EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No.

1 | 2021
UDC: 115:161.2
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.1.7

IS THERE CHANGE ON THE B-THEORY OF TIME?

Luca Banfi1
1
University College Dublin

Review article – Received: 02/06/2020 Accepted: 01/07/2021

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection

between change and the B-theory of time, sometimes also called
the Scientific view of time, according to which reality is a four-
dimensional spacetime manifold, where past, present and future
things equally exist, and the present time and non-present times are
metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a novel response to
the much-vexed question of whether there is change on the B-theory
or not. In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of
time. But this far from being innocent label: if the B-theory of time
presents a model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no
change on the B-theory. From this, one can reasonably think as
follows: of course, there is change, so the B-theory must be false.
What I plan to do in this paper is to argue that in some sense there is
change on the B-theory, but in some other sense, there is no change
on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of
change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with
respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that
things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional
Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with
respect to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading
of these three instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so
there is change on the B-theory in this sense, there is a B-theoretical
reading of each of them that is not true on the B-theory, and therefore
there is no change on the B-theory in this other sense.

Keywords: Change; B-theory of time; existence; properties; propositions

© 2021 Luca Banfi

Correspondence: [email protected] (B1)5
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 1 | 2021 Review article 1

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between change and
the B-theory of time, sometimes also called the Scientific view of time,
according to which reality is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold,
where past, present and future things equally exist, and the present time
and non-present times are metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a
novel response to the much-vexed question of whether there is change on
the B-theory or not.1

In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of time. But this
far from being an innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents a model
of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the B-theory.
From this, one can reasonably think as follow: of course there is change,
so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper is to argue
that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in some other sense,
there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of
change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with
respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that
things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional
Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with respect
to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading of these three
instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so there is change on
the B-theory in this sense, there is a reading of each of them that is not true
on the B-theory, and therefore there is no change on the B-theory in this
other sense.

1. Three Instances of Change

Bubbles, chemical reactions, flowers, butterflies, human beings (and so on)

exist, but do not exist forever. More generally, many things change with
respect to existence. Hence, the following counts as an instance of change:

EXISTENTIAL CHANGE: things change with respect to

existence over time.2

1 For a classic discussion see McTaggart (1927), Prior (1968) and Williams (1951); for a
contemporary discussion see Sider (2011, Ch. 11) and Williamson (2013, ch. 8).
2 Existential Change may take different forms. Some believe it to be true, since they believe

that things both begin and cease to exist, such as Lowe (2003, 2006, 2009), Prior (1968),
and Zimmerman (2008); others, think of it to be true because things begin to exist, but then
do not cease to do so (Correia and Rosenkranz 2018).
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

It is important to be clear about the meaning of ‘exist’ in Existential

Change: ‘exist’ means here the same as ‘being’ or ‘being something’ or
‘being identical to something’ in the most unrestricted sense. What I am
assuming here is the standard meaning of existence assumed by most
contemporary metaphysicians. 3 So, for a cat to exist is for it to be
something, for a car to exist is for it to be something, and so on. Nothing
more or less.

For the sake of convenience, it is useful to introduce a more formal way of

expressing Existential Change, and the following instances of change. To
do so, let’s appeal to the language of free tense logic,4 the language that
implements the language of free logic with the so-called tense operators
such as the past tense operator ‘It was the case that’ or ‘It is the case at
some past time that’ (symbolised as ‘P’) and the future tense operator ‘It
will be the case that’ or ‘It is the case at some future time that’ (symbolised
as ‘F’). From these, one can further define the operator ‘It is sometimes the
case that’ or ‘It is the case at some time’ (symbolised as ‘S’, where ‘S𝜑’ is
defined as ‘5P𝜑 ∨ 𝜑 ∨ F𝜑’), and the operator ‘It is always the case that’ or
‘It is the case at all times’ (symbolised as ‘A’, where ‘A𝜑’ is defined as
‘P𝜑 ∧ 𝜑 ∧ F𝜑’).

3 See van Inwagen (2009) for a detailed discussion of the view.

4 I say free tense logic instead of quantificational tense logic, since the latter arguably
entails the falsity of Existential Change (see, for instance, Bacon (2013) and Williamson
(2013)). I will not rehearse all the details of the argument here, but a brief discussion may
help. Given quantificational tense logic, every instance of ‘∃x a = x’ is proved to be true
(where ‘a’ stands for any singular term in that language, ‘∃x a = x’ says that there is
something identical to a). Given the temporal analogue of the rule of necessitation, one can
infer from the true  that it is always the case that , such that one can infer ‘A(∃x a = x)’
(which says that it is always the case that there is something identical to a) from ‘∃x a = x’.
Now, by the rule of generalization, that allows one to infer from the true  the true ∀x,
one can infer ‘∀y A(∃x y = x)’ (which says that everything always exists) from ‘A(∃x a =
x)’. So, given quantificational tense logic, one can prove that everything always exists, thus
contradicting Existential Change.
If one adopts a free tense logic, one can deny that every instance of ‘∃x a = x’ is proved to
be true in the first place. In fact, given a free tense logic, one can reject the axiom of
universal instantiation of quantificational tense logic, namely ‘∀xx → a’, from which
‘∃x a = x’ is inferred, and accept the weaker axiom of free universal instantiation, such as
‘∀y(∀xx → y)’ (which says that for every way everything in the domain is, there is
something we can name in the domain that is in that way). Therefore, those who accept a
free tense logic have the logical resources to accept that some instances of ‘∃xa = x’ are
false, when ‘a’ fails to denote a member of the domain of quantification, and also to resist
the above argument for the inconsistency between quantificational tense logic and
Existential Change.
5 In fact, there the list of tense operators I present is not exhaustive, as there are further tense

