Garcia vs. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 180 1999)

Facts
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name a parcel of land was registered, sold the same
to their daughter the Magpayos. The Magpayos mortgaged the land to the PBCom,
however they failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the
highest bidder bought the land. PBCom filed at the RTC for the issuance of writ of
possession over the land , upon service of writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s
brother, Garcia, who was in the possession of the land refused to honor it. Garcia
thereupon filed against PBCom, suit for recovery of realty, wherein he alleged inter
alia, that he inherited the land as of their heirs. In its answered, PBCom averred,
inter alia, that Garcia’s claim over the land is belied by the fact that is not among
the properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory of Real estate at the then
CFI. In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by
the Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. Thus, it is invalidated the

foreclosure sale and nullified TCT no. 138233 issued to PBCom. Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner Garcia has the right over disputed land.
Held
No, we stress again the possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to
his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of the other.
Ownerhip confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of
the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their
right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the
Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as a holding of the
thing or enjoyment o the right. Literally to possess means to actually physically and
actually occupy the thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of the owner and a possession of the holder. A
possessor in the concept of the owner may be the owner himself or the one who
claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether
his belief be right or wrong. The record shows that the petitioner occupied the
property not in the concept of the owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his
parents.
People vs. Mariano
Facts:
The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing Mariano of estafa.
Mariano was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be receipted
for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property
received were electric cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to
deliver to the Mayor. However he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of
confidence and deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the items.
Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He
claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the
same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of
malversation and found guilty. He claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has
already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him.
Respondent judge granted the motion to quash stating that since the Military Commission had
already taken cognizance of the malversation case involving the same subject matter in its
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has already been heard and decided.
Issue:
Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over estafa
and committed by a civilian
Held: there is no concurrent jurisdiction
Ratio:
The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute
providing for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides the
CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the
original jurisdiction of CFI.
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force vesting
jurisdiction upon said court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4,
1974,redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and
malversationare not enumerated therein. Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with
jurisdictionover the crime of estafa.
We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a
particular crime so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction
exclusive of the other. The Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and
determine the crime of estafa against Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak
of. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.
Tolentino vs. SSC [G.R. No. L-28870.  September 6, 1985.]
Second Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concurring, 2 on leave

Facts: [GR L-28870] Amado Tolentino was employed as an Editorial Assistant in

the SSS before 14 April 1961 with a salary of P2,400.00 per annum. His
appointment as such was duly approved by the Civil Service Commission. On 14
April 1961, he was given a promotion in salary from P2,400.00 per annum to
P2,580.00 per annum effective 1 March 1961. This promotion in salary was likewise
duly approved by the CSC. On 16 March 1962, his designation was changed from
Editorial Assistant to Credit Analyst. This appointment was also duly approved by
the CSC. On 15 June 1964, he was given an appointment reinstating him to his
former position as Credit Analyst. This reappointment was extended to him
following his resignation from the SSS to run for a municipal position in his
municipality in the 1961 elections. On 16 June 1964, he took his Oath of Office. On
11 May 1965, his designation was changed from Credit Analyst to Technical
Assistant effective 1 January 1965, with an increase in salary from P2,580.00 per
annum to P4,200 per annum. It was the position of Technical Assistant (Executive
Assistant) that Tolentino was holding when the SSC passed Resolution 1003 on 15
September 1966 affirming the decision of Administrator Gilberto Teodoro finding
Tolentino guilty of dishonesty, as charged, and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service, effective on the first day of his preventive suspension (6
July 1966) with prejudice to reinstatement. Under dates of May 23 and 24, 1966,
respectively, the Administrator filed charges against Tolentino for dishonesty and
electioneering. Tolentino answered in two separate letters. The administrator was
unsatisfied with his denial, and an investigation ensued, with Tolentino in
preventive suspension. On 30 September 1966, Tolentino received a letter dated 20
September 1966 from the Administrator informing him, among others, of his
dismissal from the service by virtue of Resolution 1003 of  the SSC.

On 10 November 1966, Tolentino filed with the CFI Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IX) a
petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction questioning the
validity of Resolution 1003. On 5 June 1967, after the parties had submitted
memoranda to support their respective contentions on the question raised by the
pleadings, the lower court rendered an order dismissing Tolentino’s petition for lack
of jurisdiction over the SSC because the latter ranks with the CFI in the exercise of
the quasi-judicial powers granted to it by the Social Security Act of 1954, as
amended, following the decision of this Honorable Tribunal in Poblete Construction
Co., et al. vs. Social Security Commission, et al. (GR L-17605, promulgated 22
January 1964). On 12 August 1967, Tolention filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied in an order dated 1 December 1967. Hence, the present petitions
for review by certiorari involve two different decisions of two different tribunals.

