Competition in The Circular Economy 2023

COMPETITION IN THE
CIRCULAR ECONOMY
OECD Competition Policy Roundtable Background Note
2
Please cite as: OECD (2023), Competition in the Circular Economy, OECD Competition Policy Roundtable
Background Note, www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-in-the-circular-economy-2023.pdf.
This document was originally released on O.N.E. as an unclassified document under the reference code:
DAF/COMP(2023)5.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions
expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member
countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or
sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name
of any territory, city or area.
Cover illustration: © Galeanu Mihai | Getty Images
© OECD 2023
The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at
https://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.
COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

3
Foreword
As a circular economy based on the reduction of waste and on the re-use and recycling of resources and
materials is increasingly recognised to be at the core of supply chain resilience, financial risk mitigation and
the green transition, two important questions arise: i) whether competition laws and policies as currently
designed and applied are compatible with its paradigm; and ii) if so, how these elements can be considered
under the competition framework.
This paper focuses on how competition, economic growth, and the shift to a circular economy interact. The
circular economy leads to different incentives, dynamics and business models than traditional linear
economy systems. The paper therefore looks at whether competition policy and its economic efficiency
goal is well-suited to embrace the move towards a circular economy. More specifically, it addresses the
following questions:
• What circular economy market characteristics and dynamics are relevant for competition policy?
• In which cases competition law interacts with the circular economy and how?
• What are the advocacy and enforcement activities that competition authorities can take to pro-
actively support the transition to a circular economy?
This note was written by Cristina Volpin (OECD Competition Division). It benefitted from research support
by Vivian Ianelli (OECD Competition Division) and from comments by Elena Buzzi and Peter Börkey
(OECD Environment and Economy Integration Division), Ruben Maximiano (OECD Policy Studies Branch
of the Economics Department), and Antonio Capobianco and Ori Schwartz (OECD Competition Division).
It was prepared as a background note for discussions on “Competition in the Circular Economy”
taking place at the June 2023 session of the OECD Competition Committee,
https://www.oecd.org/competition/competition-in-the-circular-economy.htm. The opinions expressed and
arguments employed herein are those of the authors do not necessarily reflect the official views of the
Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.

4
Table of contents
Foreword 3
1 Introduction 6
2 The relationship between circular economy and competition 9
2.1. Circular economy and sustainability 9
2.2. Circularity as resource efficiency 10
2.3. Circular economy market characteristics and competition dynamics 11
2.4. Sources of market power in the circular economy 12
2.4.1. Infrastructures, economies of scale, and network effects 12
2.4.2. Vertical integration as barriers to entry and local markets 13
2.4.3. Intellectual property rights 14
2.5. Practical ways in which competition policy supports the circular economy 15
2.5.1. Creation of incentives for an efficient use of resources 15
2.5.2. Innovation 16
2.5.3. Development of circular economy business models 16
2.5.4. Pro-competitive collaboration and exploitation of synergies 16
2.5.5. Standardisation 17
2.5.6. Market creation 19
3 Competition enforcement issues in the circular economy 20

3.1. Main anticompetitive conduct and theories of harm relating to the circular economy 20
3.2. Agreements and exchange of commercially sensitive information to slow down or limit the
repairability, longevity or recyclability of products 20
3.3. Buyers’ cartels to fix the input price for the recycled material 23
3.4. Vertical restrictions 24
3.5. Hub and spoke type of arrangements 25
3.6. Abuses of dominant position 25
3.6.1. Refusal to supply or provide access to indispensable infrastructure by the dominant
player 25
3.6.2. Exclusivity provisions and other exclusionary abuses aimed at slowing down or limiting
repairability, longevity or recyclability of products 27
3.7. Merger control 29
3.7.1. Circularity-enhancing merger remedies 31
3.8. Efficiency gains, benefits to consumers, and pro-competitive justifications 31
3.8.1. What types of circularity-enhancing efficiencies may be considered in the assessment? 32
3.8.2. Can the assessment consider benefits arising to non-consumers, such as citizens in
other jurisdictions? 32
3.8.3. How far away in time can the benefits arise for them to be considered transaction-
specific or for the agreement or conduct to be considered necessary to produce them? 33

5
4 Competition advocacy and the circular economy 34

4.1. Enforcement guidelines, comfort letters and regulatory sandboxes 34
4.2. Power to issue opinions to Governments 36
4.3. Market studies 37
4.4. Competition-friendly procurement in circular markets 37
4.5. Competition assessment and other ways to reduce regulatory barriers 38
5 Conclusions 39
Endnotes 41
References 49
Tables
Table 3.1. Examples of anticompetitive conduct and theories of harm relating to circular economy 20
Figures
Figure 2.1. Circular business models value chains 9
Boxes
Box 2.1. Deposit-return system for non-reusable packaging in Romania 13
1 Box 2.2. German waste disposal system 14
Box 2.3. Collection and management of electric and electronic devices in Switzerland 17
Box 2.4. Agreement among soft-drink producers to reduce plastic production 19
Box 3.1. Exchange of commercially sensitive information in the scrap metal purchasing market 21
Box 3.2. Restrictive agreements on recycling end-of-life vehicles 22
Box 3.3. Car manufacturers collusion on the deployment of emission reduction technology 22
Box 3.4. Car batteries cartels 24
Box 3.5. Refusal to provide access to an indispensable infrastructure in the waste management market 26
Box 3.6. Exclusivity obligations in the waste management of electrical and electronic devices 27
Box 3.7. Electric vehicles charging sector 28
Box 3.8. Remondis/DSD merger 29
Box 3.9. Aurubis/Metallo 30
Box 3.10. Videolar/Innova merger 31
Box 4.1. The Austrian Cartel Law Amendment and Guidelines on Sustainability Co-operations 35
Box 4.2. Opinion of the French Competition Authority on EPR for household packaging 36

6
1 Introduction
In the lack of timely additional policy initiatives, the global consumption of raw materials is projected to
more than double by 2060, with severe impacts on human wellbeing, the economy and ecosystems
(OECD, 2019[1]). It is estimated that the demand for some metals, such as steel and aluminium, cement
and plastics could be four times as much as the current one in 2050.1 Waste generation is also increasing,
while recycling rates remain low (OECD, 2021[2]). According to the World Economic Forum, “[…] we’re using
about 60% more of the Earth’s resources than it can regenerate every year. By 2050, with an increased global population and a
resulting rise in consumption, that “overshoot” could get to 3-4 earths, which is clearly unsustainable.”2
Increasing demand for raw materials may lead to shortages, severe price increases, and supply chain
disruptions. For instance, many critical elements, such as lithium, cobalt and rare earth elements, are
supplied only by a limited number of countries and changes in their prices and production volumes may
significantly affect prices downstream and resilience of supply chains for a large number of products (IEA,
2021[3]). Firms need to be able to obtain in a timely fashion and at competitive prices the necessary raw
materials for all sorts of products, ranging from new green technologies to energy sources, vehicles,
buildings, and food.
While technological innovation will progressively aid in the decoupling of productivity growth from resources
consumption, improving resource efficiency is a fundamental objective for governments and businesses to
accelerate the transition and secure the economic stability required to continue flourishing (OECD, 2019[1]).
The gap between available raw materials and rising commodity prices, as well as the needs for security of
supply mean that circularity is high up on the global policy agenda (OECD, 2021[2]). Furthering the transition
to a circular economy will help ensure such security, while also improving economic and environmental
outcomes (Livingstone et al., 2022[4]; Yamaguchi, 2022[5]).
The economic impact of a shift to a circular economy is significant. It can contribute to economic growth by
creating new revenue streams, reducing unnecessary costs and untapping innovation potential for the
equivalent of USD 4.5 trillion (Lacy and Rutqvist, 2015[6]). There is also an increasing recognition that
investments in circular economy reduce risks to investors. For instance, a recent research study conducted
with more than 200 listed companies across 14 different industries in Europe finds circular economy
strategies and investments to lower debt default risks and to increase risk-adjusted returns. This is thanks
to the progressive dissociation between consumption and extraction, protection from resource price
volatility, diversification of business models, readiness to new regulatory standards and anticipation of
changes in consumers’ preferences (Bocconi University, Ellen MacArthur Foundation and Intesa Sanpaolo,
2021[7]).
Further, a move to the circular economy will strongly benefit the environment (OECD, 2021[8]). It plays an
important role in the fight against climate change but also in addressing the negative impacts on the
environment of the use of certain resources and materials, such as biodiversity loss and pollution, for
instance by limiting the extraction of raw materials, thus also resulting in a reduction of GHG emissions
associated with virgin material extraction, keeping materials within the economy, reducing landfill, and
preserving ecosystems (McCarthy, Dellink and Bibas, 2018[9]; Wang, 2022[10]; OECD, 2019[1]). To
understand the potential magnitude, suffice it to mention that the extraction and processing of materials,
energy sources and food represents half of greenhouse gas emissions across the world and more than

