Feliciano vs Pasicolan

FACTS: Petitioner was one of the eighteen persons charged with

the crime of kidnapping with murder in an amended information
filed on October 24, 1958. Upon learning of the filing of said
information and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, the
petitioner, fearing, according to his lawyer, that he might fall into
the hands of irresponsible police officers, and to avoid disgrace and
humiliation consequent to an arrest and incarceration, went into
hiding. On October 30, 1958, however, Attorney Filemon Cajator,
at the instance of the petitioner's wife, filed in the case a motion
asking that the Court fix at P10,000.00 the amount of the bond for
petitioner's release pending trial. The Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing
thereof was premature as the petitioner had not yet been arrested.
Respondent Judge dismissed petitioners motion on the ground
that pending his arrest or surrender, petitioner has not the right to
ask this court to admit him to bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail.
RULING: No. The person applying for admission to bail should be
in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. Bail
is defined under the Rules of Court as security "required and given
for the release of a person who is in custody of the law. In the case
of Herra Teehankee vs. Rovira, this Court held that According to
this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he
is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either
arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever
have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. And in the
case of Manigbas v. Luna, this Court held that the right to bail
only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty.
The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, `bail is the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law. Without surrendering himself, he filed the

motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail
bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the
petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled
to admission to bail.
Docena-Caspe vs Bugtas
Doctrine:
The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence or to interpose
objection to a petition for bail will not dispense with the conduct of a bail
hearing. Neither may reliance to a previous order granting bail justify the
absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail, more so where said
order relied upon was issued without hearing and while the accused was at
large.
Facts:
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be
allowed to post bail on the grounds that (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter
of right because he is charged with murder allegedly committed at the time
when the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the Constitution;
and that (2) both the investigating Judge and the First Assistant Prosecutor
recommended P60,000.00 bail for his temporary liberty.
The court gave the prosecution five (5) days within which to file a comment
to the accuseds motion for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the
said motion for reconsideration on the basis of a previous order granting bail
to the accused. He ratiocinated that on page 49 of the records, there indeed
appears a final and executory order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his
predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez granting bail of P60,000.00 to the
accused, hence, the inevitable recourse is to grant bail to accused Celso Docil.
ISSUE: The complainant filed the instant administrative case against the
respondent Judge for granting bail to accused Celso Docil without
conducting a bail hearing.
HELD: Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of

a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail

especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under
the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter
of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail
in cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the issue of whether or
not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination
of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.
In Santos v. Ofilada, it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an
objection on the part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not
dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the
granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant without hearing.
This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of
guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength
of the States evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail.
Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a
hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of
the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the
grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertain
from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail
application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take
into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail.

Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements
have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.
Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged
belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued
by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the prosecutions failure
to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration of the August
11, 2000 order denying the application for bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge
Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible judge, he should have looked into the
real and hard facts of the case before him and ascertained personally whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. To make things worse, respondent Judge
relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact that the same appears
to have been issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and
while the accused was at large. In addition to the requirement of a
mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have known the basic rule
that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to
say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet
to be curtailed.In Basco v. Rapatalo, the Court laid down the following rules
which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the abovecited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the
courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the

evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and

usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the summary
of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially
granted the prosecutions motion praying that the accused be denied bail, no
hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.
The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both
the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or
denial of bail.

Miranda vs Tuliao

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA,
REPRESENTED IN THIS SUIT BY HIS MOTHER,
MARGARITA G. PRESENT: LARRANAGA, PETITIONER VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPPINES. RESPONDENTS.

Cebu City. He is presently detained at the Bagong Buhay

Rehabilitation Center.
Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation and sought to annul the informations as well as the
warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof.. In the alternative,
petitioner prayed that a preliminary investigation be conducted and
that he be released from detention pending the investigation.
Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for habeas corpus or bail on
October 6, 1997.
On October 27, 1997, we issued a resolution holding that petitioner
was deprived of his right to preliminary investigation when the City
Prosecutor of Cebu insisted that he was only entitled to an inquest
investigation.
On October 30, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu an urgent
ex parte motion praying for his immediate release pursuant to our
October 27 resolution.
The following day, on October 31, 1997, Judge Martin A. Ocampo,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, issued an order
deferring the resolution of petitioners motion. It stated that it would be
premature to act on the motion since the trial court has not yet
received an official copy of our October 27 resolution and that said
resolution has not yet attained finality. Furthermore, Judge Ocampo
called the Courts attention to the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997 and waived his right to preliminary
investigation.

RESOLUTION
ISSUES:
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga is charged with two counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention docketed as CBU-45303 and
CBU-45304 pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7,

(1) WON petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation

(2) WON petitioner should be released from detention pending the
investigation.
RULING:

(1) YES. Petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary

investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 applies only to persons
lawfully arrested without a warrant. Petitioner in this case was, in
the first place, not arrested either by a peace officer or a private
person.
An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[14] It is
made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.[15] An
arrest signifies restraint on person, depriving one of his own will and
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.[16] The
foregoing facts show no restraint upon the person of petitioner. Neither
do they show that petitioner was deprived of his own will and liberty.
Hence, Section 7 of Rule 112 does not apply to petitioner.
To be sure, even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG
personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the absence of
a warrant. Section 5 of Rule 113 states when a warrantless arrest is
deemed lawful, thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without a warrant; when lawful.-A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

It does not appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense when the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15,
1997. In fact, petitioner was attending classes at the Center for
Culinary Arts at that time.
We reject the prosecutors' argument that petitioner was actually
committing a crime at the time of the arrest since kidnapping with
serious illegal detention is a continuing crime. In the case of Parulan v.
Director of Prisons[17] cited by the prosecutors, kidnapping with illegal
detention is considered a continuing crime where the deprivation of
liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another. There is
no showing that at the time of the arrest on September 15, 1997,
Jacqueline Chiong was being detained by petitioner who was then
residing in Quezon City. Hence, petitioner may not be considered as
continually committing the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention at the time of the arrest.
A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in clear and
unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to
appear before the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17,
1997 cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to preliminary
investigation, considering that petitioner has been vigorously invoking
his right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the
proceedings before the City Prosecutor.
Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned
on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at
the time of entering a plea at arraignment.[18] Petitioner, in this case,
has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary
investigation even before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner
refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a
pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular
preliminary investigation.[19] Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his
counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part
of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver
appears to be clear and informed.

(2) NO. Petitioner should not be released from detention pending

the investigation.
We held in Sanchez v. Demetriou that the filing of charges and
the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly
detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him
the right to be released because of such defect.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it
issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it
was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that
the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but
only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other
grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that
objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the courts
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court,

instead of dismissing the information, should conduct it or remand the

case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted.
As regards petitioners motion to change the venue and the authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation, we are constrained to dismiss
the same for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive Department and not of the
Judiciary.[27] Petitioner should therefore address their plea to the
Department of Justice that has control and supervision over the
conduct of preliminary investigations.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due
process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,
we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden.