The Changing Face of Parties and Party S

THE CHANGING FACE
OF PARTIES AND
PARTY SYSTEMS
A Study of Israel and India
Sunil K. Choudhary
The Changing Face of Parties and Party Systems
Sunil K. Choudhary
The Changing Face

of Parties and Party
Systems
A Study of Israel and India
Sunil K. Choudhary
Developing Countries Research Centre
University of Delhi
Delhi, India
ISBN 978-981-10-5174-6 ISBN 978-981-10-5175-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3
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Preface
The number 14 assumes significance in the literary, academic and

personal domains of India in general and by the author in particular. In
Hindu mythological scripture – the Ramayana - ‘14 years’ became related
to the exile of Lord Rama to follow the directions of his father, Lord
Dashratha, with unequivocal obedience. ‘Fourteen’ is the date when the
author of the book was born in New Delhi, the capital of India, in January
1968. The number 14 is also linked to the culmination of the author’s
struggle. After failing to be selected at thirteen colleges of the University of
Delhi, the author was finally selected as a regular faculty at Shyam Lal
College Evening, University of Delhi, which became the academic abode
in his fourteenth attempt. ‘Fourteen’ is also associated with the joining of
the author as a professor of Political Science at the University of Delhi in
the year 2014. And, finally, it is the fourteenth year since the return of the
author from Tel Aviv University, Israel, after completing his postdoctoral
research during 2002–2003 that this work seems to be seeing the light of
publication in 2017.
The academic trajectory of writing the manuscript on Israel and India
began in 2003 after my return from Israel. Writing on a nation with
innumerous similarities in terms of culture, history, society, economy and
v
vi Preface
polity vis a vis India unknown to the external world, at least in terms of
academic literature, became an important challenge. Election after elec-
tion passed in the two democratic nations and my penchant for accom-
modating the latest developments with formative events kept on
increasing. Meanwhile, I got another postdoctoral engagement at the
University of Oxford during 2010–11 that diverted the focus of my
research attention and engagement, from Israeli parties to the Indian
diaspora in Britain.
Throughout the decade since my arrival from Israel, I kept on writing
on different issues related to Israel and India. Fortunately, from 2006 to
2016, I attended five meetings of the World Congress of International
Political Science Association, held in Fukuoka, Santiago, Madrid,
Montreal and Poznan, and presented my papers with comparative
perspectives on Israel and India by covering many topics from democra-
cies to parties, civil society to nationalism, and finally to subalterns and
marginals. The scholarly feedback on my papers with rich inputs kept on
strengthening my desire not to stop until I had produced a classic work on
the two nations.
The year 2014 marked a real watershed in my long academic journey
covering Israel and India. My joining the Department of Political Science,
University of Delhi, as a professor in 2014 and my nomination as
Director of the Developing Countries Research Centre (DCRC), Univer-
sity of Delhi, in 2015 by Hon’ble Vice Chancellor Professor Dinesh Singh
made me strive towards my mission of translating all my collected and
collective ideas in the form of a seminal work. The finishing touch was
made when the University of Delhi approved my proposal for a postgrad-
uate course on Israel for the academic session 2016–17. The course, titled
‘Society, State and Politics: Comparing Israel and India’, received tremen-
dous support and intake from students, including foreign nationals. It was
during the course of my continuous interactions and consistent engage-
ments with my students and scholars that my Vision was transformed into
a Mission, with Springer and Palgrave Macmillan becoming the flight
carriers.
The present work is an honest attempt to highlight the similarities
amidst the differences between Israel and India against the backdrop
of parliamentary governance, coalitional polity and party systems. It
Preface vii
underlines the democratic journey of the two parliamentary nations,

particularly from the late nineteenth century until contemporary times,
delineating the transitions and transformations, continuities and convul-
sions, movements and momentums that the two nations have been
undergoing since their emergence as independent political entities.
Much to the discomfort of those Western scholars who had seen the
Israeli party system as either ‘baffling’ or ‘decimating’ and the Indian
counterpart as ‘dal dal’ (chaotic in view of a multiplicity of parties), the
contemporary party systems in the two parliamentary nations have
actually attempted to transform democracies into accountable polities.
The holding of the 20th elections for the Knesset and the 16th elections
for the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) tells the success stories
of the two unique parliamentary systems which have succeeded in with-
standing the trends of authoritarianism, dictatorship and undemocratic
militant takeovers witnessed in different parts of the world.
The present work thus delineates many forms and formulations, con-
cepts and conceptualizations, ideas and idealizations that would leave
scope for further research and explorations in the discipline of social
sciences. The elections in the twenty-first century in both Israel and
India have witnessed many new trends that also need to be theorized by
social scientists across the globe. The shift from a one-party dominated
government to a one-party headed coalition, the formulation of the
Mapaivot and Coalitional Multipolarity, Salience of the Silence – the Silent
Voters - replacing floating voters, the politics of re-alignment taking over
alignment and de-alignment, and the emergence of pan parties as an
alternative to the ‘umbrella parties’ are some of the emerging trends
seen in both Israel and India. Further, party formations on the basis of
the I4 as well as the C5 party-building models in contemporary times
could be seen as new theorizations that need to be examined under
competitive party systems across the globe.
Theorization of these new terms and formulations would further
require serious social science understanding in the context of empirical
investigations by scholars and social scientists in different parliamentary
democratic nations around the world.
The completion of my research work has incurred innumerable debts. My
doctoral supervisor, Professor M.P. Singh, formerly with the Department of
viii Preface
Political Science, University of Delhi, provided his magnanimous helping

hand during the entire course of the completion of my post-doctoral work at
Tel Aviv University, Israel. His generosity, cordiality and benevolence have
left an indelible imprint that has received consistent exposure in my research
commitments.
I owe my sincere thanks to Professor Yogesh Atal, who retired as
Principal Director of Social and Human Sciences at UNESCO, Paris.
Working with him for two of my projects on Corruption and Election
improved my understanding of the subject and strengthened my focus on
the criticality of social science analysis. It would not be an exaggeration to
admit that his consistent supervision, persuasive guidance and generous
directions along with critical comments carved out a new academic
persona in me. He is responsible for elevating me to a new saga of ‘real
academics’.
No one could have expressed so much happiness for the publication of
this work from an international press than my sister, Dr Kanchan Jain,
currently working as a principal with the Directorate of Education,
Government of National Capital Territory, Delhi. Like a parent, her
perennial support, inspiration and encouragement was a real panacea for
me during the critical juncture of my undertaking research at Tel Aviv in
2002 and its rightful culmination in 2017. The work is also a tribute to
my Daddyji and Chaiji who would have always seen me flying at the top of
the academic world.
I would like to express my gratitude to my friend, philosopher and
guide Professor Ramesh Bhardwaj, Joint Director, DCRC, University of
Delhi. Throughout the long period of crises and convulsions, his
unflinching support made me resilient to the externalities and complex-
ities of the day. It is due to his blessings and wishes that this work is
coming out in the form of a book.
I extend my profound thanks from the core of my heart to my loving
students, Arun and Aashish, Arvind and Umesh, and my beloved
students-cum-daughters, GPS, each letter referring to their names, viz.,
Garima, Preeti and Srishty, for their caring and sharing spirit. Their
painstaking efforts, invaluable suggestions and critical observations short-
ened the journey of this work. If the work is seeing new light in the global
sphere, it is because of their concern with, commitment to and conviction
Preface ix
in me and my work. Their parents and family members equally deserve

thanks for showing unequivocal empathy for the project.
My acknowledgements would be incomplete without focusing on
the academic and moral support of all my senior colleagues and other
friends, especially Dr Harish Sharma, Consultant, ICSSR, New Delhi;
Professor A S Narang, formerly faculty with IGNOU, New Delhi;
Dr R. C. Varmani, Dr O P Arora and Dr R C Bhatia, formerly faculty
at Shyam Lal College (Eve.), University of Delhi; Professor Sangit K
Ragi from the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi;
Lawyer Anurag Bana, London; my brotherly neighbours Shri Rahul
Tandon and Shri R K Saraf; and many others. The innovative ideas and
critical insights of all of them greatly accelerated the pace of my
momentum, leading to the accomplishment of the research work.
My gratitude is also due to all my fellow colleagues and staff at the
DCRC, University of Delhi, for imparting vitality and vibrancy to the
work. Engaging with all my fellows, characterized as Navratnas, during
the course of seminars and conferences, lectures and discourses, for the
past one and half years immensely enriched my knowledge, in addition to
adding immense expertise and exposure.
I would also like to place my formal acknowledgement on record for
the initial guidance and support during my stay in Israel by my postdoc-
toral supervisor in the Political Science Department of Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, Israel, Dr Ornit Shani, and other professors in the Department, viz.,
Professor Michal Shamir, Professor Gad Barzilai and Professor Shaul
Mishal.
My stay at Tel Aviv University, Israel, was boosted with renewed
energy and zeal amidst the hospitality and generosity of Mr Ahron
Nagan and all the members of his family. The regular post-lunch discus-
sions and interactions with Ahron bhai at the University campus over
coffee kept me striving for excellence in the alien land. It was also the
company of my Indian friend in the Department of Physics, Sridhar, that
made me feel at home. Other members of the Indian diasporic group,
mostly scholars like Vilas and Mrs and Mr Das and their family, also
provided me with a homelike ambience by making my stay more
productive and fruitful.
x Preface
It was the earnest desire of my younger brother, an alumnus from IIT

Bombay and IIM Ahmedabad, the late Mr Anil Choudhary alias Chow, to
get my work on Israel published by an international press. Even though he
is no longer here to see this work, this book will remain as an everlasting
tribute to his memory.
I am greatly indebted to my family – my Matashree (other), my wife
Sasmita and son Shreyak - for their unswerving cooperation, unfaltering
support and unflinching trust that strengthened my perseverance for the
Mission. It was a balance between my perseverance and their patience which
ultimately facilitated the accomplishment of the much awaited work.
Last but not least, I am highly thankful to the staff of the Central
Reference Library and Ratan Tata Library, University of Delhi; Indian
Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi; Nehru Memorial Library,
Teen Murti, New Delhi (particularly Rita Mam and Seema Mam); Sourasky
Central Library and Brender-Moss Library for Social Sciences, Management
and Education, Tel Aviv University, Israel, for giving their immense help by
allowing me to access the rich research materials and archival literature
during the course of my stay. The plethora of research materials of these
libraries and the cordiality of their staff will always remind me of the effective
bonding between the academic institutions and aspiring scholars that all
desire but very few actually acquire in the competitive global society.
With the support and sustenance of all my beloved and revered ones –
students and scholars, fellows and friends, supervisors and supporters,
colleagues and companions, institutions and instructors – I have finally
come to the end of my academic journey on Israel stretching from 2002
until 2017. Though the work which has seen the light of publication
today couldn’t have been possible without the inputs and insights of all of
them, the sole responsibility of producing the ideas into a coherent and
consistent book rests on me only.
Developing Countries Research Centre Sunil K. Choudhary

University of Delhi
Delhi, India
10 April 2017
About the Book
Very few nations in the world bear such similarities and present such
distinct differences in their historical evolution, social formation and
democratic governance from their inception until the present as Israel
and India. Parties appear to have played a critical role in this new
transformation in the socio-economic and political realms in both these
democratic nations.
The book is a modest attempt to examine the role of parties in the
transformation of the democracies and governance of these two leading
parliamentary systems. Highlighting the trajectory of parties and party
systems from the twentieth century to contemporary times, the book
seeks to underline the changing dimensions of parties and party systems
in Israel and India within the context of parliamentary democracy,
coalitional polity, electoral profiles and social diversity.
The book also attempts to underline the changing transformation of
societies, democracies and governance in both Israel and India, and
examines the role of political parties as a real catalyst of change in these
two democratic nations, particularly in the aftermath of liberalization and
globalization.
xi
Contents
Part I Parties and Party Systems: A Conceptual Framework 1
1 Theorizing Parties and Party Systems 3
2 Locating Israeli and Indian Parties and Party Systems 23
Part II Parties and the State Formation 33
3 Yishuv: The Pre-state Period in Israel 35
4 Indian National Congress: From a ‘Safety Valve’ to the

Political Pioneer of Freedom Struggle 47
Part III Parties in the Post-independence Polities: From

Predominance to Pluralism 57
xiii
xiv Contents
5 Mapaivot vs Congress System 59
6 Mahapach vs Janata Parivar 85
7 Toward a Coalitional Multipolarity 97
Part IV Ideological Roots, Social Bases and Electoral Patterns

of the Parties: Exploring Israel and India 119
8 The Left-Wing Parties (Socialist Block) 121
9 The Right-Wing Parties (Nationalist Block) 139
10 The Centrist Parties (Centrist Block) 175
11 The Ethno-Religious Parties (Ethno-Religious Block) 201
12 The Arab Parties (Arab Block) 235
Part V Parties and the Government Making 251
13 Coalition Politics in Israel and India 253
14 Competing Issues of Governance: Israel and India

Compared 311
Contents xv
The Way Forward 343
Bibliography 349
Index 369
About the Author
Sunil K. Choudhary is a
professor of Political Science
and Director of the Developing
Countries Research Centre at
the University of Delhi.
He has an outstanding
academic record and research
publications. A postdoctoral
fellow from Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, Israel, and a Common-
wealth Fellow at the University
of Oxford, U.K., he has
written extensively on contem-
porary issues which have not
only been featured in various
refereed national and interna-
tional journals but have also been published as peer-reviewed books.
xvii
xviii About the Author
He has to his credit today 6 books, 38 research papers and 114 research
publications and presentations. As an expert/examiner/editor, he has been
associated with various premier institutions.
He is the recipient of various national and international awards. He was
honoured with the prestigious Global South Award, 2014, by the Inter-
national Political Science Association in Montreal, Canada. This award is
given to only one social science scholar from nearly amongst 150 nations
for making distinct research contributions in the countries of the Global
South.
List of Abbreviations
AAP Aam Aadmi Party

ABVP Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad
ADP Arab Democratic Party
AGP Asom Gana Parishad
AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
AIB Arab Islamic Block (al-Kutla al-‘Arabiyya al-Islamiyya)
AITUC All India Trade Union Congress
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BaLad National Democratic Alliance
BAMCEF Backward and Minority Community Employees Federation
BC Before Christ
BCE Before Christian Era
BJD Biju Janata Dal
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BJS Bharatiya Jana Sangh
BLD Bharatiya Lok Dal
BMS Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party
CPC Communist Party of China
CPI Communist Party of India
CPI (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)
xix
xx List of Abbreviations
CPI (ML) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRM Civil Rights Movement
CSO Civil Society Organizations
DASH Democratic Movement for Change
DFPE Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH)
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
EESP Emerging Economy Stabilization Plan
EU European Union
FEMA Foreign Exchange Management Act
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GPEW Green Party of England and Wales
GST Goods and Services Tax
HVC Haryana Vikas Congress
ICHR Indian Council of Historical Research
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IMIM India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen
INC (O) Indian National Congress (Organization)
INC (R) Indian National Congress (Requisitionists)
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
IZL Irgun Zvai Leumi
J&K Jammu and Kashmir
JD (U) Janata Dal (United)
JD Janata Dal
JMM Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
JP Jaya Prakash Narayan
KACH Movement, founded by Rabbi Meir Kahana
KMPP Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
KMSP Kisan Mazdoor Socialist Party
KMT Kuomintang
Lal-Bal-Pal Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal
LHI Lohamei Herut Israel or Fighters for the Freedom of Israel
LKD Lok Dal
LPG Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization
LS Lok Sabha
Mafdal Miflaga Datit Leumit (National Religious Party of Israel)
Maki Miflaga Communistit Yisraelit (Communist Party of Israel)
List of Abbreviations xxi
Mapai Mifleget Poalei Eretz-Israel (Workers Party of the Land of Israel)

MAPAM Mifleget Poalim Meuchedet (United Workers Party of Israel)
MDMK Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly
MNF Mizo National Front
MP Madhya Pradesh
MP Member of Parliament
NAG National Agenda for Governance
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NC National Conference
NCP Nationalist Congress Party
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NDA National Democratic Alliance (al-Tajammu’al-Watani al-Dimukrati)
NDF National Democratic Front
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NRI Non-Resident Indian
NRP National Religious Party
NRV (Movement for) National Religious Revival
NSUI National Students Union of India
OBC Other Backward Classes
PA Progressive Alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Taqaddumi)
PDS Public Distribution System
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PLP Progressive List for Peace
PMK Pattali Makkal Katchi
PMO Prime Minister’s Office
POK Pakistani Occupied Kashmir
PRI Panchayati Raj Institutions
PSP Praja Socialist Party
PSU Public Sector Undertaking
PWP Peasants and Workers Party
RAFI Israel Workers’ List
RAKAH Reshima Komunistit Hadasha
RAZ Citizens’ Rights Movement and Peace
RJD Rashtriya Janata Dal
RKMS Rashtriya Kisan Mazdoor Sanghathan
RPI Republican Party of India
RRP Ram Rajya Parishad
RS Rajya Sabha
xxii List of Abbreviations
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

RTI Right to Information
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAD Shiromani Akali Dal
SAP Samata Party
SC Scheduled Caste
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SGPC Sikh Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee
SHAS Shomrei Torah Sephardim or Sephardi Torah Guardians or
Association of Sephardi Observants of the Torah
SOC Socialist Party
SP Samajwadi Party
SP Sangh Parivar
SP Swatantra Party
SS Shiv Sena
SSP Samyukta Socialist Party
ST Scheduled Tribe
SVD Samyukta Vidhayak Dal
TC (All India) Trinamool Congress
TDP Telugu Dessam Party
TI Transparency International
TINA There Is No Alternative
TMC Tamil Maanila Congress
TRS Telangana Rashtra Samiti
UAL United Arab League
UCC Uniform Civil Code
UDF United Democratic Front
UF United Front
UP Uttar Pradesh
UPA United Progressive Alliance
UTJ United Torah Judaism
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad
VOAM Voice of Agreement Movement (Nida’ a al-Wifaq)
WPP All India Congress of Workers and Peasants
WTO World Trade Organization
WZO World Zionist Organization
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Bases for party formation 5

Fig. 5.1 Mapai in Knesset (1949–1965) 61
Fig. 5.2 Congress in Lok Sabha (1952–67) 74
Fig. 5.3 The Congress System 78
Fig. 6.1 Left and right blocks in the Knesset (1977) 87
Fig. 6.2 Left and right blocks: seats in the Knesset (1977–1988) 87
Fig. 6.3 Left and right blocks: vote % in the Knesset (1977–1988) 88
Fig. 6.4 Congress and Janata in Lok Sabha (1977) 92
Fig. 7.1 Regional parties in Lok Sabha (1989–2014) 105
Fig. 7.2 Congress in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 105
Fig. 7.3 BJP in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014 106
Fig. 8.1 Labor’ seats in the Knesset, 1949–2015 126
Fig. 8.2 Labor’s voting percentage in the Knesset, 1949–2015 127
Fig. 8.3 Labor’ performance in the Knesset, 1949–2015 128
Fig. 8.4 CPI in the Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 133
Fig. 8.5 CPM in Lok Sabha, 1967–2014 134
Fig. 9.1 Likud’s seats in the Knesset, 1949–2015 150
Fig. 9.2 Likud’ voting percentage in the Knesset, 1949–2015 151
Fig. 9.3 Likud’s performance in the Knesset, 1949–2015 152
Fig. 9.4 BJP’s seats in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014 155
Fig. 9.5 BJP’s voting percentage in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014 156
xxiii
xxiv List of Figures
Fig. 9.6 BJP’s performance in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014 157

Fig. 9.7 Shiv Sena in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 171
Fig. 10.1 Shinui/Kadima’s seats in the Knesset, 1981–2013 180
Fig. 10.2 Shinui/Kadima’s voting percentage in the Knesset,
1981–2013 181
Fig. 10.3 Shinui/Kadima in the Knesset, 1981–2013 182
Fig. 10.4 Congress’ seats in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 187
Fig. 10.5 Congress’ voting percentage in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 188
Fig. 10.6 Congress’ performance in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 189
Fig. 11.1 NRP’s seats in the Knesset, 1959–2015 207
Fig. 11.2 NRP’s voting percentage in the Knesset, 1959–2015 208
Fig. 11.3 NRP’s performance in the Knesset, 1959–2015 209
Fig. 11.4 Shas’ seats in the Knesset, 1984–2015 215
Fig. 11.5 Shas’ voting percentage in the Knesset, 1984–2015 216
Fig. 11.6 Shas’ performance in the Knesset, 1984–2015 217
Fig. 11.7 Po’alei Agudat Yisrael in the Knesset, 1951–2015 221
Fig. 11.8 BSP’ seats in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 223
Fig. 11.9 BSP’ voting percentage in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 224
Fig. 11.10 BSP’ performance in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 225
Fig. 11.11 Samajwadi Party in Lok Sabha, 1996–2014 227
Fig. 11.12 Rashtriya Janata Dal in Lok Sabha, 1998–2014 229
Fig. 11.13 Shiromani Akali Dal in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 230
Fig. 12.1 Hadash’ seats in the Knesset, 1997–2015 241
Fig. 12.2 Hadash’ voting percentage in the Knesset, 1977–2015 242
Fig. 12.3 Hadash in the Knesset, 1977–2015 243
List of Tables
Table 5.1 The Knesset elections: 1949–2015 62

Table 5.2 Coalition governments in Israel (1949–2015) 75
Table 7.1 The Lok Sabha elections: 1952–2014 107
Table 13.1 Constitutional governments in India (1952–2014) 256
xxv
Introduction
Democracy is a treasure which no one will ever discover by deliberate

search. But in continuing our search, in labouring indefatigably to discover
the indiscoverable, we shall perform a work which will have fertile results in
the democratic sense. (Robert Michels)
Democracies, parties and governance are the essential ingredients for a

smooth functioning of polities all over the world. While democracies as
foundations of polities empower people, parties as democratic wheels give
effective say to the people in controlling power and ensuring governance.
Though non-democratic polities do ensure governance, such governance
fails to fulfil the basic parameters of accountability, transparency and
peaceful transition of power.
The democratic systems all over the world have been showing consid-
erable maturity in terms of accommodating and absorbing the disparate
elements into their systems of governance. The twenty-first century has
witnessed many significant developments where a transition has taken
place from authoritarian regimes to democratic polities through people’s
protests. The Arab Spring of 2011 is one such development where the
hitherto excluded West Asia started getting swapped by democratic
xxvii
xxviii Introduction
movements. Notwithstanding the inherent anomalies and prominent

diversities in such a spirit of absorption, democracies have been sustained
in this third wave of democratization (a la Huntington 1997) by with-
standing all anti-democratic and authoritarian pressures.
The democratic regimes get their very sustenance from the people. The
voice of a man in the street replaces the common voice in the democratic
framework of a system. Such a voice per se gets its authoritative presen-
tation in governance through the legitimate party system. Political parties
and party systems in this way strengthen the democratic ethos in the
political systems characterized by a multiplicity of identities and diversity
of nations.
Political parties offer a vital link between the state and civil society. In a
representative democratic system, parties often operate as autonomous
units in the domain of political action. They play a decisive role in
bringing political stability to the parliamentary democratic system. They
are not only the catalyst for transforming people’s aspirations into dem-
ocratic goals but also act as watchdogs, as a representative democracy
cannot function without political parties.
Political parties are the essence of democratic systems as they tend to
effectively channel the governmental machinery. Their role is no less
important in non-democratic systems, though parties work more or less
on the principle of checks and balances under democratic regimes. The
success of a democratic polity is invariably linked to the strength of the
parties and the vibrancy of the party systems.
Political parties in contemporary societies have become the real cata-
lysts, harbingers or wheels of democratic governance. Democratic polities
seldom function effectively in the absence of political parties. With their
genesis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, parties have
been in a constant phase of transformation. The process of liberalization
and globalization has further strengthened this transformation process in
the twenty-first-century global world, which has become a competitive
market society. As catalysts of democratic participation and good gover-
nance, parties have come to assume new salience in the contemporary
world.
The post-colonization period marked the birth of new democracies
around the world. Huntington examined the democratic resurgence in
Introduction xxix
different parts of the world under the ambit of ‘waves’. Similarly, the
developments of the 1980s brought about a change of emphasis from
government to governance all over the world. However, unlike the much
discussed and debated notions of ‘democracies’ and ‘governance’, political
parties have never gained much attention amongst researchers and social
scientists. The seminal works on parties by Ostrogorski, Michels,
Duverger, Sartori and others sought to examine the political systems
within the party framework during the twentieth century only.
The onset of globalization has brought about new alignments, trans-
formations and challenges for political parties and party systems. Besides
giving rise to new forms of parties rooted in ethnicity, religiosity, ecology
and probity, contemporary parties and party systems have witnessed new
challenges from different sectors of society, the most prominent being
civil society organizations. Parties are grappling with the new issues of
alignments and re-alignments, electorate volatility, increasing floating
voters, emergence of green parties, coalitional dynamics and new ideolog-
ical transformations. However, in spite of the diverse challenges, parties
have become indispensable in the functioning of democratic politics all
over the world.
Very few nations bear such similarities and present such distinct
differences in their historical evolution, social formation and democratic
governance from their inception to the present as Israel and India. By
reconciling the state suzerainty with people’s power, parties appear to have
played a critical role in the socio-economic and political realms in both
these democratic nations.
The present study is an attempt to examine the role of parties in the
transformation of the democracies and governance of the two leading
parliamentary systems, viz., Israel and India. With its emergence as an
independent political entity from British rule in 1948, Israel moved from
a one party-led government and an ethnically dominated homogeneous
society of the mid-twentieth century towards a multiparty coalitional
system and a heterogenous ethnic society of the twenty-first century. By
gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1947, India too moved
from one-party dominance, called the ‘Congress System’, and a plural
society from the 1950s to 1980s to an era of multiparty coalitions and a
multicultural nation with the beginning of the global market society of the
xxx Introduction
present century. The current study aims to highlight the changing nature
of the parties and party systems of Israel and India, and shows how the
societies, states and governments have been transformed during the long
course of their existence in these countries.
The process of globalization during the 1980s heralded a new change in
the system of governance in both Israel and India. This is reflected in the
ideological postulates of the parties in electoral politics, as well as in the issues
of goverance in both nations. The study seeks to encapsulate the new changes
the parties and party systems have been undergoing in the two parliamentary
democratic nations. The author has examined all the parliamentary elections
and the forms of government in both Israel and India and has characterized
the transformation in these two parliamentary polities as ‘a shift from
predominance to pluralism’.
For a clear understanding of the evolution, growth and changing trends
of parties, party systems and governance, the book is divided into five key
parts besides the introduction and conclusion.
The First Part of the book is an attempt to conceptualize the parties and
party systems. It begins with an introductory chapter focusing on the
salience of parties as democratic wheels of governance. It examines the
parties within the framework of both democratic and non-democratic
political systems. The Introduction is followed by a theoretical understand-
ing of parties and party systems across the world. Interpreting parties
through the principle of ‘I4’ which could be located across the world on
the basis of locus and focus, the part analyzes the existing typologies of the
parties and party systems from Ostrogorski to Peter Meir under three
distinct phases, viz., the pre-behavioural era, the behavioural era and the
post-behavioural era, with different party theorizations and model-building
like C5 – referring to the Cleavage, Catch’ll, Consociational, Cartel and
Conservancy Models. The first part attempts to study existing theoretical
paradigms under which the Israeli and the Indian party systems could
broadly be located. It underlines the Salience of Silence through a shift in
electoral politics from floating voters to Silent Voters, which in the case of
both Israel and India could be seen from the working of the term M5.
‘Parties and the State Formations’ are the subject of discussion in the
Second Part of the book. The first two chapters examine the role played
by political parties in the formation of the state in both Israel and India.
Introduction xxxi
They underline the formative phase of state-building as undertaken by

cultural forces led by the World Zionist Organization on the one hand
and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and other Hindu outfits on the
other. While the first chapter underlines the role of different political
parties in the pre-state period in Israel, called Yishuv, the fourth chapter
analyzes the changing role of the Indian parties, particularly the Indian
National Congress, in their struggle for independence. This part broadly
highlights the predominant position held by the key political parties in the
society and polity and their pioneering role in the freedom struggle against
British colonial rule, particularly Mapai in Israel and the Indian National
Congress in India.
The Third Part discusses the transition and transformation of parties
and party systems of Israel and India from post-independence to contem-
porary times. It analyzes the changing nature of party systems in both these
parliamentary polities. While the first chapter presents the predominance of
the key parties in the first two decades of their post-independence era under
the theorizations Mapaivot and ‘Congress System’, the other chapters
delineate the transformation of the party systems from a bipolar or
two-party system of the 1970s to the beginning of the coalition era from
the 1980s onwards. This transformation is encapsulated by the author
under the phrase ‘from predominance to pluralism’.
An overview of the ‘Ideological Roots, Social Bases and Electoral
Patterns of the Israeli and Indian Parties’ is discussed in Part Four of
the book. It attempts to discuss the Israeli and Indian parties under five
key chapters, viz., the Socialist Block, Nationalist Block, Centrist Block,
Ethno-Religious Block and Arab Block. A comparative analysis is made of
the five leading blocks/groups of the parties in these two democratic
nations, with a focus on their ideologies, organizations, leadership and
electoral base. It also discusses the changing patterns of parties and the
emergence of new parties in the twenty-first century under their respective
classified blocks or categories in both Israel and India.
The Fifth Part of the book discusses the role of ‘Parties in Government
Making’. The first chapter discusses the coalitional dynamics in both
Israel and India working on the principles of power, pulls and pressures.
The chapter also carries out a critical analysis of the Prime Ministerial
forms of government in both the countries and examines the changing
xxxii Introduction
patterns of governance under the compulsions of coalition politics. The

second chapter examines the competing issues of governance in both the
countries underlining five major areas of govenance, viz., peace and
security, religiosity and ethnicity, settlements and infiltration, economy
and markets, and scandals and scams.
Titled ‘The Way Forward’, the concluding observations summarize the
major findings of the work and outline some suggestions for future
research.
The approach of the author throughout the book has been analytical,
empirical and behavioural. The sources used in the work have largely
remained secondary, though the primary sources in terms of interviews,
sample surveys, and animated discussions with scholars and academicians
both in Israel and India have proved beneficial to the outcome of the
findings. The book also sheds light on many contemporary issues and
challenges in these two parliamentary democracies that need further
exploration and research.
References
Huntington, S. P. (1997). Democracy for the long haul. In L. Diamond
et al. (Eds.), Consolidating the third wave democracies: Themes and perspec-
tives. Baltimore/London: The John Hopkins University Press.
Michels, R. (1915). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchi-
cal tendencies of modern democracy (trans: Eden & Paul, C.). New York:
Dover Publications.
Part I
Parties and Party Systems: A Conceptual
Framework
Political parties are the outcome of the modern world. They are generally
associated with the functioning of democratic polities. They enable
democracies to work successfully. Unlike the direct democracies of the
yesteryears, parties are the sine qua non of the modern indirect democra-
cies, usually referred as representative democracies.
As ‘representative democracies,’ modern democracies seek to forge vital
links between people at the peripheral level and government at the central
level. The success of such democracies is dependent on the strength of
political parties. They attempt to link the state with the civil society.
Besides working as political catalyst for transforming people’s aspirations
into democratic goals, political parties also act as watchdogs for preserving
and procuring representative democracy.
While the twentieth century came to be described as the century of the
parties, political parties are facing new challenges in terms of finding their
vitality and space in the contemporary socio-political set up. Candidates
have appeared to take preeminence against parties at the center stage of
political governance. Parties are getting increasingly replaced by the
voluntary organizations within the ambit of the civil society. With the
voting becoming less ideological-oriented and more sectarian and
‘marketized’, civil society appears to mark its edge on the parties in the
present century.
2 I Parties and Party Systems: A Conceptual Framework
The first part of the book seeks to explore the theoretical underpinnings
of political parties in the writings of Moisei Ostrogorski, Robert Michels,
Michael Duverger, Myron Weiner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Steve
Rokkan, Geovanni Sartori and others while linking them to the Israeli
and Indian parties and party systems. Tracing the historicity and theoret-
ical understanding of political parties in the writings of old and contem-
porary scholars, an attempt is also made in the subsequent chapter of the
part to locate the parties and party systems within the democratic frame-
work of Israel and India.
1
Theorizing Parties and Party Systems
As soon as a party, even if created for the noblest object, perpetuates itself,
it tends to degeneration
Moisei Ostrogorski
Parties are group of people that come together in their pursuit of political
power. Edmund Burke defines party as ‘a body of men united, for
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some
particular principle in which they are all agreed’. Parties thus act as
instruments of articulation and mobilization of the masses. They mobilize
people not merely for electoral politics by winning the legislative seats,
but, more importantly, for building awareness and enthusing people for
‘nation-building, state-building and democratic identity-building’.
Parties are the actual linchpin that connects the grassroots activity with
the superstructural polity. They carry expectations and aspirations
upward, from citizens to state, and take policies and programs downward,
from state to citizens. Hence, they can prove to be instrumental in
changing the very nature of the government on the one hand and
democratizing the state on the other. In this way, they establish and
© The Author(s) 2018 3

S.K. Choudhary, The Changing Face of Parties and Party Systems,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_1
4 1 Theorizing Parties and Party Systems
maintain direct linkages between the state, the government and the
people.
In a representative democratic system, parties often operate as auton-
omous units in the domain of political action. Their role is no less
significant in the presidential system. However, they can play a far more
influential role in the parliamentary democratic system by bringing polit-
ical stability to the system of governance. Even the Communist and the
totalitarian regimes function on the effective strength of the parties to
keep the masses intact with the state system. Hence, the role of the parties
keeps varying from parliamentary to totalitarian system, thrusting more
challenge to them to act as real catalysts for the people.
As autonomous units in the democratic framework of government,
political parties try to operate within the context of political institutions
and structures. Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane define party systems as
‘structures of party competition and cooperation’ (Pennings and Lane
1998: 5). Over the years, party systems have been showing considerable
changes in terms of their ‘volatility, polarization, strength and size, elec-
toral disproportionality, and cleavage structures’ (Ibid.: 5). These factors
significantly change the structures of both competition and cooperation,
leading to the respective stability and change in the party systems across
the world.
Interpreting the Parties

Parties are complex, multifaceted and intermediary organizations between
the state and the citizens. They are organized bodies and are primarily
concerned with the acquisition, consolidation and expansion of power.
When parties try to compete among themselves to acquire power, they
constitute the party system. Party systems are thus the structures of party
competition and cooperation.
There are different bases in the formation of political parties across the
world. One could highlight two prime movers of this formation, which
may be characterized as ‘locus and focus’—the former refers to ‘location’
and the latter to ‘orientation’. Based on the location and orientation of
Interpreting the Parties 5
Ideology
Locus
Issues & Interests
Focus
Individuals
Fig. 1.1 Bases for party formation
parties, one could see different types and variants of parties. Generally
speaking, there are four important bases on which parties are found to be
formed. They may be described as ‘I4’—ideology, interests, issues and
individuals (Choudhary, 2017) (see Fig. 1.1).
While some parties are formed on the basis of ideology, others may get
constituted on the basis of interests. Some others find issues as their key
focus and locus, whereas for others, individuals remain the key players.
The ideology-driven parties could be seen as Republican and Democratic
Parties of the USA, Labor and Conservative Parties of UK, Mapai and
Labor Party in Israel and Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in
India. Generally, ideology-based parties used to be called umbrella parties
for representing divergent interests of the society as well as accommodat-
ing varying sections of communities. Contemporary trends witness trans-
formation of umbrella parties into pan parties in view of their being the
lead parties, both in coalition building and government formations.
In some countries, interests like caste, class, clan and community
constitute important locus and focus of parties. For example, the Com-
munist Parties in former Soviet Union, China and India, African National
Congress in South Africa, Polish United Workers’ Party in Chile, Soli-
darity in Poland and Shas in Israel could be characterized as interest-
oriented parties. Most of the parties in Africa are clan-based parties.
Bahujan Samaj Party in India may be called as the party broadly

representing the interests of the downtrodden strata of society.
Among the issue-based parties, one could cite the examples of Green
Parties in Germany and other parts of Europe, and the Asom Gana
Parishad and Aam Aadmi Party in India. And, finally, the individual-
centric parties could be Nazi and Fascist parties formed by Hitler and
Mussolini, respectively. Examples of individual-driven parties are Forza
Italia Party, which was formed by the media tycoon Berlusconi, who later
became the prime minister of Italy, and the Citizen Power of Bangladesh,
founded by the noble laureate Muhammad Yunus in February 2007.
Kadima and Yesh Atid in Israel could also be brought under the
individual-dominated parties, as both of them were creations of Ariel
Sharon and Yair Lapid, respectively. In India, Lok Jan Shakti Party set
up by Ram Vilas Paswan and Maharashtra Navnirman Sena formed by
Raj Thackeray are some of the examples of the individual-centric parties.
It may be true that some of the parties may claim to represent all the
three components like interests, issues and individuals in their ideology;
the centrality of the locus and focus would broadly characterize and
determine the nature of the parties across the world.
Parties and Party Systems: Historical Perspective

Political parties did get their significant reflections in the earlier writings of
Bolingbroke, David Hume and Edmund Burke. While Bolingbroke and
Hume failed to differentiate categorically between parties and factions,
Burke, despite conceiving the modern idea of party for the first time,
could not theorize on the parties.
Later writers such as J. S. Mill, Walter Bagehot and James Bryce largely
contributed to general theories of ‘parliamentarianism’ rather than parties.
Though parties in terms of factions did have their bearing on the academic
literature in the eighteenth century, systematic work on the parties and
party system did not occur until the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.
Evolution and Growth of Parties 7
Evolution and Growth of Parties

Based on the research on parties as undertaken by Howard L Reiter
(2006), evolution and growth of the parties and party systems could
broadly be classified under three salient phases: pre-behavioral era, behav-
ioral era and post-behavioral era.
First Phase: Pre-behavioral Era [1906–1949]
The first phase of parties and party systems dominated the first five
decades of the twentieth century. Applying the holistic approach, the
first phase studied parties on the basis of organizations. Three important
works of this period could be associated with Alexis de Tocqueville,
Moisei Ostrogorski and Robert Michels.
The earlier references on the parties generally focused on the mass
nature of parties. In this context, the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville on
parties also deserved special attention. Tocqueville stressed the importance
of mass political parties and associations being the key institutions of civil
society. His description of parties constituted two main forms—the big
parties emphasizing ideology and the smaller ones adhering to interests.
The small parties, according to him, have no ideological base as ‘their
moving impulses are mainly interest and ambition, and which are
concerned with day-to-day issues or at worst with the scramble for
power’ (Lively 1965: 139).
The first extensive analysis of the parties was provided by Moisei
Ostrogorski. Ostrogorski was the first to recognize that political parties
were becoming significant in the new era of democratic politics. Parties,
according to him, focus on ‘the political feelings and the active wills of the
citizens’ (Ostrogorski 1964: 1xxix). They ‘tend to become simple aggre-
gates, drawn together, by the attractive force of a leader, for the conquest
or preservation of power’ (Ibid.: 331).
Ostrogorski’s work is considered to be original and classical study of the
history of Anglo-American party systems. By focusing on the caucus in
British and American politics, Ostrogorski attempted to discover the
general attributes of political parties within the context of universal
suffrage. His work in this way entailed a detailed historical account of the
rise and changes in the party system and sought to analyze the conse-
quences of the democratic suffrage on the British and the American
polities.
After Ostrogorski, it was Robert Michels who sought to highlight the
organizational dimension in parties. Michels discusses the oligarchic
tendencies of mass organizations. Every party organization, according to
him, represents an oligarchical power grounded upon a democratic basis.
In his formulation, parties refer to an ‘organization which gives birth to
the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over
the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organiza-
tions say oligarchy’ (Michels 1915: 401).
Though the main concern of Michels was to study intra-party pro-
cesses, he championed the notion of ‘iron law of oligarchy’ in modern
mass organizations, which seemed to carry the idea of direct democracy.
‘As a form of social life democracy should be chosen as the least of evils.
The ideal government would doubtless be that of an aristocracy of persons
at once morally good and technically efficient’ (Ibid.: 407).
Advocating the objective immaturity and perennial incompetence of
the masses, he argues that ‘the mass will never rule except in abstracto’
(Ibid.: 402). ‘Thus the majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal
tutelage, are predestined by tragic necessity to submit to the dominion of a
small minority, and must be content to constitute the pedestal of an
oligarchy’ (Ibid.: 390). Parties in this way are increasingly based on the
competence of the few.
Second Phase: Behavioral Era [1950–65]
Behavioralism laid the foundation of empirical orientation in the study of

parties and party systems. The phase sought to link electoral politics with
party systems. Some of the important contributions of this period could
be seen in the pioneering works of Maurice Duverger, Neumann and
Anthony Downs.
The more systematic and analytical comparative study of European
parties and party systems owes its tribute to Maurice Duverger’s seminal
work in 1951. Though the main focus of Duverger’s work is on the party
structures in terms of its analysis of the organization, membership and
leadership, it also emphasizes the party systems by elaborating the effect of
numbers, strength and alliances in addition to delving into the relation-
ship between political parties and political regimes.
Duverger discusses the great variations in party organization. ‘A party is
not a community but a collection of communities, a union of small
groups dispersed throughout the country and linked by co-ordinating
institutions’ (Duverger 1954: 17). He described these small basic com-
munities in terms of caucuses, branches, cells and militia that agglomerate
to constitute the party by linking one with another. On the basis of these
four basic elements, he sought to classify and theorize political parties. He,
however, stated that while caucuses, branches, cells and militia happen to
be present in almost all the parties, it is rare that a party is based exclusively
on any one of the four basic elements.
Like Michels, Duverger also accepted the preeminence of the elite in
the society. The formula ‘government of the people by the people’ must
be replaced by the new formula ‘government of the people by an elite
sprung from the people’ (Ibid.: 425). ‘All government is by nature
oligarchic but the regions and training of the oligarchs may be very
different and these determine their actions’ (Ibid.: 425).
Duverger thus believes that both liberty as an essence of democracy and
the party system coincide. His work also shows the relationship between
specific electoral systems and particular types of party systems. He believes
that the party system is largely determined by the electoral system.
Viewing parties as the lifeline of modern polity whose primary task is to
organize the chaotic public will, Sigmund Neumann emphasized the
basic distinction between the ‘parties of representation’ and ‘parties of
integration’. The parties of individual representation strengthen democ-
racy by ensuring people’s participation. The parties of social integration
on the other hand weaken democracy and self-government by enforcing a
strict compliance to their basic ideology. ‘The viability of a party system’,
according to Neumann, ‘becomes a test for the stability of a social and
political order’ (Neumann 1956: 396).
Study of parties within the context of democracy took a new lead with
the innovative and pioneering work of Anthony Downs. Downs
advocated a model of democratic government decision-making, which

seeks to assign party politics a central place within the context of democ-
racy. He assumes that political parties and voters act rationally in the
pursuit of certain clearly specified goals. ‘Parties formulate policies in
order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate
policies’ (Downs 1957: 28).
Downsian model could well be described as a study of political ratio-
nality from an economic point of view as it maintains that ‘parties in
democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking
economy’ (Ibid.: 295). It not only states that parties act to maximize
votes but also asserts that citizens behave rationally in politics.
Downsian model is based on the assumption that every government
seeks to maximize political support. The theory of elections appears to be
central to his theory of democracy. The central purpose of elections in a
democracy is to select a government. And political parties play an impor-
tant role in a democratic government.
Downsian model also focuses on different forms of two-party compe-
tition. It attempts to combine both the formal purpose of parties in terms
of designing and carrying out policies when in office, and the informal
structure by centering on the private motives of the individuals running
the party. ‘The party which runs the government manipulates its policy
and actions in whatever way it believes will gain it the most votes without
violating constitutional rules’ (Ibid.: 31).
Downsian model later lays the foundations for the emergence of the
spatial approach in party politics in which parties have come to be
portrayed as ‘unfettered entrepreneurs, rationally calculating their strate-
gic chances of electoral success by embracing programmes that should win
them a maximum number of voters’ (Daalder 1983: 19).
Jean Blondel carried forward the spatial approach of parties. Not only
the social background of the individuals constituting the parties is to be
analyzed but also the collective developments which take place in them
need to be assessed. Hence, ‘the social life of the parties cannot be entirely
divorced from the ideology and general political attitudes of the electors,
members, and leaders of the political parties’ (Blondel 1963: 12). Profes-
sionalization, class barriers, machines and bureaucratization are some of
the dangers cited by Blondel in his analysis on the social structure of the
British parties.
Ian Budge champions the spatial theory of party politics. The spatial
theory assists parties in deciding policies in the absence of any reliable
information about the effect of the policy decisions on voting. The theory
holds that ‘parties occupy a particular area within policy space, marked
out by ideology – often specified in the party name. Parties are assumed to
stick to this area and not to leapfrog. They are moreover restricted to
taking up one policy position for each election, independently of other
parties, and this forms the equilibrium point for their campaign’ (Budge
1994: 451). The theory further assumes that policy spaces are
multidimensional because of the complexity of the political and social
world; hence, they ‘must be generally characterized by instability, absence
of equilibria, and voting cycles’ (Ibid.: 456).
‘Budge’ analysis, which is based on testing several models of party
policy-making under uncertainty for 20 post-war democracies, maintains
that parties do not move out of their own ideological area and, in
particular, do not ‘leapfrog’ other parties in policy terms. ‘Parties decide
on policies in terms of internal ideological imperatives and they decide
independently of each other’ (Ibid.: 458). The uncertainties in electoral
politics impart more significance to the popularity of the spatial theory
and models in comparative party literature.
Third Phase: Post-behavioral Era [1966– to Date]
The third phase in the evolution and growth of parties and party systems
is an outcome of the post-behavioral revolution. While on the one hand
the period focused on the use of rational choice approach, policy-making
processes and parties, it also brought new issues on the political platform
like electoral change, mass partisanship and legislative behavior including
coalition building and methodological issues. Further, the post-behavioral
phase led to the theorization of parties and party systems, with new
typologies and models gaining ascendancy.
The new transformation of the parties and party systems could be seen
from two perspectives. While the first part reflects party model building in
particular cases leading to its salience and application in specific countries,

the second part focuses on party typologies and party theorizations with
universal applicability in most of the countries of the world.
Some of the important contributions of this phase could be examined
under the following theories and models in party building:
1. Party Model Building: The Notion of C5
The first part of the party model building could be encapsulated by the
term C5, as the five key models of party theorizations begin with the
letter C, namely, Cleavage, Catch’all, Consociational, Cartel and
Conservancy.
(a) Cleavage Model
A pathbreaking finding in the literature of parties and party system is

made by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Lipset and Rokkan
have enriched the party literature with their innovative theorization on the
cleavage politics. Their work broadly discusses the institutionalization of
the cleavage politics, the transformation of the cleavages structures into
the party systems and finally a model for the generation of the European
party system. Irrespective of the structure of the polity, parties according
to the authors ‘have served as essential agencies of mobilization and as
such have helped to integrate local communities into the nation or the
broader federation’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 4).
Conflict–integration dialectic is the central concern in the analysis of
the cleavage politics and the political parties. A cleavage in their analysis
generally refers to socio-economic division of groups with a corresponding
consciousness of their respective strength and their outright organizational
expression through parties. Hence, parties act as significant poles of
attraction and produce their own alignments independently of the geo-
graphical, social and cultural factors.
The authors discussed two important criteria of voters’ alignments,
which they characterize by the term ‘cleavage’. One is the socio-cultural
criteria of alignments containing region, class and religious denomination,
whereas the other one is the political criteria consisting of ‘we’ versus
‘they’ group cleavages. The term cleavage in their seminal work thus
indicates the organizational expression of the socio-economic division
among groups based on consciousness.
Parties, according to the authors, have always stood for division,
conflict and opposition and sought to serve as essential agencies of
mobilization integration. ‘In competitive party systems while on the one
hand each party establishes a network of cross-local communication
channels and in that way helps to strengthen national identities; on the
other, its very competitiveness helps to set the national system of govern-
ment above any particular set of officeholders. A competitive party system
protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and
attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed towards the
current set of powerholders’ (Ibid.: 4).
To analyze the cleavage model, the authors built the freezing hypoth-
esis, which presumes that the advent of the universal suffrage has consid-
erably frozen the party alignments. ‘No party can hope to gain decisive
influence on the affairs of a community without some willingness to cut
across existing cleavages to establish common fronts with potential ene-
mies and opponents’ (Ibid.: 5). The authors argue that changes in electoral
behavior have an immediate impact on party fortunes, which have great
consequences for the party system.
In a separate work, Rokkan also stated that mass democracy ensures the
politicization of particular cleavages. Similarly, Lipset, in his subsequent
writings, advocates institutionalized party competition as the minimalist
conception of democracy, which requires two main preconditions,
namely, the existence of opposition and the creation of support base.
Lipset believes that the sheer presence of the ‘opposition seeks to reduce
the resources available to officeholders and to enlarge the rights available
to those out of power. In both new and revived democracies, conflict
between the governing and opposition parties helps establish democratic
norms and rules’ (Lipset 2000: 48). Similarly, the electoral survival of the
parties also requires permanent base of support among a significant
segment of the population.
By stating that ‘the study of the conditions encouraging democracy
should focus on the sources of both cleavage and consensus’ (Lipset
1960: 21), Lipset states that ‘parties in new electoral democracies will be
inherently unstable unless they become linked to deep-rooted sources of

cleavages, as parties in the older, institutionalized western democracies have
been’ (Lipset 2000: 49). Lipset finally argues that ‘higher national income,
more widespread education, a less expansive state, a vital civil society, and
religious values that foster individualism will help in institutionalizing a
competitive party system’ (Ibid.: 54) in the contemporary world.
(b) Catch’all Model
One of the first to single the demise of the mass parties and the birth of
the ‘Catch’all’ parties was Otto Kirchheimer. Kirchheimer’s work gained
conspicuous significance in the party literature. Proclaiming the end of
ideology, he argued that decreasing ideological loyalties forced the mass
parties to resort to ‘Catch’all’ strategies. In his analysis of the Western
European party systems, he advocated a fourfold classification of the
parties, namely, bourgeois parties of individual representation, class-
mass parties, denominational parties and Catch’all people’s parties.
Kirchheimer viewed the transformation of the party system to the
‘Catch’all parties’ during the post-World War II period. The ‘Catch’all’
party, according to him, refers to a system in which the parties sought to
embrace a variety of other clienteles by sticking to their special working-
class clientele. The Catch’all parties were largely the outcome of
de-ideologization. Kirchheimer, however, believed that only major parties
could become successful Catch’all parties.
The integration potential of the ‘Catch’all’ mass party rests on a
number of factors. Calling it as action preferences, Kirchheimer argued
that the ‘Catch’all’ party should arrange its policies in such a way that ‘the
benefits accruing to the individual members of the community are greater
than the losses resulting from its policy’ (Kirchheimer 1966: 195). The real
contribution of the ‘Catch’all’ party, according to him, lies in its mobiliza-
tion for the concrete action preferences of its leaders vis-à-vis the voters.
(c) Consociational Model
Among the leading theorists of party systems, Arend Lijphart’s name

deserves special mention. Though his main contribution has broadly
remained in the field of democracies, his classification of democratic
systems generally provides the basis of the party typologies and influences
the functioning of party systems. Lijphart’s work is based on the main
hypothesis that ‘segmental cleavages at the mass level can be overcome by
elite cooperation’ (Lijphart 1977).
The party typology as advocated by Lijphart is two-dimensional. It is
based on the structure of society (homogeneous versus pluralist) and the
behavior of elites (coalescent versus adversarial). The party elites,
according to him, behave in a cooperative and stabilizing manner by
means of the four well-known practices: grand coalition, segmental
autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto. He considers the consocia-
tional model as the key model of party system because of the extent of
cooperation displayed by the segmental elites in such a model, notwith-
standing the deepening cleavages.
Lijphart’s later works attempt to establish effective bonds between the
electoral systems and party systems. His study undertaken in 1994
analyzes the operation and the political consequences of electoral systems,
especially the degree of proportionality of their translation of votes into
seats and their effects on the party system. The four measures of party
system characteristics as defined by him are basically the measures of
different aspects of the party system.
(d) Cartel Model
Peter Mair in his leading works on parties and party systems has
advocated the replacement of the cleavage identification model with the
party identification model. He discovers changes in the party system due
to organizational or programmatic dissatisfaction with parties, which
strengthen the forces of alignment and de-alignment. ‘While re-alignment
is channeled through party, de-alignment may lead to decomposition and
dissolution of the party’ (Mair 1983: 428).
One of the leading contributions of Mair is the projection of ‘cartel
model’, which he devised with Richard Katz. Through the cartel model
(Mair 1994) discussed the relationship between the civil society and the
state. The public financing of parties and the expanded role of the state
enable the party leaders to restrain competition and perpetuate themselves
in power. Parties forming the cartel rely heavily on the state resources,
thereby inhibiting entry of the new party incumbents.
State subvention, professionalized mass campaigns, privileged access to
state-regulated media, a ‘stratarchical’ relation between ordinary members
and the party elite, contained inter-party competitions, capital-intensive
campaigns, autonomy of political elites and individuality within the
organization are some of the characteristics of the cartel model as
described by Katz and Mair (1995). The cartel parties, according to the
authors, are more pronounced in countries with significant state funding
and extensive political patronage.
Mair believes that state plays an important role in party survival. It can
be seen as an intermediary between the parties and the citizenry. Instead
of declining parties, Mair finds the ‘changing parties’ and ‘adapting
parties’ as the dominant trends in the European party system. Parties
accordingly are empowering their members through the process of intra-
party democratization. They are changing in two important respects. In
the first place, ‘party structures are tending to become increasingly
stratarchical in character. Second, parties are becoming increasingly
state-oriented, and are correspondingly less firmly tied to civil society’
(Katz and Mair 1995: 18).
(e) Conservancy Model
Born out of the ecological and anti-nuclear mobilizations of the 1970s

and 1980s, Conservancy Model broadly represents the Green Parties. The
Green Parties were typical ‘challenger’ (Rochon 1985) parties that sought
fundamental political change in the systems of governance. They emerged
as carriers of an alternative vision of society. Their political fortunes varied
from country to country, but many parties managed to become relevant
political players in the course of time. The political journey of past three
and half decades, the ‘challenger parties’ now appeared to have become
part of the political establishments across the world, more particularly in
Europe.
The Greens were genuinely ‘new’ and, unlike anti-system parties of the
extreme right or left, did not have any ‘political baggage’ in terms of
established party cadres, activists and so forth. Once characterized as the
‘outsider’ parties, the Greens started becoming radical in their working

and orientation in the course of time. Wolfgang R€ udig (2009) argued that
unlike other parties, the Greens shunned the idea of party leaders; all
members were supposed to be active and involved in their political
functioning. They discarded the idea of elite formation and believed in
collective decisions. Decision in these parties were not made by a leader or
leaders but by the grassroots membership. They showed complete trans-
parency and openness in their routine deliberations and actions. The very
organization and working of these parties enabled them to mobilize a
substantial number of younger generations.
In the late 1990s, the Greens joined national governments in a number
of countries. Their success stories could be seen mostly in Europe,
namely, Belgium, France and Germany. The Greens emerged as junior
partners in a two-party coalition in Germany. Joschka Fischer was elected
to the German parliament in 1983 and became the party’s first minister in
a regional government as environment minister in 1985, and subse-
quently elevated to foreign minister and deputy chancellor from 1998
to 2005. Similarly, led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the Greens posed signif-
icant challenge to the dominant parties of France in 1999. Further, the
Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW) tasted its first success in
having two Members of European Parliament (MEPs) elected and
re-elected twice (in 2004 and 2009).
Petra Kelly, the German Green Party co-founder, described the Green
parties as ‘anti-party’ organizations, whereas Andreas Schadler (1996)
viewed them as ‘anti-system’ or ‘anti-establishment’ parties. Despite the
claims by some that the Green parties are aging out, their significance has
grown in electoral politics over the years.
Ferdinand M€ uller-Rommel, Sara Parkin and Herbert Kitschell are the
key exponents of the Green parties.
2. Party Typologies and Party Systems
Though individual party models discussed earlier could be seen in some

or other countries, party typologies broadly characterizing the common
features in most of the countries of the world were first undertaken by
Giovanni Sartori in 1970s, followed by Richard Gunther and Larry

Diamond in the beginning of the twenty-first century.
(a) Party Typologies: A Sartorian Analysis
One of the original and most systematic theorizations on the party

systems that have enlisted a sound claim of a distinct seminal work is made
by Giovanni Sartori. Sartori’s rather compact and lucid presentation
attempts to provide a grand theorization and framework of analysis of
parties and party systems. The primary emphasis of Sartori’s work is to
analyze how different types of party systems work differently throughout
the world.
Defining a party as ‘any political group that presents at elections, and is
capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office’ (Sartori
1976: 63), Sartori outlines the three main attributes of parties, namely,
parties are not factions, a party is part of a whole and parties are channels
of expressions.
Looking at the party as a system containing sub-units, parties constitute
the central, intermediate and intermediary structures between society and
government in Sartori’s significant work. The interactions among parties
are thus viewed as mechanical propensities, as structures of rewards and
opportunities that go a long way toward explaining the different perfor-
mances of different types of party politics. Parties and party systems in this
way ensure the molding of the political society.
On the basis of distinctive features and systematic properties, Sartori
further classifies the parties into the sevenfold typologies. Unlike the
earlier typologies, which were based primarily on number, Sartori’s typol-
ogy is an attempt to link the number of parties with the ideological
distance. The sevenfold classification of party systems, according to him,
are: single-party system (Albania, USSR), hegemonic party system
(Mexico), two-party system (USA, UK, New Zealand), predominant
party system (India, Japan), limited or moderate pluralism (Belgium,
Federal Republic of Germany), extreme or polarized pluralism (Chile,
Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland) and atomization (Malaysia).
Although he tries to explain and analyze almost all parties of the world in
Concluding Remarks 19
his typology, the distinction between moderate and polarized pluralism

remains central to his work.
(b) The Five Genera of Parties
Describing parties as channels of intermediation between political elites

and voters, Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond proposed the latest
typology of parties. Based on the organizational, programmatic and
strategic criteria, the authors divide the party on five genera, namely,
elite-based parties, mass-based parties, ethnicity parties, electoralist parties
and movement parties.
The earlier typologies of the parties, according to the authors, failed
to capture ‘the diversity of party types present within established democ-
racies’ (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 190). To quote the authors, ‘the
evolution of parties or the emergence of new types of parties may be
the product of several fundamentally distinct casual processes, not all of
which would move the transformation of the party in the same direction,
and not all of which are unilinear in their evolutionary implications’
(Ibid.: 191).
The contemporary party systems broadly reflect the characteristics of
party typologies as cited by Gunther and Diamond in most of the
countries of the world.
Concluding Remarks
A succinct description and brief analysis of parties, as undertaken by
various scholars, attempted to provide theoretical conceptualization of
party system in different political settings. While going through general-
izations, one witnesses changing trends in the party systems, from orga-
nizational theories of Ostrogorski, Michels and Duverger to numerical-
ideological theories of Sartori, the cleavage orientations of Lipset and
Rokkan and the spatial approaches of Anthony Downs, Budge and others.
One can equally find the different phases in which the parties have
undergone evolution and growth since their formal inception during the
early twentieth century. From Michel’s elite party of the first phase in the
1920s, parties entered into the political arena as mass movements based
on the cleavage politics of Lipset and Rokkan, sustaining until the 1960s;
they then moved to form the Catch’all configuration in its third phase in
the mid-1960s on Kirchheimer’s paradigm, formed the cartel model in
the 1990s on the lines of Peter Mair and now mark a shift to the post-
cartel phase in the contemporary polity. The diverse theories and distinct
approaches of parties have found a real challenge of conceptualizing and
theorizing about the proper pattern of relationship between ‘the systems
and their lifer worlds’.
During the past hundred years, parties and party systems have reflected
significant developments at different levels. The party system has not
remained immune to the forces of globalization and democratization.
The growing marketization, issue-based politics and increasing media
accessibility have sought to weaken the bonds between voters and parties
on the one hand, and increasing volatility, fragmentation and
de-alignment on the other. The emergence of civil society has further
reflected the strength of voluntary associations. Consequently, the rise of
social movements has sought to undermine patrimonialism in the party
system, which was based on privileging certain groups in terms of pro-
viding special access to public goods.
Despite exhilarations, fluctuations and decimations, political parties
have remained the indispensable vehicles for electoral change and political
transformation in global democratic politics. Revolution in information
and communication technology (ICT) under global era has made parties
and party systems more competitive. Competitive parties and party sys-
tems in contemporary times witness three major transformations, namely,
change from floating voters to silent voters, alignment to re-alignment and
umbrella parties to pan parties.
The contemporary party system thus needs to be analyzed at the
backdrop of the totality of these changes. How these transformations
get broad encapsulation in parties and party systems in Israel and India
will be the subject of discussion in the following parts and chapters.
References 21
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Choudhary, S. K. (2017 in press). Party systems. Block V, Unit 16. Comparative
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Daalder, H. (1983). The comparative study of European parties and party
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party systems: Continuity and change. London: Sage.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper Collins.
Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the
modern state (trans: Barbara & North, R.). London: Methuen.
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Katz, R., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party
democracy: The emergence of the cartel party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28.
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cies of modern democracy (trans: Eden & Paul, C.). New York: Dover
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II (trans: Clarke, F.). New York: Anchor Books.
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2
Locating Israeli and Indian Parties
and Party Systems
Party systems in both Israel and India initially focused on the mass politics
than on parliamentary politics. Political parties in both the countries, the
Mapai in Israel, which later became the Israel Labor Party, and the Indian
National Congress in India, emerged as movements. The onset of inde-
pendence sought to blend both liberalism and democracy in national
polity in these countries. As a result, parliamentary system became the
hallmark of their democratic polity, which invariably forced the parties
into government–opposition duality.
Although Israel does not represent a federal principle in its system of
parliamentary democracy, political parties here are playing a significant
role by ensuring stability of the coalitional polity. The Israeli party system
is broadly considered as the ‘overdeveloped multiparty system’ (Akzin
1955). Its role as an instrument of direct social action that has paved the
way for a stabilized coalitional system seems to make the study of the party
system in the country more interesting, which further needs in-depth
analysis and theorization.
In India the unique combination of parliamentary and federal compo-
nent has imparted greater functionality to the formation of national
government. In fact, the federal system has multiple political parties in

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_2
24 2 Locating Israeli and Indian Parties and Party Systems
the Indian context. As a result, one witnesses a shift in party system from
‘Congress System’ (à la Rajni Kothari 1964) to a multi-party system.
M.P. Singh (1996) describes this change as a march from ‘Predominance
to Multiple System of Polarized Pluralism’. This new trend reflects the
growing federal characterization of parties and party politics in India.
Formation of political parties in both Israel and India could be seen
from the perspective of I4 where individuals, issues, interests and ideolo-
gies constituted important bases of party origination. Though the
founding parties in the pre-independence period, called the Yishuv,
revolved around ideologies, the class- and community-based interests
also permeated in the party formations in Israel. The emergence of
Mapai and the Revisionists were the ideology-based parties under Yishuv,
and the Aguda parties emerged from the objective of fulfilling the religious
interests of the Jewish workers in Israel. Political parties that emerged in
the post-independence Israeli history represented ethnic interests like Shas
and issues of peace and conciliation like Shinui and Yash Atid. The
beginning of the twenty-first century was also marked by the individual-
oriented parties like Kadima by Ariel Sharon and Ha’Tnuah by Tzipi
Livni.
Indian political parties too have followed the fundamental principles of
I4 where all the four ‘I’s’ had their underpinnings in the party formation
and evolution. The Indian National Congress, the first political party of
pre-independence era, established in 1885, was the party of ideology, an
umbrella party which tried to cater to the interests of all sections of
society, including castes and communities, region and religion, vocation
and profession. The Muslim League founded in 1906 was founded as a
party to promote the interests of the Muslims. The Hindu Mahasabha in
the 1920s also emerged as the Hindu-based party. The Communists on
the other hand emerged in the 1920s as the party promoting the class
interests of the workers following the success of the Bolshevik Revolution.
The post-independence history of India witnessed many other parties
representing the interests of caste and community, region and religion.
The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Shiv Sena,
Telugu Dessam Party, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) are some of
the interest-based parties. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the parties
driven by individuals like Jaya Prakash Narayan pioneering the Janata
Parivar in 1977. Corruption emerged as an important issue of party
formation, and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) could be seen as one such
example set up in 2012.
In the broad theoretical frameworks of parties and party systems as
evolved over 125 years, political parties in Israel and India have fluctuated
from Sartorian analysis of the one-party dominance system from the
1950s to the early 1970s and the bi-party system of the mid-1970s to
the multi-party coalition system from the 1980s onward. Though for
Geovanni Sartori (1976), Israeli party had always been ‘baffling’ in view of
complexities of society and polity, the first two decades of the party system
in the country followed the ‘one-party dominance system’. It was during
this period that the dominant party in Israel, Mapai, established its
dominance both in the Knesset and the government formation besides
Histadrut.1 Following its pivotal position in Israeli polity and govern-
ment, the first phase of the Israeli party system came to be characterized as
Mapaivot.2
Indian party system in the formative post-independence period also
found place in the Sartorian analysis in terms of ‘one-party dominance
system’. Like Mapai, the one-party dominance system was led by Indian
National Congress. Morris Jones described the founding phase of the
party system in India by ‘predominant party system’, whereas Rajni
Kothari equated the phase with the ‘Congress System’. The dominant
position of the Congress from the 1950s to the late 1960s was marked by
its preponderance in terms of its seats both in the Parliament and the State
Assemblies.
What became noticeable in case of both Israel and India is the fact that
Mapai and Congress represented the post-independence political histories
of the two parliamentary democracies. As the founding parties of the two
nations, both of them undertook the struggle for independence by bring-
ing all shades of political opinion under their broad canvas. Hence, the
two parties also came to be equated with the umbrella organizations. The
electors in the post-independence polities rewarded both of them with
greater trust and responsibilities by bringing them to the helm of
governance.
Another remarkable development in the theorization of parties and party
systems in both Israel and India took place in 1977 when the one-party
dominance came to be challenged and replaced by an alternative right-wing
formation in the two nations. The Likud replaced the dominance of
Mapai/Israeli Labor Party and presented the first credible political alterna-
tive. The Israeli scholars described the change as Mahapach in Hebrew,
meaning the reversal or the earthquake in Israeli polity.
The Indian party system also witnessed a change in 1977 when the
Janata Parivar3 challenged the hegemony of the Congress and replaced it
both at the federal level and in most of the states. The two-party system
was the outcome of the initiatives undertaken by Jaya Prakash Narayan
challenging the authoritarianism of the Congress and its centralizing
leadership through ‘Total Revolution’. The Janata government challenged
the TINA4 Factor of the Congress and brought together all anti- and
non-Congress political formations on a common platform. The bi-party
system or the two-party system was short-lived, but it did bring about
significant transformations in the parties and party systems in both Israel
and India in the following decades.
The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed new developments in the dem-
ocratic politics of Israel and India. The period was marked by the
emergence of new regional formations, on the one hand, and the begin-
ning of LPG in India—referring to Liberalization, Privatization and
Globalization—and EESP in Israel—indicating Emerging, Economy,
Stabilization, Plan, on the other. The withdrawal of the State and its
replacement by Market made the electoral politics more competitive by
bringing issues of development and governance to the center stage,
particularly from the twenty-first century onward. The increasing political
participation by the downtrodden strata of society, described as the
‘Second Democratic Upsurge’ (Yogendra Yadav 2000), made Indian
polity more accessible, accommodative and accountable. Though it is
stated that no tangible changes could be visible in the standard of living
of such sections, called the Dalits, the democratic resurgence of the
backward communities strengthened their self-respect and empowerment
in Indian parliamentary politics.
Parties and party systems in Israel and India from the 1980s entered the
third phase with the formalizing coalitions in government formation, to be
characterized by the author as Coalitional Multipolarity. The forms and
formations of coalitions underwent changes from the 1980s onward.
Breaking down of one-party dominance system and the emergence of
multi-party system offered opportunities and challenges for parties in
government formation. The period witnessed transformation of umbrella

parties into pan parties as the lead parties of coalition formation. The
success of coalitions started vesting on the pan parties which eventually
became the real electoral magnet attracting parties across ideological spec-
trum in coalition formation. The pan parties emerged as the key electoral
poles around which rest of the parties got associated as alliance partners.
With pan parties constituting significant poles attracting allies in coali-
tion formation across board and the electoral poles remaining politically
non-sacred for being accessible to any ideological stream of parties, such
multipolar coalitions would be characterized by the term Coalitional
Multipolarity.
Israeli polity has always been a system of coalitions, though the difference
could be seen in terms of a shift from ‘one-party-dominated government’ to
‘one-party-led coalition’. The dominance of the single party, either as the
pioneering government formation or as the leading political coalition,
remained intact in Israel from the 1980s to date. The same could be seen
in India, where the coalitions started getting stabilized and streamlined from
late the 1980s onward. The emergence of National Front, United Front,
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) could be the outcome of increasing regionalization and federalization
of Indian politics where coalitions became inevitable, nay, desirable.
The changing political discourse in party orientation and government
formation from the 1980s constituted important development in both
Israel and India. The changing political discourse in Israel could be
anchored around M5 5 referring to Masoret, Moledet, Mussar, Mishpacha
and Matz’biya. Masoret symbolizes the tradition of synthesizing old and
new ideas in this modern world; Moledet means homeland, expressing
nationalism and patriotism; Mussar is an attempt to bring back ethics and
morals in the decision-making process; Mishpacha focuses on the princi-
ples of community, fraternity and solidarity as the Jewish State; Matz’biya
refers to the strength and awakening of the Israeli voter.
Political discourse in post-independence India also revolved around M5
(Choudhary 2016) referring to Mandal, Mandir, Masjid, Market and
Matdata, which brought about significant political re-alignments in elec-
toral politics. The issues of reservation under Mandal and the construction
of the temple of Lord Ram in Ayodhya, demolition of the disputed Babri
structure in Ayodhya, the competitive electoral politics revolving around the
issues of development and governance and the increasing political con-

sciousness and awakening of the voters all brought about new democratic
alignments in Indian democratic politics.
The salience of M5 in both Israeli and Indian political discourse could
be seen in terms of changing democratic political realities in the two
nations where ideological populism would seem to be paving the way for
pragmatic political governance. New transformations in democratic elec-
toral politics in contemporary times could be encapsulated under re-align-
ment, particularly from the 1990s onward, which marks a shift from the
alignment politics of the 1950s–1960s to the politics of de-alignment of
the 1970s–1980s.
The contemporary party building models, as theorized by the author
with C5 (Cleavage, Catch’all, Consociational, Cartel and Conservancy),
could also be located in the democratic politics of both Israel and India.
While the cleavage model (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) is disintegrating in
India as the caste and class cleavages are breaking down with the
re-alignment of voters moving beyond castes and communities for their
electoral preferences; Israeli voters, particularly the Arabs and the
Sephardi, still appear to be guided by their religious and ethnic affinities,
respectively. The increasing electoral threshold limits in Israel from 1 to
1.5 per cent in 1992, 2 per cent in 2006 and 3.25 per cent in 2015 further
strengthen the cleavage politics as signs of solidarity among these ethnic
groups and religious communities.
Indian politics over the years has witnessed disintegrating caste politics
while reasserting caste consciousness, thereby resulting into the parties
making strong inroads into their respective caste and regional strongholds.
The Indian voters, particularly in the rural hinterlands, appear to be
guided by caste considerations, though the last Lok Sabha elections in
2014 and the assembly elections in some of the North Indian states,
particularly Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal in 2017, show BJP making
inroads into caste- and community-based cleavages as a pan-Indian party.
The catch’all and consociational models of party building could also be
located in the working of coalitions in both Israel and India. The base of
the Israeli politics has broadly remained coalitional despite one-party
dominance. The same could be attributed to Indian politics from 1989
onward when the coalitions started settling down in the parliamentary
politics. Both Mapai and Congress, as umbrella organizations, were the

catch’all and consociational parties, as they sought to overreach all sections
of society. Mapai included the like-minded left and socialist groups as part
of government formation, which also had members coming from the Arab
community. The Congress too had members belonging to all sections of
society under its democratic panoply.
Indian coalitions from the late 1980s, and particularly from the
mid-1990s, witnessed the catch’all model in terms of reflecting participa-
tion of parties across ideological shades in government formation, whereas
consociationalism could be seen in terms of pan-Indian parties like BJP
leaving its core Hindutva6 agenda for the national agenda of governance.
The cartel model is the specific feature of the Israeli party politics where
state subvention has been the significant feature since the beginning.
Elections in Israel are broadly funded by the State, particularly in terms
of giving free and equal space to the parties in state-run radio and TV
channels. Partially, the access of national and state parties to the national
and state radio and TV channels was introduced early, though it’s a
limited feature of party politics in India, and the country is still debating
to introduce state subvention to curb the use of black money as part of
electoral reforms. However, professionalized and technocratic mass cam-
paigns to address voters are assuming salience in the past one decade, as
parties in both Israel and India are either resorting to the media houses to
manage their electoral campaigns professionally or bringing them to the
party fora by giving them tickets and asking them to lead the parties.7
Conservancy as the front running issue of party model building is the
peculiar feature of the European parties. However, Israel has also witnessed
the Green parties championing the cause of ecology and environment and
bringing the young voters as part of their anti-system establishments. The
Green Movement—Meimad, the Green Leaf, the Green and the Young—
did make its appearance in Israeli electoral politics in the twenty-first
century, but it failed to cross the threshold limit to mark a democratic
entry into the parliamentary politics of Israel. India has not witnessed
Green parties formally, though the issues of ecology and environment and
the young leaders could be seen both in the national and state parties,
largely as parts of the hereditary politics.8
Thus the C5 models in Israel and India could be seen in different

parties and party systems in separate forms, if not collectively. Some of the
salient characteristics of these models necessitated significant transforma-
tions in party theorizations and party model building in both Israel and
India. The Knesset and the Lok Sabha results as well as the assembly
outcomes in recent state elections in India witnessed resurgence of young
voters whose increasing participation and critiquing orientation of party
platforms and policy decisions of the existing political dispensation
immensely changed the fortunes of the so-called winnable parties and
governments. Such voters are different from the floating voters in the
sense that they already made up their mind in casting their electoral
preferences with the onset of election process. However, such voters
would be characterized as Silent Voters. The salience of the silent voters
could be seen in terms of their being decisive without being expressive. The
changing transformation of parties and formation of governments across
globe in recent years could broadly be characterized by the new phenom-
enon, namely, Salience of the Silent Voters.
Final Comments
While the parties and party systems have undergone transformations and
witnessed downturns across the globe, the Israeli and the Indian parties
and party systems have retained their central place in the parliamentary
politics. The competitive electoral politics and the re-alignment of the
electorate have necessitated major changes in the ideological postulates
and strategic postures of parties in both Israel and India. One could see a
perceptible changes in the political platforms of the pan parties in the two
nations where centrist orientations have come to guide their policies and
programs. With issues of peace, security, development and governance
replacing the core ideological issues of the parties—the left, right, cen-
ter—parties have also started gearing up to adjust and accommodate the
new and young voters who are guided more by governance and less by
populism.
The twenty-first-century Israel witnessed the growing prominence of
center parties presenting as the third-way alternative to the left and the
Notes 31
right and increasingly getting closer to the hearts of the electorate. The
contemporary politics in India on the other hand is showing signs of
re-alignment of electors, which are increasingly being accommodated by
the pan parties, particularly the right-wing BJP on the issues of develop-
ment and governance. With strong organizational roots and wide ideo-
logical platforms, the pan-Indian parties are making significant inroads
into the regional, state and local polities. The growing federalization of
Indian parliamentary politics has provided much needed space and scope
to the state and national parties to present viable alternatives to ensure
democratic sustenance.
How parties and party systems in both Israel and India have undergone
democratic transformations from pre-independence era to the post-
independence democratic polities would be the subject of further inves-
tigation and exploration in the subsequent parts of the book.
Notes
1. Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor, was the umbrella organization
in Israel comprising workers of different ideological shades. Though it was
formed in the pre-independence period, it came to occupy a significant
position in the post-independence political history of Israel.
2. The term Mapaivot is coined by the author and reflects a combination of
Mapai and Pivot. The term will be explained in detail in the following
chapters.
3. The Janata Parivar comprised five components of anti-Congress parties—
Bharatiya Lok Dal, Congress O, Socialists, Congress for Democracy and
Bharatiya Jana Sangh.
4. TINA refers to There Is No Alternative.
5. The idea of ‘Four Mems’ was coined by Gil Stern (Jerusalem Post,
17 February 2015) arguing for the case of Third Way in Israeli Polity.
The author added the fifth M, Maz’biya, showing the inclination and
orientation of young Israeli voters toward issues of peace, prosperity and
governance, particularly in the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the
twenty-first century.
6. Political Manifesto of BJP as NDA in 1996 didn’t include the core issues of
the party like building of Ram Temple in Ayodhya, Article 370 dealing
with Jammu and Kashmir and Uniform Civil Code for all communities,
including the Muslims.
7. The success of Yash Atid could be seen as one such attempt where the former
journalist Yair Lapid set up the party in 2012 in an attempt to bring together
the secular middle classes of Israeli society. In India, the formation of
AIADMK by M.G. Ramachandran in 1972, and later headed by
J. Jayalalitha, and Telugu Dessam Party by N.T. Rama Rao in 1982 are
some examples. Moreover, there are many examples where national and state
parties have given tickets to the lead media and film celebrities to win over the
voters. While BJP had cine stars of the Indian cinema, Dharmendra and
Hema Malini, Congress roped in Raj Babbar and Nagma, and Samajwadi
Party used Jaya Bhaduri Bachchan and Jaya Prada in national elections.
8. Rajiv Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi as heads of the Congress, Raj Thackray as
the leader of Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, Akhilesh Yadav heading the
Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal supremo Lalu Prasad Yadav’s sons
Tejashwi Prasad Yadav and Tej Pratap Singh Yadav, respectively, as the
current Deputy Chief Minister and the Minister of Health in the State
Government of Bihar are some of the examples.
References
Akzin, B. (1955). The role of parties in Israeli democracy. The Journal of
Democracy, XVII(4), 507–545.
Choudhary, S. K. (2016, September 15). Lensing 2014 from a voter’s perspective:
The road ahead. Sri Guru Nanak Dev Khalsa College, Univesity of Delhi.
Kothari, R. (1964). The congress system in India. Asian Survey, 4(12),
1161–1173.
Singh, M. P., & Saxena, R. (Eds.). (1996). India’s political agenda: Perspectives on
the party system. Delhi: Kalinga.
Yadav, Y. (2000). Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of
Bahujan participation in electoral politics in the 1990s. In F. R. Frankel et al.
(Eds.), Transforming India: Social and political dynamics of democracy. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Part II
Parties and the State Formation
Sharing a long and common history and culture, both Israel and India
have been nations from primitive times. Until the nineteenth century,
Israel was the nation in exile, whereas India as a nation had been a colony
of the British. The formation of State in both the nations began in the late
nineteenth century with the beginning of Zionism as national movement
in 1897 and the foundation of Indian National Congress in 1885.
Founded by Theodore Herzel, the Zionist movement actually laid the
foundation of Israeli political formations in the beginning of the twentieth
century. In India, on the other hand, Britisher A O Hume helped the
Indian leaders in setting up Indian National Congress in 1885.
As catalysts of democratic transformation, political parties played a vital
role in the formation of State, both in Israel and in India. While in Israel
the ‘nation in exile’ got political statehood with the active role of political
parties representing Zionist movement in 1948, State in India got its
legitimacy with political independence form the British Raj in 1947.
This part delves into the processes of state formation in both Israel and
India and seeks to examine the struggle for independence and the associ-
ated challenges faced by major political parties in the two nations.
3
Yishuv: The Pre-state Period in Israel
Israel has been seen in biblical history as the ‘nation in exile’. The Hebrew
Bible mentions Abraham as the patriarch of the Israelites, arriving in the
land of Canaan1 with his family and followers in approximately 1800 BC.
Though the land of Canaan was left by Abraham’s grandson Jacob who
went to Egypt with his family, it was only in 1300 BC that the Israelites
were taken back to Canaan under Moses, also called, Moshe Rabbenu—the
religious leader of the Israelites who survived for 199 years.2
The Biblical history of Israel considered Moses as the savior for the
enslaved Israelites from the Egyptian Pharaoh. It is believed that the
Pharaoh was worried with the increasing number of the Israelites who
might ally themselves with Egypt’s enemies. As a result, the Pharaoh
ordered the killing of all the newborn Hebrew boys to contain their
population. Moses was sent out of Egypt, but he returned later to free
his populace from slavery. The story could be related to Indian mythol-
ogy, where Kansa, the king of Mathura, imprisoned his sister based on the
prophesy that the seventh son of Devki would kill him. Later, Lord
Krishna was born and killed Kansa by freeing the state from evil tyranny.
Israel has also been known for decades as the ‘bastion of democracy in
the middle east’ (Horowitz and Lissak 1989: 144). The Jewish Bible