7
90% of biodiversity and water degradation (UN Environment, 2019[11]). See further, on the relationship
between sustainability and circularity in Section 2 below.
The shift to the circular economy, and its focus on resource efficiency, raises questions about the role of
competition authorities in accompanying or promoting the transition to a circular economy. This background
note focuses on exploring how competition, economic growth and the transition to a circular economy can
co-exist. It does not discuss the relationship between competition and sustainability, even if it makes
reference to some sustainability cases that are useful, by analogy, to understand the interplay between
competition and the circular economy. The OECD explored in detail the relationship between competition
and sustainability and competition and environmental protection, including in relation to waste management
and recycling, in various roundtables, such as Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement
(2021), Sustainability and Competition (2020), Competition Law and Responsible Business Conduct
(2015), Competition Issues in Waste Management (2013), and Horizontal Agreements in the Environmental
Context (2010).
Given that the circular economy poses different incentives to market players and creates different dynamics
and business models compared to traditional linear economy systems, this background note examines
whether and how competition law is suitable to embrace this shift. Specifically, the paper addresses the
following questions:
• What is the relationship between the circular economy, sustainability and competition law and
policy? Are the goals of competition law and the incentives and dynamics created by the circular
economy in alignment? (Section 2)
• Does competition law hinder or promote the transition to a circular economy and what are the main
competition concerns arising in the circular economy? How can the current analytical framework
best capture competition harms and efficiencies in the circular economy? (Section 3)
• How can competition authorities proactively support the transition to a circular economy, beyond
enforcement? (Section 4)
It should be noted that the debate around the circular economy is often conflated with the long-standing
debate around de-growth3 and whether de-growth is the only possible solution to the climate, given finite
resources, and even considering technological progress. This paper does not allow to tackle or, even less,
settle this debate. The paper does tackle the interaction between the circular economy and competition
starting from the premise that a shift to a circular economy that is informed by competition principles would
not undermine economic growth, but rather meaningfully contribute to it, by enhancing resource efficiency
and productivity growth.4 This would be attained by enabling innovation and green technologies, as
fundamental levers of economic growth and progress (Aghion, Antonin and Bunel, 2021[12]), preserving
Earth’s resources, allowing finite resources to have a longer economic life span and addressing other
negative environmental impacts of materials’ use. 5
As this view allows conciliating the goals of competition and of the circular economy within the currently
adopted paradigm, in that both pursue resource efficiencies (Zachmann, 2022[13]), its practical implications
are more readily useful to competition authorities across the world in the short-term and are, for this reason,
examined below.
The below analysis revealed that, while competition as currently applied does not alone necessarily
stimulate a transition towards circular business models, there is in principle significant alignment between
circular economy targets and competition goals, in that both create significant incentives for private
companies to increase resource efficiency and extract as much value as possible from input and raw
materials. As a result, competition principles, when correctly applied, can stimulate investments in
innovation, the development of new circular business models, exploitation of complementary skills and
synergies, standardization and market creation. By protecting productive efficiency, competition authorities
are able to prohibit anticompetitive conduct as well as block mergers that are harmful for the circular

8
economy. They can also provide clarity on which lawful agreements that lead to efficiency gains relating to
the circular economy are allowed.
Importantly, since both the circular economy and competition can promote productive efficiency, it seems
possible to integrate circular economy considerations relatively effortlessly into competition analysis within
the current framework. In many cases, and typically more often than in relation to sustainability effects, the
protection of circular economy considerations will likely coincide with the protection of competition, and vice
versa, harm to the circular economy will often coincide with a reduction of productive efficiency and negative
impacts on competition. This may be particularly important to recognise for those competition authorities
which, for various reasons, may not be able to take into account sustainability considerations in their
competitive assessment, which will instead conceivably be able to consider circularity when looking at
concrete cases and when shaping competition policies.

9
2 The relationship between circular

economy and competition
2.1. Circular economy and sustainability
Various definitions have been provided for the circular economy, at least 114 have been identified by
researchers (Kirchherr, Reike and Hekkert, 2017[14]). Broadly, it can be defined as “a regenerative system in
which resource input and waste, emission, and energy leakage are minimised by slowing, closing, and narrowing material and
energy loops. This can be achieved through long-lasting design, maintenance, repair, reuse, remanufacturing, refurbishing, and
recycling” (Geissdoerfer et al., 2017[15]). Following a 2004 initiative by the Japanese Government aimed at
promoting a “sound material-cycle society”,6 it is also sometimes referred to as an economic system based on
“3Rs”: reduction of waste, reusing and recycling of resources and materials to the maximum extent
possible.7
Figure 2.1. Circular business models value chains
Source: OECD (2019), Business Models for the Circular Economy: Opportunities and Challenges for Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.187/g2g9dd62-en
According to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the circular economy is thus founded on the following three
principles:
• Avoiding the creation of waste and pollution;
• Saving and preserving energy, labour and materials, including by prolonging their duration or
enabling their re-use;
• Protecting and enhancing renewable resources. 8
The notion of circularity is distinct from the one of sustainability in that sustainable development aims at
promoting the efficient use of resources in the long-term perspective of meeting “the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and

