SECOND DIVISION

[Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997.]

INOCENCIO BASCO , complainant, vs . JUDGE LEO H. RAPATALO,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union , respondent.

Rogelio A. Ajes for complainant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; DEFINED. — "Bail" is the security required
by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the
proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him
or her.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION THEREOF. — In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the
appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of con ning the
accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the
trial. In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory
that the proof being strong, the defendant would ee, if he has the opportunity, rather than
face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed
should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution.
In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might
otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release." It is in
view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in
cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN THE GRANT IS DISCRETIONARY; REQUIREMENT FOR THE PROPER
EXERCISE THEREOF. — When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court,
the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal." To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very
nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely
provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge's
rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting
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 out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a
misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mans eld, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in
granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING REQUIRED; RATIONALE. — In the application for bail of a
person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just le a comment or leave the
application for bail to the discretion of the court. Corollarily, another reason why hearing of
a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the abovecited case, is for the court
to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court in xing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even if the
prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused,
the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the
strength of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. After hearing,
the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion, as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the
accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be
invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the
judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY HEARING, CONSTRUED. — "A summary hearing means
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may con ne itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination." If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there
would be a violation of procedural due process.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENUMERATION OF PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE
IN CASE OF BAIL APPLICATION. — In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the
jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge
in case an application for bail is led: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison,
243 SCRA 284 [1995]); (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
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 denied. The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the
duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would
amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or
awareness thereof.
7. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; JUDGES; REQUIRED TO KNOW MORE THAN
JUST A CURSORY ACQUAINTANCE WITH STATUTE AND PROCEDURAL RULES. — A judge
owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to
apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants
of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO , J : p

In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross
ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a
murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and conducting a
hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was
led against a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente led a
petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but
was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995
but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22,
1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set.
Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in
connection with said petition were not noti ed. Another attempt was made to reset the
hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3,
1995. He later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition
had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been
granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995 1 was issued on the basis of a marginal
note 2 dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor
Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by the
assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a
release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant
Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and
instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.

In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the
petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's
recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when
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 the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether
to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right
to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with
the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private
prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled
and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for
reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and
approved the motion for reconsideration. 3 To date, accused is con ned at the La Union
Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its
nature and purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the accused
to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and
place to answer the charges brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of bail
is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of
con ning the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his
presence at the trial. 4 In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses,
it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would ee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability
of evasion of the prosecution. 5 In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release
of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might
not want to release." 6
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right
in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the
judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited
or produced before the court, 7 it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right
of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." 8
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be
sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature
involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that
its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude
for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An
uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a
fallacy. Lord Mans eld, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying
bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided
by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and
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 fanciful; but legal and regular." 9
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing
means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be
left to the discretion of the court which may con ne itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination." 10 If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard,
there would be a violation of procedural due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in
the following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981. 11 In this case seven separate informations
for murder were led against the accused Sola and 18 other persons. After
preliminary investigation, the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest.
However without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail
for their temporary release. Citing People v. San Diego, 12 we held: "We are of the
considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before
the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in
the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of
the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground."

(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989. 1 3 In this case, an information was led
against the accused for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge, without
conducting any hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough
evidence to warrant a case for murder because only af davits of the prosecution
witnesses who were allegedly not eyewitnesses to the crime were led . We held:
"Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground
to engender a well founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing
the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong for each individual accused still has to established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted
or held. It is equally entitled to due process."

(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990. 1 4 In this case, the prosecution was scheduled
to present nine witnesses at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence
against the private respondents was strong. After hearing the fth witness, the
respondent judge insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The
prosecution in the instant case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that
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 there is strong evidence of guilt and to present within a reasonable time all the
evidence it desired to present."

(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991 1 5 which involved an administrative

complaint against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse
of discretion. In this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior
hearing, directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged
with murder, xing at the same time the bail at P50,000 .00 each on the ground
that the evidence against them was merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a
person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding to allow the prosecution to present, within a reasonable
time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before xing bail in the
instant case amounted to a violation of due process." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the
performance of his duties.
(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992. 16 In this case, the judge issued an order
admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any
hearing. We held: "The prosecution must rst be given an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the
basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong." cdasia

(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992. 1 7 In this administrative case, the
respondent judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the accused
had been arrested or detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for
bail from a person charged with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the defense and the
prosecution must be given reasonable opportunity to prove (in case of the
prosecution) that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of
the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong." The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties.

