The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between change and

the B-theory of time, sometimes also called the Scientific view of

time, according to which reality is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold,
where past, present and future things equally exist, and the present time
and non-present times are metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a
novel response to the much-vexed question of whether there is change on
the B-theory or not. In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of
time. But this far from being innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents
a model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the B-
theory. From this, one can reasonably think as follows: of course, there is
change, so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper is to
argue that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in some other
sense, there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances
of change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with
respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that things
change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional Change,
namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with respect to truth
value over time. I argue that while there is a reading of these three instances
of change that is true on the B-theory, and so there is change on the B-
theory in this sense, there is a B-theoretical reading of each of them that is
not true on the B-theory, and therefore there is no change on the B-theory in
this other sense.
Keywords: Change; B-theory of time; existence; properties;
propositions
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection
between change and the B-theory of time, sometimes also called
the Scientific view of time, according to which reality is a four-
dimensional spacetime manifold, where past, present and future things
equally exist, and the present time and non-present times are
metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a novel response to the
much-vexed question of whether there is change on the B-theory or
not.[1]
In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of time. But this
far from being an innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents a
model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the
B-theory. From this, one can reasonably think as follow: of course there
is change, so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper
is to argue that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in
some other sense, there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present
three instances of change: Existential Change, namely the view that
things change with respect to their existence over time; Qualitative
Change, the view that things change with respect to how they are over
time; Propositional Change, namely the view that things (i.e.
propositions) change with respect to truth value over time. I argue that
while there is a reading of these three instances of change that is true
on the B-theory, and so there is change on the B-theory in this sense,
there is a reading of each of them that is not true on the B-theory, and
therefore there is no change on the B-theory in this other sense.
1. Three Instances of Change
Bubbles, chemical reactions, flowers, butterflies, human beings (and so
on) exist, but do not exist forever. More generally, many things change
with respect to existence. Hence, the following counts as an instance of
change:
EXISTENTIAL CHANGE: things change with respect to existence over
time.[2]
It is important to be clear about the meaning of ‘exist’ in Existential
Change: ‘exist’ means here the same as ‘being’ or ‘being something’ or
‘being identical to something’ in the most unrestricted sense. What I am
assuming here is the standard meaning of existence assumed by most
contemporary metaphysicians.[3] So, for a cat to exist is for it to be
something, for a car to exist is for it to be something, and so on.
Nothing more or less.
For the sake of convenience, it is useful to introduce a more formal way
of expressing Existential Change, and the following instances of change.
To do so, let’s appeal to the language of free tense logic,[4] the language
that implements the language of free logic with the so-called tense
operators such as the past tense operator ‘It was the case that’ or ‘It is
the case at some past time that’ (symbolised as ‘P’) and the future tense
operator ‘It will be the case that’ or ‘It is the case at some future time
that’ (symbolised as ‘F’). From these, one can further define the operator
‘It is sometimes the case that’ or ‘It is the case at some time’ (symbolised
as ‘S’, where ‘S𝜑’ is defined as[5] ‘P𝜑 ∨ 𝜑 ∨ F𝜑’), and the operator ‘It is
always the case that’ or ‘It is the case at all times’ (symbolised as ‘A’,
where ‘A𝜑’ is defined as ‘P𝜑 ∧ 𝜑 ∧ F𝜑’).
So, one can regiment Existential Change as:
EXISTENTIAL CHANGE: Sometimes, something is not always something.
(Formally: ‘S(∃x ¬A(∃y y = x))’)
There is not just change in what exists over time, however. Tim was a
kid, and he is an adult, Lisa is seated, even though she was standing,
and Barack Obama was the US President, but he is not anymore.
Therefore, a further instance of change is the following:
QUALITATIVE CHANGE: things change with respect to how they are over
time.[6]
If we understand the predicates ‘is adult’, ‘is seated’ and ‘is the US
President’ as expressing properties or qualities, Qualitative Change
amounts to the view that things change with respect to properties or
qualities over time: Tim does not always bear the property of being an
adult, Lisa does not always bear the property of being seated, and
Barack Obama does not always bear the property of being the US
President.
Qualitative Change is naturally linked with the view that
things persist through time. Take Lisa: it is not just that Lisa, for
example, changes as she is seated, but she was standing, but also that
Lisa exists and she is seated, and existed and she was standing;
analogously, Lisa will exist and will be standing too.
