Module 4
Module 4
Module 4
ENGAGEMENT PLANNING
_________________________________________________
1. INTRODUCTION
Effective planning and preparation are the most critical elements in achieving
negotiation objectives. Those negotiators that achieve their objectives invest many
days and hours in planning for a negotiation. Results without proper planning occur
by chance rather than by the efforts of the negotiator.
To plan effectively a negotiator must anticipate the most important events that may
occur during a negotiation and prepare for them in advance.
§༊ Understand the nature of the conflict, given that conflicts vary in size, seriousness
and characteristics, as well as the parties involved. Although most of the aspects
of a conflict may be obvious, this is not always the case. What appears to be a
serious conflict may turn out to be simply innocuous.
§༊ Identify negotiation issues which are those matters of substance for discussion
with the other party. Some are simple, such as the price for a product. Others
are more complex, such as the myriad of economic data to justify a union’s wage
demands. Some are subtle, such as the exact wording of a clause in a contract
that both parties essentially agree about, but which could easily result in conflict if
not carefully handled.
§༊ Prioritise the issues which must be ranked in terms of their importance and how
critical it is that they should be achieved during the negotiation.
Negotiators need to not only determine where they want to go and how they wish to
get there (strategic and tactical), but also the means (administrative) they need to
succeed.
For example, in a labour negotiation, management might want to define what its
goals are for the next five years regarding wage compensation, job security etc, and
what process is necessary to achieve these goals. In the case of a negotiation
involving the sale of land for a shopping centre, the buyer would need to define what
he wishes to pay, what terms he requires, and whether he wishes to be in a position
to acquire land for future expansion. In addition, the buyer would need to establish a
strategy for achieving these goals.
5.1 Outcomes
When parties to a negotiation have a win-lose or zero-sum interdependence, their
goals are mutually exclusive. If Party A achieves its goal, Party B of necessity
cannot achieve its goal. However, when the parties have a win-win or non-zero-sum
interdependence, Party A can achieve its goal only if Party B achieves its goal.
Where parties are interdependent, and their goals are totally separate from one
another, the likelihood of conflict is extremely limited.
Consider a case where Party A and Party B set up a new financial services business.
Both have five years of independent experience in this field, each contributes
R20 000 to the business as start-up capital and each works in the business on a full-
time basis. A profit-share agreement is concluded where Party A receives 60% and
Party B 40% of the profits, on the basis that Party A has resided in the business area
for many years and therefore has an established network of business contacts and
high visibility, whilst Party B is new to this area. Although Party A and Party B are
interdependent in the sense of achieving overall gain, their individual returns are not
equal. Despite their acceptance of the rationale that unequal inputs should translate
into unequal outputs, two aspects of their agreement may cause conflict, namely
whether the additional contribution by Party A justifies a 20% difference in returns,
and whether the time perspective within which this agreement is formulated is valid.
Although the initial contribution of Party A may be very valuable, this is likely to
gradually diminish over two or three years as Party B becomes equally well-known
and exposed, thus posing the question whether the differential is still sufficient to
justify the differentiated outcomes. Furthermore, Party A may argue his contribution
from a short-term perspective based on current market knowledge and exposure,
whereas Party B may take a long-term view that provides for phased changes to the
initial agreement as inputs equalise.
Party A may prefer negotiations to take place in a long, continuous session, whilst
Party B may prefer short, frequent meetings. Party B may be concerned about
Party A’s management style stemming from the style Party A had displayed in a
previous business.
§༊ Failing to understand how intangibles influence the behaviour of the other party
and therefore having difficulty discerning what is important to the other party;
§༊ Failing to take cognisance of the influence intangibles have in terms of their own
negotiation objectives; and/or
§༊ Not understanding the influence of their own intangibles and the psychological
process that determines whether they feel satisfied with a deal or not.
