OV't'OLOU't'OV,<l't'LOtU't'O
't'OU't'O-rcj>8e:cj>
~yv(J)O"t'OtL
&pocp6-r(J)c;,
-ro µ~ &pocp6-r(J)c; -r6v3e:'t'LVIX-rov &v8p(J)7tOV xocl ~e:~oc((J)c;
~ou).e:a6otL
TIX
xpe:lnovoc~ o(h(J) 8e:A~O'e:Lv TIXx_e:(povoc, c':lO"t'e:
&ve:1t£3e:x-rov
ocu-rovfoe:a60tL
µe:-roc~oA'Yjc;
't'Yjc;
i1tt -rixauµcpepov-roc (314.4-9 Koe.). The train of thought
is indeed the same as in Calcidius 195.19-196.3. Two details in
Origen's text are quite remarkable: (1) the striking resemblance
of id ipsum(195.19) and ocu-ro-rou-ro.(2) the use of the term &pocp6-r(J)c;,
which reminds one of the word &pocp6c; which, according to Proclus,
Porphyry used when speaking about God's knowledge. PROPTER-
EAQVE This conclusion contradicts leges etiam et exhortationes et
obiurgationes et disciplinas quaeque huius modi sunt omnia teneri
Jatalibus condicionibus(194.5-7) and repeats the statements found
in the second half of eh. 157 (191.13-17). NVTRIMENTORVM CERTA
OBSERVATIO The inclusion of this strictly corporeal care among
moral and spiritual remedia may seem strange, but in eh. 168, too,
care for the body is mentioned beside other requirements: Corporis
quoque obsequium sufficiens animae uiribus esse debet ad tolerandum
exercitii laborem.(198.22-23). QVIA RECTE cf. quia horum electio
in potestate nostra (191.14-15).
est
1 Naples 1964, p. 28-29.

GOD'S PRESCIENCE AND MAN'S FREEDOM 57
b) An appendix: the correct use of praise and blame

[164] Therefore, when most existing things belong to our
authority, and some lie outside our power, ours are desire,
judgment, will, agreement, preparation, choice and avoidance;
not within our power are riches, glory, beauty, bravery and
other things which we can rather wish for than claim. This
being so, if by chance someone might want to suppose that things
not within our power belong to our authority, one may rightly
call such a person ignorant; consequently also the person, who
considers things in our personal power as lying outside that
sphere, in my opinion is ignorant. Indeed no one is praised for
obtaining good fortune, which is not within human power,
unless perhaps he is considered blessed (for prosperity is not
in his power), but in the agreements based on justice, in the
pains of moderation and the observance of the other virtues
we are justly praised, since virtue is free; and, when acting
contrarily, we are censured, because we are thought to sin on
purpose.
This chapter does not add much to the argument. It seems

merely a digression about the last two terms of the enumeration
in eh. 163, viz., lausuituperatio (196.4). It may also be, that Cal-
cidius intends this chapter as an answer to the objections in eh. 161
(Similis ratio est laudum etc.).In that case, however, the refutation
would not deserve that name, for the essence of the objection
was the exception taken at the fact, that quae recte gesta sunt
are often not praised, but censured. This problem is by no means
solved in the present chapter. The argument is as follows. First
Calcidius shows that from what precedes it may be concluded
(igitur) that some things, such as riches and glory, are not subject
to our decision, and that other things, such as judgment and
desire, are within our power. Those who hold the opposite view
are rather stupid. In conformity with the right idea, however,
praise and blame should be confined to the domain of our free will.
PRAESVMERE In the notes on eh. 144 b I tried to show, that this
verb could have the special meaning 'to grasp mistakenly', 'to be
mistaken in thinking' (cf. above p. 15). In the present text the
meaning may simply be 'to suppose', 'to assume'. Here too, how-
ever, praesumere is used to indicate a false opinion. Perhaps this
can give support to the meaning suggested for eh. 144 b. DENIQVE
58 REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS
NVLLVS cf. Alexander Aphr. eh. 27: &£ µev oi5v ~v e:x ye:ve:njc;o
cpp6vLµoc; 't'OLOU't'Ot;
xoct't'OU't'O
1tpoc;'t'OLt;&i.AoLt; 't'OLt;
U7t0njc; cpucre:wc;
OCU't'cj>
3e:3oµevoLc; e:!:x.e:v
7totp' E:XE:LVYJt;
Aot~WV,ou3' /S).wc;&v ~v e:1t' QCU't'cj> 't'O
e:!votL't'OLOU't'Cp, t>cr7te:p
ou3e 't'Oe:!vocL 3(1to3L~ AO"(LXcj>, ou3' &vE:7t1)VE:L't'O
e:!votL,a.U' e:6 Qt I)µ&.~E:'t' 0 we;
l't'Le:1tt't'cj>'t'OLOU't'Ot; l:x.wv7totp1X
njc; 6e:(occ;
cpucre:wc; 3C>pov't'YJALxou't'ov. (197.17-22). Although this idea is quite
similar to the thought of Calcidius, the context is different. In
fact the argumentation is the other way about, for Alexander is
using praise as a link in an argument to prove the freedom of virtue
-3Lix 't'OU't'O
e:cp'~µi:v 't't E:CJ't'LV xnjcrLc;(198.23-24) is the
~ 't'WVa.pe:TC>v
conclusion reached-, whereas Calcidius proves the usefulness of
praise by pointing to the freedom of virtue: siquidem uirtus libera
est (196.16). NISI FORTE One might say that there is a certain
amount of praise in calling a person happy. BEATVS Aristotle
considered external goods indispensable to reach a state of happi-
ness: {e:u3octµov(oc)cpoc(ve:TotL3'6µwc; xoctTwv e:xToc;&yoc6C>v
1tpocr8e:oµev1J,
e:t1toµe:v(Eth. Nie. I 9, 1099 a 31-32). Most interesting is
xoc6&.1te:p
also the view of Antiochus of Ascalon: Zeno in una uirtute positam
beatam uitam putat. Quid A ntiochus? Etiam, inquit, beatam, sed non
beatissimam. (Cicero, Acad. pr.II 134); cf. also Cicero, Tusc. disp.
V 22 and Seneca, Epist. 92, 14. VIRTVS LIBERA cf. the quo-
tation from the Politeia in eh. 154: liberam esse uirtutem(189.5)
and Waszink's notes.
3. A FRESH STOIC OBJECTION: PERVERSIO
a) J ntroduction
[165 a] Their next argument is: offences are not voluntary,
because every soul partaking in divinity by natural desire always
aspires to the good, yet sometimes errs in its judgment of good
and evil; for some of us consider pleasure as the highest good,
others riches, most glory and all other things rather than the
true good itself. The reason of their error is manifold. The first
is called 'double perversion' by the Stoics. This arises both
from the things themselves and from the glorification by the
people(?).
Von Arnim has included eh. 165-167 (as distinguished by Wrobel,

i.e., up to p. 198.19) in his SVF III as fragment 229. In his notes
Waszink suggests that eh. 168 ought to have been included as
well.
[165a] RERVERSIO 59
The first problem we have to solve is: what is the function of

these chapters in Calcidius' argument? Are they simply a digression
of some kind? Despite their striking verbosity this does not seem
the case. At first sight the fresh objection from the side of the Stoics,
with which chapter 165 opens, may appear quite sudden, but in
fact there is a close link with the preceding chapter. To see this
we have to read between the lines, paraphrasing I. 18-22 as follows:
"Let us grant you the liberty of man's choice, etc. Now you, Pla-
tonists, have a high opinion of the human soul, taking it to be of
divine origin and thus participating in divinity. Certainly such a
soul by nature will strive after the good. Yet what do we see?
A lot of errors in defining the supreme good. So in principle the
choice may be free, but people's actual choices, by going astray,
abolish this freedom, because they lead towards a wrong goal,
which had not been chosen. So after all behaviour is not sponta-
neous". If this paraphrase is right, the content of the Stoic objection
amounts to a disqualification of the remedia of human freedom,
which Calcidius has so enthusiastically enumerated in eh. 157.
As was the case with the con/ atalia,here too Calcidius makes it
appear, as if the Stoics are using an argument, viz., their doctrine
of 3LatG"t'pocp~.
for the purpose of attacking their opponents, whereas
in using it they were in fact rather on the defensive.
Testimonia for this doctrine of 8LatG"t'pocp~ can be found in SVF
III 228-236. The problem with which the Stoa was confronted,
was the fact that the pursuit of cx.pe:ni, which according to Stoic
doctrine was inherent in human nature, was obviously often
perverted. Pohlenz (Die Stoa,p. 123) says: "'Als Vemunftwesen
hat der Mensch von Natur nur die Zueignung zum Sittlichguten'
hat Chrysipp mit aller Entschiedenheit erkliirt; die Schlechtigkeit
kommt von aussen in ihn herein. Hier sind freilich die schlechten
Einfliisse so iibermachtig, dass kaum einer sich ihrer erwehrt."
This straying from the right path is called 8LatG"t'pocp~or perversion. 1
Instead of reporting this doctrine concisely Calcidius gives a
detailed account of it. Obviously he is quite interested in the subject,
so much so, that occasionally his style becomes florid, especially
in eh. 167. Thus these chapters in the end are indeed a digression,
although at the close of eh. 167 Calcidius, as we shall see, once
more finds rather a clever transition to return to his actual subject.
1 A similar idea has already been briefly sketched in eh. 156 (190.17-191.6).
SPONTANEA cf. Plato, Protagoras 345 d 9-e 1: ou8e:tc;-r&v aocp&v

&v8p&v~ye:'i:TotL
ou8evot&v8p6>7t(a)V 1 This maxim
ex6v-rotE~otµotp-rave:Lv.
of Socrates' intellectualism fits in very well with the fundamental
optimism of the Stoa. NATVRALIS .•• EXPETIT cf. Cleanthes'
view, as reported in SVF I 566: 7t(XVTotc; yocp &v8pw1touc;&cpopµocc;
~Xe:Lvexcpuae:wc;1tpoc;ocpe:'n)V.SVMMVM BONVM For the Stoa this
is &pe:'n). VOLVPTATEM .•. DIVITIAS •.. GLORIAM These terms are
juxtaposed, as if they were on an equal footing. We shall see that
in fact this is not so. The emphasis is very much on uoluptas;
riches and glory are even in a subordinate position. This prepon-
derance of uoluptas or ~8ov~ is easily accounted for: our experience
seems to tell us clearly that all people strive after pleasure, and
much attention has to be paid to this dangerous problem. An-
other veryl important factor, although not mentioned by Calci-
dius,is of course the rival doctrine of Epicurus, for whom ~80~
is the TtAoc;of man's endeavours. DVPLICEM PERVERSIONEM cf.
SVF III 228, quoted in Waszink's edition. The wording, which
Galenus ascribes to Chrysippus, is perhaps even closer to Calcidius:
8L't"'n)V
yocpe:lvotL
T~c;8Lot<r-rpocp~c; ex
"OJVotMotv,e-repotvµe:v XotTY)X~<re:wc;
TWV7t0AAWV &v8p6>7tWV yvoµtV1)V,hepotv 8'E~ otutjc; TWV1tpotyµa-rwv
EYYL
tjc; cpuae:wc;(SVF III 229a). DIVVLGATIONE FAMAE This expres-
sion should be the Latin equivalent of Xot'nJX1J<rLc; (-r&v auv6v-rwv
or -r&v 1toAA&v&v8pwnwv), but the meaning of these words is not
the same at all; Xot'nJX1J<rLc; according to the Thesaurus Graecae
Linguae IV 1350 means: Institutio, et quidem peculiariter ea, qua
prima scientiae alicujus rudimenta traduntur. The Lexicon of
Liddell and Scott agrees with this: "instruction by word of mouth",
but for the translation of SVF 228 and 229 a another sense is
suggested: "communication with companions, in bad sense".
Pohlenz (Stoa p. 124) translates 'Katechese <lurch die Umwelt'.
All this differs greatly from the meaning, which the Thesaurus
Linguae LatinaeV 1647 gives to diuulgatio: i.q. actus in publicum
proferendi, promulgatio.Now it may be possible to solve this prob-
lem. SVF III 233 quotes a text from Origen, contra CelsumIII 69,
In itself this does
we find 1te:pL~X1J<rLc;.
where instead of Xot'nJX1J<rLc;
not help much, for the meaning of this word is circumsonatio
(TGL VI 829), resounding, echoing(Liddell and Scott). Lampe's
1 Socrates' maxim is used in a different context in Tim. 86 d 7: xixxo~

µev ycxpixwv ou3e:!1;.
[165b] PERVERSIO 61
Patristic Greek Lexiconeven gives the translation instruction in

evil for the quotation from Origen. But when we turn to the cor-
responding verb, a solution is possible. Both the Thesaurus and
Liddell and Scott refer to Euseb., Prep. Evang.I ro. There we find
the following expression: 'Ha(o8oi; o! 't'e xux1.Lxot 1tepLl'JX.l'J!J.tVoL.
The following translations are given: celebro (TGLVI 829), pass.
to be noised abroad, to be celebrated (Liddell-Scott). The Latin verb
diuulgare according to the T LL can be used concerning res and
homines. In the second case the first meaning given is: in bonam
partem i.q. praedicare, proclamare aliquem. A text is quoted from
Tertullian, adv. Marc.4, 8 p. 439.12 destructor creatoris nihil magis
gestisset, quam spiritibus
a ipsius agnosci et diuulgari.
So the verbs 1tepLYJX.tW
and diuulgare can have a similar meaning.
If the same holds for the corresponding nouns, diuulgatio could be
the rendering of 1tepL~X.l'JO"L<;
and the meaning of both words (accord-
ing to Calcidius of course) would be 'glorification', 'being made
famous'. If that is right, famae, taken as a genit. subiectivus, can
very well have its original sense 'the talk of the multitude', 'that
which people say' (cf. 't'wv 1to'JJ..wvocv8pC:mwv,SVF III 229a). So
the translation of diuulgatio famae could be 'being celebrated by
the talk of the people'. I may add that with this explanation I
have only tried to explain, why Calcidius uses this term. In fact
the use of diuulgatio is wrong, as we shall see in eh. 167.
b) peruersio ex rebus
cc.)in the case of newborn babies
[165 b] For as soon as children are born and come forth from
the womb of the mother, their birth involves considerable pain,
because they migrate from a warm and humid residence to the
cold, dry air which envelops them; against this painful cold,
which the babies have to endure, the midwives by way of medicine
have taken this ingenious precaution: they coddle the new
babies with warm water and replace and imitate the womb of
the mother by warming and coddling. Relieved by this care,
the tender body is pleased and rests quietly. So from both
sensations, that of pain and that of pleasure, proceeds a kind
of innate opinion that everything sweet and pleasant is good,
and, on the other hand, that what causes pain is bad and has
to be a voided.
MOX This stands for eu8ui;, as in the translation of Tim. 20 c 6

eu8ui;ev8ev8e:mox conuentu soluto(12.2). The rest of this paragraph
about the behaviour of newborn babies has a remarkable parallel
in one of the texts quoted by Usener, Epicurea Test.398, to which
Waszink refers, viz., Sextus Empiricus, adu. math. XI 96. The
Epicureans say, IS·ncpucnx&c;xcxt &.8LMx-.euc;
-.o ~cjlov cpeuyeL(J,tv niv
&.>.yri86vcx,
8LWXEL 8e 'OjV ~8ov~v• yevvl)8evyouv xcxt µ.l)8t1teu't'Oi:<;XCX't'CX
86~CXV 8oUAEUOV £µ.ex't'cjl pLma8°YjvcxL acruv~8eL«epo<;~U~ELfXACXUO't ff
xcxt EXWXUO'&V. et 8e cpUO'LX6><; opµ.i (J,eV1tpo<;~8ov~v, txx>.(veL8e 't'OV
1t6vov,cpuaeL cpeux-.6v-.e EO"t'LV
cxu-.cjlo 1t6vo<; ~ ~8ov~1 • Such
xcxtcxtpe-.ov
a text shows the vulnerability of the Stoic doctrine about the
natural striving after virtue. The words cpuaLx&<;and &.8L8ixx-.eu<;
are
almost directly opposed to the Stoic view. But, as appears from
Calcidius, the Stoics had an answer. They pointed to the actions
of the obstetrices, who put the newly-born babies on the wrong
path, suggesting to them that pleasure is preferable. Thus at least
the Epicurean &.8LMx-.eu<; was argued away. QVAEDAM NATVRALIS
Here quaedam is certainly the rendering of o!ov. Two instances
of this in the translation of the Timaeus can be found in the Index
Graeco-Latinus of Waszink's edition, page 369.
~) in the case of adults

[166] Exactly the same view is also held concerning need and
satisfaction, flatteries and rebukes, when they have become a
little older, and therefore, when this age has gained strength,
they persist in the opinion already formed, considering every-
thing agreeable as good, even if it is useless, and everything
troublesome, even it gives benefit, as bad. Consequently they
exceedingly love riches as the most excellent tool of pleasure
and they cherish glory instead of honour. For by nature every
man strives after praise and honour,-as honour is the evidence
of virtue. But men of sense, who are engaged in the pursuit of
wisdom know, which and what kind of virtue they have to culti-
vate, whereas the unthinking mass, on account of its ignorance
of (the value of) things, instead of honour cultivate glory and
reputation with the people, and instead of virtue they eagerly
pursue a life soaked in pleasures, regarding the power to do what
1 It is perhaps useful to note two differences in Mutschmann's edition:

and cpeux't'6v't'e/cpeux't'6v't'l.
pmta6'ijvoi:t/poi:ma6'ijvotL
[166] PERVERSIO
they like as a kind of royal prerogative. Since man by nature is

a royal animal and because kingship is always attended by power,
they presume that power is also accompanied by kingship,
whereas in fact kingship is the righteous guardianship of the
subjects. Likewise, because a happy person must needs live
cheerfully, they think that also those who live with pleasure
are happy. Such is, I think, the error which, arising from things,
dominates the souls.
After the discussion of the newly-born in eh. 165 this chapter

deals with older children and adults.
OMNE BLANDUM BONVM cf. omne suaue bonum in 1.7-8. The change of
suaue into blandum is due to blanditiis in 1. ro. DIVITIAS ••.
GLORIAM In our comments on eh. 165 a we have already said,
that these terms are not on a level with uoluptas. As far as riches
are concerned, this is obvious, because they are called the tool
of pleasure. But glory, too, is dependent on uoluptas, as we shall
presently see in 1. 15-20. HONOR VIRTVTIS TESTIMONIVM Wise
men (prudentes uersatique in sciscitatione sapientiae I.uiri, 17)
strive after honour by way of their virtue. Stupid people (uulgus
imperitum), however, seek glory and a life of pleasure instead of
honour and virtue. So there is the following parallel: prudentes-
uirtus-honor, uulgus imperitum-uitam ... uoluptatibus delibutam-
gloria. PRO VIRTVTE .•• VOLVPTATIBVS The fundamental anti-
thesis of the Stoa and Epicurus.
REGIVM ANIMAL µ6vov -rov aocpov ~cxar.Aecxwas the Stoic adage
(cf. SVF III 617-622) QVIA REGNVM This sentence (197.22-23)
runs parallel to Simul quia . . fore (198.1-2), but this involves a
difficulty concerning the meaning of obsequi. Both sentences criti-
cize the erroneous conversion of a true statement. The second
phrase (198.1-2) grants that happiness implies living with pleasure
(libenter). But this statement cannot be converted: a life of pleasure
(cum uoluptate)does not make a person happy. In quia regnum etc.
a similar warning is given. Indeed kingship is always accompanied
by power, but power does not necessarily imply kingship. That at
least seems to be the purport of the words, but, unfortunately,
obsequi normally means 'to yield', 'to submit'. This, however,
would not suit the context at all. Therefore I venture the suggestion
that obsequi here is about equivalent to comitari. BEATVS This
is the Latin for e:u3cx(µ<uv (in the fullest sense of that word).
c) peruersio ex diuulgatione
[167] In consequence of 'diuulgatio', however, the above-
mentioned error is followed by ideas about riches, glory and
other things erroneously considered good, which are suggested
by the vows of mothers and nurses. Further confusion is caused
by scares, which make a more violent impression on tender age,
and also by soothing and all things of this kind. Nay, with regard
to pleasure and distress, how strong is the appreciative inclina-
tion forced upon inexperienced souls by poetry, which has a
soothing influence on more grown-up minds, and further by the
brilliant works of prose-writers? What about the representatives
of the plastic arts, do not they drag the souls away from activity
to sweetness? The greatest rousing of vices, however, is due to
the state of condensation of the fluids in the body, by whose
respective abundance or shortage we are more prone to passion
or anger. Add to these the hazards of life and lot, illness, slavery,
lack of necessaries, preoccupied by which we are led away from
honourable pursuits to the worries attending such a life, and
by which we are called back from the cognizance of the true
good.
EX DIVVLGATIONE Neither the explanation, which I suggested

above (p. 61), nor the normal meaning of diuulgatio (making
public) suit the contents of this chapter, whereas Xot'MJX1J(n<:;would
be very appropriate for the first part. So in all probability Calci-
dius has made a mistake here. Four dangers are mentioned: (1)
1.4-7: At a tender age the vows etc. of mothers; (2) 1.7-n: In
later years the temptations of the arts; (3) 1. II-13: The condition
of the body; (4) 1. 13-15: Other physical dangers. Only the first
two of these can actually be incorporated with xoc.Tfix1JaL;. The
other two sets of threats rather belong to the res dealt with in
eh. 165 and 166. This strengthens the impression that Calcidius
does not quite understand, what is meant by xoc.Tfix1JaL;.
IVXTA I have translated this word by 'with regard to', starting
from the fact that in Calcidius' translation of the Timaeus there
are three instances, where iuxta stands for 1tep( + acc. Two of
these are relevant here: 1tept Tov 1t0Tefo6!J.evov8eov (34 a 8) is ren-
dered by iuxta natiuum et umquam Juturum deum (26.14) and 1tept
yeveaLv (41 c 5) results in iuxta effectum uestrum
TYJVUfLt:Ttpoc.v
(36.6). VOLVPTATEM LABOREMQVE These terms are also juxta-
[168] PERVERSIO
posed in SVF III 229a, where Galenus censures Chrysippus' view,

µ:tj8e:µ(a.v
otxe:lw1me:!va.LCj)OO'E:L
1tpo~~8ov~v ~ &tJ.o-rp(c.>O'LV
1tpo~1t6vov.
INCLINATIONEM FAVORIS These words can very well be synonyms,
as e.g. Tacitus, Hist. IV 81: caelestis fauor et quaedam in Vespasia-
num inclinatio numinum. Therefore I take/ auoris to be an example
of the so-called genitivus inhaerentiaeor identitatis (Leumann-
Hoffmann-Szantyr, Lateinische Grammatik, II. Syntax und Stilistik,
p. 63). PICTORES ET FICTORES Also juxtaposed in Plato Politeia,
373 b 6: ot 1te:pt't'OCax~µa.-rcx't'E: xa.t :x,pwµa.-ra..VITIORVM A similar
view is put forward by Plato, Tim. 86 b sqq. Calcidius will say
more about this subject in eh. 181. LIBIDINEM AVT IRACVNDIAM
This is Platonic as well: the em6uµ'1)nx6v and the 6uµoe:L8e~get
the upper hand of the AoyLa-rLx6v.INSTITVTAE This does not
make much sense, even if we take the best suitable meaning of
the verb instituere, i.e. 'to establish', 'to organize'. A modification
is needed, the more so as uitae institutaeobviously refers to the
first half of the sentence. I think that we have to read uitae < ita >
institutae. The dropping-out of ita can easily be explained as a case
of haplology. The combination ita institutus has been used twice
by Calcidius in his translation of the Timaeus, both times as a
free rendering of a Greek expression: hominem ita institutum
(40.II-12) stands for -rov¥.:x,ov-ra. a.u-rcx~(44 b 7), ita instituto sermone
(46.1-2) for xa.-roc-rov1ta.p6v-ra. -rp61tov't"Yj~8Le:~68ou(48 c 5).
4. CALCIDIUS' REACTION TO THE CONTENTS OF CH. 165-167

[168] Therefore those who are to become wise need a gentle-
manly education and rules leading to virtue as well as instruction
distinct from the great mass, and they have to mark and observe
all excellent things leading to wisdom. Before anything else
they need divine assistance for the perception of the greatest
goods, which, though belonging specially to the gods, yet are
shared with men. The obedience of the body, as well, has to
be adequate to the energies of the soul in order to bear the toil
of exercise. Good teachers ought also to be available and that
design of life, which each of us has obtained as a divine protector.
For it is told that Socrates had 'a daemon who attended him
from childhood', instructing him in everything he had to do,
not in such a way that he instigated him to some action, but so
that he held him back from things which had better not happen.
For the same reason things in human power, if they are done
s
inconsiderately, when it is unprofitable that they are done,

may cause harm, a thing which the friendly daemon kept away
from Socrates.
OPVS EST Without doubt Waszink's correction in the distinction

of the chapters is right. But I disagree with his suggestion that
eh. 168 ought to have been incorporated together with eh. 165-167
in SVF III 229. In a note he gives the reason for this: Uox sapien-
tibus (I. 17) monstrat Stoicam doctrinam referre
hie pergereC. Indeed
sapiens may very well stand for aocp6c;,especially in the typically
Stoic sense of that word, but it may also be the rendering of
cptMaocpoc;.In Calcidius' translation of the Timaeus there are two
instances of this: 8.13 and 16.16. Now, in my opinion, the first
part of eh. 168 summarizes very briefly the programme for the
education of the cpu)..ixxec; or cptMaocpot,which is expounded
't'&A&LOL
in Politeia 521 c-541 b. The first sentence could contain a remi-
niscence of the mathematics etc. in 521 c-531 c, whereas the
of 531 c-541 b may be the ultimate base of the next
8t1XA&X't'LX~
sentence about the perceptio bonorum maximorum.I do not suggest
that Calcidius really has in mind the paragraphs of the Politeia
with all the implications of the three classes, etc. I only think that
eh. 168 has a Platonic background rather than a Stoic one. This
also enables us to explain Calcidius' train of thought more easily.
Calcidius, having reported extensively and, so it seems, approv-
ingly the dangers of perversion, to which the Stoa had drawn
attention, now seems to say somewhat triumphantly: "All these
difficulties, which you have set forth in order to challenge my
emphasis on the benefit of education etc., in fact exactly prove
my point, viz., that a proper education is necessary". ERGO If
I am right, this word has a triumphant ring: "As you Stoics, say,
there are many dangers. Therefore we need education". CVM
SINT PROPRIA DIVINITATIS, CVM HOMINIBVS TAMEN The distance
between god and man, emphasized in this concessive tum of phrase,
can hardly be in tune with Stoic doctrine. The Stoa rather taught
the fellowship of god and man: xotvwvCixvunocp)(&Lv npoc; tx.AA~Aouc;
8tix -.o Myou µe-.exew (SVF II 528; other testimonia can be found
in the index, SVF IV page 71). CORPORIS QVOQVE This refers
to yuµvixa't'LX~. PROPOSITVM ••• NVMEN In the translation of the
Timaeus in proposito (38.10) is the rendering of ev -.cj)eixu-.ouxix-.ix
-.p6nov ~6et (42 e 5). This proves that propositum is Latin for ~6oc;,
[r69] THE STOIC ARGUMENT ABOUT DIVINATION
numen of course being the equivalent of 8oc(µ.wv. So here we have a

reminiscence of Herakleitos' famous saying ~80<;&v8p6>1t<t> 8oc(µ.wv
(fr.Bug), although without its original meaning.
PROPTEREA QVOQVE This is very puzzling: as it stand, propterea
can only refer to what precedes and the translation has to be:
"for this reason human freedom can bring harm". But what is
meant with "this reason"? It cannot refer to the preceding sentence
about Socrates' daemon, with which the present phrase is obviously
linked: agi ea sit inutileis of course the equivalent of fieri non
expediret. The word quoque makes the problem even more difficult.
It suggests that there are other reasons for the potential calamitous
use of human freedom. In itself this could refer to the contents of
eh. r65-r67, but apart from the fact, that in this way the coherence
of the text would be very weak, we do not make any further
progress in elucidating propterea. Therefore I propose to change
quoque into quod, which is only a slight change paleographically,
and to place a comma after expediret. The full sentence would
now run as follows: Quippe Socrati dicitur a pueris comes daemon
rerum agendarum praeceptor fuisse, non ut hortareturad eum aliquem
actum, sed ut prohiberet quae fieri non expediret, propterea quod
quae in hominis potestate sunt,per siimprudentiam agantur, cum
agi ea sit inutile, cladem afferant, quod a Socrate arcebat benivolum
numen. Propterea quod is a normal combination, which is also used
by Calcidius. If this change is right, we can summarize l.r-6 as
follows: Socrates' daemon did not instigate him, but held him
back from unprofitable acts, because human freedom can by
imprudence result in such acts.
5. CALCIDIUS' ANSWER TO THE STOIC ARGUMENT ABOUT

