Search and Seizure

 Scope of Protection
1. Moncado v. People, G.R. No. L-824 January 14, 1948

J. Pablo
"As we understand it, the main, if not the sole, purpose of our constitutional
inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, was to place a salutary
restriction upon the powers of government. That is to say, we believe the framers of
the constitutions of the United States and of this and other states merely sought to
provide against any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to authorize, justify, or
declare lawful, any unreasonable search or seizure. This wise restriction was
intended to operate upon legislative bodies, so as to render ineffectual any effort to
legalize by statute what the people expressly stipulated could in no event be made
lawful; upon executives, so that no law violative of this constitutional inhibition
should ever be enforced; and upon the judiciary, so as to render it the duty of the
courts to denounce as unlawful every unreasonable search and seizure, whether
confessedly without any color of authority, or sought to be justified under the guise of
legislative sanction. For the misconduct of private persons, acting upon their
individual responsibility and of their own volition, surely none of the three divisions
of government is responsible. If an official, or a mere petty agent of the state, exceeds
or abuses the authority with which he is clothed, he is to be deemed as acting, not for
the state, but for himself only; and therefore he alone, and not the state, should be
held accountable for his acts. If the constitutional rights of a citizen are invaded by a
mere individual, the most that any branch of government can do is to afford the
citizen such redress as is possible, and bring the wrongdoer to account for his
unlawful conduct. . . ."
If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his
authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be
responsible for the wrong done. But this is no good reason for excluding the papers
seized, as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were.
When papers are offered in evidence the Court can take no notice how they were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor would they form a collateral issue to
determine that question."
"'We know of no constitutional principle which requires the government to surrender

the papers under such circumstances.
"'The papers having come into possession of the government without a violation of
petitioner's rights by governmental authority, we see no reason why the fact that
individuals unconnected with the government may have wrongfully taken them,
should prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an offense where the
documents are of incriminatory character.' (Bureau vs. McDowell.)
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The seizure of the papers and effects in question, having been made without any
search warrant, was and is illegal, and was effected in open violation of the following
provisions of the Constitution:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Article III, section 1 3 of the Constitution.)
"The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be in violable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise." (Article
III, section 1 5 of the Constitution.)
The seizure was also in open violation of sections 3, 10, and 11 of Rule 122, which
are as follows:
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
"SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property."
"SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. The officer must
forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace or judge of the municipal
court or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified by oath."
Even more, the illegality and unconstitutionality amounted to two criminal offenses,
one of them heavily punished with prision correccional. The offenses are punished
by articles 128 and 130 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
"ART. 128. Violation of domicile. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being
authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner
thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of
such owner, or, having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to
leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.
"If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not
constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made
by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods."
"ART. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in
their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality."
BENGZON, J., dissenting:

Sanctity of the home is a by-word anywhere, anytime. The house of man was the
first house of God.
2. Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
CONCEPCION, C .J
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby (Lewis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F.
2d. 916; Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz vs. U.S., 26
F. 2d. 444). Consequently, petitioner in the case at bar may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the document, papers, and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporation adverted to, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity
U.S., vs. Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).
REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. Two points must be

stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in the case at bar do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest
order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code", as alleged
in aforementioned applications without reference to any determine provision of
said laws or coders.
GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. To

uphold the validity of the warrants in question, would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the victims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision Sec. 1, par. 3 Art. III, Const.) to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though
by legal means. Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court, by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."
CASE AT BAR. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application
for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: "Books of accounts,
Financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers,
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements." Thus, the warrants authorized
the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transaction were legal
or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be
seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants.
ON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONAL

PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also to
the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the
party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause and only possible for
the Judge to find that there is probable cause and hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of crime. But
when this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO SECURE ILLEGAL
SEARCH WARRANT OR MAKE UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS
NO EXCUSE. The theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party
in power, for certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse
a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority
usually but understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power
of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED. The doctrine adopted in
the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the warrants for the
search of 3 residences of petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; the searches and seizures therein made are illegal.

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 Scope of Protection

1. Moncado v. People, G.R. No. L-824 January 14, 1948

"'We know of no constitutional principle which requires the government to surrender

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. Two points must be

GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. To

ON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONAL

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