[GR L-39149] On 7 May 1968, the Prosecution Division of the CIR filed with said
court a complaint on motion of the SSS Employees Labor Union — NLU and Amado
Tolentino charging the SSS and Gilberto Teodoro with commission of unfair labor
practices (Case 5042 — ULP). On 5 March 1974, the CIR rendered a decision
declaring the SSS and Gilberto Teodoro guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering
the reinstatement of Tolentino with back wages. On 13 August 1974, the CIR en
banc denied the motion for reconsideration dated 12 March 1974 filed by the SSS,
the petition for review on certiorari.

On 13 January 1975, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in GR L-39149

consolidating the two appeal cases as both involve the same parties and
substantially the same issues. The Supreme Court remanded to the Office of the
Commissioner of Civil Service for appropriate action the questioned Resolution 1003
together with the records thereof, and set aside as null void the decision and
resolution appealed from in GR L-39149 for having been rendered without
jurisdiction; without costs.

1.    Jurisdiction over subject matter vested by law; Once acquired,

continues until terminated
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. It is not acquired by the
consent or acquiescence of the parties, nor the unilateral assumption thereof by
any tribunal (Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, October 26, 1967; De Jesus
vs. Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967). Jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
(Aquisap vs. Basilio, L-21293, December 29, 1967; Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, L-23848,
October 31, 1967; People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715). And once acquired,
jurisdiction continues, regardless of “subsequent happenings”, until the case is
finally terminated (People vs. Pegarum, 57 Phil. 715).

2.    Laws and jurisprudence relevant to the case

The pertinent laws under the circumstances are the Social Security Act of 1954 (RA
1161), as amended by RA 2658 (which took effect 18 June 1960) and the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (RA 2260). Mendoza vs. SSC (L-29189, April 11, 1972, 44
SCRA 373) is in point.

3.    Mendoza case: Section 33 of the Civil Service Law of 1962 (Republic
Act 2260); Administrative Jurisdiction for Disciplining Officers and
Employees
The law provides that “the Commissioner may, for dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct, neglect of duty, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
notoriously disgraceful or immoral conduct, improper or unauthorized solicitation of
contributions from subordinate employees and by teachers or school officials from
school children, violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules of reasonable
office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer
or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than
one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months’ salary. In
meting out punishment, like penalties shall be imposed for like offenses and only
one penalty shall be imposed in each case.

4.    Mendoza case: Imposition of disciplinary actions on civil service

employees vested exclusively in the CSC
Section 33 of the Civil Service Act (Republic Act 2260), before the amendments
introduced therein by RA 6040, the sole power to impose disciplinary sanctions on
civil service employees was vested exclusively in the Commissioner of Civil Service.
This is emphasized by the provisions of section 27 of the Civil Service Rules
requiring the Department Head concerned within 15 days from receipt of the
complete record of the case, to forward such record with his comment and
recommendation to the Commissioner for decision, so that the Department Head’s
powers were purely recommendatory; it had no power to decide nor impose any
penalty, much less to implement the decision or carry it out into execution.

5.    Mendoza case: Article II, Section 3 of Civil Service Act of 1959; Scope
of Civil Service, positions embraced in the Civil Service
The law provides that “the Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, and appointments therein except as to those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be
made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination. Positions included in the civil service fall into three
categories; namely, competitive or classified service, noncompetitive or unclassified
service and exempt service. The exempt service does not fall within the scope of
this law.”

6.    Mendoza case: Section 3 (c) of the Social Security Act of 1954, as
amended by RA 2658; Social Security System
The law provides that “the Commission, upon the recommendation of the
Administrator, shall appoint an actuary, medical director, and such other personnel
as may be deemed necessary, shall fix their compensation, prescribe their duties
and establish such methods and procedures as may insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purpose of this Act: Provided,
however, That the personnel of the system shall be selected only from civil service
eligibles certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service and shall be subject to civil
service rules and regulations’.”

7.    Mendoza case: Civilian non-elective officer exempt service if

employment through a contract
In order to belong to the exempt service and thus forfeit the protection of the Civil
Service Law, a civilian non-elective officer must have obtained employment through
a contract. In fact, section 2, paragraph (j), of the Civil Service Rules, interpreting
section 6 of the Act, declares that “the term ‘persons employed on a contract basis’
refers to independent contractors and those who may be employed by them; it
does not include employees or laborers who serve under the direction and
supervision of a governmental agency, except aliens who may be thus employed on
a contract basis when the exigencies of the service so require. In this context, the
term ‘independent contractor’ refers to one who undertakes to do a piece of work
for the government under his own responsibility, with minimum interference on the
part of any governmental agency in the performance or accomplishment thereof.”