operators such as ‘It has always been the case that’ (symbolised as ‘H’) and ‘It is always
going to be the case that’ (symbolised as ‘G’). One can also make use of the so-called metric
tense operators, operators of the form ‘It was the case n units of time ago’.

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So, one can regiment Existential Change as:

EXISTENTIAL CHANGE: Sometimes, something is not

always something. (Formally: ‘S(∃x ¬A(∃y y = x))’)

There is not just change in what exists over time, however. Tim was a kid,
and he is an adult, Lisa is seated, even though she was standing, and Barack
Obama was the US President, but he is not anymore. Therefore, a further
instance of change is the following:

QUALITATIVE CHANGE: things change with respect

to how they are over time.6

If we understand the predicates ‘is adult’, ‘is seated’ and ‘is the US
President’ as expressing properties or qualities, Qualitative Change
amounts to the view that things change with respect to properties or
qualities over time: Tim does not always bear the property of being an
adult, Lisa does not always bear the property of being seated, and Barack
Obama does not always bear the property of being the US President.

Qualitative Change is naturally linked with the view that things persist
through time. Take Lisa: it is not just that Lisa, for example, changes as
she is seated, but she was standing, but also that Lisa exists and she is
seated, and existed and she was standing; analogously, Lisa will exist and
will be standing too.

More specifically, for Lisa to change with respect to her properties, she
must remain in existence through time. That’s the dynamic phenomenon
philosophers call persistence:

PERSISTENCE: things persist through time.

For Lisa to change with respect to her properties is not for Lisa to begin to
exist when she gains the property of being seated, and for her to cease to
exist when she loses the property of being seated and gains the property of
being standing. As a matter of fact, Lisa exists both when she is seated and
when she was and will be standing. It is one and the same thing that both
changes and persists through time: it is one and the same Lisa that is seated
and exists, and did exist and was standing.

6Those who believe in Qualitative Change include, for example, Hinchliff (1996) and Prior
(1968, 78–9).
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

So, Qualitative Change and Persistence count as a single instance of

change (or so I claim): call this instance of change Qualitative Change plus
Persistence. One can express Qualitative Change plus Persistence more
formally as follows, where F stands for some property:

QUALITATIVE CHANGE PLUS PERSISTENCE:

Sometimes, some x bears some F but x does not always
bear F. (Formally: ‘S(∃x∃F (Fx ⋀ ￢AFx))’)

The last instance of change that I wish to consider is change in what is the
case, or what is true, over time. One can derive such instance of change
from either Existential Change or Qualitative Change. Consider Lisa: since
Lisa exists, it the case that Lisa exists. Moreover, since Lisa is seated, it is
the case that Lisa is seated. But Lisa does not always exist and is not always
seated. Therefore, it is not always the case that Lisa exists or that Lisa is
seated. By taking talks about “being the case” as equivalent to “being true”,
where the primary bearers of truth and falsehood are propositions, then one
can say that the propositions that Lisa exists and that Lisa is seated are
true, but not always so. As a matter of fact, they change with respect to
truth value. Here is the third instance of change:

PROPOSITIONAL CHANGE: things (i.e., propositions)

change with respect to truth value over time.7

Very much as with Existential Change and Qualitative Change plus

Persistence, one can express Propositional Change in more formal
terms as follows, where ‘p’ stands for a propositional variable:

PROPOSITIONAL CHANGE: Sometimes, there is some

true proposition that is not always true. (Formally: ‘S(∃p
(p ⋀ ￢A(p))’

This concludes the presentation of three entirely plausible instances

of change.

In this paper, my purpose is to argue that the B-theory of time, which

I will introduce in more detail in the following section (Section 2), is
consistent with certain readings of such instances of change; thus, in
this sense, there is change on the B-theory. Nevertheless, I argue that
there is a reading of each of them that is false on the B-theory, and
therefore that in this other sense, there is no change on the B-theory.

7The view is extensively defended in Borgaard (2012) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009)
among others.

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The plan for the remaining part of the paper is as follows. In Section
2, I say more about how to understand the B-theory; in Section 3 I
discuss the connection between Existential Change and the B-theory;
in Section 4, I discuss the connection between Qualitative Change
plus Persistence and the B-theory; in Section 5, I discuss the
connection between Propositional Change and the B-theory.

2. The B-theory of time

B-theorists, those who defend the B-theory of time,8 typically hold that
reality consists of a four-dimensional block universe, the spacetime of
relativistic physics 9 (in virtue of which it is sometimes also called the
Scientific view of time), where past, present and future things equally exist,
and the present time and non-present times are metaphysically the same.
On this view, for the present time to be present does not designate anything
of metaphysical significance, as ‘present’ is an indexical expression that
refers to the time of utterance of such expression.

Consider dinosaurs, for example. B-theorists hold that dinosaurs exist very
much as you and me; and the same goes for times: B-theorists think that
the time at which dinosaurs are located exists very much as this time, the
time at which we are located. In fact, B-theorists think of time as very
similar to space: very much as all places, and things located at such places,
equally exist, all times, and things located at such times, equally exist. To
this, B-theorists add that as for some place to be the place that is here does
not designate anything of metaphysical importance, for some time to be
the time that is present does not designate anything of metaphysical
importance: ‘here’ and ‘present’ are merely indexical expressions that
refer, respectively, to the place and time at which they are uttered.

A further B-theoretic commitment on which I want to focus is how B-

theorists usually interpret tenses and tense operators, as this will help to
introduce the B-theoretical readings of Existential Change, Qualitative
Change plus Persistence and Propositional Change. B-theorists think of
tense operators as being fully reducible; to describe how reality ultimately
looks like, B-theorists do not make use of any tense operator. This idea is
captured by what Sider says in following quotation:

8 Some supporters of the B-theory include Deng (2013), Dyke (2002), Leininger (2021),
Mozersky (2015) and Sider (2001; 2011) and Williams (1951).
9
As characterized by the pioneering research of Einstein (1952) and Minkowski (1952).
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

[B-theorists] do not admit tense operators into their

fundamental ideology, since they can describe temporal reality
without them—by quantifying over past and future entities and
predicating features of them relative to times. (Sider 2011, 241)

Now we have all the ingredients we need to proceed with the discussion.
Let’s begin by exploring the connection between Existential Change and
the B-theory.

3. Existential Change and the B-theory

Existential Change is the view that things change with respect to their
existence, and B-theorists might happily grant that Existential Change is
true on the B-theory. Consider the more formal version of Existential
Change, namely ‘Sometimes, something is not always something’. Now,
there is a reading of Existential Change that is true on the B-theory, and to
see that we must be clear about what it is for something to be such that it
is sometimes something, or that it sometimes exists. As stated in the
previous section, tense operators such as ‘Sometimes’ or, equivalently, ‘It
is sometime the case that’ are fully reducible on the B-theory.10 In fact,
according to B-theorists, tense operators are fully reducible to quantifiers
over past, present and future times, as Sider makes clear in the passage
quoted in the previous section: for something to be such that it sometimes
exists is for it to be such that there is a time at which it exists. In other
words, B-theorists reduce expressions of the form ‘sometimes, x exists’ to
expressions of the form ‘x exists at some time t’. Accordingly, Existential
Change reduces to the following:

EC-1: For some times t and t1, some x is such that x exists at t
but x does not exist at t1

And EC-1 is true on the B-theory. Consider dinosaurs, for example: it is

true that dinosaurs exist at some times but not at others.

However, contemporary research on the topic suggests that expressions of

the form ‘x exists at t’ are inherently ambiguous (Correia and Rosenkranz
2019; Deasy 2019; Markosian 2014): on one reading, they are equivalent
to expressions of the form ‘x is located at t’; whereas on another reading,

10Defenders of Existential Change like Prior (1968) or Crisp (2007) accept the partial (but
not full) reducibility of tense operators to quantifiers over times, where times are intended
as maximal, consistent, and sometimes-true propositions. However, since times are defined
as “sometimes true” propositions, tense operators do not fully reduce to quantifiers over
times.

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they are equivalent to expressions of the form ‘at t, x is something’. Thus,

on the first reading, ‘x exists at t’ is understood in locational terms, such
that to say that something exists at a time is to make a claim about where
things are located in time; on the second reading, ‘x exists at t’ is
understood in perspectival terms, such that to say that something exists at
a time t is to make a claim about what there is relative to (i.e. from the
perspective of) t.

If expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are equivalent to expressions of the

form ‘x is located at t’, then Existential Change is true on the B-theory,
since one can think of EC-1 as equivalent to the following:

EC-2: For some times t and t1, some x is such that x is located
at t but x is not located at t1

EC-2 is true on the B-theory.

However, one can read Existential Change as a thesis about what there is
in time, rather than about where things are located in time. On this reading,
Existential Change becomes a thesis about there being change in what there
is over time. And on this reading, Existential Change is false on the B-
theory. Or so I argue.

In order to develop this argument, I wish to consider the modal analogue

of the B-theory, namely Modal Realism, on which actual things exist just
as possible things do, and the actual world and non-actual worlds are
metaphysically the same, notably defended by Lewis (1986). Modal
Realists understand expressions of the form ‘x exists at world w’ very much
as B-theorists understand expressions of the form ‘x exists at time t’.
Accordingly, we can disambiguate between two readings of expressions of
the form ‘x exists at world w’, as either equivalent to ‘x is located at w’ or
‘at w, x is something’.