More specifically, for Lisa to change with respect to her properties, she
must remain in existence through time. That’s the dynamic
phenomenon philosophers call persistence:
PERSISTENCE: things persist through time.
For Lisa to change with respect to her properties is not for Lisa to begin
to exist when she gains the property of being seated, and for her to
cease to exist when she loses the property of being seated and gains
the property of being standing. As a matter of fact, Lisa exists both
when she is seated and when she was and will be standing. It is one and
the same thing that both changes and persists through time: it is one
and the same Lisa that is seated and exists, and did exist and was
standing.
So, Qualitative Change and Persistence count as a single instance of
change (or so I claim): call this instance of change Qualitative Change plus
Persistence. One can express Qualitative Change plus Persistence more
formally as follows, where F stands for some property:
QUALITATIVE CHANGE PLUS PERSISTENCE: Sometimes, some x bears
some F but x does not always bear F. (Formally: ‘S(∃x∃F (Fx ⋀ ￢AFx))’)
The last instance of change that I wish to consider is change in what is
the case, or what is true, over time. One can derive such instance of
change from either Existential Change or Qualitative Change. Consider
Lisa: since Lisa exists, it the case that Lisa exists. Moreover, since Lisa is
seated, it is the case that Lisa is seated. But Lisa does not always exist
and is not always seated. Therefore, it is not always the case that Lisa
exists or that Lisa is seated. By taking talks about “being the case” as
equivalent to “being true”, where the primary bearers of truth and
falsehood are propositions, then one can say that the propositions that
Lisa exists and that Lisa is seated are true, but not always so. As a matter
of fact, they change with respect to truth value. Here is the third
instance of change:
PROPOSITIONAL CHANGE: things (i.e., propositions) change with respect
to truth value over time.[7]
Very much as with Existential Change and Qualitative Change plus
Persistence, one can express Propositional Change in more formal
terms as follows, where ‘p’ stands for a propositional variable:
PROPOSITIONAL CHANGE: Sometimes, there is some true proposition
that is not always true. (Formally: ‘S(∃p (p ⋀ ￢A(p))’
This concludes the presentation of three entirely plausible instances of
change.
In this paper, my purpose is to argue that the B-theory of time, which I
will introduce in more detail in the following section (Section 2), is
consistent with certain readings of such instances of change; thus, in
this sense, there is change on the B-theory. Nevertheless, I argue that
there is a reading of each of them that is false on the B-theory, and
therefore that in this other sense, there is no change on the B-theory.
The plan for the remaining part of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I
say more about how to understand the B-theory; in Section 3 I discuss
the connection between Existential Change and the B-theory; in Section
4, I discuss the connection between Qualitative Change plus Persistence
and the B-theory; in Section 5, I discuss the connection between
Propositional Change and the B-theory.
2. The B-theory of time
B-theorists, those who defend the B-theory of time,[8] typically hold that
reality consists of a four-dimensional block universe, the spacetime of
relativistic physics[9] (in virtue of which it is sometimes also called
the Scientific view of time), where past, present and future things equally
exist, and the present time and non-present times are metaphysically
the same. On this view, for the present time to be present does not
designate anything of metaphysical significance, as ‘present’ is an
indexical expression that refers to the time of utterance of such
expression.
Consider dinosaurs, for example. B-theorists hold that dinosaurs exist
very much as you and me; and the same goes for times: B-theorists
think that the time at which dinosaurs are located exists very much as
this time, the time at which we are located. In fact, B-theorists think of
time as very similar to space: very much as all places, and things located
at such places, equally exist, all times, and things located at such times,
equally exist. To this, B-theorists add that as for some place to be the
place that is here does not designate anything of metaphysical
importance, for some time to be the time that is present does not
designate anything of metaphysical importance: ‘here’ and ‘present’ are
merely indexical expressions that refer, respectively, to the place and
time at which they are uttered.
A further B-theoretic commitment on which I want to focus is how B-
theorists usually interpret tenses and tense operators, as this will help
to introduce the B-theoretical readings of Existential Change, Qualitative
Change plus Persistence and Propositional Change. B-theorists think of
tense operators as being fully reducible; to describe how reality
ultimately looks like, B-theorists do not make use of any tense operator.
This idea is captured by what Sider says in following quotation:
“[B-theorists] do not admit tense operators into their fundamental
ideology, since they can describe temporal reality without them—by
quantifying over past and future entities and predicating features of
them relative to times.” (Sider 2011, 241)
Now we have all the ingredients we need to proceed with the
discussion. Let’s begin by exploring the connection between Existential
Change and the B-theory.
