Oppca 1
Oppca 1
Oppca 1
Suppose that arguments are identified with—or, at any rate, characterized by—sets of
identified as the conclusion of the argument; and the remaining c’∈C, c’≠c, are the
There are various ways in which the conclusion of a cosmological argument might be—
For instance, it might be—or it might be intended to be—that it is necessarily that case
uncontroversially a truth of logic that, if Δ then c. And so on. Speaking roughly, in these
kinds of cases, we might say that the argument is a deductive cosmological argument.
if Δ then c. Or it might be—or be intended to be—that the best explanation of why Δ—or
of why Δ’, for some Δ’⊆ Δ—is that c. And so on. Speaking roughly, in these kinds of
given cosmological argument), and the nature of Δ (the set of premises of that given
cosmological argument).
Christian doctrine, e.g. the claim that there is an immaterial, omnipotent, omniscient,
wholly good creator (ex nihilo) and sustainer of all things who is three persons in one
substance, with one of these three persons being numerically identical to a human being
who died to atone for human sins; who exercises providential control over free human
beings; who will bring about the bodily resurrection of all to eternal life; who allows
some lives to lead to eternal bliss and other lives to lead to eternal torment; and who is
the ultimate author of authoritative (and perhaps inerrant) scripture, viz. the Christian
Bible.
arguments for the conclusion that some proper part of the role that they take to be
occupied by the Christian God is actually occupied. Exactly how these sub-roles are to be
characterized is a matter of controversy, but it seems to me to be right to say that they all
3
arise from particular interpretations of the claim that the Christian God is the sole creator
where both ‘THE WORLD’ and ‘⇒’ are items in need of further explanation. In typical
cosmological arguments, what Christian philosophers then aim to show is that there is a *
such that
* ⇒ THE WORLD
where ‘THE WORLD’ and ‘⇒’ are given that particular further explanation.
Given that this is an accurate characterization of the way in which typical cosmological
arguments proceed, it is clear that there are several different points at which the
conclusions of arguments of this kind might be attacked. In particular, on the one hand, it
is possible for opponents to claim that, while there is a * that occupies the role in
question, that * is not the Christian God. And, on the other hand, it is possible for
opponents to claim that there is no occupant of the role in question. Of course, it is also
4
possible for opponents to adopt a mixed strategy, i.e. to claim that, on some
interpretations of ‘⇒’ and ‘THE WORLD’, there is no occupant of the role while, on
other interpretations of ‘⇒’ and ‘THE WORLD’, there is an occupant of the role but that
Given that we are talking about arguments for a conclusion of the form ‘there is a * such
that * ⇒ THE WORLD’, there are numerous ways in which these arguments are
susceptible to criticism. In some cases, the relationship that is alleged to hold between the
premises and the conclusion will be contested. In some cases, the premises will be
like. In some cases, both of these criticisms will be made together. (Some philosophers
may think that there is another class of criticisms that I have overlooked: criticisms that
hold that certain arguments are circular, or question-begging, or the like. I take it that
these kinds of criticisms may be subsumed under criticisms of the premises: given that a
claim is plainly controversial, any circular or question-begging argument with that claim
as conclusion will also have premises that are plainly controversial, and hence unsuited to
the persuasive task that I take to be the principle aim of cosmological arguments. 1 )
One way to approach the task of criticizing cosmological arguments is to examine them
one by one, scrutinizing the premises and inferential steps in each argument. If one
adopts this approach, one will find that there are many defective cosmological arguments
5
out there. Moreover, in my opinion, one will also find that, to date, there is no persuasive
cosmological argument that has been produced. 2 (That is, there is no cosmological
argument which is such that it ought to persuade reasonable people like me who are not
already persuaded of the conclusion that there is a * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD, that
this claim is indeed true, on some appropriate interpretation of ‘⇒’ and ‘THE WORLD’.)
But, even if I am right in claiming that no persuasive cosmological arguments have yet
been produced, it is clear that the truth of this claim does not in any way foreclose on the
formulation. In particular, it seems, those of us who deny that there is a * such that * ⇒
THE WORLD—on any suitable interpretation of ‘⇒’ and ‘THE WORLD’—are required
philosophers that there is no God of the kind in which they believe. Indeed, I see no
reason to suppose that such arguments will ever be within the reach of non-Christians.