Now, consider the following quotation from Lewis (1986):

The phrase ‘at W’ which appears within the scope of the

quantifier, […] works mainly by restricting the domains of
quantifiers in its scope, in much the same way that the
restricting modifier ‘in Australia’ does. […] [However] I do
not suppose that they must restrict all quantifiers in their scope,
without exception. […] ‘At some small worlds, there is a
natural number too big to measure any class of individuals’ can
be true even if the large number that makes it true is no part of
the small world. (Lewis 1986, 6)
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

In the first half of the quotation, Lewis is referring to the first reading of ‘x
exists at world w’, where w, a world, is where some x is located. In the
second half of the quotation, Lewis speaks of the second reading of ‘x
exists at world w’, and says that sentences such as ‘At w, there is a natural
number too big to measure any class of individuals’ can be true, even if
such natural number is not located at w. In other words, irrespective of the
location of such natural number, it is true of it that it is something, or it
exists, given Modal Realism. So, Lewis is here suggesting that when
attached to claims about what there is, irrespective of the location, in the
modal space, the phrase ‘at w’ is irrelevant: that there is a natural number
too big to measure any class of individuals is true even at worlds at which
it is not located.

Let’s apply the understanding of expressions of the form ‘at t, x is

something’ proposed by Lewis to the temporal case. To do so, consider the
sentence ‘at t, there is a dinosaur’: ‘There is a dinosaur’ is true on the B-
theory, even if there are no dinosaurs located at t. So, when attached to
claims about what there is, irrespective of the location, in time, the phrase
‘at t’ seems to be irrelevant on the B-theory too: ‘There is a dinosaur’ is
true on the B-theory, even at times at which dinosaurs are not located.

In light of that, one can argue that there is a reading of Existential Change
that is false on the B-theory as there is a reading of Permanentism, the view
that ‘Everything always exists’, namely the negation of Existential
Change, which is true on the B-theory. To see that, let’s reduce
Permanentism to the view ‘Everything exists at every time’, 11 and let’s
disambiguate between two versions of Permanentism in accordance with
the disambiguation of the expression ‘x exists at t’:

P1: Everything is located at every time

P2: At every time, everything is something

P1 appears to be false:12 it is false that dinosaurs are located at every time,

as they are not located at this time. However, ‘Everything is something’ is
(trivially) true at every time: it is true at this time that some dinosaur exists,
for example, even though there are no dinosaurs located at this time. So,
there is a reading of Permanentism, namely P2, that is true on the B-theory.

11 Given the reducibility of tense operators proposed by B-theorists, for something to be

always something is for it to exist at every time.
12 Unless one accepts some less-standard view on which, for example, there are just

eternally existent atoms. On this view, P1 turns out to be true.

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However, when ‘x exists at t’ is read at ‘at t, x is something’, namely when

expressions of the form ‘x exists at t’ are read as making claims about what
there is, irrespective of the location, in time, P2 is equivalent to
Permanentism. In very much the same way, one can read Existential
Change as making a claim about what there is, irrespective of the location,
in time:

EC-3: for some times t and t1, at t, x is something and at

t1 x is nothing

However, the B-theory is inconsistent with this reading of Existential

Change, since on the B-theory there is no change in what there is,
irrespective of the location, in time.

As we have seen, there is a sense in which Existential Change is true on

the B-theory, and so in this sense there is change on the B-theory; however,
there is also a reading of Existential Change that is inconsistent with the
B-theory, such that in this other sense, there is no change on the B-theory.
We can make a very similar claim with respect to Qualitative Change plus
Persistence, as I argue in the following section.

4. Qualitative Change plus Persistence and the B-theory

As we needed to be clear about what is for something to sometimes exist

on the B-theory, in order to explore its connection with Existential Change,
we now have to be clear about what is for something to sometimes bear
some property on the B-theory, in order to explore the connection between
the B-theory and Qualitative Change plus Persistence (from now on,
simply QCP).13

Think again of the above quotation from Sider (2011, 241). Sider remarks
that B-theorists can describe things over time by “predicating features of
them relative to times (italic mine)”, such that for something to sometimes
bear some property is for it to bear some property at some time. Therefore,
B-theorists think of expressions of the form ‘sometimes, x is F’ as reducing
to ‘x bears F at some time t’. However, different B-theorists understand
expressions of the form ‘x bears F at some time t’ in different ways. In this
section, I explore different B-theoretical interpretations of such expression,
and I explore their connection with QCP.

13For a discussion of how the B-theory connects with what I call Qualitative Change plus
Persistence see Cameron (2015, 152-159) and Wasserman (2006).
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

To begin with, consider what Lewis says in the following quotation:

Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it

exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something
perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or
stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly
present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists
by being wholly present at more than one time. (Lewis 1986,
202)

Accordingly, Perdurance is the view on which things persist by perduring

and Endurance is the view that things persist by enduring. More recently,
philosophers have introduced a further notion of persistence called
Exdurance (Hawley 2001; Sider 1996), on which things persist by
exduring, namely by having different temporal counterparts at different
times. Depending on whether one endorses Perdurance, Endurance or
Exdurance (plus the B-theory) one delivers a different interpretation of ‘x
bears F at t’. My plan in what follows is to discuss each option in order.