10 
Development, 1987[16]). The notion of sustainable development has several dimensions, encompassing
environment, economy and society aspects (OECD, 2020[17]), but the main points of commonality with
circularity are likely found in relation to the conservation of resources and the environmental considerations.
There is, however, significant uncertainty as to the relation between sustainability and circular economy
goals. As noted by (Velenturf and Purnell, 2021[18]),
from a conceptual perspective it is debatable whether the pursuit of a circular economy will necessarily promote
sustainable development; whether circular economy is better than, a condition for or fully interdependent with
sustainable development; or whether circular economy is one of the tools for sustainable development.
Analyses suggest that circular economy is integral to delivering various UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) […] i.e. in order to achieve the SDGs, circular economy practices will have to be implemented, but it is
important to distinguish different types of circular economy and their ability to contribute to sustainability.
There are indeed concerns that a vague definition of circular economy may include circular economy
solutions that have a feeble connection or are even in conflict with the notion of sustainable development.
To give an example, unused waste may be diverted from landfill to be burned to produce heating as part
of circular economy objectives of landfill reduction but that may, when not suitably managed, contribute to
GHG emission increases or toxic substance releases which are not in alignment with sustainable
development efforts (Velenturf and Purnell, 2021[18]) and may be a sub-optimal choice from the perspective
of recycling and re-use of materials (Farmer, Shaw and Williams, 2015[19]). There are also concerns relating
to the lock-in effects of committing to maintain a certain amount of waste to run recycling plants.
While it is recognised that circularity may support sustainability goals in several ways (for instance, by
contributing to emission reduction from production processes or waste management, see (Wang, 2022[10]))
the two do not necessarily align and it is therefore only a case by case analysis that may reveal whether a
specific circular economy initiative is actually sustainable.
It is however to be noted that, while the recent debate concerning the integration of environmental
sustainability consideration in the competition assessment has not focused explicitly on circular economy,
some of the initiatives considered by competition authorities when issuing sustainability agreement
guidelines, for example, can be categorized as “circular” and their treatment may be subsumed in that
context. The practical importance of a separate analysis of the interplay between the circular economy and
competition is given by the fact that while, in some jurisdictions, sustainability considerations may remain
difficult to consider (particularly as regards collective out-of-market effects, see for more details, Section 3),
circular economy considerations, due to their closeness to productive efficiency, are likely to be easier to
evaluate in the context of any traditional analysis of the competitive effects (harm and efficiencies).
2.2. Circularity as resource efficiency
As noted above, the notion of circular economy hinges on the effectiveness with which natural resources
are used (OECD, 2015[20]). This includes technical efficiency, resource productivity, and reduction of
negative environmental impacts and is calculated in economic terms as resource intensity, i.e. “the ratio
between the value of economic output from a particular sector or economy, and the amount of resources (typically in terms of
weight) used to produce it […]. An improvement in resource efficiency therefore describes a situation where more economic value
is being produced with a particular amount of resources (or one where fewer resources are being used to produce a particular
level of economic value)” (McCarthy, Dellink and Bibas, 2018[9]).
The circular economy aims at minimising or eliminating product waste and harm to environment, by
promoting alternative technical solutions that maximise the use of materials that remain in the supply chain
and the amount of time for which they are used. This is “to slow depletion of scarce natural resources, reduce
environmental damage from extraction and processing of virgin materials, and reduce pollution from the processing, use and end-
of-life of materials” (Ekins et al., 2019[21]). For instance, about 50 million tons of electric waste containing raw
materials like iron, aluminium, gold, but also lithium, cobalt, tin and tungsten are created each year for an

 11
annual value of approximately EUR 55 billion (Forti et al., 2020[22]; PACE (Platform for Accelerating the
Circular Economy), 2019[23]). Metals, however, can be recycled, without loss of function, virtually
innumerable times. Lithium batteries for example are recyclable at 95%.9
As opposed to a linear economy, which is based on extraction of natural resources, transformation into
capital and products, and disposal, the circular economy is focused on increasing productivity and
improving asset utilisation in the face of finite resources, and acts on decoupling economic growth from
resource depletion. The implementation of circular economy systems therefore challenges the assumptions
and incentives of a linear economy.
2.3. Circular economy market characteristics and competition dynamics
Circular economy markets have some distinctive features that may be relevant under a competition
analysis in a concrete case, depending on the circumstances. For example, these markets may often be
characterized by one or more of the following:
• Infrastructure may be costly and natural monopolies may be present. In municipal solid waste
management, for example, evidence shows that “costs increase when more than one collector is used.
Consequently, municipalities usually arrange for MSW [municipal solid waste] to be collected from households by a
provider that is granted the monopoly for this service, either the municipality itself (directly or as a municipal company)
or a private company” (OECD, 2013[24]).
• Markets may be local, and transportation costs may be quite relevant (e.g., the market for the
collection of heavy scrap metals or for waste collection and management). Long transportation
journeys may make the recycling or re-use of resources more costly and the relevance of local
infrastructure higher given the transport costs.
• Data collection and information exchange may be necessary to provide the product or the service
or to make it circular. Sharing data may enable technological research for the reduction of waste,
it may enable more efficient transport coordination along the supply chain; or it may allow collective
switching to electric vehicles.10 To ensure that resources are used in the most efficient way, it is
particularly important to preserve their quality to ensure their re-use and to enable coordination
along the supply chain. The type of information that may need to be exchanged may entail
anticompetitive risks (see, for more details on the exchanges that may be problematic,
Section 3 below), ranging from time windows and modalities for material returns, repair services,
inventory, and costs of collection and recycling (Serafimova and Hörnig, 2023[25]).
• The service offered may be associated with a by-product or production waste that has a negative
rather than a positive value (e.g., disposal of waste, scrap metal, exhausted tyres, or batteries). For
example, extended responsibility obligations require producers to take charge of the disposal of the
by-product, which is therefore considered as a cost, rather than a source of revenue. This, however,
may shift once a market for the re-use of the by-product has been established, affecting its
appreciation, significantly so for high-value materials (Laubinger et al., 2022[26]).
• The players may operate in an “eco-system” or so-called industrial symbiosis (Desrochers and
Leppälä, 2010[27]), using the waste or by-products from one production process as an input for a
different one (with related conglomerate-type of effects). For instance, an incinerator in Suffolk,
United Kingdom, is using the additional heat produced by the incineration to warm greenhouses for
tomatoes production.11 Rolls-Royce’s extra electrical power is used to supply local greenhouses
farms.12 A British Sugar’s factory in Norfolk produces as many as 12 different products from
previously wasted energy and materials (for instance, it produces bioethanol fuel from beet sugar
syrup and recovers yeast to sell it as high-protein animal feed).13
• Different business models may be used to the purpose of keeping materials as long as possible
within the economy. This leads to the development of business models based, for example, on

12 
sharing infrastructure and limited goods or on product-service systems, where products are offered
as a service (see, for more details (OECD, 2019[28])and below).
• Innovation and R&D investments may represent extremely important part of a circular business and
inform competitive commercial strategies and acquisitions. For the purposes of competition
analysis, it is also useful to remember that, due to path dependency, companies which have in the
past invested in non-circular technologies (say, for the extraction of primary resources) are more
likely to continue investing in such technologies (Aghion, Antonin and Bunel, 2021[12]), rather than
switching to circular ones. There may therefore be incentives for anticompetitive dynamics between
circular and non-circular players when they interact in a specific market, particularly if the former
meet costumers’ or consumers’ preferences.
2.4. Sources of market power in the circular economy
Based on the above-described features of the circular economy, there are a few characteristics of the
circular economy that may theoretically lead or contribute to market power and potentially raise competition
policy challenges, depending on the circumstances and if left unaddressed. Some of the main ones are
discussed below.
2.4.1. Infrastructures, economies of scale, and network effects
In many circular economy markets, the presence of infrastructure (for instance, for recycling or waste
collection) may be relevant. At times it may even be a necessary condition to operate in the market and its
duplication may not be economically viable. Further, in some cases, involving, for instance, recycling or
waste management initiatives, significant economies of scale may be present. It may also often be the case
that the service offered becomes increasingly more valuable for the consumers if more consumers
purchase or participate in it (as it may be the case for the establishment of a waste disposal initiative or
take-back scheme). These three features, alone or in combination, may create the conditions for market
power and, in some circumstances, anticompetitive concerns (in particular in the form of vertical restrictions
and abuses of dominance, see further below). In some cases, such conditions may also emerge following
the granting of public concessions which establish an incumbent to create a market but may unduly persist,
thus preventing market entry by alternative suppliers of the service.
In this context, an important distinction may be drawn in these scenarios between competition for the
market and competition in the market. Competition for the market occurs in those situations where the
market features lead players to compete for the whole market rather than for only a share of it. This may
happen because the market is more suitably served by only one player (e.g., a significant infrastructure),
which means that that tends to be the most efficient scenario for that market. Examples include natural
monopolies (where only one company can fully exploit available economies of scale), legal monopolies
(where the monopoly position of the market player is protected by law, such as by means of intellectual
property rights), publicly funded monopolies (where the government only purchases from one supplier) and
platform monopolies (where network effects are significant) (OECD, 2019[29]).
Since all these categories of markets may be relevant for the circular economy, 14 it must be observed that,
while competition in the market tends to be always desirable, in some markets where circularity may be
important (e.g., recycling waste), competition in the market may not take place due to specific
circumstances. Where this is the case, and governments decide to opt for the award of time limited
exclusive rights to enable market entry and create competition for the market in the short run, these should
be allocated by means of competitive tendering, as a preferable option to the direct granting of privileged
rights.