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_3
36 3 Yishuv: The Pre-state Period in Israel
mentions that the first and the only democracy that ever made its
penetration in the world had existed in Israel 1500 years before Christ.
According to the Holy Bible, the Jewish people elected 70 Jurists called
‘sages’ in order to govern themselves. The jury system, as an important
semblance of democracy, is said to be derived from Judaism, the Jewish
religion.
Much of the literary history of the Israelites who later turned into Jews
could be seen in sixth century BC when the Prussian king, Cyrus the
Great, after capturing Babylon in 538/39 BC, passed a decree asking all
the Jews to return to the Land of Israel, namely, Jerusalem. From 459 BC,
Jerusalem became the center for Jewish worship and habitation. The
dispersal of the Jews to their homeland from sixth century BC is generally
called ‘diaspora’ in world political discourse. The dispersal later came to be
known as Aliyah where the Jews were encouraged to return to the Land of
Israel.
Aliyah
Aliyah has its own salience in the Hebrew literature, history and formation
of society and state. Defined as an ‘act of going up’, Aliyah referred to the
movement of Jews from diaspora to the Land of Israel, that is Jerusalem.
The Jewish Aliyah underwent different waves of immigration and can be
classified under three main periods as under:
1. Pre-Zionist Aliyah
2. Zionist Aliyah
3. Post-Zionist Aliyah
Pre-Zionist Aliyah
The first period of the Jewish immigration began in the thirteenth century
and continued until eighteenth century. The pre-Zionist period broadly
witnessed the Aliyah of the Babylonian Jews and the Karaite Jews.3 Two
Aliyah 37
factors contributed to the migration of diasporic Jews to the Land of

Israel, namely, religious persecution and spiritual yearning. While the
Jews from England, France and some other European states were forced
to leave Europe for fear of religious persecution, the Jews from Russia,
Poland and North Africa were guided by ‘resurgence of messianic fervor’
with a spiritual yearning to return to the Land of Israel.
Zionist Aliyah: The Yishuv
While the immigration of Jews before the beginning of the process of state
formation didn’t get any political orientation, the formation of Zionism
and Zionist movement from late nineteenth century came to be charac-
terized as Yishuv. ‘Yishuv and the State of Israel were built up by waves of
immigration in a continuous process of absorption and expansion’
(Eisenstad 1967: 5).
The late nineteenth century witnessed major immigration of Jews to
the Land of Israel. The Jewish immigration from the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was greatly supported and pioneered by the
Zionist movement as World Zionist Organization (WZO) led by Theodor
Herzl in 1897. Derived from the word ‘Zion’, the term Zionism refers to
Jerusalem. Originally a movement to transform ‘nation in exile’ to an
independent Jewish nation-state, Zionism stood for the protection, pro-
motion and preservation of the Jewish culture, identity and the nation.
As a political organization and movement, Theodor Herzl greatly
contributed in facilitating the Jewish Aliyah during this period as part of
Zionism. After Herzl, it was Chaim Weizmann who expedited and
executed the immigration of the Jews to the Land of Israel.
Two important waves of Jewish immigration could be seen during this
period. The first Aliyah (1882–1903) witnessed approximately 35,000
Jews coming from Russian Empire and Yemen settling down in areas
under the Ottoman Empire; the second Aliyah (1904–14) saw around
40,000 Jews reaching the Ottoman Empire mainly from Russia to protect
themselves from pogroms and anti-Semitism in that country.
World War I (1914–1918) reflected a humiliating defeat of the Otto-
man Empire, resulting in its annexation and occupation as UN-mandated
territory by the British. The inter-war period thus brought about three
main Jewish Aliyah (1919–1939).4 While the third Aliyah was guided by
the desire to come to the UN-mandated territory, the Palestine, as settlers
to undertake different occupations and professions, the fourth and fifth
Aliyah were the result of the growing feeling of anti-Semitism, particularly
in the Nazi-ruled states.
Establishment and claim for greater Israel, called Eretz Israel, was the
common denominator among all the Zionists. The Zionist movement was
based on the ancient historical affinity and the religious bonding linking
the Jewish people all across the world to the Land of Israel. Zionism did
not have a uniform ideology, but was evolved as discourses through
different shades of ideologies. Three prominent ideological shades of
Zionism could be identified as the Labor Zionism, Revisionist Zionism
and Religious Zionism.
The Zionist period was marked by the scattering of Jews in Palestine,
described as Yishuv. Yonathan Shapiro categorized the presence of the
Jewish community in Palestine as Old Yishuv and New Yishuv—the
former representing the religious Jews, and the latter comprising of
the nationalist Jews. The rise and growth of political groupings
representing different shades of opinion, strategies, and tactics of mobili-
zation, and absorption of the aliyot5 into their own cohesive strata
influenced the political trends of the Yishuv to a considerable extent.
One can broadly classify the evolution and growth of political parties in
Yishuv under three broad categories, namely, left, right and religious.
Left/Labor/Socialist Zionism
The left ideology under Yishuv to be defined as the Labor or Socialist

Zionism came to be represented by Ahdut Ha’avodah6 formed in 1919.
Ahdut Ha’avodah was, in fact, the first organized political group to be
characterized as a formal political party. By providing welfare organiza-
tions, health services and loan funds for its members, Ahdut Ha’avodah,
according to Yonathan Shapiro (1976), became the actual ‘role model’ for
other parties. The left political tendencies in the Yishuv came to be
Aliyah 39
characterized by the labor movement because the founders of the move-

ment had been brought up in the Russian socialist political culture.
The organizational strength of the Labor Zionism could be seen in
terms of its leadership skill absorbing successfully the new immigrants as
well as acting as the umbrella organization accommodating divergent
sections of society. Its organization included members of agricultural
settlements (Kibbutzim and Moshavim), urban workers, professionals,
artisans, women, youth, ethnic groups and the religiously observant
groups.
One of the important contributions of the Labor Zionism under
Yishuv was the creation and promotion of Kibbutzim and Moshavim.
While Kibbutz meant gathering and collective living of the members
relying on the principles of equality, sharing property and imbibing
fraternity predominantly working in the agricultural sector, Moshavim
emerged as the ‘cooperative agricultural community’ of Labor Zionism.
With the passage of time, Kibbutzim started producing leaders for parties
and other political organizations. Realizing the significance of the grass-
roots entities, other schools of Zionism also started setting up their
respective Kibbutzim and Moshavim.
With village as the center of unit under Kibbutz7 and individual as part
of Moshavim, Indian experience of Panchayats and Municipalities during
pre-independence era broadly was similar. Panchayats as ‘units of self-
government’ started becoming precursor to democratic institutions in
post-independence politics of India as Kibbutz and Moshav did under
Yishuv.
In order to establish its control and dominance in the new political set
up, Mapai advocated the goal of Social Zionism. The moderation in its
ideological pronouncements legitimized its acceptance. Its ideological
appeals and commitments, policy promises and rewards largely influenced
all sections of the society.
The informal party structures under Yishuv represented by the left-
dominated Ahdut Ha’avodah witnessed conflicts between the Old
Guards and Young Turks or between the veterans and the newcomers,
which Shapiro (1980) characterized as ‘conflicts between the generational
units’. However, the party leaders created a non-partisan organization of
the Jewish laborers called Histadrut,8 for carrying out all the economic
and financial tasks of the party in 1921.
It was on the basis of the ‘rapport system’ of negotiations between the
two generational units that both Ahdut Ha’avodah and Hapoel Hatzair
finally agreed to form a new political entity in 1930 called Mapai
(Mifleget Poalei Eretz-Israel—the Workers Party of the Land of Israel).
However, as this unification was broadly the outcome of the desire of the
top party leadership of the two discreet parties, the merger was viewed
only as ‘unification of leaders’ rather than ‘unification of parties’ (Ibid.).
In the Yishuv, Ahdut Ha’avodah in the beginning, and Mapai subse-
quently, succeeded in establishing its organizational as well as spiritual
dominance among the Jewish immigrants. Yonathan Shapiro viewed
Mapai as ‘the epitome of a machine party’ (Shapiro 1980: 26) for its
principles, working methods and style, and it started becoming dominant
in the Yishuv. The key to the organizational success of Mapai was its
gaining control of the economic organizations of the Histadrut—the
agricultural settlements, the cooperatives, the welfare organizations and
so forth—whereas its spiritual dominance was ensured by the ideological
consensus of its socialist-Zionist ideology.
Histadrut was the unique contribution of Labor Zionism to Yishuv and
post-State formation of Israel. It was created to handle the economic
absorption of the new immigrants in 1920. It set up various organizations
under its panoply—financial and industrial enterprises (agricultural com-
munes and cooperatives), Bureau of Public Works, Worker’s Bank, trade
unions and other welfare agencies. The money for all the Histadrut’s
economic activities was supplied primarily by WZO.
Peter Medding characterized Histadrut as “a microcosm of the future
independent Jewish state; it was the ‘state on the way’” (Medding 1972:
9). Others described Histadrut as “quasi-state” based on the self-rule for
the working class. Shapiro viewed Histadrut as “class democracy” as it
catered to the needs of all laborers and peasants regardless of political
affiliations and beliefs.
‘While the Histadrut was an economic organization, it was run by
politicians in accordance with political norms’ (Shapiro 1976: 207).
The bureaucratic politicians running the Histadrut enterprises were
asked to be subordinated to their political mentors. Party cells were
Aliyah 41
created in all the organizations, both within and outside the purview of
Histadrut, to show that the party was keenly interested in improving their
standard of living.
After independence, the Histadrut actually emerged as one of the most
powerful organization, which started controlling the state and the gov-
ernment. It actually acted as the ‘quasi-state’ and came to be defined as the
‘state within state’. The leadership of Mapai established its strong nexus
with the Histadrut. As a result, the party leadership succeeded in control-
ling the management of the Histadrut both in the Yishuv and in the new
state.
In view of the salience of Mapai and significance of the Histadrut, the
post-independence Jewish society witnessed the transfer and implemen-
tation of the political process and democratic structure of the two orga-
nizations of the Yishuv under new state formation.
Right Zionism
The right group of political tendencies under Yishuv could be seen in the
Revisionist Party formed by Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky. The Revisionist
group mainly represented middle class petty bourgeoisie. It tried to absorb
economically well-off sections of the middle-class immigrants from
Europe.
The Revisionist movement took its sustenance from its youth organi-
zation called Betar, which was formed in the 1930s and hailed hero
worship, militarism and disciplined life. Betar became the ‘main politici-
zation agent of Revisionist activists, pioneers, and fighters’ (Sprinzak
1991: 26). As the head of Betar, Jabotinsky soon came to be viewed ‘as
the embodiment of the national ideal rather than the representative of the
consensual wishes of the membership – the triumph of military discipline
over democratic argument’ (Shindler 1995: 15). His fiery speeches in the
World Zionist Congress continued imparting the political legitimacy to
the Revisionist movement in addition to increasing its organizational
strength. Shindler cites the phenomenal increase in the votes for Revi-
sionist candidates at Zionist Congress from 500 in 1925 to 8438 in 1927,
to 18,000 in 1929, to 55,848 in 1931 and to 96,818 in 1933.
The nationalistic ideology of the Revisionists further spread its tentacles

with the formation of Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) (National Military Orga-
nization) in 1937. The IZL emerged as a right-wing nationalist paramil-
itary organization, which believed in expelling the British and the Arab in
Palestine through the underground guerilla warfare activities.
The early history of the Revisionist movement also witnessed
co-existence of radical/extreme and the moderate groups. Jabotinsky’s
moderate nationalism was disliked by another group of radical leaders
led by Abraham Stern (Yair). On the issue of cooperating with the internal
foe (the British) or siding with the external enemy (the Nazis) during
World War II, Stern and his followers left the Irgun and formed another
extremist underground terrorist organization called Lehi (Lohamei Herut
Israel [LHI] or Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) in 1940.
The Revisionist movement failed to attain its influential position in
Yishuv because of the institutionalized dominance of the socialist block.
Its revolutionary activities conducted through Irgun and Lehi did not
succeed comprehensively in driving the British out of Palestine. Lack of
control on WZO, paucity of funds and weakened organizational struc-
tures created greater handicaps for it to allure the new influx of the
immigrants. Its ideological and political platform of embracing the
whole of the historic Land of Israel failed to be materialized in view of
the partition of the state. And when the new state was proclaimed in the
aftermath of the British exit in 1948, the Revisionist movement could not
have comprehensive followers and strong supporters.
Religious Zionism
The religious front in the Yishuv comprised moderate as well as radical

parties. It was broadly dominated by the religious Jews who were preoc-
cupied with worship and populated into the holy cities like Jerusalem.
Mizrahi (Merkas Ruhani), founded in 1902, and Hapoel Hamizrahi
(The Mizrahi Worker) formed in 1922, were the significant political
groupings of the religious front during this period.
Stephen Oren described the Mizrahi Party as a small ‘party of notables’
(Oren 1973: 38), which was mainly a party of shopkeepers and rabbis.
Parties and the Constitution Making 43
The party acted as the spiritual center of the religious Zionists. The need of
the party activists to have their separate socio-economic structures paved
the way for the emergence of Hapoel Hamizrahi, which came to serve as
the trade union of the Mizrahi Party. Following the patterns of Histadrut,
the Hapoel Hamizrahi also created its own industrial enterprises and
agricultural cooperatives in its attempt to conform the immigrants to
the religious ethos.
Notwithstanding the ideological differences, all the prevailing political
groupings across left-right-religious spectrum in the Yishuv broadly agreed
on one objective, namely, the creation of an independent Jewish state in
Palestine, which came to be described as Zionism.9 The only difference
that occurred among them was the enforcement of the Zionist ideology.
Parties and the Constitution Making

In view of preoccupation of political parties addressing socio-economic-
cultural issues of Aliyah under Yishuv, little time was left for them to
undertake the major task of constitution making. The end of World War
II had already hinted the transition of political power to the new State,
and Yishuv didn’t have any formal and direct colonial experience of
political representation, as was the case with British India.
With Israel’s Declaration of Independence in May 1948 came the
proposal for drafting the constitution within a short span of six months,
not later than 1 October 19480 . However, the conflicting ideological
schools within Zionism failed to bring any common consensus bringing
all of them to a common, formal and unified constitutional document.
Believing in the sanctity and sacrosanct nature of Torah, the religious
parties didn’t accept the sovereignty of any other political document over
the religious one. Accordingly, any attempt to have a constitution would
inter alia challenge the religious and spiritual supremacy of Torah.
Similarly, the voice of opposition to a common constitution from the
Socialist Zionist School also came from its leader, Ben-Gurion, for whom
the fledging state, which was still struggling to focus on defense, security,
immigration, construction and development, didn’t have much time to
design, define and drive10 a constitution. Among the Zionists, only the
Revisionist School wanted to have a written constitution in line with the

Declaration of Independence.
However, after incessant debate and discourse on the issue, a compro-
mise formula was devised in June 1950, called Harari Resolution,
suggesting a series of basic laws to be drafted by the Parliament, hence-
forth to be called Knesset.
Post-Zionist Aliyah
Backed by different political parties, the Zionist movement finally laid the
foundation of an independent State of Israel in May 1948. The post-
Zionist Aliyah was backed by the incorporation of the principle of the Law
of Return, which promised both citizenship and residency to the immi-
grating Jews to the new State of Israel. The post-Zionist Aliyah witnessed
immigration of Jews from different parts of the world, particularly the
west-Asian countries, North Africa, North America and France.
A significant transformation of the Israeli society took place with the
disintegration of former Soviet Union and the immigration of Jews from
the post-Soviet States to Israel in great numbers. While the Jews coming
from Europe until 1950s were mostly of higher education and profession
and hence came to be described as Ashkenazim, the post-Soviet Jews were
mostly of the menial and labor professions and came to be characterized as
Sephardim.
State and politics in Israel were broadly influenced by different and
divergent social composition of Aliyah, as the immigrating Jewish popu-
lace started becoming the vote bank of respective political parties in post-
independence Israel.
Notes
1. The land of Canaan extends from Lebanon southward to Egypt and
eastward to the Jordon river valley.
2. According to the Hebrew Bible, Moses was born in 1400 BCE and died
1201 BCE, thus surviving for 199 years.
References 45
3. It is stated that the Babylonian Jews were greatly inspired by the rabbinic
learning and hence started settling in Israel as the rabbis and religious
leaders, whereas the Karaite Jews remained under the Persian rule and
asked their followers to move and settle in Jerusalem.
4. The Third Aliyah (1919–1923), Fourth Aliyah (1924–1929) and the
Fifth Aliyah (1929–1939) witnessed massive immigration of Jews to the
UN-mandated territory.
5. Aliyot refers to immigrants. The formation of Israel in 1949 is constituted
by five different waves of immigrations.
6. Two other left front minor organizations besides Ahdut Ha’avodah were
Hashomer Hatzair and Hapoel Hatzair. While Hapoel Hatzair later
merged with Ahdut Ha’avodah and formed Mapai, Hashomer Hatzair
merged with Ha’Tnuah La’Ahdut Ha’avoda (The Movement of the
Unity of Labour), and subsequently formed Mapam (Mifleget Poalim
Meuchedet), United Workers Party, in 1948.
7. The first Kibbutz established under Yishuv was in Degania in 1909. It is
stated that by the first decade of the twenty-first century, Israel has
270 Kibbutz.
8. Histadrut (General Federation of Labour) was created to handle the
economic absorption of the new immigrants in 1920. It consisted of all
workers—socialists and non-socialists, Zionists and non-Zionists. It set up
various organizations under its panoply—financial and industrial enter-
prises, welfare agencies, trade unions. It had economic enterprises (agri-
cultural communes and cooperatives), Bureau of Public Works (engaged
in construction projects, later became a shareholding company—Solel
Boneh), Worker’s Bank.
9. Viewed as an ideology, Zionism refers to the creation of an independent
Jewish state.
10. The phrase ‘Triple Ds’—design, define and drive—was used by students of
political science, University of Delhi, in their presentation of the course,
‘Society, State and Politics: Comparing Israel and India’ on
7 March 2017.
References
Eisenstad, S. N. (1967). The Israeli society. New York: Basic Books.
Horowitz, D., & Lissak, M. (Eds.). (1989). Trouble in Utopia: The overburdened
polity of Israel. Albany: The State University of New York Press.
Medding, P. Y. (1972). Mapai in Israel: Political organization and government in a

new society. London: Cambridge University Press.
Oren, S. (1973). Continuity and change in Israeli religious parties. Middle East
Journal, 27, 36–37.
Shapiro, Y. (1976). The formative years of the Israeli labour party: The organization
of power, 1919–1930. London: Sage.
Shapiro, Y. (198?). The party system and democracy in Israel. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv
University.
Shindler, C. (1995). Israel, Likud and the Zionist dream: Power, politics and
ideology from begin to Netanyahu. London: I.B. Tauris.
Sprinzak, E. (1991). The ascendance of Israel’s radical right. New York: Oxford
University Press.
4
Indian National Congress: From
a ‘Safety Valve’ to the Political Pioneer
of Freedom Struggle
Unlike Israel, India has always been a nation and nation-state. With its
rich mythological history, India has been described in the Vedas and
Upanishads1 as Sone Ki Chidiya (‘Golden Sparrow’). Indian mythology
has many incidents that can be linked to the Jewish mythology. Both
Hinduism and Judaism thus contain many similar traditions and conven-
tions, the most important being the fact that both the religions do not
preach conversion, although they do talk about re-conversion. Further,
the Jewish Bible mentions Abraham, the Jewish spiritual leader and
worshipper of God, equivalent to Brahma, the creator of the universe
according to Hindu mythology.
The literary history of India could be seen in three periods, namely, the
Ancient India, the Medieval India and the Modern India. While the
ancient Indian history would see the Empire of Magadha in the North
and the Vijay Nagar Hindu Empire in the South, the medieval history was
the history of Islamic invasion, with the Mughal dominance throughout
India. The onset of modernism could be seen with the British Raj (rule)
controlling India and bringing almost all parts of the country under one
colonial rule, particularly from eighteenth century onward.

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_4
48 4 Indian National Congress: From a ‘Safety Valve’ to. . .
The first collective rebellion against the British Raj took place in 1857,
which witnessed the participation from almost all sections of the society.
The British Raj dismissed the movement as merely a ‘sepoy mutiny’
(a military uprising), which was ruthlessly suppressed. The last of the
Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, was imprisoned, and the whole of
India was placed under the colonial rule. The rule of the East India
Company was also overtaken by the British Crown.
As organized vehicles of mass participation and electoral representation,
political parties entered the political battle with the formation of Indian
National Congress in 1885. While 1857 is seen as the first freedom struggle
for India, the first organized political initiative towards Indian independence
took place under Indian National Congress which actually became political
pioneers of the country’s freedom. Anticipating the organized political
movement by the Indian populace against the British Raj, the colonial
masters thought of creating a political organization that would act as a buffer
zone between the masses and the Raj. Hence, the idea of a political party
under the name of Indian National Congress was allowed to be set
up. Devised as ‘safety valve’ by A O Hume, the Indian National Congress
sought to bridge the gap between colonial Raj and the colonized populace.
The Congress became the pioneer of India’s freedom movement. From
1885 to 1947, the leadership of the Congress was placed under three
important phases:
1. Moderate Leadership, 1885–1907

2. Extremist Leadership, 1907–1914
3. Gandhian Leadership, 1914–1947
The Moderates
In its formative years, the Congress leadership was held by the Moderates
like S N Banerjee, Dada Bhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale. The
Moderates formulated the policies and programs of the early Congress by
championing peaceful methods such as ‘prayers, petitions and protests’
defined as ‘Triple Ps’ in order to enlighten the Indian masses as well as
to awaken the British rulers for ensuring administrative reforms through
legislative actions in India.
The Extremists 49
Though having trust in the British Raj with a focus on the philosophy
of ‘constitutional agitation’, the Moderates tried to train the Indian masses
in constitutional democratic practices. The constitutional agitation was
inspired by the new outlook of renaissance, reformation and Western
political literature. The Moderates looked toward the Raj for guiding
Indian people to overcome their social and cultural backwardness and
for training them in the art of representative government. They consid-
ered the interests of the Raj and India allied rather than antagonistic.
Believing in orderly progress in alliance with and with the aid of the
British nation, the Moderates rejected all revolutionary sudden changes
and methods of struggle. The Moderates thus did win over the hearts of
the people on the one hand and the trust of the British Raj on the other.
The British were, however, quick to realize that the safety valve theory
would ultimately threaten the colonial survival as Congress had started
getting political legitimacy across the nation through political
mobilization.
Scared of Congressional predominance, the British started equating it
with Hindu hegemony on the one hand, and by propping up a parallel
Muslim organization on the other. The formation of Muslim League in
1906 was thus an outcome of strategic overtures of the British. The
British also succeeded in dividing the Congress on the issue of Bengal
partition.2 ‘The Britishers thus found the opportunity to use the "divide
and rule" policy and political parties actually provided the fertile terrain to
the British design of colonial expansion and consolidation’ (Sunil 2010:
96–97).
The Extremists
The Surat split of the Congress in 1907 overshadowed the modest
political achievements of the Moderates and paved the way for the
emergence of Extremists. Popularly called ‘Lal-Bal-Pal’, the trio of the
Congressional extremists under the leadership of Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal
Gangadhar Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal not only criticized the policies
of the Moderates as ‘political mendicancy’ but also advocated new
strategies like swadeshi, boycott, national education and united action to

accomplish Swaraj (self-government) under the banner of the Congress.
The political propaganda of the Extremists instilled a feeling of national
self-respect and self-confidence among the people who, instead of looking
to the British for political freedom as counseled by the Moderates, began
to rely on their own strength for achieving it. The extremists undertook
various measures to awaken the people against the unjust and exploitative
rule of the Raj. Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s Marathi newspaper, Kesari,
attempted to galvanize and educate the masses against the Raj. Calling
the colonial structure of the Raj as ‘immoral’, Tilak argued that the basic
functions of the State would be not only to protect Dharma but also to
provide the congenial environment in which Dharma could be promoted.
The State which failed to protect Dharma should be overthrown. Similar
attempts and initiatives were also taken by Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipin
Chandra Pal in Panjab3 and Bengal regions, respectively.
Gandhian Era and Movement Toward

Independence
The Congress underwent transformation under Mahatma Gandhi. With
his unique strategies of truth, non-violence and Satyagraha,4 as well as his
charismatic mass following, Gandhi was able to steer the Congress toward
a new mission of independent India. His initial call for Indian support for
the British in the ongoing world war during 1914–1918 brought him
laurels from the colonial Raj. His efforts to forge unity between the
Moderates and the Extremists within the Congress on the one hand and
between the Congress and the Muslim League on the other further
strengthened his political stature in the Indian national movement. Con-
gress under Gandhi started extending its organizational tentacles to all
parts of the country. ‘Gandhi imparted all India character to the Congress
and Gandhian endeavors transformed the Congress as an all-inclusive
umbrella organization’ (Ibid.).
The disenchantment within the Congress, especially after the suspen-
sion of the non-cooperation movement in view of violence at
Gandhian Era and Movement Toward Independence 51
Chauri Chaura5 in 1922, also led to the formation of Swaraj Party by C

R Roy and Moti Lal Nehru. The Swaraj party was founded by the
erstwhile Congressmen who wanted to ensure continuity to the political
momentum in the aftermath of non-cooperation suspension.
‘The party did not shed its Congressional gown and it continued to
fight the legislative elections under the same umbrella with a different
name, namely, the Congress Khilafat Swaraj Party’. While the Congress
Swarajists came to be known as ‘pro changers’6 who wanted to enter the
legislative councils in order to ‘work and wreck’ from within, those who
were dissatisfied with the new political group and had absolute faith in
Gandhian leadership were called ‘no changers’. Under Gandhian persua-
sion, both the pro changers and no changers were allowed to work in
separate ways without weakening and splitting the Congress the
Surat way.
Realizing that the Congress had sought to undermine the interests of
the majority of the Hindus for appeasing Muslims, the Hindu votaries
formed Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha in December 1913 and the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925. According to Craig
Baxter, ‘the Mahasabha was a forum within the Congress, in which
Mahasabha members could express Hindu views and work for the pro-
tection of the Hindu interests’ (Baxter 1971: 10). However, while the
Hindu Mahasabha emerged to counter both the Congress and the League
politically, the RSS challenged them culturally.
Set up by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1913, the Hindu Mahasabha
emerged to counter the influence of the Muslim League. Its cardinal
principles were unity and integrity of the country. It sought to integrate
all the isolated regions into one organic Hindu nation. In this way, it came
to be confined to Hindus and was overtly hostile to Pakistan. It
condemned the Congress for ignoring the interests of the Hindus. In
this way, ‘the Mahasabha presented itself as a credible rival both to the
Congress and the League’ (Sunil 2001). However, owing to its preoccu-
pation with the upper-caste Hindus and socially conservative views on
different issues, the Mahasabha failed to make any decisive impact in the
post-independence Indian polity.
The RSS, on the other hand, was founded in 1925 by Keshav Baliram
Hedgewar to bring about an all-round regeneration of the Hindu society.
The aims and objects of the Sangh were ‘to organize, revitalize and
rejuvenate different groups within Hindu society and to awaken the
feeling of selfless social service based on national self-respect, patriotism
and dignity. On the basis of Dharma and Sanskriti, the Sangh sought to
achieve an all-sided development of the Bharatvarsha’ (Ibid.).
The RSS defined itself as a cultural organization, and not a political
party. It never attempted to make any quest for political power. It wanted
to work for the nation by keeping aside the ‘self’, which was not possible
by being a part of any party. In fact, the Sangh ideologues did not want to
play second fiddle to any political party. Hence, the Sangh discarded the
idea of giving a political shape to their organization.
The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 also strengthened class
formation of political parties across the world. Enamored of the Commu-
nist Movement, the Communists in India formed Communist Party of
India in 1925. Initially, the Communists were unorganized and were
working in different groups. The antipathy of the Raj vis-à-vis the
Communist Russia, the Communist activities were banned by the Raj.
Some of their members had already been charged in different conspira-
cies7 against the Raj.
Opposing the Congress from the beginning, the Communists
supported and later joined the left wing of the Congress, namely, Con-
gress Socialist Party. The Communists couldn’t challenge the Congress
dominance democratically, so they started controlling the workers
through the All India Trade Union Congress. However, the Communists
did not get much headway as the workers and the peasants had collectively
associated with the Congress partly due to Gandhian charismatic leader-
ship and partly due to the Congress-led peasant and workers associations
during the inter-war period.
While the Communists came closer to the Raj by supporting the
British during World War II (1939–44), their opposition to the
Gandhi-led Quit India Movement (1942) broadly isolated them from
the mainstream freedom movement of India.
The dyarchy in 1919 and provincial autonomy in 1935 were the out-
comes of the consistent struggle of Congress for democratic participation
and legislative representation. Under the system of provincial autonomy,
the Congress fought the electoral battle and formed governments in seven
Parties and the Constitution Making 53
provincial assemblies (out of a total eleven) in 1937. The electoral success

of the Congress established its political legitimacy and democratic pre-
dominance across India; it also shattered the ‘Leaguee’ ambitions by
exposing its democratic hollowness as well as its false claims of
representing the exclusive Muslim interests in India.
The later part of the 1930s also witnessed an increasing sectarianism
among the Muslim leadership, particularly Jinnah. In its failure to defeat
the Congress democratically in the system of electoral representation,
Jinnah and the Muslim League took recourse to ‘two nation theory’ by
spearheading the demand for Pakistan. Gandhian overtures failed to
contain Jinnah and the League. ‘Unable to placate the League under
Jinnah on democratic secular principles, the Congress finally yielded to
accept the partition disgracefully in 1947’ (Sunil 2010: 100).
The Congressional predominance in the pre-independence era can thus
be equated with the Mapai dominance in the pre-independent Israeli
democratic polity.
Parties and the Constitution Making

As was the case with Israel, the end of World War II also facilitated the
British in transition of power to India. Indian Independence Act 1947 was
preceded by the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), where the provisions for an
interim government and formation of the Constitution were made.
Jawaharlal Nehru was made the head of the Interim Government and
was asked to expedite the process of independence. The members of the
Constituent Assembly who were authorized to draft the constitution for
an independent India were elected from across British Provinces and
Indian States.8
The Constituent Assembly was given the herculean task of framing a
Constitution for an independent India. All political parties made their
representations in the Constituent Assembly. The members of the Con-
stituent Assembly comprised the elites, the intellectuals, the Chief Min-
isters of Provinces, the Congress workers besides members from the
Muslim League, the Akali Dal, the Forward Block and the Independents.
Like the prevalence of different shades of Zionism under Yishuv, the

Constituent Assembly also reflected the dominance of three prominent
ideological schools, namely, the Gandhians, the Socialists and the Lib-
erals.9 The Constituent Assembly worked through five Committees,
namely, Statutory, Rules, Union Subjects, Advisory, Drafting. It took
2 years, 11 months, 18 days for the Constitution to be drafted.
The Draft Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly on
26 November 1949, and it came into effect on 26 January 1950. The date
26 January was actually chosen to commemorate the declaration of
independence in 1930. The Constitution declared the Union of India
to be a sovereign, democratic republic,10 assuring its citizens of justice,
equality and liberty, and endeavors to promote among them all, fraternity.
With 22 parts, 8 schedules and 395 articles,11 the Constitution of India is
one of the biggest, comprehensive and detailed Constitutions laying down
the framework defining fundamental political principles; establishing the
structure, procedures, powers and duties of the government; and spelling
out the fundamental rights, directive principles and duties of citizens. It is the
longest written constitution of any sovereign country in the world.
The founding fathers believed that the success of the Constitution
would be based on the intention and the spirit in which its provisions
would be implemented.
Notes
1. The primitive richness of Indian history could be traced to the Hindu
scriptures called Vedas [the Rig-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda and
Atharva-Veda] and Upanishads.
2. Bengal was partitioned by the British into East Bengal and West Ben-
gal—the former had the Muslim majority, whereas the latter had Hindu
dominance. The British explained the partition as administrative expedi-
ency, but it came to be characterized as a communal polarization between
the two communities—Hindus and Muslims.
3. The present Punjab in India in its earlier undivided form was called
Panjab.
References 55
4. Satyagraha was Gandhian tool of protest and resistance, which means

‘holding firmly to truth’.
5. A place in Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh, where an angry mob put on fire the
police station by killing all the policemen. Gandhi was so perturbed with
the incident that he called off the entire movement.
6. N C Kelkar, H S Suhrawardy, Subhash Chandra Bose besides M N Roy
and C R Das constituted the pro-changers group.
7. The Cawnpore (now Kanpur) Conspiracy was lodged against the leading
Communist leaders of the time in March 1924, like M N Roy, S A Dange
and others on the charge that they were attempting to overthrow the Raj
through violent revolution. Similarly, the Communist leaders were also
charged under Meerut Conspiracy case in 1929.
8. British India comprised 11 British Provinces and 565 Princely States.
Total membership of the Constituent Assembly was 323. Members of the
Constituent Assembly were elected from among the British Provinces and
Princely States on the basis of property and education.
9. Some of the Gandhians in the Constituent Assembly were Rajendra
Prasad, J B Kripalani, B Pattabhi Sitaramayya; the Socialists comprised
Somnath Lahiri, Renuka Ray, Shibban Lal Saxena; the Liberals included
Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardal Patel, Maulana Azad, K M Munshi, Minoo
Masani and Alladi Krishna Swami Iyer.
10. The words socialist and secular got added to the Preamble of the Consti-
tution by 42nd Amendment in 1976.
11. The Constitution now has 21 parts [4 new sub-parts got added,
1 repealed, totalling 25 in number], 12 schedules [4 new schedules
were added to 8, making 12] and 395 articles [53 sub-articles got
added, leading to 448 articles]. Addition with sub didn’t change the
primary number of the parts and articles.
References
Baxter, C. (1971). The Jana Sangh: A biography of an Indian political party.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Sunil Kumar. (2001). Communalism and secularism in Indian politics: Study of
BJP. Delhi/Jaipur: Rawat Publications.
———. (2010). Pluralism and a second democratic upsurge. Eternal India,
2(6), 95–109.
Part III
Parties in the Post-independence Polities:
From Predominance to Pluralism
The party systems in Israel and India can be studied in terms of their
different evolutionary phases; each of the phases entails salient character-
istics of its own and in turn differs from others, thereby representing both
significant continuity and remarkable change, which the chapter tends to
encapsulate as a shift from ‘Predominance’ to ‘Pluralism’.
The part examines the changing nature of party systems of the two
nations in three phases. Three chapters of the part highlight the
transforming nature of the party systems from ‘one-party dominance
system’ to ‘two-party system’ or ‘bi-block polarity’, and finally ‘one-
party-led coalition’ to be called ‘Coalitional Multipolarity’. While the
Indian party system in its first phase was theorized in party literature,
no such theoretical attempt has been made for the Israeli party system.
The part underlines a shift of predominance to pluralism in terms of
ushering into the era of multiparty system.
The salience of the part could be seen in terms of its theorization
besides commonalities, continuity and change.
5
Mapaivot vs Congress System
Political parties in Israel and India are governed through rules and
regulations framed by the Parliament from time to time. While in Israel
the Party Law 1992 provides for ‘a standardized legal framework for the
constitution and operation of parties and behavior of the members’
(Peretz and Doron 1997), Indian Constitution makes the provision for
parties under Article 324 through the Election Commission of India.
The Israeli Party Law 1992 underlines the following two key principles
and conditions for the formation and working of parties:
I Every party should have a centre/convention responsible for the decision

making process.
II (i) A party should not deny the existence of Israel both as a Jewish and
democratic state.
(ii) A party should not have a racist message against the Jews and the
non-Jews.
(iii) A party should not act as a cover for illegal activities. (Ibid.: 74)
Similarly, the Constitution of India assigns the task of holding elections

to the Election Commission of India under Article 324. The Election
Commission of India is a constitutional body with its independent

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_5
60 5 Mapaivot vs Congress System
working, free from the interference of the Executive. Besides making rules
and regulations for the parties and candidates along with classification of
parties, the Election Commission also ensures holding of elections from
local bodies to the legislative institutions of states and the center.
The Israel Party systems in both Israel and India have witnessed three
broad transformations in the working of their democratic polities in the
past seven decades of their post-independence history. These three major
transformations could be underlined as follows:
1. One-party-dominated system—‘Mapaivot’ (1949–1967) vs ‘Congress

System’ (1952–1967)
2. Mahapach (1977–92) vs Janata Parivar (1977–79)
3. Coalitional multipolarity (1989-to date)
Mapaivot (1949–1967)
Post-independence Israel is dominated by Mapai, which also spearheaded
the struggle for Israeli independence from the British rule in Palestine in
1948. The first phase of the Israeli party system existed for two decades,
from 1949 when the first elections for Knesset were held to December
1967. The first phase broadly reflects the predominance of Mapai both in
administration and in government. The sixth Knesset elections that the
party contested during this phase accorded a pivotal position to Mapai in
terms of its sharing of seats and the percentage of votes. The seats and the
votes as captured by Mapai throughout the first phase remained more or less
consistent, thereby ensuring its dominance in the entire left-right spectrum
of Israeli political system. Figure 5.1 shows the dominance of Mapai in the
Knesset for a total of 120 seats during 1949–65 (also see Table 5.1).
Party analysts differed in their interpretation and classification of Israeli
party system during this phase. Duverger’s typologies appear to cite the
remnants of ‘one-party dominance’ in Mapai’s pivotal status in Israeli
party system. According to Duverger (1954), a dominant party is larger
than any other party heading the list and clearly outdistancing its rivals
over a certain period. Sartori (1976) in his classification finds the Israeli
Mapaivot (1949–1967) 61
50 46 47
45 45
42
40
40 37.3 38.2
35.7 36.7
34.7
32.2
30
Seats
20 Vote %
10
0
1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965
Fig. 5.1 Mapai in Knesset (1949–1965) (Source: Compiled from Central Bureau of
Statistics, Results of the Elections to the Fourteenth Knesset, 29.05.1996, Vol. A,
June 1997)
party system rather ‘baffling’. According to Sartori, Israeli turnouts in the

first two decades failed to suggest any definitive trends toward party
system theorization. Sartori does not describe Israel as the predominant-
party system because Mapai had never surpassed the 40 per cent mark, the
perquisite in his analysis for a party to be clubbed in this category.
Though Mapai’s dominance in the first two decades of Israeli polity
could not provide the party a status of ‘a predominant party system’, it
nonetheless constituted one of the strongest pillars of the party govern-
ment and coalitional polity during this period. The first phase of the
Israeli party system, which continued just before the formation of the
Israeli Labor Party, in January 1968, is described by the author as
‘Mapaivot’. The acronym Mapaivot usually refers to the intermixing of
‘Mapai’ with ‘Pivot’. The first two decades of the Israeli party politics
attempt to establish a clear-cut ascendancy of Mapai in the entire system
of governance and administration.
Mapaivot had its roots in the existence of four distinct cleavages1
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967) in the Israeli society since independence,
namely, the Jewish versus the Arab, the religious versus the secular, the
Ashkenazi versus the Sephardi and the affluent versus the poor. The
divisions based on nationality, religiosity, ethnicity and economic status
Table 5.1 The Knesset elections: 1949–2015
62
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Knesset elections 1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981
Eligible voters 506,567 924,885 1,057,795 1,218,483 1,271,285 1,499,709 1,748,710 2,037,478 2,236,293 2,490,014
5
Valid votes 434,684 687,492 853,219 969,337 1,006,964 1,206,728 1,367,743 1,566,855 1,747,820 1,937,366
Invalid votes 5511 7515 22,866 24,969 30,066 37,978 60,239 34,243 23,906 17,243

Actual voters 440,095 695,007 876,085 994,306 1,037,030 1,244,706 1,427,981 1,601,098 1,771,726 1,954,609
Qualifying threshold 4346 6874 8532 9693 10,070 12,067 13,677 15,668 17,478 19,373
(1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (1%)
Votes per seat 3592 5692 6938 7800 8332 9881 11,274 12,424 14,173 15,312
Contesting lists 21 17 18 24 14 17 16 21 22 31
Qualifying lists 12 15 12 12 11 13 13 10 13 10
Turnout (%) 86.9 75.1 82.8 81.6 81.6 83.0 81.7 78.6 79.2 78.5
XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX

Eligible voters 2,654,613 2,894,267 3,409,015 3,933,250 4,285,428 4,772,075 5,014,622 5,278,985 5,656,705 5,881,696
Valid votes 2,073,321 2,283,123 2,616,841 3,052,130 3,309,416 3,148,364 3,137,064 3,373,490 3,792,742 4,210,884
Invalid votes 18,081 22,444 21,102 67,702 64,332 52,409 49,675 43,097 40,904 43,854
Actual voters 2,091,402 2,305,567 2,637,943 3,119,832 3,373,748 3,200,773 3,186,739 3,416,587 3,833,646 4,254,738
Qualifying threshold 20,733 22,831 39,253 39,253 49,672 47,226 62,741 67,470 71,580 136,854
(1%) (1%) (1.5%) (1.5%) (1.5%) (1.5%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (3.25%)
Votes per seat 16,786 18,563 20,715 24,779 25,936 25,138 24,620 27,246 26,840 32,822
Contesting lists 26 27 25 20 31 27 31 33 32 25
Qualifying lists 15 15 10 11 15 13 12 12 12 10
Turnout (%) 79.8 79.7 77.4 79.3 78.7 68.5 63.6 64.7 67.7 72.3
Left block
Mapai, Labor 46 45 40 47 42 45 56 51 32 47
(35.7) (37.3) (32.2) (38.2) (34.7) (36.7) (46.2) (39.6) (24.6) (36.6)
(Alignment) (Alignment) (Alignment) (Alignment) (Alignment)
Mapam 19 15 9 9 9 8 * * * *
(14.7) (12.5) (7.3) (7.2) (7.5) (6.6)
Ahdut Ha’avodah # # 10 7 8 * ♠
(8.2) (6.0) (6.6)
Maki 4 5 6 3 5 1 1 ◙
(3.5) (4.0) (4.5) (2.8) (4.2) (1.1) (1.1)
Rafi 10
(7.9)
Meretz
Moqed 1 ☼
(1.4)
Shelli 2 0
(1.6) (0.4)
Ha’olam Hazeh 1 2 0 ☼
(1.2) (1.2) (0.7)
Total 69 65 65 66 64 65 59 52 34 47
(53.9) (53.8) (52.2) (54.2) (53.0) (53.5) (48.5) (41.7) (26.2) (37.0)

Left block
Mapai, Labor 44 39 44 34 26 19 19 13 15 24Θ
(34.9) (30.0) (34.6) (26.8) (20.2) (14.4) (15.6) (9.9) (11.3) (18.6)
(Alignment) (Labor) (Labor) (Labor) One Israel with Meimad with Meimad &
ЖAm Ehad
Mapam * 3 ♣
(2.5)
Ahdut Ha’avodah
Maki
Rafi
Meretz 12 9 10 6 5 3 6 5
(9.6) (7.4) (7.6) (5.2) (3.7) £ (2.9) € (4.5) (3.9)
Moqed
Shelli
Ha’olam Hazeh
Total 44 42 56 43 36 25 24 16 21 29
(34.9) (32.5) (44.2) (34.2) (27.8) (19.6) (19.3) (12.8) (15.9) (22.5)
#Part of Mapam, *Part of alignment, ♠ Merged with labor, ◙ Part of Moqed, ☼ Part of Shelli, ♣ Merged with Meretz, £ Transformed into Yahad and the Democratic Choice,
€ New Movement, Comprising Labor, Gesher, Meimad, Ж Em Ahad headed by Amir Perez, Θ Part of Zionist Union

Right block
Herut, Likud (1973–to date) 14 8 15 17 17 26 26 39 43 48
(11.5) (6.6) (12.6) (13.5) (13.8) (21.3) Gahal (21.7) Gahal (30.2) (33.4) (37.1)
63
(continued )
Table 5.1 (continued)
64
General Zionists 7 20 13 8 *
5
(5.2) (16.2) (10.2) (6.2)
Progressive Party 5 4 5 6 *

(4.1) (3.2) (4.4) (4.6)
Liberal Party 17 # #
(13.6)
Flatto- Sharon^ 1 0
(2.0) (0.6)
Shlomzion 2 ☼
(1.9)
Kach – –
(0.3) (0.3)
Tehiya 3
(2.3)
Tzomet
Moledet
Halchud HaLeumiЛ
Yisrael B’Aliya†
Yisrael Beiteinu
Total 26 32 33 31 34 26 26 39 46 51
(20.8) (26.0) (27.2) (24.3) (27.4) (21.3) (21.7) (30.2) (37.6) (40.3)

Right block
Herut, Likud (1973–to date) 41 40 32 32 Ψ 19 38 12 27 31‫א‬ 30
(31.9) (31.1) (24.9) (25.1) (14.1) (29.3) (8.9) (21.6) (23.3) (23.4)
General Zionists
Progressive Party
Liberal Party
Flatto- Sharon^ 0
(0.1)
Shlomzion
Kach 1 ¤
(1.2)
Tehiya 5 3 0
(4.0) (3.1) (1.2)
Tzomet ♪ 2 8 @ – –
(2.0) (6.4) (0.1) (0.06)
Moledet 2 3 2 Φ Φ § џ Њ
(1.9) (2.4) (2.4)
Halchud HaLeumiЛ ♠4 ◙7 § 4 Њ
(3.0) (5.5) (3.3)д
Yisrael B’Aliya† 7 6 2†
(5.7) (5.1) (2.1)
Yisrael Beiteinu 4 Φ 11 15 ‫ئ‬ 6
(2.6) (8.9) (11.7) (5.1)
Total 47 47 43 41 33 47 23 46 31 36
(37.2) (38.1) (34.9) (33.2) (24.9) (36.9) (17.8) (36.6) (23.3) (28.5)
* Part of Liberal Party, # Part of Gahal, ☼ Joined Likud subsequently, ¤ Disallowed by Supreme Court, ♪ Part of Tehiya, @ Merged with Likud after elections, Ψ With Gesher-
Tsomet Haleumi, Л National Union, † Merged with Likud in February 2003, Φ Part of Halchud Ha Leumi, ♠ Represented Moledet, Tkuma and Herut—the National Movement,
◙ Representing Yisrael Beteinu, Moledet and Tkuma, ^ Peace and Development Party, ‫ א‬Likud-Yisrael Beitenu, ‫ ئ‬Part of Likud, § Part of NRP-National Union, џ Part of
National Union, д Comprising Moledet, Hatikva faction of Moledet, Tkuma and Ahi faction of NRP, Њ Merged with Habayit Hayehudi

Centrist block
Independent Liberals 5 4 4 1 0
(3.8) (3.2) (3.6) (1.2) (0.6)
State List 4 *
(3.1)
Free Center 2 *
(1.2)
Ratz 3 1 1
(2.2) (1.2) (1.4)
DMC 15
(11.6)
Telem 2
(1.6)
Shinui Kadima- 2006 2
(1.5)
Yahad
Ometz
Third Way
65
(continued )
66
Center Party
5
Am Ehad
Pensioner’s Party

Yesh Atid
Ha’Tnuah
Kulanu
Total – – – – – 5 10 7 17 5
(3.8) (7.5) (5.8) (14.0) (5.1)

Centrist block
Independent Liberals
State List
Free Center
Ratz 3 5 #
(2.4) (4.3)
DMC
Telem
Shinui Kadima 2006 3 2 ☼ ☼ 6 15 29 28 2 ȸ
(2.6) (1.7) (5.0) (12.2) (22.0) (22.4) (2.08)
Yahad 3
(2.2)
Ometz 1
(1.2)
Third Way 4
(3.2)
Center Party 6 0
(5.0) (0.06)
Am Ehad 2 3
(1.9) (2.7)
Pensioner’s Party 7
(5.9)
Yesh Atid 19 11
(14.1) (8.8)
Ha’Tnuah 6 ɰ
(5.01)
Kulanu 10
(7.5)
Total 10 7 – 4 14 18 36 28 27 21
(8.4) (6.0) (3.2) (11.9) (14.9) (27.9) (22.4) (21.3) (16.3)
*Merged with Likud # Formed Meretz, ☼ Part of Meretz, ȸ Didn’t contest, ɰ Part of Zionist Union

Ethno-religious block
URF 16
(12.2)
Sephardim 4 2
(3.5) (1.8)
Agudat Yisrael URF 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4
(2.0) 6 6 (3.7) (3.3) (3.2) 5 (3.4) (3.7)
(4.7) (4.7) (3.8)
Po’alei Agudat Yisrael URF 2 RTF RTF 2 2 2 UTF 1 0
[Yahadut Hatorah–UTJ since 1992] (1.6) 3 3 (1.9) (1.8) (1.8) 2 (1.3) (0.9)
NRP (Habayit Hayehudi since 2009) URF* 10 11 12 12 11 12 10 12 6
(8.3)* (9.1) (9.9) (9.8) (8.9) (9.7) (8.3) (9.2) (4.9)
Tami 3
(2.3)
Shas
Yachad
Degel Hatorah
Total 20 17 17 18 18 17 18 15 17 13
(15.7) (13.7) (13.8) (14.6) (15.4) (14.0) (14.7) (12.1) (13.9) (11.8)

Ethno-religious block
URF
Sephardim
Agudat Yisrael 2 5 ♪
(1.7) (4.5)
(continued )
67
68
Po’alei Agudat Yisrael 2 ◙ 4 4 5 5 6 5 7 6
5
[Yahadut Hatorah–UTJ since 1992] (1.6) (3.3) (3.2) (3.7) (4.2) (4.6) (4.3) (5.1) (5.0)
Morasha Agudat Yisrael☼

NRP (Habayit Hayehudi since 2009) 4 5 6 9 5 6 9 3 12 8
(3.5) (3.9) (5.0) (7.9) (4.2) (4.2) (7.1)© (2.8)¥ (9.1)ζ (6.7)
Tami 1 0 #
(1.5) (0.7)
Meimad
Shas 4 6 6 10 17 11 12 11 11 7
(3.1) (4.7) (4.9) (8.5) (13.0) (8.2) (9.5) (8.4) (8.7) (5.7)
Yachad 0
(3.0)
Degel Hatorah 2 ♪
(1.5)
Total 13 18 16 23 27 22 27 19 30 21
(11.4) (15.3) (13.2) (19.6) (20.9) (16.6) (21.2) (15.4) (23.03) (17.7)
URF – United Religious Front, RTF- Religious Torah Front, UTF- United Torah Front, ☼ With Meizad, ◙ Part of Agudat Yisrael along with Chabad Movement, # Part of
Yahadut Hatorah, * NRP represented Hamizrahi and Hapo’el Hamizrahi in 1949 and 1951, ♪ Merged with Yahadut Hatorah, © NRP-National Union [National Union
included Moledet and Tkuma], ¥ Habayit Hayehudi comprising Jewish Home and Tkuma, ζ Habayit Hayehudi comprising Jewish Home and Tkuma [Tkuma formally
merged with Jewish Home]

Arab block
RAKAH/Hadash (DFPE) from 1977 to date 3 3 4 5 4
(2.3) (2.8) (3.4) (4.6) (3.4)
Rakah Rakah Rakah
Progressive List for Peace
Arab Democratic Party
NDA (BaLad)
Ra’am - Ta-al
Total – – – – – 3 3 4 5 4
(2.3) (2.8) (3.4) (4.6) (3.4)
Arab block
RAKAH/Hadash (DFPE) from 4 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 4 13Ϫ
1977 to date (3.4) (3.7) (2.4) (4.2) (2.6) (2.9) (2.7) (3.3) (2.9) (10.6)
NDB with Ta’al
Progressive List for Peace 2 1 0
(1.8) (1.5) (0.9)
Arab Democratic Party 1 2 4 5 2 ¥ ¥ ¥ 0Ѧ
(1.2) (1.6) (2.9) (3.4) (2.0) (0.1)
(UAL) (UAL) (UAL)
NDA (BaLad) * 2 3 3 3 3 Ϫ
(1.9) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5)
Ra’am - Ta-al 4 4 4 Ϫ
(3.02) (3.3) (3.6) Ϋ
Total 6 6 5 9 10 8 10 11 11 13
(5.2) (6.4) (4.9) (7.1) (7.9) (7.1) (8.02) (9.0) (9.2) (10.7)
RAKAH – New Communist Party, DFPE – Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash), UAL – United Arab League, Ta-al – Arab Movement for Renewal, NDA – National
Democratic Alignment/Assembly, *Part of NDB (National Democratic Block), ¥ Part of United Arab List-Ta’-al, Ϋ United Arab List-Ta’al Ϫ Part of Joint Arab List comprising
BaLad and Ra’am - Ta-al, Ѧ Contested as Arab List with Arab National Party

Others
Democratic Party of Nazareth* 2
(1.7)
Yemenite Association 1 1
(1.0) (1.2)
WIZO 1
(1.2)
Fighters List 1
(1.2)
Democratic List of Israeli Arabs* 3 2
(2.4) (1.8)
Kidmah Va’avodah* 1 2 2 2
(1.2) (1.5) (1.3) (1.6)
Hakla’ut Ufituah* 1 1 1
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
69
(continued )
70
Shituf Ve’ahvah* 2 2 2 2
(1.1) (1.9) (1.3) (1.4)
Kidmah Ufituah* 2 2 2
5
(1.9) (2.1) (1.4)

Arab List for Bedouins* 1
(1.0)
United Arab List* 1 0
(1.4) (0.6)
Others
Total 5 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 1 0
(5.1) (5.9) (4.4) (3.5) (3.5) (3.2) (3.5) (2.4) (1.4) (0.6)
Grand total 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
(95.5) (99.4) (97.6) (96.6) (99.3) (98.1) (98.7) (95.6) (97.7) (98.2)

Others
Democratic Party of Nazareth*
Yemenite Association
WIZO
Fighters List
Democratic List of Israeli Arabs*
Kidmah Va’avodah*
Hakla’ut Ufituah*
Shituf Ve’ahvah*
Kidmah Ufituah*
Arab List for Bedouins*
United Arab List* 0Ѧ
(0.1)
Others 0 0 0 0
(5.8) (3.10) (7.09) (1.3)
Total – – – – – – 0 0 0 0
(5.8) (3.10) (7.09) (1.4)
Grand total 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
(97.1) (98.3) (97.2) (97.3) (93.4) (95.1) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100)
*Minority list associated with Mapai/Labor, Ѧ The Arab list
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Results of the Elections to the Fourteenth Knesset, 29.05.1996, Vol. A, June 1997 and the
Knesset Sites from 1999–2015
Mapaivot (1949–1967) 71
have continued to define these distinct four cleavages in Israeli society,

respectively.
Mapai was able to consolidate its pivotal position in all the four
cleavages during the first 20 years of its existence by successfully
addressing the concerns and issues of both the majority Jews and the
minority Arabs, the religious and the secular Jews, the Ashkenazi and the
Sephardi Jews and the affluent and the poor in its broad ideological plank.
Its alliance with the minority lists in the Arab sector and its strategy of
influencing the Arab politics through the ‘hamula’2 practice yielded
encouraging results. By choosing the potential Arab leaders in the
hamulas, the Labor largely succeeded in grabbing the Arab votes and
seats. Such an effort enabled the party to have its representation in the
Arab sector on the one hand and divided the Arabs on the other.
The status quoist stance of Mapai in some of the controversial and
sensitive issues like Jewishness of the state, the co-existence of the reli-
gious, the secular and the independent school systems, helped Mapai to
enlist support from the leading religious party like National Religious
Party (NRP) to its coalitional governance. Moreover, the Ashkenazi-
Sephardi cleavage was molded by Mapai because of its patronage to
both the Ashkenazi elite and the Sephardi immigrants. And, finally, its
welfarist orientation with an emphasis on the nation-building policies and
programs through its ideology called statism or ‘mamlachuit’3 successfully
handled the class cleavage during this period too.
By virtue of holding this pivotal position in the competitive party
system, Mapai came to carry cohesive and consistent traits of governance
and its political acceptability across the party cleavages. Israeli scholars like
Amitai Etzioni (1959) also characterized Mapai as the strong institution-
alized party whose presence in the office for a longer time created respon-
sibilities in other parties, thereby strengthening the position of the party in
office. Peter Medding (1990) stressed that for the first six Knesset elec-
tions that Mapai contested (1949–1965), it won most seats than any
other political party, formed and led the governmental coalition and held
all the key cabinet posts. Myron J Aronoff (1990) also argued that the
labor dominance in the Yishuv, carried out under the leadership of Mapai
was further strengthened in the post-independence era with the institu-
tionalization of the bureaucratic state mechanism.
Mapaivot continued to dominate the early phase of Israeli party politics

despite the first party split in 1964 in the form of Rafi. Mapai dominance
during the first phase could be attributed to its ‘incorporation of diverse
forces, on its long-term institutional and organizational penetration and
control and on the structures and processes it had developed over the years
to weld these diverse forces together’ (Medding 1972: 279). The Israeli
politics in the post-Mapaivot phase actually witnessed the real coalitional
dynamics where the parties across the political spectrum started dominat-
ing the specter of governance.
‘Congress System’ (1952–67)

Just like Mapai in Israel, the Congress also spearheaded the struggle for
independence in India. After the adoption of democratic constitution, a
new party system emerged in the wake of the first general elections based
on universal adult franchise during 1951–1952. Being the champion of
national movement, the Congress won the first parliamentary elections
and subsequent state assembly elections. From a distinct political party,
the Congress became a dominant ruling party in India.
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s variously came to be characterized
as the ‘Congressional System’ (Rajni Kothari), ‘One-Party Dominant System’
(Morris Jones) and ‘Predominant Party System’ (Sartori). The party system
in the post-independence era did witness an opposition, nay strong and
organized, from the right-wing Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), Ram Rajya
Parishad and Swatantra Party, and the left-wing Communist Party of
India, Praja Socialist Party and Samyukta Socialist Party. Most of the
opposition parties took their roots from the pre-independence organiza-
tions. They actually emerged in the wake of the parliamentary elections in
the 1950s.
Unlike the Western prophecy that the nascent Indian democracy
would not survive in view of lack of literacy, absence of modernization
and inaccessible media, electoral politics in post-independence India
witnessed a strong wave of democratization. Although social scientists
failed to theorize the first wave of democratization in post-independence
Indian politics, it reflected the emergence of the first democratic upsurge
‘Congress System’ (1952–67) 73
(Choudhary 2015). The introduction of universal adult franchise added

strength to the democratic politics of the country. While the Cold War
world was still struggling to give equal status to voters in terms of gender,
age, property and qualifications, India took the lead in imparting electoral
equality irrespective of differences and distinctions. Increasing electoral
participation in the Lok Sabha elections from 1951-52 to 1977
representing 45.7 to 60.5 per cent of the population, respectively, broadly
corroborated the salience of first democratic upsurge and the sustainability
of electoral democracy in India.
However, despite the presence of other rightist and the leftist parties,
the indomitable presence of the Congress in the Indian polity never came
to be questioned. The entire phase was marked by the dominance of the
Congress party, both at the center and in majority of Indian states. For
Morris Jones (1978), the early Congress was a political movement as it
sought to re-distribute power to the hitherto excluded sections of society
by both changing and creating new structures of political power. Rajni
Kothari described the Congress system in terms of a consensus, which was
working through the ‘high command–grassroots’ relationship. ‘The Con-
gress in real sense depicted a miniature Indian society. It was an umbrella
organization which not only sought to accommodate diverse groupings
within its own structure but also attempted to incorporate their ideas in its
policies and programs’ (Sunil 2010).
The first phase in the Indian party system highlighted hegemony and
dominance of the Congress in view of its seats in the Parliament (see
Fig. 5.2 and Table 7.1) and state legislative assemblies as well its strong
organizational strength. Kothari (1964) said that the ‘Congress was a party
of consensus and opposition parties were parties of pressures’. Fission and
fusion were going on simultaneously within the Congress. According to
Stanley Kochanek (1968), the effectiveness of the Congress did not rest
merely on the charisma of Nehru; rather, its durability could be attribut-
able to ‘its well-exercised ability to adapt pragmatically to change, its
highly developed skill in managing internal conflict, and its evolution of
a decision making process designed to aggregate the demands of a highly
differentiated following’ (Kochanek 1968: xix–xx). From this perspective,
the Congress came to be described as the country and the country as the
Congress (Table 5.2).
400 364 371 361
300 283
200 Seats
Vote %
100
45 47.8 44.7 40.8
0
1952 1957 1962 1967
Fig. 5.2 Congress in Lok Sabha (1952–67) (Source: Compiled from David Butler
et al. 1995: 70)
Congressional hegemony got challenged after the death of Nehru in

1964. Congress suffered its first major split during the 1967 elections
when a dominant group of the party leadership under the command of the
Syndicate4 deserted the parent party.
The Syndicate was the most important party structure falling
between the party high command and the masses. It broadly comprised
influential, dominant and powerful Congress leaders across states in India.
Some of the Syndicate leaders were K Kamraj, the Congress President,
and regional party bosses, Atulya Ghosh of Bengal, S K Patil of Mumbai,
N Sanjiva Reddy of Andhra Pradesh and S Nijlingappa of Mysore
(Karnataka). Rajni Kothari stated that the Congress System was able to
dominate Indian politics during the first and a half decades of the post-
independence era through its party high command–syndicate–masses
linkages. See Fig. 5.3.
The succession crisis within Congress after Shastri’s death
became acute, with the Syndicate leaders questioning the elevation of
Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister in 1966. The disenchantment among the
Syndicate leaders and their dislike for Mrs. Gandhi were seen in 1967
Lok Sabha elections when the Syndicate-backed Congressmen went
on defeating Mrs. Gandhi-nominated Congressmen in the elections.
The 1967 elections to the Seventh Lok Sabha thus was a binary fight
between the Congressmen themselves—the one representing the
Table 5.2 Coalition governments in Israel (1949–2015)
No of
parties in Size of % of No of Deputy
Coalition government Leadership Coalition parties coalition coalition coalition ministers ministers
First Ben-Gurion Mapai, Religious Block, Progres- 5 73 60.8 12
(10 March 1949–Oct. 1950) (Mapai) sives, Sephardim, Minority (1)
Second Ben-Gurion Mapai, Religious Block, Progres- 5 73 60.8 13
(1 Nov. 1950–14 Feb. 1951) (Mapai) sives, Sephardim, Minority (1)
Third Ben-Gurion Mapai, NRP, Agudat Yisraels, 6 67 55.8 13 2
(8 Oct. 1951–19 Dec. 1952) (Mapai) Poaleli Agudat Yisrael, Minority
Lists (2)
Fourth Ben-Gurion Mapai, NRP, Progressives, General 6 87 72.5 16
(23 Dec. 1952–7 Dec. 1953) (Mapai) Zionists, Minorities (2)
Fifth Moshe Sharett Mapai, NRP, Progressives, General 6 87 72.5 16
(26 Jan. 1954–29 June 1955) (Mapai) Zionists, Minorities (2)
Sixth Moshe Sharett Mapai, NRP, Progressives, Minori- 5 64 53.5 16
(29 June 1955–3 Nov. 1955) (Mapai) ties (2)
Seventh Ben-Gurion Mapai, NRP, Progressives, Ahdut 8 80 66.7 16 3
(3 Nov. 1955–31 Dec. 1957) (Mapai) Ha’avodah, Mapam, Minorities

(3)
Eighth Ben-Gurion Mapai, NRP, Progressives, Ahdut 8 80 66.7 16
(7 Jan. 1958–5 July 1959) (Mapai) Ha’avodah, Mapam, Minorities
(3)
Ninth Ben-Gurion Mapai, NRP, Progressives, Ahdut 8 86 71.7 16 3
(17 Dec. 1959–31 Jan. 1961) (Mapai) Ha’avodah, Mapam, Minorities
(3)
Tenth Ben-Gurion Mapai, Ahdut Ha’avodah, NRP, 6 68 56.7 16 5
(2 Nov. 1961–16 June 1963) (Mapai) Poaleli Agudat Yisrael, Minori-
ties (2)
Eleventh Levi Eshkol Mapai, Ahdut Ha’avodah, NRP, 6 68 56.7 18
(26 June 1963–22 Dec. 1964) (Mapai) Poaleli Agudat Yisrael, Minori-
ties (2)
Twelfth Levi Eshkol Mapai, Ahdut Ha’avodah, NRP, 6 68 56.7 18
(22 Dec. 1964–12 Jan. 1966) (Mapai) Poaleli Agudat Yisrael,
Minorities (2)
75
Thirteenth Levi Eshkol Alignment (Mapai+ Ahdut 7 75 60.8 18 8
(12 Jan. 1966–1 June 1967) (Mapai) Ha’avodah), NRP, Mapam, Indpt.
(continued )
76
No of
parties in Size of % of No of Deputy
Coalition government Leadership Coalition parties coalition coalition coalition ministers ministers
5
Liberals, Poaleli Agudat Yisrael,

Minorities (2)
Fourteenth Levi Eshkol Alignment (Mapai+ Ahdut 9 111 91.6 21 8
(1 June 1967–17 March 1969) (Mapai) Ha’avodah), NRP, Mapam, Indpt.
Liberals, Poaleli Agudat Yisrael,
Rafi, Gahal, Minorities (2)
Fifteenth Golda Meir Alignment (Labor+ Mapam), NRP, 7 100 83.3 24 5
(17 March 1969–Dec. 1969) (Mapai) Indpt. Liberals, Poaleli Agudat
Yisrael, Gahal, Minorities (2)
Sixteenth Golda Meir Alignment (Labor+ Mapam), NRP, 5 76 63.3 18
(30 July 1970–Dec. 1973) (Mapai) Indpt. Liberals, Minorities (2)
Seventeenth Golda Meir Alignment (Labor+ Mapam), NRP, 5 68 56.7 22
(10 March 1974–3 June 1974) (Mapai) Indpt. Liberals, Minorities (2)
Eighteenth Yitzhak Rabin Alignment (Labor+ Mapam), CRM, 5 61 50.8 19
(3 June 1974–30 Oct. 1974) (Mapai) Indpt. Liberals, Minorities (2)
Nineteenth Yitzhak Rabin Alignment (Labor+ Mapam), NRP, 5 68 56.7 19 2
(3 June 1974–30 Dec. 1976) (Mapai) Indpt. Liberals, Minorities (2)
Twentieth Menachem Likud, NRP, Shlomzion, Agudat 5 62 51.7 13 4
(20 June 1977–24 Oct. 1977) Begin (Likud) Yisrael, Indpt. Liberals
Twenty-first Menachem Likud, DMC, NRP, Shlomzion, 6 77 64.2 18 1
(24 Oct. 1977–June 1981) Begin (Likud) Agudat Yisrael, Indpt. Liberals
Twenty-second Menachem Likud, NRP, Agudat Yisrael, Tami 4 61 50.83 18 5
(Aug. 1981–Sept. 1983) Begin (Likud)
Twenty-third (National Shimon Peres Alignment (Labor-Mapam), Likud, 5 97 80.83 25 4
Unity) (Labor) and NRP, Shas
(Sept. 1984–Nov. 1988) Yitzhak Sha-
mir (Likud)
Twenty-fourth (National Yitzhak Shamir Likud, Labor, Shas, NRP, Agudat 5 95 79.16 26 3
Unity) (Likud) Yisrael
June 1988–May 1990
Twenty-fifth Yitzhak Shamir Likud, Shas, NRP, Tehiya, Tsomet, 8 62 51.66 19 9
(June 1990–June 1992) (Likud) Moledet, Mizrahi Faction
(of Agudat Yisrael), Gur Faction
(Labor)
Twenty-sixth Rabin (Labor) Labor, Meretz, Shas, 3 62 51.66 17 9
(July 1992–Nov. 1995)
Twenty-seventh Netanyahu Likud-Gesher-Tsomet, NRP, Shas, 6 66 55 18 7
(18 June 1996–17 May 1999) (Likud) Yisrael B’Aliya, Yahadut
Hatorah, Third Way
Twenty-eighth Ehud Barak One Israel (Labor+ Gesher 7 75 62.5 23 8
(17 May 1999–6 Feb. 2001) (Labor) +Meimad), Shas, Meretz, NRP,
Israel Be’aliyah, Center Party,
Yahadut Hatorah
Twenty-ninth Ariel Sharon Likud, One Israel (Labor+Meimad), 8 78 65 26 13
(7 March 2001–28 Feb. 2003) (Likud) Shas, Israel Be’aliyah, National
Union-Yisrael Beteinu, Am Ehad,
Yahadut Hatorah, Derekh
Khadashah
Thirtieth Ariel Sharon Likud, Shinui, NRP, National Union 4 68 56.66 23 3