4.1 B-theoretic Perdurance

Perdurance as defended, for example, by Heller (1984), Lewis (1986) and

Quine (1950) is the view that things persist by having different temporal
parts at different times. Think of Lisa again. Lisa persists by having
different temporal parts at different times. Then, on Perdurance, for Lisa
to change from being standing to being seated, is for Lisa to have a
temporal part that is standing and a later temporal part that is seated.

For the sake of a better understanding of Perdurance, we must get a better

grip on what temporal parts are. Temporal parts are usefully characterized
by analogy with spatial parts: as things have spatial parts, such as Lisa has
a spatial part, such as her arm, and another spatial part, such as her leg,
Lisa also has temporal parts, such as one that is standing and another that
is seated.

Both spatial and temporal parts can be understood as spatially and

temporally extended: as Lisa’s arm is extended through space, Lisa’s
temporal part that is standing can be taken to be temporally extended too.
However, as Lewis (and many others) defines the notion of temporal parts,
temporal parts exist at times, and since times are instantaneous objects,
temporal parts are naturally understood as instantaneous too: thus, x is an
instantaneous temporal part of y if and only if (Sider 2001, 59) x is part of
y, x overlaps, or shares, any part of y, and x exists only at a single time. In

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what follows, for the sake of simplicity, when I speak of ‘temporal parts’ I
mean ‘instantaneous temporal parts’.

Thus, perdurantists naturally read expressions of the form ‘x bears F at t’

as equivalent to ‘one of x’s temporal parts is F and is located at t’.
Accordingly, there is a reading of QCP that is true on the B-theory, namely:

QCP-1: for some times t and t1, there is some x, y and z such
that y, one of x’s temporal parts, is F and is located at t, and z,
another of x’s temporal parts, is not-F and is located at t1

So, perdurantists accept the truth of QCP by treating possession of

properties as possession of properties relative to times; and then, by
analysing possession of properties relative to times as possession of
properties by temporal parts. In this sense, there is change on B-theory, as
there is change given Perdurance.

However, there is also a reading of QCP that is ultimately inconsistent with

Perdurance. Let me expand on that. On this alternative reading, it is Lisa
the thing that is seated simpliciter and it is Lisa who changes with respect
to that property. On the contrary, defenders of B-theoretic Perdurance think
that it is not Lisa, but one of her temporal parts – call it T-Lisa – which is
seated simpliciter. However, as an instantaneous object, T-Lisa does not
persist, and therefore does not change with respect to her being seated, as
there is no other time at which it is located and bears the property of being
standing. So, T-Lisa does not change with respect to the property of being
seated: T-Lisa is always seated.

The result is that B-theoretic Perdurantists reduce QCP to the eternal

possession (simpliciter) of properties by temporal parts. Moreover, on the
assumption that there is a sense in which B-theorists accept Permanentism–
–the view that everything always exists––B-theorists accept that in some
sense it is true that temporal parts always exist. So, B-theoretic
Perdurantists reduce QCP to the eternal possession of properties by
eternally existent temporal parts. But one can read QCP as being about
Lisa’s changing with respect to her properties while persisting through
time, while the B-theoretic Perdurantist’s explanation of such a
phenomenon bottoms out in permanent facts about the eternal properties
of (eternal) temporal parts. B-theoretic Perdurance is thus inconsistent with
this reading of QCP.

In the next section I show how a similar argument applies to B-theoretic

Exdurance too.

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4.2 B-theoretic Exdurance

Distinct from Perdurance, Exdurance as defended by, for instance, Hawley

(2001) and Sider (1996), among others, is the view that ordinary things are
not temporally extended things, but instantaneous temporal parts, or
stages, and for something to persist is for it to have different temporal
counterparts at different times. Think of Lisa: Lisa persists by having
different temporal counterparts at different times. Then, on Exdurance, for
Lisa to change from being standing to being seated, is for Lisa, an
instantaneous stage, to be seated, and to have a temporal counterpart that
is standing.

One of the main novelties of Exdurance is the introduction of the notion of

temporal counterparts: to get a better sense about what a temporal
counterpart is, an analogy with the modal case is instructive. David Lewis’
notion of modal counterpart (Lewis 1968) is probably the best place for
that: the point here is to get a sense of how, for example, Lisa modally
persists. For Lisa to modally persist is for Lisa to have various modal
counterparts at various worlds, where for something to be a modal
counterpart of Lisa is to resemble Lisa in all her relevant features (Lewis
1968, 114; Sider 2001, 111–2). For example, ‘Lisa is seated but might be
standing’ is true because Lisa modally persists by having a modal
counterpart at some world, which resembles Lisa in all her relevant
features, and it is standing. The same applies to the temporal case. For Lisa
to persist is for Lisa to have different temporal counterparts at various
times, which resemble Lisa in all her relevant features. Then, ‘Lisa is
seated but was standing’ is true because the Lisa that is seated has a
temporal counterpart at some time, which resembles Lisa in all her relevant
features, and it is standing.