DIVINATION
[r69] However, divination of things subject to necessity and
also of things which are contingent, but which have already
come to their destined end, is true and 'complexibilis', if it is to
be called divination at all-for once something has happened,
it cannot be undone-, but divination of contingent things, the
outcome of which is still a matter of doubt as long as no merits
yet precede, is contingent and oblique, as e.g. Apollo's oracle:
"By crossing the Halys Croesus will destroy a very great king-
dom". For in that case there were, if I am not mistaken, three
contingencies, viz., the first, whether the kingdom of Cyrus and
the Persians was to perish, the second, whether rather the king-
dom of Croesus him.self and the Lydians was to perish, and the
third, whether war could on reasonable terms be avoided. This
could indeed have happened, and there were precedents of wars
which had been cancelled; but because the desire of both opposed
a laying down of arms, as both Cyrus had a sort of wild and
haughty character and Croesus, too, was self-confident and
very fond of power, the decree which followed had been made
certain because of the intention of both, viz., that there was to
be no peace between them; so either of the two remaining
possibilities was still open, and the doubtful point was, whose
kingdom was doomed to extinction; and therefore a dubious
prophecy and an oracle of doubtful meaning was issued, in order
that whatever happened would seem to be predicted by Apollo.
[170] There are other predictions resembling a multitude of
advices, because, as it is within our power to choose one of two
uncertain things, gracious divinity, lest out of ignorance a faulty
choice is made, advises men, what is to be chosen. Forinstance,
when the Argives inquired at the oracle, if it was suitable to
start a war against the Persians, they received the following
answer: "People loathed by the neighbours, very dear to god,
stop any armed defence: all danger of the body will be averted
solely by the shadow of the head." For God knew, what had to
be chosen and that the choice is in the power of man; that
however, which follows the choice, belongs to fate.
[171] To the Hebrews, too, an advice was given by God
together with a prediction of the future in the following manner:
"If you will obey my commandments, all the goods of the earth
will be in your power. Accordingly milk and streams of honey
will not be wanting. If you defy my will, the divine voice has
preceded to describe the series of imminent punishments",
because that which lay in man's power, viz., either to obey or
to defy the commands of heaven, was uncertain. But if their
choice would be preceded by an inevitable decree and defiance
be necessary, the prediction would be redundant, as would also
be the promises and threats. So there is something in human
power and men are not, like those holding the opposite view
maintained, the instruments of the things that happen and by
means of which they happen, but the preceding cause followed
by that, which is according to fate.
THE STOIC ARGUMENT ABOUT DIVINATION
These chapters contain the rejection of the Stoic contentions in

eh. 161: At uero diuinationem dicunt clare demonstrare prouentus
iam dudum esse decretos (194.20-22). Ch. 169 deals with oracles
which prove nothing.
NECESSITATI ••• AMBIGVARVM As he did in eh. 162, Calcidius
faithfully sticks to to the distinction made in eh. 155 in which
ambiguus is obviously the equivalent of dubius, but, as we shall see,
he is at the same time playing with the latter notion.
COMPLEXIBILIS This is a &1toc~).e:y6µ.e:vov,explained by the
Thesaurus as i.q. intellegi potest (TLL III 2099). This is unsatis-
factory. Indeed the verb complector can mean 'to understand',
but in the first place this meaning has a special nuance: 'to embrace
something intellectually as a whole' (Lewis and Short), which is
not at all required here, and in the second place the whole notion
of comprehensibility is not needed in the context. But there is a
more remarkable fact. It seems that complexibilis is closely linked
with completus exitus,and that Calcidius takes it to summarize
the whole passage quarum iam fatalis completus sit exitus. If this
idea is right, the course of things may have been such, that Calci-
dius had at his disposal the term complexibilis, a term which he
did not understand and for which he invented an explanation.
How did he get the term complexibilis? I suggest he misunderstood
a Greek word, as he did in the case of xocnixYJaL~ (see above, p. 6o).
Which Greek word? Possibly, if we suppose a literal translation,
I shall try to illustrate this possibility. Naturally my
auµ.1t1.e:x-r6~.
explanation can only have the character of a suggestion.
Gellius, N.A. XVI 8 deals with <i~Lwµ.ci-roc; in par. 10 he says:
quod illi auµ.1te:1t1.e:yµ.~vov,nos uel 'coniunctum' uel 'copulatum'
dicimus. This proves that the Greek verb auµ.1t~Lv can be rendered
by the Latin copulare. Now we tum to Cicero, De JatoXIII 30,
which paragraph already called for our attention, when we dealt
with the doctrine of confatalia (see above p. 50): si ita fatum est:
'Nascetur Oedipus Laio', non poterit dici: 'siue fuerit Laius cum
muliere, siue non fuerit' ; copulata enim res est et con/ The atalis.
Greek equivalent of confatalis is auve:Lµ.ocpµ.~o~; copulatus might
be the rendering of auµ.1t1.e:x-r6~. Although in the passage quoted
from Cicero the subject is not divination, but the doctrine of
con/atalia, the example given, is an oracle, even a famous one.
The same statement might have been made, if the discussion had
concerned divination. Calcidius may have read something in this
vein, but, misunderstanding the term auµ1t).ex:r6c;,instead of

translating it by a perfect participle, he took the suffix -'t'oc;in its
normal meaning and invented the literal equivalent complexibilis.
Once having devised this word, he found an explanation for it. As
an additional argument for my suggestion I consider the strangeness
of the conception of divination of things past. Cicero, De divina-
tione I 1, gives the following definition: diuinationem, quamGraeci
appellant, id est praesensionem et sententiam rerum Juturarum.
µar.v't'~x~v
Indeed Chrysippus' definition was broader: uim cognoscentem et
uidentem etexplicantem signa, quae a diis hominibus portendantur
(Cicero, De divin.II 63.130 = SVF II n89), but still this definition
does not include divination about the past, which seems to be an
invention of Calcidius.1
AMBIGVARVM (ro) ... AMBIGVA (n) Here Calcidius is delibera-
tely or accidentally playing with words. In the first case ambiguus
must stand for ev8ex6µevoc;(i.e., 'contingent'), but the second time
it means 'ambiguous', 'having a double meaning'. NONDVM
PRAECEDENTIBVS MERITIS cf. meriti praecessio (187.4) PERDET
CROESVS cf. Cicero, De divin. II n5: Croesus Halyn penetrans
magnam peruertet opum uim.In his commentary Pease gives a list
of texts where this famous oracle is quoted or hinted at. 8 GLORIOSA
NATVRA as in the case of Achilles: propenso iuxta gloriam Jauore
(189.3) DECRETVM QVOD SEQVEBATVR This is the direct answer
to nisi decretum praecederet (194.21).
DVBIVM ..• DVBIA ••• DVBII Evidently Calcidius wants to stress
this word. Its meaning in this context is 'doubtful', 'uncertain', but
probably Calcidius also wants the reader to remember the technical
sense 'contingent'; cf. the use of ambiguus in this chapter. DVBIA
SORS Perhaps there is an ellipsis of erat. In that case the trans-
1 There is another possibility which should at least be stated, viz., to

assume that complexibilis means 'susceptible of a conclusion'. Indeed both
the verb complecti and the noun complexio can take such a meaning. The
Thesaurus provides the following relevant notes to complexio: II A i.q.
enarrationis comprehensio, conclusio, F i.q.conexio, nexus sententiarum,
auXAoyLaµ.6t; (TLL III 2rno). It might be argued that, thus understood,
complexibilis refers to Calcidius' statement in eh. 152 lex, quae ... habet
textum et consequentiam talem: "si hoe erit, sequetur illud." (187.14-16). In
my opinion this explanation is unsatisfactory, for in that case Calcidius
would certainly have explained this himself, especially because the word
complexibilis is very unusual. So for me the only acceptable explanation is
to assume that complexibilis refers to completus exitus, whereas uera should
rather be connected with necessitati subiectarum rerum.
1 Cicero, De Divinatione, Ed. Arthur Stanley Pease, Illinois 1920, p. 538.
[171] THE STOIC ARGUMENT ABOUT DIVINATION 71
lation should be: 'fortune was dubious'. QVODCVMQVE ACCIDIS-

SET cf. Cicero, De divin.II n6: Utrum igitur eorum accidisset, uerum
oraculum fuisset.
Although he does not expressly say so, Calcidius appears to
contend that oracles of the kind dealt with in this chapter do not
prove the Stoic point. It is small wonder that necessary things
and things of the past are known by the oracles, whereas ambiguous
oracles like the one Croesus got rather demonstrate that events
are not fixed.
CONSILIORVM ••• SVADET This function of the oracles is stressed
by Alexander Aphr. eh. 31: ,r( 8~1to-re, et 1tocv-rixTot yLv6µevix e:~
y(v&TIXL,IXL7t1Xpot
IXVOC')'X'1Ji; 't'WV 8ewv µixv-reLIXLµev y(yvoVTIXLauµ~oUAoti:i;
(202.5-7). EXAMINI The meaning of this word in the present
e:oLxui:ixL
context is obscure. One of the normal senses of examen is 'swarm (of
bees)'; from this results the more general meaning 'multitude' used
in the paraphrase. This is unsatisfactory, but I have not been able to
find a really convincing alternative. The only other possibility-
apart from a mistake by Calcidius-that I can think of is the follow-
ing. According to the Thesaurus examencan stand for actio lib-randi
vel aequilibrium.Possibly Calcidius means to say that the advices
given in the shape of an oracle are themselves in equilibrium. Man
has to choose and by his choice he tips the scales. (cf. parere uel con-
temnere,200.19). NE IN DELECTV In this case divination has the same
task as Socrates' daemon; cf. especially the expressions per impruden-
tiam (199.4-5) and ex ignoratione (200.5-6). OPTIO PENES HOMINEM
The oracle only gives advice, the choice stays in the hands of man.
So this class of divination, too, fails to prove the Stoic contention
that events have long been decreed.
HEBRAEIS QVOQVE As in some other parts of Calcidius' corn-
mentary, the argument is rounded off by an illustration taken
from the Old Testament. In our notes on 189.8 sqq. we suggested
the possibility of a Numenian influence (see above p. 36). Such
may be the case here too. I do not think, however, that we can be
so positive about a Numenian background for the present chapters
as Waszink's notes suggest. There are, so many parallels with
eh. 150-159 in this second part of the tractatus de Jato, indeed
Calcidius' refutation of Stoic doctrine is so consistent with those
chapters, that, if we reason according to the argument in the notes,
we ought to ascribe the whole of eh. 150-159 to Numenius. In my
opinion, this seems improbable. SI PRAECEPTIS This is not a
literal quotation of a particular text from Scripture. The mentioning

of lac et melliflui fluctus does not help to determine the pericope
which Calcidius might have in mind. The Bible speaks more than
a dozen times about the 'land flowing with milk and honey' and
none of these passages reminds one specially of Calcidius' words.
Another possibility is, that the quotation is a kind of summary
of a whole chapter, as e.g. Leviticus 26 or Deuteronomy 28, but in
my opinion the nearest parallel to the text taken as a whole is
Isaiah I, 19-20, which in the version of the LXX reads like this:
Kottea:v8tAl)'C'Exocte:£crotKOUGl)'t't
µou, 't'IX:
cx.yot8a:
njc; yijc; q>ixye:cr8e:·
ea:v
3e:µ~ 8tAl)'C'E!,Ll)3E:
e:£crotKOUGl)'t't
µou, (l,IXX,otLpot
uµiic;Kottt3e:-rotL
· 't'Oya:p
M6µocxup(ou EAIXAl)cre:v -rotihot.Both Justin (Ap. I 44) and Origen
(De princ.III 6, 201.15-17 Koe.) make use of this text as a Scriptur-
al argument to prove human freedom, the very subject Calcidius
is speaking about.
ABVNDARET cf. uacaret sciscitatio, uacaret etiam praedictio
(188.17) in the chapter about Laios. EST IGITVR This conclusion
refutes the last part of eh. 161. PER QVAS AGVNTVR cf. per nos
agente jato (192.24). CAVSA PRAECEDENS Exactly the same con-
clusion was reached at the end of eh. 170. It is completely harmo-
nious with thee~ u1to8foe:wc;-doctrine set forth in eh. 150 sqq.
6. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

a) fate is not responsible for evil
[172] "But they say that quite a number of things occur
against all expectation". We know this and we know further
that the character of all these things is twofold: on the one hand
those which happen very seldom, either occurring accidentally
or brought about by some chance, e.g. monsters being born from
man, and on the other hand, things taking place more frequently,
but originating from the perversion of human judgment, when
things are judged either by people in power, when they are angry
or by enemies, as befell Socrates and when by a judgment of
the same people Aristides, the most righteous of men, was
convicted, or when one of the prophets was cut up limb by limb
by scoundrels and another buried by stones. Is the cause of these
things also in the power of fate? They fail to understand that
they are conferring different and conflicting powers (that is
to say virtue and at the same time vices, which is impossible)
[173] THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 73
on fate, when they say that offences of this kind are proper
to fate. Therefore let them determine what they want fate to be. Di-
vine virtue? But then it would not be the cause of evils. Or perhaps
the evil <World-> Soul ? But in fact from badness no good can
result, and it is said that by fate also good things happen. Perhaps
they will say that it is a kind of mixed substance. And how can
it be, that one and the same thing is at the same time provided
with goodness and badness and creates excess and purity and
brings about the remaining conflicting virtues and vices?
[173] Moreover, what is their opinion about fate going to be?
That it certainly wants all things to be good, yet lacks the power?
So it will be something weak and powerless. Or that, having the
power, it yet does not want all things to be good? This truly is a
kind of savage and monstrous jealousy. Or perhaps that it lacks
both wish and power? But to say this about fate would be parti-
cularly disgraceful. Or perhaps that it has both powers and will?
So it will be the cause of all good things and the responsibility for
evils will have nothing to do with fate.
SED PRAETER SPEM The Stoic objections of 194.17-20 are

repeated in a more general wording and indeed discussed in con-
nection with the problem of evil in general. PERRARO ... FRE-
QVENTIVS Again Calcidius is completely in accordance with
distinctions he has made earlier. That fortune and chance belong
to the sphere of rare occurrences, has been said in eh. 158: fortuna
et casus in his inueniuntur quae raro accidunt (192.12-13, cf. above
p. 45). Man's free choice has to do with things of which the fre-
quency is evenly matched (erit ergo eorum quae peraeque dubia
sunt optio penes hominem, 190.12). It is of course quite correct to
say that these things happen more frequently (frequentius) than
those of the first category. DEPRAVATIONE cf. deprauetur (191.1).
VIRTVTEM ET ITEM VITIA SIMVL The statement that fate, apart
from being the cause of bad things, which were the only subject
up till now, is also in Stoic doctrine the origin of good things is
rather sudden. It seems to be considered as self-evident. Exactly
the same unexpected tum can be found in eh. 174, where the whole
argument shows a strong resemblance to the present chapter. ANI-
MAM MALIGNAM In eh. 297 we read that Numenius praised
Plato for introducing two world-souls, a beneficent one and malig-
nam alteram, scilicet siluam (299.16). I do not think that this forces
us to assume a Numenian influence in eh. 172. Calcidius has

taught that fate as an essence is the world-soul. It is quite natural
that, Stoic doctrine looking upon fate as the cause of evil, he suggests
the possibility that this world-soul is evil. Moreover, in eh. 297
the anima malignais matter and this is not mentioned in the present
chapter.
Stoic doctrine leads to a dead end. It is impossible to ascribe
everything, both good and evil, to fate. Now a short and somewhat
over-ingenious argument in eh. 173 proves, of which class fate is
the origin. QVOD VELIT The contents of this paragraph are a
revised version of an argument against God's providential care
for our world which according to Lactantius was devised by Epi-
curus: ... argumentum illud Epicuri. Deus, inquit, aut uult tollere
mala et non potest, aut potest et non uult, aut neque uult neque potest
aut et uult et potest. Si uult et non potest, inbecillus est, quod in deu
non cadit; si potest et non uult, inuidus, quod aeque alienum est a
deo; si neque uult neque potest, et inuidus est et inbecillus est ideoque
nee deus; si et uult et potest, quod solum deounde conuenit,
ergo sunt
mala aut cur illa non tollit?(Lactantius, De ira dei 13.20-21 = Use-
ner, Epicurea fr. 374). Epicurus' argument was also eagerly appro-
priated by Sceptic philosophy: et 8e ·nvwv 1tpovoe'i:,8LocT( Twv8e
µ.ev 1tpovoe'i:'C'Wv8e8e O\l; ~'C'OL yocp Kott ~OUAe'C'otL Kott 8uvot'C'otL
7t/XV'C'c.>V
1tpovoe'i:v,~ ~OUAe'C'otL µ.ev OU8uvot'C'otL 8e, ~ 8uvot'C'otL
µ.ev OU~OUAe'C'otL 8e,
~ O\l'C'e~OUAe'C'otL ix)).' et µ.ev x.otl~~OUAe'C'O
O\l'C'e8uvot'C'otL. Kott ~8uvot'C'O,
7t/XV'C'c.>V
&v 1tpouv6eL • OU 1tpovoe'i:8e 7tlXV'C'c.>V 8Loc'C'(X
1tpoeLp7Jµ.tvot
• OUK
&potKott ~OUAe'C'otL x.ott 8uvot'C'otL 1tpovoe'i:v.et 8e ~OUAe'C'otL
7t/XV'C'c.>V µ.ev OU
8uvot'C'otL
8e, oca8eveCJ'C'ep6<; ECJ'C'L
'C"ijt;otMott; 8L' ~v OU 8uvot'C'otL 1tpovoe'i:v
©VOU1tpovoe'i: • lCJ'C'L
8e 7totpa.'C'1)V
8eou e1t(voLotV 'C'Ooca8eveCJ'C'epov
elvot('C'LVO<;
et 8e 8uvot'C'otL
otU'C'6v. µ.ev 7t/XV'C'WV 1tpovoe'i:v,OU ~OUAe'C'otL 8e, ~IXO'XotVO<;
&v elvotLvoµ.La8e(7J,et 8e O\l'C'e~OUAe'C'otL O\l'C'e8uvot'C'otL,
Kott ~IXO'XotV6t;
ECJ'C'L
Kott oca8ev~<;.g1tep ).eyeLV1tept 8eou OCO'e~OUV'C'c.>V ECJ'C'(v.
OUK&pot
1tpovoe'i:TWVev K6aµ. o8e6i;. (Sextus Empir., Pyrrh. hyp. III I0-11).
Similar ideas can be found in Max. Tyr. 38, 6d and Min. Felix,
Oct. XII 2. Of course Calcidius' use of this argument is diametrically
opposed to the intention of both Epicurus and the Sceptics.
BONORVM OMNIVM, NEC MALORVM Although this conclusion only
has value as a confutation of Stoic doctrine and as such cannot
be regarded as the Platonic view stated by Calcidius, it is not
wholly alien to the latter, in which fate ranks highly, as we have
seen in the first part of the tractatus.
b) the starsare not responsible for evil

[174] So whence are evils? They consider the movement of
the stars as the cause. But whence is this very motion? And is
it according to or against the wishes of the stars, that this motion
is such that from the same motion both good and evil result ?
If it is according to their will, the stars are living beings, moving
after a plan; if against their will, they do not act at all.
Certainly either all stars are divine and good and do not do any
evil, or some are wicked. But to what extent is it appropriate
that there are wicked stars in that holy place full of goodness?
And as all stars are full of heavenly wisdom, and badness, as we
know, is born from insanity, to what extent is it appropriate to
say that stars are wicked? Unless perhaps-which it is forbidden
to do-we have to assume that the same stars are sometimes
good, sometimes evil and therefore grant favors and injuries
indiscriminately; but this is absurd, to think that a heavenly
substance endowed with one and the same nature is not the
same in all stars, but that most, as it were, degenerate from their
own nature. "But surely the stars suffer this against their will."
And which is that necessity, so strong, that it forces them to
offend against their will? Is this a divine or a wicked soul?
MOTVM STELLARVM Both Waszink (Praefatio p. LIX, Studien

p. 22, note 2) and van Winden (o.c. p. n5) are very positive in
linking this chapter with eh. 298. Indeed, they claim a fundamental
resemblance to that chapter. I cannot subscribe to their opinion.
As this is rather important, because it implies the possibility of a
Numenian background, it is necessary to go further into this
matter.
First we need a short summary of eh. 297. In that chapter
Calcidius says that, according to the Stoa, matter is neither bad
nor good. If asked: unde igitur mala?, they blame a certain peruer-
sitas, whatever that may be. However, they fail to explain the
origin of this peruersitas, God being good and matter neutral.
Pythagoras and Plato have a better insight into this problem, as
they hold matter to be bad. In this way, as is explained at the
start of eh. 298, good can be ascribed to God, evil to matter. The
next sentence is the crucial one : Qua ratione intellegidatur Stoicos
frustra causari nescio quam peruersitatem, cum quae proueniunt
ex motu stellarum prouenire dicant. Van Winden translates as fol-
lows: 'And thus we understand why the Stoics vainly put the
blame on a certain 'perversity', when (my italics, d.B.) they say
that things happen by virtue of the stars'. In my opinion the ren-
dering of cum by when is incorrect. Grammatically it is possible
to explain the subjunctive dicant as due to the fact that in oratio
obliqua a subordinate clause always takes the subjunctive. But I
think that we should take cum in a causal sense: because. Before
explaining this, I first quote van Winden's remarks, which agree
entirely with his rendering of cum: "QVA RATIONE From the
clause cum ... dicantur it seems that, to the Stoics, the 'perver!'ity'
mentioned is produced by the movement of the stars. This is
confirmed by a passage in the treatise on fate: Unde ergo mala?
Motum stellarum causantur. Sed ipse motus unde? (par. 174). This
is precisely the same thought met with in par. 297. Numenius
shows that, since the stars themselves consist of matter, it is quite
useless to appeal to their perversity without indicating its basis" .1
Van Winden-and Waszink seems to agree with him-thinks that
somehow a special bad influence is allotted to the stars in Stoic
doctrine as reported by Calcidius. But, as I see it, the train of
thought at the start of eh. 298 is quite different. In the first sentence
of that chapter Calcidius says that evil is due to matter. Therefore
(qua ratione)the Stoics' accusation of peruersitas, whatever that
may be (nescio quam peruersitatem) is of no avail (frustra), because
they also say, that all events-good and evil-are due to the stars.
But the stars are corporeal (Stellae corpora sunt) and this is due to
matter (omnium corporum silua nutrix), which, as Plato has so rightly
taught us, is bad. So after all evil is the result not of that mysterious
peruersitas, but simply of matter.
Thus the argument is meant to show that the Stoa is wrong in
introducing the unknown peruersitas as the source of evil, wrong
because of the Stoics' own tenet of the influence of the stars,
which according to Platonic doctrine owe their corporeality to
matter, and matter is evil. The conjunction cum has to be taken
in a causal sense with special reference to frustra: the Stoic accusa-
tion is vain, because... So van Winden is wrong in suggesting,
"that, to the Stoics, the 'perversity' mentioned is produced by
the movement of the stars". On the contrary, the vague 'perver-
sity' is rejected by a reference to the dominating influence of the
stars.
1 Van Winden, o.c. n5.
Let us now tum to eh. 174. VNDE ERGO MALA? It is important
to follow Calcidius' line of thought carefully. The main subject
is evil, for which the Stoa is seeking a cause. First fate (e:tµoc.pµtvY))
is blamed: it is the cause of evil, simply because it is the cause of
everything, whether good or bad. But in eh. 173 Calcidius shows,
that it is impossible to allot evil to fate. So the problem is still
unsolved. The Stoics now play a second trump. They blame the
motus stellarum.This is the source of evil, not for some mysterious
reason, but again simply because this movement is source of
everything, both good and bad: talis, ut ex eodem motu et mala
proueniant et bona. Exactly as in the case of fate (201.10-n, see
above p. 73) it is suddenly stated that not only bad things are
caused by the stars, but good things as well. Indeed the only
reason why one can ascribe evil to the stars is the fact that every-
thing takes place through their influence. If van Winden would
be right in his opinion that both in eh. 174 and in eh. 298 the Stoa
is said to ascribe a special evil influence to the stars, the agreement
of these chapters would indeed be remarkable and as eh. 298
represents Numenian doctrine, in eh. 174, too, Numenius would
have to be considered as the auctor intellectualis.But the only
similarity is the fact, that in both chapters the Stoa is said to teach
that everything-good and evil-is dependent on the stars. This is
not at all remarkable, indeed it is quite normal Stoic doctrine, so
the parallel between eh. 174 and 298 is not remarkable either.
Moreover, there is even a notable difference. In eh. 298 the stars'
corporeality is stressed and said to be due to evil matter, but in
eh. 174 no such blemish is found, on the contrary: the stars are
expressly said to be holy, heavenly and wise. In virtue of all this
I think no Numenian influence can be traced in the present chapters.
Astrology plays an important part in Stoic doctrine. Of the
main Stoics only Panaetius was opposed to it. The introduction
of astrology was supported by the theory of a cruµmx.6e:Loc. Twv
l>Awvand by the ideas about e:tµoc.pµtvY), Pohlenz says: " .... es
ist auch kein Zufall, dass in der Antike sofort die orientalische
Astrologie einen Bund mit der Heimarmenelehre der Stoa schloss.
Chrysipp selbst hat sich bei seinen Untersuchungen iiber die
Heimarmene ausdriicklich auf die chaldaische Astrologie berufen
und wollte fiir sie die logische Begriindung geben". 1 Indeed astrol-
ogy so thoroughly invaded the doctrine of e:tµocpµtvY), that it became
1 Pohlenz, o.c. 107.
part and parcel with it. Nemesius, when arguing against the
Stoic etµ.ocpµ.evl), starts the chapter in question thus: ot -tjj 1tepL-
qiop~-rwv&cr-rpc.>v TIJV0tM0tv-rwv"(LVO(J£VCi>V 7tCXV'rCi>V
emyp&.qiovnc; ...
(c. 35 p. 289 Mathaei). The possibility and usefulness of astrology
is accepted by Calcidius: recteque et rationabiliter mathematicus
originem captabit instituendi actus ex prosperitate siderum atque
signorum, ut, si hoe factum erit, proueniat illud. (191.9-n). That
does not mean, however, that the stars have to be regarded as
causes; they are simply signs: intellegi datur non stellas f acere quae
proueniunt, sed jutura praenuntiare (168.15-16). Similar thoughts
are found in Origen's comments on Genesis I. 14, reported by
Eusebius, Praep. Ev.VI II and in the treatise of Plotinus, to which
Waszink refers. At the start of that treatise Plotinus declares
straightaway: ~ -rwv&cr-rpc.>v rpopa.CJl)!J.Ot(veL
1tepl.fxoccr-rov-ra.fo6µ.evat,
&'>J..'oux OtUTIJ 1t0Lei:.(Enn. II 3.1). But whereas Calcidius
1t&.v-r0t
confines himself to a few remarks, Plotinus discusses the problem
thoroughly and in great detail. In the first chapters of Enn. II 3,
however, there are a few not unimportant parallels, as can be seen
in Waszink's notes. The most striking of these perhaps is the one
between ev Odep-r61tept8puµ.e:voc (par. 2) and in illo sancto et pleno
bonitatis loco(202.6).
AVT QVAEDAM MALEFICAE The third possibility (aut omnes
maleficae) is not stated. This is easily understood, for it would
imply that only evil is caused by the stars, which idea, as I have
explained, is not held by the Stoa. For the rest Calcidius is hinting
at the astrological doctrine, that some of the stars, or rather
planets, are beneficent, some maleficent. Sextus Empiricus, Adv.
Math. V 29 says: -rwv8e:occr-repc.>v ev(ouc;µ.e:vocy0t601tOLOUc;
e!vatLi..eyoucrLV,
evlouc;8e: KOtK07tOLOUc;, TLva.c;
8e: xatl.KOLVouc;,ofov &y0t601t0Looc; µ.e:v-rov
-rou ~Loe;xatl.-rov't'ljc;'Aqipo8('rl)c;, KOtK07tOLOUc;
8e:-rov -rou "Apec.>c; xatl.
Kp6vou,E1tlxoLVOV 8e:-rov-rou'Epµ.ou,E1t£l1tep µ.e-ra.
µ.e:vocy0t601tOLWV ocy0t-
601toL6c;, (J,ETCX8e: KOtK07tOLWV KOtK07tOL6c;.
1 SIDERA PLENA SAPIENTIAE
A similar view is held by Plato: -r6v n etp11!J,ivov tv -ro!c;&cr-rpoLc;
vouv-rwvISv-rc.>v (Leg. 967 d 8); cf. also Epinomis 982 c 6: vouv tx.eLv
&cr-rpat -re xocl.cruµ.1t0tcr0tv
-ratU'rl)V
TIJV8L0t1topd0tv. But it is also a Stoic
idea: Z~vc.>v-rov ~AL6v!pl)CJL xatl.TIJVCJEA~Vl)V xatl.-rwv lJ.i.J..c.>v
&cr-rpc.>v
1 Cf. Bardesanes ap. Euseb., Praep. Ev. VI 10, 337.22-24 Mras: xcxl ou-rc
ol ciycx601t0Lol-rwv cicr-repoov -ro&.ouc;!Ll) IJ.LCXLcpove:!v
xe:xooMxcxcrL xcxl IJ.7)ci6e:!J.LTO·
ycx!J.e:!v
olhe: ol xcxxo1t0Loli)vcxyxcxcrcxv xcxxoupye:!v.Macrobius,
-rouc;Bp«J(!J.iivcxc;
Comm. I 19, 20 sqq. also deals with this question.
!xat.a-rov e!vat.Lvoepov )((X.L<pp6vLµov(SVF I 120).1 MALITIAM EX

DEMENTIA The Stoa is reproved by virtue of her own tenets. The
background of this argument is Stoic intellectualism in the field
of ethics: µ(at. µev a.pe'"J y(voL't'O&v, ~ emcmiµYJ, µCat.8& waat.U't'Cuc; ~
Xat.Xlat.,1tpoaat.yopeuoµtvl)
)((X.L
~8e '7tO't'&
µev &yvoL<X., 8&a.vema't'l)µOaUVYJ
'7tO't'&
(SVF III 256); njc; a.cppoauvl)c;,~v µ6vl)V <pat.atvdvat.L)((X.)(OV ol OC'7t0
njc; ~-roiic; (SVF III 79). Although the way in which Calcidius
is reasoning is not without subtlety, beating the Stoics with their
own weapons, I can hardly imagine Numenius arguing in such a
cool manner. As Pohlenz says, the problem of evil was very impor-
tant for him 2 and, as can be seen in eh. 297, he took matter to be
the origin of evil. Of this we find no trace in this chapter. NISI FORTE
This is quite similar to the refutation of fate as a mixta substantia
in eh. 172 (201.15-19). INTERDVM ••• INTERDVM This, too, is
an astrological theory, as is shown by the immediate sequel of
the text just quoted from Sextus: a.).Aot8e -rouc; «u-rouc;a.a-re:p«c;
Xat.'t''llAAYJV)((X.L
llAAYJV
CTJ..E:aLV ()'t'£ 8& )((X.)(0'7tOLOUc;
C>T£µev a.yat.601t0Louc;,
u1tiipxeLvvoµ(~ouaLv(adv. Math. V 30). INVITAE cf. Plotinus Enn.
ill' ~vat.yxat.aµe:voL
II 3, 3: ,AAA' oux ex6v-rec;'t'oti::i't'ot, -roi:c;-r61t0Lc;
)((X.L
-roi:c;ax11µ«aLv.Plotinus' reaction is very different, though: he goes
on to show the impossibility of some astrological theories and
ideas. DIVINA ANIMA AN MALIGNA As in eh. 172 (201.13) the
mentioning of anima malignamight be regarded as a N umenianum.
But this is not necessary. I think Calcidius, as he does more often,
has abridged the argument. We must bear in mind that the motions
of the stars and planets are in fact the circles and tracks in the
World-Soul, 3 as is explained in the Timaeus. If the stars by their
movement involuntarily cause evil, they are constrained by some
mysterious force. But the movement is due to the World-Soul,
which is good or even divine. Are we then to suppose that the
World-Soul is bad or to assume the workings of a bad World-Soul
in the heavenly spheres? To sum up: in my opinion the two ques-
tions, which are put after the mentioning of the constraint put on
the stars, are ironical and meant to show the impossibility of this
way out.
1 Cf. Firmicus Matemus, Math. I 5.7: Habent enim stellae proprium

sensum diuinamque prudentiam.
1 Pohlenz, o.c. p. 387-388.
8 In the above-mentioned treatise Plotinus has this to say about the
World-Soul: ljiuxiji;8~ -ro 1tiiv -r68e 8LoLxo6a'I)~ (eh. 13).
Before dealing with the contents of eh. 175 something must first
be said about the tone of that chapter.
Calcidius has started his defence against the attacks of Stoic
theories calmly, even on a friendly note. He seems to feel sympathy
for the Stoic doctrine of 8uxCITpoq>~.But the last chapters show a
much less friendly tone. Irony is introduced. This tendency now
culminates in a definite sarcastic scorn. Calcidius seems to lose
patience. This also comes to light in a shortening of the argument,
which I think is traceable here, as at the end of the predecing
chapter.
c) refutation of some other pretended causes evil of

