FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 160739. July 17, 2013.]

ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M.

PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY
SOLINAP, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO), respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired

into through habeas corpus.

Antecedents

On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita

Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code , in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with
violations of Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in
Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 16916 to No.
16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment
by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract
workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees,
membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without
lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). 1

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan,

Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the
complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants,
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts
without bail. 2 On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the
warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the
prevailing rules. 3

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at

the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). 4

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was
not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance
of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior
finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition
for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred
that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no
longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest
considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of
the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.
5 STcHEI

In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003, 6 the CA denied the

petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit, explaining:

As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted

where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to
another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if petitioner
is detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid,
the remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a
petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation
of the case by the Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.

Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides that the Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation shall transmit his resolution, together with the record of
the case, including the warrant of arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor,
who shall review the same and order the release of an accused who is
detained if no probable cause is found against him. Thus, the proper
remedy available to petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial
Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the grounds
alleged in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack

of merit.

SO ORDERED. 7

Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for
habeas corpus, 8 but the CA denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to
obtain the release of Mangila from detention?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review lacks merit.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy
and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v.
Court of Appeals, 10 the Court discoursed on the nature of the special
proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner:
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In
Ex Parte Billings , it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution
and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that
court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended

as substitute for the trial court's function. It cannot take the place of
appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null
and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that
habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the
course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and
not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is
under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not
illegal.CIScaA

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a

proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the
person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause
of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ
of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the
only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of

liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right
but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ
of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is
 not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but
unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate
purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not
the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held. 11
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of
the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where
the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. 12

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged

against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary

investigations. — The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall

include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)

Under Section 6 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the
preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find
after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable
cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of
this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her
cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila's petition for habeas
corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant
issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably
possessing the legal authority to do so.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and
MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective
on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

With Mangila's arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is
because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not
be inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by
Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons: 13

The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have

the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of
justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority.
The function of habeas corpus , where the party who has
appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not
extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by
which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its
face. It is not a writ of error. . . . (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)

Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:

Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it

appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)

Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by

Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists that the illegality and
invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of its having been issued without an
exhaustive examination of the complainants and the witnesses in writing and
under oath; without a prior finding of probable cause; and without consideration
of the necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
were enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus. 14

Mangila fails to persuade. ScaHDT

To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining
Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the
investigating judge, considered Palayon's evidence sufficient for finding
probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably
presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of the
City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary investigation
he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy
by which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting
that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be
the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights. 15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance
of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all
consider the necessity of determining the existence of probable cause for its
issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, for that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, 16 Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure , the resolution of the investigating judge was not
final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the
power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be
ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to
seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from
detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities
attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the
warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been
meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan's transmittal of them
to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. 17 We agree with the CA,
therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
another available remedy. 18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on

October 14, 2003 and November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo , p. 5.

2.Id. at 6.

3.CA rollo, p. 21.

4.Rollo , pp. 7 and 46.

5.CA rollo, pp. 2-11.

6.Rollo , pp. 16-17; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon (retired), and
concurred in by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño (retired/deceased) and
Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court).
7.Id. at 17.

8.CA rollo, pp. 43-48.

9.Rollo , pp. 20-22.

10.G.R. No. 163108, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 312.

11.Id. at pp. 324-326.

12.In Re: Azucena L. Garcia , G.R. No. 141443, August 30, 2000, 339 SCRA 292,
301.

13.55 Phil. 304, 306 (1930).

14.Rollo , pp. 7-9.

15.39 Am. Jur. 2d; Habeas Corpus, § 45.

16.Section 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10)
days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall
transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to
the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate
action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts and the law supporting
his action, together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the
warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-
affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or
bail of the accused and the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of the
proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of
cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the
complaint.

Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city
prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be, shall
review the resolution of the investigating judge on the existence of probable
cause. Their ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and the law on
which it is based and the parties shall be furnished with copies thereof. They
shall order the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause if
found against him.

17.CA rollo, p. 21.

18.In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa , G.R. No. 158802,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 706, 721.