Negotiators need to take into account that intangibles act as filters through which
they and the other party see and evaluate tangibles, colouring, shaping, or even
distorting feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with deals. Simply relying on a
cost/benefit analysis is not sufficient to determine their or the other party’s
satisfaction. They need to understand how they and the other party will see the
package of outcomes.
In cases where the status and power of the negotiating parties are unequal, the effect
on their satisfaction with the procedure and outcome of the negotiation is dramatic,
since a high- or a low-status position has a profound effect on perceived satisfaction.
Parties that regard their status as low tend to be more concerned with equality than
high-status parties. Status discrepancies hold a real danger in that parties that
experience their status as high tend either to see the other party’s status demands as
trivial, extreme or unfair (as they do not wish to relinquish their advantages related to
their high status), or may see the status difference as irrelevant to the negotiation.
High-status parties tend to view the status demands of the other party as nonsensical
and as an attempt to waste time, and are therefore inclined to obstruct such
demands by refusing to acknowledge them.
The history of the relationship between the parties determines the climate for the
current negotiations. Where one party feels that the other has ‘won’ or obtained an
unfair advantage in the past, that party will, as the 'loser', be inclined to be extremely
cautious or even angry to the point of seeking revenge. Where the last negotiation
ended amicably, but the relationship between the parties has subsequently
deteriorated, this is likely to cause the parties to be tense, cautious, and distrusting.
When the negotiating relationship had been strained in the past as the result of one
of the parties feeling that it had been ‘fleeced’, that party might accuse a new
negotiator of dishonesty, untrustworthiness and even deceit, despite this negotiator
not having been previously involved on behalf of the other party. Such accusations
need not necessarily be verbal, but could be conveyed by attitude and expression.
The tendency for the accusing party to focus on the negative aspects of the other
party’s behaviour so as to justify its own negativity, invariably creates a ‘self-fulfilling
prophecy’ in that the accused party might well act accordingly, as it feels that it has
already been tried and pronounced guilty. Even when the accused party does not
act in the described manner, it may experience personal offence and react angrily or
defensively.
When a negotiator knows prior to a negotiation that the other party is entering the
negotiation with a particular set of historical experiences, this enables him/her to
psychologically and factually prepare him-/herself and anticipate how that party may
see and interpret events. This information helps the negotiator to determine the
negotiation strategy and tactics, depending upon whether there is a desire to change
the negative elements that currently define the relationship.
When a seller’s real base is below the buyer’s real base, a positive contracting zone
exists, e.g. the lowest wage settlement the union is willing to accept is below the
highest wage settlement management is willing to grant. Conversely, when the
seller’s real base is higher than the buyer’s real base, a negative contracting zone
exists that makes any agreement impossible.
§༊ Although the parties are generally willing to disclose their aspiration bases, they
usually do their best to hide their real bases.
§༊ The parties usually work hard to convince each other that their real bases are
very close to or identical to their aspiration bases.
§༊ Although the parties generally do not want to reveal their real bases, there are
occasions when it is to a party’s advantage to reveal its real base as a means of
convincing the other party that it has very little room to move as its real and
aspiration bases practically coincide.
When both parties succeed in convincing each other that their real bases and
aspiration bases are very close, a negative contracting zone is created, which
questions the feasibility of further negotiation.
In any negotiation, a complete list of the issues at stake is best derived from:
Although the accumulated issues may initially seem excessive, this is not necessarily
a disadvantage as negotiators are inclined to be more flexible when more, rather
than fewer issues, are on the table. A large bargaining mix affords negotiators
greater creativity in developing mutually beneficial agreements.
§༊ A simple way is for the negotiator to rank them in terms of what is most important,
what is second most important, and what is least important;
By understanding those issues that are the most and the least important, the
negotiation process is speeded up and the quality of agreements is enhanced.
In cases where negotiators are not sure of what they desire and of the priority of the
issues before entering a negotiation they:
§༊ Easily fall prey to arguments, offers, counter-offers and concessions that are not
in their best interests;
§༊ Often give away important information without appreciating the consequences;
§༊ Tend to lose perspective and agree to inferior settlements, or become ensnared
by unimportant points; and/or
§༊ Are inclined to accept points aggressively argued by opponents.
