COMELEC v.

Silva contrast to an appealed case which is brought in the name of the parties in the court
206 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 129417. February 10, 1998 of origin and for this reason retains its title below, the case, which is an original
action, is brought by him.
Facts: Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC
charged private respondents: Considering the authority of the COMELEC over the prosecution of election offenses,
 Erasto Tanciongco- who is provincial prosecutor of Bataan, was vice chairman. its decision to bring this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is conclusive on
 Norma Castillo- who is division superintendent of schools, was secretary of the the Solicitor General. It would simply be a matter of referring this case to the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan. Solicitor General so that, if he agrees, he may take over the conduct of this case.
Otherwise, the COMELEC could just continue handling this case as it has actually
with violations of 27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with done.
 Zenon Uy- assistant regional director of elections, was chairman of the board
Hence, the omission of the COMELEC to refer this petition to the Office of the Solicitor
General for representation should be disregarded. To make the filing of this case
in twelve separate informations filed with the RTC Bataan. the three were accused of depend on his decision would be to place him in the same position in which
having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of canvass by respondent judges placed Chief State Prosecutor Zuo. That would further negate the
increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in constitutional function of the COMELEC.
certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections.

In orders dated March 31 and April 7, 1997 respectively, Judges Silva and Vianzon
summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents.

Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo who has been authorized by the Commission on
Elections to prosecute the cases, was required to comment on the Notice of Appeal
which does not bear his signature.

Zuo states that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by Jose P.
Balbuena of the Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position that he would
abide by whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of probable
cause as against the accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo. Consequently,
the notice of appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena is unauthorized and without legal effect.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?

Ruling: COMELEC has the authority.

The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the
COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and
function to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but
also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses
for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an
information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation

and prosecution of election offenses.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies.
They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. 12 Consequently, it was
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the appeal of the
COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases
should be dismissed.

Under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices (Art. IX [C], Sec. 2[6]), and under the Omnibus Election Code, (BP Blg.
881), it may avail of the assistance of other prosecution arms of the government (Sec.
265). Thus, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gave the Chief State, Provincial and City
Prosecutors a continuing authority as deputies to prosecute offenses punishable
under the Election laws (COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part 12, Rule 34, Sec. 2).

Petition for Certiorari vs. Appeal-- under the Rules of Court, the proper party who
can file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus is the person aggrieved by
the action of a tribunal, board or official because such action was taken without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or in willful neglect of duty. In
 Faelnar v. People
331 SCRA 429, G.R. Nos. 140850-51. May 4, 2000

Facts: Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections.
The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-
JING FAELNAR’S CUP," opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to
April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering filed against petitioner
and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy.

The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign
gimmick staged outside the campaign period which officially started on May 1, 1997,
in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Luy alleged that:
(1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioner’s name was placed on the
facade of the Guadalupe Sports Complex;
(2) petitioner’s name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone during the
games;
(3) the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and (4) a raffle
sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was held with home appliances given away as prizes.

Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor
was Gillamac Marketing, Inc. He contended that the same was purely a sporting event
for the benefit of the youth. The complaint was investigated by Atty. Edwin Cadungog,
election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended the dismissal of the charges
against petitioner and Gillamac.

Faelnar avers that since the resolution in question was immediately final and
executory, it was no longer within the power of the COMELEC to reconsider.
Consequently, Resolution No. 98-2914, in directing the filing of charges in court, was
"ultra-vires," and the Informations filed against him should have been quashed.

Issue: WON the COMELEC has the power to reconsider the Resolution No. 98-2914, in
directing the filing of charges in court?

Ruling: COMELEC has power to reconsider the resolution.

First, Faelnar’s petition is nothing but an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of

the COMELEC. Resolution No. 98-2914 was promulgated by the COMELEC en banc on
October 29, 1998. Petitioner’s remedy was to seek its annulment by way of a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Even if said resolution is
erroneous for being contrary to the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC, the same is not void. Since it has become final and executory, it is already
binding and effective.

Second, is the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for
violation of the election laws immediately final and executory, as petitioner
contends?

There is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in

an election offense. Hence, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is
allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.

Third, the reliance of petitioner in Art 34 has no basis-- In cases where the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal exercises the delegated power to conduct
preliminary investigation of election offense cases, after the investigating officer
submits his recommendation, said officers already resolve the issue of probable
cause. From such resolution, appeal to the COMELEC lies. As the exercise by the
Commission of its review powers would, at this point, already constitute a second
look on the issue of probable cause, the COMELEC’s ruling on the appeal would be
immediately final and executory.

