Boado Notes and Cases On The RPC

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
What is criminal law?

It is that branch of public law which defines criminal offenses and prescribes specific punishment for them. It is a branch
of public law because it treats of acts or omissions of the citizens which are deemed primarily as wrongs against the State
more than against the offended party.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. (Lacson
No. 128096, January 1999)
What are the constitutional limitations on penal laws?
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provides the following limitations on the inherent right of the State
through the Legislature to enact penal laws:
a. "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Section 1) Thus, the law must be general in application so as not to violate the equal protection
clause.
b. "No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the
No law, therefore, must be passed imposing cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines.
c.
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
(Section 12[2])
"No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted." (Section 22)
v. Exec. Secretary, G.R.
free will shall be
3. Describe due process as applied to penal laws.
Due process, whether substantive or procedural, can be described as nothing more and nothing less than compliance with
the requirements of fair play, or the right of any person to be given notice and be heard before he is condemned for an act
or omission defined and punished by law (twin requirements of notice and hearing). Ynot, 148 SCRA 659, struck down the
executive order (EO) which prohibited the transport of carabao or carabao meat across provincial boundaries without
government clearance for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. The rationale was that the EO
defined the prohibition, convicted petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him "the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play."
4. Who are entitled to the mantle of due process of law?
The State, as well as the accused, is entitled to due process of law. For justice to prevail the scales must be balanced;
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. A verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not
necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice
then must be rendered even-handedly
proprio dismissing the cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's
Due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner
was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at
the proper time. (Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000)
to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. (Dimatulac
G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998)
In receiving ex-parte the Department of Foreign Affairs advice and in motu
NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE
2
right to due process was violated.
v. Vilon,
cases against petitioners over the objection of the Special Prosecutor. By such order, the court deprived the People of its
right to due process. It acted in excess of its jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the
criminal cases. Hence, the order was null and void; it may thus be rectified despite the lapse of 15 days from notice to the
Special Prosecutor.
A void order or judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even
necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.
6. What makes a penalty cruel and unusual?
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It implies something inhuman and barbarous
5(r*^Ml
'
When the penalty is wholly disproportionate to the offense committed, e.g., life imprisonment for jaywalking, it not only is
cruel and unusual but is likewise violative of the due process clause as that would amount to deprivation of liberty for an
unreasonable length of time.
/
7. What is an ex post facto law?
An ex post facto law is a penal law which is given retroactive application to the prejudice of the accused. Hence,
3
5. What is the effect of violation of the due process clause?
In Guevarra
G.R. No. 138792-804, March 31, 2005, the Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of 13
(Harden v. Dir. of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741), or shocking to the conscience (People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299) such as
cutting the fingers of thieves, burning at the stake incestuous rapists, or putting onto the stock and barrel illegal possessors
of firearms. But mere severity of the penalty does not make the same cruel Y'<"
and unusual punishment. "It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution." To come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
u. Sandiganbayan,
and plainly oppressive,'
'wholly
'
perpetua cannot be imposed for homicide instead of reclusion temporal no matter how many generic aggravating
circumstances are present because that penalty is not prescribed by law for homicide. Also, Article 22 provides that penal
laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person who is not a habitual criminal. Therefore, a law which
increases the penalty for an act or omission cannot be given retroactive effect. Consequently, the court cannot impose a
penalty higher than that prescribed by law for a particular crime, no matter how perverse the offender may be.
8. Give examples of ex post
facto law.
a. Makes an act punishable as a crime when such act was
not an offense when committed.
b. While not creating new offenses, aggravates the
seriousness of a crime.
c.
greater punishment for a crime already committed.
d. Alters the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially
easier to convict a defendant.
e. Alters, in relation to the offense or its consequences, the
situation of a person to his disadvantage.
f. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful.
g. Deprives the accused of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (Lacson v. Exec. Secretary)
even if the penal law is made to apply retroactively, if it is favorable to the accused the same is not ex post facto, and, thus,
allowed under Article 22.
A law is ex post facto when it makes an act or omission criminal which when committed was not yet so. In the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), there are provisions which complement the prohibition against ex post facto law. Article 21
states that "no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission." Thus, reclusion
Prescribes
4
Moreover, it is an encroachment of judicial function by the legislative.
RA
August 15, 1994)
Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-54645-76, December 18, 1986 upheld the inclusion of public officers and employees
earlier charged for suspension pendente lite under the law amending R.A. 3019. The amendment was not ex post facto
even if applied retroactively because the suspension was not a form of penalty but merely preventive. It is not a penalty
because it is not imposed after and as a consequence of hearing on the merits.
y
%t^K
9. Give examples of laws not covered by the ex post
10. What is a bill of attainder? Why is it constitutionally proscribed?
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382). It
offends against the due process clause and has the features of ex post facto law.
of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975 which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, is not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional,
(id.)
The prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there
is absolutely no merit in the contention that sustaining the extradition treaty's retroactive application with respect to
offenses committed prior to its coming into force and effect violates the constitutional prohibition. The Treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which was already committed or consummated at the time the Treaty was ratified.
(Wright v. CA, No. 113213,
-
facto clause.
Ex post facto law generally prohibits retrospectivity
5
Ferrer said that the Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder because although the law named the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP), it did so only for definitional purposes and applies not only to that organization but also to any
other organizations having the same purpose and its successors. Were the Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But
the fact is that, "The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Party knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power." [The Anti-Subversion
Act had been expressly repealed.
]
What are the characteristics of penal law?
They are generality, territoriality, and prospectivity. Generality refers to the persons covered by penal laws; territoriality,
the place where the law is applicable; and prospectivity, the time when the law should be applied.
What is the generality characteristic of penal law?
Penal laws are binding on all persons who reside or - sojourn in the Philippines whether citizens or not. This is based on
Article 14 of the New Civil Code (NCC) and on the equal protection clause in Article III(l) of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides, respectively, viz.:
"Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all those who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory."
"Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."
Even aliens are covered by the generality principle because they are also protected by the laws of the Philippines during all
the time that they sojourn within its territory and the word "person" in the Constitution does not refer only
6
•
As distinguished from the territoriality principle, generality refers to the persons covered, whereas the former deals with
the situs of the act or the place where the penal law is applicable.
•
The exceptions are preferential laws and treaties providing for exemption from the coverage of penal laws for certain
classes of persons, on the one hand, and the expansion of the coverage of the Code outside its territory for certain acts or
omissions listed in Article 2, on the other. Example of the first is the laws and treaties governing heads of States and their
representatives.
^14.
G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996)
/
13. Describe the territoriality characteristic of penal law.
The law is applicable to all crimes committed within the limits of Philippine territory. The basis of this characteristic is
Article 2 of the RPC.
15. Does the prospectivity rule cover only laws?
No. The prospectivity rule applies also to penal circulars such as DO
What does prospectivity rule mean?
Prospectivity of penal laws means that laws have prospective application unless they are favorable to the offender who is
not a habitual delinquent. Conversely, and to the same effect is irretrospectivity which prescribes that "laws shall have no
retroactive application unless the contrary is provided." The bases of this characteristic are Articles 21 and yf
22 of the RPC, Article 111(22)
to citizens. Excepted with qualification are those covered by treaties and laws of preferential application such as
ambassadors and heads of State under the principle of
par in parent
of the Constitution on ex post facto laws and Article 4 of the NCC
.
To mete the death penalty reimposed by R.A. 7659 on December 31, 1993 for a crime committed inl987 would violate the
rule that if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
applied. (People v. Bracamonte,
J Circular No. 12 issued on August 8, 1984 which declared that all checks including guarantee checks are covered
7
non habet imperium.
,
,
,
*
(id.)
17. What is the rationale against retroactivity of laws?
Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is that a law „
(id.)
i/18.
•-/>
usually derides rights which may have already become ->
)
16. What effect does the court's interpretation upon a written law have? The interpretation placed upon a written law
by a competent court has the force of law. When a doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court is overruled and a different
view adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it
is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society,
It
^
Enumerate the different philosophies underlying the criminal law system.
vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional. There is the improvised necessity to take
account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification as an operative fact negating acceptance of a "principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity." Prior to such nullification, the statute must have been in force and had to be complied
with. It will deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication,
by B.P. 22. This Circular cannot be applied retroactively because petitioners cannot be faulted for relying on the earlier
official pronouncement of the DOJ Secretary that guarantee checks issued prior thereto are not covered by said Circular.
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory has been applied to administrative rulings and circulars,
and to judicial decisions which although in themselves are not laws, are evidence of what the laws mean, this being the
reason why under Article 8 of the NCC, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of our legal system. (Co v. CA, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993
There are four schools of thought: a) the classical or j>
or realistic; c) the ecclectic; and d) the £
u 19. Distinguish the classical (juristic) from the positivist (realistic).
•^Classical
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with reclusion perpetua, and so on.
4. Emphasis of the law — on the offense and not on the
offender.
^Positivist
juristic; b) the positivist
utilitarian.
or realistic.
t,
or juristic.
1. Basis of criminal liability — human free will. The subscribers to this theory believe that man has the capacity to choose
between right and wrong, good and evil. Hence, when he does or omits to do an act, he does so willingly and voluntarily
with full knowledge of the effects and consequences thereof.
2. Purpose of the penalty — retribution — "an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth." In view of the voluntariness of the act
or omission of the offender, he should be given the penalty that he deserved. Justice is for the offended party also which
requires that the offender be repaid with commensurate punishment.
3. Determination of penalty — predetermined and rigid established by a specific and predetermined penalty for the offense
committed. The penalty is mechanically determined in direct proportion to the crime committed. Thus, homicide is
penalized with reclusion temporal; murder with reclusion perpetua;
1. Basis of criminal liability — the proponents are of the view that man is inherently good but the offender is socially sick.
He is a product, not only of biological factors, but also of his environment. His thoughts and actions are influenced by his
upbringing, social environment and associations.
2. Purpose of the penalty — reformation. Since the offender is not inherently evil but only made so by his environment,
then the penalty should be
9
corrective or curative to reform him or bring him back to his good nature. (Thus, jails are also
called reformatories.)
3. Determination of the penalty — case to case basis — arrived at after an

individual examination of the offender. The penalty should be suited to
the individual offender precisely because the purpose is to reform him.
4. Emphasis of the law — on the offender and not on

the offense.
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which the RPC is
mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man
is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal
act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man
therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts
so long as free will appears unimpaired. (People v. Genosa, G.R.
135981, September 29, 2000)
The rigid penalty in Book II under the classical theory is tempered by factors approximating
the positivist theory, e.g.:
/ 6. 40-year maximum limit for penalty; and
7. Executive clemency under Articles 5 and 70

and the Constitution.
10
1. Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) 3. Extenuating/absolutory circumstances