At times such interaction between a negotiator and his/her constituency can become
a drawn out and an exhausting process, e.g. where a negotiation is conducted on
behalf of a management in a labour dispute. The negotiator would then need to
consult internal sources (supervisors and rank-and-file members) to ascertain the
patterns of conflict or the grievances that have developed during the term of the
current wage agreement, and external sources to take note of agreements reached
by other groups in the community or industry in similar circumstances. Pre-
negotiation contact affords the negotiator the opportunity of toning down the
constituency’s wish list should it be unrealistic and unattainable, and to suggest
issues that should be included in the agenda.
Although studying the other party can be a tedious and time-consuming exercise, the
results usually far outweigh the investment.
Negotiators should never lose sight of the potential dangers when drawing
conclusions from information about the other party. The assumptions about how the
other party may behave in future should always be seen as mere assumptions that
should be tested within the negotiation, as negotiators may act differently in different
circumstances and at different times.
“Assumptions are potential hurdles that can move us in the wrong direction..........
The reality of negotiation is that we must and should make assumptions about the
The best information about the goals and interests of the other party is available
directly from that party. Given the importance of the goals and interests of the parties
with regard to developing a negotiation strategy, skilled negotiators often exchange
information about goals and interests before the commencement of the negotiation.
NEEDS DESCRIPTION
1. Physiological Biological drives and urges – hunger, sex,
thirst, chemical balance
opini
on
that needs are the driving forces that underlie a negotiator’s position on issues and
that an understanding of these needs provides insight into intangible objectives.
Where a negotiator is motivated by a need for security, that negotiator is likely to
desire an agreement that ensures safety and protection, whereas a negotiator
motivated by a need for affiliation will seek a supportive relationship with others and
will do nothing to endanger that relationship.
The authority of a negotiator is often limited in order to prevent him/her being cajoled
into a decision that will not be in the best interests of his/her principles, or to prevent
sensitive information from being carelessly divulged. Although these limitations are
often a necessary precaution, they have the effect of being extremely irritating to the
other party who would prefer to interact with someone who is well informed and has
the authority to take decisions. Negotiators much prefer to negotiate with a party
who does not have to regularly revert to his/her constituency; therefore appointing a
party without the necessary authority can cause unproductive tension within the
negotiation.
§༊ The first is the negotiator’s aspirations base, derived from the most optimistic
settlement that can be expected. This is consequently often the opening bid or
asking price.
The most important requirement with regard to goal-setting is that negotiators should
start out from the point where they feel most comfortable, or from the point where
their research and preparation has clearly indicated the most likely aspiration and
real bases are.
When evaluating a bargaining mix that includes a number of different issues, most
negotiators find it very helpful to explore different ways of combining these issues
Many negotiators have found it convenient to position all issues on some common
continuum to compare them, e.g. translating all issues into rand value. In the store
rental example, the tenant would estimate the rand value of a large sign in terms of
the additional customers it would attract as well as the associated increase in
revenue, and compare this calculated value to the higher rental. Some negotiators
prefer a utility scale as the basis for comparison, assigning utility points to each issue
in accordance to its relative importance. If the tenant is so uncertain about the
success of the new outlet that he/she fears the possibility of having to close the outlet
before the end of the rental contract, the possibility of including a sub-lease as a
clause may be of extreme importance and therefore be awarded 50 utility points.
Conversely, if the tenant is assured of long-term success, he/she may not rate a sub-
lease clause very highly and therefore only value it at 15 points.