 13
In such scenarios, it is also important for competition authorities to monitor the situation to avoid competition
concerns linked to the advantage of the incumbent and to be ready to tackle any abuses of dominance
linked, for instance, to creating strategic barriers to potential entrants, as well as carefully scrutinize
mergers that may reinforce dominance (Macmillan, 2019[30]). In some cases, long-term exclusive
agreements may be justified economically to allow for satisfactory returns on investment, but they should
not extend in time beyond what strictly necessary for such recoupment (see, on this point, also Section 3
below). It is also important to be ready to allow competition in the market as soon as the conditions for such
competition to occur are present.
Box 2.1. Deposit-return system for non-reusable packaging in Romania

Romanian Competition Council
Romania is introducing a new deposit-return system (“DRS”) for non-reusable packaging operated and
implemented by a legal entity at the national level, which should enter into effect in November 2023.
The DRS creates a new set of requirements to optimize sustainable management of packaging to
achieve and surpass the environmental objectives set at the European level.
The DRS manager, an entity formed by industry associations with at least 30% of DRS packaging units
in the Romanian market, standardises the implementation of the system nationally.
The Romanian Competition Council (“RCC”) engaged in advocacy and formulated recommendations
on the amendment proposal with the aim to ensure a level-playing field in the waste management
market, based on the principle of minimum harm to competition.
Among other proposals, the RCC stressed the importance of verifying the need and efficiency of having
a single operator in the market, recommending the Ministry of Environmental to ensure that the
establishment of a single DRS manager is the “only real and efficient possibility” for this waste
management system.
It also recommended limiting in time the granting of the license to a single operator, which could result
in significant anticompetitive distortions in the long run. It recommended putting in place mechanisms
to enable the separation of the DRS manager duties from the commercial activities of its
representatives, as well as to avoid any exchange of sensitive information. The conditions to entering
the system must be equal and transparent for all players, thus preventing any form of discrimination,
especially of those producers and retailers that do not hold shares of the DRS manager.
Source: OECD (2023) ‘Competition in the Circular Economy – Note by Romania’
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2023)44/en/pdf; OECD (2021) ‘Environmental considerations in Competition Enforcement
– Note by Romania’ https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2021)56/en/pdf; Schönherr, Romania introduces deposit-return system
for beverages packaging, 3 December 2021, https://www.schoenherr.eu/content/romania-introduces-deposit-return-system-for-beverages-
packaging/.
2.4.2. Vertical integration as barriers to entry and local markets
As mentioned above, circular economy supply chains and business models may require significant
infrastructural or technological investments or vertical integration. This may facilitate the creation of barriers
to entry for players that do not have the size or the necessary access to capital to compete. For example,
a circular economy player which owns a necessary infrastructure may attempt to prevent competitors from
entering the market or, if present both upstream and downstream, engage in margin squeeze type of
behaviour. The presence of the infrastructure or vertical integration may provide the opportunity, under
specific circumstances, to lessen competition. See, for example, Section 3 below.

14 
Further, markets may often be local, given that recyclable inputs are often linked to high transport costs,
as many may be heavy and bulky, as well as due to licensing of some circularity services. This means that
market power may more frequently be observed at local level. For example, when household packaging
waste is collected at city level, the recycling company which provides the service may have significant
market power.
2.4.3. Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property (hereafter, IP) rights play an ambivalent role in stimulating the transition to a circular
economy. The way in which they allow competitors to protect returns on their investments provide
significant incentives to circular innovation and R&D. At the same time, especially if they go beyond what
is strictly necessary to stimulate innovation, they may enable market players to restrict access to circular
technologies or processes or their essential inputs via various forms of anticompetitive exclusionary
conduct.
Box 2.2. German waste disposal system

European Commission
In 1991, Germany adopted an Ordinance imposing manufacturers and distributors to retrieve and
recycle packaging waste.
In a very important case for the German market for waste collection and recycling, the European
Commission found in 2001 that Duales System Deutschland AG (DSD) had abused its dominant
position in the market for organising the collection and recycling of sales packaging in Germany. It found
that the company implemented a payment system that created significant barriers to entry in the market
and discriminated against customers. As noted by the then Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, the
decision was aimed at ensuring “an improved choice of service providers and lower costs for companies complying
with their environmental obligations”.
DSD was dominant with an 80% market share and the owner of the “Green Dot” trademark (Der Grüne
Punkt). DSD customers were required to pay fees proportional to the volume of packaging bearing the
Green Dot trademark, rather than to the volume of packaging for which the company effectively provided
its take-back and recycling service. The recovery of the packages could be done in two ways: (i) as a
self-management solution – manufacturers and distributors themselves would retrieve their own
packages from the consumers and/or (ii) as an exemption system, whereby manufacturers and
distributors could rely on a third party to do the recovery and management of the packages.
The European Commission considered that a “no service, no fee” principle should apply whereby no
fee would be due to DSD when the service was carried out by means of self-management or by
competitors, regardless of the use of the Green Dot trademark. The European Commission considered
that the licence fee obligation imposed by DSD prevented customers from switching to competitors of
DSD, as this would have meant incurring in double costs, and that they could not, for this reason,
develop in the market.
The decision was later upheld by the Court of Justice on these points.
Source: European Commission, AT.34493 – DSD Duales System, 20 April 2001,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_AT_34493; C-385/07 P - Der Grüne Punkt - Duales System
Deutschland v Commission, 16 July 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:456 (Appeal Case before the General Court T-151/01).

 15
2.5. Practical ways in which competition policy supports the circular economy
There seems to be a significant alignment between the goals of competition policy and those of the circular
economy. As mentioned above, the two can reinforce each other, putting in place the right incentives for
market players to engage in competitive dynamics that support the maximization of productive efficiency
and the transition to a circular economy.
The complementarity of competition and the circular economy is further supported by a recent study on the
relationship between extended producer responsibility (hereinafter EPR) schemes and competition (Ahlers
et al., 2021[31]). EPRs are schemes whereby the responsibility for the end-of-life management of a product
is given to the producer, instead of the final consumers, citizens or municipalities. Examples include take-
back schemes, advance fees or deposit and refund schemes. EPRs have become increasingly more
common (there were about 400 EPRs in operation worldwide in 2016) in different sectors (e.g. packaging
waste, electronics, batteries, tyres, pharmaceuticals, cars) and they are central to the development of a
circular economy (for details and guidance on EPRs, see OECD (2016[32]). The study examines the effects
of a competitive setting, based on several performance indicators, including collection rate, waste collection
per capita, recycling and treatment rate, cost for producers, cost for collection, cost for waste recycling and
treatment, stakeholder satisfaction, innovation potential and awareness creation potential. Looking at
waste of electrical and electronic equipment, batteries and packaging, it finds that producer responsibility
organisations perform better when they operate in competitive markets, which pressures them to strive for
innovative solutions and higher quality services. Producer responsibility organisations are more effective
and cost-efficient in market with more than one player (Ahlers et al., 2021[31]).
Some of the main ways in which competition law and policy, as traditionally interpreted and applied, may
support the circular economy are described in more detail below.
2.5.1. Creation of incentives for an efficient use of resources
As mentioned above, one of the main objectives of competition law and policy is economic efficiency, which
is typically intended as encompassing static and dynamic efficiency. 15 Static efficiency, which relates to the
most efficient production and allocation of resources considering the technology available, has two
components. Productive efficiency, which involves minimising resource waste (i.e., production occurs with
the lowest cost per unit given the technology available), and allocative efficiency, which involves matching
production to consumers’ demand. While these are static parameters of efficiency, economic efficiency
also includes dynamic efficiency, which is about improvements in production processes and quality of
products via technical progress (Dunne, 2015[33]; Motta, 2004[34]).
As the circular economy pushes companies to focus on reducing intake of new materials, re-use of those
that are already in the supply chain and increase their productive efficiency, it goes to the very essence of
productive efficiency. Competition and circular economy both increase incentives for overall productive
efficiency, by ensuring that companies are vigilant to keep their costs low, produce as much output as
possible from a given input, and their production is attuned to consumers’ preferences.
This alignment can be observed in at least five ways in which competition may promote circularity, by
stimulating:
• innovation investments;
• the development of new circular business models;
• collaboration with other companies for the exploitation of synergies;
• standardisation; and
• market creation.
Each of these factors is analysed below.