[175 a] Or perhaps is there a certain 'Reason', as they (viz.,
the Stoics) say, by which all things happen which are done at
present and by which all future events will take place? But
surely it is a monstrosity to say that evils take place by reason,
evils of which it will be much more true to state that they take
place without reason; it (?) is unfair or even arbitrary. But
whence is that inevitable series of causes to receive its origin,
if our merits have not previously taken any direction whatever?
RATIO Without any doubt this stands for the Stoic Logos.
The intention of the last part of the refutation of Stoic objections
is to criticize a few important Stoic terms and statements in the
domain of fate; thus eh. 172 and 173 concern e:tµ.ocpµ.evY), eh. 174
speaks about the q>opoccfo't'pwv. The present chapter deals with
Myoc; and the e:tpµ.oc;oct..~&v, another aspect of fate. Now I suppose
that the latter two notions (and perhaps some more) were to have
been explained on the same scale and possibly with comparable
arguments as the former two. 1 But instead these ideas are only
just glanced at, because Calcidius' impatience causes him to abridge
the source used by him. Only five lines are devoted to this matter,
for at 1.9 he starts the conclusion of the whole of eh. 160-175.
NVLLA RATIONE cf. the remark in the preceding chapter malitiam
porro sciamus ex dementia nasci. Again this is quite a valid argument
against Stoic doctrine. Having conceived the optimistic idea
of a guidance of the universe by reason, the Stoa had a lot of trouble
1 I certainly do not think that the start of eh. 175 merely continues eh. 174,
an uero ratio introducing a third possibility along with diuina anima an
maligna. An uero puts ratio against motum stellarum at the start of eh. 174.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL Sr
in trying to find answers to the objections of those who pointed

to the many evils in our world.
INIQVVS In my opinion the cohesion of the text is very obscure
here. Waszink, agreeing with Fabricius, notes that the subject
of this sentence is motus stellarum.Grammatically this is of course
possible. Besides, Waszink could point to such texts as Nemesius
eh. 35 p. 290 Matth.: "A8LxoL8e: xcxt otuTot ot cx.aTepe:c;, Touc;µe:v
µoLxouc;,"C'Ouc; 8e: cpovecxc;
cx.1te:pycx~6µe:voL.
Yet I find this solution
rather unsatisfactory. The motus stellarumhas not been mentioned
directly since the very start of eh. 174. But it has not been dealt
with indirectly either, for in the rest of eh. 174 attention is directed
to the stars themselves rather than to their motion. Add to this
that, as far as I can see, the first part of the present chapter deals
with Myoc;.This, however, does not solve the problem, because the
feminine ratio would have required iniqua. There are two possi-
bilities. Either there is something wrong with the text and we
have to assume a lacuna, or Calcidius has made a mistake. The
first possibility is not very attractive, but the second, though not
giving cause for great enthusiasm, is quite reasonable. We have
discovered more mistakes and inexcusable abridgments. Perhaps
the present case belongs to the latter class; Calcidius, who wants to
hurry on, abbreviates the argument and then forgets that an adjec-
tive, which in the Greek text is masculine, because it refers to
Myoc;, ought in the Latin version to have the feminine gender,
because Myoc;has been translated by ratio.1
SERIES CAVSARVM INEVITABILIS One of the Stoic definitions of
fate was to call it a e:tpµoc;cx£TLwv
cx.1tcxpix~cxToc;
(SVF II 917 and 918).
The expression series causarumhas already been used in eh. 144
(183.8-9). The connection between the sentence series uero etc.
and the preceding one (Iniquus est etc.) is again very obscure. If
Waszink is right in taking the last-mentioned statement to refer
to the motus stellarum,there is quite a remarkable parallel in Euse-
bius: TIJVe:tµcxpµ&V1jVe:tpµov"C'LVot
otL"C'LWV
e:!vcx(cpotaLVcx.1t'cx£wvoc;
CX.7t'otpot-
~IX"C'(J)c; h njc; "C'WV
xcxtcx.µe:TotXLV~"t'(J)c; oupcxv(wv of.a"t'pwv
cpopiic;xcx8~XOV"C'ot.
(Praep. Ev.VI 6, 309.26-28 Mras). But although this illustration
is interesting, it does not at all elucidate the obscure abruptness
with which the chain of causes is introduced in the present text.
For how are we to interpret illa? We might take this pronoun
1 For other abridgements by Calcidius cf. Waszink, Studien p. 10, 44, 66.
6
82 REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS [175b]
to mean 'the well-known', 'the famous'. But this is not convincing,

for such a meaning could only have a very sarcastic connotation,
and if Calcidius wanted to be sarcastic, the use of iste would have
been normal. The other possibility is to take illa as an anaphoron,
which is quite well possible according to Leumann-Hofmann
par. 105c. In this case ille might be the translation of oo't'o~.which
in the Greek source, followed by Calcidius, would refer to a preced-
ing sentence or argument, left out by Calcidius in his abbreviation.
EXORDIVM NISI PRIVS This question is a very apt illustration
of the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian criticism.
Alexander Aphr. in the passage, from which Waszink quotes, is
complaining that the chain of causes has no first cause, which is
impossible: 7tW~yap OU)(1ho1tov 't'Ot.1:yewe1t' !1teLpovetvotL't'<Xot('t'Lot
xott 't'OVelpµov otU't'WV xott TIJVemauv8ecnv 6)~ !L~'t'e7tp6>'t'OV
't'L etvotL
!L~ff t:axot't'ov; (eh. 25, 196.1-3). This is of course a typically Peri-
patetic question, to be expected in this case. Calcidius' question
is wholly different. It is completely in accordance with the doctrine
of meriti praecessio,which is expounded in eh. 150 sqq. and which
has a Platonic character.
My notes to this paragraph imply a punctuation of lines 6 and 7
which is different from Waszink's, viz., a semicolon behind ratione
and a full stop behind libidinosus.
7. CONCLUSION
[175 b] But who could bear that beside their other impious
statements and thoughts also God's providence is removed by
this assertion of theirs and at the same time all divinity is
annihilated? For what will God do, if all things will happen
according to this affirmation of clever men and might rush on
by a vehement impetus according to the instigation of necessity?
Yet this idle presumption will make defence easy for the guilty,
to whom it will be allowed not to condemn the perversity of their
own spirit, but to complain of the violence of fate; it makes the
vows of good people to lead a praiseworthy life and their ardour
for intelligence more inactive; therefore we have to dismiss a
kind of men grown from cunning and falsity, who, as is their
own opinion, were born under an unfavourable fate, because it has
befallen them through fate to hold these and similar opinions.
In this short paragraph, which concludes the refutation of Stoic
objections, the Stoics are for the first time attacked rather harshly
[175b] CONCLUSION
for the unhealthy consequences of their doctrine in the field of

religion and human behaviour. Calcidius' remarks belong to the
class of what Amand calls '!'argumentation morale antifataliste'.
At the end of his learned and voluminous book, which we have
mentioned before (p. 42, note 1), Amand gives a conjectural recon-
struction of this argument, which ultimately goes back to Carneades,
that great opponent of the Stoa (et µ~ yocp~v Xpucmmo<;, oux. &v ~v
eyw he used to say). For this reconstruction Amand mainly uses
six 'textes temoins', which owe their privileged position to their
length and mutual resemblance. But other texts, too, supply some
evidence. Amand's six special texts are taken from Philo, Alexander
Aphrodisias (Ile:pt e:tµ(XpµevT)<; eh. 16-20), Firmicus Maternus,
Eusebius (Praep. Ev.VI 6) and St. John Chrysostomos. If Amand's
hypothesis is right, Calcidius' strong words in the present paragraph
may be termed as 'Carneadic' in origin.
CETERA QVAE INRELIGIOSE This could very well refer to Car-
neades' sixth argument in Amand's reconstruction: "Le fatalisme
astrologique aneantit la religion et ruine la piete a l' egard de la
Divinite. Celui qui croit a une invincible et inexorable e:tµ(XpµevT)
ne peut que mepriser des deux impuissants a le proteger et a le
secourir. Logiquement il rejettera egalement les prieres, neces-
sairement inefficaces et incapables de flechir l'e:tµ(XpµevTJ. 11 n'aura
que du dedain pour les rites sacres et les ceremonies du culte des
dieux". 1 PROVIDENTIA DEi TOLLITVR cf. Nemesius eh. 35 p. 289
Matth.: e~op£~e:'t'(XL 8e:x.(Xt1tp6voL(X µe:-roc
tj<; e:uae:~e:t(X<;
and Waszink's
quotation from Alexander Aphrodisias. Amand considers this the
'complement normal' of the sixth argument just reported. VERSV-
TORVM HOMINVM cf. Alexander's ironical picture of Stoic philos-
ophers: Cj)LAOO'O(f)ELV 't'LVE<;
)..eyovn<;)((Xt~v a.1.:fi6e:L(XV
~v EV't'OL<; OOO'LV
µe:-repxe:a6(XL)((Xt't'(XU't'T)V
't'WV&AAwva.v6p6>7tWV 7tASOV ~XELV U7tOA(Xµ~oc-
VOV't'E<;
(eh. 7, 171.23-25). FACILIOREM ••• PIGRIORES I quote part
of Carneades' fifth argument in Amand's list: "Posons l'hypothese-
dato non concesso-dufatalisme astral. La croyance a l'e:tµ(XpµevTJ
entraine necessairement avec elle le rela.chement de !'effort, la
negligence et !'indolence. Le fataliste se laissera naturellement aller
a la nonchalance et a la faineantise dans !'execution de tout ce
qui exige fatigue et labeur. A quoi bon les peines et les sueurs
pour acquerir la vertu? Le fataliste negligera cette derniere ou ne
1 Amand, o.c. 584. Not too much attention should be paid to the word
'astrologique'. The argument just as much aims at fate in general.
REFUTATION OF SOME STOIC ARGUMENTS [175b]
s'y portera qu'avec mollesse, tandis qu'il s'empressera de se livrer

aux joies faciles du vice". 1 I do not think this argument is the
original &pyoc;Myoc;. That objection certainly tried to show that
man was condemned to inactivity. Pohlenz says: "Fiir die Gegner
lag der Einwand nahe, dass dieser starre Determinismus ein Ver-
nunftgesetz verlange, das den Menschen zur Untatigkeit verurtei-
le, well das Ergebnis auf jeden Fall feststehe, sodass jedes Handeln
um eines Ziels willen zwecklos werde ('Apyoc; Myoc;)" 2 • But the
&pyoc;Myoc; is mainly a logical argument, whereas in my opinion
the present text has an ethical character after the manner of
Carneades, who, it may be noted in passing, did not like the &pyoc;
Myoc;: Carneades genus hoe totum non probabat(Cicero, De Jato
XIV 31).
1 Amand, o.c. 583.
• Pohlenz, o.c. 103.
C. RENEWED EXPOSITION OF THE PLATONIC
DOCTRINE OF FATE
1. FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY
[r76] We, however, shall, obeying divine law, repeat from the
beginning in the right order of succession what Plato, inspired
by truth itself, at least as it seems to me, has said about fate.
In the first place all things and the world itself are held to-
gether and ruled principally by the highest God, who is the Su-
preme Good, beyond all essence, above appraisal and under-
standing, after whom all things seek, whereas himself He possesses
full perfection and does not need any fellowship; to say more
about Him would cause a deviation from the course of my subject.
In the second place things are ruled by providence, which
has the second eminence after that supreme God and which the
Greeks call vouc;; this is an intelligible essence, which emulates
the goodness of the highest God because of its unwearied turning
to Him, from whom it has a draught of goodness, by which it is
as much adorned itself as other things, which are embellished
on His personal authority. Therefore this will of God, because
it is a wise guardianship of all things, is called providence by
mankind, which name is not used, as most people think, because
of its anticipation in seeing and understanding future events,
but because it is characteristic of the divine mind to understand,
which is the characteristic act of mind. And God's mind is eternal:
so God's mind is the eternal activity of understanding.
[r77 a] This providence is followed by fate, which is divine
law published by the wise harmony of intelligence for the govern-
ment of all things. This is obeyed by the so-called second mind,
i.e. the tripartite World-Soul, as has been observed above,
just as if one would call law the soul of an expert law-giver.
This passage, together with eh. r88, is very important. Here we

find the doctrine of fate incorporated in a hierarchical system of
divine hypostases.
Many scholars 1 have already commented on these paragraphs,
1 E.g. Theiler, o.c. 56, 26o, van Winden, o.c. 29, 89, 111, H. J. Kramer,
Der Ursprung Amsterdam 1964, p. 278.
der Geistmetaphysik,
86 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [176]
usually however in the context of their current subject and without

enough attention to the connection with the rest of the tractatus
de jato. Although one can maintain that the present exposition
is a kind of Fremdkorper within the whole of the treatise, it should
not be forgotten that right at the beginning, in eh. 143a, 146 and
147, preparations have been made. As I have shown above (p. 8,
18 and 19), in these chapters Calcidius with the help of some
texts from the Timaeus-in part wrongly interpreted-proved the
thesis that providence ranks above fate. Now these particular
chapters have no parallel in pseudo-Plutarch, in contrast to some
other fundamental paragraphs like 144 a and 148. The chapters
143a, 146 and 147 are an elucidation of a few statements in Timaeus
41 d 4 sqq. about the final stages of the Demiurge's creative work
and his orders to the veoL6e:o£to finish the task. It is quite clear
that the position of the Demiurge is taken by providence, whereas
the second gods are superseded by the World-Soul. This state of
affairs should be taken into account in commenting on the present
paragraph.
But first it is necessary to call to mind some of the main charac-
teristics of Middle-Platonic theology. Middle-Platonism distin-
guished three metaphysical principles: God, matter and ideas.
Principal witnesses to this doctrine are Albinus, Epitome c. 8-ro
and Apuleius, De PlatoneI 5. Their testimony is confirmed by others,
but it should be stressed that the ideas are, so to speak, the weakest
of the three &.pxocC.This can be seen very clearly in Diogenes Laertius
III 69, where the ideas have disappeared altogether: 8uo 8e -rwv
nocv-rwvocnecp7jve:vocpxoci;, 1 Such a development is not
6e:ovxoct \JA1)v.
surprising, when we bear in mind the general increase in the interest
taken in religion and theology, which is so obvious in the second
century A.D. In Middle-Platonism the chief materials used to
build a conception of God were found in the Demiurge of the
Timaeus, -ro ocyoc66v of Politeia, the passage about beauty in Sympo-
sion 210 e 3-2II b 3, the une:poupocvLO<; -r6no<;of Phaedrus and other
such texts. In this way the dualistic tendencies in Platonism
came more into prominence, for over against the godhead matter
1 Cf. van Winden in his comments on eh. 307: "In Calcidius the ideas are
scarcely more than an addition mentioned for the sake of completeness.
They are by no means an integrating part. If their occurrence in his system
had not been absolutely necessary, the ideas would have been omitted".
van Winden, o.c. 143.
[176] FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY
makes its influence felt as a powerful principle. There is not one

unanimous opinion about 1'.J)..ll however. One can say that there
is a fluctuation between a highly abstract, formalized conception
of matter as an almost 'neutral' force and the idea that matter is
a strong power, seeking free scope for its viciousness. The former
opinion is held e.g. by Albinus, Epit. 8 and Apuleius, de Platone
I 6, whereas the latter doctrine is characteristic of Numenius.
But in any case God and matter are the protagonists on the scene
of our universe. This places Platonic philosophy before the following
dilemma: on the one hand God has to be removed as far as possible
from the influence, whether evil or 'neutral', of matter, but on the
other side there is the strong religious need of a God who cares
for the affairs of the world in general and humanity in particular.
Platonism s~ught a way out of this problem by distinguishing
different phases in the godhead, first tentatively, gradually with
more resolution, finally with complete elaboration in Plotinus'
system of hypostases. On the whole this process is characterized
by the separation of a highest divine entity, free from contact
with matter, from lower entities, in charge of such tasks as creation
and the care of our world. Now in following this philosophical
development from Albinus to Plotinus we are greatly handicapped
by the fragmentary state of our material. It should be stressed,
however, that this is not the only reason for the uncertainties
and even contradictions in the diverse theories; the intrinsic
philosophical causes for such wavering must not be overlooked.
For although, as is often said (at times even with some exaggera-
tion), Platonism tended more and more to dogmatism and had
no interest in any form of scepticism, it is the theological problem
itself which is causing the uncertainty. It is quite understandable
that a solution was not found overnight, but that different attempts
were necessary. Moreover, to my opinion, the problem is funda-
mentally insoluble. But a digression on this question would be
out of order now.
With this background in mind, viz., the use made of Timaeus
41 d sqq. at the start of the tractatus and the theological problem
just sketched, we shall now proceed to an examination of the
important details of the present paragraphs.
DIVIN AM LEG EM SEQVENTES Our (Platonic) attitude towards
fate is entirely different from the Stoic ideas. According to their own
system the Stoics have formed their opinions under compulsion
(haec et talia opinari Jato prouenerit, 204.2). We, however, are

developing our doctrine in free and pious obedience to the divine
law, which is fate. AB EXORDIO Perhaps with deliberate ambi-
guity. In the first place these words express that Calcidius in his
recapitulation of the doctrine of fate wants to start 'right at the
beginning'. But he may also have in mind another meaning: we
shall now go back right to the metaphysical origin of fate. PRIN-
CIPALITER This again may be meant ambiguously. It can have
its usual meaning 'chiefly', 'in the first place', as in other passages
of Calcidius, e.g. 59.18/19 and 77.15. But a more special sense is
also possible, as is shown in eh. 268, where matter is said to be
subiecta corpori principaliter (273.17). Van Winden remarks
about these words: "These words, too, strike us as Aristotelian;
Phys. 192 a 31: )..ey(J)yixp UAYJV't'O1tpw-rovU7toxe£µ.evov Else-
EXIX.G'C'<t).
where Calcidius says: materiam principalem et corporisprimam
subiectionem (340, 13-14)". 1 In other paragraphs principaliter is
used as contrary to ex accidenti.2 This proves that principaliter
can indeed have a special meaning. For the present context I
venture another guess. Possibly Calcidius wants to say that the
highest God rules the universe 'in a way fitting for him as First
Principle'. That the highest God is indeed principle and origin
of all else is stated explicitly in eh. 188: originem quidemrerum,
ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur, esse summum
et ineffabilem deum(212.22-23). This concept is very important.
As far as I know, it is not stated explicitly before Plotinus, e.g.
Enn. III 8, 9: dei: 8e:(XIJ't'O
ocp:x.~v
e!v(X~X(XLe!v(X~ V 5, 10:
1tpo7tlX.V't'(J)V,
(X7tAOUVyixp )((XL IS-nocp:x.~.
7tp6>'t'OV, V 2, l: ocp:x.~ Of course we
7tlX.V't'(J)V.
3
must beware of any quick conclusions, but anyhow it seems to
me that Waszink's remark Non igitur est, cur Platinum uel Por-
phyrium hie a Calcidio adhibitos esse sumamus (p. 205) is somewhat
too apodictic. Besides, there are other reasons for some doubt,
as we shall presently see. OMNEM SVBSTANTIAM OMNEMQVE
NATVRAM About this expression cf. Waszink's note ad loc. con-
cerning Calcidius' love of locutiones bimembres and also van Winden's
remarks on eh. 344.' Three meanings of substantia are given by
van Winden: (1) substantia = essentia = natura (oua(1X),(2) sub-
1 Van Winden, o.c. 31 (340, 13-14 = 312.20-313.1 in Waszink's edition}.

1 Cf. Index C in Waszink's edition p. 419.
a Cf. RE XXI1 col. 562 (Schwyzer).
' O.c. 221.
[176] FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY 89
stantia = existence (u1t6<ITotaLc;) and (3) substantia = substratum

(u1toxe(µevov).The first of these fits the present context. AESTIMA-
TIONE INTELLECTVQVE In this case Calcidius' doublet is very
helpful. If he had only written intellectu melior, three explanations
would have been possible: (1) above vouc; (the second hypostasis},
(2) above intellectus in an active sense: higher than thinking,
which is an unsuitable activity for the highest God, as in Plotinus:
'A.)J..' E7t$XELVotoua(otc;lSv't'LXotL< 't'O> 't'OUvoe!v E7t$XELVot dvotL (Enn.
V 6, 6), (3) intellectus taken passively: unthinkable for the human
brain. In view of the addition of aestimatione, it seems to me im-
possible to choose the first or second meaning. Besides, the idea
that God cannot be known or at least is difficult to know, is quite
common already in Middle-Platonism. Ultimate authority for
this view was found in Plato's famous words -rov µev oov 1tOL1JTIJV
XotL7tot't'epot-rou3e 't'OU7totv-roc;
eupe!v -re epyov XotLeup6v-rotetc; mxv-rotc;
&Mvoc.-rov i..eyeLv(Tim. 28 c 3-5). However, we should not discard
the possibility that actually the first or second sense was meant
in Calcidius' source and that Calcidius has misrepresented this
by his love of double expressions. In that case there would be a
remarkable agreement with the words which Waszink quotes from
Plotinus' essay Ilept -rwv -rpLwv&px_Lxwv u1to<ITcxaewv (Enn. V 1). In
the context of the description -r&yoc.8ov xoc.t't'OenexeLvoc.
vou xoc.te1te-
xeLvoc. oua(otc;(V 1, 8) the word vouc;refers to the second hypostasis. 1
The following descriptions of the summus deusare all quite normal,
as can been seen in W aszink' s notes. This also seems to be the
case for the expression NVLLIVS SOCIETATIS INDIGVVS. It is
easy to understand that God in his perfection is not in need of
anything. He is &1tpoa3e~c;.But the addition of the word societatis
is intriguing. It somehow reminds one of µovoc.:x,6c;, a predicate
whichPlotinusconfersupon-.Hv (Enn. VI 8, 7). Indeed, as Waszink
notes, -ro lv is never directly mentioned by Calcidius. But it is quite
possible, that nullius societatis indiguus at least comes quite near
to that title (cf. also page 131, note 1). QVEM NOYN This is a
very difficult, though most interesting, statement. In addition to
the identification of vouc;and prouidentia, the discussion of which
we shall postpone for a moment, the most remarkable aspect of this
relative clause is the evident implication that only the second
hypostasis is called vouc;and that the highest principle has to be
1 For this description of the highest God cf. J. Whittaker, 'Emimvot voi:i
xotl oua(~. Vig. Christ. 23 (1969) p. 91-104.
raised even above this stage. In Albinus' Epitome we find such an

idea tentatively suggested at the start of eh. 10, 2: 'Em:l. 8e \jiux'Yji;
vout; &.µe:(vwv,vou 8e 't'OU&V8uv«µe:Lo XCX.'t'evepye:LCX.V
1
7t<XV't'CX.
vowv xcx.l.
&µex.xcx.l.
&.e:(,
't'OU't'OU 8e xill(wv ocx.t't'Lot;
't'OU't'OU
xcx.l.
<l7te:p
~v ~'t'L&.vw-repw
't'OU't'WV
ucpta't"Y)XE:V, OO't'Ot;~v e:!'Yjo 1tpw-rot; 6e:6t;, cx.Mot;U7t<Xp)(WV't'OU
&.e:l.
eve:pye:i:v oupcx.vou.As can be seen, Albinus
-riji viji 't'OUauµ1tct.V't'Ot;
is not speaking with strong resolution. And although there is no
uniformity in Numenius' thought-and neither in its interpretation
by scholars-in any case it is clear that he, too, is not forcing a
breakthrough. He still calls the first God vout;, albeit placed on a
higher level than the second hypostasis, as is shown by fr. 26:
6) &v6pw7tOL, 8v 't'07t<X~E:'t'E:
uµe:i:t;vouv, 0\J)( ~CJ't'L
1tpW't'Ot;,&.iJ..'!:-re:pot;
1tpo 't'OU't'OU
vout; 1tpe:cr~u-re:pot;
xcx.l.
6e:L6-re:pot;.
The first time vout; is mentioned as the second hypostasis only
is in Plotinus, 1 whose name is thus again linked with a definite
characteristic of the present chapter.
But all this is in sharp contrast to the main statement of this
sentence, viz., the identification of vout;and providence. These were
certainly not identified by Plotinus. 2 In fact this rather seems an
indication of Numenian influence. In his translation of the Timaeus
Calcidius renders -roc 8Locvou 8e:8'1jµLoupY'1)µevcx.(47 e 4) by quae
prouidae mentis intellectus instituit (45. 9/10).
Commenting on this particular phrase in eh. 268 he explains the
quoted expression by saying quae prouida mens dei contulerit
(273.II) and in the next chapters he speaks about consulta prouidae
mentis (274.10). In his comments on eh. 269 van Winden 3 points
to the resemblance with the 'Numenian' passage 295-299. Indeed
e.g. in eh. 298 we find prouidentiae consultis salubribus(300.14).
According to van Winden the conception of providence in the
treatise De siluahas to be linked with eh. 176 and 188,' the passages
1 "Calcidius ... speaks of the second God as voiic;and thus seems to favour
Plotinus, who beyond the voiic; postulates a higher supranoetic God". Van
Winden, o.c. 111.
1 For Plotinus' opinion cf. Enn. III 2 and 3 and the explanation of Brehier
in his Notice to III 2 and 3, vol. III of his edition, p. 17-23.
3 o.c. 34.
' "Whenever Calcidius speaks of mens dei or mens provida dei, his concept
of Providence should be borne in mind. It is generally known that the concept
of Providence was fully elaborated by the Stoics. There is, however, no need
to think of a direct influence of the Stoa on Calcidius; from what follows
it will be evident that one should think rather of Numenius. Numenius, like
Calcidius, distinguished three phases in the Godhead". o.c. 30. The last
remark is not very convincing.
FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY 91
we are considering. Moreover, Numenius being responsible for

the conception of providence in De silua, the conclusion for the
present chapter is ready to hand.
I shall not deny that all this is quite possible and reasonable.
Yet I am not entirely convinced. In the first place prouidentia in
De siluais continually used in opposition to necessitas etc. Further,
providence in De siluais not clearly distinguished from the highest
God. In a highly pregnant phrase at the end of eh. 297 (i.e. right
in the middle of the Numenian passage) we even find: Porro ex
deo et silua factus est iste mundus (300.3). My third objection is
inherent in a different view on the whole problem, which I shall
try to defend a little further on.
AEMVLAE The idea that the second God emulates the first was
no doubt held by Numenius. Apart from passages where it is said
implicitly, it is stated very clearly in fr. 25: o ii,e:v1tp&-roc;6eoc;
«6-roocy«6ov • o8e:'t'OO't'OU
!J,LIJ,'1)'t'Yjc; &y«66c;.But in a different
8'1)!J,LOupyoc;
way Plotinus, too, has this idea: irlvotov &xe'i:voc; (Enn.
-ra:ISii,m«1t0Le'i:
V 2,I). CONVERSIONEM Undoubtedly this word stands for E7t'LO''t'po-
(J)~. which notion is quite characteristic of Plotinus. In the domain
of the hypostases e.g.: 1t&c;ouv vouvyevv~ (-ro~v); "H l>-rL -tjj &ma-rpocpij
1tpoc;(XU't'OMp«· ~ 8e: ISp«O'Lc; «<51"1)vouc;. (Enn. VI, 7) 1 and 't'O 8e:
yev6ii,evovetc; «6-ro &1teO"t'p«cp'1J
x«t &7t'A'1Jpw6'1J
x«t &yeve-ro1tpoc;«u-ro
~Ae7t'ovx«t vouc; ofJ-rwc;.(V 2, r) Albinus has a comparable idea;
about the highest God he says: 't'YjV!Jiux~v-rou x6aii,ou &1teydp«c;
(Epit. 10.3). But, as can be seen, in his
x«t etc; e:«u-rovEmO"t'pelji«c;
case the 'turning towards' emanates from the supreme principle
with a lower entity as its object. HAVSTVS This clearly refers
to the theory of emanation, so well-known from the system of
Plotinus. But it seems to belong to Numenius' theory too: '11
secondo emana dal primo, senza per<'>che il primo depauperi se
stesso, e senza essere altro dal primo. E, in una parola, l'attivita
emanante dal primo. Emanatismo, dunque, proprio nel senso
plotiniano del termine: il secondo dio-come in Plotino l'Intelletto-
emana dall' uno, cosi come dal fuoco emana un'altra attivita che
e il calore'. 2 Indeed fr. 29 says about the Demiurge: 1tecp«v-r«L
~ii,'i:v&y«6oc;ii,e-roua(qt-rou 1tpw-rou-re x«t ii,6vou.Another interesting
fragment is 23, where Numenius says: -ra:8e:6e'i:ocfo-rLv,o!« ii,e-r«8o-
1 For the meaning of this text cf. H. R. Schwyzer, Nachlese zur indirekten
Obe'Ylieje'Yungdes Plotin-Textes in Mus. Helv. 26 (1969) p. 260.
• G. Martano, Numenio d'Apamea, Naples 1960, p. 39.
92 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE
8e-rt'ot, ev8ev8' exe:LOtye:yEV'Y)!J,EVot,

ev8ev8e:'t'E oux CX.7tEA~Au8e:.
xcx.xe:!8t
ye:v6µe:vot 't'OVµev c:'>V'Y)O'E, T7i1te:pt
't'OV8' OUKl~Aotljie:,XotL1tpOO'WV'Y)O'E
wv ~7tLO''t'ot't'o
cx.vocµv~ae:t.
Commenting on this text Dodds speaks
about 'the principle of "undiminished giving", which implies
non-reciprocating causal relations, so that the cause is never
dissipated among its effects-'t'oc 8e 8e:!ot... oux cx.1te:A~Au8e:
(f. 23).
This is cardinal for Plotinus, who like Numenius uses the illustration
of communicated knowledge' . 1 A full discussion of this problem is
out of place here, but we can in any case conclude that emanation
finds its place in N umenius' system too. The next words QVO
TAM IPSA ORNATVR QVAM CETERA QVAE IPSO AVCTORE HONESTANTVR,
however, have a much more Plotinian ring. Indeed the possib-
ility of a Numenian background is not to be ruled out. Al-
binus has a comparable idea, as Waszink's notes show. But one
is reminded rather strongly of Plotinus, by whom vou<;is called
&yocAµot 't'O 1tpw't'ovexcpocvev(Enn. V 1, 6). Another predicate given
to vou<;is cx.yoc8oe:t8~<; (V 6, 4) 2 • The goodness which is reflected in
the vou<;,is passed on to lower entities: l5 't'Loov eyevvoc,cx.yoc8ou ex
8uvocµe:c.u<;~v xoctcx.yoc8oe:t8e<;
~v xoctotu't'o<;
cx.yoc8o<;
e~ cx.yot8oe:t8&v,
cx.yoc8ov
1totx().ov(Enn. VI 7, 15).
IPSO AVCTORE If this is right ipso can only refer to the highest
God. Nowauctormay well be the Latin rendering of ocfoo<;:Calcidi-
us translates o 8'&pta't'o<;'t'WVoct't'(c.uv(29 a 6) by ille auctor maximus
(21.21/22). If this is so, the words in Albinus' Epitome 10.3, quoted
by Waszink, would have even greater resemblance to Calcidius.
It is not likely that ipso should refer to prouidentia. The grammat-
ical difficulty involved could perhaps be ascribed to a blunder by
Calcidius, but there does not seem to be any other argument.
For it is impossible to illustrate this point of view by referring to
praestantissimum quidem animal id esse quod ceteris caelestibus
animalibus substantiam ex se largiatur (214.24-25). In a highly
interesting paper Calcidius' Erkliirung von Tim. 4I e 2-42 a 4
(Mus. Helv.26, p. 271-280) Waszink has shown that by praestan-
tissimum animal Calcidius means the World-Soul and not Provi-
dence. Besides, a much clearer parallel to cetera quae ipso auctore
1 Dodds in his article Numenius and Ammonius,Entretiens sur l' Antiquite

