The People of the Philippine Islands vs.

Ricardo Mendoza
G.R. No.: L-39275
Facts:
1. On September 30, 1932, in the bustling municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, a distressing incident
unfolded within the walls of the local high school.
2. Ricardo Mendoza, a pupil enrolled at the said high school, found himself in a heated altercation with his teacher, the
esteemed Iluminada Tinio.
3. The confrontation occurred during a routine class session, where Tinio was diligently performing her duties as an
educator, striving to impart knowledge and discipline to her students.
4. Amidst the hum of learning and the scratching of pens on paper, Mendoza, fueled by some undisclosed grievance or
impulse, suddenly lashed out.
5. With a swift motion, Mendoza raised his hand and delivered a resounding slap across Tinio's cheek, shocking both the
teacher and the observing students.
6. The act of aggression occurred within the confines of the high school building, an establishment dedicated to the
pursuit of education and enlightenment.
7. Tinio, momentarily stunned by the unexpected assault, quickly regained her composure and sought redress for the
affront to her person and authority.
8. In response to the incident, the provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed an information against Mendoza, charging him with
the crime of assault upon a person in authority.
9. The gravamen of the charge rested on the assertion that Mendoza, by virtue of his attack on Tinio, had violated the
laws and norms governing respect for authority figures and public servants.
10. However, Mendoza, through his legal counsel, moved for the dismissal of the information, contending that the acts
alleged therein did not rise to the level of a crime but rather constituted a misdemeanor or light felony.
11. Thus, the trial court was tasked with adjudicating the crucial question of whether the actions attributed to Mendoza
constituted a grave offense warranting prosecution or a lesser transgression deserving of a more lenient treatment under
the law.
Issue:
Whether the acts alleged in the information filed against Ricardo Mendoza constitute the crime of assault upon a person
in authority, or any other grave or light felony.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case, ruled as follows:
1. The Revised Penal Code has revised the provisions regarding assault upon a person in authority.
2. The court clarified that a teacher is neither a person in authority nor an agent thereof but merely a public officer.
Therefore, the assault committed upon a teacher while engaged in the performance of their duties does not constitute
assault upon a person in authority.
3. The complaint did not sufficiently allege the motive behind the assault or the fact that it was committed publicly,
leading to the conclusion that the acts constituted a light felony under article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the case due to the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense.
5. The dismissal of the case was upheld, and costs were declared de oficio.
Key Points:
- The distinction between a person in authority and a public officer was emphasized, with the court determining that a
teacher falls under the latter category.
- The court highlighted the importance of accurately alleging the motive and circumstances of an offense in the
complaint to determine the appropriate jurisdiction and penalty.
- Precedents and legal texts were cited to support the court's interpretation of relevant provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
- The court addressed potential conflicts in the law and provided a reasoned analysis for its interpretation and
application in the case at hand.
 [G.R. No. 39275. December 20, 1933.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-

appellant, vs. RICARDO MENDOZA, defendant-appellee.

Solicitor-General Hilado for appellant.

Zoilo Hilario for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ASSAULT UPON A PUBLIC OFFICER AND PERSON IN

AUTHORITY; RULINGS PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE NEW PENAL
CODE. — The prosecution bases its appeal on the decisions rendered by
this court in the cases of People vs. Villacenda (G.R. No. 32596,
promulgated April 26, 1930, not reported); People vs. Lagrimas (G.R. No.
33529, promulgated April 8, 1931, not reported); and People vs. Tacud
(56 Phil., 800) wherein a question similar to the one under consideration
was discussed and decided, claiming that the facts as alleged in the
complaint constitute upon a public officer and person in authority, at the
same time. The acts committed by the defendants therein constituted
the crime of assault upon a public officer and, therefore, they should
have been sentenced to the penalty prescribed in article 251 of the old
Penal Code.
2. ID.; ID. — Inasmuch as the acts complained of in those cases
had been committed long before the present Revised Penal Code went
into effect, it was necessary that the defendants and appellants therein
be convicted of the crimes of which they had been accused and,
consequently, be sentenced to the penalty prescribed in the said article.
As this court has declared, such acts constituted a violation of the
aforesaid article.
3. REVISED PENAL CODE; ASSAULTS UPON PERSONS IN
AUTHORITY. — Article 251 in question was not fully reproduced in the
Revised Penal Code, as evidenced by article 149 thereof. The Legislature
suppressed and omitted all reference to public officers, which
necessarily conveys the idea that it did not intend to make the same
applicable to cases of assaults upon public officers who are not persons
in authority or agents thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; A TEACHER IS NOT A PERSON IN AUTHORITY. — A
teacher is not a person in authority in the strict sense of the phrase as
employed in article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise a
directly vested jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of authority on the
ground that, in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the case of
United States vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil., 472), wherein Viada was cited in
support thereof, agents of authority are only those persons who, by
direct provision of law, by direct provision of law, or by appointment by
competent authority, are charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and property, and those who come
to the aid of a person in authority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. — In the case of
United States vs. Smith (39 Phil., 533), the word "authority" has been
given a restricted meaning so as to include only persons who perform
some of the exclusive functions of the Government and further exercise
a directly vested jurisdiction in accordance with the afore-cited article.
By "directly vested jurisdiction" is meant "the power or authority to
govern and execute the laws"; and "authority" and "directly vested
jurisdiction" are two things which should be conferred by the law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PERSON IN AUTHORITY
AND A TEACHER. — There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person
in authority not only on the grounds already stated but also because the
difference between the two may be inferred clearly from the very
provisions of article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
7. ID.; ID.; NOT EVERY PUBLIC OFFICER IS AN AGENT OF
AUTHORITY. — There is no question that a teacher is a public officer
because, as a matter of fact, he is charged with the performance of
some of the public functions of the Government. Furthermore, the same
doctrine has been established in the aforesaid three cases of Villacenda,
Lagrimas and Tacud. However, this does not necessarily mean that
every public officer is at the same time an agent of a person in authority.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; A TEACHER IS NEITHER A PERSON IN AUTHORITY
NOR AN AGENT OF AUTHORITY. — A teacher is neither a person in
authority nor an agent of authority but simply a public officer and,
therefore, the assault committed upon him, while he is engaged in the
performance of his duties as such, is not and cannot constitute an
assault upon a person in authority or an agent thereof.