16 
2.5.2. Innovation
Competition typically encourages businesses’ rivalry on multiple dimensions, including price, product
quality product, and innovation.16 As the circular economy requires companies to explore ways to optimise
their use of input, capture more value from resources and reduce their non-recyclable waste, it will also
tend to encourage product and process innovation. This typically constitutes an important stimulus to
investment in product design and research and development (hereafter R&D) which support recycling,
repairing and reuse of materials. In many cases, thanks to the target of productive efficiency, circular
economy investments will lead to both higher innovation and to lower prices.
Competition may be significantly more effective and work better to stimulate circular innovation in
association with consumer protection regulation to raise consumer awareness, environmental regulation
or State measures17 to direct innovation investments to new markets (Aghion, Antonin and Bunel, 2021[12]).
When accompanied by well-designed regulation that is goal-based and flexible, however, competition plays
a very important role by increasing the likelihood of innovation occurring in the circular economy (Cecere
and Corrocher, 2016[35]).
2.5.3. Development of circular economy business models
Competition can push companies to innovate to meet consumers’ demand by minimising waste and
preserving resources’ value as long as possible, which can promote the development and adoption of new
circular economy business models. The main business models for the circular economy are identified as
follows (OECD, 2019[28]):
• Circular supply, where renewable and recovered input is used instead of extraction of virgin
resources;
• Resource recovery, where the use of secondary input materials derived from waste is maximized
to avert extraction of new resources;
• Product life extension, where the end of life of products is extended as late as possible;
• Sharing, where existing infrastructure and scarce goods are shared to avoid under-use and reduce
demand for new raw materials;
• Product-as-a-service, where the products are marketed by the supplier as a service, encouraging
recycling and refurbishing of products (e.g., Xerox leasing printers and copiers).
Competition may stimulate companies to adopt one or more of these businesses models, in order to benefit
from a competitive advantage, for instance because they allow it to reduce costs, be present in a
remunerative secondary market or aftermarket or provide consumers with a more innovative product, while
also serving circular economy requirements.
2.5.4. Pro-competitive collaboration and exploitation of synergies
Competition can also encourage businesses to collaborate by combining complementary skills and
technologies to offer new and better circular products to consumers. Various forms of pro-circularity co-
operation and “innovative co-operation”, such as those aimed at providing a new solution to a technical
problem or at creating a new product, do not typically raise competition concerns, provided that the
exchange of information that they involve is limited to what is strictly necessary for the collaboration to be
successful (OECD, 2020[36]). Examples may include temporarily pooling resources or joining investment
efforts to the purposes of investing in R&D that will lead to circular methods and solutions. Sharing
resources or platforms may also enable firms to optimise their use of resources and reduce waste.
While the internalization of environmental externalities would be preferably attained by way of regulation,
(Tirole, 2022[37]; Schinkel and Treuren, 2021[38]), where this is missing or insufficient competition authorities

 17
may play an important complementary role in ensuring that these objectives are attained with little to no
harm to competition18 (see, for ways in which competition authorities can integrate environmental
considerations in their assessment, OECD (2021[39])). Further, as noted by Tirole (2022[37]),
The absence of sufficient governmental action (as is unfortunately the case for climate change) confronts us
with a second-best situation. Sustainability agreements such as a boycott of highly polluting input suppliers or
a coordination on environmentally friendly packaging have the potential of raising social welfare when stand-
alone responsible behaviour runs the risk of loss of market share. The competition authority may be able to
acquiesce to such agreements provided it has a clear objective trading off harm to the consumer or competition
against the environmental benefit (which requires putting a price on carbon) and that it carefully monitors the
industry’s compliance with its societal pledges.
Similarly to the case of sustainability agreements, in some instances, the combination of a regulatory void
and the presence of market failures in circular markets such as coordination problems, first-mover
disadvantage, and information asymmetries, or as the existence of consumers’ behavioural biases, may
have to be taken into account by competition authorities in their assessments of circularity collaborations
and may make it so that co-operation or synergies between businesses may be, in certain circumstances,
a way to achieve economic efficiency in alignment with circular goals. The co-operation should of course
be genuinely aimed at generating synergies and market benefits and not an excuse for collusive
practices.19
Box 2.3. Collection and management of electric and electronic devices in Switzerland
In 2005 the Swiss Competition Authority (ComCo) closed an investigation into possible concerns raised
by an agreement between Swico (Swiss Economic Association for the Suppliers of Information,
Communication and Organizational Technology) and S.EN.S (Foundation for Waste Management and
Recycling in Switzerland).
The agreement aimed at establishing which entities would collect different types of electric and
electronic appliances (specialisation agreement) and that manufacturers, sellers and importers of new
appliances would levy the advance recycling fees, which they would then pay to Swico and S.EN.S.
ComCo analysed two main horizontal concerns: (i) the fee charged by the companies and (ii) the market
allocation according to type of devices. ComCo found that manufacturers, sellers and importers
remained free to pass on the fee, which was a relatively small element of the price compared to the
total and was unlikely to impact the final prices to consumers. Regarding the market allocation, ComCo
found that it was economically justified as it reduced transaction costs and increased economies of
scale, making the recycling more effective.
ComCo thus concluded that the agreement did not give rise to any anticompetitive concerns thanks to
the economic and environmental efficiencies it yielded. ComCo kept monitoring the companies’
activities to prevent any abuse of collective dominance, such as discriminatory treatment of waste
disposal companies.
Sources: ComCo (2005) Press Release, La ComCo clôt sans suite l'enquête sur l'élimination des appareils électriques,
https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/14278.pdf; OECD (2006) ‘Environmental Regulation and Competition’
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2006)30/en/pdf.
2.5.5. Standardisation
Standardisation agreements are those arrangements that aim at setting technical or quality requirements
for a certain product or service. Standardization is largely beneficial from the competition viewpoint, 20