(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993, 18 the respondent judge issued a

warrant of arrest and also xed the bail of an accused charged with the non
bailable offense of statutory rape without allowing the prosecution an opportunity
to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent
judge alleged that the only evidence on record — the sworn statements of the
complaining witness and her guardian — were not suf cient to justify the denial
of bail. We held: "It is an established principle that in cases where a person is
accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the
temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before xing bail
amounts to a violation of due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest
was returned unserved and that after the case was re-raf ed to the complainant
judge's sala, the warrant was set aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on
record showing whether the approved bail was revoked by the complainant judge,
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 whether the accused was apprehended or whether the accused led an
application for bail. Hence, the respondent judge was ordered to pay a ne of
P5,000.00 instead of the usual P20,000.00 that the court imposes on judges who
grant the application of bail without notice and hearing.
(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993. 19 In this case, a complaint for murder
was led against ve persons. While the preliminary investigation was pending in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was led by one of the
accused before the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court . The respondent
judge ordered the prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the
guilt of the accused is strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor
failed to appear prompting the respondent to grant the application for bail. We
held: "Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial,
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time
all evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
bail." The respondent judge was ned P20,000.00 and was warned that the
commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994. 2 0 In this administrative case, the

respondent judge issued two separate warrants of arrest against two persons
charged with murder and parricide, but xed the amount of bail for each accused
without notifying the prosecution of any motion to x bail nor of any order
granting the same. Citing People v. Dacudao, 2 1 we held: "A hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's
evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce
evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally
entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for
determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec 6." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a ne of P20,000 with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994 2 2 In this case, an

administrative complaint was led against the respondent judge, alleging, among
others, that she granted an application for bail led by the accused charged with
murder. The grant was made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted
that the evidence of guilt was strong and without allowing the prosecution to
present evidence in this regard. We held: "In immediately granting bail and fixing it
at only P20,000.00 for each of the accused without allowing the prosecution to
present its evidence, the respondent denied the prosecution due process. This
Court had said so in many cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who
granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from service
because the erroneous granting of bail was just one of the offenses found to
have been committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.
(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994. 23 In this administrative case the
respondent judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own
motion. authorized the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal
cases for murder. The accused were still at large at the time the order granting
bail was issued. We held: "A hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to
an accused who is charged with a capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay
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 a ne of P25,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely. He was meted a ne in a higher
amount than the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two criminal cases
wherein the respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but likewise the
applicant therefor."

(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994. 2 4 In this administrative case, the

respondent judge issued an order directing the arrest of the accused charged with
rape and, motu proprio, xed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000 .00
without application on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the
accused led a motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge again, without
any prior notice and hearing, reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is
explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that
purpose has been led by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a
judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong."
The respondent judge was ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 with a warning
that a repetition of similar or the same offense will be dealt with more severely.

(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995 2 5 involving an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for granting bail to the two accused charged with
serious illegal detention. When the two accused rst led a joint application for
bail, the petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused
and the prosecution in opposition thereto were properly taken into account.
However, the respondent judge denied the application for bail on the ground that
it was premature since the accused were not yet in custody of the law. In a
subsequent order, the respondent judge, without conducting any hearing on the
aforestated application and thereby denying the prosecution an opportunity to
oppose the same, granted said petition upon the voluntary appearance in court of
the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing but the
proceeding he adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for
bail was rst considered and then denied for being premature . We held: "The error
of the respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the
application for bail, he acted af rmatively thereon without conducting another
hearing and what is worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or
resume of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the
grant of bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded because despite the
irregularity in the procedure adopted in the proceeding, the prosecution was
undeniably afforded the bene t of notice and hearing. No erroneous appreciation
of the evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to introduce
additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated grant of bail by
the respondent.

(14) Santos v. O lada decided in 1995. 2 6 In this case, an administrative

complaint was led against the respondent judge, who, without notice and
hearing to the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder and
illegal possession of rearm . We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of
discretion, a hearing is mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. At the
hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove, in case of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt of the
applicant is strong, and in the case of the defense, that evidence of such guilt is
not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.