DECISION
DIAZ, J :p

In criminal case No. 4851 of the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga, the provincial fiscal thereof filed an information against the
herein appellee, which reads as follows:
"The undersigned provision fiscal accuses Ricardo Mendoza of
the crime of assault upon a person in authority committed as follows:
"That on or about September 30, 1932, in the municipality of
San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, the said
accused, Ricardo Mendoza, being a pupil of the teacher Iluminada
Tinio, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack
and lay hands upon her person, to wit: slapped said Iluminada Tinio
on one of her cheeks, while she was engaged in the performance of
her duties as such teacher and while she was within the premises of
the high school building exercising the functions inherent in such
capacity."
Upon motion of the appellee, as accused in the aforesaid case, the
trial court dismissed the information on the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor or light
felony. The present appeal was taken by the fiscal for the purpose of
setting aside the order of dismissal in question.
The question to decide, therefore, is whether or not the facts as
alleged in the said information really constitute the crime of assault
upon a person in authority or at least an assault upon an agent of
authority, or any other grave or light felony.
The fiscal bases his appeal on the findings of this court in the cases
of People vs. Villacenda (G.R. No. 32596, promulgated April 26, 1930,
not reported); People vs. Lagrimas (G.R. No. 33529, promulgated April 8,
1931, not reported); and People vs. Tacud (56 Phil., 800) wherein a
question similar to the one under consideration was discussed and
decided, claiming that the facts as alleged in the information constitute
an assault upon a public officer and agent of authority at the same time.
In the three cases above-cited, this court, in modifying one and
affirming two of the judgments rendered by the courts a quo, really held
that the acts committed by the defendants therein constituted the crime
of assault upon a public officer and, therefore, they should be sentenced
to the penalty prescribed in article 251 of the old Penal Code. The reason
for such doctrine is base on the fact that the said article, as explained in
the case of People vs. Mijares (44 Phil., 684), provided as follows:
"The maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in the last
paragraph of the preceding article shall be imposed upon those who
 shall have employed the force or the intimidation mentioned in No. 1
of article 249 for the object indicated in No. 1 of article 229 or who
shall have placed hands upon persons coming to the assistance of
authority or upon its agents or upon public officers."
Inasmuch as the afore-cited article was in force at the time the
decisions in the three cases were promulgated and the acts complained
of therein had been committed long before the present Revised Penal
Code went into effect, it was necessary that the defendants and
appellants in the aforesaid cases be convicted of the crimes with which
they had been charged and sentenced later to the penalty prescribed in
the afore-cited article. The reason is obvious because said acts
constituted a violation of the article in question, as held by this court.
However, the truth is that said article 251 was not fully reproduced
in the Revised Penal Code as shown by article 149 thereof. The article in
question now reads as follows:
"The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon an person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any
person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on
occasion of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next
preceding article."
It will be noted that the Legislature suppressed and omitted all
reference to public officers in the article just cited, which necessarily
conveys the idea that it did not intend to make the same applicable to
cases of assault upon public officers who are not persons in authority or
agents thereof. And there cannot be the least shadow of a doubt that a
teacher is not a person in authority in the strict sense of the phrase, as
employed in article 148, on the ground that he does not exercise a
directly vested jurisdiction. Neither is he an agent of authority on the
ground that, as has been held in the case of United States vs. Fortaleza
(12 Phil., 472), wherein Viada was cited in support thereof, agents of
authority are only those persons who, by direct provision of law, or by
appointment by competent authority, are charged with the maintenance
of public order and the protection and security of life and property, and
those who come to the aid of persons in authority.
It is true that Viada said that by implication and in accordance with
the final section of article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code, which
corresponds to the aforesaid article 251 of our old Penal Code, it may be
affirmed that for the purposes of said article, public officers are also
entitled to be considered as agents of authority. However, such
consideration was due to the fact that assault upon public officers was
penalized likewise in the said article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code.
A teacher is not a person in authority on the ground that he does
not possess the necessary requisite therefor prescribed by law. Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code defines a person in authority as follows:
"In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles
of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or governmental
corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority."
The word "authority" has been given a restricted meaning in the
case of United States vs. Smith (39 Phil., 533), so as to include only
persons who perform some of the functions of the Government of the
Philippine Islands and who, according to the aforesaid article, are
directly vested with jurisdiction. By "directly vested jurisdiction" is
meant "the power or authority to govern and execute the laws,
particularly the authority vested in the judges to administer justice, that
is, to try civil or criminal cases or both, and to render judgment thereon
in accordance with the law" (Escriche, Rational Dictionary of Legislation
and Jurisprudence, p. 1154); and "authority" as well as "directly vested
jurisdiction" are two things which should be conferred by law.
The Administrative Code, which creates the Executive Department
and the bureaus and offices dependent on it, for the purpose of
exercising the executive functions of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, is silent with regard to powers had or which may be had by high
school teachers, in defining those vested in functionaries of the
aforesaid offices. The Code in question only defines the duties and
powers of the Director of Education and of the division superintendents.
Nothing is said about principals, except that their authority should be
determined by the Director of Education, and much less about high
school teachers. The powers granted to the said Director of Education
and division superintendents are very limited and are not for purposes of
government nor execution of any law, but only as provided for in section
910 et seq. of the aforesaid Code.
There can be no doubt that a teacher is not a person in authority
not only on the grounds already stated but also because the distinction
between the two may be inferred clearly from the very provisions of
article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. After defining less serious
physical injuries, the law provides as follows:
 "Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's