18 
because it may allow compatibility and interoperability of products, with positive impact on consumers;
technological advancement; creation of new products and markets; lower transaction costs and innovation
(OECD, 2023[40]). A transparent standard that is not mandatory to comply with and made accessible to all
market players on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, for example, is typically considered
unlikely to create anticompetitive concerns.21 Standardisation may, however, lead to preventing market
access or enable discrimination and foreclosure opportunities against competitors, as well reduce
competition on prices.22
Well-designed standards and labelling initiatives play a particularly important role in the circular economy,
because they may enable reparability, recyclability, and keeping the value of the materials as long as
possible in the supply chain with minimal to no harm to competition. When they involve only some market
players (as opposed to the whole market), standardisation may strengthen the ability of those companies
to differentiate their offer and compete with other players, informing business partners’ and consumers’
choices. When they involve the whole market, they may allow entire sectors of the economy to progress
towards a more advanced circularity target or away from less recyclable options, benefiting consumers and
society as a whole with minimal to no harm to competition. Competition can therefore encourage
businesses to invest in creating, setting, and obtaining such standards and certifications, promoting the
transition to a circular economy.
This is acknowledged by the European Commission in its Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines which
considers that some agreements may be needed to enable competitors to recycle or reduce waste. 23 It
also establishes a soft safe harbour for these agreements (which include more broadly all types of
sustainable initiatives), when the following 7 conditions are met:
• The standard is transparent and the setting process is accessible to all interested competitors;
• The standard is not mandatory;
• The standard is not limiting, i.e., standards going beyond the set standard are always possible to
adopt and implement;
• There is no exchange of commercially sensitive information beyond what strictly necessary for the
standardisation;
• Access to the standardisation process is allowed on an effective and non-discriminatory basis;
• There is no significant impact on price or reduction in the product choice;
• A monitoring mechanism to check standard compliance is set up. 24
Market-driven standardisation may also, in fast moving technology markets displaying significant degrees
of uncertainty, provide the advantage of a flexible alternative to regulation (Blind, Petersen and Riillo,
2017[41]; OECD, 2023[42]). Standardisation may also untap benefits on the demand-side, enhancing
consumer awareness about circular products, which may limit the negative impact of some behavioural
biases (see, for an analysis of behavioural biases relating to environmentally-friendly choices (Dolmans,
2020[43]) and (Volpin, 2020[44])) and drive changes in preferences (Inderst and Thomas, 2021[45]). This can
contribute to reinforcing the positive feedback loop of increased demand for such products and competition
to offer them in the market.
Among these types of agreements, one could include agreements aimed at discontinuing less recyclable
products while the circular quality of the products that continue to be sold is maintained or improved. These
agreements are unlikely to be problematic, particularly if they do not lead to significant price increases of
the products that continue to be sold.

 19
Box 2.4. Agreement among soft-drink producers to reduce plastic production

Dutch Competition Authority
In 2022, the Dutch Competition Authority gave a favourable opinion on an agreement between various
competing soft-drink producers, including Coca-Cola and Vrumona, and some supermarkets (Albert
Heijn and Jumbo) to phase out plastic handles on soft-drinks and water multipacks (i.e., to set a
standard to eliminate this product element with no additional costs for the consumers).
The agreement allowed the participants to individually determine their contribution to the common target
set by the agreement, autonomously deciding when and how to discontinue the production of the plastic
handles.
Asked to issue an opinion, the authority considered that consumers did not see that product feature as a
competition parameter on which the soft-drink producers competed. The change did not reduce product
quality or choice nor add costs for consumers. It allowed the multipacks to become more recyclable,
reducing the amount of plastic involved in their production for more than 70% of multipacks produced.
Among the categories provided for by its guidelines, the Dutch Authority considered that the agreement
could fit two of the allowed categories: first, as a non-binding agreement that allowed the involved
companies to reach a sustainability objective; and second, as an agreement that allowed to phase out
a more polluting product, whilst improving product quality.
Source: Dutch Competition Authority, Press Release, ACM is favourable to joint agreement between soft-drink suppliers about
discontinuation of plastic handles, 26 July 2022, https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-favorable-joint-agreement-between-soft-drink-
suppliers-about-discontinuation-plastic-handles.
2.5.6. Market creation

Competition pushes market players to respond to consumer demands in the best and most efficient way.
Innovative ways to reuse or recycle waste materials may therefore enable the firm to enter and compete in
new markets, for example, where such materials are valuable input in the production process. This may
also lead to market creation and the development of entirely new circular products which in turn attracts
market players and generates more competition in circular markets, further promoting efficiency, choice,
and innovation.
In sum, it can be concluded that competition is largely supportive of the circular economy by providing
incentives for productive efficiency, which in turns leads to innovative business models and products, new
markets, co-operative and synergy-creating settings, and standardization.
As noted by Egypt,
While there is a clear connection between competitive market outcomes and the goals of the circular economy, it is important
to acknowledge that circular business models will not necessarily develop organically in competitive markets. In some
instances, competition can even lead to a dysfunctional circular economy and suboptimal investments. Therefore,
competition authorities have a crucial role to play in facilitating the transition to a circular economy, namely, accounting for
circular economy considerations in their competition enforcement and proactively mitigating any potential adverse impacts
of competition on the development of circular economy practices (OECD, 2023[46]).
While some of the characteristics of the circular economy may create the opportunity for anticompetitive
behaviour, competition authorities can use their current tools to ensure that harm to competition and
consumers does not ensue. Hence the importance for competition authorities to carefully assess
competition concerns arising in the circular economy (see Section 3 below), as well as engaging in different
types of advocacy efforts to facilitate circular economy initiatives, regulatory activity and adoption of state
measures that promote circular economy while preserving competition (Section 4 below).

20 
3 Competition enforcement issues in

the circular economy
3.1. Main anticompetitive conduct and theories of harm relating to the circular
economy
The present section focuses on the main anticompetitive conduct and theories of harm that also harm
circularity. A separate analysis of all the anticompetitive issues and cases that may arise in relation to
sustainability considerations in competition and merger control can be found in OECD (2021[39]).
Table 3.1. Examples of anticompetitive conduct and theories of harm relating to circular economy
Anticompetitive conduct Example
Agreements and/or exchanges of commercially sensitive information between players with
access to circular input or technology to reduce the use of that input, increase its price or slow
down the development or the implementation of the technology (see, for relevant examples,
Horizontal restrictions of Box 3.1, Box 3.2, and Box 3.3).
competition
Cartel and/or exchanges of commercially sensitive information between buyers of the recycled
material (which they use as input in their production) to collectively fix its price (see, for relevant
examples, Box 3.1 and Box 3.4).
Agreements between manufacturer and resellers imposing fixed or minimum resale prices for
the recycled product.
Selective distribution agreements where quality criteria implicitly exclude recyclable materials.
Vertical restrictions of competition Exclusive supply obligations to make the supplier sell recyclable input or the recycled product
only or mainly to one buyer and affecting a significant part of the market.
Exclusive purchasing obligations to make the downstream customer buy only or mainly from
a specific non-circular supplier and affecting a significant part of the market.
Exchange of commercially sensitive information between different manufacturers, facilitated
Mixed horizontal and vertical
by the supplier of scrap material coordinating the recycling and not necessary for setting up
restrictions
the recycling scheme (hub-and-spoke arrangement).
Refusal to supply or provide access to indispensable infrastructure by the dominant player
(see, for a relevant example, Box 3.5).
Exclusivity provisions aimed at preventing trading partners from recycling more (see, for
Abuse of dominance
relevant examples, Box 3.6 and Box 3.7).
Preventing customers from developing or implementing more circular product or production
process.
3.2. Agreements and exchange of commercially sensitive information to slow

down or limit the repairability, longevity or recyclability of products
When looking at anticompetitive distortion between circular economy players, companies may collude to
reduce competitive pressure from rivals. In order to meet a specific circular economy objective (e.g.
increased recyclability of the materials or reduction of waste) or implement a circular business model or