Christians how things look from their point of view, in such a way that reasonable
Christians can see how it is possible for reasonable people to see things that way, even
though, of course, they suppose that those who see things that way hold false beliefs in
consequence of seeing things that way. (And vice versa: it should be possible for
6
reasonable Christians to explain to reasonable non-Christians how things look from their
point of view, in such a way that reasonable non-Christians can see how it is possible for
reasonable people to see things that way, even though, of course, they suppose that those
who see things that way hold false beliefs in consequence of seeing things that way. But
So, what I propose to do in this paper, is to set out my reasons for thinking that there is no
* such that that * ⇒ THE WORLD, on any interpretation of ‘⇒’ and ‘THE WORLD’
that would set this claim at odds with anti-supernaturalism. As just indicated, my aim is
that have been presented so far are representative of the cosmological arguments that
there are; and I’m also taking for granted that all cosmological arguments that have been
I shall divide the argumentative strategies that I consider into three classes, which I shall
call TOTALITY, CHAIN, and FIRST. I shall try to say more about the nature of these
First, arguments that belong to TOTALITY aim to show that there is a certain totality—
the conjunction of all contingently obtaining states of affairs, the aggregate of all
contingently existing objects, the aggregate of all contingently occurring events, or the
explanation, or the like. Of course, in the notation introduced above, the totality in
Second, arguments that belong to CHAIN aim to show that, if one starts with
uncontroversial instances of pairs that stand in appropriate relations—of cause and effect,
or explainer and that which is explained, or sufficient reason and that which is provided
with sufficient reason, or the like—and then traces back the ancestry of pairs that stand in
that relation, one will eventually come to a pair in which God is—or is crucially
implicated in—the first member of the pair, i.e. the cause, or the explainer, or the
sufficient reason, or the like, of the second member of the pair. (Moreover, of course,
these arguments will also aim to show—or will take for granted—that there is no pair in
which God is—or is crucially implicated in—the second member of that pair; i.e., there is
Third, arguments that belong to FIRST aim to show that, if one considers the temporal
organization of THE WORLD, then one finds that there is an initial PART (or STAGE,
8
recently propounded by Robert Koons 4 , and by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss 5 ; the
class of paradigmatic instances of CHAIN includes at least the first three of Aquinas’ five
ways; the class of paradigmatic instances of FIRST includes numerous versions of the
There are some arguments that have been called ‘cosmological arguments’ that do not fit
neatly into this system of classification. However, it seems to me that these arguments are
much less worthy of consideration than the familiar, standard arguments that do clearly
fit neatly into this scheme. Consequently, I shall have nothing more to say about these
other so-called ‘cosmological arguments’ here. (One possible example, I think, is the
family of cosmological arguments that have been defended by Barry Miller in a steady
1. TOTALITY
It is uncontroversial that it is part of orthodox Christian doctrine to claim that God is the
maker of heaven and earth. The intuition that guides the construction of arguments that
9
belong to TOTALITY is that it is possible to show that it must be the case that—or that it
is highly probable that it is the case that, or that it is most reasonable to believe that—
there is a maker of heaven and earth. (There is a * such that * MAKES HEAVEN AND
EARTH.)
what we mean by HEAVEN AND EARTH. There are at least four potential candidates
here.
objects, or things. (An alternative possibility is that one might mean the set, or class, of
particular individuals, objects, or things. But I do not think that there are any advantages
terms of mereology.) This formulation is rough because there are some particular
AND EARTH (at least for the purposes of the present exercise). However, it does not
Second, we might mean (roughly) the maximal actual state of affairs, i.e. the global way
that things are. This formulation is rough because we need to ‘subtract’ the way that God
is from the global way that things are in order to arrive at a characterization of the way
10
that heaven and earth are. Moreover—as we shall soon see—it is no easy matter to see
how to repair the initial formulation in a way that effects the needed ‘subtraction’.