3. Existential Change and the B-theory
Existential Change is the view that things change with respect to their
existence, and B-theorists might happily grant that Existential Change is
true on the B-theory. Consider the more formal version of Existential
Change, namely ‘Sometimes, something is not always something’. Now,
there is a reading of Existential Change that is true on the B-theory, and
to see that we must be clear about what it is for something to be such
that it is sometimes something, or that it sometimes exists. As stated in
the previous section, tense operators such as ‘Sometimes’ or,
equivalently, ‘It is sometime the case that’ are fully reducible on the B-
theory.[10] In fact, according to B-theorists, tense operators are fully
reducible to quantifiers over past, present and future times, as Sider
makes clear in the passage quoted in the previous section: for
something to be such that it sometimes exists is for it to be such that
there is a time at which it exists. In other words, B-theorists reduce
expressions of the form ‘sometimes, x exists’ to expressions of the form
‘x exists at some time t’. Accordingly, Existential Change reduces to the
following:
EC-1: For some times t and t1, some x is such that x exists at t but x does
not exist at t1
And EC-1 is true on the B-theory. Consider dinosaurs, for example: it is
true that dinosaurs exist at some times but not at others.
However, contemporary research on the topic suggests that
expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are inherently ambiguous (Correia
and Rosenkranz 2019; Deasy 2019; Markosian 2014): on one reading,
they are equivalent to expressions of the form ‘x is located at t’; whereas
on another reading, they are equivalent to expressions of the form
‘at t, x is something’. Thus, on the first reading, ‘x exists at t’ is
understood in locational terms, such that to say that something exists at
a time is to make a claim about where things are located in time; on the
second reading, ‘x exists at t’ is understood in perspectival terms, such
that to say that something exists at a time t is to make a claim about
what there is relative to (i.e. from the perspective of) t.
If expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are equivalent to expressions of
the form ‘x is located at t’, then Existential Change is true on the B-
theory, since one can think of EC-1 as equivalent to the following:
EC-2: For some times t and t1, some x is such that x is located at t but x is
not located at t1
EC-2 is true on the B-theory.
However, one can read Existential Change as a thesis about what there
is in time, rather than about where things are located in time. On this
reading, Existential Change becomes a thesis about there being change
in what there is over time. And on this reading, Existential Change is false
on the B-theory. Or so I argue.
In order to develop this argument, I wish to consider the modal
analogue of the B-theory, namely Modal Realism, on which actual things
exist just as possible things do, and the actual world and non-actual
worlds are metaphysically the same, notably defended by Lewis (1986).
Modal Realists understand expressions of the form ‘x exists at world w’
very much as B-theorists understand expressions of the form ‘x exists at
time t’. Accordingly, we can disambiguate between two readings of
expressions of the form ‘x exists at world w’, as either equivalent to ‘x is
located at w’ or ‘at w, x is something’.
Now, consider the following quotation from Lewis (1986):
“The phrase ‘at W’ which appears within the scope of the quantifier, […]
works mainly by restricting the domains of quantifiers in its scope, in
much the same way that the restricting modifier ‘in Australia’ does. […]
[However] I do not suppose that they must restrict all quantifiers in
their scope, without exception. […] ‘At some small worlds, there is a
natural number too big to measure any class of individuals’ can be true
even if the large number that makes it true is no part of the small
world.” (Lewis 1986, 6)
In the first half of the quotation, Lewis is referring to the first reading of
‘x exists at world w’, where w, a world, is where some x is located. In the
second half of the quotation, Lewis speaks of the second reading of
‘x exists at world w’, and says that sentences such as ‘At w, there is a
natural number too big to measure any class of individuals’ can be true,
even if such natural number is not located at w. In other words,
irrespective of the location of such natural number, it is true of it that it
is something, or it exists, given Modal Realism. So, Lewis is here
suggesting that when attached to claims about what there is,
irrespective of the location, in the modal space, the phrase ‘at w’ is
irrelevant: that there is a natural number too big to measure any class
of individuals is true even at worlds at which it is not located.
Let’s apply the understanding of expressions of the form ‘at t, x is
something’ proposed by Lewis to the temporal case. To do so, consider
the sentence ‘at t, there is a dinosaur’: ‘There is a dinosaur’ is true on the
B-theory, even if there are no dinosaurs located at t. So, when attached
to claims about what there is, irrespective of the location, in time, the
phrase ‘at t’ seems to be irrelevant on the B-theory too: ‘There is a
dinosaur’ is true on the B-theory, even at times at which dinosaurs are
not located.