(28 Feb. 2003–4 May 2006) (Likud)
Thirty-first Ehud Olmert/ Kadima, Labor, Meretz, Pensioners 5 68 56.66 23 3
(4 May 2006–31 March 2009) Tzipi Livni Party, Yisrael Beteinu
(Kadima)
Thirty-second Netanyahu Likud, Yisrael Beteinu, Labor, 5+1 69 57.5 25 3
(31 March 2009–18 March (Likud) Shas, Habayit Hayehudi, [2+1 Vice [Ministers]
2013) Kadima, joined in May 2012. PMs]
[4 Dy PMs]
Thirty-third Netanyahu Likud, Yisrael Beteinu, Yesh Atid, 5 68 56.6 29 11
(18 March 2013–14 May (Likud) Habayit Hayehudi, Ha’Tnuah
2015)
Thirty fourth Netanyahu Likud, Habayit Hayehudi, Kulanu, 6 67 55.8 33 10
(14 May 2015–till date) (Likud) Yisrael Beteinu, UTJ, Shas [1 V PM+2
Ministers]
Sources: Data compiled from Nachmias and Navot (2002): 156, Arian and Shamir (2002): 95, and Seliktar (1982). For details
77
from 29th to 34th Governments, see Israel Government Portal, www.knesset.gov.il
High Command
SYNDICATE
Masses
Fig. 5.3 The Congress System
Syndicate, and the other following Mrs. Gandhi. The results of the
elections were well known.
The Congress lost the major states in North as well as in South.
Incapacity of the Congress to form its governments in these states pro-
vided opportunities to other oppositional parties to form coalitional
governments in different parts of the country. Rajni Kothari (1970)
described this trend as ‘a movement from a dominant party system to a
system of competitive dominance’ (Kothari 1970: 200).
The fight between Mrs. Gandhi and the Syndicate started taking an
ugly picture in the aftermath of the 1967 elections. During the 1969
presidential election, Mrs. Gandhi's followers were directed to support the
independent candidate, V V Giri, whereas Neelam Sanjiva Reddy was the
Syndicate candidate for the presidential post. The defeat of Neelam
Sanjiva Reddy was the personal victory of Mrs. Gandhi.
The defeat of the Syndicate-backed candidate for president exposed the
intra-party rivalry within the Congress, leading to its formal split in 1969
into Congress O (Organization) led by the Syndicate and Congress
(Requisitionists) guided by Mrs. Gandhi. The formal split within the
Congress also led to the withdrawal of support by the Syndicate-backed
Congressmen, reducing the Congress at the center to a minority status.
Breaking Down of the Mapaivot and Congress System 79
M. P. Singh (1981) cited two reasons for the decline of the Congres-
sional hegemony. First, anti-Congressional feeling started getting consol-
idated in states on the basis of caste, class and regions. Such a feeling
provided sufficient space to the opposition parties, enabling them to build
up stronger challenges against the Congress. Second, intra-party democ-
racy in the Congress started diminishing. As a result, the Congress was not
able to reconcile interests from different and varying groups.
Stanley Kochanek (1968) argues that the fourth elections to Lok Sabha
in 1967 actually marked the ‘beginning of a transformation of the Indian
political system from a dominant one party system to multi-partyism’.
However, despite the loss of Congressional hegemony, ‘Congress
remained the largest, the most highly organized, and the only all-India
party’ (Kochanek 1968: 427).
Breaking Down of the Mapaivot and Congress

System
The dominance of Mapai as the single largest party at the helm of
government, and of Histadrut in Israel and the Congress in India started
breaking down from 1967 onward. The decline was marked by different
factors, and continued due to divisive forces. Four factors could be cited
for the decline of Mapaivot, namely, intensification of generational crisis
in Mapai leadership, breaking down of the consensus, declining the
organizational coherence and failure to accommodate and absorb
social diversity in view of increasing Aliyah. The Congressional decline
on the other hand was characterized by Rajni Kothari in terms of
de-institutionalization, which also reflected in the disintegration of the
democratic structures within the party and the government.
The post-1967 party politics in Israel and India came to be defined
differently until it got settled in 1977 with the emergence of bi-party
system or bi-block polarity. A decade of working of party system in both the
nations was marked by alignments and bargaining and carried many
similar characteristics, the most prominent among them being the market
politics based on political bargaining.
Alignment-Based Coalitional Polity (1968–1977)

in Israel vs Market Polity (1967–77) of India
The post-1967 period in the history of Israeli party system constituted a
short interregnum that laid the foundation for the institutionalization of
parties and crystallization of groups. It witnessed the birth of a strong
cohesive umbrella organization in the form of the Israeli Labor Party in
1968. The Labor Party attempted to provide continuity in terms of its
ideological goals and organizational patterns of its erstwhile predecessor,
Mapai. The merger of Rafi and Ahdut Ahavoda also sought to energize the
party workers and leaders as well as instill confidence among its voters.
Mapai in its new incarnation of Labor went to the polls in 1969 under
the banner of Alignment. Its mega alliance (merger of Mapai, Rafi and
Ahdut Ahavoda on the one hand, and forming an electoral understanding
between Labor Party and Mapam on the other) yielded enormous political
dividends, resulting in the capture of 56 Knesset seats, the highest since
independence.
However, despite its initial victory, the Alignment started becoming
vulnerable to intra-party bickering, leadership tussles and political scan-
dals during this period. This led to the erosion of its social base,
diminishing of its ideological importance and weakening of its spiritual
dominance. The new Sephardi immigrants from Asia and Africa failed to
find any respectable place in the Labor Party fora. The consistent infight-
ings among the Labor leaders and the eventual mudslinging failed to give
the party leadership enough time and scope to rejuvenate their party
structures to accommodate the new Sephardi immigrants.
From the mid-1960s, Israeli polity had entered into severe succession
crises between the ‘Old Guards’ and the ‘New Turks’. The leadership crises
reached to new heights, especially after the Yom Kippur War, 1973.5 The
right block also underwent a new phase of transformation and realign-
ment. The formation of Likud by the erstwhile right constituents like
Herut, the Liberal Party, Free Centre and Rafi gave a new look to the
right-wing party. Likud appeared to impart new challenge to the Labor-
led Alignment coalitional polity. Similarly, the developments within the
parties of the right block were also paving the way for bigger dissension
The Indian Market Polity 81
among the Alignment constituents, leading to the formation of a new

centrist block, Civil Rights Movement and Democratic Movement for
Change.
The post-Mapaivot in the Israeli party system largely strengthened the
realignment of political forces along the left-right political spectrum. It
saw the virtual downfall of the one-party dominance. The intensification
of the leadership crisis, breaking down of the consensus politics, failure of
the Labor’s umbrella organization for absorbing diverse social forces into
its ambit, degeneration of its organizational coherence and spiritual dom-
inance and emergence of new issues in the aftermath of 1967 war were
some of the factors that led to the decline of the Labor-led alignment
coalitional polity and paved the way for the institutionalization of the
bi-block politics.
The Indian Market Polity

Like the Mapaivot being challenged from the right-wing parties in Israel,
the Congressional hegemony also received a serious jolt in 1967, resulting
in the emergence of factions and factionalism in Indian politics. Morris
Jones (1978) described this phenomenon as ‘Market Polity’, which was
based on bargaining, leading to defections within the Congress. This phase
was marked by fierce factionalism and corruption in many Congress-ruled
states. Accordingly, the Congress lost elections in states due to dissident
Congressmen working as Syndicates. In the 1967 elections, the Congress
lost majority in eight states—Bihar, Kerala, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, Rajas-
than, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. In states where the Congress retained
power, its biggest loss of seats was in Assam, Mysore and Maharashtra. Of
15 states, the party suffered losses in 13. Only in Haryana and Madhya
Pradesh (MP) the party gained in votes and seats. The colossal loss of the
Congress in 1967 Lok Sabha elections got equated with ‘political earth-
quake’ like the Israeli upheaval of 1977 terming as ‘Mahapach’.
The opposition parties formed coalition governments in every state they
controlled. Morris Jones argued that these coalition governments themselves
became ‘small markets’. The Congress split resulted into the formation of an
alliance by the Congress with the CPI and the DMK in 1969. The 1969
was thus the first coalition experiment at the center in Indian politics. This
phase was marked by the beginning of ‘plebiscitary politics’.6 While the

non-Communist Opposition parties comprising Congress O, Bharatiya Jan
Sangh, Swatantra and the Samyukta Socialist Party formed the Grand
Alliance with its populist campaign ‘Indira Hatao’, Mrs. Gandhi “countered
the opposition slogan with the more effective slogan ‘Garibi Hatao’”
(Chandra et al. 2008). Mrs. Gandhi attempted to free herself from the old
party bosses and the organizational structure without creating a new one.
Morris Jones argued that plebiscitary politics during this period had been
institutionalized while the Congress got completely deinstitutionalized.
Final Comments
Mapaivot and Congress System remained the dominant characteristics of
the first phase of the party system in both Israel and India. Both Mapai
and Congress tried to contain inter-party and intra-party competition.
The dominance of the two parties in these nations could be the result of
their being on the springboard of the struggle for independence. The
period was also marked by the alignment of the voters in both the nations,
as the electorate didn’t show any major deviance from their party alle-
giance in this phase, at least until 1967.
The decline of the one-party-dominated system in Israel or Mapaivot
and the Congress System in India brought about realignment of political
forces and the electors. The market polity was the intermediary transi-
tional phase of the institutionalized party politics, which the two nations
were about to witness from 1977 onward.
Notes
1. A cleavage in the analysis of Lipset and Rokkan generally refers to socio-
economic division of groups with a corresponding consciousness of their
respective strength and their outright organizational expression through
parties.
2. Hamula, a practice by which the dominant Mapai sought to appease and
accommodate the Arab voters.
References 83
3. Mamlachuit—also called Statism—through which Mapai brought out

many welfarist policies and programs for its workers.
4. Syndicate constituted a group of dominant regional Congress leaders. It
became very powerful after the death of Nehru in 1964.
5. It was a war fought by the coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria
against Israel from 6-25 October 1973. The war was a big setback, both to
the Labor Alignment and the idea of the ‘invincibility of the Israeli state’.
The war, besides witnessing a killing of nearly 3000 Israeli soldiers, also
brought about a new phenomenon of an active army involvement in the
Israeli politics, thereby questioning the civilian–military relations in the
democratic polity. Asher Arian characterized the war as a “veritable earth-
quake” for the political system, which showed loss of public confidence in
the country’s leadership (Arian 1980: 12).
6. It refers to removal of poverty. The successive parties resorted to different
plebiscitary slogans in an attempt to make emotional chord with the masses.
Issues like ‘Indira Hatao’ during 1977 elections, ‘Government that Works’
during 1985 elections, ‘India Shining’ during 2004 elections and ‘Congress
Ka Haath, Aam Admi Ke Saath’ (Congress’s hand [electoral symbol] with
the common man) during 2009 elections gained ascendancy after that.
References
Arian, A. (Ed.). (1980). The elections in Israel – 1977. Jerusalem: Jerusalem
Academic Press.
Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.). (2002). The elections in Israel 1999. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Aronoff, M. J. (1990). Israel under labour and the Likud: The role of dominance
considered. In T. J. Pempel (Ed.), Uncommon democracies: The one-party
dominant regimes. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Butler, D., et al. (Eds.). (1991/1995). India decides: Elections 1952–1991. New
Delhi: Living Media Books.
Chandra, B., Mukherjee, M., & Mukherjee, A. (2008). India since independence.
Delhi: Penguin Books.
Choudhary, S. K. (2015, November 9). Towards greater democratization: A
constitutional perspective. Shivaji College, University of Delhi.
Etzioni, A. (1959). Alternative ways to democracy: The example of Israel.

Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV, 196.
Kochanek, S. (1968). The Congress Party of India: Dynamics of one-party democ-
racy in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kothari, R. (1964). The Congress system in India. Asian Survey, 4(12),
1161–1173.
Kothari, R. (1970). Politics in India. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Medding, P. (1990). The founding of Israeli democracy 1948–1967. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Morris-Jones, W. H. (1978). Politics mainly India. Chennai: Orient Longman.
Nachmias, D., & Navot, D. (2002). The electoral reform and broad coalitions:
The Sharon government. In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), The elections in
Israel 2001. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
Peretz, D., & Doron, G. (Eds.). (1997). The government and politics of Israel.
Colorado/Oxford: Westview Press.
Seliktar, O. (1982). Israel: Fragile coalitions in a new nation. In E. C. Browne &
J. Dreijmanis (Eds.), Government coalitions in western democracies. New York:
Longman.
Singh, M. P. (1981). Split in a predominant party: The Indian National Congress
in 1969. Delhi: Abhinav.
Sunil Kumar. (2010). Pluralism and a second democratic upsurge. Eternal India,
2(6), 95–109.
6
Mahapach vs Janata Parivar
No two nations in the world would have attained so much of similarity in

terms of path-breaking party transformation as Israel and India. The year
1977 marked a real turning point in the history of party systems in the
two democratic nations. Whether it was a coincidence or a deliberate
devolution, the one-party dominant system in the two nations got crys-
tallized in terms of bi-party system. The institutionalization of the
bi-block polarity in Israel came to be characterized as Mahapach,1 whereas
in India it resulted in the formation of political confederation called the
Janata Parivar.2
Institutionalized Bi-Block Polarity: ‘Mahapach’

(1977–1992)
The 1977 elections for the ninth Knesset significantly influenced the
growth and polarization of party politics in Israel. The one-party domi-
nance led by Mapai, both in terms of Mapaivot initially and alignment of
coalitional polity subsequently, got challenged with the unprecedented

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_6
86 6 Mahapach vs Janata Parivar
and unexpected outcome of the 1977 elections. With a capture of 43 seats

in the Knesset, Likud emerged as the biggest parliamentary block in the
country in 1977.
The year 1977 thus marked the end of both spiritual ascendance and
political prominence of Labor. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (2001)
described this change as the outcome of various forces of alignment and
realignment, which increasingly strengthened political polarization across
the left-right spectrum in Israeli politics. Even though the blocks across
the left-right political spectrum were in their rudimentary forms and had
yet to be crystallized into institutionalized political settings, they had
started channelizing their competitive potentiality in mobilizing voters
across different cleavages (see Figs. 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 and Table 5.1).
The preceding period also marked the splits and counter-splits among
the established parties in different party blocks. The rise of Kach, Gush
Emunim, Poaleli Aguda Israel, Flatto Sharon, Shlomzion, Moked, Shelli
and so forth can be attributed to the radicalization of the party politics
during the Labor-dominated alignment polity. The right-wing parties led
by Likud challenged the Labor hegemony significantly. This setback was
further strengthened with the emergence of another center of power in
terms of Democratic Movement for Change and Civil Rights Movement
(Ratz), which also hastened the decline of the Labor dominance.
Asher Arian (1998) described the new phenomenon in terms of ‘the
competitive two block systems’. Jonathan Mendilow (2002) categorized it
by the system of ‘conglomerate blocks’. In view of its unprecedented
impact and the overwhelming changes as wrought by the 1977 elections,
political scholars described the changed milieu as an ‘earthquake’, a
reversal or turnabout, or Mahapach. During this period, the two major
blocks led by Likud and Labor alternated in power, with ‘Israel’s ideolog-
ical culture giving way to a more interest-oriented politics marked by a
high level of underlying consensus’ (Isaac 1981: 205).
This phase thus not only witnessed the emergence of political groups
on moderate and radical settings in almost all the five major blocks—
Socialist Block, Nationalist Block, Centrist Block, Ethno-Religious Block
and Arab Block—but also saw the emergence of new dominant cleavages
in the Israeli politics, which were based on territories as well as ethnicity.
Religious-secular cleavage came to be overtaken by Ashkenazi-Sephardi
Institutionalized Bi-Block Polarity: ‘Mahapach’ (1977–1992) 87
50
46
45
40 37.6
34
35
30
26.2
25 Seats
20 Vote %
15
10
0
Left Block Right Block
Fig. 6.1 Left and right blocks in the Knesset (1977)
60 56
51
50 47 47 47
44
42
40
34
30 Left Block
Right Block
20
10
0
1977 1981 1984 1988
Fig. 6.2 Left and right blocks: seats in the Knesset (1977–1988)
cleavage. Similarly reconciliation on the territorial issue or confrontation

with the Palestinian cause also transformed the cleavage in terms of
dovish–hawkish or left-right cleavage.
While the lower Sephardi classes started moving into the Likud’s block,
the middle and the upper middle classes appeared siding with the Labor.
Though initially showing its hawkish orientation with the occupied
territories, Likud took a leading role in arriving at a settlement with
50
40.3
40 37.6 37 37.2 38.1
34.9
32.5
30 26.2
Left Block
20 Right Block
10
0
1977 1981 1984 1988
Fig. 6.3 Left and right blocks: vote % in the Knesset (1977–1988) (Source: Com-
piled from Central Bureau of Statistics, results of the elections to the fourteenth
Knesset, 29.05.1996, Vol. A, June 1997)
hostile Arab neighborhood. The visit of President Sadat and the Camp
David Agreement (1978) normalized the relations between Israel and
Egypt at the cost of the return of Sinai.
The voting behavior during this period showed ideological inclination
in the block politics. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir in their pioneering
studies have shown the political orientations of voters, social adjustments
of the electorate and ideological affiliation of the classes into the existing
blocks during elections. In this way, the year 1977 was marked by
multidimensional characteristics. The realignment of the political forces
led to the institutionalization of the bi-block polarity in terms of the
strong emergence of the Labor and the Likud blocks across the left-right
spectrum of party politics. These two powerful blocks acted as the main
catalysts, enlisting the constellation of political forces under their vast
political and ideological umbrella. While ideology tended to remain vocal
at the peripheral level of the block politics, ethnic and class dimensions
marked their strongholds into the block politics.
The principles of coalition politics appeared to remain the same despite
the formation of the right-wing government under Begin in 1977. The
major difference, however, occurred only in terms of the choice of the
particular ministries and consequent ministerial payoffs, which started
dominating the coalition negotiations and bargaining deals at the time of
Institutionalized Bi-Block Polarity: ‘Mahapach’ (1977–1992) 89
government formation. Realization of the holy mission of Eretz Israel

through the absorption of the immigrants and their subsequent expansion
to the acquired territories became one of the important planks of the
rightist and the religious parties. Hence, the effective politicization com-
menced in the coalition politics after 1977.
Asher Arian, David Nachmias and Ruth Amir argued that with the loss
of Labor dominance in 1977, fragmentation became more problematic in
Israeli parliamentary politics. With smaller parties increasing their
demands for ministerial payoffs, the consensual politics started becoming
difficult to manage. Smaller parties started releasing their significant
potentiality in ‘making or breaking of coalitions’ (Arian et al. 2002: 93).
The Likud could have hardly enjoyed its electoral success in 1977 with
the ease and comfort it had in the beginning. The subsequent years and
the following decade proved to be extremely challenging for the party
leadership. During the 1980s, Likud started witnessing regular fights
between the pragmatics and the radicals or the hardliners. After Begin’s
exit, the party leadership fell on Yitahak Shamir. Shamir lacked Begin's
charisma and leadership skills. His acceptance in the party organizational
structures could not gain the requisite legitimacy in view of the emergence
of the hardliners. In fact, Likud also witnessed severe polarization within
itself in the aftermath of Begin’s exit.
Nevertheless, the year 1977 marked a radical transformation in the
history of party evolution in Israel. The emergence of Likud as a credible
alternative to the Labor was also marked by the phase of de-alignment (à
la Anthony Heath et al. 1985) where the Israeli voters started shifting their
political allegiance from the Labor to Likud. The Yom Kippur War and
the associated developments in Israeli politics in early 1970s paved the
way for the transformation of parties and party system. The years that
followed were guided by the political upheaval of 1977.
The Two-Party System and the Janata

Experiment (1977–80)
The party system in India also got major transformation in 1977 with the
emergence of the conglomeration of political umbrella under the Janata
Party. The Janata Party presented the first major challenge and alternative
to the one-party dominance of the Congress in the sixth Lok Sabha
elections held in 1977. Following the Jaya Prakash-led movement, called
‘Total Revolution’, the non-Congress parties got united under the banner
of Janata Parivar. The excesses of emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi
during 1975–77 and the political churning within and outside Congress
paved the way for the emergence of second significant pole in Indian
politics in 1977.
The political man of India who brought together all the disgruntled
parties and politicians on the common platform was Jaya Prakash
Narayan. It was Jaya Prakash Narayan who launched his crusade against
Indira’s authoritarianism, misgovernance and emerging systemic corrup-
tion under the banner ‘Total Revolution’. The nearly two years of the
emergency interlude highlighted administrative high-handedness, which,
besides containing the non-party protest agitations under the JP move-
ment, led to the arrest of all popular leaders considered to be Indira’s
political adversaries, suspension of individual freedoms and press
censorship.
The high-handedness of the emergency imposed by Mrs. Gandhi
constituted a dark chapter in the history of post-independence India.
For Granville Austin (1999), the imposition of emergency had nothing
to do with the preservation and protection of democracy; it only
attempted to protect the ‘political office of one individual’. ‘Instead of
protecting the seamless web, the emergency distorted beyond the imagi-
nation of founding fathers. Self-governance in India ended’ (Ibid.).
One of the strongest opposition to emergency and the staunch sup-
porters of individual freedom was Jaya Prakash Narayan who undertook
the mission of overthrowing the authoritarian and dictatorial regime of
Mrs. Gandhi through his call for ‘Total Revolution’. With his successful
experiment in Gujarat and Bihar, where he challenged the corruption and
The Two-Party System and the Janata Experiment (1977–80) 91
authoritarianism of the Congress government through the students and

youth of the country, Jaya Prakash soon became the ‘the beacon of hope
for a disenchanted nation’ (Atal and Choudhary 2014). Popularly called
as the JP Movement, the agitation launched under JP’s leadership became
the ‘harbinger of transformation for a resurgent India in the mid-1970s’
(Ibid.).
It was on the assiduous and painstaking working of JP that all the
non-Congress parties decided to fight the Congress in 1977 on a common
platform. The political overtures of JP finally succeeded in merging all
major opposition parties into a single non-Congress party, called the
Janata Party. And when Indira Gandhi withdrew emergency and decided
to face the electorate in 1977, it was the JP-led coalition that defeated her
party and formed the first non-Congress government in the country.
The Janata government started working with great fanfare. All the
leaders showed their commitment to taking forward the country and
presenting it a credible alternative by freeing the nation from authoritar-
ianism and corruption. However, as the new outfit started functioning,
personal interests of political leaders and vested interests of the coalition
partners clashed, and the Janata Parivar split into different factions and
went back to the pattern of individual-based parties, with some excep-
tions. The period also witnessed emergence of several regional parties and
regional satraps, dominating the state politics on the one hand and
asserting at the national level on the other hand.
Baxter described Janata Party as the ‘Congress with a New Name’
(Baxter 1987: 107). The five components that fought the elections against
the Congress in 1977 on the common platform were Congress O, Jana
Sangh, Socialists, Bharatiya Lok Dal (Charan Singh) and Congress for
Democracy (Jagjivan Ram). Since Janata Party could not get the electoral
recognition by 1977, all these five constituents contested the elections on
the election symbol of Bharatiya Lok Dal. Winning 295 seats out of
543 with 41.3 per cent of the seats, with the Congress winning 154 seats
and 34.5 per cent of the seats, the Indian party system appeared to have
headed for the two-party system, with the Janata and the Congress
emerging as two strong poles of the Indian party system in 1977
(Fig. 6.4).
295
300
250
200
154
150 Seats
Vote %
100
50 34.5 41.3
0
Congress Janata
Fig. 6.4 Congress and Janata in Lok Sabha (1977) (Source: Compiled from David
Butler et al. 1991: 70)
The two-party system did not succeed in creating a good hype for long,
as it miserably failed in consolidating its electoral fruits gained exclusively
against an anti-Congress platform. Despite the formalization of Janata
Party after the elections, the Janata components maintained their separate
and distinct identities. The clash of personalities took place among three
key leaders, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram, in addition to
the problems arising out of ‘Dual Membership’3 concerning Jana Sangh–
RSS relations that led to the premature fall of the first non-Congress
experiment in 1979.
The breaking of the Janata Parivar on the issue of dual membership
ultimately led to the downfall of the Janata Sarkar in 1979. The Janata
constituents were left with no option except to face the seventh Lok Sabha
elections as either new or merged political entities. Since disintegration
and downfall of the Janata Parivar was directly linked to the controversy
and complicity of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and its relationship with RSS,
the BJS members decided to enter the electoral politics with a new
political identity from 1980 onward. Hence, Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) emerged in April 1980—a right-wing party formed by its erstwhile
Jana Sangh leaders and members, but with a new ideological identity.
Notes 93
The re-emergence of Congress, first under Mrs. Gandhi and subse-

quently under Rajiv Gandhi, not only gave the party time and space for
introspection, it also went ahead with new experiments in India’s parlia-
mentary system of governance. While Mrs. Gandhi’s regime (1980–84)
was based on mass awakening and institutional decline, Rajiv Gandhi era
(1984–89) laid the beginning of federal principles of accommodation and
conciliation in the Indian party system. A technoman with new vision and
mission, Rajiv’s era heralded the beginning of many new changes in
parliamentary democracy of India, marking a sharp break with his
predecessors.4
The post-Rajiv Congress of the 1990s remained organizationally weak
and a de-institutionalized party. The mass party of the yesteryears was
reduced to ‘grass without roots’. Since the 1967 coalition experiment, it
attempted to strengthen itself not by improving the organization but by
destroying the coalitions—pulling down Janata government by alluring
Charan Singh in 1979, Chandra Shekhar in 1989, United Front govern-
ment of Deve Gowda and Gujral in 1998.
Final Comments
The alternative politics as witnessed in 1977 both in Israel and India
didn’t sustain for long. Like the Likud, the Janata experiment too short-
lived its political sustenance. The charisma of political leadership started
fading in both the nations. With the death of JP and the challenge of
Begin’s leadership in the following years, party alignments witnessed new
transformations. The decade of the 1980s and onward witnessed the
changing forms of alignments, competitive coalitions, new electoral expe-
riences and increasing voting patterns in Israel and India.
Notes
1. In Hebrew, it indicates earthquake, which signifies a radical electoral
transformation.
2. The term Parivar refers to family. It was used for the first time for Janata
Party in view of five different political groups coming together to present
an anti-Congress alternative under the initiative of Jaya Prakash Narayan
in 1977. Later on, the term became frequently associated with RSS.
Anderson and Damle (1987) used the phrase for RSS, calling it as Sangh
Parivar for the first time.
3. The Jana Sangh members in the Janata Parivar happened to be the
members of its parent organization—RSS. Some of the Janata constituents
wanted the Jana Sangh dissociation from RSS as the pre-condition to stay
in the ruling coalition.
4. A man with expertise in technology as against politics, Rajiv Gandhi did
not have any political experience in Indian politics. A trained pilot with a
specialization in mechanical engineering from London, he used his tech-
nological know-how in addressing many important issues affecting Indian
polity. He became in 1984 the first technocrat to hold the post of Prime
Minister in the country.
References
Andersen, W. K., & Damle, S. D. (Eds.). (1987). The brotherhood in Saffron: The
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism. London: Western Press.
Arian, A. (1998). The second republic: Politics in Israel. Chatham: Chatham
House Publishers.
Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (2001). Candidates, parties and blocks: Israel in the
1990s. Party Politics, 7(6), 689–710.
Arian, A., Nachmias, D., & Amir, R. (Eds.). (2002). Executive governance in
Israel. Hampshire: Palgrave.
Austin, G. (1999). Working a democratic constitution: The Indian experience.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Baxter, C. (1987). Government and politics in South Asia. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Butler, D., et al. (Eds.). (1991). India decides: Elections 1952–1991. New Delhi:
Living Media Books.
Heath, A., et al. (Eds.). (1985). How Britain votes. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Isaac, R. J. (1981). Party and politics in Israel: Three visions of a Jewish state.
New York: Longman.
References 95
Mendilow, J. (2002). The Likud’s campaign and the headwaters of defeat. In

A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), The elections in Israel 1999. Albany: State
Yogesh Atal, & Sunil K Choudhary. (2014). Combating corruption: The Indian
case. Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan.
7
Toward a Coalitional Multipolarity
The third major transformation in the party systems in Israel and India
could be located in the late 1980s, which witnessed unprecedented
political developments at the levels of electoral politics and government
formations in both the nations. The post-1980 party systems in both
Israel and India got centered on the principle of coalitional polity.
The post-1980s/1990s electoral politics in both Israel and India came
to be described by the term M5. While Israeli M5 refers to Masoret,
Moledet, Mussar, Mishpacha and Matz’biya (meaning tradition, home-
land, ethics, solidarity and voters, respectively), Indian M5 indicates
Mandal, Mandir, Masjid, Market and Matdata (representing the issues
of caste, community, religion, market and voters, respectively).
The phenomenon of M5 represents consistency, continuity and con-
sensus in the Israeli and Indian polities. While the first M, Masoret and
Mandal, revolved around the notion of identity, loyalty became the
guiding feature for the second M, Moledet and Mandir. With its focus
on ethics and peaceful co-existence, Mussar and Masjid stood for morality
in the two polities. The 1990s heralded the beginning of a neo-liberal
economy in terms of the Emergency Economy Stabilization Plan (EESP)
and Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG) in both Israel

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_7
98 7 Toward a Coalitional Multipolarity
and India, respectively, thus focusing on connectivity between the local

and the global. Twenty-first-century global Israel and India witnessed
a significant political transformation where voters – Matz’biya and
Matdata – emerged as the real catalyst of political change in the demo-
cratic polities of the two nations.
While coalitions have always remained the salient feature of Israeli
politics from the 1980s onward, what was different between the first
and the third phase of the party systems in Israel was the transformation
of the ‘one-party dominant system’ or one-party-dominated government to
the ‘one-party-headed coalitions’ to be called ‘coalitional multipolarity’.
India did witness the coalitional experiments initially at the state level in
1950s and at the federal level in 1969, and coalitions started getting
institutionalized in Indian party politics from 1989 onward.
Coalitional multipolarity is a new phenomenon, which can best
describe the contemporary multiparty system based on coalitions. As
described in the formative chapter on theoretical discourse on parties
and party systems, coalitional multipolarity is characterized by the follow-
ing features:
1. Emergence of Pan Parties as lead parties constituting important poles in

coalition building and government formation.
2. Attraction and association of smaller parties as coalition partners to the
pan parties by cutting across ideological spectrum.
3. Flexibility and accessibility of pan parties representing electoral poles in
terms of their core ideological agenda.
Coalitional Multipolarity in Israel

The coalition era in the Israeli party system began with the introduction of
electoral reforms and the subsequent 1992 Knesset elections. During this
phase, electoral threshold was increased besides the introduction of direct
election to prime minister. In view of its significance for the future Israeli
politics, the 1992 reforms came to be dubbed as ‘constitutional revolu-
tion’ (Barak quoted in Edrey 2005: 4).
Coalitional Multipolarity in Israel 99
The party system in Israel had already started witnessing profound

changes in the wake of changing international ambience and growing
domestic insistence on the issue of Palestinian uprising known as Intifada1
and a search for permanent peace negotiations with the Palestinians. The
1992 elections for the Knesset were held under this changed environment
backed by the need for a solution to the existing crises bedeviling the
Israeli economy, polity and society.
The 1992 elections attempted to mold the Israeli party politics to the
coalitional multipolarity. The elections itself were preceded by two sig-
nificant reforms in the electoral politics of Israel. First, the electoral
threshold for parliamentary representation was raised from 1 to 1.5 per
cent. Second, a provision was made for the direct election of the prime
minister independent of the Knesset. These two reforms were a unique
blend of the parliamentary and presidential features on the lines of the
French and American political systems.
The 1992 elections for the Knesset were held against the backdrop of
these two electoral reforms. The elections were described by Asher Arian
(1998) as the second ‘reversal’ in the Israeli polity held after 1977
elections. Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997) called it as the ‘second
transition of power’ after 1977. The 1992 elections established Labor’s
predominance in the parliamentary polity once again. It enabled the
Labor Party to seek coalitional partners as per its own choice, thereby
leaving little room for political maneuverings usually resorted to by the
smaller parties.
The 1996 elections were held simultaneously for the Knesset and the
prime minister. While the elections witnessed a fierce battle for the Knesset
among the parties, they largely displayed a broad unanimity for the prime
ministerial candidates. Being aware of their respective limitations and
incapability to win their own prime ministerial candidate in the second
round of the split system, the smaller parties entered into bargaining deals
with their leading parent parties. This ‘give and take strategy’ only
strengthened the political leverage among the parties and converted the
political arena into ‘hotbed of bargaining deals’.
Media largely facilitated the role of the prime ministers in making
direct appeals to the voters. Hence, media debates highlighted different
issues of governance to be accomplished by the political actors. With
Labor’s land for peace formula and Likud’s rigid stands toward Palestinian
conciliation security issues continued to dominate the coalition agenda
throughout the 1990s.
The direct election of the Prime Minister according to Medding,
however, ‘promoted the multi-issue, multi-party, multi-block and essen-
tially consensus dynamic of Israeli democracy’ (Medding 1999: 198). The
coalition negotiations, which used to be held between parties and carried
out on their behest by the party leaders, were overtaken by the directly
elected prime minister and the other parties after 1996. ‘The empower-
ment of the Prime Minister by direct elections has made his own party
impotent, while strengthening rival parties’ (Ibid., 204).
The direct election of the prime minister, which was designed to make
him free from the hectic coalition bargaining and negotiations, failed
miserably to ensure political stability. The three prime ministers having
narrow coalitions in a short span of five years further indicated the fragile
nature of the coalition-building exercise. The split system, which enabled
the parties to distribute their prime ministerial votes in exchange of
substantial payoffs during the government formation, made the position
of the prime minister more weak and vulnerable. Hence, instead of stable
and sustainable coalition during the mid-1990s, Israel witnessed only
unwieldy coalitions with short tenures. The issues that gained relevance
during the post-electoral reform happened to be centered once again on
peace and security.
The elections for the prime minister, which were held thrice during a
period of five years, only highlighted the fragile and fragmented coalitional
system of Israel. In their bid to support the prime ministerial candidates of
the Labor and the Likud, the smaller parties largely succeeded in enhanc-
ing their political stakes in coalitional governance of polity. The number
of parties contesting the Knesset elections has not come down since the
raising of the threshold to 1.5 per cent initially, 2 per cent from 2006 and
3.25 per cent from 2015 onward. Similarly, the actual number of the lists
finally making their presence felt in the Knesset has been above ten (mean
average: 12.14) since 1992. All these developments have brought Israel
closer to the coalitional multipolarity, thereby making it more vulnerable
to its discouraging trends like total ‘volatility, electoral disproportionality
and political instability’.
Coalitional Multipolarity in Israel 101
Political scholars have viewed the process of electoral reforms and its
implications on the political system and party politics from different
angles. Myron J Aronoff has stated that the reforms ‘intensified the
dramatic decline of both mass parties and the concurrent rise of several
parties based on identity politics’ (Aronoff 2001: 447). While stating that
‘the purpose of electoral reform was not to enhance accountability, it was
to increase the ability to govern effectively’ (Doron and Harris 2000: 81)
Gideon Doron and Michael Harris have argued that the 1992 reforms
have considerably weakened Israeli democracy.
Asher Arian and Michal Shamir argue (2001) that the contemporary
phase of the Israeli party system is a highly fragmented system. Candidates
have become the mainstay of the political system rather than of political
parties. Parties only appear to resemble the ‘single-issue or single-
constituency interest groups’ (Arian and Shamir 2001). The rise of
sectarian politics and privatized voting according to the authors has
strengthened the forces of de-alignment in the party system. According
to Yael Yishai (2001), the contemporary Israeli party system witnesses ‘a
shift from a cartel model to the post-cartel polity’. Accordingly, formation
of new party organizations, role of party members and emergence of new
issues assumed significance in post-cartel period. Political parties during
the post-cartel period tend to display strong orientation toward civil
society. Parties in Israel seem to have brought society back into their
political milieu.
The contemporary phase of the Israeli party system thus appears to
be moving toward the multiplicity of the political parties having
lower ideological bonds among themselves. The left-right continuum
has more or less become weakened, and the centrist parties are in
their march of attracting voters through their rather vague and
ambivalent policy instances on various socio-economic and political
issues. The socio-economic and religious issues also acquired un-
precedented ascendancy in the electoral campaigns from the beginning
of the twenty-first century. The formation of four coalition govern-
ments from 2003 to 2015 by Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Netan-
yahu witnessed realignment and emergence of new coalitional actors
and principles.
By realizing the fallacy of the direct election of the prime minister, the
political parties in Israel in 2001 decided to discard the practice for the
future. However, such a move has yet to see any perceptible change in the
party politics and the system of governance. The present trends do show
the emergence of new political formations with massive middle-class
appeal and anti-settlement drive like Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi
as well as the return of civil society organizations in terms of restoration of
grassroots activities. However, it has not actually led to the disappearance
of Israeli political parties in near future.
Coalition Era and Indian Party System

The contemporary phase in Indian party system can be described as an era
of coalition politics, which started getting consolidated from 1989
onward. The formation of the National Front (1989–90) Government
under V. P. Singh and later on Chandra Shekhar, with two national
parties, namely, BJP and Communists, supporting the third front gov-
ernment, formally laid the formal beginning of coalition era in Indian
parliamentary polity. This phase came to be described in terms of ‘polar-
ized pluralism’, as reflected in the works of Sartori (1976).
The beginning of the 1980s witnessed personalization of politics and
politicization of personality having significant ramifications on the coalition
formation. With the increasing decline of the role of parties, particularly
national parties, and the growing influence of the party leaders coupled
with the role of the media and the new centrist political forces, the
bargaining leverage in the coalition formation got further enhanced.
Issues of caste and community, region and religion became strong
driving forces for elections and coalitions during the 1980s and 1990s.
Scholars and social scientists attempted to describe the democratic trans-
formation of the two decades as ‘second democratic upsurge’ and ‘M3’.
While Yogendra Yadav (2000) emphasized the increasing participation of
lower castes and communities and their leaders bringing significant trans-
formation in the democratic politics of the country, the term ‘M3’
highlighted the salience of Mandir, Mandal and Market as strong
Coalition Era and Indian Party System 103
democratic forces impacting the political fortunes of parties and party

systems in subsequent years.
Institutionalization of coalitions in Indian parliamentary politics from
1980s reflected a binary relationship between the legislature and the
executive. The strength of coalitions during this period came to be
equated with the weakness of the prime ministers. Unlike the formative
prime ministerial models—‘Parliamentary Premiership to Imperial Pre-
miership’ – the coalition era witnessed the emergence of Federal Premier-
ship where Prime Ministers became the dignified individuals and the
Prime Minister Offices emerged as the powerful institutions of gover-
nance. However, instability also marked the working of coalitions as could
be seen in the formation of 11 coalitions in 25 years from 1989–2014
though ideally it should have not more than five stable governments.
Ashish Nandy in his earlier work described the fragile nature of the
coalitions in states with ‘2½ years of government’.2
The onset of liberalization, privatization and globalization further
strengthened the coalitional dynamics in Indian politics since 1991.
The formation of the Congress government under P. V. Narasimha Rao
with the outside support of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) showed the
one-party dominance had appeared to be over as the umbrella party was
dependent on small regional outfits like JMM for its democratic survival
in parliamentary politics.
The post-liberalized politics in India from 1990s onward witnessed
different and distinct transformations. While social movements during
the 1970s and 1980s paved the way for second democratic upsurge (Yadav
2000) leading to massive participation of the backward classes in India’s
electoral politics, the post-1990s facilitated a transition toward competi-
tive market politics to be characterized as festive electoral polity. Elections
under coalition era in India were seen as festive occasions where political
parties started alluring the electors with their policies and programs in the
course of elections spanning across phases. The use of technology
imparted more competitiveness to the electoral market where parties
started taking recourse to media professionals and managers in order to
get connected with the electors.
The tone and tenor of electoral campaigns started changing with
the introduction of technocracy, particularly with the beginning of the
twenty-first century. No parties—national or state—were left behind in

such competitive festive electoral polity. Emergence of young voters—the
‘fifth M’ called Matdata (Choudhary 2016) spanning from 18 to 35 years of
age—brought about new alignments in the electoral politics of Indian
democracy. The post-1990s also witnessed breaking down of the cleavages,
with Matadata moving beyond ideological baggage of the parties with a
focus on development and governance. Such transformation has come to be
characterized as third democratic upsurge (Choudhary 2015) in Indian
polity.
The mid-1990s appeared to have institutionalized and legitimized the
coalitional principles in Indian politics. This could be seen in the formation
of United Front Government (1996–98) with the outside support from the
Congress, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA I and II: 1998–2004)
led by BJP in its two-span period comprising 13 parties each; and the
United Progressive Alliance (UPA I and II: 2004–2014). While UPA I
constituted the Congress-led alliance consisting of nine coalitional partners
supported by the Communists externally, UPA II formed during
2009–2014 had the coalitional support of its seven pre-poll regional outfits
like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Nationalist Congress Party, All India
Trinamool Congress, Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and
JMM.3
The NDA III at present (2014–2019) is the tenth coalition experiment
at the center since it first started in 1969. According to Bidyut
Chakrabarty (2006), Indian politics is both coalitional and regionalized.
There have been changing social constituencies of the parties and chang-
ing political discourse in post-1989 era. India’s problems are too complex
and too numerous to be solved by any single political party. Coalition thus
is both a ‘device of governance and a dialectics between coalition dharma
(principles) and coalition karma (articulation)’ (Ibid.). Chakrabarty states
that national parties have become increasingly regionalized and the center
is now region-dependent for its survival. Regional parties are broadly
united in their rejection of the core ideological orientation of the Congress
and the BJP. ‘While the NDA was a surplus majority coalition UPA was a
minority coalition’ (Ibid.). Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show consistent rise of
regional parties as well as the decimation of the pan-Indian parties in
Indian parliamentary politics (also see Table 7.1).
Coalition Era and Indian Party System 105
200 190
182 182
168
160 146
120 110
Seats
% Votes
80
42
40 30 27
23.6 23.6 24.3 24.8 25.4
15.5 15.1
0
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 7.1 Regional parties in Lok Sabha (1989–2014) (Source: Chakrabarty (2006)
and Election Commission of India Results, 2009 and 2014)
250
232
206
197
200
141 145
150 140
114 Seats
Vote %
100
50 39.5
44
36.5
28.8 25.8 28.3 26.5 28.5
19.3
0
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 7.2 Congress in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 (Source: Election Commission of

India Results, 1989–2014)
Indian parliamentary democracy has been witnessing plebiscitary pol-

itics since 1967. The de-institutionalization of the Congress has actually
strengthened the plebiscitary politics with single issue agenda getting
nationwide eminence over the years. While on the one hand it has
paved the way for coalitional experiments both at the center and the
states, it has also ensured emergence of regional parties at the center stage
300
282
250
200
182 182
161
Seats
150 138
Vote %
120 116
100 85
50
31
25.5 23.7 22.1
20 20.2 18.8
7.7 11.3
2
0
1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 7.3 BJP in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014 (Source: Sunil (2001) and Election Commis-
sion of India Results, 2009 and 2014)
of national governance. Whether they may be called as ‘flush parties’

(Craig Baxter quoted in Chakrabarty 2006) for vanishing or remaining at
the margins or described as the ‘third sector parties’ (D L Seth quoted in
Chakrabarty 2006) for their failure in overtaking the national parties in
the near future, the regional parties are going to be part of national and
state coalition in the India’s federal polity, at least in the years to come.
The first three Lok Sabha elections (2004, 2009 and 2014) in the
twenty-first-century India witnessed mixed response to the rise of regional
parties in terms of their seats and voting percentage, but their role in
forming the government at the center has not been diminished. The
Congress came to form the national government successively from 2004
to 2014 only because of the help of its pre-poll regional allies under UPA.
The same could be attributed to the BJP in 2014, which, despite getting a
clear-cut majority of its own in Lok Sabha, entered the national fray only
as the leader of the NDA III.
Table 7.1 The Lok Sabha elections: 1952–2014
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984
Electorate (million) 173.2 193.6 217.6 250.6 274.0 321.1 363.9 379.5
Valid votes (million) 105.9 120.5 115.1 145.8 146.6 188.9 197.8 235.1
Invalid votes (million) n.a. 29.5 47.4 68.6 49.3 53.5 49.3 60.6
Turn out (%) 45.7 47.7 55.4 61.3 55.3 60.5 57.0 63.6
Total seats 489 494 494 520 518 542 542 542
Contested 479 482 491 515 517 540 529 515
Uncontested 10 12 3 5 1 2 13 27
Number of candidates 1874 1519 1985 2369 2784 2439 4629 5312
Number of parties 53 15 27 25 53 34 36 33
INC (1952–77) INC (I) 364 371 361 283 352 154 353 404

from 1980 (479) (490) (488) (516) (441) (492) (492) (491)
45.0% 47.8% 44.7% 40.8% 43.7% 34.5% 42.7% 49.1%
INCO (1971) – – – – 16 3 13 4
INCU (1980) (238) (19) (212) (31)
ICSS (1984–91), ICS 96–98 10.4% 1.7% 5.3% 1.5%
BLD 1977, JNPS 80, – – – – – Part of 41 3
LKD 84–96, BKKGP 98, Janata (294) (173)
RLD 1999–2014 Party 9.4% 5.9%
Janata Dal, JD (United) 99 – – – – – – – –
Janata Party – – – – – 295 31 10
(405) (432) (207)
41.3% 19.0% 6.8%
(continued )
107
108
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984
* *
BJS (1952–71) 3 4 14 35 22 2
BJP (1984) (94) (130) (196) (251) (157) (224)
7
3.1% 5.9% 6.4% 9.4% 7.4%* 7.7%

BSP – – – – – – – –
CPI 16 27 29 23 23 7 11 6
(49) (110) (137) (106) (87) (91) (48) (61)
3.3% 8.9% 9.9% 5.0% 4.7% 2.8% 2.6% 2.7%
CPM – – – 19 25 22 36 22
(62) (85) (53) (63) (59)
4.4% 5.1% 4.3% 6.1% 5.8%
KMPP (1952) 9 19 12 13 2 – – –
PSP (1957–71) (145) (189) (168) (109) (63)
5.8% 10.4% 6.8% 3.1% 1.0%
Swatantra Party – – 18 44 8 – – –
(173) (178) (56)
7.9% 8.7% 3.1%
SOC (1952–62) 12 – 6 23 3 – – –
SSP (1967–71) (254) (107) (122) (93)
10.6% 2.7% 4.9% 2.4%
J&K National Conference – – – 1 – 2 3 3
(4) (3) (5) (5)
0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
Shiromani Akali Dal 4 – 3 3* 1 9 1 –
(14) (7) (8) (15) (9) (7)
0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 1.2% 0.7%
DMK – – 7 25 23 2 16 2
(18) (26) (24) (19) (16) (28)
2.01% 3.7% 3.8% 1.7% 2.1% 2.4%
AIADMK – – – – – 18 2 12
(21) (24) (12)
2.9% 2.3% 1.6%
Telugu Dessam Party – – – – – – – 30
(34)
4.3%

Shiv Sena – – – – – – – –
Samajwadi Party – – – – – – – –
Asom Gana Parishad – – – – – – – –
Rashtriya Janata Dal – – – – – – – –
Biju Janata Dal – – – – – – – –
Nationalist Congress Party – – – – – – – –
All India Trinamool – – – – – – – –
Congress
AAP – – – – – – – –
Others 43 31 24 16 29 21 13 11
(306) (119) (211) (123) (388) (103) (210) (198)
15.6% 7.6% 7.7% 5.6% 9.2% 3.9% 3.2% 5.4%
Independents 38 42 20 35 14 9 9 5
(533) (481) (480) (864) (1134) (1224) (2826) (3791)
15.9% 19.4% 11.1% 13.7% 8.4% 5.5% 6.4% 7.9%
(continued)
109
110
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Electorate (million) 498.6 498.3 592.5 602.3 619.5 671.4 716.9 814.5
Valid votes (million) 300.7 275.2 334.8 366.6 364.4 389.7 417.03 553.8
7
Invalid votes (million) 82.7 75.1 84.3 70.5 72.3 0.2* –* –*

Turn out (%) 61.9 56.7 57.9 62.0 59.9 58.07 58.1 66.4
Total seats 543 543 543 543 543 543 543 543
Contested 525 521 543 539 543 543 543 543
Uncontested 18 22 – 4 – – – –
Number of candidates 6160 8699 13,952 4708 4648 5435 8070 8251
Number of parties 113 145 209 176 169 230 363 464
INC (1952–77) INC (I) 197 232 140 141 114 145 206 44
from 1980 (510) (492) (529) (477) (453) (417) (255) (464)
39.5% 36.5% 28.8% 25.8% 28.3% 26.5% 28.5% 19.3%
INCO (1971) 1 1 0 0 – – – –
INCU (1980) (14) (28) (26) (7)
ICSS (1984–91), ICS 96–98 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.01%
BLD 1977, JNPS 80, 0 0 0 0 2 3 5* 0*
LKD 84–96, BKKGP 98, (116) (78) (101) (27) (15) (32) (9) (10)
RLD 1999–2014 0.2% 0.06% 0.19% 0.19% 0.3% 0.6% 2.05% 0.1%
Janata Dal, JD (United) 99 143 59 46 6 21 8 20 2
(244) (308) (196) (191) (60) (73) (55) (93)
17.7% 11.8% 8.08% 3.2% 3.1% 2.3% 1.5% 1.08%
Janata Party 0 5 0 1 0 1 0 –
(155) (349) (101) (16) (26) (10) (9)
1.01% 3.3% 0.1% 0.12% 0.05% 0.09% 0.0%
BJS (1952–71) 85 120* 161 182 182 138 116 282
BJP (1984) (225)* (468) (471) (388) (339) (364) (365) (428)
11.3% 20.1% 20.2% 25.5% 23.7% 22.1% 18.8% 31.0%
BSP 3 2 11 5 14 19 21 0
(246) (231) (210) (251) (225) (435) (182) (503)
2.07% 1.6% 4.02% 4.6% 4.1% 5.3% 6.1% 4.1%
CPI 12 14 12 9 4 10 4 1
(50) (42) (43) (58) (54) (34) (49) (67)
2.5% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 0.8%
CPM 33 35 32 32 33 43 16 9
(64) (60) (75) (71) (72) (69) (70) (93)
6.5% 6.1% 6.1% 5.1% 5.4% 5.6% 5.3% 3.2%
KMPP (1952) – – – – – – – –
PSP (1957–71)
Swatantra Party – – – – – – – –

SOC (1952–62) – – – – – – – –
SSP (1967–71)
J&K National Conference 3 – – 3 4 2 3 0
(3) (6) (6) (6) (3) (3)
0.02% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.07%
Shiromani Akali Dal 0 – 8 8 2 8 4 4
(4) (9) (8) (9) (10) (9) (10)
0.03% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.6%
DMK 0 0 17 6 12 16 18 0
(32) (32) (18) (18) (19) (16) (22) (35)
2.3% 2.09% 2.1% 1.4% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 1.7%
AIADMK 11 11 0 18 10 0 9 37
(11) (11) (10) (23) (29) (33) (23) (40)
1.5% 1.6% 0.6% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 1.7% 3.3%
Telugu Dessam Party 2 13 16 12 29 5 6 16
(33) (35) (36) (35) (34) (33) (31) (30)
3.2% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 3.6% 3.0% 1.5% 2.5%
111
(continued )
112
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Shiv Sena 1 4 15 6 15 12 11 18
(3) (22) (132) (79) (63) (56) (43) (58)
7
0.1% 0.8% 1.4% 1.7% 1.5% 1.8% 1.6% 1.8%

Samajwadi Party – – 17 20 26 36 23 5
(111) (166) (151) (237) (182) (197)
3.2% 4.9% 3.7% 4.3% 3.4% 3.3%
Asom Gana Parishad – 1 5 0 0 2 1 0
(4) (11) (10) (8) (12) (6) (12)
0.5% 0.7% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1%
Rashtriya Janata Dal – – – 17 7 24 4 4
(116) (61) (42) (44) (30)
2.7% 2.7% 2.4% 1.2% 1.3%
Biju Janata Dal – – – 9 10 11 14 20
(12) (12) (12) (18) (21)
1.0% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.7%
Nationalist Congress – – – – 8 9 9 6
Party (132) (32) (68) (36)
2.2% 1.8% 2.04% 1.6%
All India Trinamool – – – 7* 8 2 19 34
Congress (29) (29) (33) (35) (131)
2.4% 2.5% 2.07% 3.4% 3.8%
AAP – – – – – – – 4
(432)
2.0%
Others 26 23 54 59 36 14 25 54
(737) (991) (1342) (853) (906) (897) (2323) (2323)
6.1% 6.2% 11.9% 11.2% 7.8% 4.2% 12.3% 13.6%
Independents 12 1 9 6 6 5 9 3
(3713) (5537) 10,635 (1915) (1945) (2385) (3831) (3235)
5.2% 3.9% 6.2% 2.3% 2.7% 4.2% 5.1% 3.02%
Source: David Butler et al. (1995): 70 and Election Commission Reports, 1952–2014
Notes:
The figures do not include results for bi-election and countermanded elections
Only figures from 1952 to 1980 are taken from David Butler et al., and not the classification. The results from 1984 onward
are analyzed from the Election Commission Reports
The figures covering electorate, valid votes, invalid votes from 1952 to 1980 are converted into millions, though they have
been mentioned in lakhs by the authors
Invalid votes from 1984 to 1999 are counted after deducting the valid votes from the total voters. *With the wider use of
Electronic Voting Machines from 2004 Lok Sabha elections, invalid votes became almost negligible

Others show the actual position of the national tally in all the elections. The category also mentions parties—national,
state, registered/unrecognized—not covered in the classified categories of the tally
The figures in ‘Others’ in all 15 Lok Sabha elections are calculated by the author on his own after deducting the parties
already covered under the listed categories
The voting percentage of BJS in 1971 elections was 7.36 according to the Election Commission report
In 1977, BJS fought the elections as part of Janata Party coalition. Since the Janata Party was not formed by a de jure
merger, the Election Commission could not grant legal recognition to the new formation. As a result, all the Janata Party
constituents including BJS fought the elections on the election symbol of BLD
BLD contested 1977 elections as a four-party conglomeration, namely, BLD, Jana Sangh, Congress O and Socialists.
Congress for Democracy led by Jagjivan Ram subsequently joined the Janata Parivar, thereby increasing its strength to 295
Before forming the BJP, the BJS members fought the 1980 elections as part of Janata Party (Chandra Shekhar group)
Elections were not held for the entire states of Assam (14 seats) and Punjab (13 seats) in 1984. Elections in these two states
were held in 1985. The data of 1984 elections exclude the figures of Assam and Punjab
Janata Party (Chandra Shekhar group) and Lok Dal (Ajit Singh group) contested the 1989 election under the banner of
Janata Dal led by V. P. Singh
There is a discrepancy in the 1989 election results of the Election Commission report regarding the BJP candidates fighting
the election. While the Election Commission report put the figures as 226, in actual state-wise counting, the figures come
113
out to be 225
(continued )
114
In 1989, elections were not held for the entire state of Assam (14 seats)
In 1991 Indian Congress Socialist contested as Indian Congress (Socialist—Sarat Chandra Sinha). Indian Congress Socialist
got the status of state party in 1996 and a registered/unrecognized party in 1998 elections
In 1991, BJP’s actual strength was 120. However, its candidate L. K. Advani won elections from both New Delhi and Gandhi
7
Nagar (Gujarat). Hence, the party decided to vacate the Delhi seat, which was later bagged by the Congress in a bi-election
The 1991 elections do not include 6 seats of Jammu and Kashmir, 13 seats of Punjab, 2 countermanded seats of Bihar and

1 seat of U.P.
Shiromani Akali Dal didn’t contest 1991 elections. However, its splinter group Shiromani Akali Dal (Simaranjit Singh Mann)
fought the election but could not open its account
After its landslide victory in 1977, Janata Party started splitting into many smaller parties. The split Janata Party started
losing its national status in succeeding elections to Lok Sabha. Some of its erstwhile constituents returned to their parent
organization like Lok Dal; others reincarnated into new formations like Bharatiya Janata Party; some others were
instrumental in forming Janata Party (Chandra Shekhar group), which later set up Samata Party. Janata Party (Chandra
Shekhar group) entered the 1996 poll as a part of Samata Party
Janata Party (Chandra Shekhar group) fought the 1998 and 1999 elections under the new party called Samajwadi Janata
Party (Rashtriya)
In 1998, elections were not held for two seats in Jammu and Kashmir, and one seat each in Bihar and Himachal Pradesh
Lok Dal fought 1998 elections as Bharatiya Kisan Kamgar Party (BKKGP)
In 1998, All India Trinamool Congress was known as West Bengal Trinamool Congress
Rashtriya Lok Dal led by Ajit Singh was a registered/unrecognized party in 2009
The percentage of invalid votes was just 0.2 million in 2004 elections because of the partial use of Electronic Voting
Machines (EVMs) for the first time. Invalid votes become infructuous after 2009, with the complete introduction of EVMs
replacing paper ballots throughout the country
For 2009 elections, the voting per cent of Shiromani Akali Dal and National Conference is derived after dividing their total
number of votes polled for the party by the total valid votes polled. Shiromani Akali Dal and National Conference,
respectively, got 4,004,789 and 498,374 votes, whereas the total number of valid votes polled in the 2009 elections was
417,037,606
For 2014 elections, NOTA (None of the Above) votes polled were 6,000,197, with 1.08 per cent of the votes
Final Comments 115
The emergence of regional parties has strengthened the coalitional

dynamics in Indian party system. The Congress and BJP seem to have
held two significant poles in party politics in India, and their key role in
governance both at federal and state levels cannot be undermined by any
regional formation, at least in near future.
Final Comments
Parties and party systems in Israel and India have traveled a long and
arduous journey from the one-party dominance (Mapaivot and Congress
System) of the 1950s and 1960s to the institutionalized block politics of
the 1970s and 1980s, and finally culminating in an era of coalitional
mulitpolarity in 1990s and the twenty-first century. During the last two
decades, political parties in the two parliamentary democracies have tried
to ensure governance by maintaining both sustainability and accountabil-
ity of the political system.
The growing presence of a large number of parties and their spirit of
working together as indispensable components in coalitional polity as well
as in national unity government foretold the successful story of coalitional
experiments of the Israeli and Indian party systems. With the two parlia-
mentary democracies successfully completing their regular national elec-
tions (the 20th Knesset in 2015 and the 16th Lok Sabha in 2014), the
contemporary phase shows the marked trends toward coalitional multi-
polarity. It has all the unique features of the party system change that are
being witnessed across the world, namely, volatility, instability,
unpredictability and disproportionality.
Political transformation in an era of globalization has heralded both
opportunities and challenges for political parties in these two parliamen-
tary democratic nations. Though political parties have partially succeeded
in transforming the ‘procedural democracy’ into ‘substantive democracy’
in terms of imparting democratic governance in both Israel and India,
they still require to work as real catalyst for ensuring social transformation,
electoral participation and political mobilization. The attempt of political
parties to perpetuate themselves into political power would only lead to
their degeneration. However, the sincere attempt on their part to absolve
power and absorb responsibility would transform them as real connect

between the rulers and the ruled.
Notes
1. Intifada refers to protests by Palestinians against Israeli settlements in West
Bank and Gaza. Israel witnessed two Intifadas—the first continued from
1987 to 1993, which broadly remained peaceful; the second emerged in
September 200, which was more violent.
2. Ashish Nandy cited formation of 8 coalitions in India in 25 years since
1989. According to Nandy, the 2½ years of government indicated the first
half of 5 years of government full of people’s expectations, which started
declining from the second spell of government.
3. All India Trinamool Congress and DMK later withdrew support to UPA II
in 2012.
References
House Publishers.
1990s. Party Politics, 7(6), 689–710.
Aronoff, M. J. (2001). Radical change in Israel: A review essay. Political Science
Quarterly, 116(3), 447–453.
Butler, D., et al. (Eds.). (1995). India decides: Elections 1952–1995. Springville:
Books and Things.
Chakrabarty, B. (2006). Forging power: Coalition politics in India. Oxford: New
Delhi.
Choudhary, S. K. (2016, September 15). Lensing 2014 from a voter’s perspec-
tive: The road ahead. Sri Guru Nanak Dev Khalsa College, University of
Delhi.
Doron, G., & Harris, M. (Eds.). (2000). Public policy and electoral reform: The
case of Israel. Lanham: Lexington Books.
References 117
Edrey, Y. M. (2005). The Israeli constitutional revolution/evolution, models of

constitution, and a lesson from mistakes and achievements. American Journal
of Comparative Law, 53, 77–123.
Sunil Kumar (2001). Communalism and secularism in Indian politics: Study of
Medding, P. Y. (1999). From government by party to government despite party.
Israel Affairs, 6(2), 198.
Boulder/Oxford: Westview Press.
Yadav, Y. (2000). Understanding the second democratic upsurge: Trends of
Bahujan participation in electoral politics in the 1990s. In F. R. Frankel
et al. (Eds.), Transforming India: Social and political dynamics of democracy.
Yishai, Y. (2001). Bringing society back in: Post cartel parties in Israel. Party
Politics, 7(6), 667–687.
Part IV
Ideological Roots, Social Bases
and Electoral Patterns of the Parties:
Exploring Israel and India
Parties are generally the cluster of organization, ideology and leadership.

The strength of the parties actually lies in the effective use of all these three
clusters, which tend to determine their electoral base, social support and
strategies of mobilization. The appropriate use of the institutional clusters
and mobilizing strategies often helps parties establish their hegemony on
the political system and ensure their sustainability in the foreseeable
future.
Political parties in Israel represent both continuity and change in their
organizational structures, ideological planks, leadership orientations and
electoral base. While the continuity embodied mostly in terms of political
objectives and ideological goals of the parties, the change is envisaged in
the means of realizing those goals. The ‘continuity’ is largely the outcome
of the strong historical and cultural roots, which the parties carried forth
with themselves from pre-independence society to post-independence
polity in both Israel and India. The ‘change’, as witnessed in the party
politics in these two parliamentary democracies, was the result of new
socio-economic and political realities faced by political parties in the
aftermath of independence in general and with the onset of globalization
in particular.
Parties in Israel and India can broadly be classified into different blocks.
They travel from one block or group to another without actually adhering
to any ideology. In other words, while these blocks spreading across left,
120 IV Ideological Roots, Social Bases and Electoral Patterns. . .
right and center do embody specific ideologies and principles, the parties
following these groups do not exactly adhere to those principles. In fact,
the coalition dynamics in Indian parliamentary politics since the 1980s
has actually strengthened the non-ideological issues, with parties across
the blocks moving from one group to another for electoral benefits. In
Israel, on the other hand, parties within the block are more committed to
the broad principles and ideological stances.
However, over the years, there has been a shift of focus from ideologies
to governance among the parties in both Israel and India. This can be seen
from the study of ideology, organization, electoral base and leadership of
political parties in these two parliamentary democracies.
8
The Left-Wing Parties (Socialist Block)
The first dominant block in the party systems of Israel and India happens
to be the left block or the socialist block. Under the left block, the Israeli
Labor Party continued to define the nature of party system and consti-
tuted the center of governance either as leading player or supporting
partner until 2009. The left parties under Indian party system successfully
held the center of power at the state levels and became a part of the federal
governance during the coalitional experiment from the 1990s.
Even though the left-wing block in both Israel and India is led by many
major and minor parties, the key ideological postulates of the left in both
the nations get broadly represented in the Israeli Labor Party and the
Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist).
The Israeli Left: The Israeli Labor Party

The Labor party constitutes the important pillar of the block politics in
Israel. By way of its ideological premises and mobilizational strategies, the
Labor block can be placed on the left front of the left-right spectrum in

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_8
122 8 The Left-Wing Parties (Socialist Block)
the Israeli party politics. Partly being the key founder of the national
struggle that led to the independence of the state and partly because of the
nationalistic polices as employed by the group of the parties, the labor
block used to be defined in terms of the Socialist block.
The labor block led by the socialist parties has not remained consistent
and coherent both in terms of its ideological postures and electoral
support. It is the outcome of various alignments and realignments,
inclusions and exclusions, and splits and mergers. As a result, the con-
glomeration of political forces within the Labor socialist block has more or
less remained incoherent and vulnerable to dissensions.
Hapoel Hatzair and Ahdut Ha’avoda were the two main left-wing Labor
parties that undertook the task of national struggle along with the absorp-
tion of the Aliyah. By 1930, Hapoel Hatzair and Ahdut Ha’avoda merged
together to form Mapai, the precursor of Israeli Labor Party. The national
struggle leading to the new state of Israel was fought under the organiza-
tional structure, ideological planks and leadership directions of Mapai.
The strength of Mapai was its coherent organization having disciplined
full-time workers. The workers were active in all the trade unions that
became affiliated to the Histadrut (the general federation of the trade
unions created in 1920). After independence, Histadrut transformed into
a ‘quasi-state’ and came to be defined as a ‘state within state’. The
leadership of Mapai established its strong nexus with the Histadrut by
controlling its management.
The Mapai leadership was both coherent and centralized. It came to be
characterized by ‘self-discipline, voluntarism, and devotion to national
goals’ (Medding 1972: 11). It generally followed the consensual approach
in sorting out the differences among its members. It shed its narrow class
outlook and tried to absorb all the sections through its slogan ‘from class
to nation’. Despite the presence of ideological differences regarding the
strategies toward achieving the Zionist goals, no major rift made its
headway in the organizational structure of the party. Hence, the creation
of the Rafi from Mapai in 1965 failed to affect Mapai organizationally and
politically.
To counter the political challenge to its organizational and ideological
ascendancy and contain the internal crisis, Mapai merged with Ahdut
Ha’avoda and Rafi to form the Labor Party in 1968. The creation of the
The Israeli Left: The Israeli Labor Party 123
Labor was considered to be an electoral necessity to absorb the disgruntled

party workers and the new immigrants. The change in the nomenclature
could not lead to any perceptible change in the party organization and
ideological goals.
Shapiro (198?) described the Labor as the machine party because most
of its decisions were taken by the top veteran leaders, whereas their
implementation was carried by the informal machine hierarchy at the
bottom. The strong organizational structure, pragmatic leadership, ideo-
logical flexibility and consistently expanding social support paved to
institutionalize the Labor dominance in the left socialist block until
1977. However, the party was severely plagued by succession crisis and
the irresponsible party caucus. The new leadership could neither contain
the decadent organizational structures nor attract the new influx of
immigrants to its flexible ideological fora.
From 1977 to 1992, the Labor lost its pivotal position and remained a
competitive party, competing neck-to-neck with Likud. During this
period, the Labor formed national unity government with Likud. The
formation of the national unity government was based on political expe-
diency rather than on ideological congruence. The electoral strength of
the Labor remained more or less consistent throughout the period.
The era of institutionalized block politics witnessed fierce leadership
battle within Labor, especially between Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.
During this period, the personal clashes marred the political and ideolog-
ical spirit of the Labor. As a result of the infighting, the control of the
party organization on the leaders started loosening, and the party once
again headed for an ideological and organizational renovation.
The major organizational change took place in the Labor party struc-
ture in 1992 when it introduced the primary elections for the selection of
the national leader and the list of the candidates to be elected for the
Knesset. The organizational changes were later substantiated by the
changed ideological planks of the Labor. The Labor under the new
leadership of Rabin during the 1990s sought to impart new dynamism
to the party ideology and strategies of political mobilization. It entered the
1992 elections with significant changes such as replacing all the party
symbols, including Labor’s socialistic red flags, de-emphasizing traditional
Labor institutions like Histadrut and Kibbutzim and changing the official
name of the party to the ‘Labor Headed by Rabin’.
Although the ideological and organizational changes did yield positive
electoral results for the Labor in terms of its electoral dominance of the
Israeli polity again after an interregnum of 15 years, it failed to mark the
consistency in the Labor ascendancy of the Mapaivot. The intra-group
infighting continued with disastrous consequences for the Labor’s polit-
ical legitimacy. The leadership tussle and the organizational weaknesses
resulted into the Labor’s irreparable loss in the elections both for the
municipalities and the Histadrut.
Losing hold of the Histadrut from 1994 was the serious blow to the
Labor. From 1994, the Histadrut leadership passed from Labor to Haim
Ramon’s List called Haim Hadashim (New Life), and later on to Amir
Peretz’s One Nation. Both Ramon and Peretz were the strong leaders with
massive workers’ following within the Labor party. However, their mar-
ginalization by the top echelons in the party hierarchy made them leave
the party and challenge the Labor hegemony outside the party domain.
Don Peretz and Gideon Doron found the Labor in the mid-1990s as
different ‘in structure, orientation, and impact on society form the party
of the 1970s’ (Peretz and Doron 1997: 93). The authors defined Labor as
‘a catch-all party with no unified ideology or single orientation towards
major items on the national agenda’ (Ibid.), and the most significant
objective of the party to keep its supporters united was its ‘desire to
deny rule to Likud’, felt the authors.
The electoral reforms of 1992 largely deteriorated Labor organization.
The direct election of the prime minister being independent of the
legislative support in the Knesset further weakened the Labor organiza-
tion. While it allowed the voters to cast their issue-oriented,
non-committed, ideological preferences for the prime minister, it encour-
aged them to choose their Knesset representatives in consonance with
their own particular interests. The Labor lost the first contested prime
ministerial election in 1996.
From the late 1990s, Labor underwent new transformation, with Ehud
Barak coming at the helm of the party. Barak advocated the rightist stance
on the security question, and hence came to be referred as ‘Bibi’s
(Netanyahu’s nick name) Compatible’. His electoral campaigns were
full of promises—granting free education, creating new jobs, investing in

infrastructure, giving adequate representation to women, rectifying mal-
treatment of the African Jews, advocating ‘government for all citizens’. In
this way, he tried to re-structure the Labor ‘as a new alliance or federation
consisting of new social groups in the spirit of the American Democratic
Party. His political appeal extended to groups and individuals driven by
social, moderate religious, and gender agendas’ (Ibid.: 185). The One
Israel was an attempt to accommodate diverse political forces like Gesher
and Meimad (a liberal religious party) into one cohesive umbrella.
Although Labor under the new incarnation as ‘One Israel’ enabled
Barak to win the prime ministerial election in 1999 and form the
coalitional government subsequently, the prime ministerial victory could
be gained only at the loss of its parliamentary support. As Doron stated,
the Labor ‘provided its leader with neither a firm parliamentary base for
legislation nor the flexibility needed for governance’ (Doron 2002: 179).
Barak’s ill-fated administration and defunct organizational structures
provided opportunity to the Haifa Mayor Amram Mitzna to acquire
Labor leadership in 2002 by a very convincing majority of 54 per cent
in the Labor primary. A former army officer who earned the epithet of a
‘dovish general’ for attacking Ariel Sharon over his involvement in the
Palestinian massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in
1982, Mitzna ‘emerged from relative obscurity to head Israel’s belea-
guered Labour Party in November 2002’ (Westcott 2002). Described in
his party circles as Labor’s peace hope, Mitzna continued on his path ‘to
pursue the vision of making peace in the Middle East. He advocated a
more far-reaching program of evacuating settlements, withdrawal from
the Gaza Strip and unilateral separation from the Palestinians’.
Though Mitzna was elected in order to put the Labor back on the road
to recovery, he was never seen as a serious contender for the premiership.
His non-popularity among the voters, his unskilled and inexperienced
leadership and his pledge to follow his political mentor Barak in peace
negotiations with the Palestinians only led to Labor’s crushing defeat
during the Knesset elections held in January 2003.
Since 2003, the Labor had failed to regain its lost crowning glory. The
party only managed to win 19 seats consecutively during the 2003 and
2006 elections to the Knesset. Its formation of an electoral alliance with
60
56
51
50
47 47
46
45 45 44 40
42
40
40 39
34
Knesset Seats
32
30
26
24
20 19 19
15
13
10
0
3
5
49
51
55
59
61
65
69
73
77
81
84
88
92
96
99
03
06
09
201
201
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Knesset Elections
Fig. 8.1 Labor’ seats in the Knesset, 1949–2015
the Meimad—the Green Movement—during 2003 elections and with