; ;
4. Probation Law;
2. Modifying Circumstances;
5. Three-fold rule on multiple penalties;
(or mixed) philosophy?
This combines the good features of both the classical and the positivist theories. Ideally, the classical theory should be
applied to grievous or heinous crimes, whereas, the positivist is made to apply on economic and social crimes.
/
/
21. What does the utilitarian theory believe on the function of
punishment?
The primary function of punishment in criminal law is v/to
20. What is meant by the ecclectic
.
22. When an act is perverse, but there is no law that punishes it, is
there a crime committed?
Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege — there is no crime when there is no law that defines and punishes it. The
Philippines is a civil law country (as against a common law country where laws are evolved.) Penal laws are enacted
hence, no matter how heinous an act, it is not considered a crime unless there is a law that punishes it (Article 5).
protect society from potential and actual wrongdoers. The retributive aspect of penal laws should be directed against them.
Thus, in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of the retribution of a wronged society should
be directed against the 'actual
MM's four checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not cover the actual 'account
as this was absent, and therefore, petitioner should not be punished for the mere issuance of the checks in question.
Following this theory, in MM's stead, the 'potential
whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting MM." (Magno v. CA, G.R. No.
96132, June 26, 1992) Since the machineries guaranteed by the check were already foreclosed, the payee had no more
right over the checks and should not have deposited them in the first place. By doing so, he was the menace to society. ,
Since a penalty cannot be imposed if not previously prescribed for a specific crime, then, when there is no law yet defining
that act as a crime and prescribing that penalty, it cannot be imposed. (Article 21)
This is also covered by the rule on ex post facto law
.
11
,
and potential wrongdoers.'
wrongdoer'
or credit for value'
^
,.
,„
_
What is the rule in the interpretation of penal laws in relation
to the accused's
culpability?
In dubio pro reo, all laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the State. This is so
because it is the State which drafted and prescribed the law, hence in case of ambiguity, the law must be read, interpreted
and construed against the State.
Thus, whenever a situation obtains where two interpretations are possible, one exculpatory and the other inculpatory, the
former shall prevail, consistent with the rule on presumption of innocence
.
Stated otherwise, where a penal law is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with acquittal, and the other with
conviction, the offender is entitled to acquittal as a matter of right. Or, where the evidence is equipoised, the balance of
justice should be tilted in favor of the accused because the State should prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt and should rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused.
CA.
142 being a penal statute should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this
principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of the individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity by which mankind would be safe and the discretion of the court limited. "Our mind cannot rest easy on the
proposition that the petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. There exists
a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction
for which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences." (Ursua
v. CA, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996)
What is the equipoise rule?
The equipoise rule — that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of ^rioral
12
certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction the same must be denied. (Abarquez
v. People, G R No. 150762, January 20, 2006)
Where the evidence of the prosecution
and of the defense are equally balanced, the scale should be tilted in favor of the accused in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence. (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991) Where the State fails to meet the
quantum of proof required to overcome such constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of
the weakness or even the absence of his defense. For any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's case and
not on the weakness of the defense. In every criminal prosecution, if the State fails to discharge its burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it fails utterly. Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been
proven with moral certainty, it is the policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence of the accused must be
favored and his exoneration granted as a matter of right. (Cosep v. People, G.R. No. 110353, May 21, 1998)
Conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
In criminal cases, moral certainty — not mere possibility — determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even
when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with
the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17,
2005)
What is the relationship of presumption of law and prima facie evidence on the constitutional presumption of
innocence?
A "presumption of law" is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that "a certain inference must be made whenever facts
appear which furnish the basis of the interference." This is to be set apart from a "presumption of fact" which is a
"[conclusion]
drawn from particular circumstances, the connection between them and the sought for fact having received such a sanction
in experience as to have become recognized as justifying the assumption." When there is a presumption of law, the onus
probandi (burden of proof), generally imposed upon the State, is now shifted to the party against whom the
13
interference is made to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption and hence, to demolish the prima facie case.
Article 217
no longer requires proof by the State that accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property.
Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property — with which said officer is
accountable — should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or property to personal use. When these
circumstances are present, a "presumption of law" arises that there was malversation of public funds or property.
Prima facie evidence is evidence good and sufficient on its face; such evidence, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or
contradicted will remain sufficient. Evidence which if unexplained or uncontradicted is sufficient to sustain a judgment
in favor of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence.
The establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may be such as to rebut
and control it. Such prima facie evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted can counterbalance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction. (Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006)
26. Cite some provisions of the Revised Penal Code which apply the
liberality of the law on the accused.
This liberal disposition in favor of the accused is manifested in the three-fold rule, the rules on mitigation of crimes, the
requirement that qualifying circumstance should be proved by the same quantum of evidence necessary to establish guilt,
the analogous circumstances in Article 13 on mitigating circumstances without the corresponding analogous circumstances
on aggravating circumstances, among others.
What does actus
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea mean?
The act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal. Since intent is an essential element of intentional felony
14
non
when the accused acted in good faith, there is no crime committed. This maxim therefore applies to dolo and not to culpa.
The error of the accused may be one of the heart and not of the mind that would render them criminally liable. (Llamoso v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-63408 & 64026, August 7, 1985; People v. Pepito, G.R. Nos. 112761-65, February 3, 1997)
v/
28. How are crimes variously classified?
A. As to commission (Article 3) —
1. Dolo or felonies committed with deliberate intent;
and
2. Culpa or those committed by means of fault.
B. As to stage of execution (Article 6) —
^
O 3. Consummated.
C.
(dolo),
^
mated because the offender cannot perform the acts j.
1. Attempted;
*
necessary for their execution without consummating the offense. Examples are crimes punished on the basis of the result
or gravity such as physical injuries. Physical injuries are punished as to whether they are serious, less serious, or slight.
The degree of injury cannot be determined without first consummating the offense.
2.
i//
Related to this is the classification of felonies as to —

Formal felonies or those which are always consum-
2. Frustrated; and
Material felonies or those which can be committed in
any of the three stages of execution
.
3. Felonies which cannot be committed in the frustrated stage, such as rape which can be either attempted or consummated
because the essence of rape is carnal knowledge. Hence, even slight penetration of the female organ consummates the
crime of rape because then there is already carnal knowledge; (People v. Clopino, G.R. No. 117322, May 21, 1998) or theft
which cannot be frustrated because its
15
element of unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same. (Valenzuela
v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007)
D. As to gravity (Article 9) —
1. Grave felonies;
2. Less grave felonies; and
3. Light felonies.
E. As to count — compound, complex, composite or special
complex crimes, continued, and continuing crimes.
Usurpation of real property or real interest therein under Article 312 is the sixth classification for unlike the above which
are deemed one crime composed of several distinct crimes with one penalty, usurpation is one crime with two penalties -
fine for the usurpation plus the penalty for the means to commit the usurpation.
F. As to nature — mala in se (singular — malum in se) and
mala prohibita (singular — malum prohibitum.)
What are crimes mala in se?
Crimes mala in se are acts or omissions which are inherently evil (mala
— evil; in se — by itself.) Generally, crimes mala in se are felonies punished under the RPC. There are however crimes
which although punished under special laws are deemed mala in se, such as those which are mere modification of the
provisions of the Code like cattle rustling which modifies Articles 308, 309 and 310 on qualified theft. Thus, P.D. 533 is
not a malum prohibitum but a modification of theft and malicious mischief. Therefore, the rules and system on penalties
under the RPC apply. (People v. Macatanda, infra). (However, the anti-carnapping law which modifies the same Article
was declared as malum prohibitum.)
What are crimes mala prohibita?
They are acts which are made evil because there is a law prohibiting the same. These would not be wrong but for the fact
16
was also determined following the rules under the RPC.
(R.A. 9165 further amended R.A. 6425 and reverted back to the "non-RPC" penalties, e.g., life imprisonment thus, R.A.
9165 now is a purely special law.)
V(
32. Which between malum in se and malum prohibitum involves
moral turpitude?
In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by the general rule that crimes mala in
se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. The rationale was set forth in Zari vs. Flores, November
21, 1979: "It implies something immoral in itself, regardless n