In light of that, one can argue that there is a reading of Existential
Change that is false on the B-theory as there is a reading
of Permanentism, the view that ‘Everything always exists’, namely the
negation of Existential Change, which is true on the B-theory. To see
that, let’s reduce Permanentism to the view ‘Everything exists at every
time’,[11] and let’s disambiguate between two versions of
Permanentism in accordance with the disambiguation of the expression
‘x exists at t’:
P1: Everything is located at every time
P2: At every time, everything is something
P1 appears to be false:[12] it is false that dinosaurs are located at every
time, as they are not located at this time. However, ‘Everything is
something’ is (trivially) true at every time: it is true at this time that some
dinosaur exists, for example, even though there are no dinosaurs
located at this time. So, there is a reading of Permanentism, namely P2,
that is true on the B-theory.
However, when ‘x exists at t’ is read at ‘at t, x is something’, namely when
expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are read as making claims about
what there is, irrespective of the location, in time, P2 is equivalent to
Permanentism. In very much the same way, one can read Existential
Change as making a claim about what there is, irrespective of the
location, in time:
EC-3: for some times t and t1, at t, x is something and at t1 x is nothing
However, the B-theory is inconsistent with this reading of Existential
Change, since on the B-theory there is no change in what there is,
irrespective of the location, in time.
As we have seen, there is a sense in which Existential Change is true on
the B-theory, and so in this sense there is change on the B-theory;
however, there is also a reading of Existential Change that is
inconsistent with the B-theory, such that in this other sense, there is no
change on the B-theory. We can make a very similar claim with respect
to Qualitative Change plus Persistence, as I argue in the following
section.
4. Qualitative Change plus Persistence and the B-theory
As we needed to be clear about what is for something to sometimes
exist on the B-theory, in order to explore its connection with Existential
Change, we now have to be clear about what is for something to
sometimes bear some property on the B-theory, in order to explore the
connection between the B-theory and Qualitative Change plus
Persistence (from now on, simply QCP).[13]
Think again of the above quotation from Sider (2011, 241). Sider
remarks that B-theorists can describe things over time by “predicating
features of them relative to times (italic mine)”, such that for something
to sometimes bear some property is for it to bear some property at
some time. Therefore, B-theorists think of expressions of the form
‘sometimes, x is F’ as reducing to ‘x bears F at some time t’. However,
different B-theorists understand expressions of the form ‘x bears F at
some time t’ in different ways. In this section, I explore different B-
theoretical interpretations of such expression, and I explore their
connection with QCP.
To begin with, consider what Lewis says in the following quotation:
“Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at
various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists
by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though
no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas
it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time.”
(Lewis 1986, 202)
Accordingly, Perdurance is the view on which things persist by perduring
and Endurance is the view that things persist by enduring. More
recently, philosophers have introduced a further notion of persistence
called Exdurance (Hawley 2001; Sider 1996), on which things persist
by exduring, namely by having different temporal counterparts at
different times. Depending on whether one endorses Perdurance,
Endurance or Exdurance (plus the B-theory) one delivers a different
interpretation of ‘x bears F at t’. My plan in what follows is to discuss
each option in order.
4.1 B-theoretic Perdurance
Perdurance as defended, for example, by Heller (1984), Lewis (1986)
and Quine (1950) is the view that things persist by having different
temporal parts at different times. Think of Lisa again. Lisa persists by
having different temporal parts at different times. Then, on Perdurance,
for Lisa to change from being standing to being seated, is for Lisa to
have a temporal part that is standing and a later temporal part that is
seated.
For the sake of a better understanding of Perdurance, we must get a
better grip on what temporal parts are. Temporal parts are usefully
characterized by analogy with spatial parts: as things have spatial parts,
such as Lisa has a spatial part, such as her arm, and another spatial
part, such as her leg, Lisa also has temporal parts, such as one that is
standing and another that is seated.
Both spatial and temporal parts can be understood as spatially and
temporally extended: as Lisa’s arm is extended through space, Lisa’s
temporal part that is standing can be taken to be temporally extended
too. However, as Lewis (and many others) defines the notion of
temporal parts, temporal parts exist at times, and since times are
instantaneous objects, temporal parts are naturally understood as
instantaneous too: thus, x is an instantaneous temporal part of y if and
only if (Sider 2001, 59) x is part of y, x overlaps, or shares, any part of y,
and x exists only at a single time. In what follows, for the sake of
simplicity, when I speak of ‘temporal parts’ I mean ‘instantaneous
temporal parts’.