Meimad and Em Ahad (headed by Amir Perez) during 2006 elections
failed to transform the party into a ruling alliance. Ehud Barak didn’t
succeed in translating his earlier governance into electoral sustenance
during the 2009 elections to the Knesset where the party, while contesting
the elections alone, managed to win only 13 seats with 9.9 per cent of
votes (see Figs. 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3).
Though the Labor did manage to be a part of the coalition government
in 2009, it failed to get any political mileage both during 2013 and 2015
elections for the Knesset. The party under its new leadership—Shelly
50
46.2
45
39.6
38.2
40
37.3
36.7
36.6
35.7
34.9
34.6
34.7
35
32.2
30.0
Voting Percentage
30
26.8
24.6
25
20.2
18.6
20
15.6
14.4
15
11.3
9.9
10
0
3
15
49
51
55
59
61
65
69
73
77
81
84
88
92
96
99
03
06
09
201
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Knesset Elections
Fig. 8.2 Labor’s voting percentage in the Knesset, 1949–2015
Yacimovich and Isaac Herzog—did try to rejuvenate its voters during the
19th and the 20th Knesset elections, respectively; it failed to translate its
seats into government formation. Although the Labor did improve its
electoral position in 2015 with 24 seats and 18.6 per cent votes as Zionist
Union, it couldn’t lead the coalition. The failure of the party to be part of
the current coalition government has further disillusioned both its sup-
porters and the members of the Knesset.
From a party of socialism, the Labor has now come to be seen as a
bourgeois party with its supporters consisting of the big business tycoons,
industrialists and members from other affluent strata of the society, rather
60
Seats
Voting Percentage
55
50
45
40
Seats/ Voting Percentage
35
30
25
20
15
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Knesset Years
Fig. 8.3 Labor’ performance in the Knesset, 1949–2015
than the workers and the peasants. The party became a subject of criticism
for hiding capitalism under the garb of socialism. The Labor primaries
have been marred by infighting resulting into what a senior Israeli citizen
has described: ‘Shinaat Chinam (free/unconditional hatred) started dom-
inating Aharat Chinam (the unconditional love)’.
The party’s main ideological peace plank was overtaken by the rival
parties, particularly the Likud, which assured of ensuring peace in its own
hawkish way. The Oslo and the Camp David Accords as backed by Labor
in 1992 and 1999, respectively, failed to enlist encouraging support from
the electorate. Conversely, the unabated killings of the citizens by the
The Indian Left: Communist Party of India and Communist Party. . . 129
Palestinian terrorist outfits further infuriated the masses, resulting into the
crushing defeat of the party during the 2003 Knesset elections.
A party of Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and Yitzak Rabin is in greater
disarray now. It needs great organizational revamping, ideological
readjustments and electoral rejuvenation to remain as a potential alterna-
tive to the present coalitional polity.
The Indian Left: Communist Party of India

and Communist Party of India (Marxists)
Unlike Israel, the left parties in India consist of the followers of Marxism–
Leninism and Mao. The left parties are organizationally and ideologically
very strong and disciplined parties. The communist movement in India
owes its genesis to the Communist International pioneered by Lenin and
other communists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
M. N. Roy, who was co-opted as the member of the Second Congress of
the Communist International, played a vital role in the formation of the
Communist Party of India in October 1920. Though the Communist
Party of India was founded by the ‘communists in exile’ in Tashkent in
Russia, M. N. Roy tried to bring the socialists and the nationalists
together in India to counter the Congress. Meanwhile, the focus of the
communist movement according to Roy should always be the workers
and the peasants.
The early 1920s witnessed the emergence of various communist groups
and communist magazines in various parts of the country under different
leaders. The initial Communist Internationals sought to unite the commu-
nist parties across the world on the basis of support from above (social
democratic parties) as well as below (socialist parties). The breakup between
the KMT (Kuomintang) and the Communist Parties of China deeply
influenced the development and growth of the communist movement in
India. The communists, nevertheless, during the pre-independence era
strategically worked together with the Congress-led front organizations
like All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) and All India Congress of
Workers and Peasants Party (WPP).
The communist movement underwent a major transformation in 1928

when the communists vehemently criticized the post-war capitalist crises.
The communists were called upon ‘to expose social democratic parties and
leaders and similarly to contend against bourgeois nationalist organiza-
tions’ (Rodrigues 2006: 206). From 1928 onward, the Communist Party
of India came to be influenced more by the Communist International
rather than by M N Roy. During the crucial years from 1929 to 1935, the
communists were busy denouncing the Congress, which resulted into the
declaration of the CPI as illegal in 1934. As a result, the communists from
1935 to independence ‘started working mainly from within the fold of the
Congress, involving themselves in mass work and mass movements with a
distinctively understanding of the situation and their tasks’ (Ibid.). Since
the communists spent more time in analyzing the class character of the
Indian National Movement, it did not strengthen the anti-colonial move-
ment. It boycotted the British efforts in World War II only when the
Soviet Union jumped into the war by declaring its people’s war.
The communists in India were largely influenced by Russia and China.
Hence, soon after their support for the Mountbatten Plan for the forma-
tion of popular governments in India and Pakistan, the communists in
India revised their argument stating that the Plan was nothing but a
‘culmination of the betrayal of the revolutionary struggle by the Congress
and the Muslim League leadership’ (Ibid.: 209). The communists in India
thus advocated a fight against imperialism, feudalism and the collabora-
tors of imperialism. Its emphasis on democratic revolution for the estab-
lishment of people’s democracy ultimately led to its participation in the
general elections in post-independence India. Though the communists
had little role to play in the freedom struggle of India due to the
dominance of the Gandhian-led Congress movement and the Hindus-
dominated parties like Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad, they
started dominating the state and regional politics after independence.
The CPI participated in the first Lok Sabha elections held in 1952 and
emerged as the second largest party in Parliament. During the first three
parliamentary elections, the Communist Party of India managed just 3–9
per cent with 16–30 seats in Lok Sabha. Though the elected representa-
tives of the party started claiming to ‘wreck the legislatures from within’,
the party began witnessing the ideological differences overtly as well as
covertly. While during the second Lok Sabha elections the CPI emerged
as the second largest party in Parliament after the Congress, the party was
also successful in forming its government in the state of Kerala in 1957.
The party during its government in Kerala advocated major reforms in
agricultural sector as well as in educational institutions, the two areas
where it could have left massive impact on the electorate. CPI supported
the minority government of the Congress during 1969–71 over the split
in the Congress.
However, hardly had the CPI settled down in the electoral politics of
the country, the ideological warfare between the Communist Party of
Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) as well
as the Indo-China war paved the way for the split within the Indian
communists. Rodrigues argues that these issues only ‘exasperated and
streamlined the existing differences within the party that eventually led
to the split’ (Ibid.: 213) in 1964. The CPM fought the first parliamentary
elections in 1967 and registered a significant presence with 19 seats and
4.4 per cent of votes as against 23 seats and 5 per cent of votes of the CPI.
Afterward, the CPM never lagged behind the CPI, both in terms of votes
and seats, and it has reduced the status of CPI as the little brother. CPM
has actually spearheaded the left movement in the country, and all other
left parties like Forward Block, CPI (ML) besides CPI have actually toed
the ideological line of CPM.
The communist movement witnessed second major split in 1967
when, on the issue of the Naxalbari movement in Andhra Pradesh, the
radical wing got separated and formed the CPI (Marxist–Leninist). The
Forward Block also emerged as a separate communist radical group, which
advocated more revolutionary changes in electoral politics of the country.
From 1960s, the communists have been trying to bring the anti-
Congress parties on the common platform. Despite internal differences,
the communists—CPI as well as CPM—have broadly displayed external
unity. The left movement in fact since the 1970s has been led only by the
CPM, though the communists did have seat-sharing adjustments in some
of the states in the beginning, especially in West Bengal and Kerala. The
formation of the first left government in West Bengal after Kerala boosted
the electoral morale of the party and its ruling of the state for more than
three decades have actually strengthened their support base and the
electoral leverage in India’s parliamentary democracy.
The left after the 1970s has virtually been seen as the CPM with having
a well-knit cohesive organizational structure. The organizational structure
of the party makes no distinction between the party and the government
as cadres are being appointed in key positions. The power is exercised by
the secretary general, and all the state governments actually follow the
dictates of the Politbureau, which consists of important party leaders.
The formation of the coalition government both at the center and in
the states further increased the role of the communist parties. The
coalition experience provided the communist parties in the country
‘power without responsibility’. The communist support to the V. P.
Singh-led National Front Government in 1989, Deve Gowda- and I. K.
Gujaral-led United Front Government in 1996, and their external sup-
port to the Congress-led UPA in 2004 broadly validates this point. While
the initial support of the left to the National Front Government was to
oust the Congress, its participation, particularly the CPI, in the United
Front Government was to keep the BJP out of power.
The orientation of the left toward Indian politics is determined by
experiences of ideological shifts in international communism. The genesis
of the CPM can be linked to the issue of Russia–China ideological split in
1964. The communists opposed the Indo–US civil nuclear deal particu-
larly because the deal was not liked by its ideological mentor—China.
Moreover, their support to the Maoists in Nepal is more guided by their
closing proximity to the Chinese interest in support of the left movement
in Nepal. These instances question the nationalist credentials of the
communist parties and expose their opportunist orientation, especially
during their making and unmaking of the government at the center.
After exercising power without sharing responsibility during the UPA
regime from 2004 to 2009, the left suddenly withdrew the support on the
eve of the elections. Its role in Nandigram and Singur in West Bengal in
2008–09 where their cadres were shown brutally murdering and grabbing
the peasant lands brought immense disrepute to the left parties across the
country. The Congress–Trinamool Congress alliance on the eve of elec-
tions put the final nail in the electoral coffin of the left parties. As a result,
the left as a whole suffered miserably in the 2009 parliamentary elections
30
Seats
Voting Percentage
25
20
Seats/Voting Percentage
15
10
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Years
Fig. 8.4 CPI in the Lok Sabha, 1952–2014
where its total seats were reduced to only 20. After a very long gap, the left
parties have been out of power. There are increasing signs of dissension
within the party leadership over the electoral debacle in 2009 elections.
The leadership rivalry1 and internal bickering within the party besides
Modi wave exposed the organizational cohesiveness and discipline of the
party, leading to its dismal failure in 2014 elections (Figs. 8.4 and 8.5).
Praful Bidwai (2015) argued that the left in India is facing an existential
crisis of identity. Instead of exploring ‘new socialist or social democratic
alternatives’ in post-Nehruvian market economy, the left instead turned to
‘economic conservatism’. How to reinforce its core agenda of socialist trans-
formation would be a real challenge for the Indian left, according to Bidwai.
50
Seats
45 Voting Percentage
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Years
Fig. 8.5 CPM in Lok Sabha, 1967–2014
Other Parties on the Israeli and Indian Left

Though the left is mainly dominated by the Israeli Labor Party and the
Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist),
other parties on the left block in both the nations do have their significant
bearing in government formations.
The left block in Israel has seen many political convulsions right from
the first Knesset elections. It used to be dominated by Mapai and later on
by the Labor party. However, the one-party dominance system could not
have been possible without the support of other like-minded parties on
Other Parties on the Israeli and Indian Left 135
the left block. Meretz and Mapam, Ahdut Ha’avodah constituted the key
political players in the Mapai-led coalition. In 1968, both Mapam and
Ahdut Ha’avodah merged with Mapai to form the Labor. Since 1969,
Labor has been contesting elections either as Alignment or with Gesher
and Meimad. Only in 1992 and 1996, the party contested elections
exclusively on the Labor platform and Labor nomenclature.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Labor as the leading force of the left
socialist block managed to take the support of the minority lists like Kidmah
Va’avodah, Hakla’ut Ufituah, Shituf Ve’ahvah and Ha’olam Hazeh. The
minority lists were mainly confined to the Arab sector and never got more
than two seats, yet they always enhanced the strength and tilted the axis in
favor of the left in the political left-right political continuum.
The Communist Party of Israel called Maki also had good presence in the
left block in the beginning, but partly with its marginalization by Ben-Gurion
for not forming government with Maki’s presence and partly because of the
subsequent emergence of Rakah and later Hadash as the potential Arab
parties, Maki disappeared from Israeli political scene from 1973 onward.
Even though it contested the 1973 elections on the name of Moqed, and
1977 and 1981 elections under the banner of Shelli, the party could not stop
its disintegration and got eclipsed from the political scene from 1984.
The Labor and Meretz2 have remained very powerful parties in the left
block from the 1990s onward, capturing jointly 56, 43, 36, 25 and
24 seats during the preceding five Knesset elections held in 1992, 1996,
1999, 2003 and 2006, respectively. The share of this block, however,
receded afterward as in the 2009, 2013 and 20153 Knesset elections, both
the parties bagged 16, 21 and 29 seats, respectively.
The Labor fought the 2015 Knesset elections as Zionist Union after
forging an alliance with Tzipi Livni’s Ha’Tnuah party and won 24 seats.
With Meretz managing 5 seats, the left block in 2015 won 29 seats in the
Knesset. The declining trends in the left support witness the weakening of
the left block and the considerable shrinkage of its vote and seat share in
the Knesset. Scholars attribute the disintegration of the left block to the
emergence of the center in form of Shinui, Yash Atid, Kulanu, the ethno-
religious party like Shas and other parties on the right of the party
continuum, which champion the cause of the new immigrants (around
1 million) from the former Soviet Union.
The Indian left on the other hand had two more significant parties like
the All India Forward Block and the Communist Party of India (Marxist–
Leninist). However, their organizational presence and electoral perfor-
mance at national politics have remained insignificant, and they have
broadly confined to the left-influential states like West Bengal only.
Final Comments
The left in both Israel and India witnessed considerable shrinkage of seats
and the voting percentage. While the Israeli Labor appears to be regaining
electoral base by political understandings and alliance with like-minded
parties on the one hand and changing its ideological orientation on the
issues of security on the other, the communists in India have been on the
verge of extinction as clearly stated by the 16th Lok Sabha elections.
Notes
1. The fight for the top leadership as general secretary in CPM took place
between Prakash Karat and the West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb
Bhattacharya in 2005, leading to the former’s dominance of the party for
ten years. However, the dismal failure of CPM in 2014 Lok Sabha
elections bagging nine seats only, the lowest since its formation, led to
the change of leadership in 2015, from Prakash Karat to Sitaram Yechury.
2. Referring to the Hebrew acronym, which means ‘energy’, Meretz was
formed out of the union of Mapam, CRM and Shinui in 1992. Meretz
symbolized the will for unity.
3. Still constructing left block, Meretz contested 2015 Knesset elections
separately, whereas the Labor entered the electoral fray as Zionist Union
with Ha’Tnuah.
References
Bidwai, P. (2015). The phoenix moment: Challenges confronting the Indian left.
Delhi: Harper Collins.
References 137
Doron, G. (2002). Barak, one – One Israel, zero, or, how labor won the Prime
Ministerial race and lost the Knesset elections. In A. Arian & M. Shamir
(Eds.), The elections in Israel 1999. Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Rodrigues, V. (2006). The communist parties in India. In P. R. deSouza &
E. Sridharan (Eds.), India’s political parties. New Delhi: Sage.
Shapiro, Y. (198?). The party system and democracy in Israel. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv
University.
Westcott, K. (2002, November 20). Amram Mitzna: Labour’s ‘peace’ hope.
BBC.
9
The Right-Wing Parties (Nationalist Block)
The right-wing parties in both Israel and India constitute the nationalist
blocks as they vigorously champion the cause of Jewish and Hindu
nationalism, respectively. The Likud in Israel and the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) in India broadly represent the two important poles of the
nationalist block in the two nations.
Likud in Israel
The right block in Israeli politics owes its origin to the Revisionist
Movement led by Ze’ev Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1925. Both the party
movement and the party leadership were largely influenced by the Polish
movement and mainly represented middle-class petty bourgeoisies. They
attacked the socialist Zionism for its conservative outlook and narrow
nationalistic vision. Jabotinsky's own version of Zionism, called revision-
ist Zionism, focused on the creation of ‘malchut Israel’ (the Kingdom of
Israel) with a Jewish majority on both sides of the river Jordan. As
Sprinzak put it, ‘the founders of the revisionist movement were aware of

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_9
140 9 The Right-Wing Parties (Nationalist Block)
the virtues of liberal democracy, but were skeptical about their value in the
struggle for national movement’ (Sprinzak 1993: 119).
With the early demise of Jabotinsky in 1940, the leadership of the
Revisionist Movement passed to Menachem Begin. Begin tried to
re-furbish the image of the right politics in the newly created society by
transforming the revisionist movement into a political party called Herut
(Freedom) in May 1948. According to Sprinzak, ‘Begin personified the
pragmatic tradition of Jabotinsky and gave it a relevant interpretation’
(Sprinzak 1993: 120). Begin sought to provide a new look to the party
through his experienced and mature understanding of the changed
domestic compulsions and international realities. His decision to disband
the Irgun and bring it under the unified state command (Haganah) in
view of the Altalena episode, which led to the killing of several Irgun
members, broadly testified his determination to fight the political battle
within the constitutional parameters of the new statehood.
Herut, under Begin leadership, continued with its militant ideological
planks for the first Knesset elections. It rebuffed any territorial compro-
mise with the Arab neighbors on the issue of Eretz Israel and strongly
advocated the old revisionist ideological agenda of acquiring both the
banks of the river Jordan as the legitimate Jewish homeland. ‘Herut’s
blanket opposition to any concession to an external enemy, and its
opposition and glorification of the Irgun’s military campaign, paid polit-
ical dividends. Herut was returned as the largest non-socialist party, with
14 seats and 11 per cent of the vote. The result effectively legitimized
Begin as the heir to the revisionist heritage and essentially the leader of the
right-wing nationalist opposition’ (Shindler 1995: 44).
In the subsequent Knesset elections, Begin tried to forge an amicable
alternative of the like-minded parties in the rightist block to challenge the
Labor dominance in the form of Mapaivot. The rise of the General
Zionists and the Progressives made Begin to change the tone of the
ideological directions of his strategies. It was Herut’s maximalism, which
prevented any eventual reconciliation with the General Zionists. The
political exigencies demanded a shift from a revolutionary and belligerent
posture to a moderate and rational orientation within Herut.
The electoral decline of the General Zionists and the political stagnation
of the Progressives from 1955 onward strengthened the need of
Likud in Israel 141
realignment of political forces within the rightist block. The desire of

checking Mapaivot by containing Mapai dominance in the Knesset and
the Histadrut further accelerated the process of reconciliation and merger
within the right block. The parties of the right block, particularly the
General Zionists, held the same belief on some sort of electoral rapproche-
ment to fight Mapaivot.
The first attempt in this direction was made with the possible merger of
the General Zionists and the Progressives as the Liberal Party in 1961. The
two parties collectively won 17 seats and 13.6 per cent of votes, whereas
the Herut’s performance too was of the same magnitude, winning 17 seats
and 13.8 per cent of votes. The initial combined electoral strength
rejuvenated the parties of the right block. The refusal of the Mapai to
take the Liberals into the socialist block of coalitional governance
strengthened the ongoing process of political reconciliation in terms of
electoral understanding of Herut and Liberal Party initially contesting
Histadrut elections and subsequently forming Gahal (Gush Herut-Liber-
alism) for fighting the Knesset elections in 1965.
The arrival of the Sephardi Jews from the Middle East and North Africa
in substantial numbers accelerated the process of political absorption.
Begin had a great vision of capturing the potential voters through political
accommodation. He read their disenchantment from the socialist Zion-
ism because of it being dominated by the upper-class Ashkenazim. Hence,
he tried to woo the new Sephardi immigrants into the party organization.
His ‘patriarchal images and nationalist rhetoric’ won the new immigrants.
He also succeeded in prevailing upon the party organization to establish
the new faction of the Herut called the Blue-White (Tkhelet-Lavan)
faction in 1963 to contest the Histadrut elections the party had boycotted
since 1952. Herut–Liberal block jointly contested the Histadrut elections
and won 15.2, 17.3, 22.7 and 28.8 per cent of seats in 1965, 1969, 1973
and 1977 Histadrut elections, respectively (Shindler 1995: 59).
The Histadrut success was the trial for the Herut-Liberal block to
repeat its victory at the Knesset level. Hence, during the upcoming
1965 elections, the Gahal block won 26 seats and 21.3 per cent of
votes. The 1965 success left a significant imprint on the policy of electoral
alignments. Though Herut continued to keep its separate identity within
the Gahal block, the initial successes made the party leadership mold its
ideological premises in view of accommodating the new working-class

supporters.
The 1967 war provided a grand opportunity for Begin and the Herut
faction of Gahal. The occupation of territories by Israel in West Bank and
Gaza legitimized Herut’s old ideological plank of Herut of shlemut
ha’moledet—the completeness of the homeland. Herut’s ideology of
greater Israel began to be accepted to the parties of the right block, thereby
getting considerable legitimacy with the passage of time. Begin’s states-
manship in joining the Labor government in the hour of crisis further
exalted his stature as a mature and seasoned politician. Colin Shindler
argued that the quarrels between Ben-Gurion and Begin and the bitter-
ness between Mapai and the Revisionists started becoming obsolete in the
changing realities, both internally and externally.
The formation of Gahal could not bring any substantial difference in
the electoral prospects for the right-wing politics. Gahal’s representation
in both Histadrut and Knesset remained more or less constant despite
Begin’s special overtures and the ramifications of 1967 war. However,
Begin started realizing the growing disenchantment of the new voters
against the Labor. The Yom Kippur War further highlighted the state
vulnerability and the Labor’s weaknesses. Hence, an attempt was made by
Begin to face the electorate with a new nationalistic and collectivist
perception. It was under this background Likud came to be formed in
September 1973 by the Herut–Liberal block, the Rafi component in the
state list, the Land of Israel Movement and Free Centre. As Shindler has
argued, ‘the new Likud was vastly different from the old-style Gahal, since
its old-Labor components brought with it strong support from the Moshav
movement of smallholders’ (Ibid., 72).
The combination of the diverse forces within Likud attempted to focus
on security as the central pillar of their ideological framework. However,
in view of their inherent differences, many policy perspectives were being
kept ambivalent in order to avoid any ideological tussle at the nascent
stage. The new formation of Likud started getting political acceptance
among the voters. Though the new combination could not enhance its
electoral strength in the Histadrut elections in 1973, it definitely increased
its representation in the Knesset from 26 in 1969 to 39 in 1973.
Likud in Israel 143
The electoral surveys undertaken during the period categorically stated

the shifting voting alignments among the native and the new voters,
especially among the members of the Sephardi community in the after-
math of the Yom Kippur War. According to Shindler, the 1973 war
‘proved to be the straw which broke the camel’s back. Public patience
with an ossified, vacuous Labor movement had run its course. The decline
of Labor manifested itself in the rise of the Likud. The election of the
1973 proved to be a watershed: the Likud came to be regarded in the eyes
of ordinary Israelis as a genuine alternative to the ruling Labor elite’ (Ibid.,
75). The Likud leadership thus strategically manipulated the ethnic
support of the Sephardi communities by expressing the Labor fallacy on
the security front on the one hand and by exposing the Labor’s ethnic
discrimination of Sephardim on the other hand.
The post-1973 war period witnessed fierce intra-party infighting
among the top Labor leaders. A group of Labor loyalists had already left
the party and formed the Citizens Rights Movement in the wake of 1973
elections. The Labor got another setback with the creation of the Dem-
ocratic Movement for Change, a centrist political formation that mainly
consisted of the leading lawyers and intellectuals. The Labor infighting
and the emergence of new political movements kept on eroding the
Labor’s electoral base in addition to strengthening the opponent forces
within the rightist camp. A series of scandals involving the senior party
leaders and ministers, including the Labor leader Rabin, tried to act as the
greatest blows to the party’s ongoing decreasing fortunes, which led to its
crushing defeat during the 1977 Knesset elections. Labor’s electoral
debacle in 1977 not only ended its nearly three decades of political
suzerainty on the Israeli polity completely, it also ensured the new
realignment of political forces on the right by espousing the new meaning
of ethnicity and nationalism to the existing political discourse.
The 1977 electoral results for the ninth Knesset came to be described as
the first upheaval or reversal by the political scholars. The results assumed
unprecedented importance in the history of the Israeli polity, as they
brought about a complete transformation of the hitherto one-party dom-
inant system. Likud ’s emergence as the center of political system of
governance enhanced political polarization that subsequently came to be
dominated by ideology and ethnicity. According to Aronoff, Likud
attempted to ‘establish its own dominance through the cooptation of new

forms of religious nationalism and the exploitation of ethnic tensions’
(Aronoff 1984: 1).
Likud sought to organize its institutional base on the patterns of the
Labor to sustain its rule and hegemony. For establishing its political
legitimacy among the undecided voters, it sought to glorify history and
mythology in its pursuit of interpretation of contemporary political
events, celebration of Jabotinsky’s birthday or state funeral of Shimon
Bar-Kochba (whose followers led the second Jewish revolt against Rome
in 132–35 A.D.). Its notion of Jewish statehood is based on the biblical
term malkhut Yisrael (Kingdom of Israel). It defined its leaders as pariahs.
The 1977 success of Likud was based on the overwhelming support of
the nationalist-right, the Eastern Jews, and the religious Jews. Begin,
according to Aronoff, successfully co-opted Gush Emunim and added ‘a
patina of religious symbolism, rhetoric and rite to the official version of
Jabotinsky’s secular martial nationalistic version of Zionism which had
become codified in Herut dogma and practice. In so doing Begin invented
his own equivalent of Ben-Gurion’s mamlachtiut’ (Aronoff 1990: 278).
“Begin’s attempt to identify the Likud with what he projected as the
new era of Jewish settlement and effective annexation of Judea and
Samaria, the ‘war of choice’ in Lebanon and the manipulation of symbols
and ceremonies failed to establish the Likud hegemony” (Ibid., 279).
Hence, in his attempt to appease the radical right elements from the
nationalistic block, Begin, like his Labor predecessor Ben-Gurion, ulti-
mately landed up in antagonizing the radical elements within their own
parties, leading to the splits and counter-splits.
The increasing polarization within Likud had serious ramifications. To
contain the hardliners, Shamir tried to encourage the new group of young
and talented leaders, which Sprinzak described as the ‘Princes’ like Ben-
jamin Begin, Dan Meridor, Ehud Olmert, Roni Milo and Binyamin
Netanyahu. These Princes were being encouraged in order to overcome
the opposition to the hardliners from Troika like Ariel Sharon, David
Levy (Sephardi) and Yitzhak Modai (from Liberal faction).
During 1984 and 1988, Likud formed the national unity government
with the Labor. The formation of the national unity government entrusted
more limitations on the very functioning of the government. Likud’s
Likud in Israel 145
electoral strength decreased in the Knesset from 48 seats in 1984 to

41 and 40 seats in the 1984 and 1988 elections, respectively. Though
Shamir tried to manage the government with his own strategic skills,
Likud started losing its popularity because of mismanagement and intra-
party fighting.
By the time the party entered the 1992 electoral fray for the thirteenth
Knesset, there had been considerable changes in the existing political
ambience, both within and outside the Israeli polity. After making the
needed adjustments and requisite alignments in its ideology, organization
and leadership, the Labor, under Rabin, increased its electoral tally
significantly by making strong inroads into Likud ’s electoral base.
Sprinzak believed that the Likud ’s defeat of 1992 only revealed ‘a com-
bination of a significant decline in the emotional attachment of former
Likud voters to their party, and a series of blunders and mistakes com-
mitted by the party’s leadership in the year prior to the elections. Much of
the blame appeared to belong to Yitzhak Shamir’ (Sprinzak 1991: 134).
The early 1990s was also a period that saw a massive influx of immi-
grants from the disintegrated Soviet Union. ‘The Russian immigrants who
seemed to have been massively pro-Likud upon arrival in Israel were
already puzzled by the clerical nature of the Shamir government and its
dependence on the ultra-orthodox parties’ (Ibid., 135). The Russian
immigrants, Likud ’s Sephardi supporters from the development towns,
municipal slums and other poor residents were more attracted to Rabin’s
notion of ‘political settlements’ than to Shamir’s focus on ‘strategic
settlements’.
The intra-Likud conflicts among the party’s three camps led by Shamir,
Sharon and Levy tarnished the image of the party to a considerable extent.
The party’s opposition to the bill for electoral reforms ensuring the direct
election of the prime minister went to the public as Likud ’s support for
the existing corruption. Hence, when the results for the 1992 elections
came out, it was the Likud that failed miserably and not the hardliners of
its rightist camp. The reason attributed to the crushing defeat of the Likud
according to Sprinzak was the ‘internal divisions and corruption on the
one hand and a diluted commitment to Eretz Yisrael on the other’ (Ibid.,
138).
Asher Arian and Michal Shamir described the 1992 elections as the
second reversal in the democratic history of Israel, which was different
from the first reversal of 1977. While the first reversal witnessed the Likud
displacing the Labor hegemony of the past three decades, the 1992
reversal once again sought to ensure the restoration of the Labor hege-
mony partially, if not fully. The authors believed that ‘the 1992 reversal
was founded on ideological division reflecting divisions regarding the
territories more strongly than the ethnic cleavage in the society, while
the 1977 election was influenced by both’ (Arian and Shamir 1995: 3).
Arian and Shamir further argued that the 1992 shift among the voters
was less along ethnic lines and more along issues. ‘Most of those who left
Labor for Likud in 1977 were Sephardim, while those who stayed with
Labor and those who shifted to the Democratic Movement for Change
were predominantly Ashkenazim’ (Ibid., 35). Sephardim outnumbered
Ashkenazim in 1992 despite the wide influx of the Russian immigrants.
Since the 1992 elections were issue-driven rather than ethnic-oriented,
Likud failed to capture the votes of the new Sephardi immigrants from
Russia who were attracted to Rabin’s peace overtures, leading to the defeat
of the party.
The Likud ’s 1992 loss was compensated by the increase of the seats for
the right-wing block from seven seats in 1988 to eleven in 1992 (with
Tsomet capturing eight and Moledet three). It was this factor that kept
the Likud ’s hopes alive for the subsequent Knesset and prime ministerial
elections.
Since the first prime ministerial election that took place in the Israeli
parliamentary democratic history was based more on personality than on
ethnicity and territoriality, Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud succeeded in
defeating Shimon Peres of Labor. Netanyahu’s success was just marginal
as he got 50.49 per cent of the votes against 49.51 per cent of Peres. The
1996 was also the first national election that was based on split-ticket in
which voters split their votes for the prime ministerial candidate and the
electoral lists for the Knesset. Nevertheless, it was this edge on the prime
ministerial contest that gave Netanyahu relative freedom in choosing his
Knesset teams notwithstanding the unsatisfactory performance of both
Likud and its alliance during the 1996 Knesset elections.
Likud in Israel 147
The marginal victory of the Likud in the first prime ministerial elec-
tions with its relatively dismal performance in the Knesset elections during
the 1996 elections made the party position and the prime minister further
vulnerable. The elections showed the remarkable performance of the
ethno-religious and other smaller parties in the left and the right blocks.
As a result of the loss of the major parties of the leading blocks, the
coalitional governance became somewhat difficult owing to the bargaining
tactics of the smaller partners.
The same parliamentary practice of the separate elections for the prime
minister and the Knesset continued for another two consecutive terms.
Likud lost the prime ministerial race during the 1999 elections when
Netanyahu lost the elections miserably to the new Labor face, Ehud
Barak. Labor (56.08 per cent) defeated Likud (43.92 per cent) by a
good margin of 12.16 per cent of the votes in the second prime ministerial
contest in 1999. The loss of the prime ministerial elections had its
repercussions on the legislative strength of the Likud as well with the
party barely managing 19 seats and 14.1 per cent of votes in the 1999
Knesset elections. The 1999 debacle for the Likud was the major blow the
party suffered after 1961 when its earlier incarnation of Herut won
17 seats.
The 1999 electoral demise kept Likud out of the race temporarily as the
party greatly encashed on the Labor blunders committed by Barak in his
peace negotiations with the Palestinians in the Camp David. The abrupt
resignation of Barak led to the prime ministerial elections again in 2001 in
which Likud recovered from its earlier losses by defeating the Labor
contestant by a hefty margin of 24.78. While Ariel Sharon polled 62.39
per cent of votes, Barak could manage only 37.61 per cent in the third and
the last prime ministerial contest held in 2001.
The combination of prime ministerial and parliamentary elections that
took place from 1996 to 2001 clearly reflected the decline of the voters’
loyalties to the parties and their corresponding preferences for the candi-
dates. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir pointed out that the electoral
politics in the contemporary Israeli democratic system resembles ‘the
single-issue or single-constituency interest groups’ (Arian and Shamir
2001), with voting becoming privatized and the politics getting sectarian.
They characterized this new phenomenon with the de-alignment of
political forces as contrary to the realignment, which marked the earlier

phases of the party system in Israel. ‘The elections of the 1990s do not
involve significant and enduring shifts in the strength of the left, the right
or the religious party blocks. Nor are significant changes in the ideological
and social group bases of the party coalitions at the heart of these changes’
(Ibid.). The issue voting and the performance evaluation of the candidates
became more potent in the elections held in the 1990s according to the
authors.
The 1999 elections for the Knesset and the Parliament were marked
more by territoriality and less by state religion and socio-economic issues.
According to the survey analyzed by Arian and Shamir in the aftermath of
the 1999 elections, ‘the majority of Jewish voters preferred peace and a
Jewish democratic state to greater Israel’ (Ibid.). Hence, Likud ’s loss of
1999 for the prime ministerial and the Knesset elections and its subse-
quent improvisation in the 2001 prime ministerial elections had much to
do with the pragmatic changes carried out by the party in its ideological
planks on the current issues and the organizational and leadership changes
to woo the voters across the blocks.
By the time Likud faced the electorate for the Knesset in 2003, it had
already brought about significant changes in its ideological premises and
leadership skills. The issue of leadership for heading the Knesset list in the
elections was being sorted out through the direct elections in the party
primaries. The members in the party primary voted Sharon for heading
the party list during the elections for the sixteenth Knesset.
Likud under Sharon emerged with an unprecedented electoral victory.
It doubled its seats and the voting percentage from 19 seats and 14.1 per
cent votes during 1999 to 38 seats and 29.3 per cent of votes in 2003
elections, respectively. The victory was remarkable as the party’s moderate
and calculative electoral tactics in dealing with peace with the Palestinians,
religion state and socio-economic issues went very well with the electorate.
Moreover, the voters preferred the Labor’s dovish agenda of peace with
Likud ’s hawkish tools.
The Knesset elections for 2003 were marked by malign campaigns and
the issue of corruptions. Likud members of the Knesset list were the
important targets of these scandals, which ‘suddenly erupted as molten
lava’ (The Haaretz, 2003) and appeared to be a big setback to the party
Likud in Israel 149
initially. However, despite these corruption scandals involving the Likud

members of the list for vote buying in the primaries for the 2003 elections
as well as Sharon for allegedly using dubious means in the party primaries
in 1999 elections emerging during the elections, these issues started
weakening at the time of the actual elections.
Likud ’s resounding success in the 2003 polls for the Knesset was the
result of the party’s strategic adjustments and ideological conciliations on
its hitherto hawkish agenda. Labor’s increasing utterances and it taking
stances on the issue of ensuring peace with the Palestinians further
strengthened Likud ’s position and inevitably increased its electoral
graph to a considerable extent.
The party under the leadership of Ariel Sharon sought to reconcile the
hardliners with the moderates on important issues of governance, espe-
cially the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The reconciliation initiative, how-
ever, took a major setback when more than two dozen Members of Knesset
(MKs) left Likud and formed Achrayut Leumit in November 2005. Such
a major split within Likud actually paved the way for the formation of
Kadima under Ariel Sharon in 2006, which emerged as the key centrist
political formation comprising dovish members of the splinter groups of
Shinui and Likud.
Likud formed poorly in 2006 elections, as its major electoral chunk had
gone to Kadima, along with Ariel Sharon. The party won only 12 seats
with 8.9 per cent of votes during the seventeenth Knesset elections in
2006. Under the leadership of Netanyahu, the party decided to work as a
constructive opposition and to re-strengthen its core nationalistic support.
The failure of Kadima after Sharon and the increasing factionalism and
corruption charges against the Kadima government led by Ehud Olmert
and Livni tarnished the image of the government. This provided the
opportunity for the right-wing parties and Likud under Netanyahu
appeared to be a major beneficiary.
Despite getting 27 seats (one seat less than Kadima) in the eighteenth
Knesset, Netanyahu-led Likud succeeded in forming the coalition gov-
ernment with other right-wing and ethno-religious parties in the after-
math of the 2009 elections. The party contested 2013 and 2015
elections—the former with Yisrael Beiteinu and the latter indepen-
dently—and managed to form the governments successively in both the
50
48
45
43
41
40
40 39
38
35
32 32
31
30
30
Knesset Seats
27 27
26 26
25
20 19
1717
15 15
15 14
12
10
8
0
19 9
51
55
19 9
61
65
69
73
77
81
84
88
92
96
99
03
06
09
13
15
4
5
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Knesset Elections
Fig. 9.1 Likud’s seats in the Knesset, 1949–2015
terms. However, its experience of aligning with the newly emerged Yesh
Atid backfired, and the Likud-led government failed to complete its full
four-year term. Likud entered 2015 Knesset on its own and won the
maximum number of seats and voting percentage (see Figs. 9.1, 9.2 and
9.3).
Like other parties, Likud too follows the organizational principle of
party primaries where the president is elected through open and secret
ballot. Under Sharon, Likud tried to bring about organizational changes
but without much success.
Likud has broadly followed the ideological planks of the Revisionist and
Herut. The core ideological agenda of the party has remained the same,
Likud in Israel 151
40
37.1
35
33.4
31.9
31.1
30.2
29.3
30
25.1
24.9
25
23.4
23.3
Voting Percentage
21.7
21.6
21.3
20
14.1
13.8
15
13.5
12.6
11.5
10
8.9
6.6
0
49
51
55
59
61
65
69
73
77
81
84
88
92
96
99
03
06
09
13
15
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Knesset Elections
Fig. 9.2 Likud’ voting percentage in the Knesset, 1949–2015
with minor modifications in its implementation brought about by the

political exigencies. ‘Peace and Security’ have always remained central to
the party ideology. The party sought to strengthen the existing peace
agreements with the Arab states and strive to achieve peace agreements
with all of Israel’s neighbors with the aim of reaching a comprehensive
solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The party is against any unilateral declaration of the Palestinian state-
hood. Safeguarding Israel’s vital interests constituted the fundamental
principle in the party’s negotiations with the Palestinian authority.
Seats
48
Voting Percentage
44
40
36
32
28
24
20
16
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Knesset Years
Fig. 9.3 Likud’s performance in the Knesset, 1949–2015
Its policy on settlements regarding the absorption of the Jewish com-

munities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza symbolize the realization of Zionist
values.
Likud has always been the forerunner of ‘free economy,’ which has
minimal state interventions. The liberalized economy according to the
party is better than the socialist and state-controlled economy. The basic
idea of the party is that individual entrepreneurship will create growth,
thereby fulfilling the social benefits. The economic policy of the Likud
The Indian Right: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 153
government would focus on quick growth, low deficit, reduced govern-

ment expenditure, reformed taxation structure and controlled inflation.
With privatization to go ahead, the party sought to adjust the state’s
economy with the rapid changes in the modern scientific and technolog-
ical world. It would attempt to renovate the old industries with the new
advancing industries. The party advocated sweeping reforms in the for-
eign exchange and stock markets. A special priority would be given to the
‘building industry’ to carry forward growth and contain unemployment.
Efforts will be made to reduce poverty and create gainful employments.
The compulsions of government have brought about significant
changes in the Likud ’s ideological premises, especially with regard to
the peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Under the domestic and
international pressures, the party has finally agreed for an independent
Palestinian statehood based on the US-sponsored road map. Such an
ideological somersault has created political ripples inside the party and
its coalitional partners in the current government, particularly those
coming from the ethno-religious block. Nevertheless, the party leadership
has gone ahead with its modified version of the peace negotiations in order
to satisfy the hardliners both within the party and the government.
The Indian Right: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

Viewed as ‘a party for all India, a party for all Indians’ with a membership
of around 110 million in July 2016 and with its government in 17 states
in 2017 and an absolute majority at the center, the BJP as the right-wing
party in Indian politics has traveled a long way from a party of opposition
to the center of governance.
Having had support from a large number of workers and peasants and
almost all sections of the society, BJP came forward to control the
country’s destiny. The founders of the party stressed the significance of
an ethics–based polity, where humility, service and sacrifice were consid-
ered as important as the quest for political power.
BJP owes is spiritual origin to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
and political inheritance to Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS). While the RSS
was founded to bring about an all-round regeneration of the Hindu
society, the Jana Sangh was created in 1951 to spearhead the movement
for political unification and national consolidation of India.
It has been urged that the ‘BJS emerged from a combination of
partyless leader – S. P. Mookerjee and leaderless party – RSS’ (Baxter
1971: 54). However, the Jana Sangh failed to offer a creditable alternative
to the Congress. According to Bruce Graham, ‘the main reason for the
BJS’s failure to become a major force in the politics of post-independence
India, was that the party failed to transcend the limitations of its origins.
Its close initial ties with the Hindi-speaking heartland were, in the long
run, a serious disadvantage; from the outset, the party was preoccupied
with Northern issues such as the promotion of Hindi, the defence of
refugee interests, and energetic resistance to Pakistan’ (Graham 1990:
253).
The creation of BJP in 1980 was undertaken by all the prominent
ideologues of the erstwhile BJS. Hence, all members of the BJS also
became the active members of the BJP. In fact, BJS got a new incarnation
in BJP in April 1980. BJP sought to carry forward a new image of the BJS.
It promised to be more moderate, flexible and democratic with broader
issues, new allies and expanded social base. In its founding session in
Bombay (now Mumbai) in April 1980, the party championed five fun-
damental principles as part of its ideological premises. The party deter-
mined to create national consensus on these principles and described
them as ‘Our Five Commitments’. These five principles are: nationalism
and national integration, commitment to democracy, positive secularism,
Gandhian socialism and value-based politics.
Under pressure from covert Hindu communalism of the Congress in
the early and mid-1980s and with the trauma of its 1984 electoral defeat,
the BJP in 1985 turned back to its Hindu religious roots and adopted a
platform that revived Integral Humanism, a precept formulated by one
of its past presidents, Deendayal Upadhyaya,
From the mid-1980s, BJP started using its ideological agenda based on
the philosophy of Hindutva. The party, with the help of its cadres and
support from the right-wing organizations like RSS, undertook Ram
Movement aimed at building a temple at Ayodhya. The movement
brought electoral dividends to the party during the Lok Sabha elections.
From a mere two seats in the eighth Lok Sabha to a hefty return of
282
280
240 282
200
182 182
Lok Sabha Seats
161
160 120
138
120
120 116
85
80
40
2
0
1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Elections
Fig. 9.4 BJP’s seats in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014
119 candidates in the tenth Lok Sabha was the beginning of BJP’s upward
journey, culminating in the unprecedented and magnificent record of
182 Lok Sabha seats in both twelfth and thirteenth general elections in
1999. BJP’s increasing seats and the rising percentage of votes in all the
Lok Sabha elections can be seen from Figs. 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6 and Table 7.1.
In addition to it, BJP also came to rule the four states of Himachal
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh on its own.
The graphs show the seats and voting percentage of BJP in the Lok
Sabha elections from 1984 to 2009. In fact, one finds an upward trend in
the voting percentage of the party—7.7 per cent in 1984, 11.3 per cent in
1989, 20.1 per cent in 1991, 20.2 per cent in 1996, 25.5 in 1998 and
35
31
30
25.5
25
23.7
22.1
Voting Percentage
20.1 20.2
20
18.8
15
11.3
10
7.7
0
1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Elections
Fig. 9.5 BJP’s voting percentage in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014
23.7 per cent in 1999. However, after 1999 the voting percentage of the
party shows downward trends. The number of seats won by the BJP has
also reflected an upward turn – 2 seats in 1984, 85 in 1989, 120 in 1991,
161 in 1996, 182 in 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections. While during
the preceding two Lok Sabha elections held in 2004 and 2009, the seats
won by the party showed a significant decline, BJP once again came to the
center stage of power by winning a clear-cut majority on its own in Lok
Sabha with 282 seats and forming the government as NDA in 2014.
Figures 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6 reflect the growth of BJP as a party evoking an
expanded version of the erstwhile BJS. The post-1984 period witnessed
the significant resurgence of the BJS on the one hand and the
300
Seats
Voting Percentage
250
200
150
100
50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lok Sabha Years
Fig. 9.6 BJP’s performance in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014
unprecedented success of Hindutva on the other hand. This was largely in

consonance with the support base of the party. The party’s support
initially comprised lower-middle and middle classes of urban Hindu
upper castes. Geeta Puri asserts that while it is true that ‘the BJP has
travelled to the South and the East. But there is not much empirical
evidence to conclude that the BJP has made solid and suave inroads into
the different social segments, such as the lower-castes, the backwards, the
tribals, the workers, the minorities, the farmers – particularly, the landless,
the marginalized, or the small landholders. These diverse social segments
constitute the majority of the electorate. The support of these sections is
central to the realization of BJP’s electoral dream of capturing power on its

own agenda alone’ (Puri 1992: 161–62).
The 1989 general elections appeared to be the landmark in the history
of the BJP. While the electoral results on the one hand led to the recovery
of the upper-caste base for the party, which had been eroded in favor of
the Congress in the 1984 general elections, they facilitated in annexing
several more upper-caste votes of the latter. This trend continued with
increased intensity in the 1991 general elections, leading to the decisive
defeat of the Congress in several northern and western states.
Geeta Puri (1992) felt that the 1989 general elections depicted two
powerful waves, namely, the Hindu wave and the anti-Congress wave.
While the Janata Dal and its allies got the benefit of the latter wave, the
BJP was the exclusive and big beneficiary of both the waves. The 85-seat
victory of BJP in 1989 was the outcome of both Hindu wave and the
opposition unity. And its electoral gains of 120 seats in 1991 appeared to
be the exclusive expression of its own organizational strength.
Under the compulsions of parliamentary democratic politics, BJP
started bringing about more pragmatic changes in its electoral strategy.
As against the populist slogan ‘Tilak, Taraju Aur Talwar, Inko Jute Maro
Char’ (To attack the Brahmins, Vaishyas and Kshatriyas by hurling shoes at
them), BJP championed the cause of ‘Social Engineering’ (Sunil 2001).
The process of social engineering as evolved by K. N. Govindacharya,
party’s former general secretary, sought to strengthen the electoral base of
the party among the backwards as it attempted to bring about changes in
chal, chehra, charitra and chintan (referring to changes in behavior,
appearance, character and thinking, respectively).
Moreover, to win over the minorities, BJP in its Panaji and Virar
conclaves in Goa in April 1995 devised a new strategy known as ‘Triple
Ts’—Taleem, Tanzeem and Tizarat (referring to changes in education,
organization and business, respectively) (Hafeez 1995). As part of its
strategy, the BJP organized Muslim Sammelans (conventions), the first
of which was held on 12 April 1995.
By shedding its traditional image and widening its electoral plank, BJP
largely succeeded in regaining the lost ground. The party contested the
1996 parliamentary elections on the plank of 5S’s: Su-raj (good gover-
nance), Suchita (probity in public life), Swadeshi (self-reliance), Samrasta
(social harmony) and Suraksha (national security) (Election

Manifesto, 1996).
The party that emerged on the political scene under stunning circum-
stances finally traveled a long way to occupy the mainstream of Indian
politics. The mid-term elections of 1998 were fought by the BJP on the
dual issues of ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Able Leadership’. After the humil-
iation of being denied office beyond 13 days in 1996, the BJP leadership
worked sincerely to win over new allies in the south besides strengthening
its ties with the old allied partners of north and the west. The hard work of
its cadres, its well-articulated and meticulously planned campaigns
highlighting the people’s problems owing to the misrule of both Congress
and United Front, its projection of Vajpayee as the prime ministerial
candidate, and its relegation of contentious issues like uniform civil code,
Article 370 and Ayodhya made the BJP victory of 1998 possible under a
new incarnation, namely, National Democratic Alliance (NDA).
The BJP’s governance of the national polity for 13 months did not pass
without tensions created both by its allied partners and the populist
gimmicks of the Opposition led by the Congress and the left. While the
government could claim nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998, the
budgetary provisions earmarking Saral, Samman and Samadhan, the
broader settlement on Cauvery, the formation of the National Security
Council as its major attributes, the coalitional government came to be
severely condemned for the breakdown of national consensus even on the
important pillar of foreign policy. The soaring prices of essential com-
modities largely crippled the government, creating broader disenchant-
ment within its own coalition constituents.
BJP’s ruling was marked by consistent pulls and pressures of its allies.
The party devoted most of its precious times in containing Samata,
Mamata and Jayalalitha than in actual issues of governance. And the
pressure tactics ultimately reached its peak in early 1999 when
Jayalalitha-backed AIADMK finally decided to withdraw its support to
the BJP-led coalition government. This sudden somersault by AIADMK
reduced the BJP government into minority. When the president asked
Vajpayee to prove its strength in the House, his government lost the
confidence vote by just one vote. The fall of BJP’s ‘thirteen-month’
government paved the way for yet another election to the Lok Sabha, the
third in quick succession in just three years.
The elections to the Lok Sabha 1999 assumed significance in the wake
of the premature fall of the BJP-led coalition government at the center.
The election also precipitated the process of the formation of the new
allies. The BJP made tactic understanding with its electoral allies. It
decided to face the elections unitedly with its old allies under the
expanded umbrella of NDA.
The 1999 verdict once again voted BJP-led NDA alliance to power,
giving it a sustainable, if not comfortable, majority. BJP returned to power
with an improvised electoral strength both in terms of numbers and allies.
The NDA under Vajpayee was projected as a model for federalized
coalition politics.
As a strong right-wing national opposition, BJP largely succeeded in
forming its government in various states on its own as well as a leading
coalition partner during 1990s and the early twenty-first century. Most of
the BJP-run state governments were formed in the north and the western
parts of the country. States like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Maharashtra and Himachal
Pradesh were the leading examples of BJP governance during the period.
Karnataka in south and Orissa in the east also reflected right-wing
governance.
Besides the state governance, BJP, for the first time, succeeded in
forming the government as a leading coalition called National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) during 1998–2004. With its coalition partners drawing
from different ideological groups, the NDA regime under the prime
ministership of Vajpayee claimed to have been remembered for two
significant achievements, namely, coalition with governance and begin-
ning of the second-generation economic reforms. The party also claimed
to have given a new shape to Indian economy in terms of getting rid of the
international debts from World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and a robust foreign policy with the nuclearization of India.
The analysis of political events during the first NDA regime during
1998–2004 made it amply clear that though BJP managed to lead the
coalition government, it paid a heavy price for it. The coalition partners
not only extracted share in government and used it to expand their
electoral base, they always restricted the BJP from promoting its ideolog-
ical cause. In some of the states like Bihar and Karnataka, BJP had better
support base, but just to enlist the support of the coalitional constituents,
the party accepted secondary role for itself in the states. The lust for
continuance of power consumed its hard-earned base.
Market created a clear divide between the old and new generations of
leaders within the party during the 1990s and afterward. In fact, market
propped up new leadership within the party, which came up not from the
below but from the top. These leaders were inducted into the party and
found higher placement in the organization of government not because of
their great mass support; rather, they were elevated to those positions
because of their intellectual caliber, techno-managerial skills, their capac-
ity to understand the new political economy in the changing world and
formulating an effective strategy for the same. These leaders of new
generation had no understanding of grassroots politics. It is these people
who were at the helm of affairs when BJP was in power and effectively
managed to marginalize the grassroots and popular leaders of the party.
The failure of BJP through its Shining India campaign could be attributed
to this only.
Equally important to note is the fact that during the power at the
center, BJP dissected some of the most popular leaders of the party like
Madan Lal Khurana, Uma Bharati and Kalyan Singh (who later joined
back on the eve of 2004 general elections).
The pro-market policies of the BJP during NDA regime snatched away
the possible political initiative against the pro-market policies of the UPA
regime. It was the reason that BJP played very safe on the SEZ (Special
Economic Zone) issues, as their own chief ministers of Gujarat and
Rajasthan in particular, happened to be big exponents of the same.
Advani’s prophecy regarding the transformation of the party into a
‘New BJP’, which would be guided not by the issues of yesterday but by
the agenda of tomorrow, failed to find wider acceptance in the Indian
polity. Though BJP managed to survive the first non-Congress coalition
on its own as NDA under the moderate leadership of Vajpayee, it failed to
steer the nation and its electorate ahead with its strong nationalist agenda
during 2004 and 2009 elections, leading to the emergence of the
Congress again as a dominant party of the pole in Indian parliamentary

democracy.
Unable to replace the Congress from its second consecutive Lok Sabha
inning in 2009, the BJP started thinking in terms of change of party
leadership. After hectic parleys at different levels of the party and the
Sangh, the party finally decided to launch its new leader, whose success
stories in the state of Gujarat had evinced great accolades even from his
adversaries, viz., Narendra Modi. Coming from the family of the Sangh
and from a modest background, Modi soon became both the warrior and
savior of the party in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.
Bypassing the Old Turks within the party like L K Advani and Murli
Manohar Joshi, Modi’s journey to becoming the party candidate for the
Prime Ministerial post was full of obstacles and controversies. The Godhra
controversy where he was alleged to have engineered massacres of minor-
ities in the state in 2002 was still haunting him. Bypassing all the hurdles,
Modi was finally elevated to the post of BJP’s campaign manager in June
2013 and later as the party candidate for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.
Modi’s elevation to the top party post galvanized both the party members
and the Sangh cadres. It was at this stage that Modi coined his Mission
272+ slogan to tell the BJP workers that the party should secure a majority
on its own by getting more than 272 seats. He also decided to make
optimal use of information technology, including social media.
Notwithstanding the internal infighting and inherent opposition to
Modi’s nomination, Modi continued to build his election strategy in a
formidable fashion. Modi lost no time in lifting the spirits of the cadres
by organizing and addressing spectacular rallies, and through aggressive
campaigning. His skillfully designed IT team enabled him to reach young
voters and the middle class with the help of social media. ‘His success
stories of Gujarat with its focus on the “growth and development” model
won the hearts of the urban middle class and the youth. His “individu-
alistic style of functioning” and his image as a ruthless implementer of the
policy and an aggressive doer won many non-committed voters. He was
hailed as a charismatic leader’ (Atal and Choudhary 2015).
1. The Godhra train burning was an incident that occurred on the

morning of 27 February 2002, in which 58 people including 25
women and 15 children died in a fire inside the Sabarmati Express
train near the Godhra railway station in the Indian state of Gujarat.
Many of the victims were Hindu pilgrims and activists who were
returning from the holy city of Ayodhya after a religious function at
the disputed site of Babri Masjid. The Godhra carnage resulted in
Hindu retaliation leading to communal riots in the state. According to
official figures, the post-Godhra riots resulted in the deaths of 790
Muslims and 254 Hindus; 2,500 people were injured non-fatally, and
223 more were reported missing. Other sources estimate that up to
2000 Muslims died. Several inquiries and commissions were set up to
look into the incident. In 2012, Modi was cleared of complicity in the
violence by a Special Investigation Team appointed by the Supreme
Court of India.
The 2014 Lok Sabha elections were a watershed in the history of BJP as
the party entered the national fray under the new leadership of Narendra
Modi. The use of technology, social media and the massive appeals of new
vision, dynamism and charisma finally brought back the party to the
national scene with its own majority. BJP getting clear majority in Lok
Sabha on its own in 2014 witnessed the re-emergence of one-party
dominance at the center despite the party contesting the elections as
part of NDA.
Atal and Choudhary (2015) viewed the success of BJP under Modi in
2014 as the ‘RIGHT Turn in Indian Polity’ for the party breaking the
earlier records of reaching the federal polity as a single dominated party
leading the coalition. However, whether BJP would be able to regain its
single-party dominance in national and state politics with its focus on
development and governance in future is difficult to be stated at this stage,
though the Opposition has started witnessing political convulsions in view
of the recent electoral successes of the party in states in India in February–
March 2017, including Uttar Pradesh.
Other Right Block Israeli Parties

The nationalist right block also has a very inconsistent history right from
the first Knesset elections held in 1949. General Zionists and the Progres-
sive Party competed for power with Herut until 1961 when they got
united under the Liberal party. Both General Zionists and the Progressives
were sharing the common ideological agenda based more or less on the
soft nationalistic discourse. The two parties broadly carried forward the
goal of private entrepreneurship. Owing to its roots in the Yishuv, the
General Zionists was more successful in the beginning as compared to the
Progressive Party. The Progressive Party emerged from the defection of
the General Zionists. However, in 1961, the decision of the two to form
the Liberal Party and subsequently the Gahal block during 1965 and
1969 elections sought to marginalize their distinct identities. From 1973,
even the Liberal component got merged with Likud.
The decade of the 1970s witnessed the emergence of Flatto Sharon,
Shlomzion and Kach as two other parties on the right block. Shlomzion
was the party formed by Likud leader Ariel Sharon, which soon merged
with Likud. Flatto Sharon received sufficient votes for two seats in its first
contested elections in 1977, but it was accorded just one seat as it was a
one-man list. The party got vanished after 1984 because of its failure to
retain even a single seat in the two consecutive elections.
Founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1971 Kach (Thus!) was the
ultranationalist party. The party advocated the forceful expulsion of
Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories in West Bank and Gaza
and fighting ‘terror with terror’. The party failed to get even a single seat in
the first two contested elections in 1977 and 1981 owing to its extreme
radicalization of the ideology. In 1984, it won one seat in the Knesset. In
1988, the Supreme Court outlawed the party for its racial ideological
overtures.
The decade of the 1980s saw the emergence of the radical political
parties on the nationalist block. It is these parties that molded the right
block into the nationalist block. Tehiya (renaissance) was one such party
that was founded in 1979 in opposition to Camp David accords signed by
the Begin-led Likud government. It was generally considered to be the
Other Right Block Israeli Parties 165
parliamentary wing of Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithfuls), though

both did have significant differences. Founded by Geula Cohen and
Hanan Porat, Tehiya was a single-issue party, which advocated the
territorial maximalist ideology with regard to the preservation of the
occupied territories in West Bank and Gaza. The party won three seats
in 1981 and 1988 and five in 1984 elections. It could not retain any seat
during the 1992 elections, which made it irrelevant.
Tzomet (crossroads) was another right-wing nationalist party, which
was founded by General Rafael Eitan in 1983. The party stood for clean
government, separation of religion and state and Eretz Yisrael. The party
also favors rekindling the Zionist spirit and pride and a new wave of
‘Yishuv Haaretz’ in the Golan, Galilee, along the green line and Negev.
It contested the 1984 elections with Tehiya and 1996 elections with
Likud. In the remaining of the Knesset elections, the party fought the
electoral battle alone. It won two seats in 1988 and eight seats in 1992
elections. From 1999 onward, the party failed to open its account in the
Knesset. In 2003, the party merely got 0.06 per cent of the votes in
Knesset.
Another radical right party of the nationalist block is Moledet (Home-
land). Moledet was founded in 1988 by General Rahavam Ze’evi (pop-
ularly known as Gandhi). The party advocated transfer (expulsion) of the
Arab population from Eretz Yisrael. It got two seats in 1988 and 1996
elections and three in 1992 elections for the Knesset. The party joined the
Halchud HaLeumi (National Union), which represented a combination
of radical forces on the nationalist block of the right and increased its
political leverage in the 1999 and 2003 elections under its banner. While
it contested 2006 elections under National Union–NRP banner and 2009
elections as part of National Union, it could not improve its electoral tally
on its own. Hence, the party decided to formally merge with Jewish
Home (Habayit Hayehudi) party for 2013 elections and became an
important alliance partner in the current government led by Netanyahu.
National Union or Halchud HaLeumi was formed during the 1999
elections and represented Moledet, Tkuma and New Herut. All these
parties broadly shared the common nationalistic vision of the right block.
Tkuma was founded by few settler leaders in 1998. It is an advocate of
‘Greater Israel’ agenda and dedicates itself to the promotion of the
interests of the settlers. Ze’ev Benny Begin (son of Menachem Begin) was
the founder of the New Herut party in 1999 after he left Likud over
ideological differences on the peace process. National Union won four
seats in the 1999 elections.
National Union intended to solve the refugee problem through popu-
lation exchange by which ‘the refugees would be settled in Arab countries
in place of Jews who emigrated to Israel from these countries’. It sought to
achieve peace ‘based on the principle of peace in exchange for peace’. It
pledged to ensure a strong Jewish presence in all of Israel, and encouraged
a productive and vibrant economy, which is the goal of the social and
economic revolution that the State of Israel was intended to bring to the
Jewish people. It focused on the codification of the Jewish and Zionist
character and democratic principles of the State of Israel in a written
constitution, which will define basic civil responsibilities and rights.
Encouragement of private enterprise, privatization of government com-
panies and adequate housing, medical care, social services and employ-
ment to all the citizens constituted other important ideological planks of
National Union.
Unable to carry its various allied partners like Tkuma, Moledet and
Herut on a common ideological platform and to offer the factions
privileged positions within the government, National Union finally
merged with Jewish Home (Habayit Hayehudi) party during 2013
elections.
The decade of the 1990s witnessed massive immigration from the
former Soviet Union. The Russian immigrants who constituted around
1 million population did have an electrifying potential vote bank. While
during 1992 they formed 8 per cent of the electorate, their strength
started increasing in the subsequent Knesset elections to 13 per cent in
1996 and 16 per cent in 1999 elections. To capture their potential vote,
the parties among the Russian immigrants sprouted up. Yisrael Be’aliya
and Yisrael Beiteinu are two such parties that tried to capture a substantial
margin of the Russian votes.
Yisrael B’Aliya was one of the leading parties in the nationalist right
block. It was the largest and most broad-based Russian immigrant party
and showed strength among all sub-groups. The party was set up by
Natan Sharansky in 1995 to ‘help the professional, economic, and social

acculturation of the Russian immigrants’ (Mckain 2003).
The leaders among the immigrants started realizing the voting potential
of their own community. From a population of 250,000 constituting
around 8 per cent of the electorate, the Russian immigrants increased to
400,000 with 13 per cent of the electorate. This propelled the leadership
to form the Russian parties and take maximum electoral mileage from the
coalitional pressure politics. It was in this context that the Yisrael b’ Aliya
came into existence.
Despite its main organizational and social base among the Russian
immigrants, the party insisted that it was not originally Russian as it did
contain the English-speaking Canadians called Anglos on its list, espe-
cially in the 2003 elections.
Zvi Gitelman and Ken Goldstein in their study argued that in the three
Knesset elections (1992, 1996 and 1999), most of the immigrants from
the Former Soviet Union voted against the party in power and the
incumbent prime minister. In view of their dissatisfaction with
re-settlement experience in Israel, the Russian immigrants voted for
Rabin’s Labor in 1992 elections. However, their ‘vote was a protest vote
against the Likud government more than it was a vote for the Labor’
(Gitelman and Goldstein 2002: 142). In 1996, they supported Likud and
its prime ministerial candidate Netanyahu. Hence, in both the elections of
1992 and 1996, the Russian immigrants voted against the party in power
largely ‘because they felt the government had not done enough for them’
(Ibid., 144).
Zvi Gitelman and Ken Goldstein considered Israel b’Aliya as another
Shas, an ethnic party with a stable constituency and a long-term player in
the Israeli politics. Through their statistical analysis, Zvi Gitelman and
Ken Goldstein showed that ‘Israel b’Aliya did its best with those who were
least satisfied with their situation in Israel and who were in the middle of
the ideological spectrum’ (Ibid).
Yisrael B’Aliya won seven seats in its first contested Knesset in 1996
elections. The party repeated its magnificent success at the municipal
elections held in 1998 when it ‘brought about its 100 representatives into
more than 60 local governments’ (Khanin 2001: 111). However, the
subsequent trends of the party were discouraging, as it got reduced to
six seats in 1999 and barely managed two in 2003 elections. The party
made housing and employment its key slogans in the 2003 Knesset
elections. One of its election slogans hinted: ‘Sharansky: Right, Sane
and Clean’. During the 2003 elections, the party lost voters to Shinui
on the left and on the religious issue and to National Union on its right on
the security issue.
The dismal performance of Yisrael B’Aliya led its leader Natan
Sharansky to merge with Likud in the aftermath of the 2003 Knesset
elections. The party contested the first three elections for the Knesset from
1996 to 2003 and won 7, 6 and 2 seats, respectively, in the fourteenth,
fifteenth and sixteenth Knesset. Witnessing its dismal performance, the
party entered an electoral alliance with Likud during the 2006 and 2009
elections to the Knesset. Since 2006 the party lost its separate political
identity as a party of the Mizrakhi Jews belonging to the Russian feder-
ation and came to be associated with Yisrael Beiteinu.
Following some of the key ideological postulates and political orienta-
tion, the party finally merged with Likud in 2003.
Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home) fought the 1999 elections on its
own turf and won four seats. To preserve its distinct identity and to
increase its electoral stake, the party entered into an electoral fray for the
2003 elections under the common banner of Halchud HaLeumi and won
seven seats.
In the 2003 elections, Yisrael Beiteinu replaced Herut in the troika of
the National Union, with Moledet and Tkuma deciding to contest under
its collective ideological banner. The National Union fought the 2003
elections under Avigdor Lieberman and won seven seats in the Knesset. Its
ideological platform for the elections focused on the realization of Zionist
goals, and respect for the heritage and values of the Jewish people. Under
the dynamic leadership of Lieberman, the party achieved significant
electoral heights in the past one decade.
Though forming an alliance with Ichud Leumi, Moledet and Tkuma
during the 2003 elections, the party decided to go to the 2006 polls on its
own. Yisrael Beiteinu won 11 seats with 8.9 per cent of the votes in 2006
elections, resulting into its entry into the coalition government under
Ehud Olmert.
During 2009 elections the party made its appeal beyond its initial
support base among the 800,000 or so Russian immigrants who had
come to Israel since 1989. It advocated not only a balance between state
and religion but also emphasized that a two-state solution with Palestine
should adhere to the principle of demographic realities incorporating the
settlement blocks into Israel. The party thus tried to grab the support
across class, ethnic and social differences and made its dent into different
social cleavages. Such a change in Yisrael Beiteinu’s political strategy and
ideological move electorally rewarded the party by winning 15 seats with
11.7 per cent of votes and coming to the third party after Kadima and
Likud—the first such electoral success since its inception. Clive Jones
argues that Yisrael Beiteinu ‘has become, in the truest sense, a pan-Israel
party’ (Jones 2010: 29).
The parties of the right-wing nationalistic block have always played an
instrumental role in the formation of the government. Their seats and
share have remained more or less consistent in the post-1970s phase of the
Israeli party system. The arrival of the Mizrakhi parties like Yisrael
Beiteinu and Yisrael B’Aliya has further strengthened the right-wing
nationalistic block by championing the cause for greater settlements
under Eretz Yisrael. Fearing the loss of their electoral base among the
Russian Jews, the right-wing parties didn’t hesitate in joining the govern-
ment led by the left-wing Labor or centrist Shinui and Kadima parties.
Under the leadership of Avigdor Liberman, the electoral graphs of
Yisrael Beiteinu showed consistent increase in its seats and votes during
2006 and 2009 elections. Boldened by its preceding Knesset success, the
party contested 2013 elections as an ally of Likud and formed the
government when the alliance won 31 seats and 23.3 per cent of votes
jointly. The party entered the 2015 Knesset independently and managed
to get only 6 seats and 5.1 per cent of votes. Because it happened to be an
important constituent of the right wing-block since the beginning, it has
always remained the part of the right-wing-led government under Netan-
yahu from 2009 to date.
Shiv Sena: The Indian Far Right

Indian parliamentary democracy does not formally witness any pan right-
ist party other than BJP; Shiv Sena has always been a strong right-wing
ally of BJP since the two decided to contest elections from the 1990s
onward. Though other regional political armies disappeared in the course
of time, the Shiv Sena of Maharashtra has succeeded in strengthening its
regional support with consistent electoral victory in various assembly and
parliamentary elections since its inception in 1966 to date.
Characterized as a far-right political party, the ideology of Shiv Sena
shifted from Marathi identity to Hindutva. As a result, the party became
closer to the right-wing BJP, both in terms of its ideology and its electoral
strategies.
Giving a call of ‘Marathi sovereignty’ in the state of Maharashtra, Shiv
Sena sought to mobilize its political legitimacy on the basis of the support
of the Maharashtrians. Following on the guidelines of West Bengal and
Andhra Pradesh, the party demanded 80 per cent of the jobs for the native
Marathi people. The party used Marathi language and culture as the
symbols of the Maratha pride.
Formed under the leadership of Bal Thackeray in 1966, Shiv Sena soon
started its political tentacles in all parts of the state. Its opposition to both
the Congress and the Communists, especially in their failure to protect the
interests of the Maharashtrians, gave Sena immense popularity and electoral
strength. The strong anti-Communist orientation of the Sena made it
acceptable to the industrialists of the state, which started opening the
doors of employment to the Sena followers. ‘This gave the early recruits
of the Shiv Sena the feeling of exclusive Sainik identity, turning them with
the passage of time into committed activists’ (Teginder 2008: 134).
Ranjita Chakraborty argues that ‘the Sena like many other political
formations remained active after its formation but its electoral fortune
always waxed and waned’ (Chakraborty 2002: 292). Though Shiv Sena
under Bal Thackeray failed to dislodge the Congress from power as late as
1990s, the Congress dominance suffered a major setback in the 1990s
when Sena made an electoral understanding with BJP. For the first time
both Sena and BJP combined to form the government in the state. This
Shiv Sena: The Indian Far Right 171
20
18
16 15 15
12
12 11
Seats
Votes
8
6
4
4
1.4 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.8
1 0.8
0.1
0
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 9.7 Shiv Sena in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014 (Source: Election Commission Reports,
1989–2014)
electoral understanding between the two continued for the parliamentary

elections from the mid-1990s to the 16th Lok Sabha elections held in
2014 (see Fig. 9.7 and Table 7.1).
The party suffered serious challenge to its survival and legitimacy due to
a split—the emergence of second-in-command in the party leadership
after Bal Thackeray damaged the credibility of the party. The leadership
fight between Uddhav Thackeray and his cousin Raj Thackeray resulted
in the split of the party in 2006. While Uddhav took the command of the
parent party from his father, Bal Thackeray, Raj Thackeray formed a new
party, Maharashtra Navnirman Sena.
Further, the issue of Marathas for the Maharashtrians once again gained
ascendancy when the Sena activists continued attacks against the north
Indians, particularly the labor from Bihar and UP. The Congress–NCP
alliance in the state did shatter the chances of the Sena–BJP combine to
wrest political power in the state. Nevertheless, Sena has continuously
maintained its consistent electoral performance in the Lok Sabha elec-
tions, which is an indication that its balance of regionalism and nation-
alism as its ideological foundation is not going to die out at least in the
state of Maharashtra in near future.
Final Comments
The right-wing parties in both Israel and India have witnessed ideological
and political realignments over the years. The changes in the ideological
postulates of the two key parties—the Likud and the BJP—have shown
the considerable toning of their ideological agenda with a deviance from
their hard ideological issues—the Eretz Israel and Hindu Rashtra, respec-
tively. Further, as the contemporary electoral politics in both Israel and
India have increasingly been gravitated toward coalition, the two main
right-wing parties have also shown considerable realignment with the like-
minded moderate parties of their respective groups.
References
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Aronoff, M. J. (1984). Political polarization: Contradictory interpretations of
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chariot. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications.
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Chakraborty, R. (2002). Ethnic identities at the service of political parties: The
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The Haaretz. (2003, January 8). Snowball fatally rolling over the Likud.
10
The Centrist Parties (Centrist Block)
Parliamentary democracy with multiparty system across the world repre-

sents salience and dominance of the centrist parties, which are generally
referred to as umbrella parties. By virtue of being the umbrella organiza-
tions, the centrist political formations over the years have become pan
parties representing the interests of all sections of society. Unlike Israel
where the centrist parties emerged as significant political forces from the
beginning of the twenty-first century onward, the Congress as the major
central party continued to be the major political player in government
formation since independence.
Shinui, Kadima, Yesh Atid and Kulanu in Israel

The dominant centrist political force with a consistent electoral
strength and viability in the Israeli party politics is Shinui. Meaning
‘change’ in Hebrew, Shinui is broadly described as a reformist political
party, which was established in 1974 by Amnon Rubinstein. The
emergence of the party could be seen in the wake of the serious