When contemplating goals, negotiators must take cognisance of the fact that:
A negotiator is not stating a clear goal when he/she insists that the price for a
property should not require an instalment that places him/her under undue pressure
with regard to monthly income. Such a goal provides no clarity on what ‘undue
pressure’ means. Is undue pressure 50%, 45%, 30% etc of the negotiator’s monthly
income? Even when the negotiator states a specific amount that is available for a
monthly instalment, this still leaves uncertainty as to whether it is the largest possible
instalment, whether it is merely the amount which would cause the least possible
discomfort, or whether it has been calculated according to bank guidelines that
suggest that an instalment should not exceed 30% of gross monthly income.
11. DEBRIEFING
After every negotiation session and at the conclusion of a negotiation, the
participating parties should debrief the negotiation, taking cognisance of whether the
strategy and tactics were successful, to ascertain what worked and what did not, to
identify gaps in their knowledge about the other party, and to decide on changes that
may need to be made to advance the negotiation towards a mutually beneficial
outcome.
The debriefing template given in Figure 4.2 overleaf could prove a useful guide in
ensuring that no aspect of the debriefing is omitted.
ANALYSIS
Review of own and other party’s assumptions
PREPARATION
Reconsider team/team composition
ENGAGEMENT
Evaluate the climate & relationship and take
appropriate steps if required
Figure 4.2
After the completion of every negotiation the accumulated knowledge derived from all
aspects of the negotiation, including what worked and what did not work, must be
committed to a database for future reference when similar negotiations come about,
e.g. obtaining approval for a gas pipeline across an environmentally sensitive area.
13. OUTCOMES
On completion of this module, the course participants will understand:
14. REFERENCES
The following publications and websites were consulted in compiling this module:
Spoelstra M & Pienaar W: Negotiation Theories, Strategies and Skills. Juta & Co,
Kenwyn, 1996.
http://www.vantagepartners.com
http://www.munners.com
http://ickb.colorado.edu/m/negotiations_strategies.jsp
http://www.intractableconflict.org/m/human_needs.jsp
http://www.negotiationskills.com
http://www.mediate.com
http://www.businessknowhow.com
http://www.beyondintractability.org
http://colorado.edu
1.1 What
seen
you
(Identify
intangible
1.2 How
to
(Identify
intangible
1.3 What
value
for
1.4 What
value
for
2.1
organisation/constituency?
2.2
organisation/constituency?
2.3
organisation/constituency?
2.4
other
2.5
party/parties?
2.6
party/parties?
3. ANALYSIS
3.1
characteristics
party/parties?
3.2
require
party/parties?
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL
4.1
organisation/constituency
this
4.2
organisation/constituency
this
organisation/constituency
exploit
4.4
organisation/constituency
relative
4.5
party/paties
negotiation?
4.6
party/parties
negotiation?
4.7
could
relative
Priority
Interests
ranking
Tangible:
5.1
organisation/constituency
fears, Intangible:
desires Tangible:
Intangible:
6. CULTURAL
6.1
differences
may
Priority
Your
ranking
7.1
could
negotiation?
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8. DEAL
……
8.2
Options
other
facilitate
9. CONCESSIONS
9.1
what
require?
10.1
the
10.2
behalf
10.3
what
10.4
party/parties
negotiation
10.2
be
of
10.3
will
you
11. COMMON
11.1
6,
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11.2
6,
11.3
6,
12. SETTING
12.1
establish
relationship
mutually
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13. NEGOTIATION
13.1
employing?
13.2
employing?
13.3
other
13.4
other
14. SELECTING
Task
14.1 Relationship
negotiation
Back- up
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15. IMPORTANT
15.1
negotiation
15.2
that
15.3 Relating
related
party/constituency
Relating
16.
16.1
negotiation
of
decision- making
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16.2
Proposed
negotiation
16.3
Proposed
negotiation?
17.1
the
consultation
the
17.2
decision- making
implementation
formally,
17.3
implementation
informally,
17.4
take
challenges,
Concession you
could make to
The counter-
motivate the other The value of the
The reason why The cost of the concession you
party to move concession to the Priority
you would make concession to would require from
towards a value- other ranking
the concession? you? the other
enhancing, mutually party/parties?
party/parties?
beneficial
agreement.