Third, we might mean (roughly) everything that happens, i.e. the sum total of history, or
the maximal actual event. Again, this formulation is rough because we need to ‘subtract’
God-events from the global total of events in order to arrive at a characterization of the
total heaven-and-earth event; and, again, it is no easy matter to see how to repair the
Fourth, we might mean (roughly) everything that is true, i.e. the maximal actual truth, or
the maximal actual fact. Once again, this formulation is rough because we need to
‘subtract’ God-facts from the maximal actual fact in order to arrive at a characterization
of the total heaven-and-earth fact. But the formulation is also rough because we need to
‘subtract’ necessary facts as well. (Perhaps there is a similar need to ‘subtract’ necessary
states of affairs in the previous case as well. Whether there is such a need depends upon
the theory of states of affairs that one adopts.) There are even more formidable
complexities here than there are in the case of the maximal actual state of affairs and the
THE WORLD’. There are several potential candidates here. For example, we might think
that HEAVEN AND EARTH requires a cause; or we might think that HEAVEN AND
EARTH requires a sufficient reason; or we might think that HEAVEN AND EARTH
requires an explanation; and so forth. (Strictly, the formulations here are required to vary
depending upon which interpretation of HEAVEN AND EARTH is adopted. So, for
example, we might think that the existence of a particular mereological aggregate requires
explanation; or that the coming into existence of that particular mereological aggregate
the coming to obtain of that particular near maximal actual state of affairs requires a
particular near-maximal event requires an explanation; or that the coming to occur of that
explanation or a sufficient reason, or the like. Perhaps we shan’t need to fuss too much
Let U be the maximal mereological aggregate that is HEAVEN AND EARTH (on the
such that * ⇒ U, on one of the above described interpretations of ‘⇒’; but it is not the
case that there is an entity $ such that $ ⇒ *+U, where, of course, *+U is the
constructed in these terms, then we need a compelling reason for thinking that there is a *
such that *⇒U, even though there is no $ such that $ ⇒ *+U. What could this
The first point to note is that, on each view—i.e. the Christian view according to which
there is a * such that * ⇒ U, and the anti-supernaturalist view according to which there is
no such *—there is a mereological aggregate A for which it is true that there is no # such
that #⇒A. So it isn’t true that the Christian view should be favoured because it avoids the
The second point to note is that there is no evident, neutral reason for supposing that one
of U and *+U is a better candidate for being the maximal mereological aggregate A for
which there is no # such that #⇒A. Of course, that’s not to say that there aren’t putative
reasons that might be suggested. For instance, it might be said that, while U is an entity
that only exists contingently, * is an entity that exists necessarily (and, of course,
13
the necessary that could be set aside by adverting to considerations of some kind). But the
difficulty with this suggestion is that, even if we suppose that * exists necessarily, we
need to examine our ⇒ in order to decide whether there is a genuine advantage here.
There are two doxastic possibilities. On the one hand, it might be necessary that * ⇒ U.
But, in that case, since * exists necessarily, it will surely follow that U exists necessarily
(contradicting the assumption that U exists only contingently, which was the reason
advanced for supposing that there is genuine advantage in postulating *). On the other
hand, it might be contingent that * ⇒ U. But, in that case, what is the clear advantage in
postulating the existence of a (necessarily existent) * such that *⇒ U, given that there
remains unexplained contingency in the relationship between * and U? Why not settle
instead for unexplained contingency in the existence of U? (There is more to say here; I
Suppose that N is the near-maximal actual event that is required by the interpretation in
terms of events. Then, according to Christian doctrine, there is a * such that *⇒N, for
some suitable interpretation of ‘⇒’; but there is no $ such that $ ⇒ (*’s ⇒–ing N),
This is trouble. Recall that the aim of the cosmological arguer is (roughly) to show that
there must be a * such that *⇒N. But, if there must be a * such that *⇒N, how can we
avoid the conclusion that there must be a $ such that $ ⇒ (*’s ⇒–ing N)?
We might try arguing that *’s ⇒–ing N is necessary; but, as we have already seen, that
avenue of argument leads to a dead end. We might try arguing that *’s ⇒–ing N requires
no $ such that $ ⇒ (*’s ⇒–ing N) on the grounds that *’s ⇒–ing N is self-explanatory,
or the like. But that route too is closed: there is nothing that is self-explanatory in the
for example, I say that the instructions are ‘self-explanatory’, what I mean is that you
won’t need to refer to anything other then the instructions in order to figure out what to
do. But I take for granted a whole range of competencies which it is perfectly possible
that cognitive agents might lack; and I can happily acknowledge that agents who lacked
those competencies would need to refer to more than the instructions in order to figure
Perhaps one might try arguing that * marks the appropriate initial point for ⇒ because it
is the intentions and reasons of * that are the engine of ⇒, and intentions and reasons are
15
not the kinds of things for which there can be an ⇒. This claim seems to me to be
evidently false. It is true that, in the ordinary business of giving explanations, we often
treat intentions and reasons as suitable ‘stopping points’ for explanation. (‘Why did x do
A? Because x had beliefs {B} and desires {D}.’) But this is not because it is the case that,
or because we think it is the case that, intentions and reasons are not the kinds of things
for which there can be an ⇒. Rather, it’s because we know that we typically lack both
theory and information needed in order to identify appropriate ⇒ ’s. Compare with the
way that we typically think about coin tosses. In everyday life, we treat coin tosses as
effectively indeterministic events; but that’s not because we think that coin tosses really
are indeterministic events (except, perhaps, insofar as coin tosses are subject to quantum
concerning, for example, the distribution of intentions and reasons across human groups
throughout history—that supports the claim that intentions and reasons are the kinds of
things for which there are ⇒ ’s. At the very least, I think that it is clear that there is no
evident, neutral reason for thinking that * marks the appropriate initial point for ⇒
because it is the intentions and reasons of * that are the engine of ⇒: the required claim
about intentions and reasons is at least as controversial as the claim that there is a * such
that *⇒N.