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_10
176 10 The Centrist Parties (Centrist Block)
shortcomings of the Labor-led Alignment government and its

mishandling of the state’s security in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur
war in 1973.
The party ideologues also defined Shinui as a Liberal Party, in the
European lexicon of the term where the term ‘liberal’ refers to ‘reform’ or
‘progressive’. However, the party vehemently dissociates itself with the
Jewish religious movements also known as ‘Reform’ or ‘Progressive’ as one
of the strong basis of the party is anti-haredim. ‘Shinui kept its political
views vague for years and presented itself as a center party, not left or right,
only against Haredim’ (Levy 2002).
The world organization of Liberal Parties, the ‘Liberal International’,
also recognized Shinui as a liberal party in Israeli party system. In view of
its ideological planks and policy statements on various socio-economic
and political issues, the party can be described as democratic, liberal,
secular and centrist. ‘Its policies are particularly attractive to young,
affluent, secular Israelis’ (Susser 2003).
Shinui’s rise in popularity was seen in terms of dissatisfaction with the
mainstream parties. ‘Many Israelis are very disappointed with both the
two main parties, Likud and Labour – Likud because it has been unable to
come to grips with the Intifada and doesn’t offer any kind of peace on the
horizon; Labour because it went too far in the peace process and it blew up
in their faces’ (Ibid.).
Unlike the defunct Center Party, which had drawn members into the
Knesset from all over the political map, ‘Shinui really does stand in the
center on security issues, advocating an eventual negotiated settlement
with the Palestinians but recognizing that it just isn’t possible in the
present circumstances’ (Ben-David 2003a, b).
Shinui didn’t have a chequered electoral history but it portrayed a
coherent political move in the Israeli polity. With Yigael Yadin’s Demo-
cratic Movement, the party founder Rubinstein merged to form the
Democratic Movement for Change and contested the first parliamentary
elections in 1977. The combined forces jointly won 15 seats in the
Knesset. They were ‘partly responsible for ending the five-decade rule of
Labor and giving respectability to the idea of change in an erstwhile stable
political system’ and clearly demonstrated that ‘a campaign in the
Shinui, Kadima, Yesh Atid and Kulanu in Israel 177
beleaguered security-conscious state of Israel could be based on domestic

issues’ (Torgovnik 1980: 75).
Though the first collective experience of both Shinui and Democratic
Movement did give electoral respectability and political legitimacy, the
temporary union could not succeed for the second consecutive parliamen-
tary elections. The issue of joining the coalitional government and the
inherent limitations within the Begin-led government led to the disman-
tling of DMC. However, unlike the unexpected demise of Yadin’s Dem-
ocratic Movement for Change, Shinui continued to contest the successive
Knesset elections under its leadership.
The disappearance of Democratic Movement for Change from the
political scene led the voters distrusting any centrist political forces.
Hence, Shinui could not continue with its erstwhile electoral success it
had won in a joint platform with its predecessor. The formation of the
national unity government by the Labor and the Likud further thwarted
any major metamorphosis by Shinui in the electoral politics. As a result,
Shinui could just manage two to three seats in its individually contested
Knesset elections from 1981 to 1988.
The national unity governance of the 1980s was beset with enormous
problems. Shinui and any other centrist party failed to increase its legis-
lative tally owing to the voters’ broad identification with the two major
parties. However, the increasing disenchantment among the voters and
the changing international ambience on the issue of peace and security,
especially in the aftermath of the first Intifada, led Shinui to encash the
changed political milieu. Hence, for the 1992 elections, it joined with
Ratz and Mapam to form Meretz.
Shinui contested the 1992 elections for the Knesset under the common
banner of Meretz and returned with an exhilarating electoral support. The
combined formation won 12 seats with 9.6 per cent of the votes. During
the 1996 elections for the prime minister and Knesset, the party came out
in support for the Labor candidate Shimon Peres. The defeat of Peres had
its implications on the decreasing support for the combined group as it
could only retain nine seats in the Knesset.
Owing to the ideological and leadership tussles, the Shinui faction left
Meretz and decided to contest the 1999 Knesset elections on its own
platform. The party leadership was taken over by Yosef ‘Tommy’ Lapid
who capitalized his high media profile while making strong penetration
into the Labor and Likud’s electoral strongholds. The party continued to
support the Labor candidature of Barak for the prime ministerial post.
‘Lapid’s monologues in the 1999 election propaganda on the threat of a
religious takeover of the country proved a rousing success, and the party
won six seats’ (Gilbert 2003).
Unlike the preceding two elections that were based on the split voting,
the 2003 elections were held for the Knesset alone. Hence, it had fewer
chances of its members dividing their loyalties. The party entered the
electoral fray for the Knesset by projecting itself as the centrist secularist
party. Its election campaigns focused on ‘A clean party for a change’,
‘Shinui means change’. Most of its members were drawn from Meretz. Its
spectacular performance in the elections in which it picked up 15 Knesset
seats is largely attributed to the disgruntled voters in the left and the right.
The Russian immigrants too appeared to be attracted to the party’s
platform focusing on the separation of religion from politics.
Shinui’s winning of 15 seats with 12.2 per cent of votes made it the
third largest party in the Knesset, thereby providing it the key position in
its bargaining leverage for the government formation in 2003. No gov-
ernment could have been possible without the incorporation of Shinui.
After hectic negotiations and dealings, the coalition government, which
was finally formed by Ariel Sharon, tended much respectability and space
to Shinui, with five of its members taking the ministries in the coalition
government. Shinui’s leaders grabbed the Justice and Interior ministries,
which had hitherto remained with the ultra-orthodox parties in addition
to the deputy prime ministership.
Gad Barzilai argued that the phenomenon of change as espoused by
Shinui challenged the Jewish political order. The focus of the party on the
separation of state and religion despite being the Jewishness of the state
wooed the undecided voters considerably during the 2003 elections. Its
anti-Haredim rhetoric went well with the electorate. As a result, it was able
to garner votes from Meretz, Yisrael B’Aliya and other parties from the left
and the right on the political spectrum.
Shinui’s ideological platform characterized the party as ‘a democratic,
secular, liberal, Zionist, peace-seeking party’. The party’s policies on
political, social and economic issues placed it firmly in the center of the
Israeli political discourse. It differed substantially from the left in terms of

its rejection of the socialist policies and from the right in view of its focus
on the realistic as against the populist policies.
The ideological postulates of Shinui sought to blend the moderate and
progressive trends by discarding the radical and extreme elements that
have hitherto hampered the Israeli society, culture and polity. The spec-
tacular success of the party and its unexpected electoral jump from 6 seats
in 1999 to 15 seats in 2003 broadly attributed the changing contours of
the party and the Israeli electorate. However, the party came to be dubbed
as anti-haredi for being so vocal against the orthodox and ultra-orthodox
communities. It was also called ‘a class-based party’ and ‘a party of the
bourgeoisie’ (Ben-David 2003a, b).
Shinui had emerged as the party for secular movement. However, in
order to strengthen its electoral base among its targeted constituents, the
party changed its name into Shinui—Party for the Secular and the Middle
Class in May 2005. Before the seventeenth Knesset elections, 2006, the
party witnessed many major and minor splits. While some of its members
left the party to form Secular Faction, Ha-olim and Habayit Haleumi, a
major section of Shinui formed Kadima with other dissident members of
the right-wing Likud.
Kadima (meaning ‘forward’ or ‘eastward’) overtook Shinui in 2005
when Ariel Sharon left Likud on the issue of unilateral Israeli withdrawal
from settlements in the Gaza Strip and formed the new party with its
centrist supporters of Shinui and Likud. Kadima entered the electoral fray
in 2006 and won 29 seats with 22 per cent of the votes. Under Ehud
Olmert and Tzipi Livni, the party formed government for the first time.
On the issue of corruption as mayor of Jerusalem, Olmert resigned and
Livni took over as the -prime minister of Israel. To the elections of
eighteenth Knesset in 2009, Kadima under Livni emerged as the biggest
party with 28 seats; however, it failed to form the government due to the
majority of the right-wing seats under Netanyahu.
The intra-party fight on the issue of leadership between Livni and Shaul
Mofaz led to the dismal performance of Kadima during 2013 elections
when its seats and voting percentage went down to 2 and 2.08, respec-
tively (see Figs. 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3).
29
28
Knesset Seats
15 15
12
5
9
6 6
3
2 2 2 2
1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013
Knesset Elections
Fig. 10.1 Shinui/Kadima’s seats in the Knesset, 1981–2013
Following Sharon’s ideological foundations, Kadima championed a

‘two-state solution’. Clive Jones argued that Kadima’s success, both in
the election of 2006 and 2009, represented the emergence of a third
discourse, one that ‘conflates elements of the Liberal ideal with its “Statist”
counterpart and its emphasis upon the centrality of the military to Israeli
security’ (Jones 2010: 25).
Under Sharon and Olmert, Kadima acquired a respectable place in
coalition politics, but the leadership tussle emerged soon after Livni took
over the reins of the party in 2008. Unable to get the top party slot, Livni
24
22.4
22.0
20
16
Voting Percentage
12.2 12.2
12
9.6
5
8 7.4
5.0 5.0
4
2.6
2.08
1.7 1.7
1.5
0
1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013
Knesset Elections
Fig. 10.2 Shinui/Kadima’s voting percentage in the Knesset, 1981–2013
stepped down from the party and formed Ha’Tnuah (the movement).
Leadership tussle within Kadima finally brought down its electoral tally in
2013 elections to 2 under Shaul Mofaz. Amidst the uncertainty of
winning the electoral support during 2015 Knesset elections in view of
increasing electoral threshold from 2 to 3.25 per cent and the breaking
away of Livni with the new formation, Ha’Tnuah, Kadima didn’t fight
the 2015 elections.
32
Seats
Voting Percentage
28
24
20
16
12
1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013
Knesset Years
Fig. 10.3 Shinui/Kadima in the Knesset, 1981–2013
Indian National Congress

Founded in 1885 by A.O. Hume as the ‘safety valve’ to contain the
colonial opposition in a democratic manner, the Indian National Con-
gress has traveled a long democratic journey from the colonial era
spearheading the nationalist movement under the leaderships of Gandhi,
Nehru and Patel to the post-independence era of Nehru, Gandhi dynasty.
The short interregnum in terms of Janata Parivar during 1975–77 or the
coalition government under National Front, United Front and NDA, the
Indian National Congress 183
Congress has been instrumental in leading the parliamentary democracy

of the country for past one and a quarter decades.
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s variously came to be characterized
by the ‘Congress System’ (Rajni Kothari 1964), ‘One-Party System’
(Morris Jones 1978) and ‘Predominant Party System’ (Sartori 1976). It
is not to say that the post-independence era was conspicuous by the
absence of an organized opposition at all. The centrist Congress did
have an opposition from the right-wing BJS, Ram Rajya Parishad and
Swatantra Party and from the left-wing Communist Party of India, Praja
Socialist Party and Samyukta Socialist Party.
However, despite the presence of other rightist and the leftist parties,
the indomitable eminence of the Congress in the Indian polity never came
to be questioned. The entire phase was marked by the dominance of the
Congress party both at the center and in the majority of the Indian states.
During this phase, the Congress functioned on the basis of consensus.
Rajni Kothari described it through the high command–grassroots rela-
tionship. It was a unique kind of relationship in which the aspirations of
the masses truly got reflected and accomplished by the party high com-
mand. The Congress in real sense depicted a miniature of Indian society.
It not only sought to accommodate diverse groupings within its own
structure, but also attempted to incorporate their ideas in its policies and
programs.
M. P. Singh described the Congress of the 1950s and early 1960s as ‘a
highly adaptive, pragmatic, catch-all, dominant, and branch-type mass
party with a fairly articulated organization and stratarchical or segmentary
authority structure’ (Singh 1975: 120). The Congress under the indom-
itable leadership of Nehru sought to ‘bridge the gaps between the party
promises and performances’ (Gupta and Kumar 2002: 123). Besides
advocating eradication of evils like corruption, poverty and unemploy-
ment, the Congress in its Nagpur session sounded a clear danger signal to
the landlords and traders within the party besides the industrial and
financial elements. However, dissension had already started reaping in
the early 1960s, especially Nehru’s focus on state institutions like the
Planning Commission, National Development Council and Finance
Commission. Unlike Nehru, Shastri was more for decentralization of
power. The economic policies of the Congress led to utter frustration
and disillusionment within the party organization. To counter this, the

Kamraj Committee was constituted to re-organize the party.
The death of Shastri led to the party infighting over the issue of
leadership. The mid-1960s thus witnessed a fierce battle between Mrs.
Gandhi and the party Syndicate, resulting in the first ever split within the
Congress in 1969 to Congress (O) and Congress (R). This great split had
a far-reaching impact on the organizational and operational aspect of the
party. ‘Qualitative changes took place in the style of functioning at the
leadership level and a serious blow was given to the so-called “accommo-
dative” policies of the Congress Party. Plans to “recognize and revitalize”
the party became the call of the day and the Working Committee held the
view that organization should be so built as to work as “suitable instru-
ment of social transformation”’ (Gupta and Kumar 2002: 131).
To strengthen her hold on the party and the government, Mrs. Gandhi
went for a mid-term poll in 1971 under the populist slogan ‘Garibi Hatao’
(Remove Poverty). In the meantime, she had already come out of the
clutches of the Syndicates. The Syndicate leaders by the time had already
started splitting into various socialist groups and parties. The emergence
of the Congress with a clear two-thirds majority in the Parliament
contributed to the growth of the position of the prime minister besides
the role of the Parliament.
After the death of Nehru, the Congressional hegemony was challenged.
The Congress hegemony was broken in most of the states due to the
emergence of the regional parties in states like Assam, Bihar, Tamil Nadu,
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and so forth, leading to the first major split in
the party during the 1967 elections when a dominant group of the party
leadership under the command of the Syndicates deserted the parent
party. In the parliamentary and the legislative elections that followed,
the Congress lost the major states in the North and subsequently in the
South. Incapacity of the Congress to form its governments in these states
provided opportunities to other oppositional parties to form the
coalitional governments in different parts of the country. Rajni Kothari
described this trend as ‘a movement from a dominant party system to a
system of competitive dominance’ (Kothari 1970: 200).
Since 1967, the Congress and the non-Congress parties had frequently
alternated in power in most of the states. Bruce Graham observed that the
Indian National Congress 185
central paradox in the Indian politics in the 1950s and 1960s was that the
party system was unable to organize the mass electorate into clearly
defined and separated sectors of social and regional support. According
to him, with some exceptions, parties in India were not able to establish a
durable and electorally rewarding relationship with the groups whose
interests they claimed to represent.
And the period from mid-80s to 1990s witnessed major turning points
in Indian politics. Emergence of Rajiv Gandhi as a young and dynamic
leader of the Congress and the nation marked a distinct gap of the two
generations of post-independence Indian history. With no political expe-
rience, Rajiv Gandhi was a technocrat who tried to address country’s
problems with science, technology and innovation. The introduction of
technology missions in different spheres of administration and polity did
try to revolutionize the nation by streamlining the notion of governance.
Rajiv tried to bring administration closer to the people. His focus on
intrinsic growth and intensive dialogues with the masses and the regional
satraps also helped him solve regional problems of Punjab, Assam and
Mizoram.
Deviating from Indira Gandhi’s high-handed approach and authoritar-
ian rule, Rajiv was more federal in terms of accommodating demands
from his opponents, both within and outside the party. The dynamism
and innovation enabled Rajiv to make new experiments in governance.
India under him started moving from License Raj toward privatization. It
is generally claimed that Indian economy started moving toward the phase
of liberalization and globalization under Rajiv’s era.
The Congress of the 1990s witnessed both a shift in its ideology and a
crisis in its leadership. The onset of Liberalization, Privatization and
Globalization (LPG) indicated an ideological shift from ‘mixed economy
to free market or democratic socialism to liberalism’ (De 2002: 153). It
also marked a political shift from dynastic legacy to the confederal
leadership. The Congress of the early 1990s was more oriented toward
federalization of decisions and decentralization of power, much like in the
pursuit of Rajiv Gandhi’s orientation. However, this period also strength-
ened the working of the coalition politics and culture in the country with
the formation of the United Front Government, National Democratic
Alliance Government and finally the United Progressive Alliance Govern-

ment led by the crypto Third Front, BJP and the Congress, respectively.
The Congress under Narasimha Rao and Sitaram Kesari did not
actually work toward strengthening the party organization. The Congress
in the post-liberalization era witnessed significant splits in the forms of
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) led by Sharad Pawar, P. A. Sangma and
their cohorts; Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) led by Moopnar and
Chidambaram; Trinamool Congress by Ms. Mamata Banerjee; Haryana
Vikas Congress by Bansi Lal and so forth. However, all these newly
created Congress outfits soon either merged with the Congress or became
Congress’ small coalitional partners.
The political vacuum created in the aftermath of the Congress decline
got filled partially by the BJP and the parties of the Third Front. However,
under Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi, the Congress once again reverted
back to power in the twenty-first century—not as a hegemonic party but
more as a predominantly leading coalitional party. The elections 2004 and
2009 further vindicated this position in the Indian party system. How-
ever, the increasing scams under the Congress-led UPA I and II and the
weakening position of the prime minister provided a new electoral milieu
when the nation went for 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The Congress got
the worst of its defeat in the 2014 Lok Sabha when it barely managed
44 seats and 19.3 per cent of votes (see Figs. 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6).
“Indecision at the top, confusion at the middle, and the long wait for
Rahul to step up” and the inaccessibility afterwards (Manoj 2016) led to
party rebellions with many state leaders like G K Vasan, Jayanthi
Natarajan, Himanta Biswa Sarma, and so on leaving the Congress before
the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. The double digit presence in the 16th Lok
Sabha with continuous dismal performance in key states like Delhi, Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal during 2015–17 questioned the credibility
of the Congress. Handling dynasty with dynamism is the need of the
hour and how Rahul Gandhi would rejuvenate the Congress and
reenergize the Congressmen will be seen from the developments that
unfold. Modi’s clarion call for a Congress Mukt Bharat will be seen as
how the grand umbrella party also takes up electoral challenges in the
years ahead.
Other Israeli Parties of the Centrist Block 187
404
371
364 361
352 353
283
Lok Sabha Seats
232
206
197
154
145
140 141
114
44
52
57
62
67
71
77
80
84
89
91
19 6
19 8
99
09
14
04
9
9
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Lok Sabha Elections
Fig. 10.4 Congress’ seats in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014
Other Israeli Parties of the Centrist Block

The centrist block broadly contained the elements with rebellious and
radical spirit in addition to other progressive political forces, which sought
to take the middle of the path on various socio-economic and political
issues. Duverger in his seminal work had stated the very divisive nature of
the center party. According to him, the centrist party reflected consider-
able overlapping, which ‘seems to be more widespread than the split.
50 49.1
47.8
45.0
44.7
43.7
42.7
40.8
39.5
40
36.5
34.5
Voting Percentage
30
28.8
28.5
28.3
26.5
25.8
19.3
20
10
0
09 14
52
57
62
67
71
77
80
84
89
91
19 6
19 8
99
04
9
9
20 20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
Lok Sabha Elections
Fig. 10.5 Congress’ voting percentage in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014
Multi-partism arises from the mutual independence of sets of antithesis’

(Duverger 1954: 231).
The centrist block in the Israeli party system does not represent any
cohesive and sustained movement. Most of the parties in this block
emerged only as a phenomenon that died out within a short span of
time. The first center party that made its presence on the centrist block
was the Independent Liberals of the 1960s. Formed by the faction of the
Progressives Party, which refused to merge with Gahal, the Independent
Liberals contested the Knesset elections from 1965 to 1977. The party
won five seats in 1965 elections, four in 1969 and 1973 elections and one
Seats
350
300
Seats/ Voting Percentage
250
200
150
100
50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Lok Sabha Years
Fig. 10.6 Congress’ performance in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014
in 1977 elections. The emergence of Ratz and DMC further reduced the
political significance of the Independent Liberals, and the party
disappeared after 1981 when it failed to manage even one seat for the
Knesset.
The Free Center led by Shmuel Tamir, which emerged after its split
from Gahal before the 1967 war, and the Rafi fragment, which formed the
State List (Zalman Shoval) after its decision not to join the Labor
conglomeration in 1968 also followed the centrist stands. However, the
Free Center and the State List won just three and two seats, respectively,
in the 1969 elections and subsequently decided to merge with Likud for
the 1973 Knesset elections.
The center platform did not get any decisive bearing on the Israeli party
system before the emergence of Ratz and Dash in the 1970s and Shinui in
the 1980s. Ratz emerged as the first significant challenge to the Labor
predominance. The party was founded by Shulamit Aloni, a lawyer by
profession before 1973 elections. Shulamit Aloni was being relegated to
the background for her outspoken critique of Golda Meir’s Labor gov-
ernment. The party won three seats in 1973 elections, followed by one
each in 1977 and 1981 elections, three in 1984 and five in 1988 elections.
‘It was more dovish than the Labor camp and stood out primarily as an
anticlerical movement. It seemed that many voters used this establishment
of CRM to register a protest vote against the alignment’ (Diksin 1991:
27). In 1992, Ratz got merged with Meretz.
The DMC or Dash strengthened the centrist movement to a consid-
erable extent when it drove away the Labor during its first and the only
contested elections in 1977. DMC was in fact a combination of two
groups, Rubinstein’s Change and Yigael Yadin’s Democratic Movement.
In view of its ideological flexibility and leadership skills, the DMC
attracted a significant number of Labor leaders who started leaving the
party for DMC. Asher Arian believed that ‘the DMC provided an
alternative channel of upward mobility for leaders (political, military,
economic and university) who disdained the opportunity of competing
for positions of leadership in the disreputed Alignment’ (Arian 1980: 15).
According to Efraim Torgovnik (1980), DMC was partly responsible
for ending the five-decade rule of Labor and giving respectability to the
idea of change in an erstwhile stable political system. He argued that the
greatest success of the DMC was its mobilization of visible activists and
leaders. The party according to him brought together a variety of people
who set aside their ideological differences on foreign affairs and the
territories in favor of running together on the DMC’s mainly domestic
issues. ‘The DMC voters were mostly of European and American back-
ground. Hence, the party pulled few seats from the development towns,
which are populated mainly by Oriental Jews. Its greatest support came
from the large cities, where most of the people of European origin live’
(Ibid.: 83–84).
Electoral reform constituted the important plank of DMC for revital-

izing Israel’s political system. Don Peretz and Giddeon Doron maintained
that ‘the common theme that united this coalition of hawks and doves,
conservatives and liberals, zealous and moderate nationalists was their
demand for change in the political environment’ (Peretz and Doron
1997: 103).
‘DMC became the darling of mass media’ soon after the resignation of
Rabin in the wake of scandals (Diksin 1991: 30). It won 15 seats in the
1977 elections and joined the coalition government, with four of its
leaders joining the ministerial posts under Begin’s coalitional government.
However, the very composition of the DMC representing divergent
factions ultimately led to its abrupt demise. The party could not see the
1981 elections. Torgovnik stated that DMC failed because it abandoned
its principles and became a party of expediency. The party, according to
him, was ‘headed by diverse personalities, not by a united leadership’
(Torgovnik 1980: 96).
Telem founded by Moshe Dayan (former foreign minister from
Likud), Yahad (Together) set up by Ezer Weizman (former defence
minister from Likud) and Ometz (Courage) created by Yigal Hurwitz
also represented brief sojourns in the centrist block in the early 1980s.
These parties however could not sustain for more than one Knesset
session.
Among other centrist parties of the 1990s, one can witness the emer-
gence of the Third Way headed by Avigdor Kahalani, the Center Party
and Am Ehad. The Third Way, which begged four seats in the 1996
elections, was largely a single-issue party. And the issue was the retention
of the Golan Heights. ‘The party’s platform sought a consensual, centrist
position on the vital issues. It had no core voter base, and utilized the
potential provided by the two ballots – one for the Prime Minister and
one for the Knesset – to gain support. On the issue of religion the party
opposed religious coercion and religious legislation, but supported
strengthening the Jewish character and values in Israel’ (Hazan 1999:
175).
The Center Party and Am Ehad were also seen as potential centrist
formations in the 1999 elections. Torgovnik argued that the Center Party
intended to establish new institutional rules to guide public life. The
center, according to him, broadly referred as ‘a directional and not an

ideological name’ (Torgovnik 2001: 140). Like Dash, the Center Party
also represented four key figures—Roni Milo, a former Likud minister
and ex-Mayor of Tel Aviv; Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, former chief of staff;
Dan Meridor, former Likud finance and justice minister; and Yitzhak
Mordechai, former general and defence minister in Netanyahu’s coalition.
The very formation of the Center Party on the basis of defections from
the parties on the left and the right of the political spectrum tended to
make it susceptible to intra-party contradictions and dissensions. It
became difficult to coalesce these diverse personalities with contradictory
ideological and personal affiliations under one cohesive umbrella for a
longer time as they were guided more by their short-term interests rather
than long-term objectives. Hence, sooner rather than later, the unrealistic
hope of the Center Party for ensuring massive change in Israel’s political
alignment started dissipating, and the party could not retain any seat in
2003 elections.
Am Ehad or One Nation was another centrist party, which was led by
Histadrut’s Chairman Amir Peretz. Describing itself as the workers’ party,
which had been established as a genuine social movement, the party
championed the rightful power of the workers and pensioners and pledged
to place them in the center of the political, economic and social spotlight
in Israel. The party intended to give socio-economic rights, together with
the right to work, to unionize, to strike and to earn, the right to equal
rights and the right to free education and healthcare to all the citizens as
being fundamental to an enlightened and democratic society.
As the name symbolized, Am Ehad aspired to ensure economic and
social equality among all citizens of the State of Israel—Jews and Arabs,
women and men, Sefardi and Ashkenazi, religious and secular, veteran
Israelis and new immigrants. The party won two slots in 1999 elections
and three for the 2003 elections. Despite having a silent campaign, the
party had a committed support that enabled it to marginally enhance its
electoral strength as the centrist force.
The party joined the Likud coalition in 2001 but later resigned over the
budget freezing for minimum wages and squeezing National Insurance
Institute allowances. Hence, it tried to project as a fighting opposition on
behalf of workers, the elderly people and the handicapped. The party did
not join the new coalition of the Sharon in the aftermath of the 2003
elections and brought enormous pressures through strikes and demon-
strations against the government moves of extensive budgetary cuts and
austerity plans. The party, however, disintegrated in 2006.
Yesh Atid
Meaning ‘there is a future’, Yesh Atid emerged as a centrist political party

in 2012. It was founded by a former journalist, Yair Lapid. The party
attempted to cater to the ‘secular middle class’ with a focus on develop-
ment and governance issues like civic amenities, socio-economic reforms
and banning military exemptions to the haredi community. The media
projection of the party by the media and the vision and dynamism of its
leaders added great popularity to the party, resulting into its emergence as
a strong alternative to right-wing Likud in 2013 and 2015 elections.
With 19 seats and 14.1 per cent of votes in the nineteenth Knesset,
Yesh Atid emerged as the decisive political bargainer in the formation of
the government. It joined the Netanyahu-led Likud government in 2013
but left the coalition by the end of 2014 in view of differences over settlers
and settlements. The electorate in the twentieth Knesset elections in 2015
didn’t reward the party as expected, and it bagged 11 seats with 8.8 per
cent of votes, thus being out of the power at the moment.
The changing political ambience in Israel with increasing decisive
influence of the young Israeli voters, initially characterized as the floating
voters and now the Silent Voters, will mark the future strength and
sustenance of the centrist parties, including Yesh Atid.
Ha’Tnuah and Kulanu
The fragmentation of Kadima and infighting within post-Sharon Likud

led to the formation of two other centrist parties, namely, Ha’Tnuah and
Kulanu. Ha’Tnuah as ‘movement’ represents the central liberal force
within the centrist camp of Israeli party system formed by the former
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. The party offered conciliatory gestures to
the issue of Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Kulanu defined as ‘all of us’
was formed by Moshe Kahlon with a focus on economic and cost-of-living

issues to be brought as the agenda issues of governance. With 6 seats and
5.01 per cent of votes in 2013 Knesset, Ha’Tnuah joined with Labor in
2015 as Zioinist Union. Kulanu has emerged as the fifth largest political
party in 2015 elections with 10 seats and 7.5 per cent of votes.
The centrist block does not portray any cohesive political movement in
the Israeli party system. The sudden disappearance of Dash in the 1970s,
Ratz in the 1980s and the Center in the 1990s largely witnesses the
organizational weaknesses, inefficient leadership, direct election of the
prime minister, strong ideological division and the rise of ethnic voting.
While the split voting based on the direct election of the prime minister
facilitated an increase in the representation of the Shas and Yisrael B’Aliya
representing the ethno-religious segments of the society, its discontinua-
tion from 2003 elections saw a significant growth in the centrist position.
The new Israeli electorate appears to show less ideological commit-
ments and more progressive and flexible orientations to the contemporary
political battle in the party politics. It is these new and young voters that
may keep up the hopes of the centrist formation for the time being. The
success of Shinui was largely attributed to this new class of young,
energetic, flexible and fluid voters who do not carry any pre-conceived
ideological underpinnings. However, whether the initial success of Shinui,
Kadima, Yash Atid and other centrist formations continues for the years to
come or will it meet the same fate of the Dash, Ratz, the Center Party,
Shinui and Kadima is yet to be seen.
Indian Socialist Parties as Centrist Political

Forces
Most of the socialist parties in the pre- and post-independence India owe
their origin to the Congress. The first group of socialists that came out of
the Congress and formed the party called Congress Socialist Party (CSP)
in 1934 was led by C. R. Das and Moti Lal Nehru. The CSP was,
however, not a separate party other than the Congress. It was formed to
continue the fervor of the national movement until the suspension of the
Indian Socialist Parties as Centrist Political Forces 195
Non-Cooperation Movement by Mahatma Gandhi in the aftermath of

the Chauri Chaura incident. Interestingly, the policies and programs of
the CSP were the same as those of the Congress.
After independence, the socialists within the Congress were disap-
pointed with the working of Nehruvian Congress. Hence, they left the
Congress and formed the Socialist Party. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia was the
pioneer in the formation of the Socialist Party in India. However, soon
afterward, dissension also started appearing among the socialists within
the Congress. This led to the formation of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
by J. B. Kriplani, Swatantra Party by C. Rajagopalachari, Praja Socialist
Party (PSP) and Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) by leaders like Jaya
Prakash Narain, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia and others.
The history of the socialists thus suffers from the phenomena of
mergers, splits and name change, thus resulting practically in the disap-
pearance of the socialist party per se in Indian politics. However, their
policies, programs and ethos have been significantly undertaken in various
parties of Janata Parivar, Lok Dals and Janata Dals. ‘Divided among
themselves, socialists in India have never recovered from the damage
they got in the process of merger and splits. In this fission and fusion
process they lost some of their credibility in Indian politics’ (Tyagi 1994:
175).
Praja Socialist Party
PSP was the outcome and merger of the Socialist Party and Kisan
Mazdoor Praja Party. Formed in 1952, the party came to be led by
prominent socialist leaders like Jaya Prakash Narain, Dr. Ram Manhohar
Lohia, Acharaya Narendra Deo, Achyut Rao Patwardhan and Acharya
Kriplani.
Despite the merger of the two parties in PSP, the leaders of the party
were holding different opinions with respect to their cooperation with the
Congress. Further, they suffered a severe blow in the aftermath of the
demise of Acharya Narendra Deo on the one hand and the premature exit
of Jaya Prakash Narain who announced his political retirement for
‘Bhoodan Yagna Movement’.
Socialist Party
Founded by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia after his ideologically differences

from the PSP leaders in 1955, the Socialist Party sought to achieve
socialist unity and attempted to ‘consolidate and energize the socialist
movement in India’ (Tyagi 1994: 158). The party finally merged with the
Samyukta Socialist Party from 1967 onward.
Swatantra Party
Swatantra Party was one of the parties that derived its genesis from the
Congress. Most of its founder members like C. Rajagoapalachari,
N.G. Ranga and Minoo Masani were the active Congressmen who had
participated in India’s freedom struggle. Formed in 1959, the party was
propagating the ideals of Govind Mahadev Ranade, Dada Bhai Naroji and
Gopal Krishna Gokhale. It remained a major national opposition party in
India from 1960 to 1970, and was established to fight Nehru’s collectivist
economic policies. It stood for liberal democratic ideals.
The party echoed anti-Congress and anti-Communist ethos. It pro-
fessed liberal ideology. Following the liberal Gandhian philosophy in
socio-economic sphere, the party accepted the objective of socialism
without methods of statism and controls. By professing conservatism,
the party advocated conserving, preserving and sustaining the established
social political institutions.
Though dominated by the aristocratic class and the propertied middle
class, different individuals, parties and groups too joined it. The party
contributed effectively in the parliamentary politics of the country by
vehemently opposing the Congress policies and programs. Its leaders
played a ‘befitting role of a liberal democratic opposition party wedded
to the constitution and the rule of law’ (Rasam 1997: 182).
Despite its good performance in the Parliament, the party failed to
consolidate its electoral gains. It suffered heavily with the death of Rajaji.
The populist electioneering by Mrs. Gandhi on the plank of ‘Garibi
Hatao’ in 1971 took away large chunks of electoral support of the
Swatantra Party. Rasam cites some of the important factors responsible
Indian Socialist Parties as Centrist Political Forces 197
for the decline of the Swatantra Party like the absence of ideological
coherence, lack of support from all sections of the society, missing second
line of leadership and emergence of new forces in Indian politics (espe-
cially the peasant classes).
However, the Swatantra Party actually acted as a precursor to the Janata
Party in 1977. Its subsequent merger with the Bharatiya Lok Dal led by
Charan Singh was a significant step toward the formation of the Janata
Party. The ideology of the Janata Parivar was broadly shaped by the
socialist orientation of the Swatantra Party. In fact, the later splinters of
the Janata Party were directly or indirectly linked to the Swatantra Party.
Samyukta Socialist Party
A progeny of the Congress Socialist Party, which was formed in 1934, the
Samyukta Socialist Party constituted an important radical group within
the Indian National Congress. The emergence of the SSP is associated
with the failure of the Congress in socialist transformation of the society.
Formed by the constituents of the Praja Socialist Party (1952) and
Socialist Party (Lohia Group, 1955), the Samyukta Socialist Party worked
as a separate political party during June 1964–August 1971. The party
came into existence as a result of the special efforts of Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia who thought that a split between the Socialist parties would
ultimately lead to the end of socialism. Hence, Lohia finally succeeded
in convincing the leaders of both the Socialist Party and the PSP to come
together as a united socialist party to contest the impure socialist ideology
of the Congress.
Ideologically, the SSP drew heavily from the Socialist Party founded by
Lohia. Its ideological postulates included socialism, democracy and equal-
ity. By rejecting both capitalism and communism, it charted out a new
integrated ideology that alone could bring new hope and new civilization
to the human race.
The SSP took lead in forming as well as joining non-Congress
Samyukta Vidhayak Dal ministries in many states. However, SSP, along
with other non-Congress parties, could not sustain the tempo of change
that emerged in Indian politics around 1967. The party lost power not
because it ‘tried to achieve maximum in the minimum time, but it tried to

continue sharing power as long as was physically possible, doing only what
was necessary for such continuation’ (quoted Deepak 1969: 35–38).
The death of Lohia halted the growth of the SSP. The party faced
severe succession crisis in the aftermath of Lohia, especially among leaders
like George Fernandes, Madhu Limaye and S. M. Joshi. In the absence of
Lohia, the party leaders could not work according to coordinated strategy.
‘The collective leadership started elbowing each other in order to emerge
at the top. For an outsider it looked like a party of conflicting ideas with
most of its leaders professing their own interpretation of various concepts
to suit their ends. The tendency of its leaders in making public statements
about party’s internal matters proved obnoxious for the party’ (Tyagi
1994: 60–63). The party failed to provide an institutional alternative to
the Congress. Its failure in ‘building up and strengthening its organiza-
tional base was more disastrous to it than its failure at the electoral and at
the governmental level’ (Ibid.: 188).
Final Comments
The parties of the centrist block in both Israel and India have been under
major ideological transformation and political churning. While in Israel,
the parties of the centrist block have failed to register a consistent upward
swing and registered disappearance from the national scene after short
interregnums, the Indian centrist parties have also come to the same
political fate, except the Congress whose long political standing in
national and state politics has come under strenuous standing under the
new leadership. Whether the Congress would go the Israeli centrist
parties’ way or the Israeli Center would follow the Congress path in the
years to come is difficult to be predicted with some certainty at this stage.
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11
The Ethno-Religious Parties
(Ethno-Religious Block)
Parties formed out of religiosity, ethnicity and other sectarian values have
been playing decisive role, both in Israel and India. Their role became all
the more dominating, especially with the onset of globalization from the
1980s. Though the religious parties in Israel had been instrumental in
government formation since independence, Indian regional and caste-
based parties started playing the role of the ‘game changer’ from 1980s
onward.
National Religious Party (NRP): Mafdal

Broadly projected as the political arm of the religious Zionism and a
synthesis between religious and secular worlds, Mafdal or NRP claims that
Israel can remain a Jewish state only if it follows Jewish religious law. The
party has its origins in the Yishuv. Its predecessors, who were very popular
among the religious people, were Mizrahi (Merkas Ruhani) set up in
Eastern Europe in 1902 and Hapoel Hamizrahi (The Mizrahi Worker)
founded in 1922. Despite their common religious affiliation and

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_11
202 11 The Ethno-Religious Parties (Ethno-Religious Block)
observance, both Mizrahi and Hapoel Hamizrahi contested the elections

separately for the Elected Assembly of the Palestine Jewish Community.
They had a significant representation in the Histadrut as well as the World
Zionist Congress.
With the onset of the independence in 1948, Mizrahi and Hapoel
Hamizrahi fought the first Knesset election with the two Aguda parties—
Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat Yisrael under the banner of United
Religious Front. While the Mizrahi parties won ten Knesset seats, the
Agudat parties bagged six seats in the Knesset. The two religious groups
together emerged as the third largest party by winning 16 seats in the
Knesset.
The electoral strength of Mizrahi and Hapoel Hamizrahi remained the
same, that is, ten in the second Knesset election in 1951 despite their
forming National Religious Front. However, the 1951 elections witnessed
the growing importance of Hapoel Hamizrahi vis-à-vis Mizrahi. To give a
strong representation with a decisive voice in the government, both the
Mizrahi parties decided to merge in Mafdal (Miflaga Datit Leumit) or NRP
in 1954. However, Stephen Oren believed that officially Mafdal was a
federation of Mizrahi and Hapoel Hamizrahi, but in practice it ‘gradually
emerged into a single rebirth of Hapoel Hamizrahi’ (Oren 1973: 45).
The main problem faced by the religious parties in the beginning was
how to operationalize the Torah State in the newly independent political
set up. The significant strength of the religious parties in general, and the
united Mafdal in particular, led them to join the Mapai-led coalition
government. However, the position of Mafdal was not strong. As Stephen
Oren argued, ‘just as religious presence in the cabinet limited Mapai’s
need to compromise in economic and security matters, so the presence of
other coalition partners (e.g., Mapam or Progressive Party) limited
Mapai’s need to compromise in religious matters’ (Ibid., 40).
Yael Yishai (1980) characterized three salient features of Mafdal. First,
it was the coalition party being a member of almost all the coalitions with
some exceptions. Second, the party had highly articulate branches and
precise regulations for the selection of its office bearers. Third, it was more
fractionalized than any other Israeli party.
Mafdal continued to maintain its electoral presence in all the Knesset
by never winning less than ten seats until the early 1980s. It was because
National Religious Party (NRP): Mafdal 203
of its consistent electoral strength and its increasing predominance among

the religious sectors that the party continued to be inducted into the
coalitional government. The party was accorded the key ministries as per
its own choice, especially the Religious Affairs and Social Welfare. The
state patronage largely enabled the party to project its distinct identity in
addition to ensure its commitment to the Jewish cause in religious terms.
However, Mapai under Ben-Gurion tactfully handled Mafdal’s
joining the coalition government. In order to contain the continuous
pressures from Mafdal and other religious parties, Mapai sought to field
its own candidates with religious background and orthodox leanings.
Nevertheless, Mafdal was able to extract maximum concessions during
Mapaivot for its followers and the religious masses.
Right from its inception, Mafdal had remained a party of factions. The
key factions that directed the policy guidelines and political perspectives
were Shapiro faction (center block), La-Mifneh, Tsirim (Youth faction),
Right faction and Sefardim. The Center and the La-Mifneh remained the
most powerful factions within the party, which largely dominated the
coalitional negotiations and other political concessions on behalf of
Mafdal. ‘Although these factions were usually described as “factions of
expediency” without ideological bases, their platforms did manifest
diverging attitudes on fundamental issues’ (Yishai 1980: 59).
Mafdal witnessed a significant change during the Six-Day War in 1967.
The occupation of the territories by Israel in West Bank and Gaza
galvanized the party activists by rejuvenating the demand for a Greater
Israel. The post-Six-Day War period activated the hitherto dormant
factions within the party. The 1960s also saw the emergence of youth
faction called Tsirim within Mafdal. It was this faction that advocated
annexationist posture toward the incorporated holy lands and wanted ‘to
transform Mafdal from a pressure group into a political party’ (Oren
1973: 46).
The post-1967 period witnessed the emergence of one of the most
prominent and religious nationalist groups outside the Knesset—Gush
Emunim (Block of Faithful). This extreme nationalist group became an
indispensable part of the NRP before the 1973 elections. The main
objective of this extra parliamentary group was to promote the settlement
of Jews throughout the entire area of the West Bank and Gaza. Charles
Liebman and Don-Yehiya described Gush Emunim as the ‘militant

messianic settlement movement’.
A real shift of power in NRP took place in 1977 when its leader Yitzhak
Raphael, who had dominated the party for two decades, was ousted by the
party’s executive committee. The four key factions constituted a ‘Block of
Four’.1 It was this block that started dominating Mafdal after 1977 by
considerably turning the party into the lines of the nationalists’ rightist
block. Yael Yishai described the change of the 1970s as the ‘quiet revolu-
tion’ within Mafdal. The quiet revolution, according to her, got
manifested mainly on the leadership level. It also changed ‘the NRP’s
image from a pragmatic party to one acting according to principles’
(Yishai 1980: 57). Yishai, however, stated that the coexistence of different
factions and the change of leadership in 1977 failed to bring any split
within the NRP.
The decade of the 1980s witnessed splits and counter-splits within
NRP. The party received the first major setback when some of its leaders
left to join and form Tehiya, Tami and Meizad, all of which took more
hawkish stands on the issue of territory and foreign policy. During this
period, the ethnic division between Ashkenazim and Sephardim within
the party increased.
Another blow was hurled on the party in 1988 when one more faction
left it to form Meimad. Meimad sought to ‘synthesize the orthodox life
styles with Zionist principles. It opposed the view that territorial expansion
was the only legitimate way to demonstrate their orthodoxy’ (Heilman
1990: 174). These splits nevertheless weakened the party considerably
when its intact vote bank began to be captured by the new ethnic parties
like Shas and Tami.
During the early decades the NRP drew its support ‘from all socio-
economic classes, ethnic groups, and educational backgrounds. The party
had affiliated kibbutzim and Moshavim, yeshivot, and a broad based youth
movement, Bnai Akiva, which drew its members from the state religious
school system’ (Bick 1995: 82). The party also worked to preserve and
expand the Jewish character of the state in all aspects of national life.
Hence, during the early 1980s, NRP, according to Etta Bick, actually
acted ‘as the bridge between the secular society and the religious commu-
nity. It participated in all governments headed by Labor until 1992 and in
all governments headed by the Likud. Because of its strong commitment

and support of Zionism, army and national service, and respect for state
institutions, the NRP was the preferred partner of the Labor rather than
the ultra-orthodox Agudat Yisrael’ (Bick 2001: 78–79).
The NRP found itself in a rather precarious position in the 1990s. The
Labor’s success under Rabin in 1992 kept the NRP out of the government
formation. However, with a short interregnum, NRP enhanced its elec-
toral tally in 1996 by winning nine seats. The 1996 was also the first
prime ministerial contest. Hence, instead of making its own contestant for
the post, NRP decided to enhance its bargaining leverage by supporting
Netanyahu’s candidature. And with the assured victory of Netanyahu
during the elections against its Labor rival Shimon Peres the NRP was
credited with its entry into the coalition government.
The 1999 elections, however, witnessed a decline in the party’s elec-
toral strength. Most of its Sephardi support, especially from the develop-
ment towns and urban neighborhood, was taken away by the Shas. Etta
Bick argued that the NRP lost much of its support from the Sephardi
voters because it failed to show any significant accomplishments in the
fields of religious education or community work. Shas was more able to
cash on the issues of education and employment than NRP.
The party, according to Bick, faced a serious crisis of ideology and
direction in 1999. After the death of its veteran leader Zevulun Hammer
in 1998, the party leadership was handed over to the hardliner Rabbi
Yitzhak Levi who failed to coalesce together all the factions. The party was
divided on the issue of supporting the Wye Agreement signed by the
Netanyahu-led government regarding the return of the territories to the
Palestinians. The internal division within the party resulted in its leaders
Porat and Hendel leaving the party and joining the Tkuma faction of the
National Union.
NRP faced another dilemma during the year 1999 with regard to the
‘several controversial decisions of the High Court on the seating of
Reform and Conservative Jews on religious Councils, the drafting of
Yeshiva students, and the recognition of conversions performed by
non-orthodox rabbis’ (Bick 2001: 86). While the Shas and UTJ galva-
nized the religious voters in their attempt to organize massive demonstra-
tions against the judicial decisions and intervention, the NRP’s silence
and dilemma on the issues further isolated the party from its own
supporters and marginalized it further.
With the premature falling of the Netanyahu government, the NRP
was blamed vigorously by its voters and supporters. Hence, when the
party went for the 1999 elections, its support got reduced to six. The party
learned great lessons during its failures inside and outside the government.
Hence, it brought about substantial organizational and ideological
changes in its electoral contest for the 2003 elections.
NRP contested the Knesset elections for the year 2003 under the new
leadership of Effi Eitam, a person who was entirely religious and nation-
alist. Despite the ideological and leadership changes, the party’s political
line remained hawkish. However, ‘the nuances have changed, as has the
party’s agenda, which has become conspicuously oriented toward social
affairs’ (Shragai 2003). The party marginally enhanced its representation
in the subsequent Knesset elections, yet its decisive location in the left-
right spectrum of the polity and its moderate preaching on religious issues
and Zionism made it indispensable to the new coalition led by Sharon
under Likud.
The year 2009 brought about significant change in NRP. The party
was re-named as Habayit Hayehudi or Jewish Home. However, the new
incarnation led its merged units leaving the party on various grounds. This
resulted into party’s ignominious defeat in 2009 elections. The leadership
of the party, however, came in the hands of its dynamic leader Neftali
Bennett whose electoral strategies and mass appeals galvanized the voters
across religious–secular domains. The party got rewarded in the 2013
results and became a crucial player of coalition formation. However, its
seats and vote share decimated in 2015 Knesset elections (see Figs. 11.1,
11.2, 11.3 and Table 5.1).
Ideologically speaking, NRP has been a religious Zionist party because
of its working with the Zionist organization in the pre-state period and its
subsequent association in the coalitional governments led by Labor and
the Likud right from the inception of the state. The party ideology has
broadly upheld the principle of religious nationalism. Unlike the ultra-
orthodox parties like Agudas and Shas, NRP had upheld the doctrine of
the Jewish-Zionist state as the first step toward redemption.
14
12 12 12 12 12
12
11
10
10
9 9
Knesset Seats
8
8
6 6 6
6
5 5
4
4
3
8
2
0
59
61
65
69
73
77
81
84
88
92
96
99
03
06
09
13
15
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Knesset Elections
Fig. 11.1 NRP’s seats in the Knesset, 1959–2015
The party believed in the unity of all the Jews irrespective of their
religious, ethnic, ideological and generational divisions. It sought to bring
together the religious and secular, Sephardim and Askenazim, left and
right, old-times and new immigrants. In this way the party professed to
work toward national unity without hatred and without coercion, ‘gently,
pleasantly, and with a smile’.
The ideological postulates of NRP sought to blend theology and
hardline nationalism. Its joining of the coalitional government with the
centrist Shinui and the moderated Likud would witness considerable
conciliation in its hard core ideological agenda like the Palestinian state-
hood, conversion process through Halacha, public transportation on
12
9.9
10 9.8
9.7
9.2
9.1
8.9
8.3
7.9
8
7.1
Voting Percentage
6.7
6
5.0
4.9
4.2
4.2
3.9
4
3.5
2.8
2
0
59
61
65
69
73
77
81
84
88
92
96
99
03
06
09
13
15
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Knesset Elections
Fig. 11.2 NRP’s voting percentage in the Knesset, 1959–2015
Shabbath and other exclusively religious issues in the due course of

coalitional governance.
Organizationally NRP holds a peculiar position in the Israeli party
system as its organizational structures are largely guided by democratic
principles. Asher Arian described the NRP as a mass party organization
having different functional units and entities, with each performing
different roles in religion, education, settlement and training. According
to Yael Yishai, the NRP has highly articulate branches and precise regu-
lations for the selection, power and tenure of members of various party
Seats
10
1959 1961 1965 19691973 1977 19811984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 20092013 2015
Knesset Years
Fig. 11.3 NRP’s performance in the Knesset, 1959–2015
organs. Like the Labor and the Likud, the NRP has also introduced the
system of primaries.
Unlike the haredi parties, which are guided by the Council of the Torah
Sages, the NRP is not bound by the dictates of the rabbinate. Though the
party seeks the religious assistance of the rabbinate in the electoral
campaigns and is broadly guided by it in the religious issues, it is free
from any political influence of the rabbinate.
The NRP is placed between the hard core haredi orthodoxy led by Shas
and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) on the one hand and the progressive
secularity championed by the centrist political parties like Shinui, Kadima,

Yesh Atid and others on the other. The party faces a real challenge of acting
as the genuine bridge between the two religious and the secular worlds. The
electoral strength of the NRP has remained constant despite the increasing
number of the religious population touching 1 million.
NRP used to capitalize on the issue of discrimination of its religious
members during the Mapaivot and the Histadrut predominance. The new
religious voters of today have shifted their political support to the main-
stream parties as they do not consider themselves as the oppressed minor-
ity that seeks special protection from their religious party. The party is
now required to further widen its ideological umbrella to accommodate
the non-religious population, particularly the new immigrants, and to
further soften its stands on the religious issues backed by pragmatism than
orthodoxy.
Shas
Referred in Hebrew as Shomrei Torah Sephardim or Sephardi Torah
Guardians, Shas is one of the leading ethno-religious parties in the Israeli
party system, which emerged after breaking off from the Agudat Yisrael in
1984. Along with the United Torah Judaism, Shas represents the ‘contra-
acculturist’ camp (Heilman 1990) in view of its rejection of modernism to
the Jewish identity. The two parties, according to Samuel Heilman, can
be called A-Zionists because they neither support the state nor oppose
it. Their focus is on the Biblical Land of Israel, and they believe that only
through the party the holy vision of the state can be achieved.
Aaron P Willis described Shas a religious movement rather than a
political party. ‘Largely appealing to sentiments of “ethnic pride” and
religious tradition among Israel’s Sephardic communities, Shas has
portrayed itself as a “people’s movement” with a mandate for social and
spiritual renewal’ (Willis 1995: 122).
According to Yoav Peled, Shas is the Mizrahi religious political party as
well as a haredi or ultra-orthodox religious Jewish organization. Shas,
according to him, ‘seeks to replace secular Zionism with religious Judaism
as the hegemonic ideology in Israeli society’ (Peled 1998).
Shas 211
Gideon Doron and Rebecca Kook stated that since its inception in
1984 as an Ashkenazi-controlled haredi party, ‘Shas very clearly identified
its target population as traditional Jews of Sephardi background. Gradu-
ally, however, it became independent of the Ashkenazi dictates and has
clearly developed into more than an additional breakaway ultra-orthodox
party: it has become a revitalization movement’ (Doron and Kook 1999:
79).
Shas differed from the Aguda parties in the sense that most of the
Aguda voters are haredim,2 whereas most of the Shas voters are
non-haredim. ‘The haredic identity of the Shas is like water which fluctu-
ates whereas for the Aguda3 parties it is like stone that remains constant’
(Leon 2003). Shas is less extreme and less orthodox. It owes its origin to
the Teshuvah4 movement of the 1970s, which enabled the party to extend
its political reach among its voters. The party represents the Sehpardi
haredi community from the Middle East and North Africa, which got
immigrated to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s.
Shas was led by Rabbi Eliezer Shach in the beginning. However, the
political leadership of the party was later shifted to Aryeh Deri, but its
actual spiritual leadership lay in the hands of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef. The
origin of the party can broadly be attributed to its retaliation to the
Ashkenazi dominance within the Aguda parties in general, and the state
establishment in particular. Shas in this way attempted to give a particular
place of respect and reverence to the Sephardi Jews in the Ashkenazi-
dominated society, economy and polity.
During the formative years of Israeli statehood, the Sephardi Jews could
not establish their own political or religious movements or institutions.
Most of them were absorbed into the established Ashkenazic bodies. They
were usually educated in the State Religious School System. The main
religious political movements, the Agudat Yisrael and the NRP, had few
Sephardim among their leadership. However, by the mid-1970s, the
ethnic divisions between Ashkenazim and Sephardim attained a major
social issue resulting in the creation of the Sephardic parallels to the
mainstream religious parties. The increasing Russian immigrants in the
1990s made the ‘Ashkenazim-Sephardim division as political reality of
Israel and has emerged as a major theme in Israeli politics’ (Arian and
Shamir 1995: 28).
The spectacular rise of the Shas could be attributed to the increasing

ethnic division and its growing consciousness in the Israeli politics. Shas
was able to portray vigorously the increasing discrimination of the
Sephardi Jews in the economy and polity of the state. Though essentially
described as a party of the Moroccan Jews with its spiritual and political
leadership broadly occupied by the Moroccans, the party started gaining
support from other Sephardi groups of Yemen, Tunisia, Ethiopia and
Bukhara.
After its split from Agudat Yisrael, Shas contested the first Knesset
elections in 1984 and won four seats and 3.1 per cent of votes. Its first
victory galvanized its voters and activists by challenging the religious
hegemony of the two haredi Aguda parties as well as the religious NRP.
From 1984, Shas’ representation had considerably undermined the elec-
toral strength of the Agudas and the NRP. As a result, it emerged as the
sole dominant political force in the ethno-religious block with its own
inclination toward joining the coalitional government.
Ideologically Shas appeared to be closer to the right block led by Likud
than to the Labor-dominated socialist camp. Peled argues that the Shas
voters have broadly drawn from the ‘religiously traditional, poor and
working class Mizrakhim’ (Peled 1998). Shas in his analysis is not haredi
because it has consistently and continuously (with some exceptions)
participated in all the government formations. Moreover, the party is
called non-Zionist because it considered its own conception of Zionism
as the only true manifestation of Zionism.
Peled, however, believed that the ‘Mizrahim support for the Shas had
much to do with the socio-economic peripheralisation rather than cultural
maladjustment by the Labour Zionist ideology’ (Ibid.). ‘Shas’, according
to him, ‘drew its support more from the Development Towns (small
urban settlements located in outlying regions of the country and
established in mid-fifties and early sixties) and from the socio-
demographically similar poor city neighbourhoods’ (Ibid.).
However, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War (1973), ethnicity
and religiosity started gaining momentum in the Israeli politics. It was the
Likud that first succeeded in mobilizing the majority of the Sephardi votes
since 1973 until the mid-1980s. Notwithstanding the electoral promises,
the national unity government of the Labor and Likud failed to satisfy the
Shas 213
Sephardi Jews. With its focus on ensuring equal representation and

political elevation, the Sephardi votes started shifting from the Likud to
the Shas from the mid-1980s onward.
Shas continued to enhance its electoral tally in the Knesset from 6 seats
in 1988 and 1992 to 10 seats in 1996 and 17 seats in 1999 elections.
During the late 1980s, the party did face competition from the other two
haredi parties in addition to the Agudat parties, namely, Redemption of
Israel Party and the Torah and Land Party. However, both the Redemp-
tion of Israel Party and the Torah and Land Party were only marginally
successful in their efforts to attract Shas supporters and failed to pass the
necessary threshold to gain a seat in the Knesset.
The most formidable challenge to Shas in the early 1990s, however,
came from Rav Peretz and the United Torah list. While Peretz attempted
to create the image of a break within the Sephardic community from
which his new movement Degel Hatorah could emerge, ‘Shas continued
to stress a “Sephardic unity” message, not attacking Peretz openly’ (Willis
1995: 130).
Gideon Doron and Rebecca Kook (1999) commented that the reason
for the success of the Shas was its dual strategy providing essential social
services to its supporters in key constituencies and unique electoral
campaigns. The party participated with Rabin’s government in 1992
despite its right leanings on the question of peace process. During the
1996 simultaneous elections for the prime minister and the Knesset, it
entered into a tacit understanding with Netanyahu’s Likud and bargained
effective political leverages in return for its support to him. The second
factor for the electoral success of Shas, according to Doron and Kook, was
the party’s key campaigns during the elections. All the electoral campaigns
undertaken by the party in the 1990s sought to strengthen the ‘spiritual
bond between the voters and their leaders’ (Ibid., 75).
Hence, throughout the 1990s, Shas held important government min-
istries like the Interior, Labor and Social Welfare, Health and Religious
Affairs and the like. On the basis of holding the powerful ministries under
its domain, Shas functionaries were able to pass the financial package to its
key supporters in the religious constituencies. ‘The funding allowed Shas
to expand its institutions and community work on the local level and
provided many patronage jobs for party activists’ (Bick 2001: 75).
One of the important points of the Shas mobilization is their education

system called El Ha’maayan El Hamaayan (Maayan Hachinuch Hatorani),
which is both formal and informal.5 The Shas-supported Torah schools’
attempt to bring the Sephardic Jews closer to the religious customs and
traditions of their forbearers. In addition to a very comprehensive and
cohesive educational system, Shas also had its own radio station through
which it keeps on consolidating its support throughout the year. It is the
only party having its independent radio station, which transmits the
preaching and blessings of the party’s spiritual leader continuously. More-
over, the party also has its newspaper named Yom LeYom and the weekend
newspapers called Shabatonim.
By the time the party set for the Knesset elections for 2003, significant
changes had already commenced in the political system. The split system
was annulled, leading to the old system of the Knesset elections. As a
result, the party’s chances of electoral maneuverings or ‘trade votes’ in
which it went on trading votes in return of the electoral support for the
prime ministerial candidate received a setback. Shinui’s fiery electoral
appeals advocating a de-linking of religion and state, secularism and a
moderate Jewish conversion got a good reception among the new voters,
especially the Russian immigrants and the Anglos. Moreover, the intra-
party fight between the Deri supporters and the new party chief, Eli
Yishai, reached an alarming proportion despite the intervention of the
party spiritual leader Ovadia Yosef.
Hence, when the party faced the electorate during the 2003 elections,
its electoral strength in the Knesset reduced considerably from 17 seats in
1999 to 11 seats. The reason for the party defeat could be located more
internally than externally. The voters who had gone from the Likud to
Shas in the preceding elections went back to the Likud in the current
elections. End of the split voting and the restoration of the erstwhile
voting pattern were other reasons for the defeat of the Shas.
In view of its social and welfare services and a strong educational
system, the electoral base of Shas has remained broadly intact. From
2003 to 2013, the party’s seats and votes in the Knesset continued to be
consistent. It replaced NRP by joining the coalitions led by Sharon in
2001 and Netanyahu in 2009. The differences within Shas, which had
started becoming imminent since the beginning of the twenty-first
Shas 215
17
12
11 11 11
Knesset Seats
10
7
6 6
1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015
Knesset Elections
Fig. 11.4 Shas’ seats in the Knesset, 1984–2015
century, transformed into a virtual split in 2015 Knesset elections with its
founder chairman, Eli Yishai, forming a new list called Yachad after
breaking off from Aryeh Deri. The split within Shas impacted its electoral
results in the twentieth Knesset in 2015 when its seats and vote decimated
substantially (see Figs. 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6 and Table 5.1).
The new alignment of coalitional forces post-2013 appeared to have
been a serious setback to its own legitimacy besides cutting off its financial
baskets to its educational and other institutions. In addition to the split
within Shas, the party also faces great challenges from new centrist and
13.0
12
9.5
Voting Percentage
8.5 8.7
8.2 8.4
8
5.7
4.7 4.
4.9
4
3.1
0
1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015
Knesset Elections
Fig. 11.5 Shas’ voting percentage in the Knesset, 1984–2015
rightist organizations like Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi, which have
opposed special concessions given to the haredi sector, particularly the
continuous state subsidy and military exemption to the ultra-orthodox
Jews, which continued to be the social base of Shas.
The party leadership now faces serious challenge of its political isolation
and factional consolidation to remain as a viable alternative to Habayit
Hayehudi within the ethno-religious block on the one hand and the Yesh
Atid and other left-right blocks on the other.
The Sister Parties: The Agudas on the Ethno-Religious Block 217
20
Seats
Voting Percentage
18
16
14
12
10
1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015
Knesset Years
Fig. 11.6 Shas’ performance in the Knesset, 1984–2015
The Sister Parties: The Agudas on the

Ethno-Religious Block
Among other parties of the ethno-religious block, the Aguda parties held a
consistent electoral strength and an overwhelming political presence
throughout the Yishuv and the new State of Israel. The Aguda parties
were the first to be classified as the haredi or ultra-orthodox parties because
of their firm opposition to the Zionist movement led by the socialist labor
parties, both before and after the creation of the state.
Agudat Yisrael or the Agudat Yisrael (meaning Union of Israel) was the
first haredi party to be formed in 1912 by the orthodox Jews who detested
any cooperation with the secularist majority in the World Zionist Con-
gress because of their refusal to acknowledge the authority of the Torah.
Under Yishuv, the new immigrants organized their own trade unions with
separate kibbutzim and Moshavim, thus forming Po’alei Agudat Yisrael in
1922. Right from its inception, the Po’alei Agudat Yisrael undertook the
same kind of activities as the Zionist organizations and worked in coop-
eration with them in order to ensure maximum benefits to its own
members.
Since their formation in the Yishuv, the two Aguda parties—Agudat
Yisrael and Po’alei Agudat Yisrael—have been holding almost similar
views in retaining the sanctity of Judaism in culture and government.
The difference between them could be visible more in terms of strategies
than ideologies, as both accepted the authority of the Council of the
Torah Sages on all issues of human governance. Based on the similarity in
terms of their ideological roots, electoral contestations, political steward-
ship and social prophecy, the two Agudas could well be characterized as
the sister parties under the ethno-religious block.
Notwithstanding the differences between the two, the Aguda parties
sought to join hands with the other two Mizrahi parties in their support
for the proclamation of the independence of the state in 1948. The unity
among the religious parties continued when they decided to contest the
first Knesset election in 1949 and jointly won 16 seats and 12.2 per cent
of votes, with the two Agudas equally managing three seats each.
Israeli political history had never witnessed the comprehensive unity
among the Mizrahi and the Aguda parties after 1949, and the two Aguda
parties did join hands temporarily during 1955 and 1959 under the
Religious Torah Front and in 1973 under the United Torah Front.
However, despite the short interregnum of the Aguda unity, the Agudat
Yisrael and the Po’alei Agudat Yisrael contested the Knesset elections on
their separate list throughout the 1960s.
The electoral results for both the Agudas had never been very convinc-
ing and exhilarating. While individually both the parties had never won
more than four seats in the Knesset, collectively too their electoral strength
had never gone beyond six seats, to date. The difference between the two
became more acute, especially on their inclination for joining the

coalitional government. While the Agudat Yisrael joined the government
without accepting the ministries, the Po’alei Agudat Yisrael readily
accepted the political offers of joining the ministries throughout the first
three decades in the post-independence era.
The Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973 brought
about reconciliation among the parties of the ethno-religious block. The
two Agudas fought the 1973 elections jointly again after a break for almost
14 years. The combined contest under the banner of United Torah Front,
however, only reduced their overall electoral strength to five from six
in 1969.
The decade of the 1970s and 1980s appeared to be gloomy for the
Po’alei Agudat Yisrael than to the Agudat Yisrael. With the formation of
the first Likud government under Menachem Begin, the Agudat Yisrael
accepted the membership of the powerful Knesset committees in its
support for the government without taking the ministerial berths. The
early 1980s witnessed the emergence of Tami and Shas, the two ethnic
parties that succeeded in weaning away a major chunk of the electoral
support of the Aguda parties on the one hand and the NRP on the other.
Tami was a splitting group from the NRP, which was founded by
Aharon Abu-Hatzeira who felt that the NRP did not give him the needed
support during his trial. ‘He also claimed that the Ashkenazi NRP leaders
were unwilling to grant Sephardi Jews a reasonable representation on the
party’s list of candidates’ (Diskin 1991: 36). Tami gained three seats in
1981, but its political fortunes started dwindling afterward. The party
barely managed one seat in 1984 elections. It contested the 1988 elections
under a new incarnation—Meimad—but failed to retain even a single
seat, leading to its disappearance. Later in 2003 and 2006, it joined hands
with the left block led by Labor.
The decade of the 1980s challenged the cohesiveness of the two Agudas
by showing inherent factionalism resulting in the birth of the Shas in
1984. To contain the popularity of Shas and its spiritual head Rabbi Yosef
Ovadia, the Po’alei Agudat Yisrael set up a joint list for the 1984 elections
under the name of the Morasha Agudat Yisrael with an NRP breakaway
group (Meizad) led by Rabbi Haim Druckman and Hanan Porat
(a former Tehiya Knesset member). The new list won two seats in 1984.
Ethnicity gained significant ascendancy during the 1988 elections.

Asher Arian and Michal Shamir argued that ‘ethnic tensions and personal
rivalries were two features of the ultra-orthodox parties in 1988’ (Arian
and Shamir 1990: 6). During the elections, the two Agudas prepared a
common list with another ultra-orthodox group called Chabad led by
Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbe. The combined list
won five seats. The list, however, received yet another challenge from a
new list set up by Rabbi Eliezer Schach called Degel Hatorah (Flag of the
Torah) in addition from Shas.
The 1990s reflected the growing realization on the part of the Agudas to
bury their political hatchet to contest the future Knesset elections on the
new electoral reforms based on increasing electoral threshold of 1.5 per cent
on the one hand and the prime ministerial contest on the other. Hence, the
political understanding between the two Agudas led them to form a
common front called Yahadut Hatorah, which contested all the elections
from 1992 onward on its common agenda. The Degel Hatorah of Rabbi
Eliezer Schach also merged with the Yahadut Hatorah, which came to be
called the United Torah Judaism. The United Torah Judaism took collec-
tive approach on the issue of election of the prime minister, and in all the
three separate elections it supported the Likud-run candidates.
Through its electoral campaigns and slogans the party attempted to
counter the Shinui ideology of de-linking state from religion on the one
hand and ensure its own committed vote by its focus on religious
orthodoxy on the other. The party has vehemently rejected the secular
character of the state and has always sought to make the Torah as the
ideological foundation of the Jewish life in Israel.
Electoral performance of UTJ in the Knesset since 1992 has remained
more or less uniform. The consistent single-digit seats and votes the party
has been winning for the past two decades showed the intact social base
and electoral support (see Fig. 11.7 and Table 5.1).
The parties in the ethno-religious block have tended to be a part of the
coalitional government right from the birth of the state. As a result, they
have been considerably successful in ensuring enormous benefits for their
members in their respective constituencies. The continued participation
of the parties of the block and their holding of the powerful ministries like
the labor, interior, social welfare, religious affairs, housing and
6
Seats
1
Voting Percentage
0
1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973 19771981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 20092013 2015
Knesset Years
Fig. 11.7 Po’alei Agudat Yisrael in the Knesset, 1951–2015
construction and the like have immensely enabled them to ensure a

consistent supply of social services and associated amenities to their
members. On the basis of the state patronage, the parties of the block
have been able to manage their own educational institutions, newspapers,
radio stations and other affiliated organizations and councils.
The assured support of the ethno-religious voters made the ethno-
religious parties as the third largest group in most of the government
coalitions. The largest winner in almost all the Knesset elections,
according to Asher Arian, enabled these parties to serve as the coalition
partner to the biggest winner. ‘It is better to pay the smaller price
demanded by the third biggest winner than to pay the higher price that
the second biggest winner could demand’ (Arian 1985: 86).
However, the political isolation of the two haredi parties from the
government formation since 2003 owing to the representation of the
religious NRP and Shas appeared to have created political fissures within
the block itself. The haredi parties came out in their strong condemnation
of the NRP’s betrayal in view of the latter succumbing to the secular
pressures in governance. The intra-block division might go in dividing the
religious constituencies by turning the religious Jews toward modern
secular state. The ethno-religious block in general, and the haredi parties
in particular, should need further modernization and pragmatism in their
approach to religion and other common issues of governance.
Caste- and Community-Based Parties in India

Bahujan Samaj Party
Inspired by the philosophy of B R Ambedkar, Jyotiba Phule, Narayan

Guru, Periyar E V Ramaswamy and Chhatrapati Shahuji Maharaj, the
Bahujan Samaj Party was founded by Kanshi Ram in 1984 to give
political voice to the poor and socially backward castes in India that
came to be characterized as ‘Dalits’. Its preceding organizations could be
seen in the Backward and Minority Community Employees Federation
(BAMCEF) in 1973 and the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangarsh Samiti (DS-4)
set up in 1984 by Kanshi Ram. DS-4 was the agitational wing of
BAMCEF. The two finally converged into Bahujan Samaj Party in
1984. The party has broadly remained a North Indian party dominant
in Uttar Pradesh initially, though its area of influence started spreading
over to Punjab, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Andhra
Pradesh.
Spearheading its electoral politics on the plan of Dalits, the party
continued to witness a significant rise in Lok Sabha from 1989 to 2009
and was able to be a part of the state government in Uttar Pradesh, with
support from Samajwadi Party and BJP in 1995 initially and later on in
Caste- and Community-Based Parties in India 223
21
20
19
15
14
Lok Sabha Seats
11
10
5
5
3
2
0
0
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Elections
Fig. 11.8 BSP’ seats in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014
2007 on its own. The party’s electoral strength in Lok Sabha elections
continued to rise significantly, and it also became a supporting constituent
of the national coalition. However, the party had a dismal performance in
2014 Lok Sabha when it failed to open its account (see Figs. 11.8, 11.9
and 11.10).
BSP was influenced by two schools of thought—Bhakti saints and
Jyotiba Phule on the one hand and Ambedkar on the other. BAMCEF
was initially a socio-cultural forum.
The British used the word ‘Depressed Classes’, but the term ‘Scheduled
Caste’ became legalized in 1930. Gandhi used the word ‘Harijan’. The
6.1
6
5.3
5
4.6
Voting Percentage
4.02 4.1 4.1

4
2.07
2
1.6
0
1989 1991 1996 19981999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Elections
Fig. 11.9 BSP’ voting percentage in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014
term Dalit was first used by Ambedkar, but it was the BSP which first used
it as an instrument of political mobilization. BSP is a product of Dalit
identity and not vice versa. Dalit identity is fragmented both class wise
and caste wise. Hence, BSP is moving from a clientele party to an
autonomous agency. The party is passing through a phase of dilemma.
If it becomes a national party, it will lose its Dalit identity. In contrast, if
the party tries to remain sectarian, then it cannot go beyond a certain
point.
Seats
21
Voting Percentage
18
15
12
1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Lok Sabha Years
Fig. 11.10 BSP’ performance in Lok Sabha, 1989–2014
Mayawati seems to have succeeded in overcoming this dilemma for the

present. However, to what extent she continues to move ahead with her
new social engineering is difficult to predict at this stage.
BSP marks a shift from Bahujan Samaj to Sarva Samaj. Zoya Hasan
(2002) argues that though the BSP has re-built the Congress-style rain-
bow coalition and has clearly succeeded in garnering the support of
non-Dalit voters, its victory does not signal a fundamental break from
the politics of identity. Dalits still constitute 70 per cent of BSP’s vote
share. The cabinet composition of the government shows that 50 per cent
of the seats are reserved for the Dalits, whereas the other 50 per cent are
distributed among the OBCs6 and the upper castes including Muslims.
BSP, according to Sudha Pai (2003), occupies a central role in the
changed political system. The party has carried forward the democratic
revolution for the Dalits and other lower castes. The introduction of some
radical aspects in its ideology by the party distinguished it from its
erstwhile predecessor, the Republican Party of India. Sudha Pai states
that the party has created a new identity and a counter-ideology to the
varna system of ‘Dalit’ and ‘Ambedkarism’, respectively, which has
succeeded in ‘removing the hold of Bramanical ideology and the submis-
sive attitude of the Dalits, providing them with a new confidence and self-
respect’ (Pai 2003: 9). While on the one hand this has challenged the
upper-caste exploitation and domination in the social field, it has also
broken the vertical patron–client relationship with the upper castes. Caste
thus comes to play a new role under BSP. ‘From an instrument of
oppression in the hands of the upper castes, it has become a tool for
political mobilisation, creating solidarity among the oppressed’ (Ibid.,
10).
Kanchan Chandra (2004) in her book Why Ethnic Parties Succeed
advocated competitive rules and the size of the ethnic group as the twin
factors leading to the success or failure of ethnic parties. Her study
focuses on patronage and ethnic head counts in the evolution and
growth of BSP.
The dismal performance of BSP in both 2014 Lok Sabha elections and
the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections presented the party to trans-
form from ascriptive to accommodating identity.
Samajwadi Party
Samajwadi Party was formed by Mulayam Singh Yadav in November

1992 after his differences with the Samajwadi Janata Party led by Chandra
Shekher. The Samajwadi Party declared its commitment to the socialist
ideology of Gandhi and Lohia. The party pledged to ‘create a socialist
society and to work for secular, democratic goals’ (Shafiuzzaman
2003: 59). The party championed the cause of the backward classes in
the state.
His confrontation with the BJP on the one hand, and the Congress
on the other, made him acceptable to the minorities and the backward
classes in the state. He also succeeded in weaning the Muslims away
from the Congress fold, and he came to be described as ‘Maulana
Mulayam’.
The formation of the Samajwadi Party in its initial years actually
transformed it into the ruling power in the state. The party became a
part of the United Front Government led by Deve Gowda and I. K.
Gujral during 1996–98 where the party supremo held the post of defence
minister. The party tried to extend its political tentacles in Maharashtra. It
did succeed in the city municipal elections in the state. However, its base
is broadly confined in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where it has been seen as
‘a party of the Yadavs and Muslims’ (Palshikar 2003: 322). The party’s
hold on the Muslims and the backwards was challenged both by the BJP
and the BSP.
The party’s electoral performance in Lok Sabha can be seen from
Fig. 11.11 and Table 7.1.
40
36
32
26
23
24
20 Seats
17
Vote
16
8 4.9 5
3.7 4.3 3.4
3.2 3.3
0
1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 11.11 Samajwadi Party in Lok Sabha, 1996–2014 (Source: Election Commis-
sion Reports, 1996–2014)
Rashtriya Janata Dal
Rashtriya Janata Dal owed its origin to the mother Janata Dal. Though
the Bihar unit of Janata Dal was practically an autonomous group due to
the growing disintegration of the Janata Dal, Laloo Prasad Yadav imparted
a separate identity to it in the form of Rashtriya Janata Dal in 1998. Just as
Mulayam’s Samajwadi Party formed an invincible coalition of the Mus-
lims and the backwards, particularly the Yadavs, Laloo applied the same
yardstick in Bihar. Under Laloo, the party not only rose to greater political
heights in the state, but he was able to make his entry into the federal
politics as well. His charismatic leadership witnessed a disproportionate
rise of the Yadav community.
Though a party of the Yadavs, Laloo’s RJD was able to rope in the
support base of diverse sections of the society in Bihar. Bihar under RJD
for nearly a decade strengthened the caste consciousness and caste polar-
ization. The electoral success of RJD in the state assembly and parliamen-
tary elections was attributed more to Laloo’s charisma and his humorous
campaigns than to governance. While a decade rule of the RJD in the state
led to Laloo’s family’s expansion in politics as his spouse Rabri Devi
became the chief minister of the state and his in-laws held important
posts during the period, he targeted the central government and occupied
important cabinet post of the railway minister along with other posts
occupied by the party leaders.
RJD got its first setback in the assembly elections when the BJP and
JDU under Nitish Kumar swept the assembly polls consecutively in 2005
and 2010 and also inflicted a crushing defeat to RJD in 2009 and 2014
Lok Sabha elections (see Fig. 11.12 and Table 7.1). The RJD returned to
Bihar politics as part of the state government after forging an electoral
alliance with JDU in 2016.
Shiromani Akali Dal
One of the oldest and most successful political organizations that sought
to transform from religion- to region-based political movement in the
democratic polity of the country is Shiromani Akali Dal. The party came
25 24
20
17
15
Seats
10 Vote %
7
5 4 4
2.7 2.7 2.4
1.2 1.3
0
1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 11.12 Rashtriya Janata Dal in Lok Sabha, 1998–2014 (Source: Election Com-
mission Reports, 1998–2014)
to its existence in 1920s. Since its inception, the party has ‘moved from
the position of being a religious-reform organization (concerned with the
affairs of the Shikh shrines) to a political party using both agitating and
electoral tactics to its present position as a leading political party in the state
of Punjab and an alternative governing party in the state’ (Teginder 2008:
124).
The post-independence history of the Shiromani Akali Dal has been a
mixture of electoral successes and political failures. The party spearheaded the
movement for state autonomy under the banner of ‘Punjabi Suba’ in the
1960s. Virginia Van Dyke argues that since the re-organization of the state in
1966, Punjab has had an essentially two-party system within which anti-
Congress coalitions have been put together. During the 1960s and the 1970s,
the Akalis were getting support from the Jana Sangh (the precursor of the
BJP) as both the parties were sharing common ideological planks, especially
on the issue of religion and language. Further, the Akalis and the Jana Sangh
were competing with each other, as the former’s support base came largely
from the rural Jat Sikhs, whereas the latter was supported by urban Hindus.
The Akali Dal as an alternative to the Congress started witnessing
factional splits from 1970s onward. The Congress took mileage out of
the Akali factional politics, and in order to control the working of the Sikh
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), it entered into an alliance
with the militant faction led by Sant Jarnal Singh Bhindranwale. This tacit
understanding between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhindranwale ultimately acted
as a fillip to militant politics, leading to ‘Operation Blue Star’ where the
Indian state army entered the premises of the Sikh shrines to oust the Sikh
militants.
The Akali politics took a new turn in the aftermath of the Operation Blue
Star. With the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and the signing of the Punjab
Accord in mid-1980s, the Akalis came to power on their own. However,
‘factional politics continued to play a crucial role in the longevity of the Akali
government’ (Dyke 2007: 127). Punjab witnessed consistent President rule
in view of the absence of a stable government due to Akali factions.
The early 1990s propelled the Akalis to seek support from the Bahujan
Samaj Party. However, this electoral understanding between the two did
not transform into electoral benefits for them. Hence, during the 1997
assembly elections, followed by the 1998 parliamentary elections, the
Akali Dal and BJP entered into an electoral understanding, which pro-
vided rich electoral dividends to both of them. The formation and
continuation of the full five-year term of Prakash Singh Badal-led
Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) government in the state tells the successful
story of this alliance Fig. 11.13.
8 8 8
4 4 4 Seats
3 3 Vote %
1.2
0.9 1 1 0.9
0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6 0.6
00.03
1952 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1989 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
Fig. 11.13 Shiromani Akali Dal in Lok Sabha, 1952–2014 (Source: Election Com-
mission Reports, 1952–2014)
Notes 231
Since the late 1990s, the Akalis have been consistently contesting
assembly and parliament elections together (Fig. 11.13). Participation in
the BJP-led NDA government from 1998 to 2004 improved the party’s
credibility in the state. The SAD was thus the first party to support the BJP
and forge an electoral understanding with the party. In fact, the alliance
with the BJP has remained intact since the 1990s.
Summing Up
One could see the increasing role of caste- and community-based parties
in federal governance in India. Some of the community- or religion-based
parties like Muslim League and India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen exist
but, their influence in national politics has largely been negligible. In fact,
the party systems in India from mid-1980s transformed toward coalitional
polity due to the growing assertion of the caste- and region-based parties.
The regional parties like Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, DMK and AIADMK
in Tamil Nadu, Telugu Dessam and Telangana Rashtra Samiti in Andhra
Pradesh, Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
in Jharkhand, Rashtriya Lok Dal in Uttar Pradesh are some of the
examples of strong regional parties deciding the fate of federal politics,
particularly from 1990s onward.
Notes
1. The ‘Block of Four’ included the Young Faction—Movement for National
Religious Revival (NRV), Lamifneh, Moshavim, Religious Kibbutz.
2. Haredim is the orthodox and ultra-orthodox group within Judaism, which
believes in the strict adherence to the principles of Judaism. The haredi
groups/parties in Israel do not support Zionism, as, for them, the Zionists
believe in the secular character of the Israeli State, whereas the haredi have
always stood for a Jewish-Zionist State.
3. Heilman further classified three distinct streams of Agudat parties—Hasi-
dim, Misnagdism and Sephardim. While ‘Hasidim emphasized the display
of piety and humane attachments to the charismatic rebbe, misnagdism
focused on strict adherence to scholarship and the letter of the law, and
respect for the authority of the yeshiva teacher/scholar’ (Heilman 1990:

