U.S. vs.

Lol-lo
The case involves two defendants, Lol-lo and Saraw, who were charged with the crime of
piracy

FACTS:

2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in
the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas
manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. The
Moros then placed all the individuals, except the two women, back on the boat and made holes in it,
intending for it to sink. However, the people on the boat were eventually rescued after eleven days of
hardship. The Moros took the two women with them and repeatedly violated them until they arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession, where the women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy.

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state
but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other
crimes has no territorial limits.

As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral
to crimes."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD:

YES. Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in
the Philippines. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only
necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be
imposed.

Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and...
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

Therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed,
and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and
is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of
first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the
equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

PRINCIPLE:

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any... particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it
be... punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."... the articles
of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article
156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also
make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. The framers of the
Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.

The provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent
with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded
the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like
the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever " Spain" is mentioned, it should
be substituted by the words "

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.

MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also
raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment
was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to
the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in
the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law
hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at
war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall
be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article
shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in
the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries
specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one
and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX,
of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.

5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is
mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to
the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)

These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions
of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as
affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered
as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated,
but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as
they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on
the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General
Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to
include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution
of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to
Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned
for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers
of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards"
are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United
States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only
public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a
penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United
States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to
the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering,
therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present,
which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible
nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as
to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant
Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at
such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District.
The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a
one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.