Classique Tome V, Les Sources de Plotin, p. 23.
1 It should be noted that the expression Tou ciyct6ouciy:>.ctlctL,
which Waszink
quotes from Numenius fr. 11, is used about the highest Being, not the second
god.
[176] FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY 93
honestantur can be found in eh. 188: originem quidem rerum, ex

qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur (212.22-23).
HANC IGITVR DEi VOLVNTATEM The introduction of this fresh
notion is rather sudden, but Calcidius evidently sees no problems
here. To him this new idea is closely linked with the foregoing
statements, as the words hanc igiturshow. God's goodness, which
was hinted at just now (hanc) because of its blessings (igitur) is
called providence. But this does not alter the fact that the introduc-
tion of God's will still poses its problems to us. In his notes Waszink
refers to some statements in eh. 9 of pseudo-Plutarch's Ile:pt e:tµixp-
µev7J<;,to which the first part of De f atoprovided so many parallels.
In that chapter the author exposes his curious doctrine of three
providences, which in a somewhat different form is also found in
Apuleius' De Platoneand Nemesius.
The three providences form a hierarchy, in which e:tµixpµbl1Jalso
finds its place. But there is a being which is even higher than this
hierarchy, as is said in ps.-Plutarch 573 b: ~ 8e: ocvwTcx:rw 1tp6v0Lix
1tpe:crl"U"C'IX"C'OV
(.I.,
IX7tlXV"C'WV,
t '
7tl\1JV
-, '
OU7ti.p
1' L
Ecr"C'LV
'
EL"C'E
"
r'OUl\1jCJL<;
(.I. ,-,
EL"C'E
"
VOTJCJL<;
'
xixt lx1he:pov.So from the text of Ile:pt e:tµixpµevTJ<;

e:t"C'e: we can build
the following hierarchical order : (1) 1tp&To<;Oeo<;(2) 1tpW"C'TJ 1tp6v0Lix
(3) 8e:u"C'&pix
1tp6v0Lix(of the 8e:1he:poL Oe:o()and e:tµixpµev1J(4) TPL"C'TJ
1tp6v0Lix(8ixtµove:<;).Calcidius' order is as follows: (1) summus
deus, (2) secundus deus:vou<;or prouidentia, (3) fatum and secunda
mens or World-Soul, (4) (among others) the daemones (eh. 188,
213.4). The similarity is striking. The greatest difference lies in the
puts the second gods and Calcidi-
third grade, where Ile:pt e:tµixpµevTJ<;
us the World-Soul. In my comments on eh. 146 and 147 (above,
p. 19) I have pointed out that in Calcidius' system the World-
Soul takes the place of the younger gods of the Timaeus. This seems
to account for this dissimilarity. The other big difference is of
course the fact that Calcidius does not speak about three provi-
dences. For him there is only one providence, which comes second
in the order. This difference is made smaller by pseudo-Plutarch's
statement, that the 1tp6v0Lix of the highest God deserves that name
in the most exact and proper sense: TpLn-ij<;Tolvuv tj<; 1tpovotix<;
Oe:wpouµbJTJ<;,
xupLW"C'IX"C'IX
8e:xixt !J.OCALcr"C'ix
tj<; 1tpW"C'TJ<; (573 a).
1.e:yoµev1J<;
These considerations induce me to put forward the following
hypothesis: In the tractatus de f ato Calcidius (or his source) adheres
to some fundamental views, which can be found in pseudo-Plut-
arch's Ile:pt e:tµixpµev7J<;,
But when it comes to placing jatum in a
94 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [r76]
hierarchical order he disagrees with Ile:pl. e:lµ.ocpµ.tvlj<;,

because he
wants to harmonize his doctrine with another hierarchy, which
greatly resembles Plotinus. The 'original' hierarchy leaves its
traces however, e.g. when Calcidius calls providence God's will.
VOLVNTATEM For the problem of God's will cf. E. Benz, Marius
Victorinus und die Entwicklung der Abendliindischen Willensmeta-
physik, Stuttgart r932. Benz compares the intellectualistic theology
of the Greek world with the voluntaristic speculation by Latin
authors. In the chapter devoted to Calcidius 1 he speaks with
some enthusiasm about Calcidius' views: "Die genannten Bei-
spiele aus Chalcidius zeigen, dass sich <lurch die ganze Obersetzung
des Timaeus hindurch die Tendenz einer voluntaristischen Deutung
und Umformung des intellektualistischen Gottesgedankens be-
merkbar macht". Benz' arguments are not too strong, however,
and this becomes very manifest when we examine a text to which
he himself attaches great value: "Wohl die auffalligste Umbiegung
der platonischen Schopfungsidee ist aber folgende. Bei Plato steht:
"e1te:l.8e Xot't"OC
vouv -rcjl<ruVLO"t'OCV't"L
1tiiaot ~ nj<; IJiuxljc;aua't"ot<rL<;
eye:ye-
Vlj't"O,µ.e:-roc
't"OU't"O
7tOCV 't"Oawµoc-roe:L8ec;
EV't"O<;
ocunj<;he:x-roc(ve:-ro xocl.
µfoov µ.ecrnauvocyocywv 1tpoa~pµone:v". Wieder ist es also das intel-
ligible, nicht das voluntaristische Prinzip, das bier nach Plato am
Anfang der Schopfung steht. Chalcidius iibersetzt bier glattweg:
"igitur cum pro voluntate patris cuncta rationabilis animae
nasceretur, aliquanto post omne corporeum intra conseptum eius effinxit
mediumque adplicans mediae modulamine apto iugabat".
Er fiihrt also den Ursprung der Weltseele unmittelbar auf einen
Willensakt Gottes zuriick, die bier auszerdem, wozu ebenfalls im
griechischen Text kein Anlasz vorliegt, als "Vater" erscheint.
In dieser Ersetzung des platonischen N us durch die voluntas patris
ist die Absicht des Chalcidius-in welchem Masse sie ihm selbst
bewusst war, ist schwer zu entscheiden-die Absicht einer Ver-
bindung des griechischen und des orientalischen Gottesgedankens
klar zum Ausdruck gebracht". As can be seen, Benz makes a great
point of Calcidius' pro uoluntate for xoc-roc
vouv. But undoubtedly the
latter expression merely means 'to his liking', for which pro uolun-
tate is normal Latin usage. 2 SAPIENTEM TVTELAM Cf. Apuleius,
De PlatoneI I 2 : ita enim de Ji nit: prouidentiam esse diuinam sen-
1 Benz, o.c. 343-350.
1 A. E. Taylor in his commentary ad loc. translates x~-rixvouv by 'to his
mind', 'as he intended'.
[I76] FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY 95
tentiam, conseruatricem prosperitatis eius, cuius causa tale suscipit

officium. In a wholly different context in eh. 54 the word tutela
is used to describe one of the tasks of the World-Soul: mundi
anima, quae ... tutelam praebet inferioribus(102.9-10). RERVM
OMNIVM This is not in accordance with eh. I45: Et diuina quidem
atque intelligibilia quaeque his proxima sunt secundum prouidentiam
solam (183.18-20). There is a striking resemblance to Nemesius,
who, as Waszink's quotation shows, also spoke about miV't'cx..a i>v"t'cx.
SED QVIA Calcidius' explanation is very obscure. Within a few
lines we find no less than three conceptions of providence: r. sa-
piens tutela;this is after the manner of Apuleius, pseudo-Plutarch
and Nemesius. 2. starting from the etymology of the Latin word:
providence foresees future events. 3. starting from the Greek word:
providence is thinking. The last idea seems to be final, but Calcidius
makes a mess of it. Waszink's suggestion that proprius explains
pro- must certainly be right. It can of course only be used as an
explanation in Latin. In Greek one needs a different etymology,
if 1tp6votcxis to be regarded as God's thinking. Such an explanation
can be found in Plotinus' treatise Ile:pt "t'ou8e:A~!J.CX"t'o<; "t'ouevo<;(Enn.
VI 8), eh. 17: ''ilcr"t'e"t'ljVOU"t'W
81.lX8e:atv
e:( "t't<;ovoµ.oc~ot1tp6votcxv,ofhw
VOEL"t'W,()"t't€<Tt'L e<Trw<;,«<p' 00 xcxt xcx8' av
1tpo "t'ou8e:vou<;"t'OU7tCXV't'O<;
..68e:. Et µ.ev oov VOU<;
"t'O7t0CV ••• I do not suggest that
1tpo 7t0CV"t'WV
Calcidius was acquainted with Plotinus' etymology, but he certainly
must have found something similar, which he could not use in
Latin for the simple reason that the preposition pro in Latin has
no temporal sense. He would have been obliged to use ante, thus
destroying the clarity of the etymology. SEQVITVR Calcidius has
stressed the subordination of fate to providence right at the begin-
ning of the tractatus. To him it is fundamental. LEX DIVINA cf.
diuina lex est mundi animae insinuata, salubre rerum omnium
regimen (185.1/2). OBSEQVITVR cf. cui parent secundi dei (184.13)
and my comments on that phrase (above p. 18-19). SECVNDA MENS
As we have seen, Numenius spoke about a 8e:unpo<;vou<;. So did
the Oracula Chaldaica:
7t0CV't'CX
yocpe~e:UAe:aae7tCX"t'ljp
XCXLv<j>1tcxpe8wxe:
8e:u'tip<J>,
av 7tflW"t'OV
XA'Y)L~E"t'E yevo<;&.v8pwv(Kroll 14).
7tOCV
But, in the first place, both in the Oracula Chaldaica and in Numeni-
us this second intellect is the second hypostasis and not the
third, as in Calcidius, although it must be admitted, that in the
NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [177a]
Oracula there is some variation, as Lewy 1 has pointed out. Some-

times the Highest Being, 1t0t-rijp,seems to be raised even above the
paternal Intellect, whereas in other texts there is no such separa-
tion. Lewy also refers to Amobius, Adu. Nat. II 25: haecine est
anima docta illa quam dicitis, immortalis perjecta diuina, post deum
principem rerum et post mentes geminas locum optinens quartum
et afluens ex crateribus uiuis? and Apuleius, De PlatoneI 6: primum
deum esse et mentem formasque rerum et animam.But in both these
cases the World-Soul takes the fourth place and not the third.
In the second place I must confess that, pace Theiler 2, I cannot
find any specific influence of the Oracula Chaldaica. Another
explication might be to assume a Plotinian influence. There are
enough indications that for Plotinus the soul, at least partly,
belongs to the intellectual sphere. Soul is an oucrt0t vo'l'j-rij (Enn.
III 6, 6), VO'l'jTI) (IV 2, I), Myoi:; lcrx0t't'oi:;'t'WVVO'l'j't'WV
cpucrLi:; (IV 6, 3),
etxwv 't'Li:;vou (V I, 3). "Soul is, of Plotinus' three hypostases, the
most wide-ranging and various in its activities. At the top of its
range it lives on the highest level, in the world of Intellect, and
with Intellect can rise in selftranscendence to union with the One ...
Its proper and most characteristic activity is discursive thinking,
reasoning from premises to conclusions" .3 Plotinus however never
calls the Soul a second Intellect.
Perhaps the following explication, which is the simplest of all,
is right. As we have seen, in the hierarchy of Ilepl. etµ0tpµevrii:;the
third place was taken by the 8eu't'&p0t1tp6voL0t.But in eh. 176 Calcidi-
us has stated that providence= voui:; or, as he says in the last
1 H. Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Cairo 1956, p. 321.

1 Theiler, o.c. 259 (in his paper Die chaldaischen Orakel und die Hymnen
des Synesios.): "Der hohere voii;, der voii; 1tor.TpLx6;,.•. ist eine bekannte
chaldii.ische Grosze. Er steht hier mit Gott verbunden einem niedrigeren
Geist (dem voii; der zweiten plotinischen Hypostase) gegeniiber, worauf die
Seele folgt. So kann Arnobius adv. nat. 2, 25, nach bestimmter Orakelinter-
pretation, bemerken anima ... post deum principem rerum et post mentes
geminas locum obtinens quartum. Die Orakelworte bei Proklos Tim. II 61, 24
ljiux7leywvor.twund bei Proklos Parm. 895, 12
u.a. µtTa. 37) TtotTpLxa.;3Lor.votor.;
MoLor.L1tor.Tp6;mochten diese Deutung stiitzen. Ein entsprechendes Schema
ist bei Chalcidius 212, 23 ff. benutzt. Es folgen sich summus et ineffabilis
deus-providentia eius secundus deus-secundamens intellectusque-animae".
Evidently Theiler misunderstands the words rationabiles animas (213.3).
for there cannot be any doubt that these are the human souls, who form no
part whatsoever of the hierarchy of hypostases.
8 A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Part III of the Cambridge History of Later
Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967, p. 250.
[177a] FATE AS PART OF THE METAPHYSICAL HIERARCHY 97
part of that chapter, mens. If the conclusion is not too bold, the
expression secunda mens could be another trace of the original
hierarchy, which Calcidius has replaced by another gradation.
The addition id est anima mundi tripertita covers this explanation
quite well. It could very well be a parallel to the descriptive addi-
tion in the case of the second hypostasis: prouidentia, quem Graeci
noyn uocant.
Possibly Calcidius has linked two hierarchies: r. Highest Being
-(first ?) providence-secunda mens (=second providence?) and
2. Highest Being-vouc;-World-Soul.
LEGVM LATORIS Waszink refers to eh. 188, where the second
god is called latorem legis utriusque uitae, tam aeternae quam tempo-
rariae (212.24-213.1). The title lator legisreminds of Numenius
fr. 22, where the Demiurge, Numenius' second god, is called
voµo8e'TI)c;,
This same epitheton is awarded by Plotinus to vouc;:
o!ov voµo8fr,ic;1tpwToc;,
µiiAAov 8s v6µoc;otu't'oc;Touelvott (Enn. V 9, 5).
In both cases the use of this title is different from Calcidius' words,
in which the ultimate origin of the idea is easy to see. For the
addition tam aeternae quam temporariae must in the end go back
to the v6µouc;Touc;etµocpµevouc; given by the Demiurge to the souls.
These laws indeed cover both lives, as the explication given in
41 e-42 d can show. After that sketch the paragraph is summed
up by 8tot8eaµo8etjaotc;ae7tCX.V't'ototU't'O°ic;
't'otU't'ot.
So the Demiurge
acts as a lawgiver. Perhaps Numenius fr. 22 also refers to these
passages. There are some indications for this, but as a whole the
fragment is rather obscure. 1
In any case Calcidius' use of lator legisdoes not prove much.
Both Numenius and Plotinus use the word voµo8e'TI)c; when speaking
about the second god. Although the farmer's use of the title is nearer
to Calcidius, this is no proof. Calcidius' additional explanation
1 fr. 22 runs as follows: "!lam:p 8e lt'(XALV :>..6yot;l:a't'! yewpyij> 1t'pot;'t'Ov cpuw'.>-

ov't'a: &va:cpep6µevot;,'t'OV a:u't'ov Myov µ(XAL<J't'(X l:anv 6 1t'pw't'ot; 6eot; 1t'pot; 't'OV
37jµLoupy6v. ·o µev ye &v <Jlt'tpµa: 1t'(X0'7jt; \jiuJ('ijt; G1t'&Lp&L et<; 't'IX µe't'IXAIXYJ((XVOV't'IX
IXU't'OUJ(P7l!LIX't'IX
auµlt'IXV't'IX• 6 voµo6t't'7jt; 3e cpunueL xa:l 3uxveµeL xa:l µe't'IXcpU't'&IJEL
Is alt'epµor. predicate of il:,v
et<; ~µix<; i:x(Xa't'out; 't'ot l:xer6ev 1t'poxor.'t'or.(,e(,:>..7jµevor..
or, much more likely, direct object of alt'e!pEL? In the latter case the Highest
God would shortly be titled 6 il:,v. A. J. Festugiere, La revelation d'Hermes
Trismegiste, Tome III, Les doctrines de l'dme, Paris 1953, p. 44, note 2 and 3,
thinks that 6 il:,v has a background in the Holy Scripture and in Philo. In
view of this he considers the use of voµo6t't'7)t; 'un trait biblique'. Festugiere
refers to James 4, 12: E!t; Ea't'LVvoµo6t't'7)t; xa:l xpL't'ljt;. But the difference in
context and atmosphere strikes one as rather obvious.
7
98 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [177b]
is based upon the paragraph of the Timaeus, which is the basic

text for the whole tractatus de Jato,
and thus is quite natural in the
context.
To sum up: In studying Calcidius' paragraphs about the meta-
physical hierarchy one is especially reminded of such authors as
Apuleius, Albinos, pseudo-Plutarch, Numenius and, not in the
last place, Plotinus. The hierarchy of Ile:pt e:tµotpµev11c;
seems to be
revised in a way which bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine
of Plotinus.
When we finally ask who can have been Calcidius' authority
for these tenets, the name of Porphyry comes first to the mind.
For he indeed meets all the requirements. His acquaintance with
Middle-Platonism and Numenius was thorough and, as a pupil
of Plotinus, he must have been very partial to the latter's theories.
That he adhered to Plotinus' doctrine of the three hypostases, is
obvious from his booklet 'Acpopµott 1tpoc;-ravo11-roc.
So Porphyry may very well have been Calcidius' direct source
in these matters. This involves an awkward problem however.
For in that case it does not seem possible that he also was the
authority for the corresponding paragraphs in Nemesius' Ile:pt
cpuae:c.>c; because Nemesius still has the doctrine of three
a.v8p6>1tou,
providences. It is easy to see the importance of this problem when
we consider two facts: I. Throughout the tractatus there are some
very remarkable resemblances to Nemesius. 2. It is a priori likely
that Porphyry was an important authority for Nemesius. And
indeed Dorrie 1 has proved that Nemesius made use of Porphyry's
~uµµLxTot~1JT7j!J.otTot
for the doctrine concerning the soul. Thus
the difficulty which we have sketched seems insoluble.
2. FATE RULES ALL THINGS IN A DIFFERENT WAY
a) Frequent events
[177 b] According to this law, i.e. fate, all things are ruled,
each according to its own nature: all heavenly phenomena, by
a blessed necessity and an unchangeable perseverance, because
they are near neighbours of Providence, natural phenomena by
a certain frequency, because of the coming to be and passing
away of all that has its origin by the law of nature. At the same
time, because art and science imitate nature, the products of
the arts are also frequent and are often brought forth.
1 H. Dorrie, Porphyrios' Symmikta Zetemata,Munich 1959.
[177b] FATE RULES ALL THINGS IN A DIFFERENT WAY 99
What is ruled by this law, is ruled by reason and order, without

violence, for everything lacking reason and order is violent; as
such, it does not persist for long, because it is torn to pieces against
its nature.
SECVNDVM PROPRIAM QVAEQVE NATVRAM As in the case of

divine knowledge (Quod deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquidque
pro natura sua ipsorum sciat, 195.2-3), this axiom is the funda-
mental restriction, which, as will become clear in eh. 179, also
warrants human freedom.
FREQVENTER Calcidius returns to the distinctions which he
has made in eh. 156. In the notes to that chapter the predominantly
Aristotelian colour of this and similar tenets has already been
indicated. The present statements about the domain of the fre-
quentia surpass eh. 156 in clarity. Calcidius' information is brief,
but adequate. It fully agrees with normal Peripatetic doctrine:
Ile:pt !J,EV't'O we; e1tt 't'O 7t0AUev3e:x6µ.e:vov lxou(n 3uo 't'LVIXocfrux,~ 't'E
<pu<nc; xoct~ 't'&XV1J (Ammonius in Arist. de lnterpr. 9, 142.5-6 Busse),
ou3' /51,.C,>c;
't'6lVipuaLX6lV ·n, Af:Y(,>3e 't'6lVEVye:veae:L
xoctip6op~.OUTE T6lV
't'EXV1J't'Clv
't'o a.vocyxoc!ov txe:L,a.llix To we; i1tt To 1to1,.u(Philoponus in
Anal. Priora I 13, 152.17-18 Wallies) IMITATVR NATVRAM ARS
!LL!J.ELTOCL
~ 't'&XV1JTYJVipuaLv(Arist. Meteor. IV 3, 381 b 6). VIOLENTVM
Both Waszink (in his note ad loc.)and van Winden (o.c. p. 36)
refer to a phrase in eh. 270: omne porro uiolentum non diu subiectum
conseruat, sed facile perdit (274.18-19). Unfortunately, van Winden
in his commentary does not provide us with any further informa-
tion as to the intention of this reference. Waszink suggests a
Numenian influence. I fail to be impressed by the resemblance
between these two texts, which is after all rather slight. In eh. 270
two types of sovereignty are distinguished, of which one is violent
and tyrannical. The other kind, on the contrary, wields its power
in a reasonable way. Now in such a way the intellect dominates
matter. This domination is the subject of eh. 270. In the present
paragraph, however, violence is set over against nature in accord-
ance with Aristotle's adage TO3e ~(q; xoct1tocpixipuaw 't'OCUT6v.
(De caelo
r 2, 300 a 23). In view of this we have to assume that uiolentus
has a passive connotation here, whereas in eh. 270 this word is
used to denote an activity. RATIONE ORDINE AC SINE VI Although
the present paragraph has a predominantly Aristotelian character,
a curious Platonic parallel for this combination can be drawn: .•.
~ l qt 8e 't'Oµev <>AOV
ecpepov-roxott icpepov, iJ>CITe xwda8otL ~<";>ov,IX't'eh -
-r we:;µ~v <>rrn
't'UX,OL
1tpoLSVotLxoci oc>..6ywc;
... (Tim. 43 a 7-b 2). CON-
TRA NATVRAM SVAM This conclusion with its counterpart secundum
propriam naturamat the start gives the paragraph a fine cohesion.
b) Digression
[178] Thus all things separately follow their own god and, as
Plato says, "the king and emperor of heaven, the head of the
procession and the lofty leader, who in his winged chariot
regulates and guides all things, is followed by legions of heavenly
and angelic powers, distributed into eleven parts". "For", as
he says, "only Vesta stays in her abode", Vesta, who evidently
as the World-Soul and the mind of that Soul guides the reins of
starry heaven according to a law ordained by Providence. This
law, which ordains by a kind of chain of consequences and
successions, is, as we have often said, fate. By the winged chariot
of the emperor we have to understand the sphere of the fixed
stars, because it is the first in order and moving more swiftly
than all other motions, as has been demonstrated, and Plato
enumerates eleven parts of the army up to this point: first the
sphere of the fixed stars, next the seven spheres of the planets,
the ninth is the seat of aether, which is inhabited by the aethereal
daemons, the tenth is airy, the eleventh has a moist nature, the
twelfth is the earth, which stays immovable outside of the revo-
lution of the cosmos.
However, this may be outside the subject, although it is in
accordance with the argument which we have started, because
fate is executed without violence and without any inevitable
constraint in a healthy and orderly way.
This chapter poses a problem as to its intention. As Waszink

notes, we should now hear something about the peraeque dubia
or the rarities of chance and fortune. But these are postponed
and the argument is interrupted. I think that the only solution
of this problem can be to take the author's own word, that it is
a digression (extra propositum,207.10), caused by association
(quamuis instituto sermoni concinat, 207.10). The argument about
the orderly and non-violent reign of fate has deflected Calcidius'
thoughts to the beauty of the Cosmic system, from which all
violence is absent. After all, this is not too far extra propositum,
[178] FATE RULES ALL THINGS IN A DIFFERENT WAY IOI
for the first category of things ruled by fate, which Calcidius men-
tioned, were cuncta caelestia. ANGELICARVM For this rendering
of 8<XLµ6v<uv cf. angelicae naturae, quos daemonas uocat (165.1) and
the exposition in eh. 132. VESTAM SCILICET For the view that
Vesta has an important role in the system of our universe cf.
Roscher's paragraph "Hestia in der Spekulation" in his Ausfuhr-
liches Lexikon der Griechischen und Romischen M ythologie12 p.
2643-2646. The explanation of the quoted text from Phaedrus,
in the sense that Vesta is the mythological name for the earth,
can be found in Macrobius, Sat. 1.23.8: quod autem additµeveL8l
'Ea·d<Xev6e&v o!xci>µ6v'1J significat quia haec sola, quam terram esse
accipimus, manet immobilis intra domum deorum, id est intra mundum,
and also in Calcidius eh. 122 : Quare uel sic intellegendum uel ali-
quanto uerisimilius medietati mundi adhaerentem quiescere propter-
eaque et a Platone et a multis aliis U estam cognominari. Denique in
Phaedro idem ait: Manet enim Uesta in diuino domicilio (166. sola
10-14). Here, however, we find the curious idea, that Vesta is
the World-Soul, ruling the starry heaven. For this I have found
no parallels. There is only a superficial resemblance to niv &:>J..'fJv
IJiux~vX<XL vouv, '9jv8~ 'E(J'C't<Xv
X<XL d7j(L'1J't'p<Xv
&1tovoµ&.~ouaLv&v6p<u1tOL
(Plotinus, Enn. IV 4.27), because of the wholly different context
of these words. 1 IVXTA LEGEM For the World-Soul obeys the
law of fate (Huie obsequitur etc.,206.2 sqq.) PRIMAM APLANEM
cf. Apuleius, De dogmate PlatonisI II: Et essecx.1tA<XVeGL primum
ordinem, secundum Saturno datum, I oui tertium, 1lf artem quartum
tenere, quintum Mercurio dari, sextum Veneris esse, septimum Solis
itineribus incendi, octauum metiri Lunam. Exinde elementis omnia
ac principiis occupari. Ignem ante alia superiorem esse, mox aeris
locum, hinc aquae proximum et tune globum terrae in medio situm
aequalem loco ac figura immobilem stare. There is only one difference
with Calcidius, who puts aether where Apuleius has fire. There
are various reasons for this. Apuleius has eleven spheres, stars
and planets belonging to the sphere of fire (quattuor species...
quarum una est ex natura ignis eiusmodi, solem qualemac lunam
uidemus ceterasque siderum stellas). But Calcidius needs twelve
spheres, because he has chosen the passage from the Phaedrus
1 Cf. also Ovid Fasti VI 267: Vesta eadem, quae terra and Augustine De
civitate dei VII 16: Vestam quoque ipsampropterea dearum maximam putaue-
runt, quod ipsa sit ter,a.
!02 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [179]
as his starting-point. 1 In the second place there are Calcidius'

own statements in eh. 129: Quinque regiones uel locos idem Plato
esse dicit in mundo capaces animalium habentes aliquam inter se
diff erentiam positionum ob dif Jerentiam corporum quae inhabitent
eosdem locos. Summum enim esse locum aitsereni, ignishuic proximum
aethereum, cuius corpus esse ignem aeque, sed aliquanto crassiorem
aeris, post humectae substantiae,
quam est altior ille caelestis, dehinc
quam Graeci hygran usian appellant, quae humecta substantia aer est
crassior, ut sitaer iste quem homines spirant, imus uero atque ultimus
locus terrae (171.21-172.7). As can be seen from Waszink's notes
and quotations ad loc., the passage just quoted is inspired by the
Epinomis, which forms such an important background for the
exposition in that part of the Commentarius. This, besides the
quotation from the Phaedrus at the start, emphasizes the Platonic
character of the present chapter. This is illustrated by another
fact. Although he does not say so explicitly, Calcidius would with-
out doubt have agreed with Apuleius, that the stars and planets
are of a fiery nature. That is the Platonic view: 't'ou µevoov 8dou
'n)V 7tAdanJV t8e«v ~)( 1tupo~OC7t1)pyix~e'C'O
(Tim. 40 a 2-3). Aristotle's
view is different: sidera autemaetherium locum obtinent (Fragmenta
Selecta ed. Ross p. 90).
c) Rare events and human free choice