140–141). Sephardim on the other hand broadly referred to the ‘tradi-
tionally religious Jews from Moslem countries’ who got ‘absorbed into
Lithuanian-misnagdic yeshivas’ (Ibid.).
4. ‘Teshuva represented the process of personal movement away from less
observant and committed past to a future of spiritual fulfillment and
enhanced individual destiny. At the same time, it was a symbolic return
to the once great traditions of the Sephardic past, to a complete Judaism, a
rich Judaism, a good Judaism’ (Willis 1995: 125–126).
5. While the formal system, as provided by Shas, is based on the schooling
(nursery school and day care at symbolic or no tuition), the informal refers
to the lessons to the people in small yeshivas in towns and neighborhoods.
The party emphasized Talmud Torah (haredi day school) as against the
secular schools.
6. Other Backward Classes or OBCs is used in India as a collective term for all
such backward and downtrodden castes that do not fall under the domain
of the constitutionally listed categories, viz., Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes. Since backwardness varies across India, the castes falling under
OBCs also vary accordingly. The Government of India through the
Mandal Commission Recommendations in late 1980s offered 27% reser-
vation to OBCs in public-sector appointments and educational institu-
tions. Such a step by the Government also led to political agitation in the
country in the beginning of the 1990s by polarizing the society into pro-
Mandal/reservationists and anti-Mandal/reservationists.
References
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Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
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12
The Arab Parties (Arab Block)
The doctrine of proportional representation has helped the minorities in

terms of sending their representation to the parliament. The Arabs con-
stituting 22 per cent of the Israeli population have also become the
beneficiaries of the principle of proportional representation. However,
the division of Arabs into different parties has weakened their parliamen-
tary representation by depriving them a decisive say in the parliamentary
politics of Israel.
Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace

and Equality, DFPE)
The Arabs in the Israeli social and political setup occupy a peculiar and
precarious position in view of both their minority status and the
non-Jewish background. Unable to oust the Jews by force soon after the
independence of Israel, the Arab leaders finally settled to extract political
gains for their community through parliamentary process of democratic
governance. However, the stigma of the partition and the question of

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_12
236 12 The Arab Parties (Arab Block)
loyalty were so strong among them that the Arabs did not bring about any
initiative for political mobilization by themselves. A significant attempt
toward this goal was made by the Communist Party, which sought to
channelize the Arab aspirations for effective political power within the
Jewish democratic political system.
Among the leading parties of the Arabs, the one which had sustained
the veracity of changes and performed consistently right from the incep-
tion of the state was the Communist Party called Maki,1 which got
transformed into Rakah in 1965 and finally in Hadash (Democratic
Front for Peace and Equality, DFPE) in 1977. The transition of Hadash
from Maki to Rakah and finally to DFPE is full of complexities, which got
invariably influenced by the internal domestic challenges and the external
political developments.
The history of the Communist Party in Palestine goes back to the
period of the Yishuv. Adhering to the ideological political line of the
Soviet communism, the Communist Party in the pre-state period chal-
lenged the basic premises of all Zionist parties even without denying their
Jewish-Zionist legitimacy. During its initial phase, the Communists tried
to ensure the participation of both the Arabs and the Jews in their struggle
against the British imperialism. The Party tried to view the pre-state
communal disturbances mainly in the typical Marxist lexicon and advo-
cated common Arab–Jewish class solidarity against the colonial power.
The predominance of the Zionist parties and the Jewish abhorrence of the
Arabs in the Yishuv had virtually brought the Palestinian Communist
Party to the position of a virtual eclipse, especially in the wake of World
War II.
The Soviet recognition of the two Communist parties in Palestine, the
one representing the Jewish aspirations and the other catering to the Arab
interests, ‘vastly eased the strains on Jewish Communists and allowed the
party to expand within the Jewish community’ (Isaac 1981: 174). With
the declaration of independence, the Jewish and the Arab Communist
camps got united in 1948 under a new common banner called the Israel
Communist Party or Maki (Miflaga Communistit Yisraelit), and decided
to chart out a new political map for its electoral battle. From 1949, the
two groups unitedly campaigned for the Knesset, municipal and the
Histadrut elections. The party leadership, nevertheless, remained broadly
Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, DFPE) 237
Jewish, with its support coming from the Jews and the Arabs in about
equal proportion. The party won 4 seats with 3.5 per cent of the votes in
its first contested Knesset elections in 1949.
Maki continued with its winning spirit for the following two consec-
utive Knesset elections by winning five and six seats in the second and the
third Knesset elections held in 1951 and 1955, respectively. While in
1955, the party gained at the expanse of Mapam,2 in 1961 the party
benefited from the intra-Mapai infighting over the Lavon affair3 when it
picked up five seats, thereby compensating its losses during the interval
between 1955 and 1961 Knesset elections.
Though Maki’s electoral success during 1951–55 and 1961 elections
had much to do with its expanding electoral base covering the Jewish and
the Arab regions, its voting percentage in the Arab sector started declining
in the 1950s. In fact, Maki’s increased political stakes in the Knesset
during the 1950s resulted in the corresponding erosion of its Arab base.
Though the party temporarily regained its Arab base by winning over
22 per cent (the same percentage it won in the first Knesset election in
1949) of its five Knesset seats in 1961, the Jewish–Arab hiatus within the
party became open in 1965, resulting into the first major party split.
The hegemony of Maki as the champion of the Arab interests got
tremendously shattered with the emergence of its potential rival Rakah,
the Communist Party in 1965. Maki’s electoral strength in the Knesset
during 1965 and 1969 collapsed substantially with the party, just man-
aging one seat in both the elections. Rakah replaced Maki as the harbinger
of the Arab interests in Israel’s parliamentary politics and sought to impart
a new dimension to its fight for equitable Arab rights in the Jewish-
dominated society under the Communist plank.
Soon after its new incarnation, Rakah went ahead in shedding its
Jewish image and started projecting the genuine Arab democratic alter-
native to the Zionist parties. From 1965 to 1973, the electoral tally of the
party fluctuated from two to four, with its voting share in the Arab region
increasing from 23 per cent in 1965 to 28 per cent in 1969 and 37 per
cent in 1973.
The Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and the Yom
Kippur War of 1973 hardened the Arab attitude vis-à-vis the Jewish
Zionist state and strengthened the ongoing polarization between the two
communities. Though Rakah could not galvanize the Arab discontent-

ment and anguish for its own electoral advantage, it definitely set forth the
stage for re-alignment of political forces within the Arab region. Rael Jean
Isaac argued that the reason for the Arabs to vote for the Communist Party
despite abhorring the Communist ideology was that the ‘communists
offer the best available means to protest the existence of the Jewish state’
(Isaac 1981: 177).
To institutionalize its formal base, enhance its legitimacy as the leading
Arab party, expand its social base and exercise the political control, Rakah
created the DFPE in 1977. Popularly called Hadash, it represented ‘a
coalition of the Jewish Black Panthers, heads of Arab local councils,
student committees and non-communist Arab community activists’
(Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar 1997: 5). In order to achieve its broader
objective, the Communists brought even the non-Communist in form of
Black Panthers (‘a disaffected group of oriental Jewish youth of slum
backgrounds’) and placed two of its members into Hadash’ safe slots for
the 1977 Knesset elections.
Notwithstanding some inherent bickering within the party on the issue
of the inclusion of the members of the Black Panthers, the Communists
succeeded in enhancing their electoral tally in the Knesset through
Hadash. The party won five seats for the Knesset. Its voting percentage
in the Arab sector rose from 37 per cent in the 1973 elections to 50 per
cent during 1977. During the same period, the Arab voting for the Labor
and other Zionist parties got reduced from 40 to 34 per cent.
The growing acceptance of Hadash among the Arab voters broadly
strengthened the political legitimization of the party’s identification as the
sole representative of the Arab interests. It also sought to contain the
argumentation that the non-Communist and non-Arab representation of
the party set the stage for increasing abstention of the Arabs in the
elections.
Until the mid-1980s, the Communist stream of thought, as represented
by Hadash, moved unhindered. It was only in 1984 that the party received
strong challenge from its other Arab competitors. The al-Ard (the Land)
movement of the 1960s and the Sons of the Village Movement of the
1970s did make their presence felt in the Arab sector and tried to air the
Arab discontentment against the moderation of the Communists. Formed
by the Arab intellectuals, these movements in the 1980s registered their

strong protest against Hadash through the creation of the Progressive List
for Peace (PLP) in 1984. Though the PLP could not contain the electoral
tally of Hadash in 1984 elections, which still remained four, it definitely
intruded into the latter’s Arab strongholds by capturing 18 per cent of the
Arab votes. Hadash’ Arab support reduced from 47 per cent in 1981 to
32 per cent in 1984 elections for the Knesset.
During the late 1980s, another strong challenge to the Hadash leader-
ship came from the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) in general, and the
Islamic Movement in particular, which got formalized and strengthened
with the formation of the United Arab List in the 1990s. It was difficult to
generalize at whose cost the ADP prospered—Hadash or the PLP. Nev-
ertheless, the Islamic Movement definitely shattered the hopes of the
Communist camp as the sole representative of the Arabs.
With the introduction of the split voting for the Knesset and the prime
minister from 1996 to 2001, Hadash mainly supported the Labor candi-
dates for the prime ministerial race—Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak
during 1996 and 1999 elections, respectively. As the election statistics
show, 88 and 95 per cent of the Arab support came for Peres and Barak
during the two elections, respectively, against their Likud rivals.
The Arab politics in the 1990s veered toward the three-cornered
contest, especially with the arrival of the nationalist camp headed by the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA; BaLad). To counter the rival
Islamic camp, Hadash first sought to form an alliance with the Nationalist
camp in 1996 under the new incarnation National Democratic Block and
succeeded in increasing its electoral strength in the Knesset to five along
with its Arab voting per cent to 38. Subsequently, in order to eliminate its
two competitors, the Islamic camp and the Nationalist camp, Hadash
entered into an electoral pact with the Arab Union for Progress and
Renewal formed by Ahmad Tibi under the Hadash-Taal List for the
2003 elections.
The Knesset elections for 2003 gained significant political heat for
sparking political controversy in view of the Central Election Committee
(CEC) decision banning Ahmad Tibi from the joint Hadash-Taal list.
The CEC, which broadly represented the outgoing Knesset members in
proportion of their relative strength, attempted to act on party lines with
the Likud and its right cohorts supporting the ban with the Labor and its
allies sticking guns against the ban. The decision was finally revoked by
the Supreme Court in its decision just few weeks before the elections.
Hadash failed to capitalize on this controversy and managed to get four
seats in both 2009 and 2013 Knesset elections.
The elections to the twentieth Knesset were contested by the Arabs
under the backdrop of the increasing electoral threshold from 2 to 3.25
per cent. The electoral change largely benefitted the Arabs, as the three
main Arab parties—Ra’am, Ta’al and BaLad—decided to enter the
Knesset on the Joint List to be headed by Hadash. The indomitable
collective strength of the Arabs could be seen from the twentieth Knesset
results when the Joint Arab List created history in the post-independence
parliamentary politics of Israel by winning 13 seats and 10.6 per cent of
votes, thereby bagging third position in 2015 (see Figs. 12.1, 12.2 and
12.3 and Table 5.1).
The organizational structure of Hadash resembles that of the Commu-
nist Party. Like its political mentor, the party is organized as cells in
different Arab localities and mixed cities. According to Ian S Lustic, the
perennial efforts of the party workers have created an impressive infra-
structure of committees, council members, mayors, youth groups, work
camps and publications throughout the Arab sector. The party claims to
have representation not only from the Moslems, Christians and Druze
among the Arabs, but some of the Jews are also enrolled as its members.
The electoral planks of Hadash are deeply rooted into the Communist
ideology. The Communist Hadash tends to implement the principles of
scientific socialism—Marxism–Leninism—in accordance with the chang-
ing conditions of Israel. It claims to be a revolutionary party of the
working class, salaried and self-employed workers, farmers, academics,
students, pensioners, women and men. The ideological goal of the party
focuses on the establishment of socialism—a socially just society based on
democratic and human values. It sought to struggle for a just Jewish-Arab
peace, comprehensive and stable, based on the concept of two states for
two peoples—Israeli and Palestinian.
The main points of its platform during 2013 Knesset elections reiter-
ated its ideological postulate that included a ‘complete Israeli withdrawal
from the territories occupied in 1967, recognition of the PLO, the
14
13
12
10
4
8
Knesset Seats
6
5 5
4 4 4 4 4
4
3 3 3 3
8
3
2 2
0
1977 1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015
Knesset Elections
Fig. 12.1 Hadash’ seats in the Knesset, 1997–2015
separation of religion and state, the Palestinian “right of return” to Israeli

territory, lobbying for workers’ rights, encouraging Israel to join the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, the establishment of a Palestinian
state alongside Israel, and full equality for Israel’s Arab citizens’ (The
Israel Project 2012).
Since all the four Arab parties comprise the Joint List, their joint
platform echoed the fundamental principles like ‘peace based on UN
resolutions, ending the occupation of all land captured by Israel in
1967, dismantling settlements, releasing of political prisoners, and
forming of a Palestinian State’. The socio-economic platform of the
12
10.6
10
8
Voting Percentage
4.6
4.2
4 3.7
3.4 3.4 3.3
3 2.9 2.9
2.7
2.4
0
1977 1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015
Knesset Elections
Fig. 12.2 Hadash’ voting percentage in the Knesset, 1977–2015
Joint Arab List talked about equality and affirmative action (as is the case
with Indian caste-based parties) to ensure greater participation and
funding for the Arabs at all levels.
The ideological premises of Hadash are just the continuation of the
Communist philosophy. Hadash basically represents the Communist
stream and seeks to implement the Communist ideological goals from a
realistic democratic framework. The 2015 success of Hadash-led Joint
Arab List would depend on its growing flexibility and accommodation in
view of the changing political realities.
Other Parties of the Arab Block 243
14
Seats
Voting Percentage
12
10
1977 1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015
Knesset Years
Fig. 12.3 Hadash in the Knesset, 1977–2015
Other Parties of the Arab Block

As’ad Ghanem and Sarah Ozacky-Lazar (2002) argued that the Israeli
Arab stream over the years developed ideological positions close to those
of the Jewish–Zionist parties. According to them, the political behavior of
the Israeli Arab stream ‘is manifested by voting for Jewish parties, from
Meretz on the left to Shas and Likud and even the National Religious
Party on the right’ (Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar 2002: 131).
‘Following Mapam, which began to accept Arabs as full members as far

back as 1954, the other Jewish parties, too, opened their ranks to Arab
membership and activism in the 1960s and 1970s’ (Ghanem and Ozacky-
Lazar 1997: 5). The authors maintained that from the first Knesset
elections in 1949 until the eighth Knesset elections in 1973, Mapai and
its affiliated lists obtained an average of 52.5 per cent of the Arab vote, and
the Communist Party an average of 21.75 per cent, with the rest of the
votes (25.75 per cent) distributed among Mapam, the NRP and other
Jewish parties.
The first three decades of the post-independence Israeli polity
witnessed the coexistence of various Arab lists at successful intervals
with the Zionist Labor to counter the growing influence of the Commu-
nist stream represented by Maki and Rakah. These Arab lists jointly
managed to get an average 18 per cent of the Arab votes until 1981.
The Labor tried to extend its influence in the Arab sector through its
‘hamula politics’. The hamulas were the kinship-based clans in the Arab
sector and exercised tremendous influence in the Arab politics. Ian S
Lustic (1977) stated that through the various ministries at the disposal
of the Labor and later of NRP, these hamula leaders were effectively
co-opted and their local paramountcy was being buttressed.
Until the mid-1980s, the Arab stream was broadly divided in its
support for the Labor, the minority lists and other Zionist parties on the
one hand, and the Communist Maki and Rakah and later on Hadash on
the other. The Arab preference for the ruling establishment was largely
guided by its anticipated social gains in view of its controlling three key
ministries —Interior, Religion and Welfare.
Abraham Diskin also pointed out that the main struggles among the
Arabs during the first three decades existed between the ‘radical camp’ and
the ‘establishment camp’. The former was represented by Maki and its
successors like Rakah, Hadash and Arab Democratic List; the latter was
represented by the minority lists, which had been associated in the past
with Mapai, the Alignment, different Jewish lists and especially left-wing
Zionist parties.
The Arab–Jewish polarization assumed new dimension with the emer-
gence of the PLP in 1984 and the ADP in 1988. The PLP was set up by
Muhammad Mi’ari and attracted membership from diverse sections of the
Arab society, namely, academicians, students and local organizations such

as the al-Nahda movement in Taibe in the Triangle as well as Jewish
groups and personalities. PLP, in fact, tried to carry forward the basic
ideological goals of both the al-Ard movement and the Sons of the Village
movement. The party demanded a secular, democratic Palestinian state
on the entire territory of historic Palestine.
The PLP won two seats in 1984 Knesset elections and one in 1988
elections. While most of its votes went to the ADP, the party appeared to
have lost support of the Arab Christian communities because of its Islamic
proclivities. Hence, the party got disbanded after its dismal performance
in 1992 elections. Some of its members led by Mi’ari became instrumen-
tal in forming the NDA, whereas the others joined with Progressive
Alliance formed just a month before the 1996 elections.
Formed by former MK Abd al-Wahhab Darawsha in 1988, the Arab
Democratic Party was the first Arab party in Israel in the sense that its
membership was exclusively dominated by the Arabs. The party made its
modest beginning when it contested its first Knesset elections in 1988 and
won just one seat. The perception started strengthening that the ADP was
nothing but another “front for Labor” (Lustic 1990: 128), as the party
leader Darawsha himself was part of the Labor.
The popularity of the ADP started gaining owing to the dynamic and
charismatic leadership of Darawsha. The party increased its Knesset tally
from one in 1988 to two in 1992. With Hadash, the party in 1992
constituted a ‘blocking block’ for the Labor-led coalition in the thirteenth
Knesset, but it failed to achieve domestic gains for the Arab sector. With
the implementation of the electoral reforms paving the way for the
coexistence of the prime ministerial and Knesset elections, the ADP
formed an alliance with the moderate wing of the Islamic Movement
(Southern Branch) and formed the United Arab List during 1996 elec-
tions. The 1996 period also witnessed a change in leadership, which came
to be dominated by Abd al-Malik Dahamsha, a leading figure from the
Islamic Movement. The close religious electoral tie between the ADP and
the Islamic Movement proved immensely beneficial as the combined list
won four seats in 1996 and five seats in 1999. The intra-party split,
especially with the leaving of Muhammad Mi’ari faction of the Progressive
Union, wrought havoc for the party, and its representation in the Knesset
came down heavily.
The 1996 period witnessed the emergence of four new political parties
and alliances that competed for power and influence in addition to the
Arab voting among themselves.
The Arab Union for Progress and Renewal (al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi li-l-
Taghayyur) or Ta’al of Dr. Ahmad Tibi was one such key party
established in 1996. The party was in great controversy right from its
inception owing to the close nexus between Tibi and the Palestinian
leader, Yasser Arafat. Focusing on the need for change and democracy
and the emphasis on a new breed of young leadership in the Arab sector
constituted the hallmark of the party.
The Arab Union for Progress and Renewal contested the 1999 elections
with NDA (BaLad) and the 2003 with Hadash (on the Hadash-Taal List).
However, the Arafat tag on Tibi cost him dear, and in both the cases, he
created problems within the alliance parties. The Central Election Com-
mittee’s ruling debarring Tibi from contesting Knesset elections and the
subsequent revocation of the order by the Supreme Court in 2003 did
provide sympathetic touch to Tibi’s campaign, but he failed to capitalize
in terms of electoral strength for the party.
To present a united Arab fight in the elections, Tibi finally merged his
Ta’al party with United Arab List (Ra’am) and contested the elections on
Ra’am-Ta-al List from 2006 onward.
NDA (al-Tajammu’al-Watani al-Dimukrati), also called BaLad,
headed by Dr. ‘Azmi Bishara, constituted the nationalist front and
made its substantial presence from 1996 onward. The NDA was basically
‘an amalgamation of several small leftist political movements that operated
in the Arab sector, including the Sons of the Land, the Equality Alliance, a
wing of the Progressive List for Peace identified with Muhammad Mi’ari,
and several local groupings such as the Mghar Socialist Party, the Ansar
Movement of Umm al-Fahm, the al-Nahda movement of Taibe, the Sons
of al-Tira and individual Arab activists’ (Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar
1997: 7).
The NDA platform advocated a change in the definition of the State of
Israel from a ‘Jewish state’ to a ‘state of all its citizens’, and the granting of
a special, recognized status of ‘national minority’ to the Arab population
of Israel. It was critical of the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian peace
agreements on the one hand and the PA-led Arafat on the other.
The NDA created political ripples in the Israeli politics when its leader
Azmi Bishara emerged as one of the contestants challenging the Labor and
the Likud candidates for the prime ministerial election during 1999.
However, under pressure from the Arab leaders and parties, Bishara
withdrew just one day before the election. The NDA won two Knesset
seats for the 1999 elections and raised its tally to three in the 2003
elections. The NDA appeared to have won the sympathy wave created
in the aftermath of the CEC decision barring its leader and the list from
contesting the Knesset elections for the year 2003. Its Arab voting went
up from 17 per cent in 1999 to 21 per cent in 2003, broadly reflecting its
growing acceptance among the Arab public.
Electoral performance of BaLad remained consistent for the preceding
three Knesset elections held in 2006, 2009 and 2013. The party won
three seats in all these three elections with a voting percentage of 2.3, 2.4
and 2.5, respectively. Its leader Bishara came under suspicion in the wake
of Israeli war on Hezbollah in 2006. Based on the evidence of internal
security agency, Bishara was charged with supporting terrorism against
Israel. Following the accusations and interrogations, Bishara left the
country and resigned from the party. Later, the party came to be guided
by its new leader Jamal Zahalka for 2013 elections. For 2015 elections,
the party decided to run a Joint Arab List with Ra’am, Ta’al and Hadash,
thus transforming a single-digit presence to a double-digit salience in the
Knesset.
Progressive Alliance (al-Tahaluf al-Taqaddumi) and Arab Islamic
Block (al-Kutla al-‘Arabiyya al-Islamiyya) were other two Arab parties
that emerged during the 1996 elections. The Progressive Alliance
represented different shades of opinion and factions—Independents
Movement headed by Muhammad Zaydan, Voice of Agreement Move-
ment (Nida’ a al-Wifaq) [representing the Bedouin community from
Negev, led by Sa’id Zabarqa of Laqia], and other remnants of the
Progressive List who had parted ways with Muhammad Mi’ari’s group.
The Alliance received 0.5 per cent of votes during 1996 elections and 0.6
per cent of votes for the Knesset 2003 elections.
Headed by Shaykh ‘Atif Khatib, the Arab Islamic Block remained
marginal in its political influence. Its leader left the Islamic movement
because of the local differences. The Block focused on the protection of
‘the civil and religious rights of the Arab sector, support for peace process,
establishment of a broad Arab coalition’ (Ibid., 8). It later joined the ADP
under UAL.
The Arab block in the contemporary Israeli party politics reflects three
distinct streams—the Communist stream led by Hadash, the Islamic
stream represented by UAL and the nationalist stream presented by
NDA. The three leading parties of the Arab block consistently won
10–11 seats in the preceding three Knesset elections from 2006 to 2013
(Table 5.1).
As pointed out by As’ad Ghanem and Sarah Ozacky-Lazar (2002), the
Arab block suffered from a lack of central leadership. Amal Jamal pointed
out the growing abstention among the Arabs due to their increasing
marginalization. Such an abstention was vigorously projected during
their united and comprehensive boycott of the 2001 prime ministerial
elections. The 2001 abstention was, however, an outcome of several
factors and could not have been viewed as a generalized yardstick of the
Arab politics in future.
Looking into its geographical strength of 19 per cent in 2001 (which is
eight times more than its strength from 1948) along with a substantial
presence of around 13 per cent of its electoral strength, the Arab popu-
lation of Israel can act as a significant catalyst and pressure group. The
unified Arab parties can fetch remarkable gains from the coalitional
politics for the people of its own sector, which the non-Arab parties
cannot bring comprehensively. In the words of Hanna Herzog, the Arab
‘penetration in the population, which theoretically could grant them
fourteen seats in the Knesset, made them a sought-after group, especially
at election time’ (Herzog 1995: 90).
While one can broadly agree with Sammy Smooha that the Israelization
of the Arabs is overweighing their Palestinization, the Arabs have yet to
make a significant inroads into the Jewish parties as genuine partners
rather than mere appendage to be used as ‘satellites’ during the election
times.
The deep political division among the Arab voters and their Arab
parties had continued to dampen their united fight to extract political
concessions from the ruling establishment. The increasing electoral
threshold to 3.25 per cent for the 2015 Knesset elections, however,
proved to be a blessing in disguise for the Arab parties, leading to ‘pan-
Arab consciousness’ and consolidation. Under a common umbrella
References 249
organization, the four Arab parties—Ra’am, Ta’al, BaLad and Hadash—

entered the electoral fray for the twentieth Knesset as Joint Arab List, and
by winning 13 seats and 10.6 per cent of the votes remained the third
largest political grouping.
Final Comments
The real challenge for the Arab parties in the parliamentary politics of
Israel is how to continue with its united electoral fight democratically by
supplementing the Arab interests with the Jewish interests
simultaneously.
Notes
1. Maki was a Communist party of Arabs. Since it fought formative Knesset
elections as an ally of Mapai, it became part of the socialist block until
1965 when it transformed into Rakah initially and finally into Hadash
in 1997.
2. After his expulsion from Mapam, Moshe Sneh’s the Left Socialist Party
joined Maki in the Knesset elections in 1955.
3. The Lavon affair related to the controversial order of the Israeli Defence
Minister Pinchas Lavon asking the IDF agents to carry out the sabotage
activities against the Egyptians in 1954. The Egyptians caught these agents
and killed some of them. The incident defamed Israel in international
arena and seriously questioned its diplomatic stature. Pinchas Lavon was
asked to resign notwithstanding his claim that the orders were being passed
by the then IDF Chief.
References
Ghanem, As’ad., & Ozacky-Lazar, S. (Eds.). (1997, June). The Arab vote in the
election to the 14th Knesset, 29 May 1996 – Data and analysis. (trans: Krausz,
J.). No. 5. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and
African Studies.
Ghanem, A.’a., & Ozacky-Lazar, S. (2002). Israel as an ethnic state: The Arab
vote. In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), The elections in Israel 1999. Albany:
Herzog, H. (1995). Penetrating the system: The politics of collective identities.
In A. Arian & M. Shamir (Eds.), The elections in Israel 1992. Albany: State
New York: Longman.
Lustic, I. S. (1990). The changing political role of Israeli Arabs. In A. Arian &
M. Shamir (Eds.), The elections in Israel 1988. Boulder: Westview Press.
The Israel Project; The Knesset. (2012, January). Moment Magazine. Wikipedia.
Part V
Parties and the Government Making
As foundation and essence of democracies, political parties assume signif-

icance in making and unmaking of the government. While they occupy
important position in formation of government in the aftermath of
elections, their role is no less important as Opposition in steering the
government toward democratic governance. The functioning of modern
government from over a century shows the vital role played by political
parties in making and breaking the government.
The last part of the book is an attempt to examine the role of parties in
the formation of government in both Israel and India. It also delves into
the transformation of the government formation in two democratic
nations from ‘one-party dominance system’ to the ‘one-party-led coali-
tion’. The changing role of the ‘pan parties’ from dominant leaders to
alliance partners in both Israel and India is also highlighted in the part.
While delineating the democratic process and challenges of govern-
ment from pre-independence to the post-independence period, the part
analyzes the competing issues of governance that have affected working of
the governments in the two nations.
13
Coalition Politics in Israel and India
Coalitions though successful, have always found that their triumph

has been brief.
Benjamin Disraeli quoted in Butler, 1978: 74
Politics of governance through coalition is an important practice of

parliamentary system. Governments are considered to be more represen-
tative, more accommodating and relatively stable if they tend to incorpo-
rate diverse political forces in their system of political governance. The
system of coalitions ensures multiple representations to various socio-
economic and political forces. The coalition politics in this way imparts
more functionality and better legitimacy to the issues of governance.
The important ingredient of coalition politics revolves around the
notion of coalition formation. The political literature is replete with
innumerable theories and mathematical formulations of coalition build-
ing/formation. Eric C Browne states that ‘a coalition is the outcome of
protracted bargaining over the distribution of some coalition payoffs
(benefit of forming a coalition) by rational, self-interested persons’
(Browne and Dreijmanis 1982: 2). E W Kelley argues that coalitions are
formed to ‘influence legislation, to secure profits in market-based

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_13
254 13 Coalition Politics in Israel and India
economies, to elect representatives to parliamentary bodies, to establish

constitutions, to pass legislation, and to govern at local and national
political systems’ (Kelley 1970: 481).
Theorists and social scientists have come to define size of various
coalitions. Willian Riker advocated the ‘minimum winning coalition’
through his famous mathematical n-person1 game theory. ‘The task of
n-person game theory is to specify similar restraints in the model in the
hope that they can then be discovered in reality’ (Riker 1962: 36).
Minimum winning coalition in Riker’s formulation is ‘one which is
rendered blocking or losing by the subtraction of one of its members’
(Ibid., 40).
Scholars like Abram De Swaan have used the term ‘closed coalition’
that is ‘made up of actors that are adjacent on the policy scale’ (De Swaan
1973: 70). Mivhael A Leiserson and Robert Axelrod championed the
theory of ‘minimal winning coalition’. Leiserson, for instance, ‘incorpo-
rated a notion of ideological diversity among the actors where players
search for those coalitions which they expect to secure them at least some
minimal satisfactory payoff and which unite actors of minimal ideological
diversity’ (quoted above 73).
Axelord advocated the notion of ‘minimal connected winning coali-
tion’, which embodies three different criteria, namely, winning,
connected and minimal. According to him, ‘the less conflict of interest
there is in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will form. The less
conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will
have long duration if formed’ (Axelrod 1970: 167).
Eric C Browne and John Dreijmanis (1982) identifies two important
variables in political coalitions, namely, size of actors and degree of
preference affinity existing among the actors in coalition formation.
Browne argues that the process of coalition formation involves a set of
conceptual components that include actors, formation, bargaining, pay-
offs and maintenance. A closed and harmonious relation among these
components broadly decides the suitability and stability of the coalition
governance in the political system.
While the minimum winning coalition focuses on the simple or major-
ity agreement and usually avoids exceeding the established decision point,
the ‘minimal winning coalition’ attempts to divide a coalition payoff not
more than the required members that are required to ensure winning.
Constitutional Provisions of Coalitional Government in Israel. . . 255
Both Israel and India have experienced coalition governments for

decades. The changes and transformations under which the coalition
experiments in both the nations have undergone defy any single theoret-
ical formulation of coalitions.
Constitutional Provisions of Coalitional

Government in Israel and India
Israel does not have a written constitution. The functioning of the
government is carried out through Basic Laws2 framed by the Knesset.
It represents a system of parliamentary democracy where the government
is the executive authority of the state and holds its office by virtue of the
confidence of the Knesset (Table 13.1).
Elected for a period of four years, the Israeli government comprises
ministers, ministers without portfolio in addition to the acting prime
minister and deputy prime minister. Members of the cabinet belong to
different factions within the coalitional setup. They behave as per the
strictures of the party and tend to follow the party disciplines in coalition
practices of the government unless otherwise directed differently.
Prime minister is the head of the government. He or she exercises
prerogatives in deciding his or her team of ministers. However, owing to
the coalitional nature of the government, the prime minister generally
leaves the option of portfolio distribution to the coalitional partners.
Coalition formation in this way involves hectic bargaining for the payoffs.
The Basic Law on Government 1996 stipulates that there should be no
more than 18 cabinet ministers and 6 deputy ministers.
Asher Arian stated that it is the government, and not the Knesset,
which is the focus of political power in the country. According to him, the
centralization in the Israeli politics is characterized by ‘the smallness of the
country, the electoral system, the parliamentary system with coalition
government and the supremacy of the executive’ (Arian 1985: 158).
India on the other hand also shares the principle of parliamentary
democracy, which is based on the federal doctrine of two sets of govern-
ment at the national and state levels. Though there is constitutional
Table 13.1 Constitutional governments in India (1952–2014)
256
Ministers
No of with
parties in Cabinet Ministers independent
13
Government Leadership Parties in government government ministers of states charge
First Jawaharlal Congress 1 14

– –
(15 Aug. Nehru
1947–1952) (Congress)
Interim Govt.
Second Jawaharlal Congress 1 15 6a 14
(1952–1957) Nehru
(Congress)
Third Jawaharlal Congress 1 13 14 14
(1957–1962) Nehru
(Congress)
Fourth Nehru Congress 1 18 12 22
(1962–1964) (Congress)
Fifth Lal Bahadur Congress 1 7 – –
(9 June 1964–11 Shastri
Jan. 1966) (Congress)
Sixth Indira Gandhi Congress 1 18 17 15
(1966–1967) (Congress)
Seventh Indira Gandhi Congress 1 6 – –
(1967–1969) (Congress)
Eighth Indira Gandhi Congress, Lok Dal, CPI 3 – – –
(1969–1971) (Congress)
Ninth Indira Gandhi Congress 1 14 22 17
(16 March (Congress)
1971–24 March
1977)
Tenth Morarji Desai BLD, BKD, Swatantra Party, 9 17 6 –
(24 March (Janata Jana Sangh, PSP,
1977–15 July 1979) Party) Samyukta Socialist Party,
Constitutional Provisions of Coalitional Government in Israel. . .

Utkal Congress,
Congress O, Congress for
Democracy
Eleventh Charan Singh Janata Party Secular 1 4 – –
(28 July 1979–14 (Janata Party
Jan. 1980) Secular)
Twelfth Indira Gandhi Congress 1 17 11 –
(14 Jan. 1980–31 (Congress)
Oct. 1984)
Thirteenth Rajiv Gandhi Congress 1 15 19 7
(31 Oct. 1984–2 Dec. (Congress)
1989)
Fourteenth V P Singh Janata Dal*, DMK, Telugu 4 14 5 –
(2 Dec. 1989–10 (National Dessam, Asom Gana
Nov. 1990) Front) Parishad
Fifteenth Chandra Samajwadi Janata Dal, 2 15 12 7b
(10 Nov. Shekhar Janata Dal
1990–21 June 1991) (National
Front)
Sixteenth Narasimha Congress, Jharkhand 3 13 5 3
(21 June Rao Mukti Morcha, CPI
1991–14 May 1996) (Congress)
* * *
Seventeenth Atal Bihari BJP, Shiromani Akali Dal, 5
(15 May Vajpayee Shiv Sena, Samata Party,
1996–28 May 1996) (BJP) Haryana Vikas Party
(continued )
257
258
Ministers
No of with
parties in Cabinet Ministers independent
13
Government Leadership Parties in government government ministers of states charge
Eighteenth Deve Gowda Janata Dal, Tamil Maanila 13 6 7 6

(1 June (United Congress, Samajwadi
1996–21 April 1997) Front) Party, DMK, CPI,
Shiromani Akali Dal,
Asom Gana Parishad,
Telugu Dessam, etc.
Nineteenth I K Gujral Janata Dal, Tamil Maanila 13 15 16 –
(21 April (United Congress, Samajwadi
1997–19 March Front) Party, DMK, CPI,
1998) Shiromani Akali Dal,
Asom Gana Parishad,
Telugu Dessam, etc.
Twentieth Atal Bihari BJP, AIADMK, Samata 13 22 21 –
(19 March 1998–13 Vajpayee Party, BJD, Shiromani
Oct. 1999) (NDA I) Akali Dal, Trinamool
Congress, Shiv Sena,
PMK, Lok Shakti, MDMK,
Haryana Vikas Party,
Janata Party, Mizo
National Front
Twenty-first Atal Bihari BJP, DMK, Samata Party, 13 25 22 8
(13 Oct. Vajpayee BJD, Shiromani Akali Dal,
1999–22 May 2004) (NDA II) Trinamool Congress, Shiv
Sena, PMK, Lok Shakti,
MDMK, Haryana
Vikas Party, Janata Party,
Mizo National Front,
Sikkim Democratic Front
Twenty-second Manmohan Congress, LJNSP, NCP, 9 29 29 10
Constitutional Provisions of Coalitional Government in Israel. . .

(22 May Singh JMM, RJD, DMK, TRS,
2004–21 May 2009) (UPA I) PMK, IUML
Twenty-third Manmohan Congress, DMK, NCP, NC, 7 32 33 12
(22 May Singh RJD, Muslim League, TMC
2009–25 May 2014) (UPA II)
Twenty-fourth Narendra BJP, Shiv Sena, Akali Dal, 10 23 12 10
(26 May 2014–till Modi TDP, Lok Janshakti Party,
date) (NDA III) Apna Dal, Rashtriya Lok
Samta Party, DMDK,
PMK, MDMK
Sources: House of the People Who’s Who, 1952, New Delhi: Parliament of India, 1952, pp. xxxi–xxxiii; Lok Sabha Who’s Who,
1957, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1957, pp. v–vii; Parliament of India, Third Lok Sabha, Who’s Who, 1962. New Delhi:
Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1962, pp. vii–ix; Parliament of India, Fourth Lok Sabha, Who’s Who, 1967, New Delhi: Lok Sabha
Secretariat, 1967, pp. viii–xiii; Who’s Who, Fifth Lok Sabha – 1971, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1971; p. xv and xvii;
Parliament of India, Seventh Lok Sabha, Who’s Who, 1980, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1980, pp. vii–viii; Parliament
of India, Eighth Lok Sabha, Who’s Who, 1985, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1985, pp. ix–xi; Parliament of India, Ninth
Lok Sabha, Who’s Who, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1992, pp. xiii–xiv; parliament of India.nic.in
Data are compiled by the author
Notes:
The table does not include the period of caretaker governments led by Gulzari Lal Nanda (27 May–9 June 1964,
11 January–24 January 1966)
Cabinet Ministers also include prime minister and the portfolio he/she is holding
Janata Dal in 1989 comprised Jan Morcha, Janata Party, Lok Dal and Congress (S)
BJP-led government in 1996 continued to remain in office only for 13 days as its prime minister failed to muster required
support to win the vote of confidence
a
Ministers of Cabinet Rank but not members of the Cabinet
b
259
Chandra Shekhar government had three Ministers with independent charges and four deputy ministers
division of power among the three organs of government—Legislature,

Executive and Judiciary—one witnesses the legislative-executive fusion of
power in Indian parliamentary democracy.
Parliament in India is the supreme and the highest law-making body
whose decisions cannot be altered by anyone except Judiciary if they
contravene the Constitution. It is a bicameral legislature with Lok Sabha
(House of the People) and Rajya Sabha (Council of States) constituting
the lower and upper chambers. Lok Sabha has strength of 545 members
with 543 coming after every five years from the direct parliamentary
constituencies spread across India. The bigger states have more represen-
tation in Lok Sabha than the smaller ones.3
The Council of States is the upper house of the Parliament and
represents the interests of the states in India. It has 250 members, with
238 getting elected indirectly by people’s representatives in their respec-
tive states. Members of the state legislative assemblies elect the members
of Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha is a permanent house and cannot be
dissolved. One-third of its members retire after every two years. The
tenure of a member of the upper house is six years.
The Indian Executive comprises the prime minister and his council of
ministers elected by universal adult franchise generally after a gap of five
years. Like the British Westminster system, Indian prime minister is the
head of the government and plays a pivotal role in formation of a new
government. He is the leader of the party as well as the government. All
the important decisions and key appointments are made by the prime
minister and his council of ministers for which it is accountable to the
Parliament.
While the prime minister is the head of the government, president is
the head of the state. All decisions and appointments are carried by the
prime minister and his council of ministers in the name of the president.
The prime minister in India used to be powerful during the first four
decades of constitutional system of governance; the position started
weakening after the onset of coalition politics from 1980s onward. The
2014 national elections once again bring the position of the prime
minister to the center stage of governance to be called ‘pivot’, around
which the entire council of ministers revolves.
Comparing Coalition Experiments of Israel and India 261
Comparing Coalition Experiments of Israel

and India
Both Israel and India inherited the parliamentary practice of political
governance from the colonial rule. The founding of political institutions
during the colonial period and their working in association with the
grassroots politics enabled the leaders and the masses to learn the basic
ethos of parliamentary governance of ruler–ruled relationship. The British
encouragement led to the invoking of parliamentary practices in the two
nations in the beginning of the twentieth century.
As politics under Yishuv politics broadly reflected conglomeration of
distinct immigrant Jewish communities, different political parties made
their penetration in the pre-state political setup. The co-existence of
various political groups with their own ideological orientations and polit-
ical programs of carrying the popular aspirations of their respective
communities into governance politics further strengthened the system of
parliamentary practices in Yishuv.
The Yishuv leaders formulated the system of proportional representa-
tion to ensure the participation of every group and community in the
system of governance. Though the Yishuv politics witnessed the domi-
nance of Ahdut Ha’avodah and later Mapai, other political parties were
not conspicuous by their absence in the system of democratic representa-
tion. The parties effectively competed in the Zionist Congress, the legis-
lative assembly and Histadrut and sought to increase their substantial
political stakes through gaining representation of masses. The system of
proportional representation enabled the political parties to strengthen
their political base among their own communities.
The Indian National Congress on the other hand was founded with the
initiative and support of the British to work as ‘safety valve’. The key
objective of the British Raj in creating Congress was to contain the
pressure of the masses from the below and to ensure a slow learning to a
small white-ruling Indian political class to ensure sustenance of the Raj.
The leadership of the Congress in its formative years (1885–1905) was
vested in moderate leaders like Dada Bhai Naoroji, Gopal Krishna
Gokhale and Surendra Nath Banerjee whose working strategies revolved
around ‘Prayers, Petitions and Protests’ (called Triple Ps) with a faith in
the constitutional authority of the Raj. The split of the Congress in 1907
led the Extremists called Lal-Bal-Pal referring to Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal
Gangadhar Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal to spearhead the movement
with a focus on Swadeshi and Boycott. However, it was with the arrival of
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, to be called Mahatma Gandhi, that the
struggle for independence and the introduction of constitutional institu-
tions by the British Raj like dyarchy and provincial autonomy started
giving Indians more experience and exposure to the system of parliamen-
tary government in India.
Post-state Coalitional Experiences in Israel

and India
With the attainment of independence from the British colonial rule in
1948 that led to the creation of a separate independent state of Israel, the
Yishuv parties decided to form Provisional Government on 14 May
1948. The Provisional Government consisted of Mapai, the religious
parties, General Zionists, the Progressives and the Sephardim. The Provi-
sional Government was only an interim arrangement, which sought to
offer political continuity until the parliamentary process got
institutionalized.
Elections were held for the first Constituent Assembly on 25 January
1949. However, conflicting views and dissensions among the parties
regarding the formation of constitution got resolved through Harari
Resolution in June 1950, stipulating that instead of a single document,
Israel should have a series of Basic Laws to be created and approved by
successive Knessets. Accordingly, the Constituent Assembly finally got
transformed into the first parliament called the Knesset.
India, on the other hand, got its Constituent Assembly formed in 1946,
which took almost three years to frame the constitution after the attain-
ment of independence. Unlike Israel, the Constituent Assembly made
comprehensive provisions for political institutions, rights and liberties of
the citizens. Post-independence Israel witnessed coalition formation right
Premiership of Ben-Gurion (1949–63) and Jawaharlal Nehru. . . 263
from the first Knesset elections due to the practice of proportional

representation-based list system. While the earlier coalitions were the
‘one-party-dominated government’—Mapaivot—the later governments
came to be equated with ‘one-party led coalitions’ from 1980s onward.
The formation of governments and coalitions in India underwent great
transformation from Nehruvian Premiership to Indira and Rajiv Congress
on the one hand and the emergence of institutionalized coalition govern-
ments under NDA and UPA on the other.
Premiership of Ben-Gurion (1949–63)

and Jawaharlal Nehru (1952–64)
The strongholds of Mapai under Yishuv got rewarded by the electorate in
the post-independence Israel where it formed the first government. It was
the ‘one-party dominant system’ led by Mapai under the leadership of
Ben-Gurion that held the Premiership for two phases from 1949 to
63 except with a short interregnum of Moshe Sharett’s period from
1954 to 1955. During the first phase, Israel witnessed ten government
formations, all led by Mapai. The dominance of Mapai in the government
came to be characterized as Mapaivot.
India, on the other hand, also witnessed the Congress-led government
for nearly two decades. The period was also called the ‘one-party domi-
nant system’ or the ‘Congress System’ as the Congress under Nehru
undertook the task of nation building by scoring comfortable majority
throughout the period. The opposition was strong in expression, but weak
in number.
Being at the helm of the state affair, Mapai made an effective use of the
‘party key’4 to establish its predominance in the political system. Despite
high hopes and expectations from the new government, the first coalition
experiment failed in October 1950 over a trivial issue of Ben-Gurion’s
proposal of creating a separate ministry of commerce and industry and
assigning it to a minister outside the Knesset.
Ben-Gurion easily overcame the first coalitional shock of the Religious
Front on the ministerial issue and formed the second coalition
government on 1 November 1950 by continuing with almost the same

coalitional team and with the same principles and objectives of its prede-
cessor. However, the second coalition government too proved to be
unstable and vulnerable owing to its minority status. The government
was defeated again on 14 February 1951 by the religious block, and this
time over the religious issue.
The religious parties comprising Mizrachi, HaPoel HaMizrachi, Aguda
Israel and Po’alei Aguda Israel collectively left the Mapai-led government
on the issue of religious education to the new immigrants. As against
Ben-Gurion’s emphasis of freedom of choice in educational preference for
the new immigrants, the religious parties had desired of an automatic
assignment of the immigrant children to the orthodox religious schools.
The results for the second Knesset did not improve the electoral
strength of Mapai; rather, it increased the number of qualifying lists
from 12 to 15. Mapai and its associated minority lists decided to form
the third coalition government again with the religious parties who were
once again rewarded with four ministries. They also got concession on
religious matters like military service for orthodox women, the ban on
non-kosher food imports and state subsidy for religious schools.
Hardly had the third coalition government crossed one year when it
was brought down by a sudden move of the Aguda parties on
19 December 1952. The Aguda parties resigned over the issue of national
service by orthodox women. They considered the Torah study far more
important for the state than the additional fighting force from the Yeshivot
(religious schools). Ben-Gurion sought to compensate the Aguda threat
by widening the coalition circle. He set up the fourth coalition govern-
ment on 23 December 1952 by taking into the government the moderate
religious Mizrakhis and the liberal rightist General Zionists and the Pro-
gressives. The fourth coalitional government continued to function until
December 1953.
The resignation of Ben-Gurion and his withdrawal from active politics
on the ground of excessive coalitional pressures led to the formation of the
fifth coalition government on 26 January 1954. The new government,
however, only reflected the change of political leadership, with Moshe
Sharett taking over the charge from Ben-Gurion. There was no change in
either parties joining the coalition or the government personnel holding
Premiership of Ben-Gurion (1949–63) and Jawaharlal Nehru. . . 265
the ministries. The fifth and coalition government simply reflected the
conspicuous absence of Ben-Gurion, and it continued to exist until
November 1955 by withstanding two important crises.
With the deepening crisis of the coalition government and the problem
of management of the coalitional, allies forced Mapai to thrust party
leadership on Ben-Gurion again. With the resignation of the Sharett’s
government, Ben-Gurion formed the seventh coalition government on
3 November 1955. The seventh coalition was called ‘turning point’ by
Peter Medding (1972), as it included Mapam and Ahdut Ha’avodah for
the first time since the formation of the first coalition government.
The eighth coalition government, which was set up by Ben-Gurion on
7 January 1958, continued until 5 July 1959. Even the fresh coalitional
experience was not free from crisis, and this time again the core of the
crisis happened to revolve around Ahdut Ha’avodah itself. The crisis was
created on the directive of the minister of interior from Ahdut Ha’avodah
regarding the issue of ‘who is a Jew’.
Holding of the fourth Knesset elections in November 1959 and the
formation of the ninth coalition government in December 1959 were
largely influenced by an important political event called the Lavon Affair.5
The Lavon case not only affected Mapai’s electoral strength in the Knesset
elections but also galvanized the intra-party crisis leading to the premature
fall of the coalition government and the final exit of its seasoned stalwart
Ben-Gurion.
The Lavon Affair continued to haunt Mapai and Ben-Gurion. The
party’s electoral strength in the Knesset got reduced from 47 in 1959 to
42 in 1961. Though the electoral result for the Knesset did not disturb the
pivotal position of Mapai, the decline in Mapai’s support continued to
make the task of coalition formation difficult for the leadership. The tenth
coalition government that was formed by Ben-Gurion on 2 November
1961, two and a half months in the aftermath of the Knesset elections, was
marred by severe internal and external crises. Ben-Gurion’s personal
preference for the ‘Young Turks’ within his own party made the veteran
leaders palpable. Though on earlier occasions the veteran leaders had
never dared to defy Ben-Gurion notwithstanding policy disagreements
and personal differences, his penchant admiration and support for the
young team disheartened many veterans.
The mid-1963 also witnessed the emergence of a four-party caucus

called ‘The Club of Four’. The Club of Four representing Mapam, Ahdut
Ha’avodah, NRP and the Liberals tried to organize strong opposition
against Mapai’s dominance during Ben-Gurion’s premiership. It also
sought to prevent Mapai from forming the coalition. The club even
attempted to allure Levi Eshkol by marginalizing Ben-Gurion, leading
to his resignation finally. The post-Gurion’s governments started weak-
ening the position of Mapai on the one hand and the emergence of
alternative parties like Liberals to go for a wider negotiation on the eve
of the 1965 election under the banner of Gahal on the other hand.
Unlike Ben-Gurion, Nehru didn’t face any major political challenge
from any of the quarters, either within the government or outside it. Being
the first choice of Gandhi, Nehru became the most accepted leader of the
post-independence Congress-led India. It is argued that Nehru faced the
toughest challenge to his leadership from Sardar Patel and Purushottam
Das Tandon. The sudden demise of Sardar Patel in 1950 and resignation
of Purushottam Das Tandon made Nehruvian leadership comparatively
unchallenged. In this backdrop, when the Congress under Nehru faced
the electorate in the first Lok Sabha elections during 1951–52, the party
didn’t face any formidable opposition. With the indomitable dominance
of the Congress both in the Parliament and the States, Nehru emerged as
the ‘unchallenged master of Indian scene’ (Metcalf and Metcalf 2002:
231). ‘Operating from a position of unquestioned strength, Nehru
impressed his will upon the administrative services, the military and the
legislature’ (Ibid.).
The 1956 elections to the Lok Sabha on the other hand once again
reposed trust in the Congress under Nehru’s leadership and brought the
Congress-led government back to the governance, both at the center and
in the states. Reposing trust of the electorate in the undisputed leadership
of Nehru and the Congress strengthened Nehru’s vision of taking India
into a new path of world politics and economic development. With strong
government at the center and in states led by the Congress, with Nehru at
its helm of affairs at the federal level, the parliamentary democracy
witnessed cohesion and balance under plural social and political setting.
The Congress government at the center remained undisputed. Strong
party structures working on the principle of consensus, called the
Premiership of Levi Eshkol (1963–69) and Lal. . . 267
Congress System (a la Rajni Kothari 1964), kept the party workers and
masses in good political tuning with the party high command.
Nehru-led Congress government made strong inroads into several
political constituencies. As an umbrella organization working on the
strength of the Syndicate System, Nehru was able to win over his political
opponents. He was able to contain important issues like Hindu Code Bill,
re-organization of states and promotion of Hindi and status of the
minorities from turning them into major crises. Even on the issue of his
relationship with the then President Rajendra Prasad, Nehru succeeded in
strengthening parliamentary democracy by bringing harmony between
the Head of the State and the Head of the Government.
Though some of his strongest critics became his greatest admirers,
Nehru faced criticism in later years, both organizationally and politically.
Nehru was criticized for placing the party below the government. In fact,
he tried to combine in himself the post of both parliamentary party
leadership and organizational party leadership. To overcome the criticism
leveled against his overarching power, he constituted the Kamraj Plan to
revamp the party organization. However, Nehru’s call for the senior
Congressmen from the parliamentary wing of the party to step down
from office in order to devote full time to organizational work did not
remain immune from criticism as Nehru adopted a ‘pick and choose’
policy, seeking voluntary step down from some leaders. Moreover, his
unflinching faith on China backfired, and India’s defeat in 1962 war with
China challenged Nehru’s political credibility, both nationally and inter-
nationally. The weak organizational structure of the Congress created
succession crisis after the death of Nehru, and it ultimately paved the
way for the split of the party in 1969.
Premiership of Levi Eshkol (1963–69) and Lal

Bahadur Shastri (1964–66)
Ben-Gurion’s marginalization leading to his abrupt expulsion from the
party led to a split in Mapai on the eve of the 1965 Knesset elections
followed by a major national crisis. Ben-Gurion’s supporters and his
young loyals, the Zeirim, left Mapai and formed Rafi. Eshkol’s entering
into an alliance and his personal rapport with members of Ahdut
Ha’avodah, the outspoken critic of Ben-Gurion and the staunchest oppo-
nent of mamlakhtiut, paved the way for the creation of Rafi. Ben-Gurion
claimed that ‘he had not left the party but the party had left its principles,
which he was seeking to restore’ (Medding 1990: 185) through Rafi.
The succession of political power to Levi Eshkol entailed crucial
challenges. The rift between the Zeirim and the Vatikim reached an
alarming proportion with the formation of Rafi. Moreover, the external
challenge against Mapai dominance had also started taking roots in the
parliamentary politics with the union of the Liberal Party (representing
the General Zionists and the Progressives) with Herut, called the Gahal.
To counter the multifaceted internal and external challenge, Levi
Eshkol entered into an electoral alliance with its long time old partner
Ahdut Ha’avodah and formed a parliamentary block called Maarach or
alignment. For the first time in the Israeli party politics, one witnesses the
concept of alignment politics, which took a new turn with a temporary
union of Mapai and Ahdut Ha’avodah. The electoral pact between the
two largely influenced the alignment of political forces. Hence, when the
election results for the sixth Knesset in 1965 were declared, many
Mapai opponents were taken by surprise, including the party’s own
workers and leaders.
Despite the overwhelming support by Ben-Gurion, Rafi could not
manage to win more than ten Knesset seats. The alignment bagged
45 seats and continued to hold the pivot in the Israeli parliamentary
politics and the process of coalition formation. Levi Eshkol sought to form
the coalition arrangement (13 in its row) with NRP, Mapam, the Inde-
pendent Liberals and Po’alei Agudat Yisrael besides Mapai and Ahdut
Ha’avodah on 12 January 1966. The coalition government could run for
two years until the sudden attack by Israeli’s Arab neighbors in 1967
necessitated the re-constitution of the coalition government with the
formation of the first national unity government.
Levi Eshkol formed the National Unity Government, which consti-
tuted the fourteenth coalition since independence on 1 June 1967 on the
eve of the war. It attempted to include two more coalitional partners,
namely, Rafi and Gahal. Gahal’s participation in the coalition government
for the first time attempted to accord political legitimacy to the right-wing
The Women Premiers: Golda Meir (1969–74) vs Indira Gandhi. . . 269
politics led by Herut. The international crisis that resulted in the after-
math of the Six-Day War and the War of Attrition considerably mini-
mized the internal political fighting among the political parties heading
for the 1969 Knesset elections, which Alan Arian described as an ‘election
of both continuity and change’ (Arian 1972: 9).
The death of Nehru in May 1964, on the other hand, facilitated the
transition of political power to his most honest and trusted Congressman,
Lal Bahadur Shastri. In the absence of succession criteria within the
Congress and the weakness of the organization in view of the partial
implementation of the Kamraj Plan, infighting, nay bitter, did take
place for Nehru’s successor. In fact, Shastri was accepted as the consensual
candidate for the Premiership after Nehru. He was equally liked by the
Syndicates because of his simplicity and modesty of working. Hence, the
first succession of political power from Nehru to Shastri took place smoothly.
India had to fight a second successive war with Pakistan in 1965 under
Shastri’s Premiership. Shastri’s populist slogan, ‘Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan’ (Hail
the Soldier, Hail the Farmer) became most important buzz word with
immense receptivity in the country. Shastri, however, remained a weak
prime minister. He did not have any hold on the leaders of the Syndicate,
who started exerting more pressures on the working of the government.
Though Shastri emerged as the most populist national leader in the
aftermath of the 1965 war across the party, government, nation and the
world; he could not enjoy the benefits of the Indian victory in the
aftermath of the 1965 war. The sudden demise of Shastri soon after
signing the Tashkent Agreement6 in January 1966 remained shrouded
in mystery. The premature death of Shastri created a real succession crisis
both within the Congress and the government at the center.
The Women Premiers: Golda Meir (1969–74) vs

Indira Gandhi (1967–77)
The year 1969 assumed significance for both Israel and India as it
formalized the splits in the major parties. While Mapai transformed itself
into the Labor Party, the Congress initially split into Congress (O) and
Congress (R), and subsequently becoming as Congress (I) in 1971.7
The Labor Party was the outcome of its previous alignment constitu-
ents, namely, Mapai, Ahdut Ha’avodah and Rafi. Since the Mapai’s
dominance remained unchallenged even under the new formation, the
Labor soon found the coalition formation to be in tune with its own
preconditions. The leadership of the Labor also fell under its first woman
head, Golda Meir. So, under Golda Meir’s Premiership, the Labor formed
the fifteenth coalition government on 17 March 1969, comprising
Mapam, NRP, Po’alei Agudat Yisrael, Independent Liberals and the
Gahal (as full-time member).
Golda Meir had to bear the war burden, and hence it faced the soaring
economy, heightened defence budget, increasing manpower, opening
markets, changing international scenario, especially in relation to the
USA. The new coalition arrangement was subjected to its first crisis on
the issue of the Roger Plan. Put forward by the US Secretary of State
William Rogers, the plan advocated a ceasefire and peace negotiations
under the UN auspices, thereby seeking Israel’s compliance with the UN
resolution 242 on the occupied territories. It was feared that the Roger
proposal would lead to the surrender of parts of the Eretz Israel the
country had won in the wake of the 1967 War. Hence, the acceptance
of the Roger Plan by the Golda Meir government led Gahal to leave the
government in July 1970.
Nevertheless, the comfortable majority of the Labor alignment in the
Knesset did not lead to the premature fall of the government; rather, it
merely reflected the re-constitution of the government and re-distribution
of the ministerial payoffs to the new coalitional partners. Without much
of the political bickering, Golda Meir was able to constitute the sixteenth
coalition government with NRP and the Independent Liberals in addition
to the Labor and Mapam on 30 July 1970. The sixteenth coalition
government continued to function until the next Knesset elections
in 1973.
The elections to the seventh (1969) and the eighth Knesset (1973) were
preceded by two crucial wars the Israeli democratic polity faced in its
march toward political consolidation and international legitimacy. While
the Six-Day War of June 1967 brought about overwhelming credibility to
the Israeli political and defence establishment, the Yom Kippur War of
1973 greatly eroded the Israeli invincibility the state had gained in the
aftermath of the 1967 War.
The Yom Kippur War led to the postponement of the elections
scheduled for October, to December 1973. The Knesset results for
1973 continued to maintain the pivotal position of the Labor alignment,
which mustered 51 seats. The Labor, nevertheless, did get a strong
challenge from the new combination of right-wing forces under the
banner of Likud, winning 39 seats. Being the first alliance of the right-
wing political spectrum with such a comfortable electoral strength, the
Likud also came to be referred as ‘the Alignment against the Alignment’
(Arian 1975: 11).
The coalition negotiation for the seventeenth government began under
Golda Meir soon after the declaration of the result and the subsequent
authorization by the president in that regard. It took a longer time for the
Labor leader to constitute the coalition agreement in view of the wide
differences within the constituent units. After a long understanding and
compromise, Golda Meir formed the coalition government on 10 March
1974, which included the Labor, Mapam, NRP and the Independent
Liberals.
‘The increased parliamentary strength of the Likud made Labor more
vulnerable to intra-party cleavages’ (Nachmias 1975: 249). Criticism was
directed against Defence Minister Moshe Dayan representing the Rafi
faction within Labor rather than against Prime Minister Golda Meir.
Even the minority lists associated with the Labor started clamoring for
more ministerial payoffs in the proto-coalition. The NRP’s youth wing
also started pressing for exercising more militant stand on the issue of
territories and insisting on the adherence for the halakhic conversion of
the immigrants.
‘The formation of the government did not calm down the party’s
internal discontent. The old guard retained its control within the party,
but at the cost of intensifying and crystallizing the discontent along
factional lines’ (Ibid., 252). The dissension within the Labor and the
internal crisis within its coalitional partner NRP led Golda Meir to resign
just after one month from the hectic parleys of the formation of the
seventeenth coalition government on 10 March 1974. Despite the
coalitional crisis, Golda Meir continued to hold the caretaker government

until 3 June 1974 when Rabin took over the prime ministership from her.
In India, during the period, the Congress system received the first
major setback in the aftermath of Nehru and Shastri. Absence of any
acceptable consensual candidate for the party leadership sowed the seeds
of dissension within the Congress. Nehru did not get time to give more
political or party assignments to Indira Gandhi, his favorite daughter. As a
result, Indira Gandhi never emerged as the acceptable candidate for the
post of prime minister. Moreover, Indira Gandhi was a young leader with
less political experience and maturity. Hence, she failed to emerge as the
favorite leader of the Congress presidency among the Syndicate leaders.
Amidst the legitimacy crisis regarding Indira Gandhi’s elevation to the
post of prime ministership among the Syndicates, the Congress went to
the 1967 Lok Sabha polls under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. Not
only did the party fail miserably in the Lok Sabha elections, it also lost
assembly elections in most of the states. The defeats of the Congress were
more because of the internal fighting than external forces. The Syndicate
played a crucial role in the defeat of the party. Though the Congress under
Indira Gandhi somehow managed to form the government in an alliance
with the Communists and the rightist parties, the Syndicate leaders like
Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram started working out a non-Congress
alternative both at the center and in the states.
The Congress witnessed the first major split in 1969 resulting into the
emergence of Congress (R) led by Indira Gandhi and Congress
(O) spearheaded by the dissident leaders of the Congress Syndicate.
Indian party system faced the first coalitional experiment at the center
when Indira Gandhi ruled the nation with the support of coalitional
partners. Despite the coalition, Indira Gandhi did not hesitate in taking
aggressive measures in important policy matters. The abolition of privy
purses, nationalization of banks, and so forth were some of the important
policy decisions taken by her government in 1969. On the organizational
front too she started revamping the party by bringing her loyalists to the
party fora to counter the Syndicate. Bypassing the Syndicates, Indira
Gandhi resorted to the populism and personal charisma and entered the
1971 elections by making direct appeal to the masses under the slogan
‘Garibi Hatao’ (Remove Poverty).
The 1971 elections to the fifth Lok Sabha assumed significance because
of many reasons. It was the first election contested and won by the
Congress (R) under the sole leadership of Indira Gandhi with phenom-
enal rise in seats as well as votes for the party. The overwhelming victory of
the Congress added a new epithet to the Congress as ‘I’ meaning Indira.
Congress Ruling thus became Congress I from 1971 onward, and so did
Indira Gandhi come to be acknowledged in the political circles as Mrs.
Gandhi. Secondly, the defeat of the non-Congress oppositional forces
gave free hand to Mrs. Gandhi to make and unmake her loyalists both
within the party and the government. Committed cadres, leaders, bureau-
crats, party functionaries, loyalists and so forth got accustomed to the
Congress culture, with Mrs. Gandhi commanding and controlling the
High Command. Thirdly, with a comfortable majority at the center, Mrs.
Gandhi brought about sweeping changes in different institutions, includ-
ing the Constitution, which ultimately made her a real autocrat and
despotic ruler. The authoritarian ruling of Mrs. Gandhi ultimately
transformed into an internal emergency from 1975 to 77, especially
after the Allahabad High Court questioning her election victory of
1971. Finally, the authoritarian tendencies of the Congress not only led
to the deinstitutionalization of the system as characterized by social
scientists but also to the crystallization of the anti-Congress political
formation across the nation.
Both Gold Meir and Indira Gandhi undertook Premierships at a crucial
juncture when the two major parties had been undergoing transformation
with splits and counter-splits. Unlike Indira, Golda Meir’s approach to
government formation and working was suave and sophisticated, as it
broadly took all the coalition partners into major policy decision-making
process. Mrs. Gandhi’s populism backed with pragmatism and astute
statesmanship made the head of Government power-centric, centralized
and thus authoritarian.
The First Alternative Premiership: Menachem

Begin (1977–83) vs Morarji Government
[1977–80]
The year 1977 marked a watershed in the parliamentary history of both
Israel and India when, for the first time, the one-party dominance in both
the countries—Mapai in Israel and Congress in India—suffered magnan-
imous electoral defeats in the elections, which resulted in the formation of
the Likud and Janata Party governments in two nations.
The election to the ninth Knesset was held in May 1977 amidst the
growing disenchantment against the Labor-led government and the seri-
ous Labor scandals. For the first time in the preceding three decades
history of Israel, the Labor dominance got replaced by the new combina-
tion of forces from the right-wing parties under the banner of Likud and
its commonly accepted and consensual leader Menachem Begin in 1977.
Political commentators described the 1977 elections as the first transition
of power in Israeli politics, which came to be characterized by the Hebrew
term ‘Mahapach’. Begin’s government also came to be called the ‘upheaval
government’.
India also witnessed the first non-Congress government at the Center
and in many states of the Union in 1977. The excesses of the Indira-led
Congress during national emergency from 1975 to 77 brought about
immense disrepute to the Congress besides highlighting the high-
handedness of its leadership. The powers of the State got concentrated
in the hands of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay
Gandhi and their coterie taking all major decisions of the democratic
elected government. The executive overtaking even the power of judiciary
and legislature besides throttling the fundamental rights of citizens didn’t
go well with the citizens, and protests against the Congress regime started
all across the country. The democratic protest movement was led by Jaya
Prakash Narayan, called ‘JP’, who was instrumental in forging an anti-
Congress alliance of parties under the banner the Janata Parivar that came
to displace the Congress in 1977.
Though the 1977 elections did not provide absolute majority to the
Likud, it strengthened its dominant and pivotal position in the Knesset.
The First Alternative Premiership: Menachem Begin (1977–83). . . 275
Under the charismatic leadership and political maturity of Begin, Likud

initiated the coalition negotiations. Likud’s own share in its projected
electoral strength was 43. Begin formed the twentieth coalition govern-
ment with NRP, Shlomzion (later rejoined Likud), Agudat Yisrael and the
Independent Liberals on 20 June 1977.
According to Shlomo Aronson and Nathan Yanai (1984), the Likud
under Begin attempted to introduce three changes in its coalitional
attitude, namely, acceptance of coalition as a legitimate and desirable
rather than forced form of government, wider coalitional agreement
based on maximal ideological understanding and a generous approach
in coalitional allocations.
Begin’s first coalitional experiment stayed until October 1977 when it
also succeeded in breaking the dilemma of the Democratic Movement for
Change (DMC), a strong centrist force led by Yigael Yadin and Amnon
Rubinstein. Some of the DMC members having had admiration for Begin
and also sharing the Likud’s hawkish orientation on the issue of territory
and security finally convinced the DMC leadership of accepting Begin’s
ministerial concessions in coalition formation. Hence, with the hope of
reforming and changing the coalition from within, the DMC ultimately
agreed to join the Begin-led coalition government. Accepting coalition
offers made DMC ‘an old unwanted spinster’ (Torgovnik 1980: 94).
Peretz and Doron (1997) stated that the issues of peace, foreign affairs
and occupied territories led to serious political ruptures within the Likud
and the government. A Likud faction, which was utterly disenchanted
with Begin’s peace overtures to Egypt and the territories, left the party to
form Tehiya. A split occurred within DMC over the issue of Camp David
accords. A group led by Rubinstein left the DMC and formed Shinui
before the subsequent elections.
The soaring inflation, frequent resignations of ministers and increasing
corruption scandals made the first right-centrist coalition experiment or
the upheaval government more vulnerable. Begin managed to survive the
first four years of the twenty-first coalitional government. The govern-
ment faced tremendous economic crisis and strong protest of the militant
right-wing parties in the Knesset against its peace planks with Egypt.
Moreover, the conviction and prosecution of Begin’s cabinet minister
from the NRP (Aharon Abu-Hatzeira) and the increasing dispute between
the interior minister and the police commissioner regarding several cor-
ruption charges and criminal cases that led latter’s resignation severely
damaged the credibility of the government.
In India, the emergence of the Janata Government in 1977 was the
outcome of the painstaking efforts and initiatives of JP who succeeded in
projecting Morarji Desai as the consensual leader of the Janata Premier.
However, the very emergence of the Janata Parivar was based on the
one-point agenda of anti-Congressism formation. The four key political
players and leaders—Charan Singh of Bharatiya Lok Dal, Jagjivan Ram of
Congress for Democracy, George Fernandes of the Socialist Party, and
Vajpayee and Advani from the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—were crucial in
forming the government under the label ‘Janata Parivar’. Most of the
Janata constituents had emerged from the Congress party itself. Hence,
their ideology, programs and policies were directly or indirectly influenced
by their parent mentor, the Congress.
Since the very existence of the Janata Parivar was based on ‘negativism’,
the motley combination of all five political parties with different ideolog-
ical orientations became vulnerable to intra-group infighting. The leader-
ship tussle among the top party leaders for prime ministership as well as
the ideological battle over dual membership8 ultimately brought the
Janata Parivar to its premature end in 1979.
With the promise of the support from Mrs. Gandhi, Charan Singh,
who was instrumental in bringing down the Janata Government, formed
the government for a very short period. However, the expected support
from the Congress did not actually come forward, and Charan Singh
government resigned before seeking the parliament’s vote of confidence
in 1980.
While the electoral results for the seventh Lok Sabha in 1980 witnessed
the return of the Congress as the one-party dominance system under
Indira Gandhi, the tenth Knesset attempted to institutionalize the block
politics. The Knesset results reflected an almost equal parity between the
two political blocks—Likud with 48 seats and the Labor-led Alignment
with 47 seats.
Shlomo Aronson and Nathan Yanai argued that the new Knesset
strongly demonstrated expansion of the ‘coalitionary circle’ with no
factions inclined to be excluded from coalition politics and all preferred
The First Alternative Premiership: Menachem Begin (1977–83). . . 277
to be included in a coalition bargaining. This new ‘coalitionary’ attitude,

contrary to exclusive protest polices prevalent among radical parties in the
past, according to the authors, was the ‘product of the new competitive
two-block dominance in the Israeli party system and its attendant political
and social polarization’ (Aronson and Yanai 1984: 13).
Asher Arian stated that in the 1981 elections, Likud largely ‘benefited
from its image of newness, of innocence, and was given credit for its
efforts in undoing many of the difficult legacies it had inherited from the
Alignment’ (Arian 1983: 5–6). Begin’s personal charisma and his rhetor-
ical ability also increased Likud’s popularity despite some setbacks the first
upheaval government had faced in its four-year turn.
By virtue of getting more seats than the Labor and its Alignment, Likud
was called to form the coalition government with the help of its own
supporting lists. With its own comfortable strong base of 48 seats, Likud
under Begin offered the coalitional overtures to the NRP, Agudat Yisrael
and Tami for the formation of the 22nd coalition government. The
combined allied partners under Likud were able to muster 61 seats and
easily formed the government. Later, Tehiya also joined in summer of
1982 in the wake of Lebanon war leading to the coalition strength of
64 seats.
The Likud government tried to keep its ‘shaky coalition intact and
succeeded in overcoming crisis after crisis’ (Arian 1986: 3). However, fall
in the stock prices, the soaring inflation rate (400 per cent a year) and
continuing fatalities in Lebanon created political ruptures within the
coalition and paved the way for early elections.
The premature fall of the Janata-led government, first under Morarji
Desai, and later under Charan Singh, provided time and space to the
Congress to move beyond emergency hangover of the masses and to
present a viable alternative to the oppositional disunity. The 1980 election
results once again returned Congress under Indira, with clear majority at
the helm of governance. The issues of populism gave way to the notion of
working governance.
The Indira Government from 1980 to 84 steered the nation toward the
path of development and modernization. The overwhelming majority of
the Congress in the government with 43 per cent of the votes and 67 per
cent of the seats provided Indira Gandhi free space to manage the polity
and ensure governance. The Opposition failed to confront Congress

aggressively either with its numbers or with its ferocity.
The assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 forced an early election by
creating a sympathy wave for the Congress. The emergence of Rajiv
Gandhi, Indira’s pilot son, brought about a new transformation in
Indian parliamentary democracy. The 1984 elections conducted in the
aftermath of Indira’s death gave Congress and its young leader an over-
whelming majority, not witnessed even during the heyday of Nehru and
Indira Gandhi. With 49 per cent of the votes and 79 per cent of the seats,
Congress under Rajiv appeared to take India toward new horizons of
democratic polity.
Expanding Political Horizons: The National