Thus, perdurantists naturally read expressions of the form ‘x bears F
at t’ as equivalent to ‘one of x’s temporal parts is F and is located at t’.
Accordingly, there is a reading of QCP that is true on the B-theory,
namely:
QCP-1: for some times t and t1, there is some x, y and z such that y, one
of x’s temporal parts, is F and is located at t, and z, another of x’s
temporal parts, is not-F and is located at t1
So, perdurantists accept the truth of QCP by treating possession of
properties as possession of properties relative to times; and then, by
analysing possession of properties relative to times as possession of
properties by temporal parts. In this sense, there is change on B-theory,
as there is change given Perdurance.
However, there is also a reading of QCP that is ultimately inconsistent
with Perdurance. Let me expand on that. On this alternative reading, it
is Lisa the thing that is seated simpliciter and it is Lisa who changes with
respect to that property. On the contrary, defenders of B-theoretic
Perdurance think that it is not Lisa, but one of her temporal parts – call
it T-Lisa – which is seated simpliciter. However, as an instantaneous
object, T-Lisa does not persist, and therefore does not change with
respect to her being seated, as there is no other time at which it is
located and bears the property of being standing. So, T-Lisa does not
change with respect to the property of being seated: T-Lisa is always
seated.
The result is that B-theoretic Perdurantists reduce QCP to the eternal
possession (simpliciter) of properties by temporal parts. Moreover, on
the assumption that there is a sense in which B-theorists accept
Permanentism––the view that everything always exists––B-theorists
accept that in some sense it is true that temporal parts always exist. So,
B-theoretic Perdurantists reduce QCP to the eternal possession of
properties by eternally existent temporal parts. But one can read QCP
as being about Lisa’s changing with respect to her properties while
persisting through time, while the B-theoretic Perdurantist’s explanation
of such a phenomenon bottoms out in permanent facts about the
eternal properties of (eternal) temporal parts. B-theoretic Perdurance is
thus inconsistent with this reading of QCP.
In the next section I show how a similar argument applies to B-theoretic
Exdurance too.
4.2 B-theoretic Exdurance
Distinct from Perdurance, Exdurance as defended by, for instance,
Hawley (2001) and Sider (1996), among others, is the view that ordinary
things are not temporally extended things, but instantaneous temporal
parts, or stages, and for something to persist is for it to have different
temporal counterparts at different times. Think of Lisa: Lisa persists by
having different temporal counterparts at different times. Then, on
Exdurance, for Lisa to change from being standing to being seated, is
for Lisa, an instantaneous stage, to be seated, and to have a temporal
counterpart that is standing.
One of the main novelties of Exdurance is the introduction of the notion
of temporal counterparts: to get a better sense about what a temporal
counterpart is, an analogy with the modal case is instructive. David
Lewis’ notion of modal counterpart (Lewis 1968) is probably the best
place for that: the point here is to get a sense of how, for example, Lisa
modally persists. For Lisa to modally persist is for Lisa to have various
modal counterparts at various worlds, where for something to be a
modal counterpart of Lisa is to resemble Lisa in all her relevant
features (Lewis 1968, 114; Sider 2001, 111–2). For example, ‘Lisa is
seated but might be standing’ is true because Lisa modally persists by
having a modal counterpart at some world, which resembles Lisa in all
her relevant features, and it is standing. The same applies to the
temporal case. For Lisa to persist is for Lisa to have different temporal
counterparts at various times, which resemble Lisa in all her relevant
features. Then, ‘Lisa is seated but was standing’ is true because the Lisa
that is seated has a temporal counterpart at some time, which
resembles Lisa in all her relevant features, and it is standing.
Thus, Exdurantists naturally read expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ as
‘x is F and is located at t’, by treating the variable ‘x’ as taking in only
instantaneous stages. In other words, according to Exdurantists, the
name ‘Lisa’ does not refer to an object that exists at different times, but
to an instantaneous stage. Accordingly, there is a reading of QCP that is
true on the B-theory, namely:
QCP-2: for some times t and t1, there is some x such that x is F and is
located at t, and there is some y, one of x’s temporal counterparts, such
that y is not-F and is located at t1
So, exdurantists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as
possession of properties relative to times; and then, by analysing
possession of properties relative to times as possession of properties
by instantaneous stages. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory,
as there is change given Exdurance.