parents, ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of
rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, provided that, in
the case of persons in authority, the deed does not constitute the
crime of assault upon such persons."
If the Legislature had not intended to exclude teachers from the
category of persons in authority or agents thereof, it would have omitted
them from the enumeration of those against whom the act, as defined
therein, may be committed and for which a heavier penalty is provided.
There is no question that a teacher is a public officer inasmuch as
it is an actual fact that he performs part of the public functions of the
Government. Furthermore, the same ruling has been established in the
afore-cited cases of Villacenda, Lagrimas and Tacud. However, this
cannot be construed to mean the every public officer is at the same time
an agent of authority.
Commenting on articles 263 and 264 in connection with article 416
of the Spanish Penal Code, which correspond to articles 249, 250 and
401, respectively, of our old Penal Code and from which articles 148, 149
and 203 of the Revised Penal Code had been taken, with slight
alterations, although assault upon public officers has been omitted in
the latter Code, Groizard has said:
"Are public officers agents of persons in authority? If not, may
they be the subject of assault although they are not included in
article 263 which describes and defines said crime? And if they
should be so, in the case stated in the last paragraph of article 264,
shall it be understood that may also be, in all the cases relative to
persons in authority and their agents as stated in article 263? To
decide these questions, it is necessary to know beforehand who are
public officers. Article 416 defines them as: those who, by direct
provision of law, popular election, or appointment by competent
authority, take part in the performance of public functions. From the
above-cited provision, it follows that ever agent of authority is a
public officer but not every public officer is an agent of authority. The
officers of a ministry and those of provincial governments are public
officers inasmuch as they perform functions intended for the
preservation and government of the State, yet in spite of it, they are
not persons in authority nor agents thereof. They are not persons in
authority on the ground that they are not directly vested with
jurisdiction either individually or as members of some court or public
corporation. They are not agents of authority because, as
subordinate officers, they are not charged with the task of executing
 the orders of any such person. This important difference should be
borne in mind so as not to mistake offices for functions.
"The same Code, speaking of the laying of hands upon agents of
authority or upon public officers defines the difference between one
and the other. Therefore, an agent of authority cannot be confused
with a public officer when the legislator himself speaks of them
separately.
"Therefore, inasmuch as public officers are not agents of
authority, it seems that, generally speaking, they cannot be the
subject of the crime of assault, as defined in article 263, on the
ground that said article considers assault as only those acts
committed upon persons in authority and their agents, it being silent
with regard to public officers.
"It is true that there is a manifest contradiction between the
generic doctrine of article 263 and the specific statement of article
264 relative to penalty. It is true that if there can never be any crime
of assault upon mere public officers for want of one of the essential
requisites thereof as stated in article 263, neither can the last
paragraph of article 264, relative to public officers, have any
application even if the guilty parties lay hands on them. Yet, what
can we do? There is conflict in the law and it is useless to pretend
not to notice it." (Groizard, Penal Code, vol. 3, p. 468.)
It is for the specific purpose of clarifying the law and eliminating
such conflict that the Legislature suppressed the phrase "public
officers" in enacting article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, which is a
reproduction of the afore-cited article 264 of the Spanish Penal Code. It
therefore becomes clear that the crime of assault cannot be committed
against a public officer unless he is a person in authority or agent
thereof at the same time.
For further elucidation of the matter, it was held in three decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain: one of May 7, 1874, another of November
16, 1889, and the other of October 8, 1901, that a teacher of a public
primary school, a professor in a higher school for teachers, and
instructors in public primary schools, are public officers. (Jose Garcia
and Romero de Tejada, Penal Monographs on Assaults upon Persons in
Authority and Their Agents, Resistance and Disobedience, p. 80;
Alcubilla, Dictionary of Spanish Administration, vol. I, p. 742; and Viada,
Revised Penal Code of 1870, Fourth Supplement, p. 281.)
The afore-cited reasons show that a teacher in neither a person in
authority nor an agent thereof but merely a public officer, and therefore,
the assault committed upon him while he is engaged in the performance
 of his duties as such does not constitute assault upon a person in
authority nor an agent thereof.
There is no question that the acts complained of, as alleged in the
complaint, constitute light felony, whether they be considered under the
provisions of article 359 (Slander by Deed), or of article 266
(Maltreatment) of the Revised Penal Code. However, inasmuch as the
complaint does not alleged the motive of the defendant in maltreating
the aforesaid teacher, in the manner he had so done, nor the fact that
the act was committed publicly, it is more proper and more in
accordance with the law to consider the aforesaid acts as merely
constituting light felony as defined and penalized in the said article 266,
with the third aggravating circumstance. In such case, the trial court
lacks jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the penalty therefor as
prescribed by law.
Let it not be said that we did not take into consideration the
doctrine laid down in the case of Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs.
Rosauro (G.R. No. 39289) 1 , for we had it before us in considering the
case at bar. The truth is that there is no similarity between the former
and the present case on the ground that although the crime alleged
therein was "direct assault upon a person in authority" and the offended
party therein was a public elementary school teacher acting in the
performance of his duties as such, nevertheless, it was clearly alleged in
the body of the complaint that the defendant therein gravely intimidated
and threatened said teacher. There is no question that, in accordance
with the provisions of article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, the
jurisdiction to try cases of grave threats belongs to Courts of First
Instance by reason of the penalty prescribed therein. Prescinding from
the title of the offense stated in the information under consideration, it is
observed from the allegations contained in the body of said pleading that
the crime committed is slight in nature, the trial of which falls under the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court.
Wherefore, we are of the opinion and so hold that the order of
dismissal appealed from is in accordance with the law and should
therefore be sustained.
Let the costs be declared de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull,
Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
(People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 39275, [December 20, 1933], 59 PHIL 163-
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173)