Thus, Exdurantists naturally read expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ as ‘x

is F and is located at t’, by treating the variable ‘x’ as taking in only
instantaneous stages. In other words, according to Exdurantists, the name
‘Lisa’ does not refer to an object that exists at different times, but to an
instantaneous stage. Accordingly, there is a reading of QCP that is true on
the B-theory, namely:

QCP-2: for some times t and t1, there is some x such that x is F
and is located at t, and there is some y, one of x’s temporal
counterparts, such that y is not-F and is located at t1

So, exdurantists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as

possession of properties relative to times; and then, by analysing
possession of properties relative to times as possession of properties by

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instantaneous stages. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there

is change given Exdurance.

Still, there is an alternative reading of QCP that is ultimately inconsistent

with Exdurance. On this reading of QCP, it is Lisa who is seated, and it is
that thing that persists through time: distinct from defenders of Perdurance,
defenders of Exdurance accept that. However, on this reading of QCP,
‘Lisa’ refers to a temporally extended object and not to an instantaneous
thing, as it does according to Exdurance. In light of that, there is a sense in
which things do not persist given Exdurance, and that’s the sense in which
things persist given this reading of QCP: Lisa exists, but did exist and will
exist too. As an instantaneous thing, however, Lisa does not persist in this
sense on Exdurance: instantaneous things are, by definition, things that do
not exist at multiple times, and in this sense, it is false that Lisa did exist
and will exist too given Exdurance.

So, in that sense, Lisa does not persist on Exdurance; but if Lisa does not
persist in this sense, Lisa does not change too, as there is no other time at
which it exists and is, for example, standing. If she does not change and
persist in this sense, namely the sense in which things change and persist
given this reading of QCP do, Exdurance is inconsistent with this reading
of QCP. Thus, there is no change on the B-theory, as there is no change on
Exdurance.

There are further elements that make one worry about the consistency of
QCP, on this reading, and Exdurance. First, while given this reading of
QCP, the Lisa that exists and is seated is one and the same with the Lisa
that did exist and was standing, given Exdurance, the Lisa that exists and
is seated is not one and the same with her earlier temporal counterpart that
is standing. As a matter of fact, given Exdurance, the two are not identical,
but resemble each other with respect to their relevant features. Such
resemblance-relation, however, is deliberately context sensitive, as it is the
notion of “relevant features”. As a matter of fact, we may deliberately refer
to one set of features S in one context according to which the Lisa that is
seated and the Lisa that is standing resemble each other, and to another set
of features S* in another context according to which the two do not
resemble each other.

As a consequence, there is no fixed set of relevant features according to

which temporal counterparts resemble each other: such set varies from
situation to situation and the choice of such set is entirely arbitrary.
However, on Exdurance things persist by being related via a relation of
resemblance in relevant features; so, Persistence becomes a deliberately
context sensitive phenomenon as well. On the contrary, given the reading
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

of QCP under consideration, Persistence is not deliberately context

sensitive: it is one and the same thing, namely Lisa, that changes and
persists over time.

Moreover, given Exdurance, we have a series of instantaneous stages that

persist by resembling each other with respect to some relevant features. In
other words, we have a series of instantaneous stages lined up in time,
related to one another by a relation of resemblance in all the relevant
features. In such a series, we have the Lisa that is seated and the Lisa that
is standing. But who is the persisting Lisa? This Lisa, namely the Lisa that
is seated, or that Lisa, the Lisa that is standing? The choice is entirely
arbitrary. 14 On the contrary, given the reading of QCP under
consideration, there is no choice to be made: there’s only one Lisa, and
that’s the persisting thing, and that’s the Lisa that is seated.

Exdurance is thus inconsistent with this reading of QCP, and in this sense
there is no change on Exdurance, and then on the B-theory. Let’s now
move to the final view I wish to discuss, namely B-theoretic Endurance.

4.3 B-theoretic Endurance

Endurance, as defined by Lewis, is the view that things persist by being

wholly present at different times. Defining Endurance in these terms raises
several difficulties. 15 It is not my aim here to try to fix some of such
difficulties. What I plan to do, instead, is to look at a couple of ways in
which self-described endurantists characterize the view and expand on
their connection with QCP.

4.3.1 B-theoretic Relationalism

Let’s begin with the view I call Relationalism as defended by Mellor

(1998) and Mozersky (2015), among others, according to which
expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ are interpreted as ‘x is F-at-t’, namely
the view on which things have different time-indexed properties. Time-
indexed properties are properties such as being-a-kid-at-t or being-red-at-
t1 and so on. Think of Lisa: for Lisa to change from being standing to being
seated, given Relationalism, is for Lisa to be standing-at-t1 and to be
seated-at-t.