Still, there is an alternative reading of QCP that is ultimately inconsistent
with Exdurance. On this reading of QCP, it is Lisa who is seated, and it
is that thing that persists through time: distinct from defenders of
Perdurance, defenders of Exdurance accept that. However, on this
reading of QCP, ‘Lisa’ refers to a temporally extended object and not to
an instantaneous thing, as it does according to Exdurance. In light of
that, there is a sense in which things do not persist given Exdurance,
and that’s the sense in which things persist given this reading of QCP:
Lisa exists, but did exist and will exist too. As an instantaneous thing,
however, Lisa does not persist in this sense on Exdurance:
instantaneous things are, by definition, things that do not exist at
multiple times, and in this sense, it is false that Lisa did exist and will
exist too given Exdurance.
So, in that sense, Lisa does not persist on Exdurance; but if Lisa does
not persist in this sense, Lisa does not change too, as there is no other
time at which it exists and is, for example, standing. If she does not
change and persist in this sense, namely the sense in which things
change and persist given this reading of QCP do, Exdurance is
inconsistent with this reading of QCP. Thus, there is no change on the B-
theory, as there is no change on Exdurance.
There are further elements that make one worry about the consistency
of QCP, on this reading, and Exdurance. First, while given this reading of
QCP, the Lisa that exists and is seated is one and the same with the Lisa
that did exist and was standing, given Exdurance, the Lisa that exists
and is seated is not one and the same with her earlier temporal
counterpart that is standing. As a matter of fact, given Exdurance, the
two are not identical, but resemble each other with respect to their
relevant features. Such resemblance-relation, however,
is deliberately context sensitive, as it is the notion of “relevant features”.
As a matter of fact, we may deliberately refer to one set of features S in
one context according to which the Lisa that is seated and the Lisa that
is standing resemble each other, and to another set of features S* in
another context according to which the two do not resemble each
other.
As a consequence, there is no fixed set of relevant features according to
which temporal counterparts resemble each other: such set varies from
situation to situation and the choice of such set is entirely arbitrary.
However, on Exdurance things persist by being related via a relation of
resemblance in relevant features; so, Persistence becomes a
deliberately context sensitive phenomenon as well. On the contrary,
given the reading of QCP under consideration, Persistence is not
deliberately context sensitive: it is one and the same thing, namely Lisa,
that changes and persists over time.
Moreover, given Exdurance, we have a series of instantaneous stages
that persist by resembling each other with respect to some relevant
features. In other words, we have a series of instantaneous stages lined
up in time, related to one another by a relation of resemblance in all the
relevant features. In such a series, we have the Lisa that is seated and
the Lisa that is standing. But who is the persisting Lisa? This Lisa, namely
the Lisa that is seated, or that Lisa, the Lisa that is standing? The choice
is entirely arbitrary.[14] On the contrary, given the reading of QCP under
consideration, there is no choice to be made: there’s only one Lisa,
and that’s the persisting thing, and that’s the Lisa that is seated.
Exdurance is thus inconsistent with this reading of QCP, and in this
sense there is no change on Exdurance, and then on the B-theory. Let’s
now move to the final view I wish to discuss, namely B-theoretic
Endurance.
4.3 B-theoretic Endurance
Endurance, as defined by Lewis, is the view that things persist by being
wholly present at different times. Defining Endurance in these terms
raises several difficulties.[15] It is not my aim here to try to fix some of
such difficulties. What I plan to do, instead, is to look at a couple of ways
in which self-described endurantists characterize the view and expand
on their connection with QCP.
4.3.1 B-theoretic Relationalism
Let’s begin with the view I call Relationalism as defended by Mellor
(1998) and Mozersky (2015), among others, according to which
expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ are interpreted as ‘x is F-at-t’, namely
the view on which things have different time-indexed properties. Time-
indexed properties are properties such as being-a-kid-at-t or being-red-
at-t1 and so on. Think of Lisa: for Lisa to change from being standing to
being seated, given Relationalism, is for Lisa to be standing-at-t1 and to
be seated-at-t.