Suppose that N is the near-maximal actual state of affairs that is required by the
* such that *⇒N, for some suitable interpretation of ‘⇒’; but there is no $ such that $ ⇒
As in the case of the near maximal actual event, we now have serious trouble. The
cosmological arguer wishes to insist that a certain near-maximal actual state of affairs
requires an ⇒, while an even more nearly maximal actual state of affairs need not have
an ⇒, even though there is no evident, neutral reason for this differential treatment. (The
more nearly maximal actual state of affairs is the ‘conjunction’ of N with * ⇒’s N. I
assume here that this ‘conjunction’ lacks an ⇒ if one of its ‘conjuncts’ lacks an ⇒.)
As in the case of the near maximal actual event, we can perhaps think of the disagreement
here in ‘economic’ terms. On the one hand, the anti-supernaturalist supposes that N is the
maximal actual state of affairs, and that it has no ⇒. On the other hand, the Christian
supposes that N is a near-maximal state of affairs, for which there is a * such that * ⇒’s
N. On the Christian view, there is no ⇒ for the * such that * ⇒’s N (or, at any rate, there
is no ⇒ for the intentions and reasons that are possessed by this *). From the anti-
supernaturalist standpoint, the Christian proposal is not progress: there is a cost in terms
17
states of affairs that lack ⇒’s (since those events that lacked ⇒’s on the initial scheme
are now matched with reasons and intentions that lack ⇒’s on the Christian scheme).
since the ontological payment does buy a reduction of commitment to states of affairs
that lack ⇒’s: for, from this standpoint, reasons and intentions are not the kinds of things
Suppose that N is the near-maximal actual fact/truth that is required by the interpretation
in terms of facts/truths. Then, according to Christian doctrine, there is a * such that *⇒N,
for some suitable interpretation of ‘⇒’, but there is no $ such that $ ⇒ that (*⇒N),
It is clear enough that the same kinds of difficulties that arose in the case of the
interpretation in terms of events and the interpretation in terms of states of affairs also
arise in this case. However, as I noted earlier, there is another kind of difficulty that also
Given the kinds of interpretations that are appropriate for ‘⇒’ when we are talking about
truths, it is a live question whether ‘⇒’ must at least involve entailment. Certainly, if ‘⇒’
is interpreted in terms of ‘sufficient reason’, then it seems quite clear that ‘⇒’ must at
least involve entailment. But even if ‘⇒’ is interpreted merely in terms of ‘explanation’,
it is plausible that the explanation that is required will involve entailment. (Of course, it is
not appropriate to interpret ‘⇒’ in terms of ‘cause’, when we are talking about truths.)
If ‘⇒’ does involve entailment, and if entailment is given a classical interpretation, then
it cannot be that * is taken to obtain necessarily while N only obtains contingently. Either
case it is hard to see what kind of theoretical advantage could be obtained by the
classical interpretation; but, at the very least, that suggestion surely requires weighty
independent support.
In the preceding discussion, I have focused on the difficulty that is raised for TOTALITY
cosmological arguments by the creative reasons and intentions of the postulated creator.
19
the TOTALITY in question—is arguably brought into question by the standing of these
reasons and intentions with respect to the relevant ⇒. Given that the claim that these
reasons and intentions either do not or need not have an ⇒ is no less controversial than
the claim that there is a * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD, we find here compelling reason
for thinking that TOTALITY cosmological arguments are unlikely to achieve their
Of course, it should not be thought that there are no other difficulties that could be raised
be raised about indeterminism, and about libertarian free actions. Note that these further
concerns press directly on those versions of TOTALITY that advert to events, or states of
affairs, or facts or truths; if they press on versions of TOTALITY that advert to objects,
If there is indeterminism in some part of THE WORLD, and if there is no * such that *
⇒ the indeterministic part of THE WORLD, then it surely follows that there is no * such
that * ⇒ THE WORLD. Since there is strong reason to suppose that there is
indeterminism in our world, there is strong reason to suppose that there is no * such that *
very hard to believe that there is evident, neutral reason to believe that the world is
deterministic.