[179] An outcome from this arrangement of affairs are the
things of rare occurrence, which are partly ruled by fortune,
partly happen unexpectedly and spontaneously and are said
to be commanded by chance. Such things are indeed 'fatal', for
they are comprised by the ordinances of fate, yet they are not
by necessity violent, just as the things which are done by us;
for these acts are comprised by our laws, yet they do not happen
according to the laws which we use. For instance the law ordains
that a traitor should be killed. Now what does this mean?
Because the law calls the person who is penalized a traitor, is it
necessary that the law makes him a traitor? The answer, to my
1 Hackforth takes exception to Calcidius' interpretation: Plato's Phaedrus

translated, with introductionand commentary by R. Hackforth, Cambridge
1952 p. 74; cf. also p. 73: "It has been too readily assumed, both in ancient
and modern times, that the relation of Hestia to the rest necessarily implies
some astronomical scheme or planetary system into which the number
eleven (or twelve) can be fitted. To my mind there is no such necessity".
[179] FATE RULES ALL THINGS IN A DIFFERENT WAY 103
opinion, is: no, for the traitor by his own wicked mind, or rather
by his insanity, bursts forth into crime, but he is punished
according to the law. On the other hand there is a law that he,
who has fought bravely, is to be rewarded; this the law ordains,
yet the law does not make victor or victory, and still the law
gives a reward. And therefore the law commands in general,
to all people, what has to be done, and withholds all people
from unsuitable actions; but not all people obey nor do all
people perform what is commanded. This fact proves that men
have a liberty to choose, though not all men have the same liberty;
the consequences however, viz. the things fixed by law, such
as punishments or rewards, are ratified by law.
[180 a] Such, to my opinion, is also the character of that
heavenly law which is called fate, ordaining virtuous deeds to
men and forbidding their opposites. To follow is our task, free
from the yoke of fate, but praise of good actions is both according
to law and to common sense and the same holds true of the
opposites: lying and leading a wicked life is contained by law
and it is in man's power as the precedent cause; but arranging
one's life in a wicked way is man's own responsibility and there-
fore to be punished is completely in accordance with the necessity
of fate, because that is a consequence of the law.
RARI EXEMPLI ••• FORTVNA ••• CASVS This summarizes very

briefly the contents of eh. 158 and 159, rari exempli being the
equivalent of "t'O e1t'~A~"t'"t'OV. NECESSITATE VIOLENTA It is not
certain, whether we have to read uiolenta or uiolenta. In the first
case there would be a parallel to beata necessitate(206.6), but that
is no sufficient proof and besides, it is likely that uiolenta refers
to eh. 177 (206.12), where uiolentus has a passive connotation
(see above p. 99). In view of this uiolenta should rather be taken
as a nom.pl.neut. At any rate there can be no doubt about the
purport of the words; in both cases the author says that the do-
mains of fortune and chance, just as (perinde ut) the domain of
our free actions, are ruled by fate without any violent compulsion
by necessity. PERINDE VT Waszink in his note ad 207.13-15
suggests: auctorem suum non plane intellexisse uidetur Calcidius, as
he thinks that Calcidius is confusing the peraeque dubiaof human
free will and 't'oe1t' This suggestion to me seems too strong;
iA~'t"'t'ov.
perinde ut shows that it is rather a case of abbreviation than of
NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [179]
misunderstanding of the source. By perinde utthe two classes are

certainly distinguished: the one is ruled by fate in the same way
as the other. The transition is indeed somewhat quick, but this is
not abnormal in Calcidius, especially when his beloved topic of
human freedom comes in sight.
LEGIBVS NOSTRIS The laws of the state clearly demonstrate
man's freedom. When the provisions of the law speak about a
traitor, this does not mean that the law forces anyone to be a
traitor. Men become traitors by their own fault, and afterwards
the law punishes them according to its provisions. These provi-
sions have a general character; man is free either to be law-abiding
or to be disobedient. The same holds true for the law of fate. We
have to be obedient to this law. If we obey, we are praised, if not,
we are punished. This passage is largely reminiscent of eh. 4 and 5
of Ile:pl.e:tµocpµev7Jc;.
However, the purport of the argument is wholly
different. Pseudo-Plutarch uses the v6µoc;1toAL'nx6c; as an illustrative
parallel in order to explain some essential characteristics of e:tµocpµe-
V1J.In eh. 4 he deals with such notions as ocxo1,.ou6wc;, xoc661,.ouand
e~tmo6foe:wc;and eh. 5, from which Waszink quotes, is concerned
with the problem 'ltjj µevOCA7J6ec;,
'ltjj 8e tjle:u8oc;
TO"1tocVTOC xoc6'e:tµocpµevljv"
(570 b). The law of the state has only come up for discussion in
a theoretical way, in order to elucidate the evepye:Loc of fate. Cal-
cidius, on the other hand, is fully interested in the law itself, or
rather in human freedom, which is proved and guaranteed by the
law. There are a few traces of the 'original' argument, e.g. gene-
raliter (9), sequuntur (12) and indeed the parallel drawn in the first
sentence of eh. 180: Talis est, opinor, etiam lex illa caelestis, quae
fatum uocatur (208.14). AMENTIA cf. my note on malitiam ex
dementia (202.7-8). TALIS The parallel drawn by Calcidius
differs widely from the one in Ile:pl. e:tµocpµevl)c;. In eh. 4 of that
treatise the author says about e:tµocpµEVl): fo·n To(vuv, &c; tl.v TLc;
otoc; o 7tOALTLXOc;
e:txocO"OCL, v6µoc;,< 8c;> 7tpc7>TOV µev TIX7tAE:LO"TOC, e:t xocl.
e~
µ~ 7tOCVTct, u1to6foe:wc;1tpoo-TOCTTe:L,
~7te:LTOC
µ~v xoc66AouTIX1t6Ae:L
7tp0cr1jXOVTOC
e:tc;8uvocµLv (569 d). The similarity is seen
1te:pLActµ~ocve:L
in the fact that both the law of the state and fate are operative
and e~u1to6foe:wc;.As we have found in eh. 150, Calcidius
xoc661,.ou
adheres to this view, which he illustrates in that chapter with the
example of geometric law. In the present paragraph, however,
Calcidius introduces a very different parallel. Just as in the case
of the law of the state, man's obedience is remunerated and his
[180a] FATE RULES ALL THINGS IN A DIFFERENT WAY 105
transgression is punished. This is the same state of affairs as was

implied at the start of eh. 151: fatum uero, quod et parendi sibi
obsequium et non parendi contumaciam uelut edicto complectitur
(187.1-3). This point of view is certainly out of harmony with the
e~ l'.mo6foewc;-doctrine,as we find it expounded in Ilept etµcxpµevY)c;,
Discussing this in the notes to eh. 151 I suggested that the dis-
crepancy was due to the circumstance that the special charac-
teristics of any example tend to intrude into the description of the
thing which is illustrated by that example. There are, however,
other possibilities, which should at least be stated. In reading
this paragraph one is somehow reminded of the Stoic demand of
0µ01.oyouµevwc; -r7icpu(m~Yjv.Especially remarkable are the following
words from SVF III 4: 8Lo1t&p -ret.oc;y(ve-rcxt-ro ocxo1.ou6wc; -r7icpua&t
~Yjv... ou8ev evepyouv-rotc; 6)V OC1totyop&U&tV &LW6&v o voµoc; o xotvoc;,
C>anepea-.tv o op6oc;Myoc;. If this Stoic tenet has indeed exerted an
influence on Calcidius' argument, this would be another example
of the use of a transformed Stoic element in a Platonic context.
There is also the very different possibility of a parallel with the
fifth-century Alexandrinian Platonist Hierocles, extracts from
whose work Ilept npovo(cxc; have been preserved by Photius cod. 214
and 251. His system seems rather out of date in the fifth century,
for, as Praechter says: "Im ganzen fiihrt Hierokles kaum iiber den
vorplotinischen Platonismus hinaus''. 1 There is no trace of Plotinus'
system of hypostases and a fortiori not of the more intricate patterns
of later Neo-Platonism. In fact, there is much that rather reminds
one of Middle-Platonism, not in the last place his doctrine of
etµcxpµevY), not without an important modification however. Again
I quote Praechter: "Dabei verliert aber die Heimarmene in den
Ausfiihrungen des Hierokles den Charakter einer starren, sozusagen
mechanisch wirkenden Notwendigkeit". 2 In Hierocles' system
fate receives the character of retributive justice. Fate is xp(atc;
6ei:otOUO'ot ev -roi:c;oux ecp' ~µi:v 1tpoc;'t"YjVOC~LotV ocµoL~~v't'WVecp' ~µi:v
(Phot. cod. 251, Migne PG 104, 93) and -rwv ex~cxtvov-rwv xcx-roc
-rov
't'Yjc;1tpovo(cxc;6eaµov 8tXotO"t'LX~ 't'OU6e(ou u1tixpx.etevepyetot (Phot.
cod. 214, p. 127 ed. R. Henry). Retribution is necessary: ou yocp
&1.1.wc; fo-rott8txcx(cx~ &vtaoc;8Lotvoµ~.µ~ u1t66&0'tV Aot~OUO'ot't'O~µenpov
cxu-re~ouatov(Phot. cod. 251, Migne PG 104, 93). Such ideas are not
very far from Calcidius, but there are also clear distinctions, of which
1 Ueberweg-Praechter, Die Philosophie des Altertums,
Berlin 192611p. 641.
I O.C. p. 642,
perhaps the fundamental one is the fact that in Hierocles' doctrine

of fate an essential part is played by 1tpo~Lo-r~:~µe:ic;µev y«p xptcm
8LXotO'"r6>V
8otLµ6vwv1tpoc;'t'l)V"r6>V1tpo~e:~Lwµevwv ~µiv cx~totvAot"(XOCVoµe:v
(Phot. cod. 251, Migne PG
~xota-roc;~tov, ev cj'>1ta.v-rotauve:tA1J7t"rotL.
104, 93). According to Theiler Hierocles is the final stage in the
evolution of a second branch of the Platonic doctrine of fate besides
the system of Gaius and his adherents. 1
So with regard to the paragraph under discussion our conclusion
could be that Calcidius, while predominantly subscribing to the
views of the school of Gaius, here shows traces of a different,
but cognate idea, although without a most important characteristic
of the latter, viz., the retribution of 1tpo~Lo~.
3. FREEDOM HAS ITS SEAT IN THE AO"(LO"'rLxov
OF THE SOUL
a) Short statement of the axiom
[180 b] All these actions have their seat in the souls of men,
and this soul is free and acts according to its own authority.
Now the best part of the soul is that which Plato has described
as having a double virtue, one in the understanding of divine
things, which is wisdom, the other in the arrangement of human
affairs, which is called sagacity.
ANIMIS ••• ANIMA •••• ANIMAE At the start of this new part of
his tractatus Calcidius straightaway emphasizes the fact that
human freedom has its seat in the soul, which transcends the body
by a long way. At least this is true of the highest part: OPTIMA
PARS TOAO"(LO'"rLXOV.
SAPIENTIA .•• PRVDENTIA cf. Apuleius, De PlatoneII 6: illam
uirtutem, quae ratione sit nixa et est spectatrix diiudicatrixque omnium
rerum, prudentiam dicit atque sapientiam: quarum sapientiam
disciplinam uult uideri diuinarum humanarumque rerum, prudentiam
uero scientiam esse intellegendorum bonorum et malorum, eorum
etiam, quae media dicuntur. There is certainly some resemblance,
in both descriptions intellectual virtue is divided into two parts.
But the definitions themselves are quite different. Apuleius'
statements have a Stoic background, which is especially evident
in his definition of sapientia, cf. SVF II 35: 't'l)Vµev aoip£otve:IvotL
8e:£wvn xoti cxv8pw1t£vwv &1tL~µ1jv, His definition of prudentia is
also inspired by the Stoa, though perhaps to a lesser degree, cf.
1 Theiler, o.c. p. 88 sqq.
[181] FREEDOM'S SEAT IN THE AO'(LG't'LXOV
OF THE SOUL 107
SVF III 262: <ppOvtjGLV 8' e:tvotL

em<J't'Y)(LlJV
l>v 7tOtl)'t'&oV
xoc.lou 7tOLlJ't'tOV
1 It is quite obvious that Calcidius has elucidated
xoc.lou8e:'t'epwv.
the terms in question in a different way and that he does not owe
his definitions to the Stoa. These definitions are fully consistent
with his own statement in eh. 137: rationabilem partem animae
duplici uirtute praeditam docens: alteram quae contemplatur eandem
semper immutabilemque naturam, ex qua intentione mentis conualescit
sapientia, alteram item quae mutabilium generatorumque opinatrix
est, cui prudentiae uocabulum congruit (177.14-18). Now it seems
quite possible to assume, that, whereas Apuleius owed his descrip-
tion to the Stoa, Calcidius leans more strongly upon Aristotle.
Bonitz in his Index p. 688 says about ao<p(oc.: sed etiam non addito
adiectivo 1tp6>'t'lJipsum nomen aocpEot significat niv 1tp6>'t'l)V
<pLAoaocp(oc.v,
i.e. nJV 't'6>V7tp6>'t'<uV cxpxC>v On p. 831 con-
xotl othtC>v8e:<uplj't'tX'l)V.
cerning <ppovtjatc; he remarks : sed plerumque angustiore sensucppovl)atc;
refertur ad't'<X1tpotx't'&..These remarks of Bonitz are confirmed by
book ~ of the Ethica Nicomachea,which deals with intellectual
virtue. There aocp(otand cppovlJGLt:; are distinguished as theoretical
and practical wisdom respectively, e.g. ~ aocp(oteG't't xoc.le7tt<J't'Y)(LlJ
xott vouc;'t'6>V't'L(Lt<u't'<X't'<uV
-tjj <puae:L (EN II41 b 2-3) and ~ 8e <ppOvtjGtt:;
1te:pl't'(Xcxv8p6>7ttVotxott 1te:pt ©V fo't'L ~OUAe:uaota8otL (EN II41 b 8-9).
If it is right to connect Aristotelian doctrine with Calcidius' state-
ments here, it should perhaps be added, that this does not at all
imply a direct borrowing from Aristotle. 2 In fact the definitions
have been adjusted to Platonic doctrine, as can be seen in the text
just quoted from eh. 137 and especially in the following words of
eh. 213: duplex uirlus, altera intellegens, opinatrix altera, iuxta
quas sapientia cum disciplina et item prudentia cum rectis opinionibus
conualescunt (228.18-20). The terms intellegens and opinatrix are
clearly reminiscent of the Platonic contrast between &7tt<J't'YJ(LlJ
and 86~oc.
b) Relation between body and soul

[181] But if someone in view of the fluids in the body and the
way in which birth has united them holds the opinion, that not
1 Cf. Albinus, Epit. 29.2: 'H (LEV8~ <pp6V7jal,;fo·nv !mani!L'll &.y«8rovx«l

XIXXWV XtXloo8e:-repoov.
1 Cf. S. Lilla, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and Jewish-Alexandrine
Philosophy in the Terminology of Clement of Alexandria's Ethics in Archivio
Italiano per la Storia della Pieta. III (1962) p. 10-14.
108 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE
without fate many people are extravagant, others moderate,

and that the extravagant suffer from the disharmonious mixture
of the fluids, whereas the moderate are supported by a happy
amalgamation, and that all this takes place by fate, his idea is
true-for the contribution of nature is such, that the feeble race
of men are either suffering from an unfortunate amalgamation
or are being helped by a moderate one in acquiring respectability
-and therefore against imperfections of this kind the law of
Providence places the healthfulness of reason and deliberation,
for greediness, passion, cruelty and other such plagues do not
represent anything great in childhood, but become harmful,
when people grow older, at the same time, I think, when also the
healthfulness of deliberation is strengthened, which receives
help from the glory of honourable endeavour, benefit from the
censure of well-wishers, healing from punishment; on the other
hand a perverse mind is dulled by misfortunes and becomes
impudent.
[182] Therefore, because they partake in corporeality, there
is between men and beasts and other things lacking life, a fellow-
ship and participation in bodily phenomena, as men have birth,
nourishment and growth in common with the others, whereas
sense-experience and desire are the common quality only of men
and animals lacking speech and reason.
Now cupidity and irascibility, in the case of animals, whether
wild or tame, are irrational, in the case of man, however, whose
characteristic it is to devote his mind to reason, rational. The
desire to reason and to understand and to know the truth is
proper to man, who is at the greatest distance from cupidity
and irascibility; for the last-mentioned qualities can also be seen
in mute animals, even to a much sharper degree; however, the
perfection of reason and intellect is proper to man and god alone.
SI QVIS The Stoic opposition has still not been fully silenced.
In the first chapter the argument mentioned in eh. 167: Maxima
uero uitiorum excitatio est in corporis humorum concretione, quorum
abundantia uel indigentia propensiores ad libidinem aut iracundiam
sumus. (198.II-13) is elaborated both on a larger scale and within
the framework of the present discussion. CORPORIS Note the
strong antithesis to animis and anima (208.21) in the preceding
paragraph. As regards this Stoic objection, we have to bear in
[182] FREEDOM'S SEAT IN THE i..oyurnx6v OF THE SOUL 109
mind the Stoa's materialistic conception of the soul and the empha-
sis laid on the similarity of mental and bodily diseases.
But is is more important that the Stoic opponent is represented
by Calcidius as basing himself on the medical theory about the
mixture of fluids in the body. HVMORES ••• CONCRETIONEM The
theory of the body-fluids had been thoroughly developed by
Galenus, the great physician of the second century A.D. According
to him the mixture of the fluids has a strong influence not only
on the bodily condition, but also on the soul. In fact he wrote a
treatise, entitled "On 'C'ot'i:i; 'C'oua6>µotTo<;xpcxae:aLv
octTrji; !.Jiuiiji;3uvocµe:L<;
faov'C'otL(ed. I. Muller, Galeni Scripta minoraII p. 32-79, Leipzig
1891). In this book he cites as his authorities Hippocrates, Aristo-
tle and Plato, e.g. eh. 6: ''O'C'L3e xocto IlMTwv ocu'C'o<; o!8e:~Aot1t'C'oµev'1jv
'C"1)V e1tt 'C'1ixocxo;x.uµt~'C'OU
'iJU)'..'1JV 0'6>!LOC'C'O<;,
~ e~'Yj<;
p°YjO'L<;~8'1j8'1jA6>0'E:L
(followed by a quotation of Tim. 86 e 5-87 a 7).
Indeed to add weight to the present objection the Stoa could
have claimed a strong ally in Plato himself, whose point of view
may be summarized in the following words: 'C'oc8e 1te:pt !.Jiux.'1Jv
(vo0"7Jµot'C'ot) e~LV
8Loc0'6l!Lot'C'O<; (Tim. 86 b 2 ). So it is not surprising
that Calcidius feels no need to contradict his Stoic opponent: uera
sentit (209.7). But, as he hastens to add, exactly this state of affairs
calls for all those activities and interventions, which orthodox
Stoic doctrine would have to consider useless: IDEOQVE cf.
eh. 168: Opus est ergo(198.17) and my remarks concerning ergo
(see above p. 66).
The start of eh. 182 is again Aristotelian in origin, as Waszink
notes somewhat cautiously. In fact there cannot be much doubt,
as we shall presently see. IDEOQVE The meaning of ideo is not
clear at first sight, especially as the addition of -que shows that
ideo has to be linked with the preceding chapter. In my opinion
the explanation is as follows: "Because ofthe state of affairs eluci-
dated in eh. 181 man, although sharing his corporality with the
animals, has reason as his special privilege". NVTRIRI ••• SENTIRE
••• APPETERE cf. U1tocp;x_e:L 8e 'C'OL<;
µev cpu'C'OL<;'C'O8pe:1t'C'LKOV µ6vov,
E:TI;pOL<;
• _L oi;;
~l. 'C'OU'C'O
- t 'C'E:
KOCL
' 'C'U • -A,.. 6V. E:L
1 OCLuv11'C'LK ' oe:
~' 'C'U
1 OCLOV'1J'C'LKOV,
'-6 ' KOCL
' 'C'O
' ope:K'C'L-
'
K6V. (Aristoteles, De anima B 3, 414 a 32-b 1). APPETITVS Cer-

tainly this word refers to appetere (1.19) and so we can see how
an Aristotelian concept is developed in a Platonic sense. Aristotle's
is taken to refer to the two lowest parts of the soul in
ope:K'C'Lx6v
Plato's theory. This use of appetitus is not confined to the present
IIO NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [182]
text. Concerning this term Waszink remarks in index C: frequenter

ad ambas animae inrationalis partes pertinens. A good example is
provided by eh. 201 : appetitum, qui diuiditur in iracundiam et
cupiditatem (221.2-3). CVPIDITAS TO em8U!J,lj't'tK6v IRACVNDIA TO
8U!J,OE:t8&~
INRATIONABILIS • • • RATIONABILIS At first sight this
looks Platonic too. Desire and spirit have to obey the commands
of reason, e.g. ouxouv -r<j>!LevAO"(tat'tK<j>
&px_e:tv
1tpoa1jxe:t,ao<p<j>
6v-rt
nj~ 4ux_'ij~1tpO!J,~8e:tatV,
Katl fx_oV't't't'1)Vf)1tep <X1t!X<nj~ T<j>8e 8uµoe:t8e:i:
U1tl)K6<t> -roo-rou; (Politeia 441 e 4-6 ). On account
e:!vattxatl O'U!J.!LOCX.<t>
of this, man's desire and passion could well be termed 'reasonable'.
Strictly speaking, however, the use of the word rationabilis implies
a much stronger unity in the soul than is possible in Plato's tricho-
tomy. In the latter case there are three clearly distinguished parts
and Plato has great difficulty to construct a unity out of these
parts. Now the unity of the soul is basic for Aristotle's theory:
A&"(OUO't 8~ 't'tve:~!J,E:ptO"t'1)V
atu~v. xatl &ll!J,e-1
voe:i:v,&ll8e em8U!J,E:LV.
't'( oih 8~ 1tO't'E: 't'1)V4ux_~V,e:£!J,E:ptO''t'1)
O'UV&)(.E:t 1t&<pUKE:V
; . • . E:Lµev "(OCp
lv, 8toc-r(OUKe:u8ew~xatl ~ 4ux.~iv; (De anima4II b 5-12 ). Accordingly
Aristotle did not speak about parts of the soul, but of 8uvoc!J.e:t~.
This idea was introduced into Platonism. "Die Frage nach "Tei-
len" der Seele war im Platonismus nicht dra.ngend; Hingst hatte
man stillschweigend die Korrektur durch Aristoteles, de an. r
9, 432 a 13 f. und 433 b 2-6, angenommen und gelemt, die Seelen
zu verstehen, und sah daraufhin die
"Teile" Platons als 8uvOC!J.E:L~
Seele als eine-vorwiegend metaphysisch bestimmte-Einheit an". 1
For Porphyry, too, the unity of the soul was very important. To
the problem he devoted his study Ile:pl -r&v nj~ 4ux.'ij~8uvoc!Le:wv,
excerpts of which have been preserved by Stobaios vol. Ip. 347-354
Wachsmuth.2
Possibly the use of the expressions we are discussing hints at
a doctrine in which the unity of the soul receives great emphasis.
It would only be a hint, for in eh. 187 ira and cupiditas are called
1 H. Dorrie, Porphyrios' "Symmikta Zetemata", p. 105.

1 Cf. Beutler's remark about this study: "Und so vermag Porphyrios
die 3uviiµeu; des Aristoteles in die dichterische und aus seiner besonderen
praktischen Absicht zu erklarenden Redeweise Platons einzudeuten und
einzubauen". RE XXIP col. 289. Important is also Dorrie's answer to a
question of Waszink in the discussion about Dorrie's paper Die Leh-re von
der Seele, Entretiens sur l'Antiquite classique XII, Geneva 1965, p. 190.
More information is provided by Waszink in his commentary on Tertullian's
De anima,Amsterdam 1947 p. 215.
FREEDOM'S SEAT IN THE AO"(L«Tt'Lx6v
OF THE SOUL III
partes animi (212.10). RATIONIS ••• INTELLECTVS cf. e:-repoLc;3e

xrxl 't'O 3LetVOlj't'Lx6v
't'E xrxl vouc;, otov cxv8pw1t0Lc;
xrxl et 't'L 't'OLOU't'OV
iTep6v
l«Tt'Lv~ nµLwTepov (Arist. De anima414 b 18-19, a text quoted by
Waszink in his notes to 238.9-10).
It is perhaps useful to give a short summary of Calcidius' argu-
ment in eh. 182: "Corporeality is common to plants, animals and
men, desire and passion are qualities of animals and men, but
only in men these are rational, reason finally is reserved to man".
c) Disagreement witin the soul

ex) Dispute of thelower parts with the t..oyLa't'Lx6v
[183] And even among men< this perfection is> not equally
<divided>, for when men become excited, cupidity and irasci-
bility and reason too are fighting one another and in turn they
gain victories over each other, reason for instance in Homer,
when Laertes' son 'having beaten his breast harshly reproves
his mind: "Be patient, my heart. For you have supported heavier
blows". ' Indeed in his mind reason then subjugated irascibility.
In Euripides on the other hand in the mind of Medea the wild
irascibility had extinguished the light of reason, for she says:
'It is not concealed from me, what bloody thoughts I hold, but
anger conquers the sanity of my heart', so thoroughly had her
indignation, because Jason had taken a concubine, closed the
way for healthy deliberation.
and the 6uµ.oeL3ec;,which is

The conflict between the AO"(LO''t'Lx6v
the subject of this chapter, indeed, as Waszink notes, reminds
of Albinos, Epit. 24. But there is an important distinction. Albinos
in his argument, which ultimately derives from Plato's analysis
in the fourth book of the Politeia (434 d-441 c), wants to prove
the tripartition of the soul and the fact that its three parts each
have a different abode, Calcidius on the other hand is mainly
interested in human freedom. As in the case of God's prescience,
Calcidius does not deal with the subject as such, but rather with
the implications for the autonomy of man's free will. PECTORE
PVLSATO This text is also quoted by Plato, Politeia 441 b 6.
MEDEAE Euripides' verses are quoted quite often, e.g. Albinos,
Epit. 24.3, Plut. De uirt. mor. 446 a, Clemens, Strom. II 15.63.1
Calcidius omits examples of the conflict between reason and desire,
1 Cf. Lilla o.c. p. 22 sqq.
II2 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE
because such cases are exactly parallel to the instances given in

the present chapter. That such a conflict is certainly implied, is
shown by the plural uitiosis partibusat the start of eh. 184.
~) Dispute of theem8uµlj't'LX6v and the 8uµoet8e~

[184 a] So in the mind of a moderate man deliberation always
has the upper hand, whereas the weakness of the immoderate
man supports the defective parts of his mind against reason.
Often also these defects themselves fight one another, for instance
in the case of the young man in Terence's play (Terentius,
Eunuchus 46-49), who in his resistance against the violent
flames of love relies upon honourable irascibility, when he says
that he will not go to see his mistress, who spontaneously invites
him, so that having shamefully shut him out she calls him back
by enticement and the charms of a harlot.
y) These disputes prove our freedom
[184 b] Now these things, which we debate in the hidden
provinces of our heart, considering whether we have to do them
or not, and about which we finally take a decision as if by vote,
to what extent are they not our own? Unless perhaps, because
excited or perverted by passion, we are not capable of judgment,
since a fair decision has to lack the prejudices both of hatred
and of favour and mercy.
ERGO HAEC This clearly indicates the purpose of the preceding
paragraphs, viz., the proof of human freedom, which is safely
harboured in the soul. DISCEPTARE The imagery seems to be
taken from the legal sphere, considering the last part of the para-
graph (aequum iudicium etc.). In the case which comes up before
the court of our free mind, we have to be just and impartial judges,
passing judgment without respect of any motives. NISI FORTE
IDEO When we are overcome by passions and emotions, our
judgment is perverted. In so far our liberty seems to be impaired.
A similar statement has been made at the end of eh. 156; cf. my
notes ad loc.(above, p. 40).
d) Divination and astrologynever concern the).oyta-rtx6v
[185] "But", they (= the Stoics) say, "the prediction of
future events testifies that all things have been arranged and
regulated long before; now this arrangement and regulation
[186] FREEDOM'S SEAT IN THE )..oyLa"C'LXOVOF THE SOUL IIJ
is called fate". On the contrary, this very prediction in every

respect denies the dominance of fatal necessity, because pre-
diction is the rational appraisal of a future condition and this
appraisal does not prevail in things which are certain and
bound by necessity, but in things which are uncertain and
doubtful. For who would consult a prophet about a new-born
baby, whether it is to be mortal or immortal? But usually rather
that is asked, which is doubtful, e.g. the length of the periods of
life allotted to him and whether he is to be rich or poor and
whether he is to hold a lofty or a low and humble post. All these
things are concluded through observation and science and also
by skilful ingenuity: for it is either through the flight of birds
or through the internal organs or through oracles that men are
forewarned by the prediction of some kind daemon, who has
knowledge of all things which follow successively, exactly as if a
doctor according to his medical learning would predict either
death or recovery, or if, to take another example, a helmsman
not unacquainted with the conditions of the sky on account
of some little cloud foretells a future storm; all these things are
not comprised by fate, but understood by skilful reasoning,
practice and experience.
[186] In the same way, when a prediction is made from the
constellation of the stars, the constellations are usually observed
and the rising and setting of the stars and the formations, brought
into a rational system, according to which fertility or sterility
come forth; and the whole system of this kind is nothing else but
a conjectural inference about those things which concern the
body or the things proper to the body or the soul, in so far as it
is behaving as a slave of the body. That is why to my opinion
Plato says that the Derniurge presided over the construction
of the souls, but that the duty and task to join on the other
things, which are added to the souls, has been enjoined to the
lower divine powers, so that the pure and clean souls, which
thrive and flourish through reason, are made by God, but as
the authors of the defective parts of the souls those powers are
regarded to which such a task has been enjoined by the Derniurge.
PRAEDICTIO At first sight it looks as if the discussion of eh.