faith.
31. If a special law uses the nomenclatures of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, what is the effect on the nature of
the crime covered by the special law?
The fact alone that a special law uses the terms of penalties in the RPC will not make the act or omission malum in se. The
law may only intend to make the RPC apply suppletorily thereto. For instance, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659
X MI
17
that positive law forbids them. In this case, the only question asked is, has the law been violated? When the act is illegal,
intent of the offender is immaterial. (Dunlao,
Sr. v. CA, G.R No. 111342,
August 22, 1996)
When a check is presented for payment, the bank will generally accept the same whether or not it was issued in payment
of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the term and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum. (Cruz
v. CA, G.R. No. 108738, June 17,
1992) However, Magno following the utilitarian school of thought acquitted the accused as it considered the purpose for
the issuance of the bouncing check in relation to the payee's conduct which manifested her ba,d
employed the penalties used in the RPC but its violations were still deemed as malum prohibitum. Nevertheless, the
system of penalties under the RPC was applied to violations involving dangerous drugs under that law. Likewise, the
penalty imposable pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL)
of the fact that it (moral turpitude) is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must
be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statutes fixes the moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in its positively
being prohibited." (Dela
Torre v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)
Compare mala in se and mala prohibita.
In mala in se:
1.
.
3. The degree of participation determines the penalty imposable so that it is computed on the basis of whether he is a
principal offender, or merely an accomplice or accessory.
4. The stage of accomplishment affects the penalty imposed thus the penalty depends on whether the crime is
consummated, frustrated, or attempted.
5.
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude.
6. Generally, crimes mala in se are punishable under
the RPC
.
In mala prohibita:
1. The basis of criminal liability is the offender's voluntariness, hence, good faith or lack of criminal intent is not accepted
as a defense, unless this is an element of the crime such as in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (evident bad faith)
The basis of criminal liability is the offender's moral trait, hence, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense.
2. Modifying circumstances are taken into account in imposing the penalty on the offender precisely because his moral
trait is the basis of this crime. Thus, if the offender is perverse, Article 14 on aggravating circumstances shall apply,
whereas, if the offender shows remorse or the like, his penalty shall be mitigated pursuant to Article 13
Generally,
18
.
frustrated stage is not an element. Thus, just like culpa, mala prohibita is always consummated.
5. Generally, crimes mala prohibita do not involve
moral turpitude.
6. Generally, crimes mala prohibita cover violations of
special penal laws.
Can a malum in se absorb or be complexed
with a malum prohibitum?
No. A malum in se felony, such as reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, cannot absorb malum prohibitum
offense, such as violations of P.D.
1067, P.D. 984 and R.A. 7942. What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. (Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006)
As to the relationship of rape and sexual abuse, Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009 explains that per Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. 7610 in relation to R.A. 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape and penalized with reclusion perpetua. If the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse
19
2. Modifying circumstances are not considered because the law intends to discourage the commission of the act specially
prohibited. Moreover, the act prohibited is not inherently evil but made evil only by the prohibition of the statute, hence,
does not involve perversity or lack of it by the offender which is the basis for the aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.
3. The degree of participation of the offenders does not affect their liability, hence, the penalty on all of them are the same
whether they are principals or merely accomplices or accessories.
4. The stage of accomplishment considered is only when the crime is accomplished or consummated. There is no
attempted or frustrated stage because it is the commission of the act itself that is prohibited and also since intent which is
inherent in attempted/
under Section 5(b) or rape under Article 266-A. However, offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act
because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a
single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with sexual abuse. Article 48 of the RPC does not allow a felony
to be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
35. Violation of what species of special laws is not deemed malum
prohibitum?
Laws that merely amend provisions of the RPC, such as P.D. 533 which amended Articles 308, 309, and 310 do not
convert their violations into mala prohibita. Thus, cattle- rustling is still malum in se. (Taer v. CA, infra)
i
36. What is a heinous crime?
It is a grievous, odious and hateful offense which by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atroc- ity and perversity, is regarded as seriously outrageous to the common standards or norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and orderly society. (Whereas clause, R.A. No. 7659.)
The fact that R.A. 9346 killed the death penalty does not declassify heinous crimes as such. They remain heinous for
purposes of the award of civil liabilities. (People v. Bon, infra.)
37. What is the effect of the repeal of penal law on the accused?
The effect depends upon the nature of the repeal. Thus:
a. In absolute or total or express repeal, the act or omission is decriminalized so that if a case is pending, it shall be
dismissed whether the accused is a habitual delinquent or not because there is no more crime for which he should be tried.
If he were already convicted and/or serving sentence, he shall be released if he is not a habitual delinquent or unless the
law provides that detention is to continue.
b. In partial or relative or implied repeal or repeal by re- enactment, the first law will govern if the accused is a habitual
delinquent or if the favorable second law
20
prohibits retroactivity. While the second law will govern if favorable to the offender who is not a habitual delinquent or
the law is silent as to its retroactivity.
The beneficent provisions of R.A. 7659 can be applied retroactively to judgments which have become final and executory
prior to December 31, 1993 and even to those who are already serving sentences. (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 135231-33,
February 28, 2001)
To impose upon the accused the death penalty reimposed by R.A. 7659 for a crime committed way back in 1987 would
violate the basic rule that if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be applied. (People v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996)
In case of conflict between the Spanish text and the English version of the Revised Penal Code, which should
prevail?
The Spanish text is controlling as provided in Section 15
of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) since the RPC was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Thus:
"SEC. 15.
Language that should prevail in the interpretations of laws. — In the interpretation of a law officially promul- gated in
English and Spanish, the English text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission, or mistake, the Spanish may be
consulted to explain the English text. The converse rule shall, however, be applied if so provided in the particular statute:
Pro- vided, however, That in the interpretation of laws enacted by the Philippine legislature after October sixteenth,
nineteen hun- dred and sixteen, the language of the text used by the house that finally passed the same shall prevail, and
in case of ambiguity, omission, or mistake, the official translation filed in the office of the Secretary of said House may be
consulted."
For instance, the Spanish version of Article 267 uses the term "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or
raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in an
enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking
up. (People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097, December 22. 1997)
21
The word "immediate" is an incorrect translation into English of the controlling Spanish text for the word "proximo." The
Spanish text allows for a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual vindication. However, the lapse of two
weeks from the discovery of the wife's infidelity and the killing of the alleged paramour could no longer be considered
proximate. There can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when accused had sufficient time to recover his
sanity. (People v. Ignas,
G.R. No. 140514-15, September 30, 2003)
What is the finality-of-acquittal
rule? Give its rationale and legal basis. "The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into the 'humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in
unequal contest with the State.' Thus Green expressed the concern that the underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in
at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207)
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as
a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of- acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for 'repose,'
a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system had built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in
a subsequent proceeding. (People v. Sandiganbayan, February 2001
22
)
BOOK ONE
General Provisions Regarding the Date of Enforcement and Application of the
Provisions of this Code, and Regarding
the Offenses,
the Persons Liable and the Penalties

2
4
Preliminary Title Date of Effectiveness and Application of the Provisions of this

Code
t/d&
Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. — This Code shall take effect on the First day of January, 1932.
The people were given two years from its publication before the RPC was made to take effect for a fuller understanding
thereof. Logically so for penal laws involve the life, liberty and property of a person, especially since the NCC excuses no
one from compliance with the law due to ignorance.
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its
interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities
issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined
in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
25
• How should the Government and the country be referred to today? The Philippine Government should be called
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to Section 2,
Introductory Provisions, E.O. 292, the "Administrative Code of 1987," which partly defines that term as the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines.
The country should be referred to as the Republic of the Philippines not Philippine Islands which impresses in the mind
scattered islands implying the lack of oneness or singularity of this nation.
• What are the two scopes of application of the Revised Penal Code? They are the intra-territorial
and the extra-territorial applications. The intra-territorial application is found in the first paragraph of Article 2 - the RPC
shall be enforced, except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, within the Philippine Archipelago,
including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone.
Its extraterritorial application is enumerated in the second paragraph to be enforced outside of its jurisdiction against those
who:
1.
Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Republic of the Philippines or obligations and securities
issued by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the Philippines of the obligations and securities mentioned
in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
26
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
the Code.
Outside of these five cases, Philippine courts cannot take jurisdiction over a crime committed outside the country. For
instance, R.A. 8491,
the "Flag and Heraldic Code of the Philippines" provides: "Sec. 37. The rendition of the National Anthem, whether
played or sung, shall be in accordance with the musical arrangement and composition of Julian Felipe." A Filipino artist
who sings the Philippine national anthem in Las Vegas, U.S.A. during the fights of Filipino boxers in contravention of said
provision cannot be prosecuted before Philippine courts because such offense is not among the exceptions in Article 2
.
What does the phrase, "except as provided in treaties and laws of preferential application," mean?
That phrase means that the treaties and laws of preferential application shall be given preference over the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, R.A. 75 which gives immunity to diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. Under international laws,
sovereigns and heads of states and their official representatives enjoy immunity from suits. In the Constitution, members
of Congress enjoy parliamentary immunity in connection with any speech delivered in Congress.
Who comprises the different heads and staff of diplomatic missions?
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include:
(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of ^
.
Comprising the staff of the (diplomatic) mission are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and
service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE
State; (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the
heads of States; and (c) charges d'
affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs
27
members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission,
are accorded diplomatic rank. (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003)
Who among the heads and staff of diplomatic missions are entitled to immunity in the host sovereign and on what
basis?
Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic
missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents,"
under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The
Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly
withholding the same privileges from all others. Even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of
commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and
visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic
immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of
representing their states in political matters.
The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or
not he performs duties of diplomatic nature,
(id.)
Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. WHO v. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 said that in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate
and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the
Philippine government, specifically its DFA, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling,
in its post litem motam
issuances. The privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing
legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction,
28
(id.)
• What international principle forms the basis for granting immunity for diplomatic heads?
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign State is a long-standing
non habet imperium — that all States are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the State to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must
be regarded as being against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded,
(id.)
USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, involving officers of the US Air Force and Air Force Office of Special Investigators
charged with preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, ruled that the doctrine of State immunity
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the State for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. As they have acted on behalf of the government,
and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, who were responsible for
their acts.
• What are the limitations to the immunity principle?
Director v. Aligaen, 33 SCRA 368, explains the limitations, thus: "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law
or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for
the
rule of customary international law. Suing a representative of a State is suing the State itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim —par
in parem,
29
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of State immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice."
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond
the scope of his authority and jurisdiction. (Shaufv.
CA, 191 SCRA 713)
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending State. The consent of the host State is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the
US, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP- US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show
any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the US (for the latter to send its agents and to
conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur . of the
Philippine government to the activities of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (USDEA), however, is evident. The official
exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of
both the Philippine DFA and the US Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of MM at the behest of SS, may be inadequate to support
the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not
30
consent, to the activities of SS within Philippine territory. The job description of SS has tasked him to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then make
the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on MM, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and
then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against MM, SS hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope
of his official function or duties. SS, as an agent of the USDEA
allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic,
is entitled to the defense of State immunity from suit. (Minucher v. CA, February 11, 2003)
Does immunity from suit of officers of international bodies include that for defamation?
The immunity of officers of international bodies is not plenary. Liang discussed this principle hereunder.
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). For allegedly uttering defamatory words
against a fellow ADB worker, he was charged before the MTC with two counts of grave oral defamation. The judge
received an "offer of protocol" from the DFA stating that LL is covered by immunity from legal processes under Section
45 of the Agreement between ADB and the Philippines. Based on said protocol, the judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two cases. In rebuking the action of the court a quo the Supreme Court held that:
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
proprio dismissing the cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. The needed
inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary
basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the dropping of the charges.
31
Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportu-
nity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because Philippine laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and
cannot be part of official functions. A public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention, a diplomatic agent, assuming LL is such, enjoys immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State except in an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside of his official functions. The commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.
What comprises the Philippine Archipelago?
The national territory comprises the Philippine Archi- pelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines (Archipelagic Doctrine; Article 1, 1987 Constitution).
What is a Philippine ship or airship? How is jurisdiction over crimes committed therein determined?
A Philippine ship or airship is one that is duly registered in the Philippines and under Philippine laws
ship of Philippine nationality is in the Philippines and a crime is committed therein, there is no
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement, the immunity therein is not absolute but subject to the exception that the act
was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section
45(a).
32
.
When a^erchant
It does not apply to war vessels over which a country always has jurisdiction.
Compare the English Rule and the French Rule on jurisdiction.
Under the ER, the host country has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the vessel unless they involve the internal
management of the vessel. The FR, on the other hand, recognizes the jurisdiction of the flag country over crimes
committed within the vessel except if the crime disturbs the peace and order of the host country.
The ER is strictly territorial, unlike the FR. But the effect on jurisdiction over the crime is about the same because the
general rule of one is the exception on the other. For instance, if drug trafficking is committed in the vessel, under the FR,
the ^/liost
question as to the jurisdiction over the crime, it being within the Philippine territory. If it is in the high seas where no
country has jurisdiction, the Philippines still has jurisdiction. But if it is within the territory of another country, the
jurisdiction is generally with that foreign State because penal laws are primarily territorial in application. But if that
foreign country will not take cognizance the Philippines can assume jurisdiction.
But Philippine warship and the official vessel of the President of the Philippines, wherever they are, are extensions of the
Philippines and its sovereignty.
What are the two recognized rules on jurisdiction oveprnerchant vessels? These are the French Rule (FR) and the
English Rule (ER). These rules refer to the jurisdiction of one country (flag) over its merchant vessels situated in another
country (host).
country will have jurisdiction because that act disturbs the peace of the host country. Same with the ER, because the crime
does not relate to the internal management of the vessel.
Who are public officers and employees within the purview of Article 2, Revised Penal Code?
They are the public officers and employees of the Philippine Government when the crime is related to the exercise of their
office. Without this intimate relation between the office and
33
the crime committed, the officers are acting in their private capacity and hence, bound by the law of
the host country.
What are included in the crimes against national security and the law of nations?
They include Treason, Espionage, Provoking War and Disloyalty in case of War, and Piracy
and Mutiny. Rebellion is not included because it is a crime against Public Order.
Hence, if rebellion is planned abroad and acts of rebellion were committed there,
there is no criminal liability over which the Philippine courts can assume
jurisdiction because rebellion is not one of those in Title I of Book II.
TITLE ONE
FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Chapter One FELONIES
Art.
3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
• What are felonies?
Felonies (delitos) are acts or omissions punishable under the RPC. Felonies are classified on the basis of how they are
committed either as dolo or culpa which are the classifications of crimes thereunder. Crimes involving special laws are
properly called offenses; violations of ordinances are infractions.
• How are felonies committed?
Felonies are committed either by means of deceit or fault. There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
There is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skills. In both cases
it is necessary that there is voluntariness which is presumed from the elements of freedom of action and intelligence
.
35
• What are the elements of intentional felonies and of culpable felonies?
DOLO CULPA
1. Freedom of action; 1. Freedom of action;
2. Intelligence; and 2. Intelligence; and
3. Intent. 3. Negligence, imprudence,
lack of foresight, lack of skill.
Felonies in general have all the foregoing elements whereas specific felonies in Book II such as homicide have their own
elements, which should be alleged in the Information. The elements under Article 3 appertain to the actor. The elements of
specific felonies relate to the act or acts constituting the felony.
• To which kind of felony is the principle that "the act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal" relevant?
Strictly to intentional felonies because in culpable felonies and in crimes mala prohibita, good faith and lack of intent are
not material. This is why both culpa and mala prohibita are in the consummated stage only because intent is inherent in
attempted and frustrated felonies.
Under the maxim "actus non a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, except for culpa and crimes mala prohibita, the act must be accompanied by a
criminal intent. Though criminal intent is - presumed disputably, the act from which such presumption is grounded must
be a criminal or unlawful act. (Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005)
• What is intent?
Intent refers to the use of a particular means to bring about the desired result. The use of a lethal weapon shows the
criminal intent to kill although death may not result therefrom. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is
demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. The only way to know what is in
36
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,"
the mind of a person is to look at the external manifestation thereof demonstrated by the overt acts or means employed.
What is the rule on the existence of intent?
As a general rule, criminal intent is presumed (general intent).
But where intent is an element of the crime (specific criminal intent), the intent cannot be presumed but must be
established. In attempted or frustrated homicide, intent to kill is a specific criminal intent because if not established only
physical injuries will be charged. Inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient
to prove the fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is physical
injuries only. (People v. Paganor, G.R. Nos. 140006-10, April 20, 2001)
Between acts of lasciviousness
and attempted rape, intent to rape must be shown otherwise the felony is only acts of lasciviousness. When the act is
equivocal or capable of giving rise to different felonies, specific criminal intent must be proved. Abdulla stated that Section
5(b) of Rule 131