Similarly, if there are libertarian free actions in some part of THE WORLD, then—at
least in the eyes of many philosophers—it follows that there is no * such that * ⇒ that
part of THE WORLD. Whence it follows that, if there are libertarian free actions, then
there is no * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD. Of course, it doesn’t follow from these
considerations that there is no * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD; rather, what follows is
that, if there is a * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD, then there are no libertarian free actions.
arguments. On the one hand, those proponents of these arguments who are strongly
wedded to the idea that we have libertarian freedom have to fold their cards. On the other
hand, those proponents of these arguments who are prepared to give up the idea that we
have libertarian freedom have various battles to fight without falling back on that familiar
trump: no free-will defense against logical arguments from moral evil; no free-will
theodicy to match against evidential arguments from evil; and so forth. (It is, I think, not
very controversial to claim that it is much harder to find arguments for the claim that, if
there is a * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD, then that * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD is a
plausibly, the ultimate aim of the Christian TOTALITY arguer will be hindered by the
Of course, some philosophers have denied the claim that if there are libertarian free
actions in some part of THE WORLD, then it follows that there is no * such that * ⇒ that
(See, for example, O’Connor (2003).) On this view, there can be a full explanation of
why an agent made a particular choice C rather than any other choice C’ that it was open
to that agent to make in the circumstances of the choice, even though the choice C was
not determined by the global state of the world at any point prior to the time of the
choice. Against this, I’m inclined to say that what we have here is partial explanation—
albeit all of the explanation that there is to be had—of the choice in question. And,
certainly, that is what everyone is inclined to say in all other non-deterministic cases.
(Suppose that the decay of an atom is non-deterministic. Then, while there is a partial
explanation of the decay of the atom—the atom had a certain objective chance of
decaying when it did—it is also true that there is no explanation of why the atom decayed
at the particular time that it did, rather than at any other time at which it might have
decayed. 8 ) However, for present purposes, I don’t need to insist that one could not
reasonably accept the agent causation account. Rather, it suffices to point out that this
agent causation account is no less controversial than the claim that there is a * such that *
22
⇒ THE WORLD. At the very least, it is not a secure foundation upon which to rest a
2. CHAIN
The intuition that guides the construction of arguments that belong to CHAIN is perhaps
slightly less obviously central to orthodox Christian doctrine than is the intuition that
Arguments that belong to CHAIN start with an observation about elements of THE
WORLD—e.g. that there are elements a and b in THE WORLD such that a ⇒ b. The
central intuition is that, where there are such elements a and b, they will belong to an ⇒-
CHAIN for which there is a * such that * is the first element of that ⇒-CHAIN. More
exactly, the intuitive picture is that there is a * such that, for any elements a and b such
that a ⇒ b, there is an ⇒-CHAIN in which * is the first element, and which has a and b
as members.
As in the case of TOTALITY, there are interpretative choices that need to be made in
order to arrive at a particular member of CHAIN. There is a choice to be made about the
elements of THE WORLD: are we talking about objects, or events, or states of affairs, or
23
facts, or what? And there is a choice to be made about ⇒: are we talking about causation,
There are difficulties in getting arguments that belong to CHAIN to turn out to be valid.
If we allow ourselves assumptions about the absence (or impossibility) of circles and
regresses, we can get the result that any given ⇒-CHAIN has a first element, i.e. an
element that is the first member of at least one ⇒-relation, but is not itself the second
element in any ⇒-relations. (Even if we don’t allow ourselves assumptions about the
absence (or impossibility) of regresses, we can still get the result that any given element
has an ancestral first element, provided that we insist that regressive ⇒-CHAINS must
themselves be elements in ⇒-relations, and provided that we can help ourselves to the
axiom of choice. 10 ) But the aim of the argument is not merely to establish that, for any
elements a and b such that a⇒b, there is a * such that * is the first element in an ⇒-
CHAIN that includes a⇒b; rather, the aim of the argument is to show that there is a *
such that, for any elements a and b such that a⇒b, * is the first element in an ⇒-CHAIN
Among the evident difficulties that arise for arguments that belong to CHAIN, there are
different first members that lack ⇒’s. If there is indeterminism in THE WORLD, it may
be that not all ⇒-CHAINS that commence with contemporary elements begin with
members that lack ⇒’s; but, if we help ourselves to standard Big Bang Cosmology, in
which the initial stages of our universe are confined entirely to the quantum realm, then it
is not clear that it is even ruled out that all ⇒-CHAINS that commence with
contemporary elements begin with members that lack ⇒’s, where these members are
simply elements of the quantum domain. (More about these kinds of considerations in a
moment.)