169 sqq. is started all over again. But that is only partly the case.
At present Calcidius' first and foremost concern is with the maxim
8
II4 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [185]
that freedom of will belongs to the soul and not to the body. It
must be admitted, however, that owing to the lack of clarity in his
argument this only becomes perfectly clear at the end of eh. 186.
SIQVIDEM The reason given here differs widely from the discussion
of oracles in eh. 170 and 171. In those paragraphs the oracles were
considered as pieces of advice from the gods, cf. suadet (200.6)
and consilium (200.14). The present chapter does not mention such
a form of validity. Here prognostication is viewed not so much from
its purpose as from its technique. RATIONABILIS This is an
important word, which foreshadows the terms used a few lines
further down, e.g. scientia (14), rationibus (20). CERTIS •••
AMBIGVIS This resembles eh. 169, cf. the notes on that chapter
p. 70). RECENS NATO One is tempted to regard this as a refer-
ence to the practice of ye:ve:8AuxAoy(oc, so vehemently attacked by
opponents of fatalism. 1 However, the question of astrology, of
is a branch, is only broached in the following
which ye:ve:8ALotAoy(oc
chapter. Still, in view of all the virulent attacks made on divination
and astrology it is somewhat surprising to read Calcidius' positive
appreciation of these practices. This is only possible, because he
stresses the scientific side of prognostication. QVAE CVNCTA The
Stoa made an important distinction within diuinatio : duo sunt
enim diuinandi genera, alterum artis est, alterum naturae (Cicero,
De divinationeI u) and Duo enim genera diuinandi esse dicebas,
unum artificiosum, alterum naturale; artificiosum constare partim
ex coniectura, partimex obseruatione diuturna (Id. II 26). The second
half of the last quotation reminds one quite strongly of Calcidius,
both in content and in wording. This impression can be corrob-
orated by some other quotations from Cicero's treatise, which is
the main source of information in this field: Quae uero aut coniectura
explicantur aut euentis animaduersa ac notata sunt, ea genera diui-
nandi, ut supra dixi, non naturalia, sed artificiosa dicuntur; in quo
haruspices, augures, coniectoresque numerantur (I 72), res futuras
quas ... aut ratio aut coniectura praesentit (I 128). Est enim ars
in iis, qui nouas res coniectura persequuntur, ueteres obseruatione
didicerunt (I 34).
MEDICVS ••• GVBERNATOR These comparisons are traditional.
The objection raised in De divinationeI 24 At non numquam ea
1 Firm foundations for this criticism were laid by Carneades; cf. Amand,
o.c. p. 49 sqq.
[186] FREEDOM'S SEAT IN THE AOYLCM"Lx6v
OF THE SOUL II5
quae praedicta sunt minus eueniunt. is met by the following answer:
Quae tandem id ars non habet? earum dico artium quae coniectura
continentur et sunt opinabiles. Then four examples are given, viz.,
physician, pilot, general and statesman. 1 Very similar, perhaps
even closer to Calcidius are the following words from Maximus
Tyrius' essay Et µixvTLX~<;o1'5Gl)<;,
foT(v "C'L
kcp' ~µ!v: xixl. yocpxu~e:pv~ni<;
VIXUVEX(J)V,xixl. e:t8w<;"C'OC'5pyixvix, xixl. TYJV6CXAIX"C"'C'IXV opwv xixl. ixta6ixv6-
µe:vo<;"C'WV 7tVe:uµoc"C'(J)V,
ol8e:v "C'O&1t0~1)0"6µe:vov. xixl. O'"C'p1X'njYO<;
••• xixl.
EixTpo<;Tov xocµvovTcxt8&>v,xixl. ~<; v6aou ~uve:t<;,xixl. ~<; TE'J.V'r)<; ixta6ixv6-
µe:vo<;,ol8e:v TO&1to~1)0"6µe:vov (XIII 4). 2 Finally I quote the following
from Origen's Contra CelsumIV 96: xixl. tixTpol. youv &1to tixTpLx~<;
1tpoyLV6>0'XOUO'( "C'LVIX
••• oG"C'(J)8e xixl. xu~e:pv~"C'IXL ••• 1tpoyLV6>0'XOUO'LV
E'ltLGl)µixaEix<;
xixl. &veµ(J)Vacpo8p6'nj"C'IX<; xixl. "t'p07ttX<;
1te:pl."C'O7tE:pLexovEX
"C'Lvo<; xixl. nip~ae:(J)<;.All these texts prove that the material
1te:Epix<;
used by Calcidius for his argument is conventional in this field.
COMPREHENDVNTVR Note the pun. Things are not in the grasp
of fate, but they can be grasped by us by means of prognostication.
SIDERVM PRAEDICTIO The purport of eh. 186, which is closely
linked with the preceding chapter, concerns &CM"povoµEix rather than
The former notion is defined as follows by Sextus
&O"'C'poi.oyEix.
Empiricus: tjp'r)O'L<;ECM"LV k1tl.cpixLvoµevoL<; w<; ye:(J)py(ixxixl. xu~e:pv'r)TLX~,
&cp' ~<; ECM'LVixuxµou<; "C'E:
xixl. fooµ~p(ix<; ••• 1tpo6e:0"1t(~e:LV (Adv. Math.
V 2). OBSERVARI ••• RATIONEM cf. the use of these same terms
in eh. 185 and the parallels quoted from Cicero's De diuinatione.
This also applies to CONIECTVRA: about this word there is an
interesting note in the Thesaurus. After a long article on the general
meaning of this word a fresh subdivision is started, under the
heading speciatim de divinatione (TLL IV 316). CORPVS ••• COR-
PORIS Although Calcidius' appreciation of all kinds of divination
is positive, there are two important restrictions. The first is the
tacit rejection of all weird and superstitious varieties. Divination
is anars and as such it is rational. The second way in which Calcidi-
us sets bounds to the possibilities of prognostication is even more
momentous in the context: divination is only concerned with
the body. So the maxim at the start of the present argument anima
libera est et agit ex arbitrio suo (208.21-22) remains unimpaired.
However, not the whole of the soul has a right to this freedom.
1 Cf. also Pease's note in his commentary ad loc.(p. 125).
• Cf. G. Soury, AperfUS de Philosophie religieuse chez Maxime de Tyr,
Paris 1942 p. 46 sqq.
This is the privilege only of the optima pars (208.22). The rest of
the soul is the slave of the body (corpori seruientem)and as such
it can very well be the object of divination.
VNDE When we realize this state of affairs, our eyes will be
opened to the essential meaning of the division of tasks between
the Demiurge and the lower gods described in the Timaeus. Of
course we must bear in mind the fact that the aliae diuinae potesta-
tes, the 1tor.i:3e(;
of the Timaeus, are the stars. Man is subject, at least
partly, to the influence of the stars, because for a part he springs
from their creative work. As Plotinus says in Enn. II 3, the treatise
which has been referred to in the notes on eh. 174: 'Ev 3e TL!J,or.L<p
8eo(;!J,EVO '7t0Ll)O'OC.(;
nJV IXflXlJV nj(; IJiutij(;3(3CuO'LV, ot 3e c:pepO!J,£VOL8eol
'C'CX3eLVCX mx81),8U!J,OU(;
xor.locvor.yxor.i:or. xor.le:m8u!J,(OC.(;
xor.l~3ovcx(;xor.l
AU'JtOC.(;
or.o,xor.l!Jiuxlj(;llllo el3o(;, occ:p' 00 'C'CX1tor.8-fi!Lor.'C'or.
'C'OC.U'C'L
Oo'C'OL
ycxpol. AO')'OL O'UV3touO'LV ~!J,ii(;'C'OL(;
IXO''C'flOL(;
1tor.p'OC.U'C'WV
!Jiux~vXO!J,L?:o-
!J,&VOU(;xor.l U'JtO'C'OC'C"C'OUO'L
-tjj ocvocyx71 EV'C'or.u8or. (Enn. II 3.9)
tOV'C'OC.(;
Plotinus' point of view is excellently summed up by Schwyzer:
"Platons Lehren im 'Staat' und im 'Timaios' diirfen nicht so gedeu-
tet werden, als ob wir bloss unter dem Zwang der Sterne stiinden.
Nur die Seele, die in diese Welt gestiirzt ist, ist den Schicksalen
ausgeliefert" 1 . Calcidius' line of thought in the last part of the
present chapter is quite similar.
SVBTEXVNTVR cf. oc8or.voc'C'<p 8Vl)'C'OV (Tim. 41 d l)
1tpoo-ucpor.(vov'C'£(;
in the Demiurge's instruction. In his translation of the Timaeus
Calcidius has rendered this rather pompously by ita ut immortalem
caelestemque naturam mortali textu extrinsecus ambiatis (36.10-n).
But in his comments on that passage he simply uses the verb
attexere (180.1), of which subtexere is a variation. As Waszink
says in his note on 180.1-2, what is stated here is the normal
interpretation of Tim. 41 d 1, e.g. Albinos Epit. 23, 1, where the
author, as he does so often, is paraphrasing the text of the Timaeus:
!Jiux~vycxp 1tor.por.Aor.~V'C'£(;ocv8pc,m(Vl)V oc8ocvor.'C'OV
OOO'OC.V,W(; 3el~O!J,£V,
1tor.pcx
'C'OU'7tflW'C'OU
8eou ot 'C'CX 8Vl)'C'CX
')'&Vl)3l)!J,LOUpyOUV'C'£(;
8eol 3uo or.u-tjj
1tpoO"e8eO"or.v!J,tpl) 8Vl)'C'OC.In fact this fully agrees with Plato's
own statement in Tim. 69 c 7-8: ixAAo 'C'eel3o(;e:vor.u'C'cj>
!Jiuxlj(;
1tpoO"<px6-
3o!Louv'C'O 8Vl)'C'Ov.
2
1 H. R. Schwyzer in RE XXP col. 546.

1 Note the parallel between 1tpo<ru(j)0tlvew(41 d 1) and 1tpoaouco3oµerv
(69 c 8). The same idea is expressed by two different metaphors, one taken
from weaving, the other from building.
FREEDOM'S SEAT IN THE AOYLO"t'LK6v
OF THE SOUL 117
e) Appendix
[187] Now the defective parts which are joined on to the soul
are anger and cupidity, quite adequate instruments to lead
our life. Many indeed are the things which by means of a manly
emotion of the soul happen properly in this life and can be de-
fended, as often as rightful irascibility shows itself a helpful com-
panion of reason, many too the things which result from honest
or moderate desire beyond the squalour of passion. So just as
to the pure World-Soul is granted the sovereignty in the perpet-
ual movement of the world, the souls inspiring men needed
reason mixed with 1 irascibility and cupidity, in order that,
whenever the whole living being had turned to reason, it would
concern itself about celestial things and contemplate these;
whenever, however, it would look down to earthly things, this
looking down might equally not be useless, but from the same
inclination care for the earthly affairs might result.
The purpose of this chapter is to take the sting out of the dis-
approving term uitiosus. The lower parts of the soul are indeed
defective, but at the same time they are quite useful: SATIS
IDONEA INSTRVMENTA. This positive appreciation is somewhat
surprising after the negative way of speaking in eh. 186. The back-
ground of this change will become clear at the end of this chapter.
COMITEM ET AVXILIATRICEM cf. Politeia441 a 2-3: ev IJ,u:x.7i
't'p('C'OV
't'Oth6 EO''C'L
'C'O6uµ.oe:L8ei;,
e1dxoupovov 'C'ij}AOYLCJ't'LXijl
cpuae:L. SICVT •••
ITA Although Calcidius does not make his intentions very clear,
to all probability he wants to stress the similarity in the intermedia-
te position of both the World-Soul and the human soul. This
similarity is indeed based upon the Timaeus. As Cornford says,
" ... the World-Soul and all individual souls belong to both worlds
and partake both of being and of becoming". 2 This intermediate
position is made possible by the composition of the World-Soul
and the individual souls. In Tim. 35 a it is explained that the
former is composed of a special mixture of cxµ.epLa'C'ov, µ.e:pLITT6vand
1 Strictly speaking, 'mixed' is not the full rendering of interpolata. The
general definition of interpolare given in the Thesaurus is i.q. sive novando
(mutando) sive inserendo afficere (TLL VIl 1 col. 2244). The present text is
referred to in subdivision C under the heading respicitur magisintermixtio
(id. col. 2245). In parentheses is added: (ad transl. p. 42 A mixtam, gr.
I fail to understand this addition.
µ.e:µ.e:Lyµ.evov).
1 Cornford, Plato's Cosmology(London 1956) p. 63.
oua(oc. For the construction of the latter the Demiurge uses -ra:
(41 d 5). 1 But now Calcidius has a great
-rwv 1tp6a8ev u1toAoL1tot
surprise in store. The parallel between World-Soul and human
soul is not due to the same mixture of ocµepLa-rov,µepLa-rovand
oua(oc, but the intermediate position of the human soul is said to
be produced by its uitiosae partes.This important alteration has
been introduced in the commentary on the passage 41 d 4 sqq., as
can be seen in the following quotation from eh. 140: Miscebat
autem, inquit, eodem propemodum genere nee tamen eadem
exoriebatur puritas serenitasque prouentuum. Merito,
quoniam in his animis, quae uiuificant morti obnoxiaanima- genera
lium, non pura ratio intellectusue sincerus sed aliquantum tam
iracundiae quam libidinis inuenitur (180.II-15). The explication
warrants the way in which the parallel is drawn in the present
chapter. To my opinion such interpretations are the result of the
contradictions in Plato's own doctrine about the soul. On the
one hand the real function of the soul is theoretical reason, on the
other hand the soul is the source of life. In the trichotomy of the
soul the three parts are fully separated from one another, yet
Plato introduces a harmony between them, based on a unity
which in fact is excluded by the same trichotomy. PVRAE cf.
(Tim. 41 d 6) and Calcidius' puritas serenitasque(36.16-17).
ocx~pot-rot
CVRA RERVM TERRESTRIVM cf. the adage \jiu:x.~1tiiO'ot7totV't'Ot;
emµe).ei-rocL (Phaedr. 246 b 6). A short summary of the
-rou ocljiu:x_ou
chapter is perhaps useful: the two lower parts of the soul are bad
(uitiosae), yet the human soul needs them (opus Juit) to attain
the same intermediate position as the World-Soul. I have not been
able to find a parallel for this curious doctrine.
4. SUMMARY
a) Fate's relation to the metaphysical hierarchy
[188] So to summarize briefly: we have to imagine the follow-
ing arrangement of this subject: (1) the origin of things, from
which existence is provided to all other being!>,is the highest
and unutterable God; (2) after Him His Providence is the
1 As Taylor says in his notes to Tim. 41 d 4-7, un:6),mn:ctdoes not mean

"remains of the former mixture", but remains of &.µepLa-rov, µe:pur-r6v,ooalct.
The souls are "just as directly the 'creation' of the Supreme God as the
cosmic soul is". So Taylor would not have approved of Calcidius' translation
reliquias prioris concretionis (36.14).
[188] SUMMARY 119
second god, the legislator of both lives, the eternal as well as

the temporary; (3) the third being is the so-called second mind
and intellect, a kind of preserver of the eternal law; (4) subjected
to these are the rational souls obeying the law and, as attendant
powers, nature, fortune, chance and the daemons, who inspect
and investigate merits. So the highest God commands, the second
arranges, the third makes known; the souls, however, act accord-
ing to the law.
BREVI MVLTA COMPLECTAR Indeed this short summary com-

prises much that has been said in the treatise. As in eh. 176 the
metaphysical hierarchy is described not because of the importance
of this structure itself, but to indicate the place fate takes in the
world-order. This time fate is viewed explicitly under its aspect
of law, that is to say taken xot-r'evepye:totv,or, to put it in Calcidius'
own words, quod in munere atque actu positum est
(185.3).
The relation of the respective entities to this law is the subject
of the present chapter. ORIGINEM cf. my notes on principaliter
(204.6), above p. 88. The idea is much akin to Macrobius' descrip-
tion of the highest God: deus qui prima causa et est et uocatur,
unus omnium quaeque sunt quaeque uidentur esse princeps et origo
est (Comm.I 14.6). Without doubt Macrobius found this idea in
the works of his two Neo-Platonic authorities, Plotinus and Por-
phyry. SVBSTANTIA MINISTRATVR It is not clear, whether this
expression only refers to the creation and birth of all things, or
also to their permanent safety and health. The former seems the
more likely in view of the term origo. INEFFABILEM This opinion
is widely spread in Platonic philosophy. It is ultimately derived
from two fundamental texts of Plato himself, viz., Tim. 28 c and
Epist. VII 341 c. The words fJTj't'OV ycxpou8otµw; eatw in the latter
passage are considered as a theological statement, e.g. µTj8otµw;
e!votLfYYJ't'OV cxyot86v,&U' ex1t0Ulj; cruvoua(ot;eyytyvoµe:vov
't'O 1tpW't'OV
e~ottp8ev<pw; ev-r7i'VUXTI
xott e~ot(tpvTj;otov CX7t0nupo; 7tTj8~0'otV't'O;
(Celsus in Origen, Contra Cels.VI 3). 1 The other basic text used to
prove God's ineffability is Tim. 28 c 3-5: -rov µev oi5v 1tOLTj'"JV xott
7tot't'epot
-rou8e:'t'OU7totV't'O;
e:upe:i:v e:£;7t0CV't'ot;
-re:lpyov xott e:upov't'ot &8uvot't'OV
).eye:tv. LATOREM LEGIS This function of the second God has
1 Cf. Justin, Dial. 4.1: oihe: ~7)-rovoi,-re:ciyope:u-r6v,&Udt 1,t6vovxoti.ov xotl

dyot86v,i~otLcpV'ljt;
TotLt;E:O
7tE:!pUXULotLt;
qlUJ(ot!t; i!yyw6(LE:VOV.
120 NEWEXPOSITION
OF PLATONIC
DOCTRINE [188]
been discussed in the notes on eh. 177 (above p. 97). Here I only
add a quotation from Hierocles: xoct Tocuniv TI)V1toc't'povoµ.Lx~v
t,-OC<1L/\&LOCV
f.1. "\
I •
OCU't'OU
-
1tpOVOLOCV
f
e:~VOCL
T
TI)V
\
e:X.OC(1't'(p
< ' yi:;ve:L
1.
't'OC
'
1tpOITT)XOV't'OC
'
voµ.o-
6e:'t'OU(1(XV(Hierocles apud Photius cod. 251, Migne PG 104, 80 B).
cvsTos LEGIS In eh. 177 the second mind was said to obey
the law of fate. Although keeping guard is not the same as obeying,
there does not seem to be a contradiction. Moreover, this time the
obedience of the human soul (rationabiles animas) is emphasized,
so that there is no reason to wonder that another duty is assigned
to the third god. RATIONABILES ANIMAE The adjective is cer-
tainly not superfluous. The whole argument of eh. 180 b and
following chapters aims at the proof of the superiority of the ration-
al part of the soul, indeed of its isolation from the irrational
parts. Only the former is free and can be said to obey fate's ordi-
nances. This again is not unlike Hierocles, in whose opinion the
&1.oyoc are outside the influence of providence and fate. NATVRAM
FORTVNAM CASVM These notions have been dealt with in eh.
156, 158, 159, 177 and 179. Nature belongs to the Jrequentia (To
wi;E1ttT<> 1toM), fortune and chance are rari exempli (ToE1t'EAOC't'Tov),
whereas human freedom falls into the domain of To E1t'tcnii;.
DAEMONESCalcidius' daemonology can be found in eh. 127-136
of the Commentarius. An exhaustive enquiry into this subject
would be out of place here. We shall only pay attention to the
special function of the daemons mentioned in this context. In
Ile:pt e:lµ.ocpµ.evYJi;
573 a the author speaks about the providential
care 't'WV()(10L 1te:ptyijv 8oc(µ.ove:i;
't'&'t'ocyµ.evoL
't'WVocv6peu1tLVCuV
1tpoc~e:euv
ipu1.ocxei; n xoctE1tCax.01toC e:EaL.In his note ad loc.Valgiglio points
out that the idea of the daemons as guardians of men can be found
as early as Hesiod Op.122/3:
Tot µ.ev8oc(µ.ovei;
e:taL~Loi;µ.e:yoc)..ou
8Lix~OUAIXi;
Ea61.o(,Emx66vLOL,cpuAocxe:i;
6VYJ't'WV
ocv6pwm,>V.
But naturally the great authority for later Platonism is Plato
himself. At the end of the great myth which concludes the Politeia
the souls, having chosen their lives, appear before the fatal sisters.
First they go to Lachesis: he:(vYJV 8' ex.oc(1't'tp
ov e:t1.e:To8oc(µ.ovoc,
't'OU't'ov
cpu)..ocxoc auµ.1teµ.1te:Lv't'OU~(ou xoctOC7t07tAYJpWTI)V
't'WV (620 d 8-
oclpe:6&v't'euv
e 1). Both Porphyry and Hierocles make use of this text: T~v
yixpAocxe:aLV, ~'t'Li;'t'~i;'Avocyx.Y)i;
Ea't't6uyocnip,'t'<j>
AOC)(6V't'L
xoct&Aoµ.evep
\ f.l.(
't'LVOC
t-' ov auµ.1ti:;µ.1te:LV
1. I').
(j)U/\OCXOC
I
't'&'t'OUt,-LOU
- f.1.1 \
)((XLex
>
7t0CV't'Oi;
\
OC7t07t/\Y)pCuTI)V
' "\ \
[188] SUMMARY 121
(Porph. Ile:pt 't'OUeip' ~µtv apud Stob. vol. II 164, 8-11

't'OUcxlpe:6ev't'oc;
Wachsmuth), xcxt't'OU't'<uv cxnocv't'<uvq:>UAct~ o e:LAYJXWc;
xcxt cx1to1tAYJp<uTI)c;
8cx(µ<uvfo't'Y)xe:v(Hierocles apud Photius cod. 251, Migne PG 104,
96). The same idea can be found in Apuleius' important treatise
on daemonology De deo Socratis: ex hac igitur sublimiore daemonum
copia Plato autumat singulis hominibus in uita agenda testes et
custodes additos (De deo Soc. XVI) and hie, quem dico, priuus custos,
singularis praefectus, domesticus speculator . XVI). Calcidius
.. (id.
himself also mentions this field of activity in his paragraphs on the
daemons: idemque speculatores et executores (174.1).
Our conclusion can be that, although the function of the daemons
has not come up for discussion in the tractatus de Jato, it is not
surprising to find it mentioned in the present synopsis, because the
idea is consistent with normal Platonic doctrine, in which the
daemons are closely linked with fate and human choice and behav-
iour.
IVBET ••• ORDINAT •.• INTIMAT Beutler in a study on the
Octavius of Minucius Felix refers to Oct. XVIII 7: (deum) qui
uniuersa, quaecumque sunt, uerbo iubet, ratione dispensat, uirtute
consummat. 1 According to Beutler, this is reminiscent of Plato Leg.
715 e o µe:v8~ 6e:6c;,Clcrne:pxcxto7tctACltLOc;
Myoc;, cxpx~v't'E:xcxt't'E:AE:UTI)V
xcxtµea-ex't'WV/)v't'<uv ~x<uv.Next Beutler quotes the passage
cxnocv't'<uv
under discussion, adding: "Die einzelnen Funktionen sind ahnlich
denen bei Minucius Felix bis auf die letzte". A second parallel
drawn by Beutler is the text in Proclus' commentary on the
Timaeus, quoted in Waszink's notes. These similarities are too
slight to be convincing as the context is hardly taken into account
by Beutler. Minucius Felix is speaking about one God whose power
should not be divided, Amelius elucidates a curious doctrine of
three 8YJµLoupyo( and Calcidius gives a short summary of the activ-
ities of his three gods. Beutler's remark: "Das Wichtigste ist
aber die Tatsache der Dreiteilung iiberhaupt", seems rather
uncritical to me. There is another reason not to trust Beutler's
parallels, for above all it is necessary to take the present context
into account. As stated in the first note on the present chapter,
its main purpose is to sketch the relation of fate, viewed as law, to
gods and men. The author pays attention not so much to the nature
1 R. Beutler, Philosophie und Apologie bei Minucius Felix,

Weida i.
Thiir. 1936, p. 45.
122 NEW EXPOSITION OF PLATONIC DOCTRINE [189a]
of the gods as such or to their activities towards the world as a

whole, but to their position with regard to fate. This also applies
to the recapitulation at the end of the chapter. Without doubt
Waszink is right in supplementing legem as the absent object to
the three verbs. 1 So against fate are set on the one side the three
gods with their authority, which varies in proportion to their
position in the hierarchy, on the other side the human souls in their
quality of law-abiding subjects (cf. subiectas, 213.2).
b) Fate rewards human choice
[189 a] The law is fate itself, as we have often said. He who
obeys this law and follows the venerable footsteps of the first
God, always leads a happy life according to the decree of the
permanent law, i.e., according to fate; those souls, however,
which have neglected God's escort, lead their lives according
to fate just as well, albeit in a kind of different and contrary
way, until they repent of their offences and return to the ranks of
the immortal God and the eternal divine powers, and that very
inflexibility of the law allows a transition from a meaner condition
to a happy one, which surely would be impossible if all things
were bound by a kind of uniform, inflexible and unalterable ne-
cessity.
CVI LEGI The first part of this chapter is reminiscent of the
6eaµ.oc;'A8p0tanl0tc;,mentioned in Phaedr. 248 c. As we have seen
at the beginning of the tractatus de Jato, this law is one of the pillars
on which the whole structure of the Middle-Platonic doctrine about
fate is built. In eh. 152 Calcidius translates the first part of the law:
Quae se comitem deo f ecerit anima eorumque aliquid uiderit quae uere
sunt, usque ad alterius circuitus tempus erit incolumis, ac si
semper
hoe faciet, semper incolumis manebit (187.20-188.3). Then he adds
his interpretation: Est igitur totum hoe lex et edictum quod Jatum
proprie uocatur, secutum uero Socratem legis edictum deo se comitem
praebuisse proprium Socratis opus; porro, quod, cum ita uiueret
Socrates, anima eius usque ad alterius circuitus tempus incolumis
perseuerat, iuxta fatale decretum prouenit ac semper
si hoe faciat, quod
est in Socrate, semper incolumis erit iuxta Jatum (188.3-8). In my
notes ad loc.I pointed out, how by the words cum ita uiueret
1 In Index C of his edition s.u. intima'Ye Waszink gives the following
explanation: i.q. enuntio: ... summus deus iubet, secundus
oYdinat, teYtius-at
(sc. legemaeteYnam) 213.5.
[189a] SUMMARY 123
Socrates the whole scene is literally brought down from heaven to

earth. Socrates' way of life meant that he followed god, thus
meeting the requirements of Adrasteia's 8e:aµ6c;.Now the present
text is a kind of free adaptation of that law. It certainly is reminis-
cent of eh. 152, but the two passages are not entirely similar. The
most crucial problem is posed by the word semper, which is certainly
caused by ci.e:tin x!v ci.d -rou-ro8uYIJ't'OtL1me:iv, ci.e:l.
cx.~Aat~'Yj
e:!vatL.It
is not possible, however, that semper has the same meaning as
in the Greek text, viz., "to all eternity", for in that case Calcidius
ci.e:(
would be speaking about the soul in heaven. To all probability,
however, exactly as in the case of Socrates in eh. 152, he is speaking
about earthly life.1 But neither does the meaning "always", i.e.
"at each incarnation", which semper takes in eh. 152 (si semper
hoe Jaciat ... semper incolumis erit,188.7), seem quite suitable
here. Perhaps semper here stands for "continually", "during the
whole span of a person's life"; but then semper would have an
altogether unusual meaning. Possibly we have to conclude that
Calcidius has thoughtlessly taken over this notion, forgetting that
in his argument it is redundant. IVXTA FATVM As in the case of
Socrates this stresses the fact that happiness is a prize awarded in
accordance with the law of fate. AT VERO Unfortunately for
this opposite case we lack a parallel like eh. 152. But it is quite
plausible that here, too, the 8e:aµoc;'A8p0ta-re:l0tc; is the origin of the
idea. The whole expression rursum et ipsae alio quodam contra-
rioque genere secundum Jatum may be a grandiloquent elaboration
of Plato's simple -r6-re:v6µoc; (248 c 8). DONEC ••• REVERTANTVR
This somehow summarizes Phaedr. 248 d-249 b. But we are also
reminded of the other basic texts for the doctrine of fate, viz., the
Aatxfoe:wc; Myoc; (Politeia 617 d 6) and the v6µoLol e:lµatpµevoL (Tim.
41 e 2). For example, the idea of a return to a blissful existence
can be found in Tim. 42 d 2: e:tc;-ro -r'Yjc;1tp&>nic;xatl.ci.ptanic;ci.cptxoL-ro
by which is meant the happy and congenial life in the
e:!8oc;!:~e:wc;,
consort star. The expiation of crimes comes into prominence in the
description of the Politeia, e.g. !vat 8e:x0t1tA1XaLov -ro lx-re:Laµat-rou
cx.8Lx~µ0t-roc;
~x-r(voLe:v
(615 b 1-2). But in this last case as well the
idea is transferred to the sphere of earthly life. There is no hint
that the penance is paid in the hereafter, nor of any transmigration
1 This cannot be proved by referring to the expression uitam agit, for
it seems rather likely that beatam uitam agit is a reminiscence of ~tov cu3ixt-
µ.ovctl!~oL(Tim. 42 b): the life of the soul in its cognate star.
of the souls. The latter idea can certainly be found in Calcidius,

e.g. eh. 196, where he is commenting on Tim. 42 a 7-c 4, but in the
present chapter it is absent, at least not consciously present. LEGIS
RIGOR This expression would rather suit the doctrine of Calcidius'
Stoic opponents. It is used either ironically ("that so-called inflexib-
ility") or, as we have seen more often, in a corrected sense: the
law of fate is indeed inflexible, but as a result of its e~u1to6foe:c;-
character it allows changes and transformations.
c) Fate and Providence