Granted the relationalist’s reading of expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’,
there is a reading of QCP that is true on the B-theory, namely:
QCP-3: for two times t and t1, there is some x such that x is F-at-t and
not-F-at-t1
So, Relationalists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as
possession of properties relative to times; and then, by treating
properties as time-indexed properties, where the index corresponds to
time relative to which the relevant property is said to be possessed in
the first place.[16] In this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as
there is change on Relationalism.
While there is a reading of QCP that is true given Relationalism, there is
a further reading of QCP that is inconsistent with Relationalism: on this
reading, Lisa changes with respect to her being seated, and being
seated is a temporary property. I claim that what are temporary
properties given this reading of QCP become eternal properties given
Relationalism. To see that, consider the property of being seated: given
QCP, being seated is a temporary property, where a temporary property
is a property that is sometimes but not always possessed. As a matter
of fact, Lisa is seated, but not always seated. In other words, Lisa does
not bear any indexed property such as the property of being-seated-at-
t, as she is simply seated, and not always so.
On the contrary, B-theoretic Relationalists think that for Lisa to be such
that she was standing and is seated reduces to her bearing the
properties of being-standing-at-t1 and being-seated-at-t, where t1 is
earlier than t. The problem is then that Lisa never changes with respect
to being-seated-at-t and being-standing-at-t1. Consider being-seated-at-
t: being-seated-at-t is an eternal property, where for a property to be
eternal given the B-theory is for it to be such that if something bears it,
it always bears it.[17] As a matter of fact, it is true at every time that Lisa
bears the property of being-seated-at-t. If so, however, Lisa never
changes with respect to this property: Lisa is always seated-at-t.
Given the reading of QCP under consideration, however, Lisa changes
with respect to the property of being seated, which is a temporary,
rather than eternal, property, that is a property that Lisa has, but not
always. Even if B-theoretic Relationalists attempt to explain this reading
of QCP, they do so by reducing temporary properties onto eternal ones,
such as time-indexed properties. Since, on this reading QCP, properties
such as being seated are temporary, rather than eternal, B-theoretic
Relationalism is ultimately inconsistent with it.
Before concluding this section, I wish to consider a slightly different
version of Relationalism as defended, for example, by van Inwagen
(1990):[18] on this view, expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ are
interpreted as ‘x is-F-at t’, namely the view on which things bear
different relations with different times. Think of Lisa again: for Lisa to
change from being standing to being seated, given this version of
Relationalism, is for Lisa to be-standing-at t1 and to be-seated-at t.
I am persuaded to think that this version of Relationalism is inconsistent
with the reading of QCP under consideration too. As a matter of fact,
very much as time-indexed properties, relations to times always hold:
Lisa always bears the relation of being-standing-at with t1 and the
relation of being-seated-at with t. On this reading of QCP, being seated,
for example, is a temporary property, that becomes a permanent
relation that Lisa bears with some time given this version of
Relationalism. Therefore, also this version of Relationalism is
inconsistent with this reading of QCP.
4.3.2 B-theoretic Adverbialism
Adverbialism, the view defended by Haslanger (1989), Johnston and
Forbes (1987) and Miller and Braddon-Mitchell (2007), among others, is
the view according to which expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ reduce to
‘x is-at-t F’, where the instantiation-relation between properties and
their bearers is time-indexed. Then, for Lisa to change from being
standing to being seated is for Lisa to be-at-t1 standing and to be-at-
t seated.
Granted the adverbialist’s understanding of expressions of the form ‘x is
F at t’, there is a reading of QCP that is true one the B-theory:
QCP-4: for some times t and t1, there is some x such that x is-at-t F
and x is-not-at-t1 F
So, Adverbialists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as
possession of properties relative to times; and then, by treating the
instantiation-relation as time-indexed, where the index corresponds to
time relative to which the relevant property is said to be possessed in
the first place. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there is
change on Adverbialism.[19]
I think that there is an argument like the one I raised against B-theoretic
Relationalism to show that there is a reading of QCP that is inconsistent
with B-theoretic Adverbialism: on this reading of QCP, Lisa changes with
respect to her being seated, as she is temporarily seated.[20] What I
believe to be problematic is that there is a reading of QCP on
which temporary ways of bearing properties are transformed into eternal
ways given B-theoretic Adverbialism. If we say that for something to
bear a property temporarily is for it to be such that it bears some
property but not always, then on this reading of QCP, Lisa, for instance,
temporarily bears the property of being seated, as she is seated but not
always so. In other words, Lisa does not bear-at-t some property, but
she simply bears the property of being seated. However, very much as
time-indexed properties are always had, the time-indexed instantiation-
relation always holds, since if something bears-at-t some property F, it
always bears-at-t F. As a matter of fact, bearing-at-t is an eternal way of
bearing properties: things do not change with respect to their bearing
certain properties if they bear-at-times properties. Given our example,
for Lisa to be-at-t seated is for Lisa to always be-at-t seated, as it is the
case at every time that Lisa is-at-t seated: Lisa does not change with
respect to her being-at-t seated.