Unless we are eliminativists about either folk psychology or causation, we shall suppose
that there are ⇒-CHAINS that contain contemporary elements, and that have the like of
the intentions and reasons of human agents ‘upstream’ from those contemporary
elements. If we suppose that intentions and reasons do not have ⇒’s, then we cannot get
the conclusion that there is a * such that, for any elements a and b such that a⇒b, * is the
first element in an ⇒-CHAIN that includes a⇒b. On the other hand, if we suppose that
intentions and reasons do have ⇒’s, at least in the case of human agents, then we surely
do not have evident, neutral reason for supposing that the intentions and reasons of God
neither have nor require ⇒’s. Since it is plausible that there are contemporary elements
that lie on ⇒-CHAINS that do not contain the like of the intentions and reasons of human
25
agents ‘upstream’ from those contemporary elements, it should not be thought that the
belonging to CHAIN. For the cosmological arguer could restrict the argument to those
⇒-CHAINS that do not contain the like of the intentions and reasons of human agents.
Suppose, then, that we restrict our attention to those ⇒-CHAINS that do not contain the
like of the intentions and reasons of human agents as elements, and suppose that there is
no indeterminism in THE WORLD that has any consequences for these ⇒-CHAINS. At
least very roughly, in the context of cosmological theorizing, these suppositions amount
to supposing that there is a standard general relativistic Big Bang model that accurately
represents the nature of THE WORLD. If we suppose that the initial singularity is a point
that belongs to the spatiotemporal manifold, then we shall suppose that all of the relevant
⇒-CHAINS lead back to that singularity. On the other hand, it we suppose that the initial
singularity is a surface that belongs to the spatiotemporal manifold, then we shall suppose
that the relevant ⇒-CHAINS lead back to different initial elements. So, it seems, if we
make enough controversial assumptions, even the anti-supernaturalist can get out the
conclusion that there is a * such that, for any elements a and b such that a⇒b, * is the
first element in an ⇒-CHAIN that includes a⇒b. But, even with all of these controversial
assumptions, we don’t get to the conclusion that the CHAIN cosmological arguer seeks;
26
for, of course, even if there were such an initial cosmological singularity, it would not be
A little reflection suggests that the prospects for finding a persuasive cosmological
argument that belongs to CHAIN are very dim. The anti-supernaturalist supposes that
there are none but naturalistic ⇒’s. Hence, the anti-supernaturalist supposes that either
there are ⇒-CHAINS that regress—as they do, for example, in standard general
relativistic Big Bang models in which the initial singularity is supposed not to be part of
the spatiotemporal manifold—or else that ⇒-CHAINS have naturalistic first elements
that lack ⇒’s—as they do, for example, in standard Big Bang models in which the initial
(naturalistic) assumption that there are no ⇒’s that involve elements that do not
thinking that there are ⇒’s where anti-supernaturalists deny that there are ⇒’s. To help
fix ideas, let’s go back again to the pretence that THE WORLD is accurately
characterized by a standard general relativistic Big Bang model in which a global time
function can be defined. In this case, we can think of THE WORLD as consisting of a
sum of global time slices with ⇒’s ‘governing’ the evolution of these time slices. While
27
the anti-supernaturalist will insist that these ⇒’s all conform to naturalistic scruples, there
have been many Christians who have thought that among these ⇒’s are such things as
CHAIN, I have not been trying to argue that Christian’s cannot reasonably believe that
there are such ⇒’s; rather, my target is the much more modest objective of securing
agreement that there are no evident, neutral reasons for believing that there are such ⇒’s.