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 (15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995. 2 7 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted with
indecent haste the petition for bail led by the accused charged with murder
because the accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he
was informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) . . ." We held: "With his open
admission that he granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any
opportunity to be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this
court holding that such act amounts to a denial of due process, and made
himself administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for which
appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The respondent judge was ordered to
pay a ne of P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996. 2 8 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without hearing nor comment from the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail
was recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of
discretion, the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such
hearing to the scal or require him to submit his recommendation. . . . Truly, a
judge would not be in a position to determine whether the prosecution's evidence
is weak or strong unless a hearing is rst conducted." A ne of P20,000.00 was
imposed on the respondent judge with the stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should rst be conducted to
determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the
judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
cases where the prosecution chooses to just le a comment or leave the application for
bail to the discretion of the court. Hence:
(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., 2 9 an administrative complaint was led against
the respondent judge for granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with homicide
case without affording the prosecution a chance to be heard. The respondent judge
explained that he issued an order for the motion to x bail but the public prosecutor led a
comment instead which respondent judge thought was adequate compliance with law.
Respondent added that the evidence of guilt of the accused, as disclosed by the records,
was not so strong as to deny the application for bail. In fact, the accused who led for bail,
together with three others, were later dropped by the Of ce of the Provincial Prosecutor
from the information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify them. We held: "The
grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter
is left to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination
whether or not a hearing should be held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the
prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable
before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for
the prosecution is weak or strong." Although the respondent judge's explanation was not
enough to completely exculpate him, the circumstances, coupled with his sincere belief in
the propriety of his order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction the Court imposes
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 in cases of this nature. The respondent judge was ordered to pay a ne of P5,000.00 and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 an administrative complaint was led
against the respondent judge for granting bail to a person charged with illegal recruitment
in large scale and estafa in ve separate information. The accused led a motion to x bail
and the respondent judge instead of setting the application for hearing, directed the
prosecution to le its comment or opposition. The prosecution submitted its comment
leaving the application for bail to the discretion of the court. The respondent judge, in
granting the bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering the prosecution to comment
on the accused's motion to x bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of a
formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce evidence but
the latter refused and left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court
held, "It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. However, such discretion may only be exercised after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining
whether or not he should be granted liberty. . . In the case at bar, however, no formal
hearing was conducted by the respondent judge. He could not have assessed the weight
of evidence against the accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail." The
respondent judge was dismissed from service because he was previously ned for a
similar offense and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense
would be dealt with more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison, 3 1 an administrative complaint was led against the
respondent judge for granting bail to several accused in a double murder case. The
respondent judge claimed that he granted the application for bail because the assistant
prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not interpose an objection thereto and that
the prosecution never requested that it be allowed to show that the evidence of guilt is
strong but instead, submitted the incident for resolution. The respondent judge further
claimed that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only
after due consideration of the pertinent af davits. We held: "The discretion of the court, in
cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing
called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the
discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating
and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused." The respondent
judge was ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the commission
of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and x bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized
in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused." 32
In the recent case of Tucay v . Domagas, 3 3 an administrative complaint was led against
the respondent judge for granting bail to an accused charged with murder. The application
for bail contained the annotation "No objection" of the provincial prosecutor and the
respondent judge, without holding a hearing to determine whether the evidence of the
prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the release of the accused from
detention with instructions to the bondsman to register the bond with the Register of
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 Deeds within ten days. It was later found out that the assessed value of the property given
was short of the amount xed for the release of the accused. We held: "Although the
provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused,
respondent judge should have nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and
diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the
bail application . . . Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish to
oppose the petition for bail for justi able cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into
account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for xing bail should respondent judge
have ordered the petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused." Respondent
judge herein was ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 and was given a stern warning that
the commission of a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned
from the abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set
forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in xing the amount of bail. 3 4 This Court,
in a number of cases 3 5 held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it
answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the state's evidence but
also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution. 3 6 On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate
the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail
may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains
the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang 3 7 invalidated the order of respondent judge
granting bail to the accused because "Without summarizing the factual basis of its order
granting bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their
respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution
was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly remind
trial court judges to perform their mandatory duty of conducting the required hearing in
bail applications where the accused stands charged with a capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail
to the accused without rst conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is
strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of
the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. cda

Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's
declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a
right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's
familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty.
Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial
discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is
the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided.
The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.

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 In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria, 3 8 this Court held that the respondent judge is duty
bound to exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to determine whether in
the case at bar, the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the
defendant and to grant or deny the petition for provisional liberty. It also held that a writ of
mandamus will lie in order to compel the respondent judge to perform a duty imposed
upon him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the
accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not
strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied
solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained
personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the
prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the
respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule
114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accused's provisional
release will be determined at the hearing .
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor
refuses or fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong can be traced to the case of Herras Teehankee v . Director of Prisons 3 9 where this
Court gave the following "instructions" to the People's Court, 40 thus:
"1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the
petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it
should fix for the purpose;

2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is
not justi ed, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's
evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular
question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the
success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not
compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the
Solicitor General, who, as head of the Of ce of Special Prosecutors, is vested with
the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be
ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce —
provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the
defendant or detainee." 4 1

The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:
"If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case
for any de nite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled
and the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence
and, in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or
the law plots a certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain
evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite course if that evidence is
wanting, and said evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the
court's clear duty would be to adopt that course which has been provided for in
case of absence of such evidence. Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was
no more within the power — nor discretion — of the court to coerce the
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 prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing
hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a perfect right to elect, the
only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the application for bail."

As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:

"The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to
satisfy his burden of proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the
prosecutor's attitude is not justi ed, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of
control over him in the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance,
the court is authorized by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecutor as
to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being
possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore,
recommending bail."

As for the third instruction, this Court declared:

"It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the of cial statement of
the Solicitor General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence
may endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest.
This is so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without
having the evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which
is sought to be avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution before the trial."