[189 b] From this it is clear that providence holds all things in
her grasp, indeed all things that according to her will are guided
rightly; fate, however, is the decree of providence; it contains
that which is within our power as precedent causes, it also holds
room for merits. Next come punishment and approbation,
which are 'fatal' and all those events which take place through
chance and fortune.
This paragraph can be compared with the short survey of Platon-

ic doctrine in eh. 145. In a nutshell some fundamental notions,
discussed in the treatise, are repeated here.
PROVIDENTIAM ••. FATVM Evidently this repeats the adage
which was so strongly defended at the start of the tractatus de Jato,
viz., praecedit prouidentia, sequitur Jatum (181.20). OMNIA This
is somewhat surprising in view of the contents of eh. 145: neque
omnia ex prouidentia fore (183.15) and Et diuina quidem atque
intelligibilia quaeque his proxima sunt secundum prouidentiam solam
(183.18-20). But possibly the author only wants to stress the pri-
macy of providence and, besides, he immediately qualifies his
statement by adding the explanatory words quippe omnia etc.
(213.17). RECTE cf. Apuleius, De Platone I 12: Sed omnia,
quae naturaliter et propterea recte Jeruntur, prouidentiae custodia
gubernantur. But mark the absence of naturaliter in Calcidius.
The addition of that word would come dangerously near to a Stoic
identification of cpuatc;and 1tp6voux.Besides, in eh. 145 Calcidius
said: naturalia et corporea iuxta fatum (183.20). CONTINET •••
COLLOCATIONEM ••• ANIMADVERSIO cf. the passages to which Was-
zink refers, e.g. Animaduersiones porro uel praemia exoriuntur
secundum collocati meriti praecessionem (187.3-4).
EPILOGUE
Now what was the purport of this treatise, which has
[190]
grown to such a great length? Because many people, not caring
to know the truth, but rather wishing to resist true reasoning,
both deceive themselves and entangle others in the hazards of
unavoidable error: looking to one particular part of the direction
of the cosmos, they make pronouncements as it were about the
management of the entire universe and they assert that what
they have found in one part, is also true for all other parts of the
cosmos. And therefore, when they say something true, their
views are held to be likely, although they make conflicting
statements; when, however, in their opinion about a part they
act just as if they were having an opinion about the universe as
a whole, they refute each other.
For it is true that some things happen by fate, just as the
truth has also been shown of the fact that other things are in
our power. Therefore those who say that everything happens by
fate, are rightly censured by those who prove that there is some-
thing within our power; finally those who put everything in
our power, without leaving anything to fate, are revealed to be
mistaken; for who would not know that there is something
belonging to fate and outside our competence? So only that is
true reason, fixed and stable opinion, which teaches that some
things happen by fate, other originate from human will and
authority.
PROLIXITAS The perfunctorius tractatus(181.15) which Calcidius
promised at the start in eh. 142, has imperceptibly rather grown
in size. This is understandable, because the author found that he
had to pay much attention to all sorts of subjects related to fate.
In this closing chapter he now returns to the main problem posed
at the start of the treatise, viz., the relation between fate and human
freedom. QVARE QVI Theiler 1 refers to a rather unexpected paral-
lel, viz., the doctrine about fate which Flavius Josephus attri-
butes to the three Jewish sects of his age: ot µe:v oov <l>otpLaotLOL
'tW(X Kotl OU 7t(XV't'ot
njc; e:tµotpµtvl)c;elvotLAeyouaLVlpyov, 't'LV<X 3' ecp'
eotu-roLc;
u1t!Xp):e:Lv
auµ~otlve:Lv -re: xotl µ"1)y(ve:a8otL.-ro 3e: -rwv 'EaO'l)VWV
1 Theiler, o.c. p. 50.
126 EPILOGUE [190]
yevoc; 1ta.V't'(l)V-niv et(J,txp(J,&VYJV

xup(txv cxnoq>tx(ve't'txL, xtxt (J,YJ3ev8 (J,~
Xtx't''hdvY)c; lji~(!>OV
cxv8pw1t0Lc; CX7t(XV't'~.
~tx33ouxtxLOL 3e 'n)V (J,£Vet(J,Otp-
(J,&VYJV CXVOtLpouaLV, ou3ev e!vtxL't'(XU't'Y)V CX~LOUV't'E«;,
ou3e Xat't'' txll'n)V't'<X.
cxv8pwmvtx't'eAO«; A(X(J,~&.veLv,
&1ttx'J't'(X
3' ~(!>·~(J,LVOtU't'OL«;
xefo80tL,&c;xoct
't'&v cxyoc8&v ocMouc;~(J,ic; txU't'ouc;
yLyvoµ.evouc; xoct 't'<X.
x.e(p(I)1ttxpa.-niv
~(J,E't'tpocv
cx~ou}..(txv (Antiqu. 13.172-173).
AOt(J,~&.vovTocc; OMNIA ••••
ALIQVID cf. Apuleius, De PlatoneI 12: Nee sane omnia referenda
ad uim fati putat, sed esse aliquid in SOLA nobis.
IGITVR The last
possibility suggested in eh. 142 was: alia esse quae Jato nihiloque
minus alia esse quae uoluntate fiant (181.18-19) and, as so often
happens in arguments, the last possibility is proved to be the right
one.
CONCLUSION
A survey of the tractatus def ato as a whole shows the notable

fact of its fundamental unity. Indeed there are many obscurities
and mistakes and, moreover, the materials for the argument are
brought in from different quarters, but this does not alter the fact
that fundamentally the line of thought is quite clear.
In the first of the three main parts of the treatise an outline of
Platonic doctrine is given, at times with great verbal resemblance
to the anonymous treatise Ilepl &tµcxpµevl)c;. The second part is
devoted to a refutation of the main opponents of Platonism in
this department of philosophy, viz., the Stoics, whereas the last
part, after the refutation of Stoicism, gives a renewed exposition
of Platonic doctrine, enriched by two very important elements,
which will presently be discussed. The unity of the treatise is appar-
ent especially from two facts. In the first place it must be noted,
that both in the first and third parts there is a good deal of polem-
ics, albeit often tacit, against the Stoa, whereas in the second
part, which is intentionally polemical, Platonic doctrine is often
explicitly elucidated. Secondly the fact must be stressed, that in
the second and third parts of his treatise Calcidius sticks to the
exposition given in the first part. There are no obvious discrepan-
cies and, besides, in the course of his argument in the second and
third parts the author makes a definite use of some of the elements
in the first part.
Now the third part is perhaps the most interesting, because of
two remarkable elements, which may also provide a clue regarding
Calcidius' source. These elements are: I. The inclusion of fate and
Providence in a Neo-Platonic hierarchy of metaphysical entities
in eh. 176, 177 and 188; 2. Freedom of choice finding its place in
the AoytGTtx6vof the soul. Man's free will is very important to
Calcidius. In eh. 142, which is the introduction to the treatise, the
relation of fate to free will is said to be the subject of the whole
investigation. Moreover, the importance Calcidius attaches to the
subject is clearly shown by the references made to it throughout
the tractatus. It is obvious that the author is interested in the
structure of fate and its place in the cosmos mainly, or at least for
a great part, because of what it implies for human freedom. These
128 CONCLUSION
reflections underline the importance of this second remarkable

element in the third part of the treatise, viz. the tenet that human
freedom has its seat in the 11.oyto-rtx6v of the soul.
Bearing in mind the unity of the treatise and the two topics of
the third part we shall now try to identify Calcidius' source. It is
of course necessary to distinguish the direct source from influences
within that source. In the praeJatio of his edition (p. LVIII-LXIII)
Waszink has given some suggestions for both these backgrounds.
On page LIX he writes: Dubitari non potest quin tota haec de Jato
doctrina ex schola Platonica media prouenerit. Sed nostro iudicio
paulo longius progredi licet et Numenium huius doctrinae auctorem
uel saltem astipulatorem asserere. To my opinion the first sentence
of this quotation does not do full justice to the third part of the
treatise and I disagree with the contents of the second sentence,
because I can find few traces of Numenian influence in the treatise.
But let us first consider Waszink's exposition. He puts forward
three arguments: (1) Exordium capiendum est a re minore quidem,
sed prorsus certa. In 174 c. (ergo intra huius de Jato disputationis
limites) oppugnatur doctrina Stoica iuxta quam mala ex stellarum
motu proueniant: Unde ergo mala? M otum stellarum causantur
(sc. Stoici). Hoe plane simile est iis quae in relatione Pythagorici de
silua dogmatis, ex ipso Numenii ad uerbum sine dubio expressa,
textu
leguntur (c.298): Qua ratione intellegi datur Stoicos Jrustra causari
nescio quam peruersitatem, cum quae proueniunt ex motu stellarum
prouenire dicant. Hine sumere licebit totam huius Stoici dogmatis
reJutationem quam artissime sibi cohaerentem174-175) (cc. una cum
dissertatione perquam simili quae in capitis 172 parte posteriore
inueniatur ex Numenio originem trahere. For this argument I refer
to my notes on eh. 174 (above p. 77), where I showed that there is
no special resemblance between that chapter and eh. 298. (2)
According to Waszink the contents of eh. 176 show a distinct
Numenian influence. However, in my notes on eh. 176 I pointed
out that one is rather, or at least just as much, reminded of Plotinus.
(3) The additional proof from the Old Testament in eh. 171 is
wholly after the manner of Numenius. This argument I shall leave
for the moment.
On p. LXII Waszink concludes totam hanc de Jato doctrinam
scholae Platonicae mediae deberi, et quidem, nisi omnia Jallunt, ipsi
Numenio. He suggests that possibly Numenius treated the subject
in his work Ilept Tocycx8ou. Waszink adds that Calcidius probably
CONCLUSION 129
did not use that book directly, but rather with Porphyry as an
intermediary. Later Waszink has changed his opinion considerably.
In his Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius he says (p. 22
n. 2), that he now adheres to the view of Theiler. As we have seen,
Theiler considers the doctrine expounded in the first part of the
treatise and showing such a considerable resemblance to pseudo-
as belonging to the school of Gaius.
Plutarch's 1tept etfLOCpfLtVlj<;
Waszink is still convinced that both in the second and third parts
there are some important traces of N umenian influence. 1 In my opin-
ion Theiler's argument that in Ilept etfLOCpfLtVlj<; and in the parallel
passages of Calcidius' De Jato we have the contents of Gaius'
teaching is very plausible. But it is also evident that in Calcidius'
tractatus this doctrine is not merely repeated, but incorporated
into a fuller investigation. Most interesting is the insistence on the
metaphysical priority of Providence to fate, to which the chapters
143a, 146 and 147 are devoted. For the second part of the treatise,
viz., the refutation of Stoic attacks, Calcidius' direct source may
itself go back to a treatise belonging to the same sphere as Ilept
In the final chapter of the last-mentioned treatise
elfLOCPfLtV'll<;·
the author gives a rapid survey of the subjects which he has ex-
pounded, then he briefly glances at some arguments brought
forward by the evocv-r(o;"A.6yo<; (the Stoics) and finally he says:
-rd:8exoc8'!xoca-roc
-rou-rwveaocu8~<; (574 f). Perhaps the author
fLt't"~fLev
fulfilled his promise and perhaps Calcidius' source had that sequel
at his disposal. However, this is highly hypo-
to Ilept elfLocpfLtvlj<;
thetical. The most we can say is that it is not a priori unlikely
that Calcidius' source made use of a refutation of the Stoic doctrine
of fate composed in the same school as Ilept etfLocpfLtVlj<;. Indeed,
as we have seen, Calcidius more than once reverts to the ideas
exposed in the first part, where the resemblance to Ilept etfLOCPfLtV'll<;
is strong. In any case I do not see a special reason to assume that
Numenius was the auctor intellectualis for the whole or for important
elements of the second part of the treatise.
1 Cf. especially the following words: "das Wichtigste ist die Oberein•
stimmung zwischen Kap. 174 und dem zu dem Referat der Lehre des Nume-
nios gehorenden Kap. 298".At the end of his note Waszink briefly recapit-
ulates his changed opinion: "Das wahrscheinlichste ist, dass Calcidius,
wie ich schon in der Praefatio ausgefiihrt habe (S. LXIII), die ganze Ab-
handlung aus Porphyrios geschopft hat, der sowohl Gaios wie Numenios
und Alexander von Aphrodisias herangezogen hat".
9
130 CONCLUSION
Let us now turn to the third part of the treatise and examine the
possibilities of a clue regarding the source used by Calcidius. It is ob-
vious that the doctrine about the metaphysical hierarchy in eh.
176, 177 and 188 lends itself admirably for the purpose of our exam-
ination. In Tome XII of the Entretiens sur l'Antiquite classique,
which is devoted to the study of Porphyry, both Waszink and
Theiler pay attention to the chapters in question. Waszink in his
paper Porphyrios und Numenios writes that there are "verschiedene
Einzelheiten, die in die Richting des Numenios weisen, und die
entweder direct oder durch Vermittlung der chalda.ischen Orakel
zu Porphyrios gelangt sein mogen". 1
The ideas he puts forward are in full agreement with the notes in
the exegetical apparatus of his edition. So, according to Waszink,
eh. 176, 177 and 188 show considerable Numenian influence.
Theiler's paper is calledAmmonios und Porphyrios.Theiler formerly
thought that it was impossible to reconstruct the doctrine of Am-
monius, the teacher of both Plotinus and Origen who, like Socrates,
did not write anything himself. Subsequently, however, he changed
his opinion that Ammonius was a "grosser Schatten". Indeed, both
in his contribution to the Entretiens and especially in the essay
Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes in his collection Forschungen zum
Neuplatonismus, he has tried to reconstruct many elements of
Ammonius' doctrine. For this he bases himself especially on the
tenets of Hierocles, the fifth-century Neo-Platonic philosopher
from Alexandria, and on the writings of the church-father Origen.
So it is not surprising, that in his discussion of Calcidius' description
of the hierarchy he remarks: "Porphyrios, zu dem ohne Zweifel
Calcidius hier gegriffen hat, referiert also z.T. im Sinne des Ammoni-
os, fiir den die Obereinstimmung zwischen Plotin und Origenes
spricht. Auch sonst lasst sich einiges Ammonische im Referaten
des Porphyrios bei Calcidius feststellen". 2 This is wholly consistent
with one of the conclusions in his essay Ammonios der Lehrer des
Origenes: "Porphyrios naherte sich in dem Masze dem Ammonios,
wie sich Plotin von ihm entfernte". 3 Of course it is out of place
here to discuss Theiler's views fully. His expositions are very
impressive, yet one should not overlook their highly hypothetical
1 Entretiens XII p. 65.

• Entretiens XII p. 99-rno.
8 Forschungen zum Neuplatonismusp. 40.
CONCLUSION I3I
character. On the other hand it must be admitted that there is at

least the possibility that some elements in Calcidius' exposition
of thee~ 01to8foewc;-doctrineagree with Hierocles (see above p. 105)
and it should not be forgotten that the latter held Ammonius in
high respect, even calling him 8eo8(8ocx't'oc;. So perhaps there are
traces of Ammonius' doctrine in Calcidius. However, I do not
believe in any thorough influence of this doctrine in the chapters
which we are discussing now. In fact, as I have pointed out in the
notes on these chapters, I think it more likely that Plotinus'
theory of the three hypostases has greatly influenced the Calcidian
paragraphs on the metaphysical hierarchy. To my opinion espec-
ially the description of the highest God, who is above all existence
(ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam, 204.7) and the source
of all things (originem rerum,212.22), points into this direction.
I also think that this explanation is in closer harmony with the view
of both Waszink and Theiler, that Calcidius' direct source in these
chapters is Porphyry. Certainly Porphyry accepted the hypostases
taught by his master, as can be seen in his 'Acpopµ.oct 1tpoc;'t'cxVO'Y)'t'IX.
Perhaps an even closer parallel to Calcidius' description can be
found in some fragments of Porphyry's History of Philosophy.In
fr. 15, 16 and 17 we find some remains of Porphyry's report on
Plato's doctrine of the three gods. Now it is remarkable that,
although that doctrine in Porphyry's rendering has a definitely
Neo-Platonic character, the highest God, just as in Calcidius, is
not called 't'Oiv, whereas otherwise the description would be quite
appropriate to Plotinus' 't'O!v, cj. o 8eoc;o 1tp&'t'oc; xatt µ.6voc;&.et,
x~v&.1t'ocu't'ou
ytv1)'t'OCL't'cx.1tixv't'oc
(fr. 17, p. 15. 9/10 Nauck) and Calcidius'
nuUius societatis indiguus(204.8-9). 1 I think it justified to stick
to the conclusion that Porphyry has revised the Middle-Platonic
doctrine of three 1tp6voLocL and tried to bring it into harmony as
1 For this expression Theiler, Ammonias und Porphyrios, Entretiens XII

p. 98 refers to the term chcoLVooVl)TOc; in Numenius fr. 34: o 3t Nouµ~vLoc;
cxxoLvoov7jTOva.6-.ov (i.e. the Jewish God) xa.l. 1tcx-.epcx 1t11v-.wv -.wv 6ewv dva.L
>.eyeL,1bcx~Louv-.cxxoLvwve!va.6-.<j> This fragment is taken from
njc; -rLµijc;TLVCX,
Lydus De mensibus 110.1-4 Wunsch. Certainly the second part of this quo-
tation (cx1tcx~Louv-.cx
x-.>..) explains the word cxxoLvoov7jToc;, which according to
this explanation must mean 'not wanting that anyone should share his
honour with him'. Quite rightly Leemans in his note ad loc. refers to Exodus
20.5, where the Lord in the second commandment says: "I the Lord thy
God am a jealous God". Cf. also Wisdom of Solomon 14.21, where at the end
of a pericope on the origins of idolatry it is said: "And this proved an ambush
for man's life, because men in bondage to misfortune or royal authority
r32 CONCLUSION
well as he could with Plotinus' doctrine 1 of the three hypostases

(see above p. 98).2
If it is right to consider Porphyry as the direct source for such an
important part of Calcidius' tractatus, the question arises, whether
other indications can be added in support of his authorship. Put
more directly the question is as follows: is it possible to accept
Porphyry as the auctor intellectualisof the other notable character-
istic of the tractatus, viz., the great emphasis laid on human
freedom, culminating in the argument of eh. r8o sqq., where this
freedom is located in the rational part of the soul? Now there is
no doubt that Porphyry, at least in the later stages of his career,
strongly defended man's responsibility. In his letter to his wife
Marcella he wrote Xatx&vcxv8p6>7t<f> ou8e:tt;8e:ot;«!·not;, (XAA(XatU'C'Ot;
eatu'C'<j)o eMµe:vot; (eh. 24, 289.r3-r4 Nauck = 28.5-6 Potscher).
Earlier, in his letter to Anebo, he had showed anxiety that of '' Chaere-
mon' s friends" ot 7tAe:(out; x«t 'C'Oecp'~µ!v ex 'tijt; 'C'WV
CXfflp(J)V
cxv'ljljiatv
xLv~ae:(J)t;(2.r3 a, p. 25 Sodano). More important is the fact that he
explicitly tackled the problem of free will in his essay Ile:pt 'C'ou
ecp' ~µ!v, in which he dealt with the myth of Er in Plato's Politeia.
Fragments of this essay, from which I have already quoted in the
notes on eh. r52 (see above p. 32), can be found in Stobaeus
Eclogae II 8, 39-42 (Wachsmuth vol. II p. r63-r73). Porphyry's
interest in human freedom is fully congruent with his general
attitude as a philosopher. Most scholars who have studied Por-
clothed stick and stones with the Name that cannot be shared with others".
(transl. E. J. Goodspeed). The last sentence of this quotation in the Septua-
gint text runs as follows: TO cxxoL11w117jT011
/Svoµix1.l60Lc;xixl ~uAoLc;1te:pr.e6e:aix11.
So in this case cxxoL11w117jToc;
has a passive, but comparable meaning. Theiler's
reference can only be justified, if the explanatory words (cx1tix~Loii11T1X xTA.)
are not ascribed to Numenius himself, but to Lydus and if Lydus has made
a mistake.
1 This conclusion is also in harmony with Beutler's adage: "Alles, was
Porphyrios seit seiner Kenntnis Plotins geschrieben hat, steht im Dienste
dieser Philosophie oder wird von ihren Grundgedanken getragen". (Beutler,
Art. Porphyrios in RE XXIP col. 285). Steinheimer, Untersuchungen uber
die Quellen des Chalcidius, Aschaffenburg 1912, p. 31 has also suggested
Plotinus' name, but his argument is rather superficial and disappointing.
There is also a very curious passage in Porphyry's Letter to Marcella, which
might preserve a trace of the hierarchy: IJiux~ o~v 1to117jp1X qie:uye:Lµev 6e:6v,
8e Oe:oue:!111XL
1tp6110L1X\I OU~O\IAETIXL,116µ.ouTE Oe:louTOU1tii11TO (!IIXUAO\I
xo).ci?;;ov-roc;
cx1toaT1XToi:'1tcivTroc;.(Ad Marc. 16, 285. 4-7 Nauck = 22.6-8 Potscher). The
trio 6e:6c;..• 1tp6110Lix is somehow reminiscent of Calcidius.
Oe:ou... v6µoc; Oei:'oc;
1 However, the problem concerning Nemesius, mentioned above on p. 98,
remains unsolved.
CONCLUSION I33
phyry's doctrine and writings, hold the opinion that he was before
all interested in the moral consequences and implications of philos-
ophy. As Beutler says, the philosopher according to Porphyry
should be a Seelenarzt. Bidez calls Porphyry a "vrai moraliste".
Perhaps it is best expressed in Porphyry's own words: xe:voc;exdvou
<pLAoa6cpou Myoc; ~<p'oi5 µ118~v1t&.8oc;
cxv8pw1tou (Ad Marc.
8e:poc1te:ue:-rocL
3r, 294. 7-8 Nauck = 34.rn-n Potscher).
Certainly Calcidius' emphasis on human freedom corresponds
quite well with Porphyry's general attitude in the same matter. 1
Now in Calcidius' treatise human choice is said to reside in the
rational part of the human soul. For this I have not been able to
find definite parallels. 3 The argument shows high esteem for this
rational part, which is not at all surprising in ancient philosophy.
Further we have seen that elements both from Platonism and
from the Peripatos were used in the doctrine about the soul, which
is at the background of the line of thought in eh. r8o b-r87. Basic-
ally, however, that doctrine is Platonic, the introduction of Peri-
patetic thoughts having become quite normal in Platonic psychol-
ogy, as indeed in other departments of philosophy. But is it also
possible to detect typical Porphyrian elements in the chapters in
question? The best introduction to Porphyry's psychology can be
found in Dorrie's contribution to the collection of essays on Por-
phyry mentioned above. Unfortunately that paper, entitled
Die Lehre von der Seele, does not provide us with any details which
specially refer to the doctrine in eh. r8o a-r87. On the other hand,
these chapters do not contain anything that goes counter to Por-
phyry's psychology, and the curious argument of eh. r87, demon-
strating the usefulness of the two lower parts of the soul for the
care of worldly affairs, has something in common with Porphyry's
idea that the soul is a µeO'Y) oua(oc.
3
1 The interest which Porphyry takes in human freedom and responsibility

could serve as an argument for Theiler's hypothesis, that Porphyry often
reverts to the ideas of Ammonius. Both Hierocles and Origen, from whose
works Theiler wants to reconstruct Ammonius' doctrine, strongly defend
human responsibility. Origen has explicitly treated the problem in book III
of his Ilept ilpxii>v.
• There are, of course, many parallels for the ideas in individual chapters
and for smaller details. For these parallel texts I refer to Waszink's exege-
tical apparatus and my notes to these chapters. Plotinus explicitly refers
free will to the intellect: ... et,; iip)(7JV-ro !qi' ~µ.iv x.0tU!aniv iivcxyovn,; TlJV
-rou vou bJipyer.0tv... (Enn. VI 8.3).
a Beutler, o.c. col.306.
134 CONCLUSION
Two arguments can be added to make it more plausible that

Porphyry is the source of Calcidius' tractatus.
(1) There is a notable similarity in the views held by Calcidius
and Porphyry on God's knowledge of contingent things (see my
notes on eh. 163, above p. 56).
(2) There are many Aristotelica throughout the tractatus. Swit-
alski 1 and Waszink (notes ad loc.)often refer to the Ile:ple:tµcxpµtvl)c;
of the great Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias.
However, the texts they have quoted mainly concern details and
nowhere prove Calcidius' use of greater Abschnitte. Indeed, Calcidius'
line of thought sometimes differs widely from Alexander's, even if
some details are greatly similar. This is not surprising, for Calcidius
holds the Platonic view, whereas Alexander is a Peripatetic to the
core. 11Now I do not deny that Porphyry, if indeed he may be called
Calcidius' source, may have studied Alexander's Ile:pl e:tµcxpµtvljc;.
On the contrary, this is even likely. Porphyry himself tells that,
during Plotinus' lectures, among other things the un:oµvfiµcx-rcx
of Alexander and other Peripatetic philosophers were studied. 3
It is quite reasonable to suppose that in preparing his own Ile:pl
he studied Alexander's fine and important treatise.
e:lµcxpµtvl)c;
But apart from any resemblances to Alexander's Ile:pl e:lµcxpµtvl)c;
there are many more Aristotelica. Without doubt the process of
introducing Aristotelic thoughts into Platonism had long since
begun; this is shown clearly in Albinus' Epitome and indeed in
pseudo-Plutarch's Ile:pl e:tµcxpµtvljc;.
So in itself this fact does not
prove much, but on the other hand it certainly suits the hypothesis
of a Porphyrian authorship. For it is a well-known fact that
Porphyry, who was a very prolific writer, also wrote commentaries
on some works of Aristotle.' Now we have sometimes illustrated
Calcidius' statements with quotations from such late Neo-Platonic
commentators on Aristotle's works as Ammonius and Philoponus.
It seems quite possible that these commentators found their mate-
rial in Porphyry's works. The resemblance of the texts quoted from
their commentaries to Calcidius could then be explained by the
1 B. W. Switalski, Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus, Munster
1902, p. 94 sqq.
1 Cf. my note to the sentence series uero ilia causarum ineuitabilis unde
accipiet exordium (203.7-8, see above p. 82).
• Porphyrius, Vita Plotinic. 14.
' Cf. J. Bidez, Vie de Porphyre, Ghent 1913, p. 58 sqq. and the list of
commentaries on p. 65• and 66• and Beutler o.c. col.282.
CONCLUSION 135
fact that both Calcidius and the Neo-Platonic commentators are

following Porphyry. In any case the Aristotelica in Calcidius are
in harmony with the hypothesis that his direct source is Porphyry.
Finally we turn to the Hebraei, who at times are quoted by Cal-
cidius to provide an additional illustration for an argument which
has already been proved by other means. In the tractatus de f ato
there are two examples of this (eh. 171, see above p. 71 and eh. 154,
see above p. 36). There are different explanations given for this
mannerism.
(1) Sodano thinks that Calcidius, who as a Christian must have
had an adequate knowledge of the Old Testament, has indepen-
dently added these texts. 1 This suggestion has been disproved by
Waszink: "Diese Losung der Frage scheint mir aber aus dem Grunde
ausgeschlossen zu sein, dass an verschiedenen dieser Stellen das
Bibelzitat mit einer unverkennbar philosophischen Ausdeutung
verbunden ist, die unmoglich dem Calcidius selbst zugeschrieben
werden kann''.2
(2) Waszink I, in the Praefatio of his edition: Deinde, ut p.
XLIII, adn. 2 obseruauimus, credi non potest Porphyrium, ut
Calcidium, tam frequenter Hebraeorum sapientiam ut suae doctrinae
confirmationem aduocauisse; iis igitur locis ipsum Numenium
secutum esse Calcidium ueri multo similius est
(p. CV).
(3) Waszink II: After some critical remarks by van Winden
in the Supplementary Notes to the Photographic Reprint of his book
Calcidius onMatter (p. 253 sqq.) Waszink changed his opinion.
In his paper Pophyrios und Numenioshe says: "Das alles fiihrt
zu der Annahme, dass die Kapitel, in denen Calcidius die Hebraica
philosophia anfiihrt, nicht direkt, sondern <lurch Vermittlung des
Porphyrios auf Numenios zuriickgehen" (o.c. p. 62).
In my opinion the problem has not yet been conclusively solved.
For this reason I venture to suggest a fourth possibility. In his
remarks on eh. 276-278 van Winden (o.c. p. 53-66) says that the
contents of these chapters may very well have been derived from
Origen's now lost Commentary on Genesis. Waszink too in the
Praefatio refers to this commentary, saying: Probabile uidetur
eum ... Origenis in Genesin commentarium praesto habuisse (p.
CVI). Origen's commentary must have been a very learned work.
1 A. R. Sodano, Sul Commento di Calcidio al
"Timeo" di Platone.Giornale
Italiano di filologia XVI (1963) p. 343 sqq.
1 Entretiens XII p. 59.
136 CONCLUSION
In no less than 13 books he commented on the first four chapters

of Genesis.1 This is confirmed by the few fragments, which have
been preserved. 2 In my notes on eh. 174 I have already referred
to Origen's essay on the words in Genesis 1, 14 "let them (the
stars) be signs". This essay, which formed part of the third book of
the Commentary, has been preserved by Eusebius, Praep. Ev.
VI eh. II. In this thorough study 3 Origen treats such questions as
human freedom, God's foreknowledge etc. The other fragments
also prove the fact that Origen did not restrict himself to a simple
exegesis. Now it is remarkable that most of the Hebraica quoted
by Calcidius are indeed highly philosophical and also for the greater
part are confined to texts from the first four chapters of Genesis,
the only chapters treated by Origen in his commentary.' So I should
like to contribute the following suggestion to the discussion on the
source of the Hebraica: These Hebraica are derived from Origen's
Commentary on Genesis. They are either introduced by Calcidius
himself or by the auctor whom he followed; in our opinion this is
Porphyry. Although I have a slight preference for the first possibili-
ty, I do not rule out the alternative. Indeed Porphyry wrote a
polemical work xcxTixXpL<M"Lotv&v, which displayed much hostility
against the Christian doctrine. But on the other hand in this work
he showed great familiarity with the Christian doctrine and indeed
with the contents of the Bible. It does not at all seem impossible
that Porphyry studied a commentary on such an important book
as Genesis by such a prominent scholar as Origen. He certainly
knew the latter quite well, as is apparent from Eusebius, Hist.
Eccl. VI 19, 5-8.6
Our final conclusion is, that in his tractatus de Jato
Calcidius has
adapted a treatise of Porphyry on fate, which in all probability
on Plato's Timaeus. Sodano was justi-
belonged to his u1roµv~1J,otTcx
1 Cf. R. Devreesse, Les anciensCommentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque et des