14 Note that the question is not “who is the Lisa that is seated?”, as the Lisa that is seated is
plausibly taken to be the Lisa that exists at the time of utterance of the sentence ‘Lisa is
seated’.
15
See Sider (2001, 63–68) for a discussion of such problems.

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Granted the relationalist’s reading of expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’,

there is a reading of QCP that is true on the B-theory, namely:

QCP-3: for two times t and t1, there is some x such that x
is F-at-t and not-F-at-t1

So, Relationalists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as

possession of properties relative to times; and then, by treating properties
as time-indexed properties, where the index corresponds to time relative to
which the relevant property is said to be possessed in the first place.16 In
this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there is change on
Relationalism.

While there is a reading of QCP that is true given Relationalism, there is a

further reading of QCP that is inconsistent with Relationalism: on this
reading, Lisa changes with respect to her being seated, and being seated is
a temporary property. I claim that what are temporary properties given this
reading of QCP become eternal properties given Relationalism. To see
that, consider the property of being seated: given QCP, being seated is a
temporary property, where a temporary property is a property that is
sometimes but not always possessed. As a matter of fact, Lisa is seated,
but not always seated. In other words, Lisa does not bear any indexed
property such as the property of being-seated-at-t, as she is simply seated,
and not always so.

On the contrary, B-theoretic Relationalists think that for Lisa to be such

that she was standing and is seated reduces to her bearing the properties of
being-standing-at-t1 and being-seated-at-t, where t1 is earlier than t. The
problem is then that Lisa never changes with respect to being-seated-at-t
and being-standing-at-t1. Consider being-seated-at-t: being-seated-at-t is
an eternal property, where for a property to be eternal given the B-theory
is for it to be such that if something bears it, it always bears it.17 As a matter
of fact, it is true at every time that Lisa bears the property of being-seated-
at-t. If so, however, Lisa never changes with respect to this property: Lisa
is always seated-at-t.

Given the reading of QCP under consideration, however, Lisa changes

with respect to the property of being seated, which is a temporary, rather
than eternal, property, that is a property that Lisa has, but not always. Even

16 The view is notably criticized in Lewis (1986, 204), with the so called temporary
intrinsics objection.
17It is important to notice that unlike the B-theory, on the view on which there is change in

what exists, irrespective of the location, in time, a property that something always bears,
namely an eternal property, would be a property that something bears whenever it exists.
20
Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

if B-theoretic Relationalists attempt to explain this reading of QCP, they

do so by reducing temporary properties onto eternal ones, such as time-
indexed properties. Since, on this reading QCP, properties such as being
seated are temporary, rather than eternal, B-theoretic Relationalism is
ultimately inconsistent with it.

Before concluding this section, I wish to consider a slightly different

version of Relationalism as defended, for example, by van Inwagen
(1990):18 on this view, expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ are interpreted
as ‘x is-F-at t’, namely the view on which things bear different relations
with different times. Think of Lisa again: for Lisa to change from being
standing to being seated, given this version of Relationalism, is for Lisa to
be-standing-at t1 and to be-seated-at t.

I am persuaded to think that this version of Relationalism is inconsistent

with the reading of QCP under consideration too. As a matter of fact, very
much as time-indexed properties, relations to times always hold: Lisa
always bears the relation of being-standing-at with t1 and the relation of
being-seated-at with t. On this reading of QCP, being seated, for example,
is a temporary property, that becomes a permanent relation that Lisa bears
with some time given this version of Relationalism. Therefore, also this
version of Relationalism is inconsistent with this reading of QCP.

4.3.2 B-theoretic Adverbialism

Adverbialism, the view defended by Haslanger (1989), Johnston and

Forbes (1987) and Miller and Braddon-Mitchell (2007), among others, is
the view according to which expressions of the form ‘x is F at t’ reduce to
‘x is-at-t F’, where the instantiation-relation between properties and their
bearers is time-indexed. Then, for Lisa to change from being standing to
being seated is for Lisa to be-at-t1 standing and to be-at-t seated.

Granted the adverbialist’s understanding of expressions of the form ‘x is F

at t’, there is a reading of QCP that is true one the B-theory:

QCP-4: for some times t and t1, there is some x such that
x is-at-t F and x is-not-at-t1 F

So, Adverbialists accept QCP by treating possession of properties as

possession of properties relative to times; and then, by treating the
instantiation-relation as time-indexed, where the index corresponds to time

18Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pressing me to consider this version
of Relationalism too.