It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under a
completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law
dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said "instructions" given
in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments
introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail" provides,
as follows:
"Sec. 5. Capital offenses de ned . — A capital offense, as the term is used in this
rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and
at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission
of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Capital offense — Burden of proof . — On the hearing of an application for

admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a
capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on
the prosecution."

The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have been
intercalated, as shown by the underscored phrases and statements below:
"Sec. 6. Capital offense, de ned . — A capital offense, as the term is used in these
rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with
death.

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

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 imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for
admission to bail led by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the
Philippines or otherwise unable to testify."
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in
the counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-
underscored sentence in Section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was
added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present
evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail
application. In such a case, the judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense,
this undermines the authority of a judge since all that the prosecution has to do to "force"
the judge to grant the bail application is to refrain from presenting evidence opposing the
same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court on "Bail"
meaningless since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person charged with a capital
offense is strong cannot be determined if the prosecution chooses not to present
evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial
judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. In the event that the prosecution
fails or refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a hearing as in a regular
trial should be scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the application for bail necessarily
means presentation of evidence, and the ling of a comment or a written opposition to the
bail application by the prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail
hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to
oppose the grant of bail to the accused. "This also prevents the practice in the past
wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force the prosecution into a premature
revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so, the accused would claim the grant of
bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong." 4 2
It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application
for bail must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If
the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial
on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to secure provisional liberty of the
accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of
a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the
merits. 43

In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated,
this Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
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 amended);

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.

The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of
the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a
hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to
judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness
thereof. 44 A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law
he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants
of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 4 5
Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail to the
accused since the Assistant Prosecutor signi ed in writing that he had no objection to the
grant of bail and recommended, instead, the bailbond in the sum of P80,000.00. It is to be
emphasized that although the court may have the discretion to grant the application for
bail, in cases of capital offenses, the determination as to whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong can only be reached after due hearing which, in this particular instance has
not been substantially complied with by the respondent Judge.
While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing three
times, thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless,
this does not completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has not
actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence
against the accused is strong for purposes of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a penalty
of P20,000.00 ne in cases where the judge grants the application for bail without notice
and hearing. In view however of the circumstances of this case, a reprimand instead of the
P20,000.00 would suffice. cdtai

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32,
Agoo, La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Release Order dated June 29, 1995, p. 13, Rollo.

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 2. p. 10, Rollo.
3. Order dated August 17, 1995, p. 19, Rollo.

4. Del Carmen, Rolando V., Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, p. 31, 3rd ed. (1995).

5. Section 7, supra.
6. Del Carmen, Rolando V., supra.

7. Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362.

8. Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55.

9. Francisco, Ricardo J., Criminal Procedure, 1993 ed., p. 226. citing Rex v. Wilkee, 4 Burr., 2527;
98 Reprint, 327, cited in note 26 (a), 6 C.J., p. 254.
10. Siazon v Presiding Judge, et al., 42 SCRA 184 (1971).

11. 103 SCRA 393.

12. 26 SCRA 522 (1968).

13. 170 SCRA 489.

14. 186 SCRA 620.

15. 199 SCRA 48.

16. 205 SCRA 155.

17. 215 SCRA 421.

18. A.M. No. RTJ-89-306, March 1, 1993.

19. 226 SCRA 206, 216 (1993).

20. 235 SCRA 283.

21. Supra.

22. 237 SCRA 1.

23. 237 SCRA 778.

24. 238 SCRA 640.

25. 240 SCRA 154.

26. 245 SCRA 56.

27. 243 SCRA 524.

28. A.M. No. RTJ-94-1209, 253 SCRA 601.

29. 250 SCRA 376 (1995).

30. 241 SCRA 84 ( 1995 ).

31. 243 SCRA 284 (1995). See also the cases of Borinaga v. Tamin , supra a n d Aguirre v.
Belmonte, supra and Tucay v. Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 (1995).
32. Baylon v. Sison, supra.
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 33. 242 SCRA 110 (1995).

34. See also People v. Dacudao, supra and Aurillo v. Francisco, supra.
35. Baylon v. Sison , supra. ; Borinaga v. Tamin , supra; Santos v. O lada , supra; Aguirre v.
Belmonte, supra.
36. See People v. San Diego , 26 SCRA 52; People v. Nano , supra; Guillermo v. Reyes , supra;
Santos v. Ofilada, supra.
37. 196 SCRA 41 (1991).

38. 54 Phil. 955, [1930].

39. 76 Phil. 756 (1946).

40. Created under Commonwealth Act No. 682 to try cases of treason and collaboration with
the enemy.

41. Supra, p. 774.

42. Regalado, F.D., Remedial Law Compendium, 7th Revised Edition, Volume II, p. 343.

43. Siazon v Presiding Judge, et al., supra.

44. Borinaga v. Tamin, supra.

45. Supra, citing Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991).

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