Rois, Studi et Testi 201, Vatican City 1959, p. 26 sqq.
1 Texts in Lommatzsch' edition of Origen's works, Vol. VIII p. 5-47.
8 In Mras' edition of the Praeparatio Evangelica it comprises no less than
17 pages.
' The full list, apart from eh. 276-278 (280.1 sqq.), is as follows: eh.
55,103.2 sqq.: Genesis1.26 and 2.7; eh. 130, 172.23 sqq.: Genesis 1.14-16;
eh. 132, 173.22: no special text mentioned; eh. 154, 189.8 sqq.: Genesis 2.17;
eh. 171,200.14 sqq.: Isaiah 1.19-20?; eh. 219,231.24 sqq: Genesis 4.10, 9.4;
eh. 300,302.11 sqq.: Genesis1.24, 2.7, 3.1.
6 Cf. especially par. 8: -rov µ.e-ra:Al)MLxov -rCiv 7L'a:p'"Elll)aL µ.ua'rl)ploov
yvou; -rp67L'OV
-ra:'t;'Iou3a:LXa:L~
7L'poa'ijq,ev
ypa:q>a:!~.
CONCLUSION 137
fied in including Calcidius' De F atoamong the fragmenta incerta

of his edition of the fragments of Porphyry's commentary on the
Timaeus. 1 This conclusion is not new. It has already been drawn
by Waszink in his Praefatio: suspicari licebit hanc de Jato doctrinam
... a Calcidio apud auctorem Numenio et Alexandro posteriorem, et
quidem apudPorphyrium ... inuentam esse (p. LXIII).
1 Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta collegit et
disposuit A. R. Sodano, Naples 1964.
INDICES
I. LIST OF QUOTATIONS FROM ANCIENT SOURCES
ALBINUS De Platone
Epitome (ed. Louis) I5 86
3 21 I6 53,96
4 54 I II IOI
8-IO 86 I 12 16, 24, 94,
10 90, 91 124,126
23 116 II6 106
24 III ARISTOTELES
26 21, 32, 35, Deanima
36
29 1071 411b5-12 110
414a32-b1 109
ALEXANDERAPHRODIS1ENS1S 414b18-19 III
In Arist. Anal.
Priora (ed. Wallies) De caelo
162.1 sqq. 39 1 3ooa23 99
In Arist. Topica(ed. Wallies) Ethica Nicom.
177.22-27 39 1 1099a31-32 58
De Jato(ed. Bruns) II 11b8-11 I3aI I 39
169.19-20 2 1113b6-8 2
171.20-21 48 1113b23-26 42
171.23-25 83 1141b2-9 107
174.30-175.1 54 Meteor.
178.12 40 381b6 99
179.9 40
181.13-14 51
Physica
182.12-13 51 192a31 88
187.26 42 196b10-13 45
196.1-3 82 197a5-6 46
197.17-22 58 197a32-35 45
198.23-24 58 197a36 44
200.12-15 49
201.16-17 Fragmenta (ed. Ross)
54
202.5-7 71 p.90 102
202.21-23 35 ARNOBIUS
AMMONlUS Adv.Nat.
In Arist. De
interpr. (ed. Busse) II 25 96
136.17-18 55 AUGUSTlNUS
136.30-137.1 55
142.1-5 De civil.dei
39
142.5-6 99 VII 16 101 1
142.13-15 45 1 BOETHlUS
143.1-2 39
Consol. Philos.
APULEIUS V3 49
De deo Socr. V4 55
XVI 121 V6 55
INDICES 139
CALCIDIUS (ed. Waszink; only I II II4

passages not belonging to the I 24 114
tractatus de Jato) I 34 114
8.13 66 I 72 114
12.2 62 I 128 114
16.16 66 II 26 114
21.21-22 92 II 63 70
26.14 64 II 115 70
36.6 64 II 116 71
36.10-11 116 De Jato
36.14-17 118
36.18 8 XIII 30 50,6g
36.21 8,49 XIV 31 84
38.10 66 XIX43 51'
40.11-12 65 Tim.
45.9-10 90
46.1-2 65 26 27
46.20 49 Tusc. disp.
59.18-19 88
88 V22 58
77,15
102.9-10 95 CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS
121.6 13 Strom.
165.1 IOI
166.10-14 IOI II 15.63 III
168.15-16 78 DIOGENES LAERTIUS
171.21-172.7 102
172.24-173.1 36 III 6g 86
174.1 121
177.14-18 EMPEDOCLES
107
180.11-15 118 fr. B II5 I
214.24-25 92
221.2-3 110 EUSEBIUS
228.18-20 107 Hist. eccl.
238.9-10 III
VI 19.5-8 136
273.11 go
273. 17 88 Pr<M,p,evang.
274.10 90 I lO 61
274.18-19 99 VI6 81
275.1 19 VI 10 781
300.3 91 VI II 78,136
300.5-7 75
300.11 15• FIRMICUS MATERNUS
300.14 90 Math.
302.11 36
312.20-313.1 88 I 5.7 79 1
316.23 151
FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS
CICERO Antiqu.
Acad. pr. 13.172-173 126
II 134 58
GALENUS
De divinatione Scripta minora vol. II (ed. Miil]er)
I I 70 p. 49 109
INDICES
GELLIUS NEMESIUS
VII 2.11 51 De nat. hom. (ed. Matthaei)
XVI 8.IO 6g 34 (p. 288) 39
35 (p. 289) 78, 83
HERACLITUS 35 (p. 290) 81
fr. A I 35 (p. 293) 51
fr. A 5 38 lP• 303) I0
fr. B 119 38 (p. 304) 27

38 (p. 305) 29
HESIODUS 38 (p. 306) 36
Ope,a 39 (p. 313) 45, 46
44 (p. 345) 25
122-123 120
NUMENIUS (ed. Leemans)
HIPPOLYTUS
Refut. fr. 9a 36
fr. 10 37
I 19.19 fr. II 92 1
fr. 22 97
HOMERUS fr. 23 92
Ilias fr. 25 91
VI 488-489 I
fr. 26 90
fr. 29 91
fr. 34 131
JUSTINUS
Apol.
ORACULA CHALDAICA (ed. Kroll)
I 44
14 95
Dial.
1191 ORIGENES
4.1
Cont,a Gels.
LACTANTIUS II 20 50
De i,a dei III 6g 60
IV 96 115
13.20-21 74 VI 3 119
MACROBIUS
De o,at. (ed. Koetschau)
Comm. 6.3 (314.4-9) 56
I 14.6 119 De princ.
I 19.20 sqq. 78 1 III 6 (201.15-17) 72
Sat.
I 23.8 IOI OVIDIUS
Fasti
MAXIMUS TYRIUS (ed. Hobein) VI 267 101 1
V5 12
XIII 4 115 PARMENIDES
XXXVIII 6d 74 fr. B 8, 30-31 I
XLI 5a 36
PHILOPONUS
MINUCIUS FELIX In Arist. Anal. p,. (ed. Wallies)
XII 2 74 151.27-152.4 39 1
XVIII 7 121 152.17-18 99
INDICES I4I
{HIEROCLES apud) PHOTIUS 39d2-7 22

cod. 214 (ed. Henry) 4oa2-3 102
p. 127 105 41a5 24
cod. 251 (PG 104) 41b2-3 25
Bo 120 41c5 64
105,106 41d1 II6
93
96 121 41d4-7 II8
41d8 18
PLATO 41d8-e2 8
Epist. 41e1 9
VII 341c Il9 41e2 49,123
41e2-3 7
Gorgias 41e-42d 97
512e3-4 I 42a7-c4 124
42d2 123
uges 42e5 18,66
715e 121 42e7 25
967d8 78 43a7-b2 100
44b7 65
Phaedo 47e4 90
58a6 44 48c5 65
u5a5 I 49a6 49
6gc7-8 u6
Phaedrus 86b sqq. 65
246b6 II8 86b2 109
248c2 86d7 6o
9
248c-249b 123 86e5-87a7 109
Protagoras [PLATO]
Epinomis
345d9-e1 6o
982c6 78
Resp.
373b6 65
PLOTINUS (ed. Brehier)
434d-441c Ill II 3.1 78
441a2-3 II7 II 3.2 78
441b6 III II 3.3 79
441e4-6 IIO II 3.9 II6
521c-541b 66 II 3.13 79 1
615b1-2 123 III 6.6 96
617c3-5 II III 8.9 88
617d6 9,123 IV 2.1 96
617d-e 32 IV 4.27 IOI
617e4 2,31 IV 6.3 96
62od8-e1 120 V 1.3 96
V 1.6 92
Timaeus V 1.7 91
2oc6 62 V 1.8 89
28c3-5 89,119 V 2.1 88,91
29a6 92 V 5.10 92
29b5-c2 53 V6.4 92
34a8 64 V6.6 89
35a II7 V9.5 97
36d8 271 VI 7,15 92
I,42 INDICES
VI 8.3 In Plat. Remp. (ed. Kroll)

VI 8.7 II 94.20 12
VI 8.17 In Plat. Tim. (ed. Diehl)
I 352.5-16 55
PLUTARCHUS
Defac. SCRIPTURA SACRA
945c 12 Gen.
De gen. Socr. 1.14 136
591b 12 2.17 36
Exod.
De virt.moY. 20.5 131
446a III Isai.
Quaest. conv. 1.19-20 72
745b 12 Sap. Sal.
14.21 131
[PLUTARCHUS) Ep. lac.
De jato 4· 12
568d II
20 SENECA
568f-56gb
56gb-c 23 Epist.
56gd 104 92.14 58
56gd-57ob 26
570b 104 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS
57oc-e 29 Adv. math.
57of 37 V2 115
571c 39 V29 78
571e 44 V 30 79
572b 46 XI 96 62
572b-c 44 Pyrrh. hyp.
572f-573f 15-16 III 10-1 I 74
573a 25,93, 120
573b 14,93 (PORPHYRIUS apud) STOBAEUS
574f 129 (ed. Wachsmuth)
I 347-354 IIO
PORPHYRIUS
II 164 121
Epist. ad Aneb. (ed. Sodano) II 16g 32
2.13a 132 II 163-173 132
Hist. Phil.(ed. Nauck)
STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA
fr. 15-17 131
(ed. von Arnim)
ad Marcellam (ed. Potscher)
22.6-8 1321 I 120 79
28.5-6 132 I 566 60
34.10-11 133 II 35 I06
II 528 66
Vita Plotini II 826 40
14 II 896 40
II 913 12
PROCLUS II 914 8 1, 12
Inst. Theol. (ed. Dodds) II 915 81
IIO.I0-23 54 II 917 8 1, 81
INDICES 143
II 918 8 1, 81 TACITUS
II 921 81 Ann.
II 931 14 VI 22.2 31
II 932 14 Hist.
II 939-944 51 IV 81 65
II 941 35
II 945 221 TERTULLIANUS
II 956-958 50 De anima
II 978 52 4.2 158
II u89 70
III 4 105 Apol.
III 79 79 8.1 158
III 228-236 59,6o 16.3 158
III 229 58,66 38.5 158
III 229a 65 49.1 158
III 256 79 adv. Marc.
III 262 I07 4.8 61
III 314 42
III 315 42 XENOCRATES (ed. Heinze)
III 617-622 63 fr. 5 II
II. MODERN AUTHORS
(the numbers refer to the pages of the present book)

AMAND(D.), Fatalisme et Liberti dans l'Antiquite grecque, Louvain 1945. -
421, 83-84, 1141
ARMSTRONG(A. H.), Plotinus, Part III of the Cambridge History of Later
Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967. - 96
BENZ (E.), Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der Abendliindischen
Willensmetaphysik, Stuttgart 1932. - 94
BEUTLER(R.), Philosophie und Apologie bei Minucius Felix, Weida i. Thiir.
1936. - 121
art. Porphyrios, RE XXIP, col. 275-313. - 110 1, 132 1, 133 8, 134'
BIDEZ (J.), Vie dePorphyre, Ghent 1913. - 134'
CORNFORD(F. M.), Plato's Cosmology,London 1956'. - 117
DEVREESSE(R.), Les anciens Commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque et des Rois,
Vatican City 1959. - 136 1
DODDS (E. R.), Numenius and Ammoniusin Entretiens sur l'Antiquite
classique, t. V, Geneva 196o, p. 3-61. - 92
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1962 1 . - 55 1
DoRRIE (H.), Die Lehre von der Seele in Entretiens sur l'Antiquite classique,
t. XII, Geneva 1965, p. 167-191. - 110 1
Porphyrios' Symmikta Zetemata, Munich 1959. - 98, 110
DURING (I.), Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1966. - 2
FESTUGIERE(A. J.), La revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste, t. III, Paris 1953.
-97 1
GERCKE (A.), Eine Platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus, Rhein. Mus. 41
(1866), p. 266-291. - 10 1, 23 1, 33
HACKFORTH(R.), Plato's Phaedrus, Cambridge 1952. - 102 1
KRAMER(H. J .),Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, Amsterdam 1964. - 85 1
LEEMANS(E. A.), Studie over den wijsgeer Numenius vanApamea, Brussels
1937. -36
LEUMANN-HOFMANN-SZANTYR, Lateinische Grammatik, Munich 1965. - 29,
41, 65
LEWY (H.), Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Cairo 1956. - 96 1
LILLA (S.), Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and Jewish-Alexandrine Philo-
sophy in the Terminology of Clement of
Alexandria's Ethics in Archivio
Italiano per la Storia della Pieta III (1962), p. 3-36. - 107 1, 111 1
MARTANO (G.), Numenio d'Apamea, Naples 196o. - 91
PoHLENZ (M.), Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung,Gottingen 1959 1 •
- 2, 81, 40 1, 59, 6o, 77, 79, 84
RoscHER (W. H.), Ausfuhrliches Lexikon der Griechischen und Romischen
Mythologie, Leipzig 1884-1937. - 101
SCHMERTOSCH (R.), De Plutarchi qui fertur 1tEplElµotpµe111jt;
libello · (epimetrum
of his dissertation De Plutarchi sententiarumquae ad divinationem
spectant origine), Leipzig 1889. - 101 , 23 1
SCHWYZER(H. R.), Nachlese zur indirekten Oberlieferung des Plotin-Textes
in Mus. Helv. 26 (1969) p. 252-270. - 91 1
art. Plotinos in RE XXP col. 471-592. - 88 8 , 116
SODANO(A. R.), Sul Commento di Calcidio"Timeo" al di Platonein Giomale
Italiano di filologia XVI (1963) p. 339-349. - 135 1
INDICES r45
SouRY (G.), Aperfus de Philosophie religieusechez Maxime de Tyr, Paris 1942.
- u5•
STEINHEIMER(E.), Untersuchungen uber die Quellen des Chalcidius,Aschaffen-
burg 1912. - 1321
SWITALSKI(B. W.), Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus,Miinster
1902. - 1341
THEILER (W.), Ammonias und Porphyrios in Entretiens sur l'Antiquite
classique, t. XII, Geneva 1965, p. 87-123. - 130, 1311
Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus,Berlin 1966. - 32 1, 48, 51 8, 85 1, 96 8,
1061, 1251, 130
0BERWEG-PRAECHTER, Die Philosophie des Altertums,Berlin 1926 18 • - 105
VANWINDEN (J.C. M.), Calcidius on Matter, Leiden 19658 • - 14, 19, 36, 42,
75, 76, 85 1, 86 1, 88, 90 1, 90 8, 90', 99
WASZINK(J. H.), Commentary on Tertullian's De anima, Amsterdam 1947.
-uo 1
Calcidius' Erkliirung von Tim.4zea-4aa4 in Mus. Helv. 26 (1969) p. 271-

280, -92
Porphyrios und Numenios in Entretiens sur l' Antiquite classique, t. XII,
Geneva 1965, p. 35-83. - 130, 135
Praefatio to the edition of Calcidius' Commentarius, Leiden 1962. - 37,
128
Studien zumTimaioskommentar des CalcidiusI, Leiden 1964. - 22 1 , 33,
75, 81 1, 129
WHITTAKER(J.), 'En:e,mvix vou xixl ouatixi;.Vig. Christ. 23 (1969) p. 91-104.
-891
IO
INDICES
III. SOME LATIN TERMS
actus 10 perus,sitas 75, 76

a,nbiguus 49,6g,70 p,aecessio 27, 29, 70, 82
casus 45,46,73, 103,120 p,aesume,e 14, 15, 57
compluibilis 6g p,aesumptio 14, 15
confatalia 35, 49, 50, 59 p,ouidentia passim
conuersio 91 ,a,us 46, 103
dubius 49,53,69,70,73 salubris 19
/alum passim salubritas 4 I
/OJ'tuna 45, 46, 73, 103, 120 substantia 10, 53, 88, 89
.frequsns 39,73,99 series (causa,um) 8, 81
Hwraei 36, 71, 135, 136 ui,tus 63
necessarius 49 uoluptas 6o, 63, 64
IV. SOME GREEK TERMS
clxOWWV"ljTOio I3I 1 i~LO'TpO!p-lJ 9I

clv«~63p«a-roi; I I iq>' 'ii!LLV29, 31, 32, 39, 51, 132
ciVC(L~03LaTOli I I 8u(LO£L3ci;65, IIO•II2, II7
clpyoi; ).oyoi; 50, 84 x«66>.ou 26, 104
cl?xii 86, 88 x«TiiX'IJO'Lt;6o, 64
CIIXO(LCITOi; 44, 45 >.oyLa-rLXov65, 106, u7, 126, 127
3LCIXOO'(L'IJO'~22 (LIIVTLX-IJ 35, 4I, 70, I 15
3uxa-rpoq>-IJ59 !Lov«xoi; 89
Buv«-roi; 37, 38 VO(L06CT'ljt; 97
cl!',CIPILMI passim vout; 89 sqq.
clp(Loi; («l-rL&>v)8, So, 81 ouat« IO, 87 sqq.
aurupWO'Lio22, 23 inl -ro noM 39, 120
i~' l>.«nov 39, 46, I03, I20 npo«tpca1i; 39, 46
Mqo(LCVOi;37, 38, 39, 54, 70, 99 -rux'IJ 44, 45, 46
ncpycL« IO '~ uno6£0'£(1)t; 26, 27, 29, 30, 33,
~L6u(L'IJTLXOV 65, IIO•II2 35, 72, 104, 131
i~la-tji; 39, I20
SAMENVATTING
In c. r42 van zijn commentaar op de Timaeus kondigt Calcidius

aan, dat hij naar aanleiding van de woorden v6µ.oui;n Tooi;
{4I e 2) een globaal overzicht zal geven van de Platoonse
elµ.1Xpµ.evoui;
fatumleer. Dit overzicht beslaat de capita I43-r90 en het kan in
drie hoofdonderdelen worden verdeeld:
A. De fundamenten van de Platoonse fatumleer (c. r43-r59),
B. Bestrijding van Stoicijnse aanvallen op deze leer (c. r60-r75),
C. Nieuwe uiteenzetting van de Platoonse leer (c. r76-r90).
In het eerste hoofdonderdeel (A) zet de auteur uiteen, dat aan de
Voorzienigheid een hogere rang moet worden toegekend dan aan
het fatum. Enkele teksten uit de Timaeus worden als bewijs hiervan
geciteerd. Het grote belang van dit principiele punt zal eerst in
onderdeel C ten voile duidelijk worden.
Het fatum nu bezit twee aspecten: men kan het beschouwen naar
zijn wezen en naar zijn actualiteit. In het eerste geval is het fatum
de Wereldziel, in het andere geval is het een wet, zoals b.v. aan het
licht treedt in Phaedrus 248 c 2, waar gesproken wordt van een 'wet
van Adrasteia'. De wet van het fatum heeft een hypothetisch karak-
ter, zij verbindt oorzaken en gevolgen. De oorzaken, die het vertrek-
punt vormen van een reeks gevolgen, worden niet door het fatum
bepaald, maar o.a. door de vrije wil van de mens. De wet van het
fatum stelt algemene regels, waarvan het grondpatroon luidt: si
hoe erit, sequetur illud. Calcidius' beschouwingen zijn hier sterk
verwant aan de geschriften van enkele Griekse auteurs. Vooral met
het ten onrechte aan Plutarchus toegeschreven tractaat Ilepl
bestaat grote overeenkomst. De auteur van dit geschrift
elµ.1Xpµ.£Vr)i;
moet gelocaliseerd worden in een Midden-Platoonse school, zeer
waarschijnlijk die van Gaius. Enkele voorbeelden lichten het
karakter van de wet van het fatum, die, zoals het in de Griekse
vertogen heet, i~ 61to8£ae<a>i; functioneert, nog nader toe.
De laatste hoofdstukken van het eerste hoofdonderdeel zijn gewijd
aan de plaats, die enkele andere zaken ten opzichte van het fatum
innemen, zoals het contingente, de voorspellingskunst, geluk en
toeval.
Het tweede hoofdonderdeel (B) gaat in op een aantal Stoicijnse
tegenwerpingen: Gods voorkennis van alle gebeuren, aldus de Stoa,
SAMENVATTING
voert onherroepelijk tot de conclusie, dat alles van te voren is vast-

gesteld. Dit is volgens Calcidius allerminst het geval. Stellig weet
God alles, maar dan toch elk ding naar zijn eigen aard, het contin-
gente als contingente. Men mag dus alleen concluderen, dat ten
aanzien van het contingente onwrikbaar vaststaat, dat het con-
tingent is. Ook de menselijke vrijheid, die voor Calcidius van
primair belang is, is volledig gehandhaafd. Deze vrijheid wordt
intussen danig bedreigd door de slechte invloed van het milieu,
waarin de mens van kindsbeen vertoeft. Deze 3uxa-rpocp1J of peruersio
ondermijnt volgens de Stoa het principe van de vrije wil. Dit
argument vermag Calcidius niet te imponeren; hij concludeert uit
deze stand van zaken veeleer tot de noodzaak van goede op-
voeding en goddelijke bescherming.
Ook in de voorspellingskunst, waaraan de Stoicijnse fatumleer
zulk een voomame plaats toekent, is geen bewijs gelegen voor de
onwrikbare voorbeschikking van alle gebeuren. Orakels zijn immers
of dubbelzinnig, zoals in het geval van Croesus, of hebben het
karakter van een advies. In beide gevallen is de vrije verantwoorde-
lijkheid van de mens verondersteld.
Hiema besteedt de auteur nog enkele bladzijden aan het probleem
van het kwaad; hiervoor kunnen noch het fatum noch de sterren
noch de Logos verantwoordelijk worden gesteld. Calcidius' antwoord
aan de Stoa wordt besloten met een aantal heftige verwijten jegens
de aanhangers van deze filosofie, die zijns inziens goddeloosheid
en laksheid bevordert.
In caput 176 hervat de auteur de bespreking van de Platoonse
fatumleer. Deze hemieuwde bespreking, die het derde hoofdonder-
deel (C) omvat, is het meest interessante stuk van de tractatus de Jato.
Twee zaken hebben de volle aandacht: a. het fa tum wordt ingepast
in een metaphysische hierarchie, b. de menselijke vrijheid wordt
verankerd in het redelijke deel van de ziel.
Het onder a genoemde komt aan de orde in de capita 176 en 188.
Hier wordt een hierarchie geschetst van een hoogste God, Zijn Voor-
zienigheid, die ook vouc; wordt genoemd en de Wereldziel of het
tweede intellect. Deze laatste hypostase gehoorzaamt aan de wet
van het fatum, dat in de rangorde na de Voorzienigheid komt,
zoals in hoofdonderdeel A een- en andermaal was bewezen.
Een aantal gedachten in de capita 176 en 188 doen denken aan
Numenius, andere ideeen herinneren sterk aan Plotinus. Het lijkt
het meest plausibel, dat Porphyrius in deze capita Calcidius' bron
is geweest.
SAMENVATTING 149
In de capita 180-187 wordt uiteengezet, dat de menselijke vrij-

van de ziel. Deze vrij-
heid haar steunpunt heeft in het 1,.oyLa't"Lx6v
heid wordt daarom niet wezenlijk aangetast door een minder
gunstige lichamelijke conditie en evenmin door de lagere zieledelen.
Ook de voorspellingskunst en de astrologie vormen geen bewijs voor
het tegendeel. Beide werken immers op rationele basis en betreffen
bovendien niet het redelijk zieledeel, doch uitsluitend het lichaam
en de lagere zieledelen.
Nadat nog enkele in de tractatus behandelde kwesties kort zijn
samengevat, besluit de auteur zijn betoog in caput 190. Van dit
hoofdstuk luidt de slotconclusie, dat sommige dingen geschieden
door het fatum, andere hun oorsprong vinden in de vrije wil van
de mens.
Uit welke bron(nen) heeft Calcidius nu de stof voor zijn verhande-
ling geput? Zoals zoeven reeds werd opgemerkt, lijkt de inhoud
van de zeer belangrijke capita 176 en 188 ontleend aan Porphyrius.
Nu zijn deze capita stellig niet als vreemd element aan het betoog
toegevoegd, integendeel ze zijn volkomen in het geheel geintegreerd,
zodat toewijzing van de stof van de beide capita aan Porphyrius
belangrijke implicaties heeft.
Er zijn evenwel meer argumenten, die ervoor pleiten Porphyrius
aan te merken als Calcidius' belangrijkste bron. Zo past de grote
nadruk, die gelegd wordt op de menselijke vrijheid, geheel bij de
opvattingen, die Porphyrius in de latere fazen van zijn wijsgerige
carriere huldigde. Ook de talrijke Aristotelica in Calcidius' betoog
kunnen een aanwijzing vormen. Porphyrius schreef immers ver-
scheidene commentaren op werken van Aristoteles, terwijl boven-
dien bij de door hem bijgewoonde colleges van Plotinus werken van
Peripatetische denkers werden bestudeerd, onder meer van Alexan-
der van Aphrodisias, in wiens Ilepl elµocpµtVYjc; vele gedachten te
vinden zijn, die ook bij Calcidius een plaats krijgen. Wellicht mag
men voorts aannemen, dat het beroep op teksten uit het Oude
Testament door Porphyrius is overgenomen van Origines.
Ten aanzien van het bronnenvraagstuk luidt de conclusie, dat
Calcidius in zijn tractatus de Jatoeen betoog van Porphyrius heeft
bewerkt, dat behoorde tot diens imoµv~µot't"otop Plato's Timaeus
e~ waarin onder meer gebruik gemaakt is van door het Midden-
Platonisme geboden materiaal.

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CALCIDIUS ON FATE

JAN DEN BOEFT

Prof. Dr. J. H. WASZINK

A. The fund.aments of the Platonic doctrine of fate 8

B. Refutation of Stoic arguments . 47

C. Renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate. 85

unde est haec, inquam, fatis auulsa uoluntas?

(614 b sqq.), where human responsibility is emphasized in the

a fierce adversary of the Stoa. Certainly Chrysippus, the second

The following investigation is based on Waszink's edition of

The tractatus has three main parts:

A further division results in the following outline of the whole

B. Refutation of Stoic arguments

A paraphrase kept as close as possible-not a literal translation-

[142] "He taught the laws of unalterable destiny". Here he

In this introductory chapter Calcidius clearly states his subject.

1. FATE AND PROVIDENCE

a) The main principle: Providence ranks above fate

[143a] Now according to Plato providence precedes, destiny

(Mundi quippe machinam absoluere etc., 184.19). Establishing

b) The two aspects of fate

This paragraph bears a close resemblance to the first chapter of

another, the literal correspondences outnumbering the differences,

The parallel words in pseudo-Plutarch are llL' cxt-.(cxv iiveµ1t63La-rov,

1 De Lacy and Einarson in their Loeb-edition (Plutarch's Moralia vol. VII

8o~oco-Twv. Here again only Atropos' name is explained etymolo-

seemed to have forgotten, when he wrote in Timaeo(182.8) instead

c) Relation between Providence and fate according to the Stoics

Before we deal with this paragraph it may be useful to recapit-

a brief and incomplete introduction, speaking only about fate

1 J. C. M. van Winden O.F.M., Calcidius onMatter, His Doctrine and

345.3-5 1 it is evident that, to him, it has the general meaning of

&pLa't'cx't'e: xatt XOCAALO''t'Ot Further on, having quoted

1 Apuleius, De PlatoneI 12.

d) The sacred text of the Timaeus shows that Providence

the universe and taught them the laws of unalterable decree."

The main argument in both these chapters is the principle of

prouidentia, sequitur Jatum(181.20). The essence of the argument

In this paragraph the very close resemblance to the treatise

eh. 3. Still there is a great difference, as for the former schools

«7t'etpovya:p TOUTO, &1telp6>V

1 In his comments on 569 a Valgiglio says: "La frase appartiene agli

It: " t\l. \ 1! 8 \ •t:- \ \

this or not regarded these statements as essentially different.

Having established the fact that fate as a divine being is limited,

42 e 7. Besides, aeturnus et indissolubilis is strongly reminiscent of

c) This law has a hypothetical character

In this chapter Calcidius starts his exposition of the most charac-

d) Choice is in our power, fate causes the consequences

ERGO INITIVM Once more this principle, which was fully

something punishable. In the case of Achilles, who could choose

that antiquissima quaequeare the antithesis of quae post illa sunt. In my

between etµocpµtv1)and etµocpµevoc(things decreed by etµocpµevYJ),

e) Phaedrus 248c3-5 proves the correctness of this principle

this distinction between fatum and fatale, made somewhat abrupt-

elegeris, certum imminentium ordinem. Theiler, who has devoted

1 W. Theiler, Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre in Forschungen zum

certainly to the same sphere as the expositions of thee~ uno8foe:c.>c;-

or punishment, for these are implied in the original law, and in