If there are no such evident, neutral reasons, then, I think, there is no prospect for finding
There is perhaps one final point worth making in connection with arguments that belong
to CHAIN before we turn our attention to the final class of arguments that I wish to
examine. It is sometimes the case that defenders of arguments that belong to CHAIN
choose to mix their ⇒’s. So, for example, when the prospect of indeterminism is raised in
connection with arguments that are initially couched in terms of efficient causation, some
cosmological arguers then fall back on the observation that, even if certain kinds of
quantum events lack efficient causes, they nonetheless have material causes. While this
might look like progress, it should then be borne in mind that all of the intentions,
reasons, decisions, and so forth that we meet with in our everyday experience have
material causes. Hence, by the lights of the anti-supernaturalist, this move does not
increase the persuasiveness of the CHAIN argument that is being presented: nowhere in
our everyday experience do we meet with intentions, reasons, decisions, and so forth that
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do not have material causes. Perhaps we might go so far as to say that it is a ‘defeasible
rule’ that all intentions, reasons, decisions, and the like have material causes; even if we
don’t go this far, we should, at the very least, note that substance dualism is no less
It is also perhaps worth thinking a little more about the way in which considerations
about the nature of freedom impact on TOTALITY and CHAIN. I argued above that, if
there is a * such that * ⇒ THE WORLD, on the TOTALITY interpretation, then there is
no libertarian freedom; and I argued that, if there is libertarian freedom, then it is not the
case that there is a * such that, for any elements a and b such that a⇒b, * is the first
element in an ⇒-CHAIN that includes a⇒b (or, in other words: if there is a * such that,
for any elements a and b such that a⇒b, * is the first element in an ⇒-CHAIN that
seems to me that there is some ‘wiggle room’ in the case of CHAIN: the CHAIN
cosmological arguer can simply set aside all of the ⇒-CHAINS that originate in the
libertarian free choices of natural agents, and argue the case in connection with this
Is there a similar strategy that is available to the TOTALITY cosmological arguer? Can
we proceed by ignoring those parts of TOTALITY that involve the libertarian free
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choices of natural agents, and arguing in terms of what remains? It would seem so.
argument that can quite properly be said to belong to FIRST (since the intuitive idea is
simply to consider THE WORLD as it was before there were any agents with libertarian
freedom, and to make the TOTALITY cosmological argument in connection with that
stage of THE WORLD). Perhaps this is not the right way to think about these matters;
consequences.
3. FIRST
The intuition that guides the construction of arguments that belong to FIRST is that, in
the beginning, the Christian God made heaven and earth. More exactly, what these
arguments seek to show is that there is a * such that * ⇒ INITIAL HEAVEN AND
I think that the most natural way to interpret the conclusion of arguments that belong to
FIRST is something like this: There is a time t=0 that marks the beginning of HEAVEN
AND EARTH. Moreover, there is a * such that * ⇒ HEAVEN AND EARTH at t=0.
Given this interpretation, there are two different questions that can be raised. First, is it
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true that there is a time t=0 at which HEAVEN AND EARTH begins. Second, given that
there is a time t=0 at which HEAVEN AND EARTH begins, is it true that there is a *
If THE WORLD were accurately described by a standard general relativistic Big Bang
model, then there is an important sense in which it would not be true that there is a time
t=0 at which HEAVEN AND EARTH begins. For, as I noted earlier, in standard general
relativistic Big Bang models, the time t=0 is a boundary ‘time’ that is not attached to the
AND EARTH exists at t=0. Rather, what is true is that HEAVEN AND EARTH exists at
all times t’>0. Of course, in these models, it is also true that HEAVEN AND EARTH
exists at all times; part of what follows from saying that t=0 is a boundary time is that
standard general relativistic Big Bang model: a full model of the early universe needs to
detailed model of the early universe. So it remains an open question whether our best
theory will ultimately tell us that there is a time t=0 at which HEAVEN AND EARTH
began. (A further complication here is that, if we are treating standard general relativistic
Big Bang models with full ontological seriousness, then—as John Earman has
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argued 11 —it is a live question whether we should think that trajectories can be extended
‘through’ the initial singularity. Even if this were not so, surely it would be a live
question whether, in better theories than those that we currently have, it is possible for
there to be trajectories that extend ‘through’ initial singularities. At the very least,
speculations about these kinds of ‘possibilities’ abound in the recent literature, as in, for
Suppose, nonetheless, that it is the case that there is a time t=0 at which HEAVEN AND
EARTH began (and that the domain of contingency coincides with the spatiotemporal
manifold S that lies on our side of that initial singular point). Are reasonable anti-
cosmological arguments, that there is a * such that * ⇒ HEAVEN AND EARTH at t=0?