On the contrary, on the reading of QCP under consideration, Lisa
changes with respect to her being seated, as Lisa temporarily bears the
property of being seated. Even if B-theoretic Adverbialists attempt to
explain this reading of QCP, they do so by reducing the temporary
instantiation of properties to an eternal one, such as the time-indexed
instantiation of properties. Since on this reading of QCP, the
instantiation of properties is temporary, rather than eternal, B-theoretic
Adverbialism is ultimately inconsistent with it.
This concludes the discussion of how the B-theory connects with QCP.
In the following, and last, section, I plan to say more about Propositional
Change and the B-theory of time.
5. Propositional Change and the B-theory
In Section 1 of this paper, I argued that one can derive Propositional
Change from either Existential Change or Qualitative Change plus
Persistence: since Lisa exists, but not always, the proposition that Lisa
exists is true, but not always; analogously, since Lisa is seated, but not
always, the proposition that Lisa is seated is true, but not always.
From this, one can infer that since there is a reading of Existential
Change and Qualitative Change plus Persistence that is inconsistent
with the B-theory, there is a reading of Propositional Change that is
inconsistent with the B-theory. Let’s expand on that.
To begin with, let’s consider B-theoretical views on which expressions of
the form ‘sometimes, p is true’ are interpreted as ‘p is true at t’, namely
on which propositions have truth-value relative to times. Here are two
versions of the B-theoretic proposal: on one conception, analogous to
the modal case where propositions are properties of worlds,
propositions are considered as properties of instants (Lewis 1979); on
another conception, propositions are functions from instants to truth
values (Sider 2001, 20–1). On both views, Propositional Change is true
because the following is true:
PC-1: for some times t and t1, there is some p such that p is true at t,
but p is not true at t1
More precisely, on the view that propositions are properties of instants,
to say that the proposition that Lisa exists is true relative to a certain
time t is just to say that t possesses the property of being a time at
which Lisa exists. Hence, on this view, to say that a certain proposition
changes in truth value over time is just to say that the property F of
times identified with that proposition is possessed by some but not all
times.
On the view on which propositions are functions from times to truth
values, the truth of that Lisa exists depends on the instant of time we
plug into the function. Hence, to say that propositions change in truth
value is to say that the function f identified with a proposition
delivers truth for some but not all times as inputs. In both views,
Propositional Change turns out to be true, and therefore there is
change in this sense on the B-theory.
In doing so, both views preserve the truth of Propositional Change by
interpreting what is for something to be sometimes true in terms of
truth-relative to times. Doing that, however, make them inconsistent
with an alternative reading of Propositional Change: on this reading of
Propositional Change, propositions are not true relative to times, very
much as one can read Existential Change as the view on which things do
not exist relative to times, and one can read Qualitative Change plus
Persistence as the view on which things do not have properties relative
to times. On this reading, propositions have truth values simpliciter.
So, on this reading of Propositional Change, some proposition, such
as that Lisa exists, is true simpliciter, but not always. On this reading of
Propositional Change, propositions do not change with respect to truth
value if they always have the truth value they have. In fact, on this
reading of Propositional Change, propositions that are true relative to
times, are always true if true: if it is true at t that Lisa is seated, it is
always true at t that Lisa is seated, as it is true at every time that it is
true at t that Lisa is seated. Thus, on this reading of Propositional
Change, propositions that are true relative to times always have the
truth value they have. Thus, treating truth as relative to times lead to a
reduction of Propositional Change, such as PC1, which is ultimately
inconsistent with the reading of Propositional Change under
consideration.
Conclusion
The result of this paper is that, granted different understandings of
what it is for things to change, we end up having different responses to
the question as to whether there is change on the B-theory. By
considering three instances of change, such as Existential Change,
Qualitative Change plus Persistence and Propositional Change, I argued
that we can read those theses such that they are all true on the B-
theory. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory. However, I
claimed there are alternative readings of each of them that are false on
the B-theory: so, in this other sense, there is no change on the B-theory.