8.    Mendoza case: RA 6040, Legislature extended the scope of the exempt
service
In RA 6040, the Legislature extended the scope of the exempt service to persons
employed in government owned or controlled corporations primarily performing
proprietary functions with collective bargaining agreements; and that furthermore,
the same Act also amended section 33 of the Civil Service Act by adding at the end
of the original section the provisos “Provided, however, that heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities, shall have original
jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
Provided further, that when the penalty imposed is a reprimand or a fine not
exceeding one month salary or suspension without pay for a period not exceeding
one month the decision of the aforementioned heads shall be final; but if the
penalty imposed is heavier the decision shall be appealable to the Commission as
provided in this Act: Provided finally, that a decision imposing removal shall always
be subject to review by the Commission.”

9.    Mendoza case: RA 6040 cannot be applied retroactively

Had the present case arisen, therefore, under Republic Act 6040, the Social
Security Commission would have had jurisdiction, after due investigation, to impose
the penalty of demotion subject only to appeal by the officer or employee affected
to the Civil Service Commission. Unfortunately RA 6040 was enacted on 4 August
1969. RA cannot be retroactively applied to the case, specially since the same act
expressly provides in its section 47 that “’rights and privileges vested or acquired
under the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations prior to the
effectivity of this Act shall remain in force and effect.”

10.    Resolution 1003 implemented when Administrator had no power to

hear and decide disciplinary charges against erring employees of the
Commission; Resolution may be treated as a recommendation
At the time Resolution 1003 was promulgated and implemented dismissing Amado
Tolentino, the respondents-appellees Social Security Commission, Gilberto Teodoro
and Angel Penano did not have the power to hear and decide administrative and
disciplinary charges filed against erring employees of the Commission. Still,
Resolution 1003 shall not be dismissed as inutile. The Social Security Commission,
as an agency of the government, may be considered a department and Gilberto
Teodoro, its department head. Resolution 1003 may be treated as the
recommendation of the department head which may be submitted to the Civil
Service Commission for decision and or appropriate action.

11.    RA 6040 void insofar as it insulates GOCCs from embrace of CSC, as it

conflicts with Article XII (B), Section 1 (1) of the 1973 Constitution
By RA 6040, the legislature extended the scope of the exempt service to persons
employed in government owned or controlled corporations primarily performing
proprietary functions with collective bargaining agreements; in addition, it
appended the proviso to section 33 of the Civil Service Act, i.e. “Provided, however,
that heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered
cities, shall have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving
disciplinary action: Provided further, that when the penalty imposed is a reprimand
or a fine not exceeding one month salary or suspension without pay for a period not
exceeding one month, the decision of the aforementioned heads shall he final; but
if the penalty imposed is heavier the decision shall be appealable to the
Commission as provided in this Act: Provided finally, that a decision imposing
removal shall always be subject to review by the Commission.” However, Section
1(1), Article XII (B) of the 1973 Constitution reads “The Civil Service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporation.” Insofar as Republic
Act No. 6040 insulates government-owned or controlled-corporations with collective
bargaining agreements with their employees from the embrace of the Civil Service
Commission, said statute is inconsistent with the fundamental law of the land. As
such, it is void (Article 7, New Civil Code).

12.    CIR lacks jurisdiction, decision void; Jurisdiction belongs to CSC

The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated 5 March 1974, and its
subsequent en banc resolutions dated 13 August 1974 are null and void, the same
having been issued without jurisdiction. At the time Amado Tolentino was charged
with and convicted of dishonesty in 1966 up to the time the Prosecution Division of
the Court of Industrial Relations filed with said court the unfair labor suit docketed
as Case 5042-ULP on 7 May 1968, the power to impose disciplinary sanctions on
erring employees of the Social Security Commission was vested exclusively in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, without prejudice to appeal to the Civil Service Board
of Appeals (sections 18 and 36, R.A. 2260). Consequently, the Court of Industrial
Relations, created under Commonwealth Act 103, a statute of earlier vintage, had
no jurisdiction over Case 5042-ULP. Again, jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action (Aquisap vs.
Basilio, supra; Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, L-23848, October 31, 1967; People vs.
Pegarum, supra).

13.    Court found no necessity to scrutinize the CIR’s findings

The Court found no further need to scrutinize the findings of the Court of Industrial
Relations. To do so would benefit no one.