I don’t think so. Let Si = HEAVEN AND EARTH at t=0. Then, on the one hand,
proponents of arguments from FIRST are Christians who suppose that there is a * such
that * ⇒ Si even though there is no $ such that $⇒*. And, on the other hand, anti-
supernaturalists suppose that there is no * such that * ⇒ Si. Structurally, at least, we are
back to the same kind of position that we examined in the case of near-maximal
mereological aggregates: both camps suppose that there is something that lacks an ⇒, but
reasons of that supernatural agent that lack ⇒’s, and so that the intentions and reasons of
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that supernatural agent can provide an ⇒ for Si. As I have already argued, it is very hard
to believe that there is evident, neutral reason for thinking that the postulation of a
supernatural agent in this case is theoretical progress. (Perhaps it is worth noting here that
the theoretical costs involved may run further than the postulation of the supernatural
agent. Does it need a domain to inhabit? Must this domain have some kind of ‘time’ or
‘spacetime’ associated with it? If so, how should we suppose that this ‘time’ or
‘spacetime’ relates to our spacetime? And so forth. But the key critical point can be made
question whether there is a time t=0 at which HEAVEN AND EARTH began. Current
scientific cosmological theorizing has not reached a stable consensus about the very
earliest history of our universe; consequently, there is no evident, neutral reason for
deciding one way or the other on this question. (Moreover, I think that current scientific
cosmological theorizing has not reached a stable consensus on the question whether our
universe exhausts HEAVEN AND EARTH, so that there is no evident, neutral reason for
deciding one way or the other on that question either.) However, even if it turns out that
there is a time t=0 at which HEAVEN AND EARTH began, it seems pretty clear that
there is no evident, neutral reason for supposing that there is a * such that * ⇒ HEAVEN
that * ⇒ HEAVEN AND EARTH at t=0 is not justified by the theoretical returns that can
CONCLUDING REMARKS
supernaturalist will disagree about a great many things. While they will certainly disagree
on the question of the existence of God, it is also highly likely that they will reasonably
disagree on such matters as the nature of free action, the ontology of mind, the
relationships that hold between reasons and causes, the metaphysics of quantum-vacuum
At any rate, we can certainly suppose that there is a set (or class) of propositions P ={pi}
that are reasonably believed by the Christian, but that are reasonably not believed by the
anti-supernaturalist; and that there is a set (or class) of propositions Q={qj} that are
reasonably believed by the anti-supernaturalist, but that are reasonably not believed by
the Christian.
Let G be the proposition that God exists. Then, as I have just claimed, it seems to me that
we can reasonably suppose that the set of propositions {G, pi} is such that it can be
reasonably believed by the Christian; and it seems to me that we can reasonably suppose
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that the set of propositions {not-G, qj} is such that it can be reasonably believed by the
there are sets of propositions P’⊆P for which P’⇒G, where A⇒B just in case A entails
B, or A provides strong probabilistic support for B, or the like; and it seems to me that we
can reasonably suppose that there are sets of propositions Q’⊆Q for which Q’⇒not-G,
under the same interpretation of A⇒B. Finally, it seems to me that we can reasonably
suppose that there are sets of propositions {P’, Q’, not-G} and sets of propositions {P”,
Q”, G}, where P’, P”⊆P and Q’, Q”⊆Q, which are logically inconsistent, or
If this is how things are, then we should not make the mistake of thinking that arguments
P’, Q’ ⇒ G and/or P”, Q” ⇒ not-G are successful arguments for the Christian and/or the
better cosmological arguments—either for the conclusion that God exists or for the
conclusion that God does not exist—than cosmological arguments of the P’, Q’ ⇒ G
form. Consequently, if I am right, it is not plausible to suppose that there are successful
cosmological arguments.
References
Earman, John. (1995) Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Gale, Richard. and Pruss, Alexander. (1999) “A New Cosmological Argument” Religious
Gale, Richard. and Pruss, Alexander. (2003) “A Response to Oppy, and Davey and
Koons, Robert. (2001) “Defeasible Reasoning, Special Pleading and the Cosmological
Nowacki, Mark. (2006) The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books
O’Connor, Timothy. (2003) “Agent Causation” in G. Watson (ed.) (2003) Free Will,
University Press
Oppy, Graham. (2006b) Arguing about Gods Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Endnotes
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1
For further discussion of this point, and for more general discussion of my views about
rationality, justification and argumentation, see Oppy (2006b), Chapters One and Eight.
2
I argue for this claim at length in Oppy (2006b), Chapter One.
3
See, in particular, Oppy (2006b), Chapter One.
4
Koons (1997)(2001)
5
Gale and Pruss (1999)(2003)
6
See, for example, Craig (1979) and Nowacki (2006).
7
See, for example, Miller (1992).
8
While there is more to argue here, it does seem to me that it is worth noting that this just
is true, then there are things that have no explanation, we say. I reckon that there is no
deterministic agent causation claim that their view accords better with certain pre-
even this; but they will certainly insist that there are theoretical costs involved in the
11
Earman (1995), cited in Oppy (2006a), Chapter Four.