On the other hand, if the preliminary investigation of a complaint for election offense
is conducted by the COMELEC itself, its investigating officer prepares a report upon
which the Commission’s Law Department makes its recommendation to the COMELEC
en banc on whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is thus the COMELEC en
banc which determines the existence of probable cause. Consequently, an appeal to
the Commission is unavailing. Under the present Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC, however, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed. This
effectively allows for a review of the original resolution, in the same manner that the
COMELEC, on appeal or motu proprio, may review the resolution of the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Fiscal.
 Laurel v. Presiding Judge The entire COMELEC cannot possibly be restrained from investigating the complaint
323 SCRA 778, G. R. No. 131778 - January 28, 2000 filed against petitioner, as the latter would like the courts to do. The COMELEC is
mandated by no less than the Constitution to investigate and prosecute, when
necessary, violations of election laws. This power is lodged exclusively with the
Facts: Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo, Chairman of respondent COMELEC 1 sent a verified COMELEC. For the entire Commission to inhibit itself from investigating the complaint
letter-complaint to Jose P. Balbuena, Director of the Law Department of the said against petitioner would be nothing short of an abandonment of its mandate under
respondent, charging petitioner with "Falsification of Public Documents" and violation the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. This we cannot allow.
of [Section 74] of the Omnibus Election Code. Laurel allegedly filed for his COC for the
position of Senator stating therein that he was a Filipino but in truth and in fact, his
parents were both Chinese. This case was remanded because the COMELEC failed to serve petitioner with a
copy of its resolution recommending the filing of an information against him.
From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner then filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He alleged, in essence, that the COMELEC
violated its own rules of procedure on the initiation of the preliminary investigation
and the consequent filing of a criminal complaint against him.

Petitioner argues that a resolution of the COMELEC en banc is necessary for the
referral of a complaint to the Law Department. He asserts that Pardo did not have the
authority, as a private citizen, to directly file his complaint with the Law Department.
According to petitioner, Pardo should have filed his complaint with the COMELEC and
the latter should have passed a resolution en banc referring the matter to the Law
Department.

Issue: WON it is only the COMELEC en banc can refer to the Law Department for the
filing of case?

Ruling: No, there is no requirement that the referral must be done by the COMELEC
en banc. The Court fails to see from Section 5 the requirement that only the
COMELEC en banc may refer a complaint to the Law Department for investigation.
What Section 5 states only is that it is the Law Department, not another office, of the
COMELEC which may conduct an investigation into the allegations in the complaint.
There is no specific requirement as to how referral to the department shall be made.
We cannot read into the rules what simply is not there.

Sec. 5 refers to two situations:

 one of which is where a complaint filed by a party other than the COMELEC is
addressed to the Commission itself. Since it is not the entire Commission that
conducts the preliminary investigation, the complaint must necessarily be
referred to its Law Department. Under the rules, this department is tasked with
conducting preliminary investigations of complaints filed before the COMELEC.
 Where, as in this case, the complaint was directly filed with the Law
Department under Section 4 of Rule 34, obviously there is no need to refer
such complaint to the same Law Department.

Second, it is allowed that the COMELEC chairman may refer the filing of the
complaint on his personal capacity-- There is likewise no rule against the COMELEC
chairman directing the conduct of a preliminary investigation, even if he himself were
the complainant in his private capacity. In fact, under Section 5, the preliminary
investigation may be delegated to any of those officials specified in the rule, upon the
direction of the COMELEC chairman. We agree with the Court of Appeals' observation
that,

[E]ven if we regard the complaint to have been filed by Chairman Pardo as a private
citizen, there is no rhyme nor reason why he cannot direct the Law Department to
perform an investigation and delegate the conduct of preliminary investigation to any
lawyer of said Department in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. The justification is, in so doing, he was merely acting pursuant to Section 5
of Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. No clash or conflict could be
attributed in his performance of the said acts, one as a private citizen, and the other
as Chairman of COMELEC, as it would not be him but another lawyer in the Legal
Department that would actually be carrying but the preliminary investigation. The
outcome of the inquiry, therefore, could not, per se, be considered as sullied with
bias.

Anent petitioner's contention that bias tainted the preliminary

investigation-- There may be evidence that the relations between
petitioner and Chairman Pardo are not exactly cordial. However, this
should not detract from the validity of the preliminary investigation and
corresponding Information filed against the petitioner, for two (2)
important reasons: First, the records will readily support the conclusion
that there is sufficient evidentiary basis to at least find probable cause to
indict the petitioner for violation of the Omnibus Election Code; and
second, it also appears from the records that, apart from directing the Law
Department to launch an investigation, Chairman Pardo had no other
participation in the proceedings which led to the filing of the Information. 23