Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers

Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers

[G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016]
FACTS: On Jan 23, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance
No. 0309 which bans aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities
within Davao City. Feb 9 2007. City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance and the
ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in Mindanao Pioneer.
The ordinance defined aerial spraying as the application of substances through the use of
aircraft that dispenses the substances in the air. Said ordinance also requires agricultural
entities to provide a 30-meter buffer zone within their agricultural farms/plantations. In
addition, provided for in the said ordinance that the ban against aerial spraying would be
strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance,
and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO).
They alleged that the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to· the confiscation of property without due process of
law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160.
ISSUE: Whether the Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that be considered as a valid police power measure, an
ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: (1) formal test and (2) substantive test. The
former refers to whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law (Sec. 53&54 of LGC). While, substantive test involves inherent merit, like the conformity
of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations in order to promote the general welfare. This authorizes the LGU to ordinances
necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its constituents, and for the
protection of their property.
On the other hand, in order for an ordinance to be a valid piece of local legislation, it must
also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
Accordingly, a local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only if it satisfies the following requisites: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State (equal
protection clause) and; the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive (due process clause).
In the case at bar, the Court held that the questioned ordinance was violative of the
required due process clause as it requires the respondents and other affected individuals to
comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of
penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits. This is definitely
be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
In addition, the said ordinance also violates the equal protection clause. The constitutional
right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It neither requires
universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction, nor intends to
prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is
to operate.
According to the Court, to determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three
levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. The
rational scrutiny demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.
In addition, the intermediate scrutiny refers to when the classification puts a quasi-suspect
class at a disadvantage. The strict scrutiny, on the other hand, applies when a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class.
In the case at bar, it is the rational basis approach which was applied by the Court.
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be
viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed
purpose. To this end, Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting
that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades
the environment. However, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in saying that the
imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the
substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted.

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