of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures (RRCP) presumes disputably that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent: "Indeed, clear it is from its very language that the disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal
intent presupposes the commission of an unlawful act." Therefore, the intent to kill is presumed when the victim dies
because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act. Gemoya,
G.R. No. 132633, October 4, 2000, held: "The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death, unless the accused
proves by convincing evidence that any of the justifying circumstances in Article 12, xxx is present." Delim,
G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003 was more emphatic when it categorically stated that: "If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed."
How is intent manifested?
Intent is a mental state which cannot be seen and therefore its existence can only be demonstrated by the overt/
acts of a person. The choice of a particular means will show the true intent of the actor.
FELONIES
37
Animus furandi is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out from the bodega of the petitioner the
tires which were loaded on his pick-up. Dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute because it is the act
alone, irrespective of the motive which constitutes the offense. When it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful
acts alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal
intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption. Moreover, Section 5, P.D. 1612 provides for the
presumption from the mere possession of anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery as prima
facie evidence of fencing. This presumption must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a
denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence. (Lim
May 18, 1993)
May a crime be committed without criminal intent?
Yes, in two instances: in crimes mala prohibita and in culpable felonies. For instance, intent to gain need not be proved in
crimes punishable by a special law such as the Anti- Fencing Law. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in
themselves called acts mala in se, and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called
acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule is
that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When
an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. (id.)
What is motive? Is it determinative of criminal liability?
Motive is the moving power or force which impels a person to commit acts toward a desired result. Generally, motive is
immaterial in incurring criminal liability; it is intent which is material. Motive may be illustrated in this manner: in
homicide, the intent to kill is demonstrated by the use of a lethal weapon by the offender. Motive, on the other hand, may
be vengeance or the desire to vindicate a wrong committed against the accused which moved him to kill the victim.
38
v. CA, G.R. No. 100311,
FELONIES
When is motive material in determining the criminal agency?
Motive becomes material when:
a. The act brings about variant crimes (People v. Puno,
February 1993);
b. There is doubt whether the accused committed the crime, or the identity of the accused is doubtful (People v. Salamat,
)
What factors affect intent and consequently the criminal liability of the actor or offender?
a. Mistake of fact — negatives criminal liability akin to
justifying circumstance under Article 11
;
b. Aberratio ictus (mistake in the victim of the blow) —
generally increases criminal liability;
c.
August 1993, 44 SCAD);
c.
The evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial; or
d. The evidence of guilt of the accused is inconclusive.
Motive alone will not give rise to criminal liability because under the RPC, there must be an overt act or an omission. No
matter how evil the internal thought is, as long as there are no overt acts, no crime is committed. The rule is that proof of
motive is unnecessary to impute a crime on the accused if the evidence concerning his identification is convincing. A
converso, if the evidence of identification is unclear, then the jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of motive is a
paramount necessity. (People v. Bautista, G.R. Nos. 120898-99, May 14, 1998)
Where the identity of the assailant is in dispute, motive becomes relevant, and when it is supported with sufficient
evidence for a conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sustainable. (People v. Macoy, G.R. Nos. 96649-50, July 1, 1997)
Motive becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.
(People v. Crisostomo
Error in personae (mistake in the identity) — may or may not lower criminal liability depending upon whether the
3
9
.
„/
•
What is mistake of fact?
That mistake which had the facts been true to the belief of the offender, can justify his act. It is such mistake that will
negative criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat) because of the absence of the element of intent. However, if the
offender is negligent in ascertaining the true state of facts, he may be free from dolo but not from culpa.
/
This is the teaching in Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March 19,
1910. Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same place and usually
slept in the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the
door, and called out twice, "who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from
the bed and again called out: "If you enter the room I will kill you." At that moment he was struck by a chair which had
been placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. AC was charged with murder.
While there can be no doubt of defendant's exemption from liability if the intruder had really been a robber, the question
presented is whether one can be held criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for
which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would be murder if he had known the true state
of facts at the time.
There had been several robberies in the area not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took place in a house
in which the defendant was employed as cook; and because
actual crime committed and the intended crime are of equal or different gravity (Article 49);
d. Praeter
(so grave a wrong caused than that intended) — lowers criminal liability under Article 13;
e. Proximate cause (the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused) — gives rise to criminal liability by analogy to
Article 4, paragraph 1
intentionem
FELONIES
of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. There was no offer of reasonable
explanation of the remarkable conduct of the deceased, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick
on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frighten him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say
who he was, in order to make AC believe that he was being attacked by a robber. Under such circumstances, there is no
criminal liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if
such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient
of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where, under the
provisions of the then Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be
different from that which he intended to commit. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite
his warning, defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
• What is aberratio
ictus? How does it affect criminal liability?
In aberratio ictus or error in the victim of the blow, the offender intends the injury on one person but the harm fell on
another. There are three persons present: the offender, the intended victim and the actual victim. Consequently, the act
may result in a complex crime (Article 48) or in two or more separate felonies, but there is only one intent that
characterized the crimes. Thus, aberratio ictus may result to a greater penalty to the offender.
41
May treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Yes. When the offender fired at his adversary but missed, the victims were helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths
were murders not simply homicide since the acts were qualified by treachery. (People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23,
2000)
Define
error in personae. What is its effect on the liability of the offender?
In error in personae or mistake in the identity, the offender committed a mistake in ascertaining the identity of the victim.
The classical example is: "A" shot "B" who turned out to be his father whom he thought was "B." [The intended crime is
homicide but the actual crime committed is parricide.]
Unlike in aberratio ictus, there are only two persons present here: the actual but unintended victim and the offender.
The fact that the victims were different from the one the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction.
Mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The
main reason is that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victims without checking carefully the
latter's identity as to place himself on the same legal plain as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously.
Neither may the fact that the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered a mitigating
circumstance. (People v. Pinto, G.R. No. 39519, November 21, 1991) The same intent to kill is present whether offender
killed one or the other.
This is true if the intended and the actual crimes committed are of the same severity or classification e.g., both are
homicide. If the crimes are different, as when the intended crime is homicide but the actual crime committed is parricide,
or vice-versa the rule is different — Article 49 shall govern. Error in personae becomes extenuating or mitigating.
Distinguish mistake of fact from mistake in identity.
Mistake of fact refers to the situation itself, not the identity of the persons involved. If the offenders had the intention to
commit a felonious act, but committed a mistake in ascertaining the identity of the victim, the criminal liability
42
FELONIES
is not negatived, because intent is present. It is the mistake of fact, not merely of identity, that will negative criminal
liability. (People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257)
• Compare aberratio ictus and error in personae.
In error in personae, two persons are present, the offender and the actual victim. In aberratio ictus three persons are
involved, the offender, the actual victim and the intended victim. Error in personae may or may not be mitigating but
aberratio ictus generally aggravates the liability for a complex crime or two separate felonies may be committed because
there could be two victims.
•
What is praeter intentionem? How does it affect the offender's liability?
In praeter intentionem, the injury is on the intended victim but the resulting consequence is so grave a wrong than what
was intended. There should be a great disparity between the intended felony and the actual felony committed.
Praeter intentionem is a mitigating circumstance. (Article 13[3])
But if the means used to commit the desired crime would also logically and naturally bring about the actual felony
committed, praeter intentionem will not be appreciated. If the intended wrong is to injure but the means used is kicking
the victim violently resulting to the death of the victim, it is not praeter intentionem because the means used would
naturally and logically result to the actual killing caused. This is because intent is a mental state which is shown by overt
acts.
Praeter intentionem is not available in violations of the hazing law as expressly provided therein.
• What is proximate cause? How does it affect the intent and consequently, the criminal liability of the offender?
Proximate cause is that cause which, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. That acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
43
having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom (Mckee v. IAC,
Simply stated, the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
• Summarize the effect of the five factors on intent and criminal liability of the offenders.
FACTOR Effect
on Intent Effect on Criminal
Mistake of fact negative criminal
intent Aberratio Ictus intended result falls
Liability negative criminal liability
on another person or may be in addition to the injury on the intended victim
increases criminal liability which generally result to complex crime (Article 48)
Error in intended result falls Personae on another due to
extenuating if the resulting crime is error in the identity
greater than intended of the victim
e.g., parricide when what is intended is homicide (Art. 49); no effect if the resulting crime is the same as that intended,
e.g., homicide and homicide Praeter
mitigating under Article Intentionem
actual crime is greater than intended results in crime although not intended
13
Proximate results in criminal cause