 21
production process, companies may wish to engage in exchanges of information, which may include
information aimed at ensuring a better matching between supply and demand (e.g., capacity of the industry
or demand volumes) or at reducing the level of information asymmetry, for instance, on expected amount
of waste or production times.
If recyclability of materials is a parameter of competition, or if it represents a cost they do not wish to incur,
companies may try to coordinate on refraining from competing on the recycling activities or on use of
recycled materials, which may at once distort competition and hurt the circular economy.
One common scenario is also that of a co-operation agreement, such as a specialisation, purchasing,
standardisation or R&D agreement aimed at meeting a circular economy objective or implementing a
circular business model or production process that ends up going beyond what is strictly necessary for the
collaboration to meet its objective and spills over into an unlawful exchange of information or collaboration.
Depending also on the frequency of the exchange, the market coverage, the level of aggregation, age and
non-public nature of the data, such an exchange may end up including commercially sensitive information
on current and future prices, production costs, expected production quantities, etc. that reduces the
strategic uncertainty of the firm’s market behaviour and thus results in an anticompetitive conduct.
Four examples of anticompetitive agreements that originated from exchange of commercially sensitive
information are provided below, first, in Box 3.1 and Box 3.2, directly in relation to the circular economy,
and then, by analogy, in Box 3.3, in relation to reduction of emissions and sustainability. While the first two
examples focus on competition in the circular markets (scrap metal purchasing and end-of-life vehicle
recycling), the second two focus on ensuring companies compete on the development and deployment of
emissions reduction technologies.
Box 3.1. Exchange of commercially sensitive information in the scrap metal purchasing market
Spanish CNMC
In 2022, the Spanish competition authority, CNMC, imposed a total of EUR 23.3 million on three steel
companies operating in the scrap metal purchasing market. The authority found evidence of two
separate anticompetitive information exchanges between AG Siderúrgica Balboa and Sidenor Aceros
Especiales in 2017 and between Sidenor and Arcelormittal Aceralia Basque Holding in 2018.
According to the authority, the following sets of commercially sensitive information were unlawfully
exchanged among the companies:
• Data on future purchase prices to offer to scrap metal suppliers;
• Timings of technical stops of the steel mills production, which could be used to forecast demand
reduction in the purchase of scrap metal;
• Own prices and prices of competing third-party not publicly available.
For another nine companies in the sector the investigation did not reveal sufficient evidence of an
infringement.
Source: CNMC, Resolución Chatarra y Acero S/0012/19, 4 March 2022, https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/3971475.pdf; Press
Release, La CNMC multa con 24 millones a tres empresas siderúrgicas por dos infracciones muy graves en el mercado de compra de
chatarra en España, 14 Mar 2022, https://www.cnmc.es/prensa/sancionador-chatarra-acero-20220314. See also PaRR, 30 July 2020, Spain
launches scrap metal purchase information exchange inquiry, https://app.parr-global.com/intelligence/view/prime-3080501.

22 
Box 3.2. Restrictive agreements on recycling end-of-life vehicles

UK Competition & Markets Authority and European Commission
In March 2022, the CMA opened an investigation into the BMW Group and some industry associations
on the grounds that they may have been involved in anti-competitive agreements to avoid competing:
• in relation to the recyclability and retrieval of end-of-life vehicles (cars and vans) and the use of
recycled materials in the manufacture of new vehicles, including by making public
announcements; and
• on paying service providers for take-back, dismantling and recycling of end-of-life vehicles.
A similar investigation has also been launched by the European Commission, which is closely co-
operating with the CMA on this matter.
Source: European Commission (2022), Press Release - Antitrust: Commission carries out unannounced inspections in the automotive
sector, 15 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1765; CMA (2022), Suspected anti-competitive
conduct in relation to the recycling of end-of-life vehicles, 15 March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/suspected-anti-competitive-
conduct-in-relation-to-the-recycling-of-end-of-life-vehicles.
Box 3.3. Car manufacturers collusion on the deployment of emission reduction technology
European Commission
In 2021, Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche (together “VW Group”) and BMW were fined a total of
EUR 875 million by the European Commission for colluding on slowing down the development and
deployment of nitrogen oxide (NOx) cleaning technologies. Daimler, which also participated in the
conduct but applied for leniency, was granted full immunity from the fine.
The companies’ unlawful co-operation involved the development of selective catalytic reduction (“SCR”)
systems for diesel passenger cars which allows to reduce polluting emissions of NOx by mixing AdBlue
with the exhaust gas of the car. They exchanged commercially sensitive information by agreeing to
coordinate on the dimensions and ranges of AdBlue storing tanks and on the average AdBlue
consumption, thus avoiding competing in the development of NOx cleaning technologies for diesel cars.
The European Commission considered the agreement a by object restriction of competition under
Article 101(1)(b) TFEU, imposing a limitation of technical development.
As noted by the European Commission, “Internal documents and public statements show that Daimler, VW, and
BMW considered environmental performance in respect of NOx-emissions to be a factor relevant for competition.
Occasionally, car manufacturers also used environmental performance in respect of NOx-emissions for advertising purposes.
Furthermore, the manufacturers internally discussed the possibility of promoting their cars on the basis of their environmental
performance” (para. 89 of the decision).
The European Commission separately indicated what types of collaboration or information exchanges
between the car manufacturers could be considered unproblematic from the competition viewpoint.
These included, for example, the standardisation of the AdBlue filler neck and the definition of quality
standards for AdBlue, likely leading to efficiencies and cost savings.

 23
Korean Fair Trade Commission

A similar conduct was investigated by the Korean Fair Trade Commission in 2023. The authority fined
Mercedes-Benz, BMW and Audi for a total of approximately EUR 300 million, for colluding to use a
dosing software that would decrease the amount of AdBlue injected in the gas exhaust stream. The
authority noted that the case “expands consumer choice in the eco-friendly car market by recognising sustainability as
a key competition parameter in addition to product, price and amount”.
Source: KFTC (2023) ‘KFTC sanctions German car manufactures for colluding to avoid competition on the development of emissions
cleaning technology’ 문서뷰어 (ftc.go.kr); European Commission (2021) Case AT.40178 – Car Emissions, 8 July 2021,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202146/AT_40178_8022289_3048_5.pdf; European Commission (2021) Letter to the
parties, 8 July 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases1/202146/AT_40178_8022302_3050_5.pdf.
Other forms of collusion may involve bid rigging schemes for contracts relating to the collection,
transportation, and recycling of waste.
3.3. Buyers’ cartels to fix the input price for the recycled material
As the circular economy often hinges on the re-use and recyclability of the production input, a particular
important anti-competitive concern may relate to competitive restrictions taking place in upstream markets.
Joint purchasing agreements may include collective purchases or collective negotiation of price or price
components or other purchasing conditions. While they may strengthen buyer power vis-à-vis a strong
seller in a beneficial way, pushing the purchasing price towards the competitive level, expanding output
and leading to consumers’ benefits, when they lead to significant buyer power, they may result in
deadweight loss upstream and harm to consumers.
Further, joint purchasing agreements relating to specific competitive parameters such as fixing or
coordinating the purchasing prices or its components, purchase volumes, or allocation of suppliers are
typically harmful and may be consider as by object/per se cartels, irrespective of the market share affected
by the agreement.25
In relation to the circular economy, these types of buyer cartels may be particularly problematic as they
may reduce incentives to recover input materials for suppliers as well as limiting the amount of recycled
output compared to the non-recycled one. In its Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, the European
Commission offers the example of several small mobile phone retail shops collecting end-of-life phones at
the time of the purchase of a new one. It notes that, if different manufacturers collectively agree to set a
cap on the price to pay for the discarded phones, which they buy to extract valuable metals to re-use in
their productions, that arrangement qualifies as a buyer cartel that does not require an examination of
market impacts (irrespective of the manufacturers’ market shares). 26 The Spanish competition authority,
for example, fined three purchasers of scrap metal for exchanges of information in the case mentioned
above (see Box 3.1). In the context of a prioritisation of buyers’ cartels, an investigation was also opened
in 2020 by the Dutch Competition Authority in relation to price-fixing of reusable waste.27 A cartel in the car
battery purchasing market was fined by the European Commission in 2017 (see below Box 3.4).