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relative to which the relevant property is said to be possessed in the first

place. In this sense, there is change on the B-theory, as there is change on
Adverbialism.19

I think that there is an argument like the one I raised against B-theoretic
Relationalism to show that there is a reading of QCP that is inconsistent
with B-theoretic Adverbialism: on this reading of QCP, Lisa changes with
respect to her being seated, as she is temporarily seated.20 What I believe
to be problematic is that there is a reading of QCP on which temporary
ways of bearing properties are transformed into eternal ways given B-
theoretic Adverbialism. If we say that for something to bear a property
temporarily is for it to be such that it bears some property but not always,
then on this reading of QCP, Lisa, for instance, temporarily bears the
property of being seated, as she is seated but not always so. In other words,
Lisa does not bear-at-t some property, but she simply bears the property of
being seated. However, very much as time-indexed properties are always
had, the time-indexed instantiation-relation always holds, since if
something bears-at-t some property F, it always bears-at-t F. As a matter
of fact, bearing-at-t is an eternal way of bearing properties: things do not
change with respect to their bearing certain properties if they bear-at-times
properties. Given our example, for Lisa to be-at-t seated is for Lisa to
always be-at-t seated, as it is the case at every time that Lisa is-at-t seated:
Lisa does not change with respect to her being-at-t seated.

On the contrary, on the reading of QCP under consideration, Lisa changes

with respect to her being seated, as Lisa temporarily bears the property of
being seated. Even if B-theoretic Adverbialists attempt to explain this
reading of QCP, they do so by reducing the temporary instantiation of
properties to an eternal one, such as the time-indexed instantiation of
properties. Since on this reading of QCP, the instantiation of properties is
temporary, rather than eternal, B-theoretic Adverbialism is ultimately
inconsistent with it.

This concludes the discussion of how the B-theory connects with QCP. In
the following, and last, section, I plan to say more about Propositional
Change and the B-theory of time.

19 For a famous objection against Adverbialism see Lewis (2002), according to whom
Adverbialism lands us in a version of Bradley’s regress.
20
For some objections to Adverbialism see Lewis (2002).
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Luca Banfi: Is there Change on the B-Theory of Time?

5. Propositional Change and the B-theory

In Section 1 of this paper, I argued that one can derive Propositional

Change from either Existential Change or Qualitative Change plus
Persistence: since Lisa exists, but not always, the proposition that Lisa
exists is true, but not always; analogously, since Lisa is seated, but not
always, the proposition that Lisa is seated is true, but not always.

From this, one can infer that since there is a reading of Existential Change
and Qualitative Change plus Persistence that is inconsistent with the B-
theory, there is a reading of Propositional Change that is inconsistent with
the B-theory. Let’s expand on that.

To begin with, let’s consider B-theoretical views on which expressions of

the form ‘sometimes, p is true’ are interpreted as ‘p is true at t’, namely on
which propositions have truth-value relative to times. Here are two
versions of the B-theoretic proposal: on one conception, analogous to the
modal case where propositions are properties of worlds, propositions are
considered as properties of instants (Lewis 1979); on another conception,
propositions are functions from instants to truth values (Sider 2001, 20–1).
On both views, Propositional Change is true because the following is true:

PC-1: for some times t and t1, there is some p such that p
is true at t, but p is not true at t1

More precisely, on the view that propositions are properties of instants, to

say that the proposition that Lisa exists is true relative to a certain time t is
just to say that t possesses the property of being a time at which Lisa exists.
Hence, on this view, to say that a certain proposition changes in truth value
over time is just to say that the property F of times identified with that
proposition is possessed by some but not all times.

On the view on which propositions are functions from times to truth values,
the truth of that Lisa exists depends on the instant of time we plug into the
function. Hence, to say that propositions change in truth value is to say that
the function f identified with a proposition delivers truth for some but not
all times as inputs. In both views, Propositional Change turns out to be true,
and therefore there is change in this sense on the B-theory.

In doing so, both views preserve the truth of Propositional Change by

interpreting what is for something to be sometimes true in terms of truth-
relative to times. Doing that, however, make them inconsistent with an
alternative reading of Propositional Change: on this reading of
Propositional Change, propositions are not true relative to times, very

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much as one can read Existential Change as the view on which things do
not exist relative to times, and one can read Qualitative Change plus
Persistence as the view on which things do not have properties relative to
times. On this reading, propositions have truth values simpliciter.

So, on this reading of Propositional Change, some proposition, such as that

Lisa exists, is true simpliciter, but not always. On this reading of
Propositional Change, propositions do not change with respect to truth
value if they always have the truth value they have. In fact, on this reading
of Propositional Change, propositions that are true relative to times, are
always true if true: if it is true at t that Lisa is seated, it is always true at t
that Lisa is seated, as it is true at every time that it is true at t that Lisa is
seated. Thus, on this reading of Propositional Change, propositions that are
true relative to times always have the truth value they have. Thus, treating
truth as relative to times lead to a reduction of Propositional Change, such
as PC1, which is ultimately inconsistent with the reading of Propositional
Change under consideration.

Conclusion

The result of this paper is that, granted different understandings of what it

is for things to change, we end up having different responses to the
question as to whether there is change on the B-theory. By considering
three instances of change, such as Existential Change, Qualitative Change
plus Persistence and Propositional Change, I argued that we can read those
theses such that they are all true on the B-theory. In this sense, there is
change on the B-theory. However, I claimed there are alternative readings
of each of them that are false on the B-theory: so, in this other sense, there
is no change on the B-theory.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Daniel Esmonde Deasy and Antoine Athanassiadis

for many helpful conversations and comments on the material of this paper.

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