liability to the actor whether acting with intent or thru negligence
211 SCRA 517).
FELONIES
Compare Articles 3 and 365
on criminal negligence.
Based on Article 3, culpa is a mode of committing a crime hence, for instance in homicide, killing is denominated
"homicide through reckless imprudence." In Article 365 (quasi- offenses), culpa itself is the crime punished; hence, the
crime is denominated "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide."
Relate reckless imprudence to malice.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proved recklessness disappears.
Appellant's external acts prove malice or criminal intent. Resenting his son's meddling in his argument with his wife,
appellant purposely took his gun and shot his son. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless
imprudence. (People v. Agliday, G.R. No. 140794, October 16, 2001)
When the information charges intentional felony but what is proved is culpable felony, can accused be convicted?
Yes. "While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon
v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, July 1995, but a distinct crime in our Penal Code, designated as a quasi-offense
it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense." (Cabello v. Sandiganbayan,
197
)
Can negligence and conspiracy co-exist?
No, because crimes committed through negligence presupposes lack of intent. On the other hand, conspiracy denotes a
meeting of minds of the co-conspirator, precisely for the purpose or intention of committing a crime. (Crisostomo v.
Sandiganbayan)
45
SCRA 94 [1991]
• Define intelligence within the purview of felonies.
Intelligence is the capacity to understand what is right and what is wrong. Discernment is relevant to intelligence, NOT to
intent. It does not mean that when a person acted with discernment, he intended the crime or the wrong done. (People u.
Cordova, July 1993). Discernment is an element of both dolo and culpa, thus, whether the resulting felony is intentional or
culpable, discernment is an element. Without discernment, there is neither dolo nor culpa.
• What is the effect when the intelligence is lacking or diminished?
Intelligence may be diminished such as for minors over 15 but under 18 years old; or it may be completely lacking for
minors 15 and below, or insane or imbecile. It is the law itself which presumes the lack of or the diminished intelligence of
minors. For diminished intelligence, the effect is to mitigate criminal liability; where intelligence is lacking, there is
exemption from criminal liability.
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
• Compare Articles 3 and 4.
Article 3 defines how felonies are committed; Article
4 is about who commits a felony.
• Who are liable for felonies?
There are two classes of offenders under this article. First are those who commit a felony (delito), although the wrongful
act done is different from that intended. Second, those who do not actually commit a felony but perform an act which
would
FELONIES
be an offense against persons or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Liability under the second will result only if the act committed does
not result in a felony under the first paragraph of Article 4.
• How many clauses are there in paragraph 1?
There are two clauses in this paragraph: 1) "By any person committing a felony (delito),"
and 2) "Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
• Does the first clause refer only to intentional felony?
No, because the provision specified "delito" and under Article 3, delitos are committed either by dolo or by culpa.
Therefore, by the process of substitution, the provision would be, "By any person committing a dolo or culpa."
Thus, the first clause refers to both dolo and culpa and even if the wrongful act done was different from what should have
been the result of the culpable or negligent act, a felony is still committed.
For instance, Facundo tried to commit suicide by jumping to his conclusion from the fifth floor of the school building. He
survived the suicide attempt but killed Chiquito who was sitting on the bench in the campus where he jumped. Was
Facundo liable for the death of Chiquito?
Yes, Facundo was not committing a felony when he attempted to commit suicide because suicide is not a crime. But by
jumping without ascertaining that there is somebody on his suicide path considering that a school is a populated place,
Facundo was not careful in committing suicide. For his negligence, he is liable for the death of Chiquito by virtue of
Article 3 and paragraph 1 of Article 4, and also Article 365.
The elements here, then, are:
a) A felony is committed; and
b) The wrong done must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the felony committed.
•
What is the rule of proximate cause?
Under Article 4, paragraph 1, a person committing a felony is liable for its consequences. For instance, Kevin
47
252 SCRA 31)
The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection between the
wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute an efficient intervening cause.
The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the appellant. Anyone inflicting injuries is responsible
for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the
injured
G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000)
There should, however, be no effective intervening cause between the first cause and the resulting injury. For instance, in a
fight, Harrison injured Ford at the palm of his hands. Thereafter, Ford returned to his work of collecting pig feeds. One
week later, he died of gangrene. The gangrene brought about by his unsanitary work condition is an effective intervening
cause and the death of Ford should not be attributed to the injury caused by Harrison.
did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the
practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act.
If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to
the immediate cause of death. (People v. Acuram,
announced a hold-up at a jeepney while brandishing a knife. Because of fear, Cosme
jumped out of the jeepney and was run over by a truck killing him instantly. Kevin will be liable for the death of Cosme
even though he had not touched the latter. When a person causes a belief in the mind of another making the latter to act in
a manner fatal to him, the former will be liable for that act of engendering such a belief. Even if there is no intent to kill on
the part of the offender, he may be liable for homicide because of the rule of proximate cause.
Thus, anyone who inflicts
injury voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death, that supervenes as a
consequence of the injuries. Here, accused is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused by the violent kicks
which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim's body. (People v. Mores,
FELONIES
What is an impossible crime?
An impossible crime is one where the acts performed would have been a crime against persons or property but which is
not accomplished because of its inherent impossibility or because of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
There is intent (subjective) to commit a crime but actually no crime is committed (objective).
The act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of
the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b)
ineffectual. (Intod
)
What are the two kinds of inherent impossibility?
a. Legal impossibility, where the intended acts, even if completed would not amount to a crime. It applies to those
circumstances where: (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime,
Example: killing a dead person or stealing property which turned out to belong to the stealer.
b. Factual or physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act. This occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime,
Example is stealing from a vault which turned out to be empty.
Is impossible crime a crime?
No. The law states that the act "would be a crime" hence, it has not ripened to an actual crime because of the ineffectual
means employed or due to its inherent impossibility. Thus, objectively, no crime has been committed.
Second, this article is under Book II on specific felonies but is in Chapter One of Book I defining felonies in general
v. CA, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992
(id.).
.
49
(id.).
(id.)
• Is there an impossible crime of rape?
Yes, because rape is now a crime against person since the Anti-Rape Law reclassified it from Crimes against Chastity.
Hence, if a person would rape one who unknown to him has just died, he commits the impossible crime of rape.
• Should the offender know of the impossibility of the crime?
No, because subjectively he intends to commit an unlawful act. For instance, in homicide, the offender has the intent to
kill. If he knew that the victim is already dead, he would not intend to kill the dead. Or, if he knew that the vault is empty,
he would not go to the trouble of breaking into a building with all the attendant risks to himself to steal nothing.
Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in
cases of M
penalties. ^excessive
— Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such state-
50
• If
there is no crime committed, why is impossible crime punished?
Impossible crime is resorted to only if the acts committed will not fall under paragraph 1 of Article 4. The purpose is to
suppress lawlessness. Subjectively, the offender is a criminal although objectively no crime has been committed. There is
no attempted or frustrated stage because there is no actual crime committed.
The RPC inspired by the Positivists
School, recognizes in the offender his formidability and penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which proved inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or property. The
rationale is to punish such criminal tendencies,
FELONIES
ment
as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
• What is the "proper decision" that the court should render if it tried a case for an act which is not yet punishable
by law?
The court should render a decision of acquittal or order the dismissal of the case because of Article 21
which prohibit the imposition of a penalty not prescribed by law prior to the commission of a felony; Article 22 which
prohibits retroactivity of penal laws; and the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto law.
The present law prohibits and punishes only drunk driving. There is no law banning a drunk person from riding a public
vehicle, or the latter's driver from allowing a person who appears to be drunk to board a public conveyance. A drunk
passenger or one under the influence
of liquor or drug poses a veritable peril to the other passengers. He is prone to react irrationally and violently, due to lack
or diminution of self-control. Senseless loss of lives and physical harm can be avoided, and the riding public duly
protected, if the potential danger posed by drunk passengers can be addressed properly.
It is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, to report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court
to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. (People v. Glino,
G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007)
• What is the duty of the court when the penalty prescribed for a felony is excessive?
The court should call the attention of the President on the matter. For instance, abduction with rape was committed by the
son with the complicity of his mother. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the mother is the same as the sons
which the Court felt to be excessive. She acquiesced to cooperate with the accused on account of maternal concern.
51
G.R. No. 117216, August 9, 2000) Likewise, for the appellant who is already 72 years old, suffering from an acute heart
ailment that requires a heart- bypass operation and has served a term of imprisonment consistent with the ends of
retributive justice. (People v. Del Rosario,
She must have agonized with her son who did not know how to court the girl of his dreams, both of them being
unschooled. (People v. Villorente,
July 1992)
May the court prevent the grant of pardon to a convict when it feels that the crime committed is so reprehensible?
No. The trial court, so revolted by the perversity of appellant's crime that it was moved to include this proposal in the
dispositive portion of its decision: ".
the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of Death is not imposed but that of
Reclusion Perpetua, this Court recommends that accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30)
years." Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves full condemnation. However, the recommendation is improper.
It is the President's prerogative whether or not to grant a pardon subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution.
(People v. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004)
Considering that the accused: [i] was only 21 years old when she committed the crime of kidnapping penalized by
reclusion perpetua; [ii] she did not maltreat the child victim; and [iii] she has been in preventive detention since 1991,
she should be granted either commutation of sentence or executive clemency. (People v. Acbangin,
G.R. No. 134581, October 26, 2000)
The penalty normally imposed for kidnapping and similar offenses appears too harsh. The record does not indicate that
HH has been injured emotionally or physically by her experience. The degree of malice exhibited by the appellant, an
unlettered woman, in committing the offense does not warrant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, particularly because to
date, she has already spent seven years in prison. Executive clemency was recommended as a means of mitigating the
undue harshness of the criminal law in this particular case. (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 81020, May 28, 1991)
52
.
.in
FELONIES
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and
it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.
• When is a felony consummated?
A felony is consummated when all the acts necessary for its accomplishment and execution are present. The offender does
not have to do anything else to consummate the offense. He has already reached the objective stage of the offense as he no
longer has control of his acts having already performed all that is necessary to accomplish his purpose.
• What are formal crimes?
Formal crimes are always consummated because the offender cannot perform all the acts necessary to execute the offense
without consummating it. Physical injuries are formal crimes since these are punished as to result and the gravity of the
injury cannot be determined whether slight, less serious or serious unless and until consummated. Slander is a formal
crime because the moment the defamatory words were uttered and heard by a third person, the crime is consummated.
• When is a felony frustrated
?
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts which would produce the felony as a consequence, but the
felony was not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The offender has reached the
objective stage because no further action is required on his part. Unlike
5
3
in consummated felony, however, the offense was not produced because of some causes independent of the will of the
offender. If the cause of frustration is due to the will of the offender, the felony is not frustrated, but could be another
crime.
• What crimes cannot be committed in the frustrated stage?
They are those which, by the definition of a frustrated felony, the offender cannot possibly perform all the acts of
execution to bring the desired result without consummating the offense. Examples:
1. Rape, since the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge, hence, no matter how slight is the penetration, the felony
is consummated. If the male organ failed to touch the pudenda, by some causes or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the felony is merely attempted. If he desisted spontaneously, he is not liable for attempted rape,
following Article 6, but he is liable for some other crime such as acts of lasciviousness.
2. Arson, because this is defined as the burning of property, hence, the moment burning occurs, even if a small portion
only, the offense is consummated. If overt acts have been commenced such as drenching the property with gasoline and
fighting a match but before it can be hurled into the property, the offender was stopped by the owner, preventing the fire
from touching the property, it is attempted.
3. Corruption of public officers because the offense requires agreement or participation of two parties, such that when the
offer is accepted, it is consummated; but when rejected, the offense is attempted because the offender was not able to
perform all the acts of execution as he failed to persuade the public officer.
4. Adultery because its essence is sexual congress,
hence, the same principle as in rape applies.
5. Theft and robbery because apoderamiento
is complete from the moment offender gains possession of the thing.
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FELONIES
• When is a felony attempted?
A felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of an offense directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. The offender is still in the subjective phase because he has not performed all acts
necessary for its accomplishment. There is something yet that he still has to do to produce the felony. Therefore, he still
has control over his acts as he may or may not continue his overt acts.
When the cause of the non-performance of all the acts necessary for the commission of the offense is other than the
offender's spontaneous desistance, the felony is attempted. (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 88043, December 9,1996).
Therefore, if the cause is his desistance, the act is not yet attempted felony.
• What are overt acts? Preparatory acts?
Overt acts are external acts which if continued will logically result in a felony. It is the start of criminal liability because
the offender has commenced the commission of an offense with overt acts. Acts which still require another act so that a
felony will result are called preparatory acts and are not as a rule punishable unless they are in themselves punished as
independent crimes. Example: buying poison, because that act cannot be related to any crime as it cannot be determined
whether the poison will be used against a person or against a pest. Proposal and conspiracy to commit a crime are
preparatory acts; hence, they are not punishable unless the proposal and conspiracy relate to, for instance, treason or
rebellion, because such "preparatory acts" are independently punished.
• What is required for the "overt act" to be considered an attempt of a felony?
The overt act must be directly related to the offense committed. The attempted felony is that directly linked to the overt act
no matter what the intention is. Example: a person intending to rob a store made an opening on its wall but before he could
enter he was apprehended. He cannot be charged with attempted robbery even if that was his intention because
55
the overt act of making an opening is not directly linked with robbery. The reason for this is that while
inside he may commit robbery or murder or rape or any other crime. Since
intent is a state of mind it can only be speculated what he would do inside. But
he may be charged with attempted trespass because that act is directly related to
the purpose of entering the store or malicious mischief because of the
destruction of property.
What is desistance?
It is the act of discontinuing the execution of the felony which will negative criminal liability of
the offender when done during the attempted stage. It is an absolutory cause
which negates criminal liability because the law encourages a person to desist
from committing a crime.
Desistance has legal effect only in the attempted stage. The attempted stage exists up to that time
when the offender still has control of his acts. The moment he has lost control of
the outcome of his acts the subjective phase is passed; the stage is now either
frustrated or consummated (objective phase). At this stage, desistance is only
factual but has no legal effect because the law recognizes desistance only in the
attempted stage. Note that in Article 6, there is no desistance in either the
frustrated or the consummated stage.
For instance, Tolits aimed his gun at Bentong and fired but missed. He again aimed his gun but
Bentong begged for his mercy. Tolits took mercy and desisted from firing his
gun. Is there criminal liability? In the first instance, yes, because he has already
discharged his firearm. His desistance pertains only to the second instance, hence,
only then will his criminal liability be absolved.
Compare attempted and frustrated felonies.
1. As to acts of execution, in attempted, not all acts of execution had been done
whereas in frustrated all acts of execution had been performed.
2. As to causes of non-accomplishment, in attempted, the felony was not

produced by reason of cause or accident other than the offender's own
spontaneous desistance; in
56
FELONIE
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frustrated, the reason for the frustration is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator.
3. In attempted stage, the offender is still in the subjective phase as he still has
control of his acts; whereas in the frustrated stage, he is already in the objective
phase because all the acts of execution are already there and the cause of its non-
accomplishment is other than the offender's own will. Hence, if the felony was
not produced due to the will of the offender, such as his giving the antidote for
the poison he administered on the victim, there is no frustrated murder, but some
other crime, e.g., physical injuries.
4. Attempted is necessarily included in the frustrated stage, hence, if one is

charged with frustrated felony but what was proved is merely attempted, the
offender can be convicted in the same information.
5. In both, intent is inherent for the offender has commenced the commission of
the felony but was unsuccessful because of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator or other than his own spontaneous desistance. There is no attempted
or frustrated culpa.
6. Example: In attempted homicide, the wound is not mortal, hence, the offender
should still need to deal another blow on the victim which he was not able to do
because of some cause or accident like his being apprehended. In frustrated
homicide, the wound is mortal, already sufficient to bring about death; hence,
there is no more need of another blow from the offender. But death nevertheless
did not supervene because of timely medical attendance.
A mere attempt to commit a felony is subsumed in the full execution thereof. To attempt is to
commence the commission of a crime by overt acts. If one has been proved to
have completely carried out all the acts necessary to commit the crime, he has
certainly been proved to have executed the initial act required in an attempt.
Thus, the accused could have suffered no prejudice, had they been tried under
either one or the other section. (People v. Boco, G.R. No. 129676, June 23,
1999)
57
January 15, 2002)
• Compare frustrated and consummated felonies.
a. As to acts of execution, in both, all acts of execution had
been done and therefore, both are in the objective phase.
b. However, in frustrated the desire was not accomplished, whereas in consummated, the purpose was accomplished.
c.
Frustrated is subsumed in consummated.
Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated,
with the exception of those committed against persons or property.
• What are light felonies? When are they punishable?
Light felonies are those infractions of law penalized with arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos, or both, is provided. (Article 9) They are punishable:
a. In general, only when they are consummated;
b. As an exception, in all stages when committed against
persons or against property.
• Who are punishable in light felonies?
Under Article 16, only the principals and the accomplices are liable. Accessories are not punishable because light felony
• What separates attempted from frustrated homicide/murder?
Where the wound inflicted on the victim is not life threat- ening, the accused not having performed all the acts of execu-
tion that would have brought about death, the crime is only attempted. There being no circumstance to qualify the assault
upon FF to attempted murder, the crime is attempted homicide. (People v. Albacin,
G.R. No. 133918, September 13, 2000)
Where there is no evidence that without timely medical attention the wounds inflicted, though serious, would be fatal if
not medically attended to, the character of the wound becomes doubtful and all doubts are to be construed in favor of the
accused and of lesser penalty, hence the crime is only attempted. (People v. Costales, G.R. No. 141154-56,
58
FELONIES
is penalized with arresto menor.
Accessories are penalized two degrees lower than the principal or two degrees below arresto menor which is non existent.
De minimis non curat lex. (The law does not deal with trifles.)
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Con- spiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only
in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person
or persons.
• What is conspiracy? How is its existence determined?
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from
the acts of the accused when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
• What quantum of proof is required for conspiracy?
The same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy. It must be
shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the fundamental
principle that no one shall be found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Pecho v. People, G.R.
No. 111399,
September 27, 1996)
Conspiracy must be proved. It cannot be surmised that conspiracy existed just because NN and LL were both seen raising
their arms and aiming at the victim. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction should be proved in the same manner as the
criminal act. Although direct proof is not essential, conspiracy must
be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. It is fundamental that a charge of conspiracy must be
59
proved, just like any other criminal accusation, "independently and beyond reasonable doubt." Mere simultaneous aiming
by appellant and his co-accused at the victim with their firearms does not by itself demonstrate concurrence of will or
unity of action or purpose that could be a basis for their collective responsibility.
The evidence only proves with certainty that LL was present when the victim was killed. It does not prove beyond doubt
who killed him. There is paucity of evidence that indicate that appellant and NN shared a common design and a unity of
purpose in killing II so as to make both responsible by reason of a conspiracy. There is even doubt whether both did fire at
the victim. For the victim was hit only once; he suffered only one bullet wound. Accordingly, acquittal of LL is in order.
His responsibility for the death of II has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Loreno, June 6, 2002)
"To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that
imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime.
Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which
the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold." (People v. Mandao,
G.R. No. 135048, December 3, 2002)
Does the finding of conspiracy require direct proof?
No, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all
of which indubitably point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. (People v. Boco)
It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. Proof that accused acted in
concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support a conviction.
(People v. Glinoa)
Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007 explained that conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the appellants
60
FELONIES
before, during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and
concurrence of sentiments. Inducement may be by command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration.
The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. Words of
command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. Tamayo
(44 Phil. 38) held that the moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases
in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression
.
To be liable for conspiracy, what is necessary to be done by a conspirator?
It is essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of others that there is intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy,
it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution
of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or it may consist of moral assistance to his co- conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. (id.)
Mere presence at the situs of the crime or sole relationship with the other accused does not make one a co-conspirator.
Evidence of actual cooperation and not mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required to establish conspiracy.
Appellant could not have been conspirator for allegedly acting as a lookout noting his eye defect (for which he was known
as "bulag")
and doubted his ability to perform the role of a supposed lookout. (People v. Tabuso, G.R. No. 113708, October 26, 1999)
The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Petitioner
was merely present when her husband signed the check. The nature of her involvement in the commission of the crime
was not specified either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in
61
the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. The only semblance of
overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
• Can conspiracy co-exist with culpa?
No, for conspiracy presupposes the existence of malice since it involves a meeting of the minds of the co-conspirators on
the manner and mode of committing a crime
.
• What are the two concepts of conspiracy?
They are (1) conspiracy as a crime by itself; and (2) conspiracy as a means of committing a crime. As a means of
committing a crime, it is either (a) by pre-agreement
or planning; or (b) implied from the concerted acts of the offenders or implied conspiracy.
• Compare conspiracy as a crime and as a means of incurring criminal liability.
As a crime by itself. Under paragraph 1 of Article 8, conspiracy as a crime is one for which the law specially provides a
penalty. As a crime by itself, the crime subject of conspiracy is
not yet committed but the mere act of conspiring is defined and punished as a crime, for instance, conspiracy to commit re-
bellion or insurrection (Article 136)
and conspiracy to commit treason (Article 115)
.
As a means of committing a crime or incurring criminal liability. If in the above, the conspiracy to commit rebellion is
actually carried
out, the offenders will be liable not for the conspiracy but for the rebellion under Article 135. Conspiracy then will be a
means of incurring criminal liability for the acts of others. Under this concept, distinction should be made
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FELONIES
between (a) conspiracy where there is actual pre-agreement
or planning stage; and (b) implied conspiracy.
• What are the kinds of conspiracy as a means of committing a crime?
1. Conspiracy by prior agreement on how to commit the crime. In this case, a conspirator is liable as long as he appeared
in the scene of the crime except when he is the mastermind who is liable whether or not he appears. This is because he is a
principal by inducement and without his inducement the crime would not have been committed. His the mens rea.
2. Implied conspiracy, or conspiracy that is deduced from the acts of the offenders. Here, the offenders acted in concert
during the commission of the crime; the agreement to pursue a common design and united purpose was instantaneous. It
is essential for liability to attach that the conspirator participated in the commission of the crime. His mere presence or
approval of the crime without more will not make the alleged conspirator liable because there would be no basis for
deducing conspiracy as to him as there is absent criminis particeps. Since conspiracy is instantaneous or spur of the
moment, if he did not partici- pate, it shows that he had no intent to join in the commission of the crime.
(In this aspect, it may be commented that there is a similarity between conspiracy and culpa: both are either crimes per se
or means of committing a crime.)
• In conspiracy by pre-agreement who should be liable for a second unplanned crime committed by one or some of
the perpetrators?
The liability of the conspirators is only for the crime agreed upon except:
a. When the other crime was committed in their presence and they did not prevent its commission indicating their
approval thereof;
b. When the other crime is the natural consequence of the crime planned, e.g., homicide resulting from physical injuries
inflicted; and
63
(infra)
In the foregoing three instances, although there was a crime committed which is not part of the plan or prior agreement, all
the conspirators are liable therefor. In other cases, an unplanned crime committed will be the liability only of the one who
committed it.
Only the actual perpetrators are to be held liable for acts beyond the agreement of the conspirators. Conspirators may only
be held accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal agreement; and as regards felonious acts not included, only the
author thereof would be liable. (People v. Sinoc, G.R. No. 115211-12, July 11, 1997)
The actual participation of the appellants in the killing of MM having been established by the prosecution, they are equally
liable pursuant to the rule that the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy was duly proven by the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses pointing to acts done in concert by the appellants to carry on their unlawful design but only with
respect to the killing of MM and not the shooting of Sgt. BB. Thus, EE alone should be held liable for the crime of
frustrated homicide. (People v. Porras,
255 SCRA 514)
It was not established by the evidence that the other accused had agreed to kill if necessary to carry out successfully the
plan to rob. In fact, one of the robbers berated the gunman for having shot the security guard. Therefore, appellants joined
with merely the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must accordingly be limited to
the robbery, not to the killing of TP. Waiting only at the parked jeep could not have given them the opportunity to prevent
the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery. In Adriano, the
driver, who was unaware of the killing perpetrated inside the building as he stayed always near his jeep, could not be a co-
conspirator in the killing of the guards, as the killing was not part of the
64
c.
When the resulting crime was a composite crime because a composite crime or special complex crime is indivisible. It
cannot be split into different parts, one part to be deemed covered by the conspiracy and the other outside of conspiracy,
FELONIE
S
original plan but arose only during the exigency of the moment. (People v.
Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997)
• What is implied conspiracy?
Implied conspiracy is one that is deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
committed. The concerted acts of the parties to achieve the same objective signify
conspiracy. This doctrine was first enunciated in Guevarra, 179 SCRA 334,
which held that "the act of the appellant in holding the victim from behind
immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and
overt act towards the realization of a common criminal intent which may be
classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the
moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting the criminal design of
the slayer immediately before the commission of the offense. That is termed as
implied conspiracy." (Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 117267-
117310,
In implied conspiracy, the co-conspirator must do an act which shows his unity of purpose and
design with the other offenders. Mere presence at the scene of the crime, without
more, will not make a person liable with the offenders, and this is true even if he
approves of the acts of the offenders.
Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to

cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the
intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. (People v. Bragaes, G.R. No. L-62359, November 14, 1991)
• When conspiracy involves a pre-conceived plan, what is required of a co-conspirator to incur

liability?
To be liable as a co-conspirator, unless he is a mastermind, he should appear in the scene of the

crime. It is essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the
acts of the others that there is intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the
mastermind, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt
act as a direct
65
or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.
The overt act may consist of:
(a) active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself; or
(b) moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime; or
(c) exerting moral ascendancy over the other conspira-
tors. (People v. Pablom,
January 2011)
Is it necessary for the co-conspirators to perform equally each and every part of the acts constituting the offense?
No. As long as the parts played by each of the principals in the conspiracy contribute to the realization of the common
design, they are all liable equally.
One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and he can no longer
repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized. Conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert. The
act of one then becomes the act of all and each them will be deemed equally guilty as co-principals of the crime
committed,
(id.)
When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part
so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were
in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments, conspiracy is present. (Siton v. CA, G.R. No. 94065, December 2, 1991)
The presence of a conspiracy was established. The appellants were animated by one and
the same purpose: to kill RR and they were united in its execution. The question as to who dealt the fatal blow on their
victim is of no consequence for when a conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all. (People v. Lao, G.R. No. 90627,
November 29, 1991)
Even if appellant never fired a gun, he would still be principally liable as a co-conspirator in the killing of the
66
FELONIES
victims, for while only BB might have inflicted the fatal blows or wounds, nevertheless, appellant must be held liable for
the killings under the principle that the act of a conspirator is the act of all co-conspirators. The degree of actual
participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in a conspiracy. (People v. Maranion,
G.R. No. 90672-73, July 18, 1991)
The quantity or quality of the participation of a co- conspirator is immaterial in the determination of the penalty for the act
of one is the act of all. Thus, one who conspired in the crime of rape by just holding the hands of the victim while another
was doing the act of raping her shall incur the same guilt and the same penalty as the actual rapist.
May a co-conspirator be acquitted while others convicted?
Yes. Although conspiracy is a joint act, there is nothing irregular if a supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others
convicted. Generally, conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed: the mere act of conspiring is not by itself
punishable. Hence, it does not follow that one conspirator alone (an alleged inducer) cannot be convicted when there is a
conspiracy. As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, other
conspirators may be found guilty of the offense. (People v. Tiguman,
G.R. No. 130144, May 24, 2001)
In an indictment based on conspiracy, the acquittal of a conspirator does not absolve the co-conspirator from criminal
liability. If the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be individually responsible for their
respective acts. (People v. Figueroa, G.R. No. 134056, July 6, 2000) Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a conspirator, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime,
pursuant to the common design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends companionship. (People v. Compo,
G.R. No. 112990, May 28, 2001)
Mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto is not sufficient to hold a person
liable as a co-conspirator. The mere fact that the accused had prior knowledge of the criminal design of the
67
and
(2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
»
.
»
March 2001)
• What are the two structures of multiple conspiracies?
Estrada, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, categorized two structures of multiple conspiracies:
(1)
Discuss the concept: "The act of one is the act of all."
When conspiracy is established, all who participated therein, irrespective of the quantity and quality of his participation is
liable equally, whether the conspiracy is pre-
planned or instantaneous. The criminal liability of one is the same as the criminal liability of the other, unless one or some
of the conspirators committed another crime, which is not part of the intended crime
In the absence of a conspiracy, what is the liability of the offenders?
In the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the
crime, or community of criminal design, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the
same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him.
(People v. Desoy, G.R. No. 127754, August 16, 1999)
principal perpetrator of the crime does not ipso facto make him as co-conspirator. Participation in the criminal act is
essential for he may yet be an accomplice. (People v. Samudio,
the "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the "spokes");
FELONIES
At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding on the part of the
conspirators to commit a felony, in this case, to kill IN. Howev- er, the attack on the victim originated spontaneously from
and was initiated unexpectedly by BBII.
BB, Sr., and his other son, BB III, immediately joined in the fray by attacking the victim with their knives, whereupon, the
two female appellants, also assisted by hitting the victim with stools.
The rapidity of the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last four coming instinctively, as it were,
to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but produce the conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or
apparent deliberation. It does not even appear that there was a call or a signal from one to the other to join the attack on
IN, much less is there even an intimation that they had a murderous intent or cabal at any time prior thereto. The
spontaneity of their respective reactions,
albeit resulting in an attack where they all participated, rules out the existence of a conspiracy. (People v. Lacao, G.R. No.
95320, September 4, 1991 [contra: Subayco
)
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute
or implement the criminal plan. (Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005)
• Relate conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price or reward.
Evident premeditation does not automatically follow a finding of conspiracy or vice versa. Where conspiracy is merely
implied from concerted actions at the time of the commission of the offense, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated,
absent proof showing how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or the time that elapsed when it was carried
out, in order to determine if the accused had sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment to dispassionately
consider and
69
v. Sandiganbayan]
accept all its consequences. (People v. Dulot,
G.R. No. 137770, January 30, 2001)
Where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and
means of executing crime, evident premeditation can be appreciated. (People
v. Givera, G.R. No. 1132159, January 18, 2001) The hiring of TT to kill the victims for a price, providing the victims'
picture and the meeting to carry out the killing provide more than sufficient evidence to appreciate the same. As to the
circumstance of price or reward, it can only be appreciated against appellant TT since it was he who committed the
felonious act for money. The same evidence on price established conspiracy between the appellants. Consequently the act
of one is the act of all. (People v. Tiguman
on the part of cohorts. (Narciso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 9826263, January 10, 1994) Conspiracy is not presumed.
Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of crime, all taken together, however, the evidence therefor must reasonably be
strong enough to show a community of criminal design,
70
)
• Is the laxity of a public official in the performance of his duty supportive of a finding of conspiracy?
No. The actions taken by MM involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties.
There has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by both DD and EE. MM
might have been indeed lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official report submitted by
his subordinate (EE). But for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense.
Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality
(id.)
• When may the head of office be held liable for the acts of his subordinates?
FELONIES
The head of office
may be found liable for the acts of his subordinates either due to conspiracy or by an act of reckless imprudence which
allowed the commission of estafa thru falsification, or malversation through falsification, without such act of negligence
the crime could not have been accomplished. Considering, however, that negligence cannot co-exist with conspiracy, his
liability shall be thru culpa but that of his subordinates thru dolo, sans conspiracy.
When, however, the infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced by a head of office on a subordinate
upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail.
(Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309)
• What is the Arias doctrine?
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare
bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each
voucher in detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through
his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. (id.)
Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. — Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the
capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of this
Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are
correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided.
71
erro, suspension, arresto mayor, or prision correccional. For instance the

penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period is a less grave felony because the maximum period of
that penalty is arresto mayor, a correctional penalty.
3. Light felonies — punished with arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.
(In Article 26, a P200 fine is a correctional penalty.)
What is the significance of classifying felonies into grave, less grave or light?
To determine:
a. Whether a complex crime was committed (Article 48

which requires grave or less grave felonies);
b. The duration of the subsidiary penalty to be imposed (Article 39, No. 2)

where the subsidiary penalty is based on the severity of the penalty;
c. keep the peace (Article 35);

on of the detention in case of failure to post the bond to
How are felonies classified as to severity?
1. Grave felonies — penalized by capital punishment or afflictive penalties in

any of its period. This means that whenever the minimum, medium or
maximum period of the penalty is an afflictive penalty, the felony is a grave
felony. Afflictive penalties cover prision mayor, disqualifi- cation, reclusion
temporal and reclusion perpetua.
2. Less grave felonies — punished with penalties which in their maximum

period are correctional, i.e., the maximum period of the penalty must be
correctional, that is, desti-
d. Whether the crime has prescribed (Article 90);
e. Whether or not there is delay in the delivery of detained persons to the

judicial authority (Article 125 where the basis of the 12-18-36 hours is the
severity of the offense alleged); and
f. The proper penalty for quasi-offenses. (Article 365)