Governments in Israel and India (1984–90)
The year 1984 marked new political formations and electoral alignments
in the democratic politics of both Israel and India. While in Israel the
leadership tussle assumed significance with the resignation of Begin, in
India the assassination of Indira Gandhi brought about new democratic
transformation in the parliamentary politics of the country.
The elections for the eleventh Knesset in 1984 were preceded by
leadership tussle in both the major parties. With Begin’s resignation, the
leadership race within Likud became more acute between Yitzhak Shamir
and Ariel Sharon. The succession crisis also crippled the Labor, as it
highlighted leadership tussle between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.
As ethnicity started getting an important manifestation during the elec-
tions from 1981 onward, the leadership race did have an ethnic orienta-
tion as well, with the two Sephardi contenders David Levy and Yitzhak
Navon braced for the race in the Likud and Labor, respectively.
The leadership struggle finally brought a consensus on both the leading
parties, and Likud under Shamir and Labor under Peres went to the polls
to determine the political future of the next government. Though the
competing lists for the Knesset came down from 31 in 1981 to 26 in
1984, the lists ultimately qualifying for coalition formation increased
Expanding Political Horizons: The National Governments in. . . 279
from 10 to 15 in these two election years. Not only the role of minor
parties increased in 1984 elections but competitiveness and polarization
also reached its peak during the elections with an increase in violence and
ethnic incitement. Ethnicity and future of the territories became impor-
tant issues during elections.
The shrinking electoral base of the Labor and Likud was a key factor in
going for the common unity government as neither of the two was in a
position to form a stable coalition without the other. Hence, the second
National Unity Government was formed in 1984, which was largely the
outcome of the political stalemate created as a result of the eleventh
Knesset elections. ‘The second national unity government stemmed
more from mathematical need than from political desire’ (Arian 1990:
209). Also called ‘Tied Government’, the 23rd coalition government was
set up under Shimon Peres of the Labor as prime minister to be replaced
by Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud after 25 months of service.
Though the Labor and the Likud carefully arranged a balanced distri-
bution of ministries, timetables and commitments between themselves,
they also brought other like-minded parties, particularly the religious
parties, into the coalition agreement, thereby raising the electoral strength
of the national unity government to an unexpected 97 members. Arian
stated that by overcoming the centrifugal tendencies of the party system,
the national unity governments ‘helped Israel achieve both stability and
competitiveness’ (Ibid., 205).
The national unity government became vulnerable to the intra-
ministerial clashes, recriminations and tensions between prime minister
and other ministers in view of lack of cooperation between the key
ministers owing to the rotation principle. The reducing cooperation
resulted in inconsistency in governmental policies and decisions, particu-
larly because of the coexistence of two parallel authorities with conflicting
commands and ambivalent demands. A series of embarrassing disclosures
like Israel’s role in the Iran Contra affair and Shin Bet’s attempt in
falsification of evidence did bring disrepute to the government, though
without bringing its downfall. Nevertheless, despite the crises, the second
national unity government, which was forced by the internal or domestic
expediency, completed its four-year turn.
The 1988 elections for the Knesset brought both the Likud and the
Labor nearly at par with each other. The Likud with its 40 Knesset seats
was asked to form the government. The religious parties with significant
18 seats became potential coalition bargainers for the new government.
Though Shamir opened the coalition negotiations with the religious
parties as well, he soon realized the futility of a coalition with the religious
parties in view of their expected pressure for incorporating the Halachcha
(the Jewish religious law) principle in the conversion process. In order to
skip the religious blackmailing, both Likud and Labor once again decided
to go for the second consecutive national unity government, 24th Coali-
tion Government in sequence and the third Unity Government since
statehood.
The national unity government under Shamir also included NRP, Shas
and Agudat Yisrael in addition to Labor and Likud. In view of the
comfortable position of the Likud and its allies and the split within the
Labor-led alignment owing to the departure of Mapam, the rotation of
the PM was not brought in the coalition agenda. The religious parties,
which got isolated in the coalition negotiations, joined the national unity
government as junior partners only in the end of the term.
The third unity government continued to carry many of the features of
the previous national unity governments. However, it also witnessed
intra-Likud fighting on the issue of peace conciliation with Palestinians.
Peres sought to take the advantage of the bitter feud within Likud and
hoped to form an alternative government; he brought down Shamir’s
government with a vote of no confidence on 15 March 1990. Rabin
described the failed attempt by Peres as the ‘dirty trick’. This was the first
no-confidence motion in the history of Israel. The government fell by a
vote of 60 to 55. The motion initiated by the Labor came to be supported
by the entire left including the Arabs and the Aguda Israel. The abstention
of the five out of the six Shas members proved beneficial for Peres and
detrimental for Shamir and ultimately succeeded in the downfall of the
government.
The fall of the Shamir-led national unity government activated the
coalition negotiations more vigorously. Both the leaders of the Labor and
the Likud were wooing the parties of the other camps besides ensuring the
cohesiveness of their own flock. As Asher Arian and Michal Shamir
Expanding Political Horizons: The National Governments in. . . 281
argued, the Knesset became a ‘seller’s market’ (Arian and Shamir 1995:
11) where everyone was approaching every other one with future promises
in the hope of forming the coalition. The first Indian coalition experience
in 1969 too got equated with ‘Market Polity’ by Morris-Jones (1978) and
was based on bargaining among parties leading to defection.
Reeling under the sympathetic wave in the aftermath of Indira
Gandhi’s assassination, the post-1984 developments in India too brought
about new political convulsions. Deviating from Indira Gandhi’s high-
handed approach and authoritarian rule, Rajiv was more federal in terms
of accommodating demands from his opponents, both within and outside
the party. The dynamism and innovation enabled Rajiv to make new
experiments in governance. India under him started moving from License
Raj toward privatization. It is generally claimed that Indian economy
started moving toward the phase of liberalization and globalization
under Rajiv’s era.
Political commentators have tried to define political governance in
India from the 1980s in terms of ‘2½ Years of Governance’ (a la Ashish
Nandy 1995). While during the first two and a half years the ruling party
gets overwhelming support from the electorate, which finally gets reflected
in more populism, the second spell of governance, that is, the next two
and a half years of governance, is beset with controversies and frustration.
While the Congress under Mrs. Gandhi and later Mr. Rajiv Gandhi got a
comfortable public mandate, their governance was beset with political
controversies and scandals.
One such scandal that brought down the Rajiv Gandhi government
was Bofors scandal involving crores of Indian rupees as ‘bribes’. The tirade
against the Rajiv Gandhi government was taken by V. P. Singh—the
finance minister under the Congress government—who resigned from the
Congress and formed the Jana Morcha. The Jana Morcha under V. P.
Singh tried to cobble together all the non-Congress parties under one
umbrella. The Jana Morcha along with Lok Dal and other minor parties
finally formed the coalitional government under the National Front
banner in 1989. The National Front Government led by V. P. Singh
tried to revive the Janata Parivar experiment of 1977 at the center after
one decade. The government got outside support from the Communists
on the one hand and the BJP on the other. It was the second
non-Congress political alternative at the center that became possible due

to the prevalent anti-Congressism.
To counter the Mandal card of the V P Singh government, BJP
championed KaMandal (signifying stoup used by saints) and undertook
a massive Rath Yatra to build Ram temple in Ayodhya by BJP leader L K
Advani. The arrest of Advani by V. P. Singh made BJP withdraw the
support to the National Front Government in 1990, leading to the
premature fall of the second non-Congress government. Until the elec-
tions to the Lok Sabha were declared, Chandra Shekher was made the
prime minister for a very short period.
The second non-Congress experiment, a la Janata Parivar type, was
different from its first formation in the sense that unlike the intra-party
leadership of the first coalitional government, it went ahead with the
polarization of the Indian society on caste lines. Indian political society
after a long gap of 50 years once again witnessed the resurgence of the
caste consciousness and caste consolidation leading to political fragmen-
tation. Though political commentators have characterized this change as
the ‘second democratic upsurge’ (a la Yogender Yadav 2000), the electoral
transformation brought issues of development and governance on the
back burner.
Political uncertainty that emerged out of the extensive bargaining and
negotiations between and among the leading and minor parties created a
great setback to the parliamentary norms and democratic traditions of the
Israeli politics. The dismal performance of the National Front Govern-
ment once again made the electorate believe in the Congress in 1991 for
reasons of stability and trust. From this backdrop, both Israel and India
headed for another phase to be characterized as LPG.
Beginning of the LPG Era and Strengthening

of Coalitions
The decade of the mid-1980s and the beginning of the 1990s witnessed
the emergence of LPG referring to Liberalization, Privatization and Glob-
alization. The changes in the economic domain in both Israel and India
Yitzhak Shamir (1990–92) vs Narasimha Rao (1991–96) 283
were also reflected in working of political governments and the strength-

ening of coalitions. From one-party-dominated government of the 1950s
and 1960s, both Israel and India entered into the one-party-headed coali-
tions from late 1980s and early 1990s onward.
Yitzhak Shamir (1990–92) vs Narasimha Rao

(1991–96)
To overcome the coalition crisis, Shamir finally made substantial concil-
iatory overtures to the parties of the ethno-religious block and the militant
nationalist block and formed the 25th coalition government with their
support in 1990. The new coalition partners included the NRP, Shas of
the ethno-religious block, and Tehiya, Tsomet and Moledet of the nation-
alist block. The support of Mizrahi of Aguda Yisrael and Ephraim Gur of
Labor ensured Shamir’s coalitional strength to 62. Both Mizrahi and Gur
were made the deputy ministers. Moreover, in view of his weakened
stature, both within the party and the government, Shamir was forced
to give ministries against his will. Three of his four senior ministers—
Levy, Modai and Sharon—were given the Foreign, Finance and Immi-
gration Ministries against his better judgment. Sprinzak stated that ‘no
Israeli premier has even been constrained in this way’ (Sprinzak 1993:
131) as Shamir had in 1990.
Shamir’s increasing vulnerability both to the hardliners of his own party
and the religious parties forced him to put on shelves the peaceful agenda
for the Palestinians initiated under the Rabin-Shamir Peace Plan. The
composition of the new coalition with a profound nationalistic orienta-
tion changed the very nature of its dealing with the peace process for
Palestinians. The changing nature of Intifada from peaceful civil disobe-
dience to violent resurgence went on strengthening the Israeli rigid stands
vis-à-vis the Palestinians.
The twin pressures of the ethno-religious and the nationalist block
further led Shamir’s government to make many catchy rhetoric announce-
ments and provocative declarations like non-negotiation with the Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization (PLO), refusal to return the liberated
territories to the Palestinians and possible settling of the new influx of the
Russian immigrants in the West Bank. Such declarations, however, led
the deteriorations in the American-Israeli relations.
Shamir’s neutrality in the Gulf crisis and his participation in the
Madrid Conference won him great laurels both at home and abroad.
However, within a year, the wide popularity of Shamir and the Likud
started waning not because of coalitional constraints but due to his
declining hold on his own party ministers and the governmental
mismanagement. Sharon’s ambitious settlement plan antagonized the
Bush administration, which linked the American-sanctioned $10 billion
loan guarantees to the settlement freeze. Shamir’s decision to sacrifice the
loan guarantees for the settlements had serious repercussions for the
crippling Israeli economy, leading to growing unemployment and the
increasing immigrants’ wrath on the Likud-led government.
The infighting within the Likud trio and the corruption charges against
the party members further brought disrepute to the Shamir government.
Rabin on the other hand emerged with a clean image, especially after his
victory in the party primaries, and his focus on the retention of the
‘strategic settlements’ as against the Likud-oriented ‘political settlement’
made him widely popular. Likud’s opposition to the bill for direct
election of the prime minister was ‘read as support of the corrupt status
quo, and also as a fear to confront the popular Rabin’ (Sprinzak 1993:
137). Under these circumstances, Israel went to the polls for the thir-
teenth Knesset in 1992.
Indian political history witnessed significant developments during
1989–91. This period was largely dominated by three major develop-
ments—politics of religion, political exploitation of caste and pursuit of
economic liberalization. All these major developments tended to occupy
their respective place in the national polity. V. P. Singh re-invented the
caste as the new political reality with the Mandal implications. Fearing
that the Mandal would lead to the erosion of its base, BJP resorted to the
issue of Ramjanmabhoomi. The Congress sought to meet these twin
challenges by playing the Manmohan Singh’s card of economic liberali-
zation. ‘In the five years that followed the country experienced strife and
corruption, and both buoyancy and decline of the economy alternately’
(Roy 1997).
Directly Elected Israeli Premiers: Rabin, Netanyahu, Barak and. . . 285
The post-1990 politics in India was influenced by ‘Mandal, Mandir,

Masjid and Market’ to be characterized by ‘M4’, referring to the issues of
caste, temple, mosque and economic liberalization.
Directly Elected Israeli Premiers: Rabin,

Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon (1992–2003) vs
the United Front Coalitions (1996–1998)
The 1990s marked innovations and new experiments in both Israel and
India. While the Israeli parliamentary politics underwent the direct elec-
tion to the post of prime minister for more than a decade, Indian political
scene witnessed institutionalizing the coalitions and change of the prime
ministers at the behest of the supporting coalitional partners.
Elections to the thirteenth Knesset in 1992 took place under the
backdrop of two significant electoral laws—raising the electoral threshold
for the Knesset from 1 to 1.5 per cent and the direct election of the prime
minister. While the 1992 elections took place under the first changed
electoral rule, the implementation of the second principle was postponed
until the election of the next Knesset. The introduction of the direct
primaries and overwhelming victory of Yitzhak Rabin over his long time
electoral opponent and political rival Shimon Peres enhanced his stature
within the Labor and the country.
‘Labor under Rabin’ entered the 1992 electoral fray for the Knesset
whose results came to be viewed by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir as the
second turnover or ‘Mahapach’, though different from 1977 in view of
weakening social allegiance and heightening divisive issues (of territories).
The support for the return of territories and ‘peace in exchange of
territories’ as against the idea of Eretz Yisrael gained ascendancy in
1992. Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997) also characterized the
1992 elections as the ‘second transition of power’ in the Israeli parlia-
mentary politics. The 1992 elections significantly reduced the number of
qualifying lists from 15 to 10. The decline of the role of the smaller parties
appeared to make the coalition formation smooth.
The defeat of the Likud and the demise of the block of parties sought to
strengthen the birth of ‘coalitional multipolarity’. By winning 44 seats on
its own turf, the Labor constituted a ‘blocking majority’ in the thirteenth
Knesset that was strong enough to prevent any possible right–religious
coalition. Shas’ participation in Rabin’s 26th coalition highlighted the
breakdown of the special coalitional chord that had hitherto been devel-
oped between the religious parties and Likud in the aftermath of the first
upheaval in 1977.
Immediately on forming the coalition government, Rabin went ahead
with his election pledges of freezing the new settlements in West Bank. It
also resumed stalemated bilateral peace negotiations with the Palestinians,
which resulted in the signing of Oslo Accords in January 1993. Rabin’s
domestic firmness and international flexibility received wide international
acclaim resulting in the Noble award for peace, which he shared with
Foreign Minister Peres and the PLO Chief Yasser Arafat. However,
Rabin’s ultra-dovish stands irked many hardliners of the right and the
religious block.
In India, during the same period, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was
assassinated by the hardliners for sending Indian army to the Golden
Temple in Amritsar. Yitzhak Rabin too was assassinated by a Jewish
religious extremist on 4 November 1995 for his conciliatory peace over-
tures to Palestinians. Rabin’s demise led to the formation of the caretaker
government under Peres. The caretaker government continued for not
more than six months when the crucial elections to the fourteenth Knesset
and the prime minister were held in May 1996.
The elections to the fourteenth Knesset in 1996 assumed extraordinary
significance in the Israeli parliamentary politics as they were held con-
comitantly with the direct election of the prime minister. The coexistence
of the simultaneous election of the prime minister and the Knesset
members was based on the revised electoral law, which had stated the
prime ministerial candidates to be the heads of their respective party lists,
should attain more than 50 per cent of the valid votes to avoid the second
round of elections, besides others.
While the prime ministerial election was described by Giddeon Doron
and Barry Kay (1995) as the ‘winner-take-all system’, much like the ‘first
past the post system’ in India, the Knesset continued to be elected by the
same system of proportional representation based on the list system with

the electoral threshold fixed for the same as in the preceding election,
namely, 1.5 per cent. The direct election of the prime minister was
intended to contain the blackmailing tactics of the smaller parties, partic-
ularly the religious parties, by making the prime minister free from their
maneuvering. The 1996 elections were also the first election based on the
split voting where the voters were free to split their choices between the
prime ministerial candidates and their Knesset list.
The elections to the Knesset and the prime minister were preceded by
the primary elections in the leading parties. The race for the prime
ministership, therefore, got confined to the Labor’s Shimon Peres and
Likud’s Binyamin Netanyahu, fondly called ‘Bibi’. Owing to the fluidity
of the system and the newness of the electoral provision, the pollsters
failed to predict the actual outcome of the prime ministerial results.
Netanyahu’s extensive media projection and his principle of ensuring
peace with security readily caught the common man’s psyche as against
Peres’ emphasis on peace before security. Efraim Karsh argued that
Netanyahu was not elected owing to his charismatic personality or
depth of ideas; rather, he was catapulted to power by an ‘atavistic mixture
of fear and hope at an extremely vulnerable moment in the nation’s life, to
which his simplistic promise of "peace with security" seemed a panacea’
(Karsh 1997: i).
The election results for the prime minister astonished the pollsters,
whereas the Knesset results surprised the leading parties of the socialist
and the rightist camps. The results were seen as ‘election shocker’ with the
prevalent maxim, ‘voters went to sleep with (Shimon) Peres and woke up
with Netanyahu’ (Newman 2016). By winning 50.49 per cent of the valid
votes, Netanyahu defeated Peres who scored 49.51 per cent of the votes
by a narrow margin of less than 1 per cent of valid votes. The Knesset
results, however, brought greater disappointments to both Likud and
Labor, as both the key parties gained 32 and 34 seats, respectively.
Though Netanyahu’s direct election as the prime minister absolved
him the petty party maneuverings, the formation of the coalition appeared
to be an uphill task full of bargaining and conciliations. Despite a smaller
share of the Likud and its electoral constituents in the Knesset,
Netanyahu-led 27th coalition government, which included NRP, Shas,
Yisrael B’Aliya, Third Way and Yahadut Hatorah, was endorsed by the
Knesset on 18 June 1996.
The sturdy silence of the new electoral law over the prime ministerial
power and areas of influence enabled the first elected incumbent to use it
by employing the vast arena of discretion. One such attempt of Netan-
yahu, according to Neill Lochery, led to the development of the Prime
Minister Office (PMO) along the presidential lines. Centralizing the
powers under PMO could be equated with the Indian experience of the
prime ministerial model where PMO has become the actual wielder of
power. Netanyahu’s PMO came to be ‘based not on the White House
model but rather the Kremlin’ (Lochery 2000: 225).
Netanyahu’s attempt to influence and direct different aspects of the
ministerial activities strengthened the opposition of different factions
within the cabinet. His government witnessed the formation of several
‘coalitions of leaders’ within the ‘coalition of parties’ constituting his
cabinet, which were bound to influence the stability and durability of
the government. Jonathan Mendilow argued that Netanyahu’s attempts
to placate both the moderates and the rightists within the Likud and the
coalition led to inconsistent policies and loss of credibility. He character-
ized Netanyahu as ‘Overloaded Juggler’ (Mendilow 2002: 199) who faced
crisis after crisis soon after the formation of the government.
However, until the time of the realization, the dissension within the
large coalitional partners had already become too wide. Netanyahu’s pleas
and pledges to the members of different parties and blocks cutting across
the left-right continuum failed to save his government. Unable to secure
the support of his own coalition allies, Netanyahu finally supported the
opposition motion in December 1998 for the early elections.
And with the fall of Netanyahu’s government, Israel’s first experience of
an attempt to present a blend of parliamentarian–presidential features in
the coalitional governance ended in an unexpected fiasco.
Netanyahu’s dismal failures on several administrative fronts, lack of
experience and the inbuilt resistance that got intensified by a series of
resignations during his three-year regime sealed his political fate in the
second election for the prime minister. The Labor on the other hand
successfully contained the Likud factions through either conciliation or
accommodation under the new leadership of Ehud Barak who ‘pledged to

end the 100-year conflict between Israel and the Arabs within one year’.
As widely expected Barak won the second prime ministerial election
with 56.08 per cent of the votes by defeating Netanyahu (who polled
43.92 per cent of votes) over more than 12 per cent of the votes.
Compared to the 1996 difference of less than 1 per cent for the prime
ministerial race, the 1999 elections for the coveted post appeared to
relatively strengthen Barak’s position and influence in the coalition build-
ing process.
However, Barak’s elevation to the post of prime minister entailed
serious coalition building problems as his newly created party One Israel
attempted to represent Labor, Gesher and Meimad won simply 26 seats—
the lowest since the party contested the first Knesset elections in 1949.
With the loosening of the erstwhile pivot position, Barak’s One Israel
faced problems similar to its immediate predecessor in the formation of
the coalition.
With the help of his professional team that went ahead with the
negotiations for the formation, Barak finally set up the 28th coalition
government in May 1999. The seven-party coalition of Barak represented
One Israel and Meretz from the socialistic left block, Yisrael B’Aliya from
the right, Center Party from the centrist block, and Shas, NRP and
Yahadut Hatorah from the ethno-religious block. The combination of
all the seven parties constituted a strong strength of 75 Knesset members
in a house of 120.
When Barak was making serious overtures in the peace negotiations
with the Palestinians, developments at home in the coalition were not
encouraging. Like his predecessor, Barak too faced the crisis. Soon after
the formation of the coalition, two members split from the six-member
Yisrael B’Aliya. Yisrael B’Aliya’s unceremonial exit engineered the depar-
ture of Yahdut Hatorah few months later, thereby reducing Barak’s initial
coalition strength from 75 to 68. It had its ramifications on the other
coalition partners, with Meretz also deciding to leave the government, but
providing the outside support owing to the differences with Shas. Barak
thus oscillated between the anti-clerical, ultra-dovish Meretz and the
haredi, ultra-orthodox Shas.
Since Barak’s coalition encompassed parties from different ideological

poles having had conflicting positions on a various policy issues, the
government was tantamount to instability and vulnerable to pressures.
Because of the periodic withdrawal of support by the partners, the
coalition government had already come under the minority status.
Barak’s coalition government remained in power for just 20 months.
Much against the wishes of the proponents of the electoral reforms, third
elections for prime minister were held in March 2001. The 2001 elec-
tions, the third in five years, were to be held only for the post of prime
minister. The 2001 prime ministerial election was the first and the only
election for prime minister. And its different outcome was based on the
fact that it provided an impressive landslide victory for Sharon with
the lowest turnout (62.28 per cent) in the history of Israel. And when
the results were declared for the third and the ‘exclusive Prime Minister
election only’, Barak simply managed to get 37.61 per cent of votes,
whereas Likud’s Ariel Sharon got 62.39 per cent of the votes, thus
defeating the former by a wide margin of 25 per cent of votes.
Unlike his immediate predecessor, Sharon handled the chaotic Knesset
with caution and acumen and formed the ‘unity government’, the 29th
coalition government on 7 March 2001. Sharon-led government, which
consisted of eight electoral partners—Likud (19), One Israel (23, [after
Gesher’s exit]), Shas (17), Yisrael B’Aliya (4 [2 members formed a new
faction]), National Union-Yisrael Beiteinu (7 [one member had left]) and
Am Ehad (2)—took his coalition tally to 72. Within a month, Yahdut
Hatorah with its five members and one member of the Center Party
(Dalia Rabin-Pelossof with her new faction Derekh Khadashah), also
joined the coalition, giving the respectable standing and credibility of
the legislative support of 78 members to Sharon’s government.
Sharon not only created different ministries to accommodate all, but he
also re-organized the jurisdiction of the existing ministries so that no
electoral partner could be left out from the coalition. To make it more
representative, Sharon sought to include three women members in his
coalition from the total 15 Knesset women members of the existing
parliament, including one Arab member (one Arab of the Druze faith)
for the very first time. Sharon’s coalition government in this way had a
total of 26 ministers along with 13 deputy ministers.
Sharon’s 29th coalition government continued for 22 months on the

basis of strong Labor–Likud partnership. However, the internal leadership
crisis within Labor led its head Binyamin Ben-Eliezer to withdraw the
support on the budget motion, resulting in the collapse of the govern-
ment. The sudden withdrawal of support by the Labor brought to an end
the 29th coalition of Sharon, forcing the elections to the sixteenth Knesset
in February 2003.
The beginning of the 1990s in India also witnessed new economic and
political transformations. The 1991 elections to the tenth Lok Sabha
didn’t give clear mandate to any political party. The elections were held
for 521 seats. The Congress by winning 232 seats formed the coalition
with the support of the Communist Party of India and Jharkhand Mukti
Morcha. The Congress, which had been lending support to other small
regional parties in the preceding election, started banking on their support
for its survival in 1991.
By the mid-1990s, the Congress under Narasimha Rao had been
struggling for political survival partly because of the leadership crisis and
partly because of the financial scandal involving the questionable political
support of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. The credibility of the Congress fell
down miserably by 1995, resulting in the announcement of polls for the
eleventh Lok Sabha in 1996.
The electoral results of 1996 Lok Sabha polls once again brought about
the hung Parliament. Though BJP was the biggest party in the Lok Sabha
with 161 votes, it failed to prove its majority and hence resigned within
13 days of its formation. The defeat of the BJP-led alliance in the
confidence vote propelled the United Front constituents to form the
coalition government with the outside support of the Congress. First
under the leadership of Deve Gowda, followed by I. K. Gujral, the United
Front constituents tried to repeat the coalitional experiments of the
National Front style of V. P. Singh regime of 1989.
However, the United Front coalition was seen to be strange as well as
unnatural. It was strange because this combination consisted of almost all
the regional parties besides the Left Front and the Janata Dal. They all
clubbed together on the false notion of Secularism. The UF coalition was
strange in the sense that most of the anti-Congress parties accepted the
Congress support for its survival. ‘Yesterday’s arch enemy became today’s
saviour, friend, philosopher and guide’ (Rao 1996: 10).
The United Front (UF)9 constituents did not fight the election on a
common platform. They tried to overcome this varying divergence by
formulating a common minimum program. Even the leadership issue
could not be settled by them for quite some time. ‘The UF coalition
was a phenomenon of political expediency. The objective of the 13 com-
ponents of the alliance was to be in power as long as they could, knowing
fully well that they were working on borrowed time. The party buttressing
them also wanted to be back in power with an absolute majority. There-
fore, the decisions and actions of the UF and Congress were not backed by
widespread confidence in each other. In fact, everyone looked at each
other with great suspicion’ (Maheshwari 1998: 60).
The UF coalition was seen simply ‘a marriage of convenience in which
divorce was bound to occur’ (Sunil 1998) even on trivial issues. Hence,
anticipating the downfall of the UF government in view of the internal
infighting among its varying constituents and the Congressional bickering
for a continuous unconditional support to the government, the pan
parties started preparing for the mid-term poll.
The Twenty-First-Century Premiers

The Rightist Premiers: Ariel Sharon (2003–2006) vs Atal
Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004)
The right government formations in both Israel and India were looked
with great excitement and expectations by the masses and the interna-
tional community, particularly with regard to the projected implementa-
tion of the ideological platforms reflecting a tilt toward hardcore
nationalism. The arrival of the right-wing BJP-led coalition government
in India as National Democratic Alliance for two terms from 1998 to
2004 and Ariel Sharon-led Likud from 2001 to 2006 could be compared
from this perspective.
The Twenty-First-Century Premiers 293
Elections to the sixteenth Knesset on 28 January 2003 witnessed fierce

political battles of the Labor and the Likud leaders to head their respective
party lists in the primaries. The fight was between Ariel Sharon and
Amram Mitzna. The elections, which were based on the old parliamentary
list system of proportional representation, stunned both the parties and
the pollsters through their incredible results. The results for the 2003
Knesset provided landslide victory for Likud, which bagged 38 seats, just
double the seats won by the Labor, that is, 19. And with Yisrael B’Aliya’s
subsequent decision to merge with Likud soon after the elections added
the Likud’s strength to 40. Likud’s resounding success under Sharon
made the task of the government formation comparatively easier in view
of party’s lesser dependence on large number of small coalitional partners.
Sharon showed a remarkable political acumen and skill in going for
coalitional partners for the Likud-led government. After one month’s
hectic negotiations and pre-coalition agreements with the allied parties
and the potential Likud contenders, Sharon succeeded in forming the
thirtieth coalition government in February 2003. While Sharon’s negoti-
ating team managed the support of the three key allies on the ground that
the future diplomatic decisions would be put to a cabinet vote, Sharon
sought to woo the strong party leaders like Netanyahu, Ehud Olmert,
Silvan Shalom and Shaul Mofaz by offering coveted ministerial payoffs.
Sharon’s coalition list of the partners was relatively small with Likud,
Shinui, NRP, and National Union adding a comfortable strength of
68 members.
Sharon became the third Likud incumbent prime minister after Begin
and Shamir (the first since 1988) to take the oath of office. His govern-
ment, which included 23 ministers and 3 deputy ministers, came to be
described as a ‘Modular, Multi-optional Lego Government’ (Marcus
2003). Sharon tactically handled the intra-party crisis that might have
aggravated over the distribution of portfolios. His new government
contained the powerful ‘kitchenette’ consisting of the Finance Minister
Netanyahu, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, Foreign Minister Shilvan
Shalom, and Industry and Trade as well as Acting Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert. The new government lasted until May 2006.
Being the first government since 1977 without the haredi party, Sharon
came to be castigated by the Shas’ spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia as ‘the
king of garbage cans’ (The Jerusalem Post, 24 February 2003). Notwith-

standing Shas’ castigations of Sharon and his alliance partners, the new
government attempted to re-shape the destiny of Israel by incorporating
the religious NRP and the secular Shinui. ‘Though both religious and
secular commentators have declared its defining characteristic to be a
revolutionary approach to matters of religion and state, a closer look
reveals a coalition driven more by economic concerns than a desire to
redefine the state’s relationship to religion, this is a government focused
on economics, not on radical revisions of the state’s relationship to
religion’ (Gordon 2003).
In India, on the other hand, there was a growing realization within the
BJP camp that the Hindutva plank would not translate electoral support
into governance. The collapse of the Hindu backlash forced the party to
look for new issues. So from Hindutva to Swadeshi and then to Su-raj, the
BJP went on transforming itself as a viable alternative to Congress. In this
transformation, the party found its own consensus man in Atal Bihari
Vajpayee in 1996.
The eleventh Lok Sabha elections in 1996 transformed the BJP into a
position of the largest political party in India. While the party retained
significant elements of its Hindu nationalist discourse, the election per-
formance was not linked directly to Hindutva as in the case of the 1991
elections. For the first time in 1996, the BJP increased its share of
representatives in the Lok Sabha through a rather moderate campaign
and limited alliances with regional parties.
BJP emerged as the single largest party by winning over 161 seats alone.
Even though the BJP and its allies like the Samata Party, the Haryana
Vikas Party, the Shiv Sena and the Akali Dal had not managed a com-
fortable majority in the Lok Sabha, yet, owing to their largest political
formation, the president invited Vajpayee as an accepted leader of the
alliance group to form the government.
This invitation to the BJP and its pre-poll allies in fact immensely
de-moralized the Congress and the UF constituents, which began forming
what came to be known as ‘catch’all conclaves’ (a la Kirchheimer 1966).
The very objective of such an alliance, characterized by the right-wing
circle as ‘an opportunistic conclave’, was just to dislodge the BJP from the
center of governance. The 1996 poll verdict also reflected a debate
between communalism and secularism. A broad polarization and ideolog-

ical division became visible in the Indian polity with the formation of the
BJP-led government. BJP’s saffron image and perception came to be
exploited by the Oppositional adversaries, which started ‘equating secu-
larism with anti-BJPism and tracing the demolition of Babri Masjid as the
manifestation of communalism’.
Hence, ‘BJP’s transitional dreams from a responsible opposition to a
ruling coalition got belied owing to the quagmire of the Oppositional
adversaries’ electoral gimmicks. The thirteen days’ coalitional government
of Vajpayee failed to survive the trial of strength on the floor of the House
on 28 May 1996’ (Sunil 1998). BJP had learned through its own
experience of running the 13-day government that remaining in splendid
isolation with its strong adherence to the Hindutva ideology would not
pay electoral dividends in the longer run. As a result, with the possibility
of elections, it changed its tactics and went all out to befriend those who
had not been close to it in the past. The party leadership worked sincerely
and seriously to win over new allies in the South besides strengthening its
ties with the old allied partners of the North and the West.
The mid-term elections of 1998 were fought by the BJP on the dual
issues of ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Able Leadership’. Acknowledging its
own limitations, the party prepared itself for a coalition government in
order to end political instability and to give good governance. This
pragmatic change in BJP made it increasingly acceptable to its new
regional allies like the Samata Party, the Trinamool Congress, AIADMK,
Lok Shakti, Biju Janata Dal and others. A sound pre-poll understanding
with the new as well as the old allies led BJP and its allies to win 255 seats
(out of the declared 534 seats) in the twelfth Lok Sabha elections. BJP on
its own once again made a consistent upward swing in its electoral tally by
winning over 182 seats as against 161 seats it captured in the preceding
elections.
The party, which had entered parliamentary politics with a modest
beginning, finally came to take charge of the national government along
with its political allies in 1998. ‘The real problem of the BJP this time had
not been how to come to power but how to make governance meaningful’
(Nayar 1998: 7). The party encountered immense expectations partly
because its poll plank was that ‘you have tried others, give us a chance’ and
‘Abki Bari, Atal Bihari’ (This time, Atal Bihari), and partly because the
non-performance of the preceding governments had made people believe
that the BJP and its allies could do what others had failed to do.
The age-old ‘Congress versus the rest’ political formation changed into
‘BJP versus the rest’ political configuration. The united Opposition
appeared to be opposed to the BJP in everything it proposed to do. The
transformation of the BJP from an urban, middle-class party of western
and northern India to a nationwide organization that had made consid-
erable inroads into the tribal, dalit and the OBC vote could be possible
due to the adoption of tactics and acts the party once denounced as
‘pseudo-secularist’. However, there did appear perceptible divergence
between the RSS-motivated forces of Hindutva and the political compul-
sion of the new secular allies like Ramakrishna Hegde, George Fernandes,
Jayalalitha and Mamata Banerjee. It was this divergence that made inter-
esting political developments within the ruling alliance.
Vajpayee government was not very successful in managing its allies. It
was under tremendous pressure from ‘Samata, Mamata and Jayalalitha’,
referring to its three alliance partners, namely, Samata Party, Trinamool
Congress and AIADMK. Nevertheless, the NDA government took the
credit of taking many bold initiatives in its first phase of governance,
which lasted for thirteen months.
The consistent pressures from the allies and the combative style of the
Congress after a spell of constructive opposition created profound embar-
rassment for the government. All these factors finally cut short the life
span of the country’s first truly non-Congress governance.
Vajpayee’s second stint as prime minister, lasting longer than his first
term of thirteen days, drew closure on April 1999. The withdrawal of
support by the AIADMK forced the BJP-led government to seek the
confidence of the Lok Sabha. After a two-hour marathon debate in the
house, Vajpayee’s motion of seeking confidence vote got ultimately
rejected by just one vote: 269 votes in favor of the motion, whereas
270 against the motion. The fall of the BJP-led NDA government by
Vajpayee by sheer one vote in 1999 could be equated with the Israeli
government of 1990 when Labor leader Shimon Peres brought down the
Shamir Government through no confidence.
The elections to the thirteenth Lok Sabha took place under the emer-
gence of Sonia Gandhi as the new leader of the Congress. The foreign
origin issue of Sonia Gandhi, however, led to a split within the Congress
circle, paving the way for the emergence of National Congress Party under
Sharad Pawar, P. A. Sangma and Tariq Anwar. BJP thought of making the
achievements of its past thirteen months’ governance as important elec-
toral issue. Pokharan II, Agni missiles, Lahore bus and Bihar were con-
sidered to be positive issues to be taken to the people during elections.
BJP tried to project Kargil10 victory as an election issue much to the
dismay of the Opposition, especially the Congress and the left. The party
also realized that it would be entirely difficult to acquire power at the
center without the help of regional allies. Despite the unpleasant experi-
ence of the party from some of the constituents in 1998, the party
leadership closely studied electoral arithmetic and thoroughly discovered
friendly regional allies.
Hence, the party had been very active in promoting alliances through-
out the country this time. Its strategy finally paid once again, and the party
returned to power with a strength of 300 seats in the Lok Sabha in 1999.
The contribution made by BJP’s alliance was significant this time as they
landed up with a support of about 100 seats. With this assured support,
BJP once again emerged as a leading party, running a ruling coalition for
full five years from 1999 to 2004.
The five-year term of Vajpayee government attempted to work on the
principle of consensus and conciliation. Since it was a ‘surplus majority
coalition’ (Chakrabarty 2006), NDA managed to complete its full-term
without any major confrontation and controversy. Anticipating a better
and comfortably placed position, the NDA went for the polls in 2004, few
months before the actual expiry of the government term under the slogan,
‘India Shining’.
With elections campaigns managed by party’s IT man, Pramod
Mahajan, BJP thought of repeating its electoral success for the third
consecutive time. However, given NDA’s better governance at economic,
defence and foreign policy fronts, neither psephologists nor journalists
had ever thought of BJP’s failure to form the government again. The
election results of 2004 were a big setback for the BJP and its NDA
partners. Though both the BJP and the Congress managed roughly the
same seats, the successful management of the pre-poll election allies by the
Congress helped the party to form the government at the center under
Dr. Manmohan Singh—the finance minister who was instrumental for
economic liberalization of the country.
The Centrist Premiers: Ehud Olmert (2006–09) vs

Congress-led UPA I and II (2004–14)
The 2006 Knesset elections were contested by Kadima under the leader-
ship of Ehud Olmert. The absence of Ariel Sharon from the political
platform of Kadima in 2006 didn’t deter the party from winning a
comfortable majority. Olmert chose the non-right and non-religious
parties as his coalition partners. Along with Labor, Meretz, Pensioners
Party and Yisrael Beteinu, Olmert formed the 31st coalition government
in Israel in February 2006. However, Olmert did not have much experi-
ence of running the coalition government. However, political opposition
had started brewing against Olmert, and corruption charges were leveled
against him for holding the post of Mayor of Jerusalem. Olmert had to
resign against the allegations of bribery, and Kadima-led coalition chose
Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister under Olmert, as Israel’s new prime
minister in 2008.
Israel experienced the Premiership of the second woman leader under
Tzipi Livni after Gold Meir’s regime of 1969. Despite being a charismatic
leader and fiery speaker with a good party following, Livni was not able to
spearhead the principle of peaceful reconciliation under Kadima gover-
nance to its logical end. Party factionalism had started taking strong roots
within Kadima. The haredi parties were getting impatient for being out of
government under the centrist Kadima during their hard positions
vis-à-vis Palestinians. Before the coalition government under Livni could
have been stabilized, elections were announced for the eighteenth Knesset
in 2009, bringing the fall of the Kadima-led government.
Political climate in India with the beginning of twenty-first-century
India also witnessed a change. Formation of Congress-led alliance in the
name of United Progressive Alliance successively in 2004 and 2009
constituted a significant development in coalition politics of India.
Headed by Manmohan Singh and controlled by Sonia Gandhi as the

Chairperson of the Coordination Committee, UPA heralded a new
realignment of political forces in the aftermath of liberalization and
globalization where ideological stands of national and regional parties
started taking the back seat.
Under its first governance in 2004, Congress-led UPA managed the
number of government formation through its pre-poll allies and post-poll
strategies. Congress gained heavily in big states of North India and South
India. Its electoral success in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Maha-
rashtra set new electoral trends and broadly failed the psephologists who
had never predicted such a clean sweep for the Congress-led UPA. Some
of the Congress pre-poll allies—the Nationalist Congress Party of Sharad
Pawar of Maharashtra, Karunanidhi-dominated DMK in Tamil Nadu
and Laloo Prasad Yadav-backed Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar—
immensely facilitated Congress in ousting BJP-led NDA at the center.
The success of Congress in smaller states like Himachal, Delhi, Hary-
ana and Rajasthan, and other states of northeast like Assam, Manipur and
Mizoram, gave the national party a decisive edge vis-à-vis its allies in
formation of government at the center. Hence, Congress easily managed
the magic number of 272 seats as required for government formation in
2004. The BJP-led NDA was in a total shock, as its ‘India Shining’
campaign failed to repeat its two successive electoral success of 1998
and 1999 in view of Congress’ ‘aam aadmi’ (common man) projection
in 2004. Further, some of the coalition partners of NDA like Biju Janata
Dal, Trinamool Congress and National Conference didn’t mind in join-
ing the Congress-led UPA in 2004. UPA was also supported by the left
front, both from inside and outside. While the Communist Party of India
joined the UPA, the CPM tended to provide outside support to the
Congress-led government at the center.
Though formation of the coalition by managing the magic number
didn’t create any problem for the Congress-led UPA, it was the issue of
prime minister that brought about initial controversy, with BJP leaders
vehemently protesting Sonia Gandhi as the prime minister of the coun-
try.11 The initial stalemate, however, got resolved subsequently when
Sonia herself declined the offer of prime minister and instead acceded to
the party request for holding the post of Chairperson of the UPA
Coordination Committee, a post created to ensure her direct association

in working of the coalition government. The critics argued that the office
of prime minister got decimated with the parallel running of UPA’s
Coordination Committee headed by Sonia Gandhi.
The success of managing a national coalition for its full five-year term
from 2004 to 2009 rejuvenated Congress cadres and brought about
immense satisfaction to its allied partners. The acceptance of the Congress
as a big brother under UPA improved the party credibility among the
common masses. The disarray within the BJP also weakened the opposi-
tion, presenting a strong challenge to the Congress-led UPA in 2009
elections. The Congress vigorously went ahead with its ‘aam aadmi’ image
for the 2009 elections along with its major policy achievements like
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program.
The strategic management of its pre-poll allies in different states once
again proved instrumental for the Congress and fatal for the BJP in 2009.
The results for 2009 elections witnessed a resounding win for the
Congress-led UPA when the party won 206 seats out of 255, with its
allies like DMK, Trinamool Congress, Nationalist Congress Party,
National Congress, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and others winning a
total of 262 seats—10 seats short of forging an alliance.
Unlike UPA I, the UPA II proved to be more troublesome for the
Congress-led alliance. It is true that Congress over the years had succeeded
in managing the coalition, the increasing intervention by Sonia Gandhi as
the UPA Chairperson and the weakening position of the prime minister
started making the coalition shaky from the beginning. The issue of FDI
in retail sector, Lokpal, use of constitutional institutions like CBI and
Election Commission and unfolding of scams after scams involving
Congress’ own ministers as well as its allies going to jails under 2G
Spectrum, Coalgate, Railgate, and so forth marred the very credibility of
the government. The CAG expose on 2G Spectrum, Coalgate and
MNREGA greatly shook the very foundations of the government.
With the passage of time, the UPA II started losing its key allied
partners like Trinamool Congress and DMK over the issue of FDI retail
and support for Sri Lanka against LTTE in UN, respectively. The UPA II
came to be characterized as a ‘brain-dead patient’ by one of the allies,
hinting that the days of the Congress-led coalition had only been
numbered. However, the arm-twisting by the government using investi-

gating agencies like CBI enabled the Congress to manage its national
alliance by bringing outside allies like Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi
Party and Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party—both of them strengthening
the coalition number decimated after the leaving of Trinamool Congress
and DMK.
The later years of governance for the centrist formations—– Kadima
and Congress—appeared to be more complex and controversial. Rising
corruption cases involving top political class, including the two Pre-
miers—Olmert and Manmohan Singh—started changing the political
climate in the two nations. It was at the backdrop of rising corruption
and mounting agitation that the two democratic nations witnessed the
right-wing coalitions.
The Rightist Coalitions: Binyamin Netanyahu (2009–To

Date) vs Narendra Modi (2014–To Date)
Clive Jones (2010) categorized the eighteenth Knesset elections in 2009 as

watershed in the Israeli politics. He argued that for the first time in the
history of Israeli politics the two dominant discourses, ethno-national
discourse and state liberal discourse, wiped out the political left in the
country. Netanyahu succeeded in forming the 32nd coalition with his
stewardship and acumen in 2009. He set out three clear priorities in the
formation of his government: ‘to curb the threat from Iran in terms of its
support for Islamist groups Hamas and Hizb’allah, as well as countering
Tehran’s ongoing nuclear program; to maintain coherence in the special
relationship with the United States; and finally, to ensure the domestic
economy was vibrant enough to withstand the worst excesses of the global
economic recession’ (Jones 2010: 25).
The weakness of his coalitional partners provided him with the chances
of ensuring stability of a national unity government. By bringing Labor to
his coalitional governance, Netanyahu kept the fledging Kadima to its
political margins. The 2009 Knesset elections witnessed the emergence of
NRP under its new incarnation, namely, Habayit Hayehudi and its
alliance with right-wing National Union. The coalition partners like
Shas, Labor, Yisrael Beiteinu and Habayit Hayehudi benefited from their
inclusion in the coalition rather than their isolation. As Clive Jones
argued, ‘Israeli politics abounds with rumours of widespread disaffection
with the party leadership and Netanyahu’s position has been subject to no
less speculation than his predecessors’ (Ibid., 33). However, with the
weakness of his coalitional partners and White House’s constant engage-
ment with Iran’s nuclear programs, Netanyahu continued to balance the
apparent contradictions in his relationship with Washington on the one
hand and his commitments to his coalition partners on the other which,
in turn, sought to ‘determine not only the future of his Government, but
that of the wider Middle East’ (Ibid.).
The elections for the nineteenth Knesset in January 2013 witnessed
many alignments and re-alignments in coalition formation in Israel.
While the elections witnessed the emergence of Yash Atid and Habayit
Hayehudi as two strong coalition forces, women members and new young
faces,12 the 2013 Knesset also saw the decimation of the haredi parties like
Shas and their elimination from the center of governance. The 33rd
coalition government under Netanyahu came to be described as ‘more
religious, more feminine, younger and more personally invested beyond
the Green Line than ever before’ (Keinon 2013).
Under the leadership of Netanyahu, the 33rd coalition government was
formed in March 2013 with Likud-Beteinu, Yash Atid, Habayit Hayehudi
and Ha’Tnuah. The absence of Shas and United Torah Judaism from the
government was a great shock to the haredi sector and the issues promoted
by these ultra-orthodox parties. The new coalition experiment was
described in the political circles as ‘bourgeois in its sensibilities and
capitalist in its outlook’ (Jerusalem Post, 2013), and the new government
would not have a ‘honeymoon period’ (Reed 2013) in view of both
domestic and international challenges spanning from budget deficit, infla-
tion, compulsory military service for the Yeshivas, rejuvenation of the
stalled peace process with the Palestinians and threatening developments
in Syria and Iran.
The 33rd Israeli coalition experiment was short-lived, however. Net-
anyahu faced difficult challenges in managing the coalition with the
support of religious Habayit Hayehudi and the centrist Yash Atid. The
issue of settlements might have placated the Habayit Hayehudi, but it
didn’t go well with other centrist allies, particularly Yair Lapid and Tzipi
Livni—heads of Yash Atid and Ha’Tnuah, respectively—forcing Netan-
yahu to fire these two leaders in December 2014.
The elections to the twentieth Knesset in March 2015 were held at the
backdrop of a significant reform, that is, rising electoral threshold from
2 to 3.25 per cent. The threshold change brought many ‘changes in the
political map’ of the country by transforming the process of alignments
and re-alignments across party blocks. The most significant change could
be seen in the Arab block where the four Arab parties—Ra’am, Ta’al,
BaLad and Hadash—decided to enter the electoral fray as a united
common list called the Joint List. The united left block was greatly
rewarded by the Israeli Arab electorate. With 13 Knesset seats and 10.6
per cent of the votes, the Joint Arab List emerged as the third largest seat
sharer in the twentieth Knesset.
The high threshold saw the disbanding of Kadima and drifting of
Livni’s Ha’Tnuah toward the Labor-dominated left block of Isaac
Herzog—the two deciding to run as the Zionist Union with an electoral
understanding of rotating Premiership halfway in case of winning the
elections and forming the government. The ethno-religious block faced
split and unity together. While it witnessed split within Shas with its
Chairman Eli Yishai breaking off from its spiritual leader Aryeh Deri and
forming a new list called Yachad, Tkuma’ coming closer to Habayit
Hayehudi appeared to be imparting new political partnership to the block.
The 2015 Knesset elections also saw minor change in electoral under-
standing and alliance within the nationalist block. The electoral alliance
between Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu ended, and the two parties decided to
run on parallel lists for the twentieth Knesset. The formation of Kulanu
by former Likud MK, Moshe Kahlon, in November 2014, attempted to
challenge the Netanyahu in the elections for the twentieth Knesset.
The results for the twentieth Knesset surprised many pollsters.
Described as the ‘Seinfeld election – an election about nothing’, (Hoff-
man 2015), the 2015 elections witnessed marginal shift in the perception
of the Israeli electorate, though it did bring about the salience of the silent
voters. Likud under Netanyahu once again emerged as the central player in
the ‘one-party-led coalition’ politics of Israel. Likud-led six-party coalition
(Table 5.2) for the twentieth Knesset comprising a jumbo cabinet with
33 ministers and 10 deputy ministers is the biggest in the political history

of post-independence Israel. Though the inclusion of right of the center,
Kulanu and the religious parties like Habayit Hayehudi and Shas sought
to give a comparative stability to the 34th government led by Netanyahu,
the electoral stability and political sustenance of the alliance would depend
on the issues the present government would be taking in the years
to come.
The sixteenth Lok Sabha elections in 2014 in India on the other hand
marked a ‘watershed in the democratic politics of India’ (Atal and
Choudhary 2015). Nearly after three decades, Indian polity witnessed a
shift from ‘one-party-dominated government’ to the ‘one-party-led coali-
tion’ at the center. The overwhelming victory of BJP under Narendra
Modi encapsulated as ‘RIGHT Turn’ by Yogesh Atal and Sunil K
Choudhary shows both an ‘ideological shift and corrective drift in
Indian Polity’. By winning 282 seats in Lok Sabha on its own, BJP
challenged the ideological domain of the Congress besides imparting
new orientation to the coalition politics of India.
With 2014 elections, coalition politics didn’t wither away, but it
entered into a new realm, with BJP coming to the helm of governance
as a single dominant party leading the coalition of 10 parties, winning
332 seats and 37.6 per cent of the votes under the NDA umbrella. The
coalition partners of BJP included its old allies like Shiv Sena, Telugu
Dessam and Shiromani Akali Dal. Among the new allies, BJP roped in the
Apna Dal of Uttar Pradesh, Lok Jan Shakti Party and Rashtriya Lok Samta
Party of Bihar and PMK, DMDK and MDMK from Tamil Nadu. With
the collective strength of the NDA allies led by BJP numbering only
50 seats with 6.6 per cent of votes in 2014, BJP succeeded in replacing
Congress as the single largest dominant party at the center.
Final Comments
While Israel has witnessed the formation of 34 coalition governments
under twentieth Knesset in the time frame of past seven decades, Indian
parliamentary democracy has experienced the formation of 24 govern-
ments under 16 general elections during the same period.
Final Comments 305
The Israeli coalitions like their European counterparts have functioned

well within the presence of the multiparty system in the parliamentary
system of governance. Asher Arian states that Israel has rarely adhered to
the minimum-size principle of the coalition as ‘most governments formed
in Israel between 1949 and 1996 have rested on solid majorities in the
Knesset, well above the minimum size needed to rule’ (Arian 1998: 244).
The electoral law 1991–92, which intended to enhance the coalition
governance and accountability through the direct election of the prime
minister, ultimately resulted into political fragmentation, thereby increas-
ing the role of the smaller parties, particularly the religious ones, in
coalition bargaining.
Indian coalition experiments started getting strengthened from
mid-1990s, with the smaller parties occupying central stage in coalition
management. The principle of coalition government in India, however,
has actually tended to impart decisive role to two pan-Indian parties
namely, the Congress and the BJP. No coalition in Indian parliamentary
democracy from the 1980s has succeeded without crucial role being
played by either of the two pan-Indian parties. All the coalitions in
Indian polity in the post-1980s have been either supported by the
Congress and the BJP or being led by them. The success of NDA during
1998–2004, UPA I and II from 2004 to 2014 and the NDA from 2014
to till date can be attributed to the role played by the pan-Indian parties.
Relying on the half-hearted implementation of the electoral reform
through the direct election provision of the prime minister, the parties
once again got united to restore the old system of parliamentary polity
with the continued need to impart a decisive thrust to the coalition
governance. The new coalitions under Sharon, Olmert and Netanyahu
for the past one decade from 2003 onward made solid and suave begin-
ning to accomplish the unfinished electoral agenda of providing govern-
mental accountability and effectiveness through its changed and
pragmatic agenda, to be addressed as agenda of economic development
and political governance.
However, whether the new alignment of political actors in the coalition
formation of the twenty-first century in both Israel and India would tend
to ensure erstwhile consensus of Mapaivot or the ‘Congress System’,
prediction entailing certainty cannot be advanced at this stage. The
electoral transformations and political alignments in both these nations,

however, do witness re-alignments in terms of increasing political awak-
ening, youth participation and democratic governance. Such re-alignment
of voters, particularly from the twenty-first--century Israel and India,
could be attributed to the awakening and assertion of the voters as
Matdata or Matz’biya, constituting the fifth M13 of M5 in the electoral
politics of both Israel and India. The success of right-wing parties in the
last elections also reflected a shift from floating voters to silent voters.
While parties and party systems across globe do witness declining
trends, if not political decimation, the parliamentary politics in both Israel
and India has been striving toward accommodating accessibility and
political accountability to the electors and the common populace.
Notes
1. Riker points out that persons in real situations are analogous to n-person
games in which the restraints limit the actual choice among coalitions.
2. Israel at present has total 15 Basic Laws dealing with the formation and
working of the principal institutions of the State and the relationship
between and among State authorities. The 16th Basic Law on ‘Israel as
the Nation State of the Jewish People’ has yet to be approved and ratified
by the Knesset.
3. Uttar Pradesh has 80 Members of Parliament in Lok Sabha, whereas
Sikkim, Mizoram and others have just one Member of Parliament in Lok
Sabha.
4. The party key was an instrument on the basis of which parties in the
newly created state were able to distribute state resources among its
members in anticipation of greater support and loyalty.
5. The Lavon affair had actually occurred in 1954 in which Pinchas Lavon,
the then minister of defence, was suspected of passing orders to the Israeli
agents to carry out sabotage activities against the Egyptians in 1954. The
Egyptians caught these agents and killed some of them. The incident
defamed Israel in international arena and seriously questioned its diplo-
matic stature. Pinchas Lavon was asked to resign notwithstanding his
claim that the orders were being passed by the then IDF Chief.
References 307
6. Tashkent Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on 10 January

1966 in which the two parties agreed to withdraw their forces pre-war
positions, not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs, orderly transfer
of prisoners of war and work toward improving bilateral relations.
7. Congress (O) and Congress (R) referred to Organization and
Requisionists, respectively, whereas the letter ‘I’ with Congress indicated
Indira. Since 1971, Indian National Congress has come to be identified
only with Congress (I).
8. The members of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh also happened to be the
members of its cultural mentor, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
The controversy erupted when the elected members in Janata Party from
BJS were asked to retain either of the memberships.
9. UF was a conglomeration of non-Congress and non-BJP parties that
succeeded in forming the coalition government in 1996—–initially
under the premiership of Deve Gowda and subsequently under I K
Gujral. The UF Government was also called the ‘crutch government’ as
it survived only on the support of the Congress.
10. The Indian armed forces thwarted the forced intrusions by the Pakistani
army and ISI into the Kargil sector within India under Operation Vijay
during May–July 1999.
11. Sushma Swaraj of BJP went on to state that she would cut her hair if
Sonia became the prime minister of the country.
12. The 2013 Knesset comprised 49 freshmen and 27 women members
constituting 41 and 23 per cent of the total strength, respectively.
13. Contemporary electoral politics in both Israel and India has come to be
described by the term M5. While Israeli M5 refers to Masoret, Moledet,
Mussar, Mishpacha and Matz’biya (meaning, respectively, tradition,
homeland, ethics, solidarity and voters), Indian M5 indicated Mandal,
Mandir, Masjid, Market and Matdata (representing, respectively, the
issues of caste, community, religion, market and voters).
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14
Competing Issues of Governance: Israel
and India Compared
While formation of government is an important imperative for political

parties in the aftermath of elections, continuation of government and
sustenance of governance become daunting challenges for political elites
coming to the helm of power. Israel and India share many common
political experiences and address similar issues of governance that have
shaped their polities for the past seven decades. The issues of governance
that dominated the Israeli and Indian governments over the years have
broadly remained the same, though their thrust kept on varying in
different periods.
Beginning from March 1949 when the first left-wing government was
formed in Israel under Ben-Gurion to May 2015 when the 34th govern-
ment took oath under Binyamin Netanyahu, Israeli politics has under-
gone great transformation. Similarly, from the first centrist Nehruvian
government in August 1947 to the 24th right-wing government under
Narendra Modi, Indian polity too has witnessed remarkable transforma-
tion. One could broadly classify the competing issues of governance in
Israel and India from their independence to the present under five key
categories:

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3_14
312 14 Competing Issues of Governance: Israel and India Compared
1. Peace and Security

2. Religiosity and Ethnicity
3. Settlements and Infiltration
4. Economy and Market
5. Scandals and Scams
Peace and Security

The transition to independence for both Israel and India in 1948 and
1947, respectively, never remained peaceful. Partition of the two nations
as part of the colonial design brought many new challenges that have been
affecting their politics and polities to date.
The British divided India into India and Pakistan as part of the
Mountbatten Plan of 1947; Israel too witnessed the division in the
Mandated Palestine between the new State of Israel and the Palestine.
The making of boundaries and creation of nations on the tables by the
political elites led to migration of people from two sides in both the
countries.
Forced movement of people across territories in both Israel and India
soon after their independence involved bloodshed, horror and trauma that
kept on haunting the populace in the coming years. While Israel entered
into an armed struggle with the Palestinians backed by the Arab neighbors
to preserve its identity and secure its independence, India too had to go to
war with Pakistani-backed guerrillas (armed men) in Kashmir.1
The pangs of partition started influencing the core of the foreign policy
of the two nations. Since the role of the Diaspora Jewry in the formation
of Israel, Israel decided to remain a close ally of the USA. India, on the
other, followed the policy of non-alignment by keeping itself ideologically
away from the political groups of NATO and Warsaw. Indian policy of
non-alignment to counter the block politics of the 1950s made India an
internationally acceptable nation as well as an emerging leader of the
developing nations. ‘Non-Alignment was both a protest against the
bi-polarization of the world and the cold war, and a contribution to
their undoing’ (Rajan 1992: 145).
Peace and Security 313
While India had been working toward building peace with its neighbor,
particularly China to contain and counter Pakistan and signed the famous
treaty with China, Panchsheel,2 on the principle of ‘Hindi Chini Bhai
Bhai’ (India-China being brothers) in 1955, Israel undertook an aggres-
sive foreign policy decision of invading Sinai in October 1956. The Sinai
campaign enhanced Israeli status domestically and internationally. Israeli
aggressive stand during the Suez crisis did create political ripples at home,
especially the pro-Soviet Mapam, which had been a part of the Begin-led
government.
However, if India acquired high political eminence internationally
due to Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),3 it also became strategically
vulnerable to China. India overlooked its eastern borders and was
obsessed with the western borders with Pakistan, which resulted in two
major wars in 1960s—a war with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in
1965. Israel on the other hand also fought a Six Day War with its Arab
neighbors in 1967. The wars made great impact on the economies and
polities of the two nations besides affecting their international standing.
Though it was India which had brought China in the mainstream of
international politics by recommending its political recognition as well as
its permanent place in the Security Council, India suffered miserably at
the hands of China in the 1962 war on the issue of Tibet.4 Partly because
of obsession with China and partly because of its neglect of the eastern
front bordering China, India suffered heavily in the one-sided Indo–Sino
War of 1962. The political effects of the defeat were more pronounced
than the military implications. In fact, this defeat shattered Nehru’s
optimism so badly that he failed to recover from the same and died
soon after in 1964.
The war with China in 1962 brought about great transformation in
Indian parliamentary politics. Under the compulsions of international
relations and protection of national sovereignty, the issue of defence
acquired prominent place in foreign policy discourses. In 1965, India
faced another sudden and unprovoked war on the western side with
Pakistan. Pakistan wanted to take advantage of strategically weak and
morally down India in the aftermath of Indo–Sino War of 1962.
However, Indian defence forces had become stronger and their pre-
paredness finally gave a big jolt to Pakistani army. Indian forces had
actually entered Lahore in Pakistan. However, India did not take undue
advantage of Pakistan’s weakness and, on the initiative of USSR, finally
ceded the acquired territory to Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan entered
into a bilateral agreement called ‘Shimla Agreement’, signed in Tashkent
in Russia. The agreement laid the foundation of the future border
negotiations between India and Pakistan. The humiliation faced by the
defence forces in 1962 got subsumed in 1965 to some extent.
Israel also entered into a major war with the neighboring Arab world in
1967. It was called the Arab–Israeli War, which was fought between 5 and
10 June 1967 between Israel and the joint Arab nations, namely, Egypt,
Jordan and Syria. The abounding victory of Israel in the War led to its
control of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, West Bank and
East Jerusalem from Jordan and Golan Heights from Syria. While the war
extended Israeli territory by ‘a factor of three’, it also expanded its
population with the capture of 1 million Palestinian Arabs.
While the 1962 and 1965 Wars were forced on India by China and
Pakistan, Israel justified its attack on the Arab world as ‘a pre-emptive
strike’ in view of a planned Arab invasion.
Politics in the post-1962 and 1965 War in India witnessed major
transformation in the policy of non-alignment. The Six-Day War also
had a significant bearing in the Israeli politics during the 1970s.
By forging defence ties with Soviet Union in 1971, India attempted to
impart new meaning to NAM. In 1971, India entered into another war
with Pakistan on its western part on the issue of the rights of Bangladeshis,
the Bengali-speaking Muslim population who had been agitating for
peace since the creation of East and West Pakistan in the aftermath of
partition. The war with Pakistan in 1971 led to the creation of an
independent Bangladesh and constituted a remarkable victory for India.
Realizing the American mobilization of the 7th Fleet on the Bay of
Bengal as part of the ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of Nixon administration to
target Indian army, India went closer to Soviet Union and signed the
Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971 to
counter any such American attempt. While the war brought about the
strategic partnership between India and Russia, it also witnessed an
increasing sign of the growing involvement of the two superpowers in
the South Asian region.
The beginning of the 1970s involved one more military confrontation

between Israel and the Arabs. Since the war broke out on the holy day of
both Jews and Arabs in October 1973, it came to be characterized as the
Yom Kippur War or the Ramadan War.5 The war was an attempt to
regain the territories lost by Egypt and Syria in 1967. Though Israeli
forces retaliated the joint Arab attacks, the killing of ‘nearly 3000 Israeli
soldiers’ questioned the invincibility of Israel. The war had ‘more effects
on Israeli society besides political divisions, and the most decisive of these
was humility’ (Asa-El 2013). In addition to witnessing strong waves of
protest at home, the war also brought the two superpowers to possible
confrontation, as was reflected during the Indo–Pak War of 1971.
The confrontationist stand of the Arab world got moderated after the
war, with the signing of Camp David Accord in September 1973 between
the Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and the Israeli Premier Menachem
Begin. The hawkish Likud under Begin took some major steps like Israel’s
withdrawal from Sinai and the return of the peninsula, thereby leading to
a considerable improvement of the relations with Egypt along with the
strengthening of the inter-state trade links between the two nations.
However, to contain criticism of his dovish stands, Israel also annexed
the Golan Heights in December 1981. With support from the radical
right for its hawkish line, Begin tried to kill two birds with just one stone
with annexation of Golan Heights.
The 1980s witnessed two major operations launched both by Israel and
India in Lebanon and Maldives, respectively. While Israel under ‘Oper-
ation Peace for Galilee’ tried to destroy the terrorist bases of the PLO in
Lebanon in June 1982, India came for the rescue of Maldives by sending
its armed forces in November 1988 to prevent attempts by People’s
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam in capturing Maldives.
The Lebanon War created unprecedented controversy.6 It was for the
first time that its armed forces got involved in a war that was not backed
by the common consensus among the countrymen. According to Diskin,
‘the war was the first in Israeli’s history to arouse such strong public debate
about its motives, achievements and management’ (Diskin 1991: 37).
One could witness ‘intensified bitterness between hawks and doves within
the government’ in the aftermath of the Lebanon war. ‘The clashes were
markedly polarized between Sephardi Likud supporters and their largely

Ashkenazi opponents’ (Peretz and Doron 1997: 261).
The 1980s saw the protest movements in both Israel and India. While
the Sikh protests in Punjab advocated for creating a separate and inde-
pendent nation, the demonstrations in north-eastern part of the country,
particularly Assam and Mizoram, were on the issue of illegal immigrants
and growing alienation from the mainstream politics; the autonomy
protest movements by the Palestinian Arabs in the occupied territories
during the period came to be characterized as ‘Intifada’.7
The Israeli governments started realizing that the Intifada would not be
checked only by military means. Hence, both the Labor and Likud put
forward the Rabin-Shamir Peace Plan in May 1989. The plan attempted
to give the Palestinians of West Bank the right of electing their represen-
tatives for negotiating a permanent solution with Israel. The hardliners
within Likud constituting the trio (Ariel Sharon, David Levy and Yitzhak
Modai), however, found out in the Palestinian peace plan a convenient
ploy to take revenge against the moderate leadership.
India also offered peaceful solutions to the secessionist and sectarian
movements and succeeded in signing the Punjab and Mizo Accords.
Externally, India also imparted strength and vigor to country’s foreign
policy, particularly with the formation of SAARC (South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation). With a focus to ensure cooperation and
coordination among the members of South Asia just on the pattern of
ASEAN and European Union, SAARC was a major foreign policy initia-
tive that enhanced India’s image in the international affairs. Further, the
use of blue water navy, sophistications in armaments, technological
innovations in country’s defense and the similar developments during
the 1980s also helped in transforming Indian foreign policy from defen-
sive diplomacy to offensive diplomacy.
The Gulf crisis in the beginning of the 1990s presented challenge for
Israel, particularly in view of provocations of expected missile attacks from
the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. Israeli neutrality and non-retaliation
against Iraq led to the release of enormous American funds and the
immediate supply of the Patriot missiles, which went on strengthening
the state’s economic and military needs effectively.
The peaceful passing of the Gulf crisis strengthened the American

legitimacy as the peace negotiator in the Middle East in general and
Palestine in particular. Under the American initiative, the Madrid
Peace Conference was held on 30 October 1991. The conference was
an attempt to bring the Arab partners in Palestine, Syria and Jordan, on
the negotiating table with Israel. Though the conference failed to reach
any conclusion, it prepared the future ground for negotiations for the
peaceful settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, paving the way for
the Oslo Accords on 20 January 1993. The Oslo Accords led the
Palestinians recognize Israel in return for the Israeli pledge of dismantling
of occupation. It was a historic pact that projected the ‘first handshake
between Rabin and Yasser Arafat’.
The 1990s also witnessed growing terrorism and increasing terrorist
activities in the form of suicide bombings, assassination of the heads of the
government, attacks on public institutions and so forth in both Israel and
India. While the peace initiatives were taking shape in Israel and India, the
neighboring military and terrorist activities were founding support under
Hezbollah- and ISI-backed groups8 in the two nations, respectively.
Amidst pressure from the international community, Israel undertook
many peace initiatives in the late 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-
first century. The signing of the Hebron Protocol in February 1997 was
one such peace initiative under which Israel promised to vacate 80 per
cent of the city and complete the withdrawal of the armed forces (called
redeployment) from the west Bank by mid-1998. In October 1998, Israel
signed the Wye Memorandum, highlighting the Israeli commitment to
the second re-deployment from the occupied territories in West Bank.
India too faced armed confrontation from Pakistan in Kargil in
mid-1999 when the Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants crossed
over to the Indian Line of Control. The Indian army operation, called
Operation Vijay, successfully thwarted the infiltration by the insurgents.
Under global pressure, Israel too was forced to work toward solution of
the Israeli–Palestinian deadlock. The ‘Road Map’ signed in 2003 focused
on the two–state solution, with an ‘independent, viable, sovereign Pales-
tinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel’ and hinted on a
three-phase solution.9 Unlike the Oslo Accords of 1993, the Road Map
categorically stated the third party monitoring under the aegis of the
Quartet consisting of the USA, Russia, the European Union and the
United Nations.
Likud’s final adherence to the Road Map notwithstanding its vehement
ideological opposition to any conciliation to the Palestinians left many
political commentators and leaders stunned. In fact, the major diplomatic
concessions to the Arabs were given by the right-wing governments led by
Likud than by the Labor-dominated left-wing coalitions. The Israeli disen-
gagement from Gaza advocating unilateral Israeli withdrawal and disman-
tling of Israeli settlements in Gaza in 2005 was a significant peace gesture
initiated by the right-wing Likud under Ariel Sharon.
India under the right-wing BJP-led NDA government during the late
1990s and early twenty-first century took many peaceful and piecemeal
initiatives like the beginning of the Lahore Bus from Delhi to Pakistan.
Vajpayee’s bus trip to Pakistan was considered to be the most significant
historical engagement between India and Pakistan since the Shimla
Agreement of 1972. Also characterized as ‘Bus Diplomacy’, it set ‘a
vision that attempted to bring the hardliners to heel by snowing them
under the “positive impulses” generated by the peace initiative’ (Joshi
1999: 14). Vajpayee’s Bus Diplomacy was a huge success. With the
Lahore visit he sent a clear message to the rest of the world that India
was as eager as Pakistan to make a new beginning from the hoary past. ‘At
home, he showed all those who talked about the BJP’s bias against
Muslims that a BJP Prime Minister was willing to go that extra mile for
peace with Pakistan’ (Guha 1999).
Even the formation of the current NDA government under Modi
offered many friendly and volatile gestures, including the sudden stopover
visit to Islamabad while returning from India on the one hand and the
surgical strikes at the possible militant hideouts across the Line of Control
in Pakistan in September 2016 on the other.
Notwithstanding the Israeli peace initiatives, the unabated terrorist
violence went on questioning the peace drives of the Israeli governments
with the Palestinians. The ethno-religious and the nationalist parties
opposed all such conciliatory gestures offered to the Palestinians by the
Israeli governments, particularly the right-wing formations.
War as an instrument of foreign policy has lost its very raison d’ etre in
both Israel and India under contemporary times. However, peace and
Religiosity and Ethnicity 319
security still dominate the foreign policy discourse and electoral politics in
the two nations.
Religiosity and Ethnicity