72
FELONIES
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
• How are the first and second sentences of Article 10 reconciled?
The first sentence provides that offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while
the second makes the Code supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first sentence should be understood to mean that special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein
specifically punished following the rule that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. Lex specialis derogant
generali.
In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause
contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall
be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. (Ladonga v. People)
• What are special laws?
They are laws that define and penalize crimes not included in the RPC; they are of a nature different from those defined
and punished in the Code.
There are special laws however which are mere amend- ments of the provisions of the RPC, such as P.D. 533 modifying
Articles 308, 309 and 310, which is, thus, not a true special law. (Taer v. CA; Canta v. People)
• What is the relationship between dolo and special laws?
Dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which
constitute the offense. When it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts alleged in the information, it was
properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was incumbent
73
Lagran, August 2001)
The rules governing civil/pecuniary
liabilities are stated in the RPC and in the NCC.
Under the former the costs of the proceedings and pecuniary liabilities are respectively found in Articles 37, 38 and 104 to
108. These pecuniary liabilities should be applicable to violators of special penal laws.
When is the Revised Penal Code suppletory
to special laws?
Whenever the special law uses the nomenclature of penalties in the RPC, indicating the intent of Congress to make the
Code apply suppletorily to such special laws (People v. Simon, July 1994), unless the special law, though using the Code's
nomenclatures, specially provide that it shall not be supplementary to such laws (Last clause of sentence no. 2). When the
RPC supplements the special law, the rules under the former shall
be followed including in the application of the ISL.
But the mere fact that the special law uses the nomenclature of penalties of the Code does not make the offense malum in
se.
v. upon him to rebut such a presumption. (Lim
CA, G.R. No. 100311, May 18,
1993)
The concept of delito continuado,
although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g., violations of
R.A. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for following up claims for veteran's benefits. Under Article 10, it shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from Penal Code
may be applied in supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws. (People v. Sabun, 10 SCRA 156)
Article 24 enumerates measures of prevention or safety which are not considered as penalties, e.g., suspension pendente
lite and preventive detention. Although a provision in the RPC, these are applicable to violations of special penal laws. It
is demanded by the constitutional provision on presumption of innocence. However, Article 29 provides that the period of
preventive imprisonment will be deducted from the term of imprisonment. (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C.
74
FELONIES
When is the suppletory
effect of the Code not available?
The general rule is that special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC. For instance, the circumstances affecting
criminal liability (Articles 11
to 15) are not applicable to crimes committed under special laws.
The suppletory effect of the Code to special laws under this article cannot be invoked where there is legal or physical
impossibility of or a prohibition in special law against such supplementary application. But, where the penalty is actually
taken from the Code in its technical nomenclature, then it is necessarily with its duration, correlation and legal effects
under the system of penalties in the Code. (People v. Simon)
Where the special law expressly grants the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no
room for the application of the Code. Since the Danger- ous Drugs Law (prior to its amendment) contains no explicit grant
of discretion to the court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law, the court must be guided by the rules
prescribed in the Code concerning the applications of penalties,
(id.) But since R.A. 9165 further amending R.A. 6425 reverted back to "non-RPC" penalties, e.g., life imprisonment the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act as the law now stands is a purely special law. Hence, the RPC has no suppletory
effect.
What principles of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to special penal laws?
Parel,
44 Phil. 437; Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; and Bruhez, 28 Phil. 305, involved the suppletory application of principles under the
then Penal Code to special laws. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 22 to violations of Act 3030, the
Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. Ponte involved the
application of Article 17 with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act 1740. Bruhez covered Article 45 with reference to the
confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act 1461, the Opium Law.
75
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy is analogous to the application of the provision on principals
under Article 17 in Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since
all the conspirators are principals. (Ladonga v. People)
B.P. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of
contrary provision in B.P. 22, the general provisions of the Code which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.
Yu, G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004, applied suppletorily Article 39 to B.P. 22.
Chapter Two
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT
FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
• Why is there a need for modifying circumstances?
Every penalty under the
be prescribed for consummated felonies and against the principal offenders. Likewise, the RPC is primarily classical; the
penalties are predetermined without regard to the moral state of the offender. Thus, the need for circumstances to modify
criminal liability taking into consideration the moral, emotional, and mental state of the offender and the circumstances
when the offense was committed. The RPC, therefore, provides for circumstances which modify the criminal liability of
the offenders.
• What are the different modifying circumstances?
1.
;
2. Exempting circumstances — Article 12;
3. Mitigating circumstances — Article 13;
4. Aggravating circumstances — Article 14; and 5. Alternative circumstances, either mitigating or
aggravating — Article 15
or 12 are without criminal liability; those benefited by the circumstances in Article 13 have reduced criminal liability;
those proved to be more perverse by committing the felony with any of the circumstances in Article 14 have increased
criminal liability; and those who act while under the circumstances stated in
will Article 15
have their liability either increased or reduced depending upon the situation obtaining in the commission of the felony. In
addition, specific felonies in Book II provide their
77
Justifying circumstances — Article 11
.
Offenders falling under either Article 11
RPC is understood to
own modifying circumstances, otherwise called absolutory and extenuating circumstances.
Is there any distinction between Articles 14 and 15?
Orilla differentiated Articles 14 and 15 in that the former enumerates aggravating circumstances per se whereas the latter
are circumstances which are not aggravating per se but may be mitigating depending upon the circumstances of the case.
When the term "aggravating circumstances" requires strict interpretation, it should be confined to Article 14.
When it calls for the award of indemnities, the term should be liberally construed to include the circumstances in Article
15.
The term "aggravating circumstances" is strictly construed, not only because what is involved is a criminal statute, but
also because its application could result in the imposition of the death penalty. The list of aggravating circumstances in
Article 14
is thus exclusive for the purpose of raising a crime to its qualified form.
Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance
under Article 15. Otherwise stated, for purposes of death penalty, the aggravating circumstance must come exclusively
from Article 14. Article 15 cannot supply the generic aggravating circumstance, which should accompany the qualifying
circumstance to raise the penalty to death pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 63.
[With the abolition of the death penalty, the above disquisition has become academic]
What other factors affect criminal liability?
1.
Absolutory circumstances referring to exempting circumstances outside Article 12 such as certain relatives who acted as
accessories to the offenders pursuant to Articles 19 and 20, and those covered by Article 332 for crimes and relatives
enumerated therein, among others.
2. Extenuating circumstances which are mitigating but not found in Article 13, e.g., abandonment in paragraph 3, Article
333 and concealment of dishonor in Article 255.
78
• Give examples of exempting/absolutory circumstances.
1.
Instigation by reason of public policy;
2. Article 6(3) — spontaneous desistance
in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed already constitutes a crime other than that intended;
3. Article 7 — attempted/frustrated
light felonies except those against persons or property;
4. Article 16 — accessories in light felonies;
5. Article 20 — certain relatives who are accessories subject
to the requisites provided therein;
6. Article 247 — death and physical injuries
inflicted under exceptional circumstances;
7. Article 332 — certain relatives in theft, estafa, and
malicious mischief;
8. Battered woman syndrome - Section 26, R.A. 9262
9. Status offenses in Sections 57 and 58, R.A. 9344
10. Somnambulism;
11.
Mistake of fact; and
12. Repeal of a penal law, either absolute or modification of
the penalty when favorable to the offender.
• What is entrapment? Instigation?
Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. In
entrapment, the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused. Nobody induces or prods him into committing the
offenses. This act is distinguished from inducement or instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator
practically induces another to commit the offense and himself becomes
a co-principal. (People v. Ramos, Jr., G.R. No. 88301, October 28, 1991)
• What is a buy-bust
operation?
It is a form of entrapment which has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the drugs law. It i
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
19
s
the day before yielded the same result, i.e., that the cigarettes the accused was selling were marijuana sticks. In addition
before Sgt. UU bought the 10 sticks of marijuana during the operation, two other persons were earlier seen buying from
the accused marijuana sticks, and for which they were thereafter apprehended. It was proved that appellant is indeed guilty
as charged.
How should allegation of frame-up and extortion be viewed?
An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous drug
cases. It is viewed with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To substantiate such defense, including instigation, the
evidence must be clear and convincing because of the presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of
their official duties,
(id.)
Can instigation and frame-up be both present in a case?
No for they are incompatible. In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused except that the intent
originates from the mind of the inducers. In frame-up, however, the offense is not committed by the accused. Precisely, the
accused is only framed or set up in a situation leading to a false accusation against him. Instigation and frame-up therefore
cannot be present concurrently,
commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or
prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the
accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and
considered an absolutory cause.
A "buy-bust operation" is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. Entrapment has received judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with constitutional and legal circumspection.
This requirement was observed in the present case. That there was no inducement on the part of the agents is bolstered by
the fact that the test-buy operation conducted by the same Sgt. UU
80
(id.)

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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

What is criminal law?

3. Determination of the penalty — case to case basis — arrived at after an

4. Emphasis of the law — on the offender and not on

/ 6. 40-year maximum limit for penalty; and

7. Executive clemency under Articles 5 and 70

1. Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) 3. Extenuating/absolutory circumstances

Related to this is the classification of felonies as to —

21, 1979: "It implies something immoral in itself, regardless n

NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Preliminary Title Date of Effectiveness and Application of the Provisions of this

NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE

5(b) of Rule 131

Proximate results in criminal cause

Compare attempted and frustrated felonies.

2. As to causes of non-accomplishment, in attempted, the felony was not

4. Attempted is necessarily included in the frustrated stage, hence, if one is

• What is implied conspiracy?

Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to

• When conspiracy involves a pre-conceived plan, what is required of a co-conspirator to incur

To be liable as a co-conspirator, unless he is a mastermind, he should appear in the scene of the

erro, suspension, arresto mayor, or prision correccional. For instance the

a. Whether a complex crime was committed (Article 48

b. The duration of the subsidiary penalty to be imposed (Article 39, No. 2)

c. keep the peace (Article 35);

1. Grave felonies — penalized by capital punishment or af- flictive penalties in

2. Less grave felonies — punished with penalties which in their maximum

d. Whether the crime has prescribed (Article 90);

e. Whether or not there is delay in the delivery of detained persons to the

f. The proper penalty for quasi-offenses. (Article 365)

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