Religiosity and ethnicity constitute important dimensions of political
governance of Israel and India. Religious versus secular discourse of Israel
is juxtaposed with communal versus secular debate in India. Similarly,
ethnic polarization in terms of Ashkenazim vs Sephardim in Israel could be
equated with the intra- and inter-caste identities that broadly permeate
Indian democratic politics, thus affecting the electoral politics of the two
nations in contemporary times. The debate could also be seen in terms of
‘boiling pot’ versus ‘salad bowl’ model where complexity within ethnic
and religious groups get boiled up in Israeli parliamentary politics,
whereas unity in diversity among castes and communities strengthens
Indian democratic polity.
Religiosity has remained a strong driving force in the determination of
Israeli democracy. The ambivalence in the formation of a single written
constitutional document by the post-independence Israeli State could be
seen in view of the religious parties pressuring the new government to give
both credence and precedence to Torah vis-à-vis the constitution.
It is difficult to ascertain why the new state failed to find a consensus in
drafting a written constitution; it is generally argued that such an initial
ambivalence on the questions of democracy and formal constitutional
draft allowed the ruling elite to manipulate the fledgling state with its own
Jewish–Zionist foundations and interpretations. The religious parties
feared that the enactment of a formal and codified constitution would
abrogate “the special and very central role of the religious institutions in
Israel’s public life” (Gutmann 1988: 290). Lack of consensus on ideolog-
ical and moral foundations of the constitution and fear of constitutional
bottlenecks suited the interests of the political elites to run the nascent
democratic nation without any formal written constitution.
Werblowsky (1976) argued that people and religion have grown
together in Israel. Religion, according to him, has played an important
role not only in proclaiming common beliefs and dictating popular
behavior of the people but also in imposing them on their vocation and
very existence. The religious roots of the Israeli demographic setup have
influenced the democratic orientation and nationality, reflecting in the
Jewish–Arab confrontation. Baruch Kimmerling commented that the
severity of the Arab-Jewish conflict would give more prominence to the
‘Jewish religion within the Jewish collectivity as a political entity’
(Kimmerling 1985: 264). The Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur
War in 1973, according to him, pushed the youth more toward their
Jewish rather than Israeli identity.
Despite the predominance of religiosity in the demarcation of Israeli
democracy, the real debate does not appear to be between communal and
secular; rather, it is between religious and secular. The religious world
integrates the Jewish religion with Jewish culture and broadly consists of
the Observants/Followers of code of conduct considered to be divine
commandants, namely, Halakha. The secular world, on the other hand,
believes in opening of the apertures of Jewish culture to the outside
modern world.
While the founding governments in the post-independence Israel were
struggling to avoid Kultukampf or cultural war between these two worlds
by resorting to the status quoist policy of resilience and concessions to the
religious sector, religious parties continued to be part of all Israeli coali-
tions led by either of the blocks since beginning. The growing religious
conciliation was reflected not only in terms of the public observance of the
Sabbath and the dietary laws (Kashrut), but also in terms of establishing
the religious hegemony in civic matters like marriage and divorce, separate
religious education and religious courts. Similar privileges were also
granted to other religions in the civic domain.
Religion too figured prominently in the Constituent Assembly debates.
The issue of safeguards to the minorities and the characterization of State
in India divided different schools of thought within the Constituent
Assembly. Though the word secular didn’t get added in the preamble of
the Constitution, Nehru and his liberal cohorts took extra care to ensure
the rights and privileges of the minorities. In fact, his obsession with the
minorities made him suspicious of the majority Hindu community. His
support for the Hindu Marriage Bill without a similar concern for
uniform civil code for all the communities made him controversial and
Religiosity and Ethnicity 321
his decisions questionable. His promotion of Urdu language is criticized

by the leaders of the right-wing parties who saw in Nehruvian action
‘seeds of second partition’ and an appeasement of the minorities. Nehru
was thus criticized for using the Muslim minorities for ‘vote bank politics’.
Religion and religiosity presented major crisis to the Israeli Govern-
ment during the 1970s. Under the directions of the chief rabbinate and
the council of Torah Sages, both NRP and the Agudas didn’t join the
government. And when the government faced the test of no confidence on
the issue of Sabbath desecration,10 the religious parties ensured to defeat
the government on the floor of the house.
Coalition politics during the war period and afterward broadly involved
the issue of territory. Since territorial concessions and Palestinian prob-
lems became one of the important campaign issues during the elections,
the coalition bargaining was attempted by major political actors on these
issues. The religious parties particularly dominated the coalition negotia-
tions with their rather hawkish stands on the preservation of the acquired
territory for the realization of their holy goal, namely, Eretz Israel. They
also got significant support from other religious non-political organiza-
tions like Gush Emunim to push forward their objectives in consonance
with the latter’s activities.
During late 1970s and 1980s, choice of particular ministries and
consequent ministerial payoffs started dominating the coalition negotia-
tions and bargaining deals at the time of government formation. Realiza-
tion of the holy mission of Eretz Israel through the absorption of the
immigrants and their subsequent expansion to the acquired territories
became one of the important planks of the rightist and the religious parties
throughout the period.
Ethnicity added new dimension to the electoral politics of Israel from
the 1990s, particularly with the immigration of the Russian Jews. Social
composition of the Jewish society started changing with the arrival of the
Russian immigrants, called the Sephardi Jews. The formation of Shas, as
the guardian of the Sephardim, changed political discourse, both in
electoral politics and government formation. Ashkenazi-Sephardi dis-
course continued dominating the policies and decisions of all Israeli
governments formed afterward.
Religiosity and ethnicity also dominated political discourse and gov-

ernment formation in India. The most significant decision of the National
Front Government was the implementation of the controversial Mandal
Commission Report11 in 1990. The Mandal Commission report for the
weaker sections had been kept in abeyance since 1980 because of political
reasons. But its sudden implementation led to a strong protest by anti-
reservation students in North–Indian towns and cities. Mandalization not
only benefited the ruling party of the day, the Janata Dal, but also brought
consistent electoral gains to many other caste-based parties like Samajwadi
Party of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Bahujan Samaj Party led by Kanshi
Ram and Mayawati.
BJP, which had just made inroads into the electoral politics with its
negligible presence, realized that Mandal card would lead to erosion of
party’s lower caste votes. Hence, to counter Mandal card, BJP resorted to
KaMandal (referring to religion) by invoking Rath Yatra12 under the
leadership of Lal Krishna Advani through Ayodhya movement. It
attempted to strengthen its vote among the upper-caste and middle-
class Hindus. BJP’s perception was that the Ayodhya movement would
overcome the issue of the lower castes and would ensure a uniformed
national movement, enlisting support from all segments of the Hindu
community. The Ayodhya movement ultimately voted BJP to power in
four states in the Hindi heartland, namely, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh in the early 1990s. The first
four Lok Sabha elections during the 1990s claimed to have increased the
seats and voting percentage of BJP, thereby facilitating its march from ‘a
party of opposition to a party of governance’ (Sunil 1998).
The Ram Mandir movement of the 1990s could have its resonance in
the movement for Jerusalem espoused by the right wingers during and
after the elections. Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount in September
2000 instigated and led violent protest throughout the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. The storming of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem by the
Israeli police to apprehend a group of Palestinians further made the
situation volatile, leading to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in
October 2000. Though it would be difficult to establish whether Sharon’s
visit to Temple Mount succeeded in galvanizing the Israeli voters, it
helped the Likud to wrest Premiership from the Labor in February
Settlements and Infiltration 323
2001 and finally form the government on its own after the sixteenth
Knesset.
Though ethnicity and religiosity do not constitute monolithic blocks,
ethno-religious issues keep on influencing the major policy decisions of all
governments in both Israel and India. While no party or government in
India has ever spoken to re-visit, nay oppose, the caste-based reservations,
Israeli political class too has remained somewhat skeptical in speaking for
or against the ethnic and religious groups. However, the last elections for
Lok Sabha in 2014 and Knesset in 2015 did highlight some ethno-
religious comments that happened to change the electoral results.
Narendra Modi, the BJP prime ministerial candidate used his Congress
opponent’s quote, ‘Neech Rajniti’ (low politics). ‘Not knowing the dis-
tinction between Neech (low level) and Neechee (lower castes/classes), the
misuse of the term created a stir. Modi and his followers took it as a
derogatory remark implying that he was a person from a low ranking caste’
(Atal and Choudhary 2015). The Congress later explained that the
reference was only to the low level of politics and not to the social status
in the caste hierarchy. Similarly, Netanyahu’s election-day warning that
‘the Arabs were voting in droves’ (Newman 2016) went on to impact the
results at the last moment by winning over the Silent Voters.
Unless development and governance start dominating the center of
mainstream political discourse, religiosity and ethnicity would continue to
guide the tone and tenor of electoral politics and government formation in
both Israel and India.
Settlements and Infiltration

The issue of settlements and infiltration has been one of the major policy
imperatives for both Israel and India. As the two nations made their
independent innings as new states in the late 1940s, migration of people
across borders became imminent. The post-partition and creation of new
nations witnessed flux of immigrants in both the nations. Increasing
number of immigrants, both legal and illegal, started changing the
demography and democracy of both Israel and India.
A small state with limited population, Israeli governments brought

about law to encourage Jewish immigration to new nation. The new
Parliament brought about the Law of Return under which all Jews across
the world were invited and accepted as citizens of the country. Such
immigrants were not only given good monetary compensation by the
State, but also all amenities in terms of housing, employment and the like
under the scheme called ‘Absorption Baskets’.
While the migrants initially coming to Israel from Europe and America
became the pioneer Jewish citizens, the subsequent migration of Jews from
former Soviet Union and Africa, particularly during the 1990s, came to be
known as settlers. With increasing number of settlers under different waves
of Aliyah, the problem of their absorption through settlements formally
began. The absorption of the Jewish immigrants took new forms with
occupation of West Bank and Gaza in Six-Day War in 1967. It reached to
its alarming position with the influx of the Russian Jews from 1990s
onward. Immigrants and their settlements thus assumed salience in the
post-independence era, and it started affecting the Israeli politics, econ-
omy and government in subsequent years.
In India, on the other hand, partition brought about voluntary migra-
tion of people across border. While the Muslim population voluntarily
migrating to Pakistan from India under the Mountbatten Plan, 1947,
came to be known as Muhajirs, the forced Hindu migrants from Pakistan
to India became Sharnarthis (refugees). Unlike legal voluntary migration
in Israel, India, since its independence, witnessed illegal migration, which
took the form of infiltration across borders of both Pakistani-Occupied
Kashmir (POK) and Bangladesh. The issue of infiltration thus started
dominating domestic as well as federal politics in India.
Unlike the voluntary movement of Jewish immigrants for nation-
building plan under Aliyah, infiltration in India across border took place
mainly with the purpose of changing the demography of the state and
challenging the sovereignty of the nation. The pangs of partition of 1947
and creation of Bangladesh in 1971 with Indian initiatives strengthened
the problem of infiltration. The state of Jammu and Kashmir witnessed
infiltration from POK, which took the form of terrorism, and increasing
infiltration from the eastern part of India, Bangladesh, from 1980s
Settlements and Infiltration 325
onward started changing political demography of the eastern and north-

eastern states.
The 1980s thus saw the state of Jammu and Kashmir under turmoil
with increasing cross-border infiltration and terrorism. Unlike Jammu,
Leh and Laddakh comprising majority Hindu and Buddhist population,
respectively, Kashmir had predominantly Muslim population.13 Beset by
infiltration and terrorism during the 1980s, demography of Kashmir
started changing. The Kashmiri Pandits14 who had been living in Kashmir
peacefully for over the centuries and happened to be strong business class
were reduced to minorities and were asked to leave the state in their own
country. The issue of Kashmiri Pandits was taken by the right-wing parties
like BJP since the beginning. The demand for the abrogation of Article
370 giving special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir was an
important part of ideological agenda of the party since its inception
in 1980.
While all the federal governments led by the Congress and Third
Fronts have espoused the cause of Muslims as minorities in India, none
of these parties ever raised the plight of the Kashmiri Pandits and their
repatriation to Kashmir. Politics under the changed demographic com-
position also assumed new forms, with regional parties like National
Conference and People’s Democratic Front supporting the Congress
and the Third Front-led federal governments while opposing the BJP
on the issue.
The problem of infiltration from Bangladesh also began during the
1980s. Two border states that broadly got affected with the Bangladeshi
infiltration were Assam and West Bengal. The increasing number of
Bangladeshi immigrants and their illegal placements in the states by
political parties strengthened their vote banks. Legalizing their arrival
with voter cards and permanent cluster residency made the illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants strong vote banks for the parties in the north-
eastern states. The changing demographic transformation made the state
of Assam rise in insurgency against such outsiders throughout the 1980s
and 1990s. The insider–outsider duality (a la Robert Merton 2002)
became an important political discourse in Assam and other northeastern
states and started influencing politics of these states.
The post-Six-Day War witnessed second major Israeli Aliyah and led to
the emigration of Arabs from the occupied territories to the neighboring
Arab nations like Jordan and Syria. Those who failed to get asylum in the
neighboring Arab world were forced to stay in UN shelters as refugees.
Unlike the post-partition Indian refugees from Pakistan, the Arab refugees
underwent major sufferings as asylum-seekers. The Arab longing to return
to its motherland started getting louder with the passage of time.
The decade of the 1970s and 1980s saw new political alignments
among parties and government in Israel. The beginning of the bi-block
polarity with Likud displacing the Labor, the politics of settlers and
settlements in the occupied territories began strengthening. Realizing
the government’s reliance on the radical right and the ethno-religious
parties in the government, the right-wing government under Menachem
Begin went ahead with the hawkish policies of increasing Jewish settle-
ment in West Bank by pouring large sums of money in Judea, Samaria
and Gaza through his ‘no constraints policy’. It was under his government
that the state embarked upon the beginning of heavily subsidized housing
settlements. ‘Embittered by its leftist critics at home and abroad, the
besieged Likud moved closer to its natural allies from the extreme right,
radicalizing its anti-Arab and anti-left rhetoric’ (Sprinzak 1993: 126) on
the issue of settlers and settlements.
In Israel, immigration took new forms in the early 1990s, particularly
with massive influx of immigrants from the disintegrated Soviet Union.
Coming mainly from the lower- and working-class positions, the Russian
immigrants soon became the center of attractions for political parties—
Likud to religious to the newly formed political groups like Yisrael
Beiteinu and Yisrael B’Aliya. ‘The Russian immigrants who seemed to
have been massively pro-Likud upon arrival in Israel were already puzzled
by the clerical nature of the Shamir government and its dependence on
the ultra-orthodox parties’ (Sprinzak 1991: 135).
The arrival of the Mizrakhi parties like Yisrael Beiteinu and Yisrael
B’Aliya further strengthened the right-wing nationalistic block by
championing the cause for greater settlements under Eretz Yisrael. Fearing
to lose their electoral base among the Russian Jews, the right-wing parties
didn’t hesitate in joining the government led by the left-wing Labor or
centrist Shinui and Kadima parties.
Economy and Market 327
The idea of Eretz Yisrael as championed by the ethno-religious and

some right-wing parties could also be seen in the political utterances of
Indian right-wing leadership like Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, the founder
of Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) calling for ‘Ek Vidhan, Ek Pradhan, Ek
Nishan’15 in the 1950s and recently the BJP National Secretary Ram
Madhav hinting on ‘Akhand Bharat’ bringing together India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
Both the right- and left-wing government formations in Israel from
1990s onward continued their dependence on the ethno-religious parties
and the Russian immigrant parties, which advocated retention of the
occupied territories by propping up settlers and settlements. The right-
wing ruling government led by Likud even went ahead for sacrificing any
lending assistance from the USA on the issue of freezing settlements.16
Labor’s focus on the retention of the ‘strategic settlements’ as against
the Likud-oriented ‘political settlements’17 during the mid-1990s
accorded it more popularity. Though such decision by the Labor led to
the release of the withheld American loan guarantees of $100 billion to
Israel, the government had to move ahead with its election pledges of
freezing the new settlements in West Bank. The unilateral settlement
withdrawal took new forms, leading to the splits and counter-splits within
parties on the issue of settlers and settlements.18 The formation of the
centrist parties like Kadima, Yesh Atid, Ha’Tnuah and Kulanu in the
twenty-first century started championing renewal of peace process with
Palestinians, which inter alia also included a freeze on settlements.
Notwithstanding political pressures to address the issue of settlements
and infiltration with strong policy initiatives by the governments in both
Israel and India, the problem persists with serious implications for peace
and security in the two nations.
Economy and Market

State in post-independence Israel and India invariably linked with the
changing nature of economy in the two nations. Soon after their inde-
pendence, economies of the two nations required immediate
reconstruction and development. State as an instrument of economic

development and welfare assumed significance in the aftermath of
independence.
The State of Israel was asked to undertake the major task of nation
building. Accommodating the immigrants by providing them housing
and employment emerged as the major challenge for the nascent State.
Consensus among the parties and direction of the leadership under Ben-
Gurion facilitated the road toward reconstruction of the economy and
building of the nation during the first three decades of independence. The
new economic policy of 1952 was designed by the government with a
focus on rationing, devaluation and price controls. Agriculture got a great
boost, with State funding the grassroots activities through Kibbutzim and
Moshavim.
The first three decades of the Israeli State witnessed promotion of
welfarism through ‘mixed economy’ (Reich 1985: 92) orientation where
the State funded major activities aimed at achieving agricultural and
industrial development simultaneously. It was during this period that
Histadrut was greatly funded by the State in its various activities like
housing, cooperatives, health, education and public works. Both State and
Histadrut started becoming synonyms as instruments of economic devel-
opment and transformation. Unlike Soviet communism, the left-
dominated socialism in Israel became the lead ideology of the ruling
party and elite that sought to promote welfarism. Thus, economy in the
first two decades of the post-independence Israel was governed by the
principles of socialism.
Post-independence India under Nehru’s Congress, on the other hand,
also attempted to steer the nation toward the path of economic develop-
ment and modernization based on the principles of socialism. To over-
come the challenges the new nation was facing on the eve of independence
in forms of ‘internal strife, grinding poverty, low productivity, inflation,
long-entrenched interests’, India advocated a rapid agricultural transfor-
mation through land reforms system and large-scale industrialization.
Though not enamored of Marxism and Capitalism, India, like Israel,
also followed mixed-economy model, called Mahalanobis19 Model, which
was based on the twin principles of liberalism and socialism. While on the
one hand the Congress government carried out land reforms with the
abolition of zamindari, tenancy reforms and land ceiling, the goal of

industrialization sought to achieve modernized and technocratic develop-
ment based on the strong support of the State. Hence, the post-
independence India witnessed the principle of ‘Permit-License-Quota
Raj’ where the State was asked to play a major role in nation’s infrastruc-
tural development.
Based on the principles of Mahalanobis Model in early 1950s and
Green Revolution during the 1960s, Indian economy acquired its strong
footing in Welfare State and tried to bring about a balance between
capitalism and socialism on the one hand and agriculture and industry
on the other. While Israel had successfully achieved Green Revolution
through Kibbutzim and Moshavim under Yishuv, India undertook it
during the late 1960s, which helped in making the nation self-reliant in
food grains.
It was during the first two decades of India’s independence that Nehru
undertook many infrastructure projects in order to spearhead nation’s
development through science and technology. Nehruvian state is
described as a ‘Social’ rather than a ‘Police’ state, as it was called upon
to solve the problem from health to education. The ‘socialistic pattern of
society’, as championed by India, involved peaceful transformation
through abolition of princedoms in terms of privy purses and the disso-
lution of big landed estates through the zamindari abolition.
State in both Israel and India in formative years of post-independence
period thus brought economy at the center stage of politics and govern-
ment. Deeply rooted into the principle of welfarism, State in the two
nations started trusting national capital to achieve economic development
imbibing the principles of equality and social justice. However, unlike
India’s limited reliance on foreign capital, Israeli economy was largely
supported by American financial assistance.20
Economies of the two nations got largely affected with wars both Israel
and India had to fight during the 1960s. While for Israel the occupation
of territories under the Six-Day War in 1967 added burden of both
annexed population and defence21 budget, for India defence budget
before and after the war got almost doubled.22 Wars during the 1960s
led to diversion of funds by the two nations from economy to defence.
The post-war Israeli State started witnessing change from American grants
and loans for agricultural and industrial products to aid for defence needs.
While war with China in 1962 increased financial burden on India,
including increasing defence expenditure, war with Pakistan in 1965
exerted economic blackmailing by the USA through its economic aid
program called PL 480.23 The PL 480 was an arm-twisting attempt used
by President Johnson to take advantage of India’s first ever food crisis in
the post-independence era. Reeling under severe economic drought,
American economic aid with political strings forced Indian State taking
strong political measures, including Green Revolution in mid-1960s and
bank nationalization in 1969, by acquiring overwhelming power through
License Raj State.
State-run economy in both Israel and India started undergoing trans-
formation from 1980s onward. The signing of Free Trade Area Agree-
ment with the USA in 1985 heralded one such economic leap in Israel,
whereas the emergence of Rajiv Gandhi during the period started paving
the way for opening of the Indian market to private and foreign players.
With no political experience, Rajiv Gandhi as a technocrat tried to address
country’s problems with science, technology and innovation. The intro-
duction of technology missions in different spheres of administration and
polity did try to revolutionize the nation by streamlining the notion of
governance.
The National Front Government due to its obsession with politico–
emotive issues made Indian economy of the nation vulnerable to interna-
tional pressures from the IMF and the World Bank. The subsequent
government of Chandra Shekher mortgaged the country’s gold with
World Bank. In fact, it was mismanagement of the economy by the
National Front prime ministers that led the country to fall prey to the
international economic giants like IMF and World Bank. With this weak
economic base, India was forced to enter the global market under the
principles of Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization, characterized
by the acronym LPG, in 1991.
Israel on the other hand also embarked upon its plan of EESP or
Emerging Economy Stabilization Plan, leading to preeminence of the
market with a reducing role of the State in economy. The new economic
plan under EESP halted the inflation and laid the groundwork for
successful liberalization of Israeli economy. The non-union activities
carried out by Histadrut were immensely affected under liberalization
measures along with the religious subsidies and exemptions hitherto
provided to the Haredi sectors by the State. The power of the Histadrut
started getting curtailed with the nationalization of the healthcare system
in 1995. Such a move led to the decline in the membership of the
Histadrut by two-thirds on the one hand and the development of the
private healthcare industry on the other.
The twenty-first-century Israeli and Indian governments undertook
many decisions that had competitive market as their fundamental drive,
with crucial socio-political and religious implications for the society as a
whole. For instance, Sharon government took many decisions from
dismantling the religious ministry to disbanding the religious councils,
delegating the religious services to the concerned municipal councils,
scrapping the Tal Law by forcing the haredim to serve the State through
army or national services, reforming religious laws governing conversion,
marriage, adoption, burial and other matters of personal status, modifying
Large Families Law to ensure equity in child allowances and finally
reducing the number of local governments and deputy heads in broad
concurrence with the policy of liberalization and globalization.
The success of the implementation of these reforms actually lay in the
presentation of the new economic plan by the Finance Minister Netan-
yahu under Ariel Sharon’s government during 2001–2003. Netanyahu’s
economic austerity plan,24 which sought to address the huge deficit of the
previous years by wage cut and dismissals, signaled a volley of protests
across the nation. Israel witnessed strong organized massive strikes by the
local authorities, government ministers, civil servants, single mothers and
other Histadrut-affiliated organizations affecting almost every area of
civilian life.
The twenty-first-century global India also unleashed series of economic
and market reforms with a focus on development and governance. Under
National Agenda for Governance, BJP gave up the most controversial
articles of its election manifesto—the building of a Ram temple in
Ayodhya, the abrogation of Article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code—
and embarked upon the policy of governance and good governance, to be
called Su-raaj. Several legislations in conformity with BJP government’s

policy of globalization and economic liberalization were also passed, for
example, Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), Trade Marks Act
and Copyright Amendment Act, 1999. The government successfully
introduced Information Technology Bill, 1999, to provide legal recogni-
tion for e-commerce.
The twenty-first-century UPA and NDA governments in India under-
took second-generation economic reforms, which now also include the
introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST), as one uniform taxation
system, much in line with the global market system.
Contemporary Israel and India witness transition and transformation
from welfare agrarian economies of their formative years to the compet-
itive global industrial market economies of the present times. The era of
EESP and LPG in Israel and India, respectively, has brought about radical
change in their economies and politics from 1990s onward. The forces of
liberalization and globalization have witnessed three major transforma-
tions in both Israel and India, namely, shift from controls to competition,
transition from government to governance and change from politics to
polity, thus bringing issues of economic development and political gov-
ernance to the center stage of global competitive market system in the two
democratic nations.
Scams and Scandals

Governments and governance have been the subject of complexities and
controversies in all forms of representative systems. Parliamentary democ-
racies provide broader platform for such issues both through open house
discussion and media projection, thereby impacting the credibility of the
parties and government. Corruption became one such major issue in both
Israel and India that kept on influencing party politics in the two nations,
particularly during elections from 1980s onward.
The Corruption Perceptions Index, 2016, of Transparency Interna-
tional highlighted the ‘connection between corruption and inequality’
amidst unequal distribution of power and wealth in society. ‘Using public
office for private gains’, the Corruption Perceptions Index assessed
Scams and Scandals 333
prevailing corruption among 176 countries of the globe, with scaling of

0 (‘highly corrupt’) to 100 (‘very clean’). The higher the scaling in terms
of number, the greater the cleanliness of the system. Israel with a score of
64 and India with 40 ranked 28th and 79th, respectively, in global
standing of corruption.
From the report of Corruption Perceptions Index, one could broadly
generalize that corruption might have a lesser issue in politics and gov-
ernment in Israel rather than in India, but scams and scandals did affect
politics of the two nations in the following decades of their independence.
The founding governments of Ben-Gurion and Nehru didn’t witness
any major corruption case affecting the credibility of their governments.
Though under Nehru, the jeep scandal25 and Mudgal case26 became the
highlight of the period targeting Nehruvian government, parliamentary
inquiries and prompt action saved the government from the Opposition’s
scathe. However, what was more latent under Nehru became more potent
with the emergence of Indira Gandhi during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Indira Gandhi was alleged for institutionalizing corruption through her
strengthening of the ‘permit-license-quota raj’ in view of the transforma-
tion of absolute power into authoritarian power leading to the imposition
of emergency during 1975–77.
Both administration and polity became victims of corruption under
Indira’s regime. Political developments in the aftermath of Congress split
was described by Morris-Jones (1978) as ‘Market Polity’, which was based
on electoral bargaining leading to defections, fierce factionalism and
corruption both in Congress and in many Congress-ruled states.
In Israel, the decade of the 1970s also brought to the light for the first
time intermittent crises and scandals impacting the Mapai-led Rabin
government. The Attorney’s report in January 1977 castigating the
Labor-nominated head for the Bank of Israel, Asher Yadlin, for taking
bribes as the head of the Histadrut’s Sick Fund immensely tarnished the
image of the government and the party. Investigation orders were also
made against the Labor Housing Minister Avraham Ofer for raising
money for the party coffers. And before the investigation could have
actually commenced, Ofer committed suicide, thus legitimizing the pop-
ular perception of his tacit involvement.
The foreign currency scandal involving Rabin and his wife for
maintaining illegal accounts in the USA also brought about serious
damage to the government credibility. And finally the State Comptroller’s
annual report indicating lack of sufficient supplies in the army emergency
warehouse ‘touched a raw nerve since that was one of the problems Israel
faced during the Yom Kippur War and the public had been assured that it
would never happen again’ (Arian 1980: 11). All these crises forced Rabin
to resign, the first such sitting prime minister tendering resignation on the
issue of corruption.
The late 1970s also brought disrepute to the Likud government led by
Menachem Begin. The period witnessed involved corruption charges
against its cabinet minister, Aharon Abu-Hatzeira, from Likud ally,
NRP as well as increasing dispute between the interior minister and the
police commissioner regarding corruption charges and criminal cases,
leading to latter’s resignation, which severely damaged the credibility of
the Begin government.
Doron Navot (2012) viewed corruption as ‘a central feature of Israeli
politics, radically altered by changes that the political and economic elite
have instituted since the 1980s’. The 1980s appeared to have provided the
fertile ground for corruption in Israeli politics. The infighting within the
parties during the 1980s, particularly in party primaries, started bringing
more disrepute to the then governments. The Israeli press played an
instrumental role in highlighting the scandals one after another.
The period of the 1980s in India on the other hand also brought to
light many key scams and scandals, leading to the falling of the govern-
ment. One such big scam unearthed was the Bofors that had taken place
during the Congress-led Rajiv Gandhi government. The issue of corrup-
tion where it was claimed that the government functionaries, including
the Congress ministers and the prime minister, took bribes from the
Italian company—Bofors—surcharged the democratic ambience in the
country with corruption against governance. ‘The Bofors case jolted
the system and highlighted corruption in high places, destroying even
the image of Rajiv Gandhi as Mr Clean’ (Atal and Choudhary 2014).
The small scandals of the 1980s continued to haunt the government
and governance in the succeeding decades in both Israel and India. Parties
Scams and Scandals 335
and government in the two nations were beset with internal divisions that
emerged in the wake of corruption.
While the twenty-first century witnessed frequent and systematic
expośe of corruption, scams and scandals affecting the very ethos of
democratic governance both in Israel and India, the period is also marked
by democratic protests by the civil society organizations in both Israel and
India. Scandals and scams during the present century ‘sparked a political
firestorm’ and ‘erupted like molten lava only added to the miserable
failure’ (The Haaretz, 8 January 2003) for pan parties of Israel. Indian
Prime Ministers like Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao, both from
Congress, faced major political convulsions on the issue of corruption.
Similarly, in Israel, charges were leveled against Kadima leader and Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert for holding the post of Mayor of Jerusalem,
forcing him to resign.
Corruption started getting new meanings as both Israel and India
moved ahead as a democratic polity. ‘From stray instances of corruption
by a few individuals, it started taking shape as an organized underworld
activity’ (Ibid.). Unlike Israel, small-scale scandals of the formative
decades of independence started transforming into substantial scams
affecting administration, business houses and government. From Hawala
to Gwala, Commonwealth to Coalgate, Telecom to 2G Spectrum,27
India witnessed series of scams that questioned the credibility of the
governments of the day, thereby providing momentum for movement
against corruption.
As part of Transparency International’s Global Corruption Perceptions
Report 2010, the Shvil-Transparency Israel Report[i] in its June 2010
release ranked Knesset as the second most corrupt institution with 88% of
the Israelis thinking the “country’s leadership is riddled with corruption”
(Hartman 2010). Similarly, the report also ranked “political parties as the
most corrupt groups in the country” (ibid.). Notwithstanding corruption
making political headlines in Israeli politics, it failed to override security
considerations in the country’s polity whereas in India corruption
emerged as the most vital issue in the 2014 elections and largely succeeded
in capturing the imagination of the electorate thus affecting the electoral
results for the 20th Lok Sabha.
[i] Judging the corruption on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being the most

honest and 5 being the most corrupt, the Shvil-Transparency Report,
based on a survey of 1000 Israelis, released its report in June 2010 and
ranked political parties with a score of 4.5 as the most corrupt political
groups in the country.
The year 2011 was a landmark in such mass agitations against corrup-
tion in the two nations. The Israeli Social Justice protest and the Anna
Movement of 2011 in India highlighted issues of governance with an
onslaught on corruption by providing congenial political environment
ensuring a change in government.
Summing Up
Experience of running the 33rd government with support from the
centrist parties like Yesh Atid and Ha’Tnuah appeared to be very bitter,
particularly with regard to Netanyahu’s plan for settlements and settlers.
Instead of working under extreme centrist pressures, Netanyahu decided
to rope in new allies by announcing elections in 2015. The current
government led by Netanyahu has support from religious parties like
Habayit Hayehudi, Shas and UTJ and the moderate centrist Kadima,
but its continuation would depend on how it balances sensitive security
and settlement issues with development and governance by ensuring
respectable standing in the contemporary global politics.
Both the right-wing formations marked new transitions in the demo-
cratic politics of Israel and India. Electoral populism seems to have been
replaced by political governance in both the nations. The two govern-
ments have spearheaded new democratic transformations, which would
focus on the issues of development and governance with an approach of
accommodation as against confrontation. The real challenge and success
for both the new right-wing formations in Israel and India is how to
project development and governance in the mainstream polities of the two
nations.
Notes 337
Notes
1. Following the Cabinet Plan of 1946, the Indian States (565 in number)
were given freedom to cede with India or Pakistan or remained indepen-
dent. When Raja Hari Singh of Kashmir decided to remain independent,
the Pakistani backed armed men invaded the State forcing Raja Hari
Singh seeking Indian military help. By the time Indian armed forces
retaliated, a large part of Kashmir had been occupied by the Pakistani
forces which still remains the part of Pakistan under Pakistani occupied
Kashmir or POK.
2. Panchsheel or five virtues was a treaty signed between India and China in
April 1954. It referred to the five principles of peaceful co-existence—
mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,
mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefits and peaceful
co-existence.
3. NAM was a group of nations that came together in the aftermath of the
Second World War which didn’t align with any of the two power
blocks—Capitalist Block led by the US and the Communist Block
headed by the former Soviet Union. Most of the countries of the Third
World joined the non-aligned movement. India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia,
Egypt and Ghana were the founder nations of NAM.
4. China claimed that India violated Panchsheel by offering asylum to Tibet
refugees, including its religious leader Dalai Lama, as it claimed Tibet to
be its integral part. India, on the other hand, countered Chinese claim by
citing its policy of political asylum to the refugees both for humanitarian
considerations and as per UN Convention, 1951, on refugees. India has
always stated that it has never allowed its territory being used by refugees/
foreign citizens against any other nation, including China.
5. The war fell on 6 October, which is considered to be the Yom Kippur day,
the holiest day in Judaism. It was also the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan.
6. The deep intrusion and the tacit support of the Israeli Defence Forces
(IDF) to the Christian Phalangists led to the massacres of several hun-
dreds of Palestinian men, women and children in Sabra and Shatilla
refugee camps. The entire military adventure also took a toll of 600 Israeli
soldiers.
7. Intifada referred to the protest of the Palestinians in the occupied terri-

tories, West Bank and Gaza, against the Israeli State. The movement that
spearheaded with the killing of several Palestinian workers by an Israeli
truck in December 1987 started getting converted into a civil disobedi-
ence movement, which increasingly came to be associated with the
Palestinian refusal of taxes, rejection of employment in Israel, boycott
of Israeli products and flying the Palestinian flags. It is claimed that while
the first Intifada remained peaceful, the subsequent Intifadas turned
violent.
8. Some of the ISI-backed terrorist organizations are Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Indian Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and so forth.
9. While the first phase (May 2003) of the Road Map advocated the
settlement freeze and dismantling of the outposts constructed in West
Bank and Gaza after March 2001, the second phase (June–Dec 2003)
entailed the creation of the Palestine State with temporary borders; the
third stage aimed at permanent status agreement and end of conflict,
agreement on final borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements to go up
until 2005.
10. The Rabin Government went ahead with its welcome ceremony in
December 1976 for the American consignment of F-15 fighter planes
even after the start of the Sabbath. A no confidence motion was moved by
the Aguda parties forming the United Torah Front against the govern-
ment’s deliberate desecration of the Sabbath. Though Rabin’s tactical
moves saved the government from the defeat notwithstanding the NRP’s
abstention in the no confidence motion, the issue highlighted further
cracks in the coalition and the principle of collective responsibility.
11. The V P Singh-led government in 1989 decided to give 27 per cent
reservation to Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in educational institu-
tions and employment.
12. BJP under its leader L K Advani undertook a massive road journey,
leading the karsevaks (cadres) belonging to Vishwa Hindu Parishad and
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh during September to October 1990 to
build temple of Lord Ram on the site of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.
13. It is a sheer co-incidence that in spite of its Muslim dominance, the state
of Jammu and Kashmir remained under a Hindu king throughout its
long history.
14. Kashmiri Pandits are the upper-caste Brahmins of Jammu and Kashmir
who were forced to flee in the wake of growing terrorism in the 1980s.
Notes 339
15. The phrase ‘Ek Vidhan, Ek Pradhan, Ek Nishan’ referring to a single

constitution, single head of the state (PM) and single identity (flag) was
stated by Syama Prasad Mookerjee in the context of special status given to
the state of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 where the State had a
separate constitution, separate nomenclature of the head of the state as
Sadar-e-Riyasat and a separate flag. State of Jammu and Kashmir still has
its own constitution and flag, though Sadar-e-Riyasat is now changed into
governor as is the case of other states in India.
16. The decision of Yitzhak Shamir government (1990–92) to sacrifice the
American-sanctioned $10 billion loan guarantees for the settlements had
serious repercussions for the crippling Israeli economy, leading to grow-
ing unemployment and the increasing immigrants’ wrath on the Likud-
led government.
17. ‘Strategic settlements’ referred to strategically located settlements in West
Bank and Gaza were considered indispensable for the Israeli security,
whereas ‘political settlements’ indicated expansionist move of Likud to
increase settlements as part of its ideological agenda.
18. Ariel Sharon’s plan of unilateral settlement withdrawal from Gaza Strip in
2006 resulted into a split within Likud, resulting in the formation of
Kadima under his leadership.
19. Designer of India’s second Five -Year Plan, 1956–61, P C Mahalanobis
emphasized investments as an important tool of India’s economic growth.
Influenced by the Soviet model of development, Mahalanobis Model
became Nehru’s key architect of development and modernization.
20. From 1949 to 1983, USA aid totaled more than $25 billion. For details,
see Bernard Reich (1985), Israel: Land of Tradition and Conflict. Colo-
rado: Westview Press.
21. It is estimated that the Six-Day War cost Israel somewhat $ 1.12 billion
calculated on the basis of the then prevailing value of the British pound.
For details, see Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 18 December 1967.
22. The defence budget before the Sino–India War, 1962, was 1.5 per cent of
the total GDP, which got increased to 2.32 per cent at the end of the year
in the aftermath of the war (see Ajai Shukla 2014).
23. Also called Food for Peace Program, PL 480 or the Public Law 480 was
the American program assisting the developing countries with food.
Under the program, the USA agreed to supply wheat to India on a
relatively lower price on rupee payment. However, India’s criticism of
American bombings of Hanoi during Vietnam War put the wheat supply
on hold, thus forcing India to a pitiable position.
24. Netanyahu’s plan thus included ‘public sector layoffs and salary cuts, a
uniform 10 per cent cut in ministry budgets, and freezing most social
security payments. It also proposed to cut allocations for families, mort-
gage grants and tax breaks for rural areas’ (Sinai, 2003). The plan in this
way attempted to cut around NIS 11 billion from government expendi-
ture in 2003 ‘by trimming the public sector and boosting the private
sector’.
25. The Jeep Case was related to the purchase of jeeps by Indian Government
from Britain to be used by the Indian army against its ongoing war with
Pakistan in 1949. One of the conditions of the contract signed by India
with the British firm, Messrs. Hunts, was that the supply of jeeps should
commence within six months of its signing. ‘It is on record that the first
and only supply of 155 of the reconditioned vehicles arrived in March
1949, and upon inspection, they were found to be unserviceable by the
army’ (Atal and Choudhary 2014), despite all the payments made by
India. The case came into the limelight as the man behind the signing of
the contract was Nehru’s confidant V. K. Krishna Menon.
26. The case related to H. G. Mudgal, an Independent Member of Parlia-
ment, who was charged guilty of misuse of his position as Member of
Parliament in influencing the government to benefit the Bombay Bullion
Association.
27. These were all major scams that shook the nation as the money involved
into them was colossal.
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The Way Forward
Israel and India as the two leading parliamentary democracies have

traveled a long and difficult electoral terrain in the past 70 years toward
political independence. Sharing commonalities on various socio-
economic, religious and political issues, Israel and India also exhibit
distinct differences on these issues. The successful holding of parliamen-
tary elections from independence to date—twentieth in Israel and six-
teenth in India—strengthens the spirit of their democratic survival. The
political governance in the two nations in the twenty-first century assumes
significance in view of transformation from politico–emotive issues to
economico–pragmatic issues, especially in the aftermath of globalization of
the 1980s. Their polities witness a unique feature of a shift from ‘one-
party dominance’ to ‘multiparty coalition’, which came to be character-
ized by the term, ‘Coalitional Multipolarity’.
The focus of the book has been more on the changing dynamics of the
parties and party systems of Israel and India. As both the countries share
common historical and colonial experiences, the party formations in the
two nations before and after independence get unprecedented signifi-
cance. Researchers on parties and party systems might not have witnessed
extensive commonalities in the systems of two parliamentary democratic

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3
344 The Way Forward
nations in terms of their electoral behavior, democratic pattern of gover-

nance, party dominance and uniform shifts in party systems. From this
perspective, comparing democracies, parties and governance of Israel and
India leave good scope for the new researchers to delve into the actual
dynamics of the two systems.
The formative years of Israeli party-building and Indian party forma-
tions reflect uniform patterns. Mapai in Israel and Indian National
Congress in India emerged as the two principal political umbrella parties
that sought to accommodate diverse socio-economic and political forces.
The two leading parties actually spearheaded the national movement for
political independence from their colonial masters. By virtue of catering to
a diverse political culture, both Mapai and Indian National Congress
came to attain a sacrosanct position in the pre-independence history of
their respective polities. Though the two leading parties did experience
political resistance and challenge to their hegemony from other forces like
the rightist and religious parties, for example, Herut and NRP in Israel,
and Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League in India, their dominant
position remained unaltered until they finally took their countries to
political independence in 1948 and 1947, respectively.
The post-independence democratic polities of Israel and India
witnessed ‘one-party dominance’ for nearly two and a half decades. The
first eight Knesset elections and the first five Lok Sabha elections
established the predominance of Mapai and Congress in Israel and
India, respectively. The early elections were exclusively marked by the
unchallenged supremacy of these two national parties. The undisputed
dominance of Mapai came to be characterized as ‘Mapaivot’ in the sense
that the Mapai in Israel constituted the key pivot on which the entire
political machinery of the government revolved during the first two
decades of post-independence Israeli democratic polity. During the first
phase of the Israeli party system, no coalition could have been possible
without the support of the Mapai.
Similarly in India, the Congress was the main ruling party both at the
center and in the states. The Congress System (a la Rajni Kothari) worked
on the principle of consensus. Congress maintained its hegemony by
virtue of accommodating the aspirations of the Indian masses through
The Way Forward 345
the democratic functioning of Syndicate—the intermediary structures of

power consisting of important state leaders.
However, both Mapai and Congress faced internal dissension in the
late 1960s, leading to the first splits. A significant section of Mapai led by
Ben Gurion left the party and formed Rafi. Similarly, the Congress also
witnessed split in 1969 with the emergence of Congress (Ogranization)
and Congress (Requisitionists)— the former by the parent group, and the
latter by the Syndicate dissidents. This split, however, did not bring about
any major transformation in the party system as the subsequent elections
to the Knesset and Lok Sabha primarily reflected the dominance of these
two parties. The difference, however, was an alignment going on among
the Israeli parties, which led to the emergence of Israeli Labor Party, the
precursor of Mapai.
The party transformations in Israel and India also affected the evolution
and growth of the rightist parties. While in Israel, one witnessed the
emergence of Likud as the leading political formation to challenge
Labor, in India such challenge to Congress hegemony emerged in the
form of Janata Party. The Congress of the period also got transformed
from Congress to Congress Indira. The high-handedness of the Congress
regime under Indira Gandhi that led to the imposition of internal emer-
gency finally brought all the anti-Congress forces on a common platform
in 1977 in the form of Janata Parivar.
The year 1977 has a very special significance in the electoral history of
both Israel and India. The party politics in the two parliamentary democ-
racies got the first major transformation this year, leading to the formation
of non-left or non-Labor government in Israel and the first non-Congress
government in India. The first right-wing party-led government in Israel
under Menachem Begin of Likud came to be characterized as ‘Mahapach’,
meaning transformation. In India, on the other hand, the non-Congress
political formation under the motley combination called the ‘Janata
Parivar’ also sought to reverse most of the anti-people regressive policies
of the Congress regime.
From the developments of 1977, it appears that the party systems in the
two nations were getting crystallized under the two-party systems, called
bi-block polarity. However, such an experience did not get materialized in
the absence of a clear-cut ideological and organizational coherence of
346 The Way Forward
parties in both Israel and India. While in Israel the two leading parties—
Labor and Likud—came closer to form the National Unity Government,
India, on the other hand, witnessed the re-emergence of a Federal Con-
gress in the 1980s under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi.
The democratic polities in the two nations witnessed emergence of the
forces of Emerging Economy Stabilization Plan or EESP as well as
Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization or LPG in both Israel
and India, respectively. The forces of EESP and LPG, which were becom-
ing strengthened in the late 1980s and early 1990s in both Israel and
India, shaped the issues of governance. The Congress under Rajiv Gandhi
underwent many policy changes by deviating from its parent party ideol-
ogy and state-dominated governance called License Raj. The Rajiv Con-
gress was considered to be more ‘federal and accommodating’ for
accepting the federal demands of various parties and groups. In fact, the
liberalization regime in India had actually taken roots during the regime of
Rajiv Gandhi when the ‘permit-license-quota’ raj gave way to ‘Consum-
erism’. Israel under the Labor–Likud conciliation on the other hand went
for the National Unity Government in the 1980s, and the forces of
globalization attributed more pragmatism in the Israeli governance, as
was reflected in the first major Israeli shift toward reconciliation vis-à-vis
the Palestinians.
The coalition politics had actually made its firm entry into the Indian
parliamentary politics by the late 1980s. The formation of the National
Front Government under the support of the left and the right parties
broadly corroborated the National Unity experiment of Israel. The post-
1990 parliamentary politics in these two parliamentary nations revolved
around the issues of governance. The political and emotive issues took to
the periphery in both these countries.
It is really interesting to note that the two strong rightist parties—
Likud in Israel and BJP in India—started shedding their core ideological
agenda behind political governance. Once at the helm of governance,
both Likud and BJP shelved their erstwhile main ideological planks
centered on the Eretz Yisrael and Hindutva/Akhand Bharat, respectively.
It is not surprising that the Likud, during its reign of governance from
1990s onward, went for greater conciliation and concessions to the
Palestinians, especially on the issue of autonomy and self-government.
The Way Forward 347
Similarly, BJP, as ruling the NDA in India, also discarded its core
ideological agenda like Article 370, Uniform Civil Code and the Ram
Temple.
The electoral reforms in both Israel and India in the 1990s forced the
political parties to ensure more transparency, democratization and
accountability, especially in terms of giving representation to the weaker
sections, women and other underprivileged groups within the party fora.
Further, the electoral reforms also brought about significant changes in
the electoral campaigns and the issues. Governance became the central
theme in the electoral politics of the two countries, and the elections
results from the 1990s onward started showing more volatility of the
voters and uncertainty of the results. Though one can argue that these
changes reflected the growing disillusionment with the political parties
with the emergence of civil society in both Israel and India, it has yet to set
the common and uniform patterns of decline of the parties and party
systems in these two parliamentary democracies. Parties in Israel and India
are trying to transform themselves in order to get better democratic
acceptance from the electorate to be viewed as Coalitional Multipolarity.
Summing up, both Israel and India are in the process of transforma-
tion. Marked by a shift from ‘predominance’ to ‘pluralism’, the transfor-
mation could be witnessed in society, economy and polity of both Israel
and India right from their independence in the 1940s to their marching
into the era of globalization during the 1980s and 1990s. The Jewish–
Zionist society started expanding its democratic canvas for the non-Jewish
groups like Arabs, Druze and others. The paradox of peace comes only on
the issue of settlers and settlements, and the West would expect Israel to
de-link with security, whereas Israel would insist to see both settlement
and security as intrinsic to each other.
The rise of the Israeli middle class has further challenged the social base
of the Jewish–Zionist society, which used to be governed by the principles
of ethnicity and religiosity. Further, the centrality of the key political
parties—Labor and Likud—started making space for the centrist forma-
tions like Shinui, Kadima and Yesh Atid. The Israeli economy is also
moving from state-controlled Histadrut-dominated welfare system until
the 1980s to an open competitive market economy of the twenty-first
century. The period thus marked a transformation from the Welfare State
348 The Way Forward
to the Market State in both Israel and India, with increasing global
participation of private and foreign players with decreasing government
role in society, economy and polity.
Post-independence Indian society, economy and polity have also
undergone transformation in an era of globalization from the 1980s and
1990s. Indian society has become more plural with the resurgence of
downtrodden strata, dalits and women to be characterized as ‘subaltern
groups’ over the years. The state-controlled License Raj has also paved the
way for market-driven economy. Experiencing democracies for the past
seven decades, parties and party systems in both Israel and India witness
three significant changes that seem to have defined the changing demo-
cratic landscape of the two nations. These changes could be seen in terms
of transformation from floating to silent voters, from alignment to
re-alignment and from umbrella parties to pan parties.
Nor would it be easier for parties in the twenty-first century to talk
of. The action and inaction of the parties in power would be judged by the
masses in the electoral battlefield, which will keep on reminding them the
essential attributes of governance, namely, transparency, accountability
and productivity.
Following Robert Michels’ basic proposition with which this work
begins, one can argue that while perfect democracies are desirable, efforts
should be to put to make them attainable. The political search for
democratic treasure has indeed produced fertile political results in both
the leading parliamentary democracies, yet the two democratic nations
still need to march ahead in order to bring substantial socio-economic and
political substance in their pattern of governance. By ensuring governance
through performance, political parties in both Israel and India can become
the real catalyst of democratic transformation in the twenty-first
century global world.
Reference
Rajni Kothari. (1964). The Congress system in India. Asian Survey, 4(12),
1161–1173.
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Unpublished Presentations

Choudhary, S. K. (2016, September 15). Lensing 2014 from a voter’s perspective:
The road ahead. Sri Guru Nanak Dev Khalsa College, University of Delhi.
Index
Number and Symbols alignments, 12, 15, 20, 28, 75, 76,
2G Spectrum, 300, 335 79–82, 85, 93, 104, 122, 135,
2½ years of government, 103, 281 141, 143, 145, 192, 215, 244,
5S’s, 159 268, 270, 271, 278, 302, 303,
306, 326, 345, 348
Aliyah, 36–44, 45n4, 79, 122, 324,
A 326
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), 6, 25 All India Congress of Workers and
Absorption Baskets, 324 Peasants Party (WPP), 129
Abu-Hatzeira, Aharon, 219, 276, All India Trade Union Congress
334 (AITUC), 52, 129
Advani, L. K., 161, 276, 282, 322, All India Trinamool Congress, 104,
338n12 116n3
Agudat Yisrael, 75–7, 218, 219, 275, al-Nahda movement, 245, 246
277 Ambedkar, B. R., 222–4
Aharat Chinam, 128 Ambedkarism, 226
Ahdut Ha’avodah, 38–40, 45n6, 75, Am Ehad, 77, 191, 192, 290
76, 122, 135, 261, 265, 266, anti-Semitism, 37, 38
268, 270 anti-system parties, 16
AIADMK, 159, 258, 295, 296 Arab Democratic Party (ADP), 239,
al-Ard movement, 238, 245 244, 245, 248

DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-5175-3
370 Index
Arab Islamic Block (al-Kutla Block of Faithful, 165, 203

al-‘Arabiyya al-Islamiyya), 247 Bofors, 281, 334
ASEAN, 316 boiling pot, 319
Ashkenazim, 44, 141, 146, 204, 211, boycott, 248, 262, 338n7
319 BSP. See Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)
Asom Gana Parishad, 6, 257, 258 Bus Diplomacy, 318
Ayodhya, 27, 31n6, 155, 159, 282,
322, 331, 338n12
C
C5, 12
B Camp David Accord, 164, 275, 315
Babylonian Jews, 36, 45n3 cartel model, 15, 16, 20, 29, 101
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 6, 24, catch’all conclaves, 294
222–6, 230, 322 catch’all model, 14, 29
BaLad, 239, 246, 247, 249, 303 caucus, 7, 123, 266
Banerjee, Mamata, 159 Chabad, 220
Barak, Ehud, 124, 126, 147, 239, 289 Chandra Pal, Bipin, 50, 262
basic laws, 44, 255, 262, 306n2 Chandra Shekher, 226
Begin, Menachem, 140, 166, 219, Chauri Chaura, 50, 195
274–8, 315, 326, 334, 345 Chhatrapati Shahuji Maharaj, 222
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), 31n3, 72, Citizen Power, 6
92, 154, 157, 183, 276, 307n8, Civil Rights Movement, 86
327 class democracy, 40
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 5, 28, cleavage model, 12, 13, 28
29, 31, 31n6, 32n7, 92, 102, The Club of Four, 266
104, 106, 115, 132, 139, Coalgate, 300, 335
153–63, 170, 186, 222, coalition, 5, 25, 71, 88, 98, 126, 149,
228–31, 257–9, 282, 285, 291, 178, 202, 238, 253, 321
294–300, 304, 305, 307n11, coalition dharma, 104
318, 322, 323, 325, 327, 331, coalition karma, 104
332, 338n12, 346, 347 Communist Party of India (Marxist),
Bharatiya Lok Dal, 91, 197, 276 52, 72, 121, 129–34, 183, 291,
Bhindranwale, Sant Jarnal Singh, 230 299
Bibi, 124, 287 Congress system, 24, 25, 72–9, 82,
bi-block polarity, 35–44, 79, 85, 88, 183, 263, 267, 272, 306,
326, 345 344
Biju Janata Dal, 295, 299 conservancy model, 16
BJP. See Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) consociational model, 14, 15, 28
Index 371
Constituent Assembly, 53, 54, 55n8, dual membership, 92, 276

55n9, 262, 263, 320 dyarchy, 52
contra-acculturist camp, 210
Corruption Perceptions Index, 332,
333 E
Council of the Torah Sages, 209, 218 E. V. Ramaswamy (Periyar), 222
economic austerity plan, 331
EESP. See Emerging Economy
D Stabilization Plan (EESP)
Das, C. R, 55n6, 194 Ek Vidhan, Ek Pradhan, Ek Nishan,
Dash, 190, 192, 194 327, 339n15
David, Ben-Gurion, 43, 75, 129, 135, Emerging Economy Stabilization Plan
142, 144, 203, 263–9, 311, (EESP), 26, 330–2, 346
328, 333 Eretz Yisrael, 145, 165, 169, 285,
de-alignment, 15, 28, 89, 101, 147 326, 327, 346
Degel Hatorah (Flag of the Torah), Eshkol, Levi, 129, 266, 268, 269
213, 220 ethnicity, 19, 61, 86, 143, 146,
Democratic Front for Peace and 212, 220, 278, 279, 319–23,
Equality (HADASH), 135, 347
235–49, 303 ethnic parties, 204, 219, 226
Democratic Movement for Change
(DMC), 60, 86, 143, 146, 176,
177, 189–91, 275 F
democratization, 16, 20, 347 Fernandes, George, 198, 276, 296
Depressed Classes, 223 First Democratic Upsurge, 72, 73
Deri, Aryeh, 211, 215, 303 first past the post system, 287
Desai, Morarji, 92, 257, 274, 276, Five Genera Parties, 19
277 Flatto Sharon, 86, 164
diaspora, 36, 312 Flag of the Torah, 220
dirty trick, 280 floating voters, 20, 30, 193, 306
DMC. See Democratic Movement for flush parties, 106
Change (DMC) Forza Italia Party, 6
Downsian model, 10 Free Center, 189
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK), 24, 104, 116n3, 231,
299–301 G
Druckman, Rabbi Haim, 219 Gahal, 141, 142, 164, 188, 189, 266,
Druze, 291, 347 268–70
372 Index
Gandhi (Mrs.), 78, 82, 90, 93, 184, Hammer, Zevulun, 205
230, 273, 276, 281 hamula, 71, 244
Gandhi, Indira, 82, 90, 91, 185, 270, Ha’olam Hazeh, 135
272–4, 276–8, 281, 286, 333, Hapoel Hamizrahi, 42, 43, 201, 202
345 Hapoel Hatzair, 40, 45n6, 122
Gandhi, Mahatma, 50, 195, 262, 300 Harari Resolution, 44, 262
Gandhi, Rahul, 32n8, 186 Harijan, 223
Gandhi, Rajiv, 32n8, 93, 185, 278, Haryana Vikas Congress, 186
281, 330, 334, 335, 346 Hasidim, 231n3
Garibi Hatao, 82, 184, 196, 273 Ha’Tnuah, 193, 336
Gesher, 125, 135, 289, 290 Hawala, 335
Godhra, 162, 163 Hebron Protocol, 317
Gokhale, Gopal Krishna, 48, 196, 262 Herzel, Theodor, 26, 35, 36, 93n1,
Goods and Services Tax (GST), 332 136n2, 175, 210, 274
Gowda, Deve, 93, 132, 291 Hezbollah, 247, 317
Green and the Young, 29 Hindu Marriage Bill, 320
Green Leaf, 29 Hindutva, 29, 154, 157, 170, 294–6,
Green parties, 6, 16, 17, 29 346
Green Party of England and Wales Histadrut, 25, 31n1, 40, 41, 43,
(GPEW), 17 45n8, 79, 122, 124, 141, 142,
Gujral, I. K., 93, 227, 291 192, 202, 210, 236, 261, 328,
Gulf crisis, 284, 316, 317 331
Guru, Narayan, 222
Gush Emunim, 86, 144, 165, 203,
204 I
Gwala, 335 I4, 5, 24
India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen,
231
H Indian National Congress
Habayit Hayehudi, 102, 165, 166, (Organization), 184, 270, 273,
206, 216, 302–4, 336 307n7, 345
HADASH. See Democratic Front for Indian National Congress
Peace and Equality (HADASH) (Requisitionists), 78, 270, 272,
Haganah, 140 273, 307n7, 345
Haim Hadashim, 124 Indira Hatao, 83n6
Hakla’ut Ufituah, 135 Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace,
Halacha, 207 Friendship and Cooperation,
Halchud HaLeumi, 165, 168 314
Index 373
infiltration, 317, 323 Kamraj Plan, 267, 269

insider–outsider duality, 325 Karaite Jews, 36, 45n3
Integral Humanism, 154 Kargil, 297, 307n10, 317
Intifada, 99, 176, 177, 283, 316, Kashmiri Pandits, 325, 338n14
338n7 Kashrut, 320
Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL), 42 Kibbutzim, 39, 124, 204, 218, 328,
iron law of oligarchy, 8 329
Israeli Labor Party, 26, 61, 80, 121–9, Kidmah Va’avodah, 135
134, 345 Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, 195
Kriplani, J. B., 195
Kulanu, 135, 175, 193, 194, 303,
J 304, 327
Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan, 269 Kultukampf, 320
Janata Dal (JD), 158, 195, 228, 259,
292, 299, 322
Janata Parivar, 24, 26, 31n3, 85, L
90–2, 94n3, 182, 195, 197, Lahore bus, 297, 318
275, 276, 282, 345 Lajpat Rai, Lala, 49, 50, 262
Jan Morcha, 259 La-Mifneh, 203
Jayalalitha, A, 159 the land of Canaan, 35, 44n1
JD. See Janata Dal (JD) Lapid, Yosef Tommy, 177, 178
jeep scandal, 333 Lavon affair, 237, 265, 307n5
Jewish Home, 165, 166, 206 leading, 265
Jewish Zionist state, 206, 237 Lebanon war, 277, 315
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), Left/Labor/Socialist Zionism, 38–41
103, 104, 231, 291, 300 Left Socialist Party, 123, 135
JMM. See Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Liberal International, 176
(JMM) Liberalization, Privatization and
Joshi, S. M., 198 Globalization (LPG), 26, 103,
185, 282, 283, 330, 332, 346
Limaye, Madhu, 198
K Lohia, Ram Manohar, 195–7
Kach, 86, 164 Lok Dal, 259, 282
Kadima, 6, 24, 149, 169, 175, 193, Lok Jan Shakti Party, 6, 304
194, 210, 298, 301, 303, 326, Lok Sabha, 28, 30, 74, 81, 90, 92,
327, 335, 336, 339n18, 347 106, 115, 130, 131, 133, 134,
Kahalani, Avigdor, 191 136, 136n1, 155–7, 160, 163,
KaMandal, 282, 322 171, 186–9, 222–30, 260, 266,
374 Index
272, 273, 276, 282, 291, 307n13, 312, 327–32, 347,

294–7, 304, 306n3, 322, 323, 348
344, 345 market polity, 80–2, 281, 333
LPG. See Liberalization, Privatization Marxism–Leninism, 129, 240
and Globalization (LPG) Masjid, 27, 97, 285, 295, 307n13,
Lubavitcher Rebbe, 220 338n12
Masoret, 27, 97, 307n13
Matdata, 27, 97, 104, 306,
M 307n13
M3, 102 Matz’biya, 27, 97, 306
M4, 285 Mayawati, 225, 301, 322
M5, 27, 28, 97, 306 MDMK, 304
Madrid Peace Conference, 317 Meimad, 125, 126, 135, 204, 219,
Mafdal, 201 289
Mahalanobis model, 329, 339n19 Meir, Golda, 190, 265–9, 298
Mahapach, 60, 81, 85–93, 274, 285, Meizad, 204, 219
345 Memorandum, 317
Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, 6, Merkas Ruhani, 42, 201
32n8, 171 minority coalition, 104
Maki, 135, 236, 237, 244 Mishpacha, 27, 97, 307n13
mamlachtiut, 144, 268 Misnagdism, 231n3
Mandal, 27, 97, 102, 282, 285, Mitzna, Amram, 125, 293
307n13, 322 Mizo National Front, 258
Mapai, 5, 23–5, 29, 31n2, 39–41, MNREGA, 300
45n6, 53, 60, 61, 71, 72, 75, Modi, Narendra, 133, 163, 259, 301,
79, 80, 82, 82n2, 83n3, 85, 304, 311, 318, 323
122, 134, 135, 141, 142, 202, Mofaz, Shaul, 179, 181, 293
203, 244, 261–6, 274, 344, Moledet, 27, 77, 97, 165, 166, 168,
345 283, 307n13
Mapaivot, 25, 31n2, 60–72, 79, 81, Moshavim, 39, 204, 218, 328, 329
82, 85, 115, 124, 140, 141, Mountbatten Plan, 130, 312, 324
203, 210, 263, 306, 344 Mudgal case, 333
Mapam, 45n6, 80, 135, 136n2, 177, Muhammad Mi’ari, 244–7
202, 237, 244, 265, 266, 268, Mukherjee, Shyama Prasad, 327
270, 271, 280, 313 multipolarity, 26, 27, 60, 97–102,
Marathi sovereignty, 170 115, 286, 343, 347
market, 26, 27, 79, 97, 102, 103, municipalities, 39, 124
153, 161, 185, 270, 281, 285, Mussar, 27, 97, 307n13
Index 375
N O
NAM. See Non-Aligned Movement Old Guard, 39, 80, 272
(NAM) Old Yishuv, 38
Naoroji, Dada Bhai, 48, 262 Olmert, Ehud, 101, 144, 149, 168,
Narasimha Rao, P. V., 103, 186, 257, 179, 180, 293, 298–301
283, 291, 335 One Israel, 77, 125, 289, 290
Narayan, Jaya Prakash, 24, 26, 90, one-party dominant system, 72, 85, 98,
94n2, 274 143, 263
National Agenda for Governance one-party-dominated government,
(NAG), 331 27, 98, 283, 304
National Conference, 104, 299, 325 one-party led coalitions, 27, 263
National Democratic Alliance Operation Blue Star, 230
(NDA), 27, 104, 159, 160, Operation Peace for Galilee, 315
186, 239, 292 Oslo Accords, 286, 317
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), Other Backward Classes (OBCs),
104, 186, 299, 300 226, 338n11
National Religious Party (NRP), 71, Our Five Commitments, 154
201–10, 243
National Union, 77, 166, 168, 205,
293, 302 P
national unity government, 115, 123, Pakistani occupied Kashmir (POK),
144, 177, 212, 269, 279–81, 324, 337n1
301, 346 Palestinian Liberation Organization
NDA. See National Democratic (PLO), 240, 284, 286, 315
Alliance (NDA) Panchayats, 39
Neech Rajniti, 323 Panchsheel, 313, 337n2, 337n4
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 53, 55n9, 263 pan parties, 5, 20, 27, 30, 31, 98, 175,
Nehru, Moti Lal, 51, 194 292, 335, 348
Netanyahu, Binyamin, 144, 146, party key, 213, 263, 306n4
147, 149, 165, 167, 169, 179, Patel, Sardar, 266
192, 205, 206, 213, 214, Peasants and Workers Party (WPP),
285–92, 301–4, 311, 323, 331, 129
336, 340n24 Peres, Shimon, 76, 123, 146, 177,
New Herut, 165 205, 278, 279, 285, 287, 297
New Yishuv, 38 permit-license-quota raj, 329, 333,
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 346
313, 314 personalization of politics, 102
n-person, 254, 306n1 Phule, Jyotiba, 222, 223
376 Index
PL, 480, 330, 339n23 Ramjanmabhoomi, 285

PLO. See Palestinian Liberation Ram Mandir, 322
Organization (PLO) Ram Rajya Parishad, 72, 130, 183
PMO. See Prime Minister’s Office Ranade, Govind Mahadev, 196
(PMO) rapport system, 40
POK. See Pakistani occupied Kashmir Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), 24, 32n8,
(POK) 228, 299
police state, 329 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
Politbureau, 132 51, 154, 307n8, 338n12
political settlements, 145, 284, 327, re-alignments, 15, 20, 30, 31, 238,
339n17 303, 306, 348
politicization of personality, 102 religiosity, 61, 212, 312, 319–23, 347
Porat, Hanan, 165, 219 Religious Torah Front, 218
Praja Socialist Party (PSP), 72, 183, religious Zionism, 38, 42, 43, 201
195, 197 Republican Party of India, 226
predominant party system, 18, 25, 61, RIGHT Turn, 163, 304
72, 183 right Zionism, 41–2
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), 103, RJD. See Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)
288, 300 road map, 153, 317, 318, 338n9
Progressive Alliance (al-Tahaluf Roy, M. N., 55n6, 55n7, 129, 130
al-Taqaddumi), 247 RTF, 218
Progressive List for Peace (PLP), 239,
244, 245
proportional representation, 235, S
261, 287, 293 SAARC. See South Asian Association
Provisional Government, 262 for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC)
Sabbath, 320
Q Sadar-e-Riyasat, 339n15
quasi-state, 41, 122 safety valve, 47–54, 182, 261
salad bowl, 319
Samajwadi Party, 32n7, 32n8, 222,
R 226, 227, 258, 322
Rabbi Meir Kahane, 164 Samata, Mamata and Jayalalitha, 296
Rabin-Shamir Peace Plan, 283, 316 Samata Party, 257, 258, 294–6
Rafi, xxiii, 72, 80, 122, 142, 189, Samrasta, 159
268–71 Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), 72,
Rajya Sabha, 260 183, 195–8, 257
Rakah, 135, 236–8, 244 Samyukta Vidhayak Dal, 197
Ramadan War, 315 Sangh Parivar, 94n2
Index 377
Saral, Samman and Samadhan, 159 Shinui, 24, 77, 135, 136n2, 149, 168,
Sartori, Geovanni, 18, 19, 25, 60, 61, 169, 175–81
102, 183 Shiromani Akali Dal, 109, 111, 114,
Sarva Samaj Dalit, 225 228–31, 257, 258, 304
Satyagraha, 50, 55n4 Shituf Ve’ahvah, 70, 135
Schach, Rabbi Eliezer, 220 Shiv Sena, 24, 109, 170, 171, 231,
Scheduled Caste, 223 257–9, 294, 304
Schneerson, Rabbi Menachem, 220 shlemut ha’moledet, 142
second democratic upsurge, 26, 102, Shlomzion, 64, 76, 86, 164, 275
103, 282 Shvil-Transparency Israel Report, 335
Sefardim, 203 Silent Voters, 20, 30, 193, 306, 323
Sephardim, 44, 143, 146, 204, 207, Singh, V. P., 102, 281, 282, 284, 291
210, 211, 262, 319, 321 Sister Parties, 217–22
settlements, 39, 40, 87, 125, 144, Six Day War, 219, 269, 271, 313,
152, 159, 169, 176, 179, 193, 314, 320, 324, 329, 339n21
203, 204, 208, 212, 284, 312, Sneh, Moshe, 249n2
317, 318, 323–7, 336, 338n9, social engineering, 158, 225
339n16, 339n17, 339n18, 347 Sonia Gandhi, 186, 297, 299, 300
settlers, 38, 165, 166, 193, 324, 326, Sons of the Village Movement, 238
327, 336, 347 South Asian Association for Regional
Shabatonim, 214 Cooperation (SAARC), 316
Shapiro faction, 203 spatial theory, 11
Shamir, Yitzhak, 145, 278, 279, Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 161
283–5, 339n16 split system, 99, 100, 214
Shapiro saction, 203 SSP. See Samyukta Socialist Party
Sharett, Moshe, 75, 263, 265 (SSP)
Sharon, Ariel, 6, 24, 77, 101, 125, state within state, 41, 122
144, 147, 149, 164, 178, 179, Strategic Settlements, 284, 327,
278, 292, 293, 298, 316, 318, 339n17
322, 331, 339n18 Suchita, 159
Shas, 5, 24, 76, 77, 135, 167, 194, Su-raj, 159, 294
204–6, 209, 210, 243, 280, Suraksha, 159
283, 286, 288–90, 294, 302–4, Surplus Majority Coalition, 104
321, 336 Swadeshi, 50, 159, 262, 294
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 268, 269 Swatantra Party, 72, 108, 111, 183,
Shekher, Chandra, 282, 330 195–7, 257
Shimla Agreement, 314, 318 Syndicate, 74, 78, 81, 82n4, 184,
Shinaat Chinam, 128 267, 269, 272
378 Index
T United Arab League, 69

Ta’al, 240, 246, 247, 249, 303 United Front, 27, 93, 104, 132, 159,
Talmud Torah, 232n5 182, 185, 291
Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC), 186 United Progressive Alliance (UPA),
Tashkent Agreement, 269, 307n6 27, 104, 186, 299
Tehiya, 164, 165, 204, 219, 275, United Torah Front (UTF), 218,
277, 283 219, 338n10
Tkuma, 165, 168, 205, 303 United Torah Judaism (UTJ), 209,
Telangana Rashtra Samiti, 231 210, 220, 302
Telecom, 335 UPA. See United Progressive Alliance
Telem, 191 (UPA)
Telugu Dessam Party, 109, 111 UTJ. See United Torah Judaism
Teshuvah, 211 (UTJ)
Thackeray, Bal, 170, 171 Uttar Pradesh, 28, 55n5, 81, 155,
Thackeray, Raj, 6, 171 163, 222, 226, 227, 231, 304,
third democratic upsurge, 104 306n3, 322
third sector parties, 106
Third Way, 30, 31n5, 191, 288
Tibi, Ahmad (Dr.), 239, 246 V
Tied Government, 279 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 258, 292–8
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 49, 50, 262 Vatikim, 268
TINA, 26, 31n4 Vishwa Hindu Parishad, 338n12
Torah, 43, 202, 210, 213, 214, 218,
220, 264, 319, 321 W
Total Revolution, 26, 90 War of Attrition, 269
trade votes, 214 Welfarism, 328, 329
Transparency International, 332 World Zionist Organization (WZO),
Triple Ds, 45n10 37
Triple Ps, 48, 262 World Zoroastrian Organisation
Triple Ts, 158 (WZO), 40, 42
Tsirim, 203 Wye Memorandum, 205, 317
Tzomet, 165
Y
U Yachad, 215, 303
umbrella parties, 5, 20, 27, 175, 344, Yahadut Hatorah, 220, 288–90
348 Yair, Lapid, 6, 32n7, 193, 303
uniform civil code, 32n6, 159, 320, Yesh Atid, 6, 102, 150, 193, 210,
331 216, 327, 336, 347
Index 379
Yeshiva, 205, 302 Yosef, Rabbi Ovadia, 211

Yeshivot, 204, 264 Young Turks, 39
Yishai, Eli, 214, 215, 303
Yishuv, 24, 35–44, 45n7, 54, 71,
164, 201, 217, 218, 236, Z
261–3, 329 Zedong, Mao, 129
Yishuv Haaretz, 165 Zeirim, 268
Yisrael B’Aliya, 166–8, 178, 194 Zionism, 23, 24, 37–43, 45n9, 54,
Yisrael Beiteinu, 166, 168, 169, 290, 122, 139, 141, 144, 152, 165,
302, 303, 326 166, 168, 178, 202, 205, 206,
Yom Kippur War, 80, 89, 142, 143, 210, 212, 217, 218, 236–8,
176, 212, 219, 237, 271, 315, 244, 261
320, 334 Zionist Union, 135, 136n3,
Yom LeYom, 214 303

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THE CHANGING FACE

The Changing Face

ISBN 978-981-10-5174-6 ISBN 978-981-10-5175-3 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017946713

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: ©imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The number 14 assumes signiﬁcance in the literary, academic and

underlines the democratic journey of the two parliamentary nations,

Political Science, University of Delhi, provided his magnanimous helping

in me and my work. Their parents and family members equally deserve

It was the earnest desire of my younger brother, an alumnus from IIT

Developing Countries Research Centre Sunil K. Choudhary

Part I Parties and Party Systems: A Conceptual Framework 1

1 Theorizing Parties and Party Systems 3

2 Locating Israeli and Indian Parties and Party Systems 23

Part II Parties and the State Formation 33

3 Yishuv: The Pre-state Period in Israel 35

4 Indian National Congress: From a ‘Safety Valve’ to the

Part III Parties in the Post-independence Polities: From

5 Mapaivot vs Congress System 59

6 Mahapach vs Janata Parivar 85

7 Toward a Coalitional Multipolarity 97

Part IV Ideological Roots, Social Bases and Electoral Patterns

8 The Left-Wing Parties (Socialist Block) 121

9 The Right-Wing Parties (Nationalist Block) 139

10 The Centrist Parties (Centrist Block) 175

11 The Ethno-Religious Parties (Ethno-Religious Block) 201

12 The Arab Parties (Arab Block) 235

Part V Parties and the Government Making 251

13 Coalition Politics in Israel and India 253

14 Competing Issues of Governance: Israel and India

The Way Forward 343

AAP Aam Aadmi Party

CPI (ML) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

Mapai Miﬂeget Poalei Eretz-Israel (Workers Party of the Land of Israel)

RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

Fig. 1.1 Bases for party formation 5

Fig. 9.6 BJP’s performance in Lok Sabha, 1984–2014 157

Table 5.1 The Knesset elections: 1949–2015 62

Democracy is a treasure which no one will ever discover by deliberate

Democracies, parties and governance are the essential ingredients for a

movements. Notwithstanding the inherent anomalies and prominent

They underline the formative phase of state-building as undertaken by

patterns of governance under the compulsions of coalition politics. The

© The Author(s) 2018 3

Interpreting the Parties

Fig. 1.1 Bases for party formation

Bahujan Samaj Party in India may be called as the party broadly

Parties and Party Systems: Historical Perspective

Evolution and Growth of Parties

First Phase: Pre-behavioral Era [1906–1949]

Second Phase: Behavioral Era [1950–65]

Behavioralism laid the foundation of empirical orientation in the study of

advocated a model of democratic government decision-making, which

Third Phase: Post-behavioral Era [1966– to Date]

particular cases leading to its salience and application in speciﬁc countries,

1. Party Model Building: The Notion of C5