24 
Box 3.4. Car batteries cartels

European Commission
In 2017, the European Commission fined three companies, Campine, Eco-Bat Technologies, and
Recyclex for an agreement, between 2009 and 2012, aimed at setting the purchasing price of discarded
lead-acid car batteries in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. It imposed a fine of
EUR 68 million.
The scrap batteries were collected by garages, maintenance and repair workshops, battery distributors
and other collectors or resellers. Since the agreement aimed at decreasing the price of the recycled
batteries, it reduced competition in the recycling market of lead, which is bought by battery producers.
It was therefore considered particularly harmful to the circular economy.
In the appeal decision on the European Commission’s decision, which reviewed the amount of the fine
following a reconsideration of the duration of the participation in the collusion of one of the parties, the
General Court of the European Union agreed with the European Commission that the agreement was
a by object restriction of competition that did not require an examination of its downstream market
effects. The General Court stated, in para. 305, that
it must be held that the exchanges of information between the cartel participants clearly have an
anticompetitive object, in that they clearly run counter to the requirement of independence, which is a key
feature of the market conduct of undertakings operating within a system of effective competition. Through
those exchanges of information, which concerned in particular current and future purchase prices and
expected volumes of purchases, that is to say highly sensitive commercial information, the cartel
participants communicated to each other how they intended to conduct themselves on the market with
regard to factors that were decisive for their input purchasing policy. Those exchanges were aimed not only
at eliminating or reducing uncertainties over the conceivable conduct of those undertakings, but also at
enabling those undertakings to agree on the purchase prices of scrap lead-acid car batteries and at limiting
the bargaining power of their suppliers. Accordingly, such exchanges of information in themselves reveal
a sufficient degree of harm to competition and can be regarded, by their very nature, as being harmful to
the proper functioning of normal competition.
Source: European Commission, Case AT.40018 Car Battery Recycling, 8 February 2017,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40018; General Court of the European Union, T-240/17,
Campine NV and Campine Recycling NV v European Commission, Judgment of 7 November 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:778.
3.4. Vertical restrictions
Anticompetitive risks in relation to the circular economy may therefore also stem from restrictive
agreements between players at different levels of the supply chain. Vertical agreements will often be
unproblematic, for instance, when they address hold-up or free-ride problems, or when they affect a
relatively small part of the market. The EU Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, for example, provides for
a safe harbour for agreements involving players each with market shares below 30%, provided that no
hard-core restrictions of competition are included. 28
Examples of potentially problematic agreements could thus involve the recycler imposing fixed or minimum
resale prices for the recycled product on the resellers, which is aimed at protecting the manufacturer’s
margin but may, in specific circumstances, make it difficult for resellers to continue using the recycled input
and make the virgin material the only commercially viable alternative. Another example could be the
imposition of export bans on recycled materials to preserve the sale of extracted virgin materials in the
country of origin, or selective distribution agreements where quality criteria implicitly exclude the recyclable
materials.

 25
Pro-competitive selective distribution criteria may also be promoting circularity. For example, the 2022 EU
Vertical Guidelines refers to admissible qualitative criteria based on limiting the use of natural resources.
They provide the example of the distributor being requested to offer recycling services or facilities in their
shops.29 It is also possible that non-compete obligations are used to enable long-term investments into
circular technologies. This would be the case, for instance, of a packaging material supplier wanting to
invest in recycling facilities. The imposition of a non-compete obligation may be justified, depending on the
circumstances, to insure the supplier from the investment risk and long depreciation, ensuring that the
buyers are willing to enter long-term contracts that will justify the large expenditure.30
3.5. Hub and spoke type of arrangements
Anticompetitive concerns may also arise in relation to indirect exchange of commercially sensitive
information among businesses in a vertical relationship that is coordinated or facilitated by a common hub
(which is normally active at different level of the supply chain) This case may be particularly frequent in
those closed-loop supply chains which are based on collaboration among actors at different levels of the
supply chain and coordinated by a central planner (Serafimova and Hörnig, 2023[25]).
An example could be that of a supplier of scrap material coordinating the recycling of such material from
different manufacturers, which uses the scheme to knowingly circulate information among different
manufacturers about their sale volumes or prices.
3.6. Abuses of dominant position
3.6.1. Refusal to supply or provide access to indispensable infrastructure by the dominant

player
By reason of some of the characteristics of the circular economy which may lead to market power (costly
infrastructure, natural monopoly, economies of scale, use of IP rights, see for more details Section 2),
incumbent players may adopt strategies to ensure their market power is not threatened by new entry.
One example would be a situation where a dominant provider of waste collection and management services
denies access to new entrants. For such a case, and based on the essential facility doctrine, it is typically
required that the refusal meets the following conditions:
• it must concern a product which is indispensable to compete in a market;
• it must be likely to lead to lesser competition in the concerned market;
• it must not be objectively justified or offset by efficiencies.31
Competition authority will typically assess whether access to the input or the infrastructure can be easily
replicated by the actual or potential competitor in a reasonable amount of time. This is typically considered
to be difficult when network effects are substantial, or there is a natural monopoly due to economies of
scale or scope.32

26 
Box 3.5. Refusal to provide access to an indispensable infrastructure in the waste management
market
European Commission
In 2016, the European Commission imposed a EUR 6 million fine on the Austrian company Altstoff
Recycling (ARA) for abusing its dominant position by refusing to give access to an indispensable
infrastructure in the household packaging waste management market for four years in Austria.
The Commission found that ARA imposed unnecessary access conditions on the use of its household
collection infrastructure to potential competitors, limiting it to individual regions. It also assessed the
non-duplicability of ARA’s household collection infrastructure, which made it is indispensable to enter
and operate in the market. Reasons for the indispensability and non-duplicability of the infrastructure
centred on landscape and environmental protection, including the following:
• the duplication would increase the number of containers, which, particularly in densely
populated areas, jeopardises the appearances and the liveability of the surroundings;
• it would increase the number of waste transport journeys, which are polluting and disturb public
quiet;
• it would raise costs; and
• it would require consumers to divide waste between different systems.
In addition to the fine, the European Commission also accepted a structural remedy in the form of the
divestiture of part of the ARA’s infrastructure.
As noted by Margrethe Vestager, EU Competition Commissioner, the case showed the importance of
free access to infrastructure for encouraging circular economy and how “Effective competition is vital for
making recycling affordable for consumers. "
Swedish Competition Authority

A similar abuse of dominant position was analysed by the Swedish Competition authority in 2008. The
Swedish company FTI had the monopoly over the collection of used plastic packaging materials in
Sweden. A competitor, TMR, faced significant barriers to entry in the market, being prevented from
using the infrastructure owned by FTI.
The Swedish competition authority found that it would represent a major cost to duplicate FTI’s
infrastructure and that the denial to provide necessary access to the recycling stations constituted an
anticompetitive abuse of dominant position. The case was closed with an agreement whereby FTI would
enable TMR’s access to the necessary infrastructure, to the benefit of plastic recycling and competition.
The recent termination of the agreement by FTI was also found to infringe competition under the
Swedish Competition Act, but, while the Swedish Patent and Market Court upheld the authority’s
decision, in 2020 the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of FTI.
Sources: European Commission (2016) AT.39759 – ARA Foreclosure,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39759/39759_3071_5.pdf; European Commission (2016) ‘Antitrust: Commission
fines ARA €6 million for hindering competition on Austrian waste management market’
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_3116; Swedish Competition Authority (2020), Press Release, The termination
of a contract with a competitor did not constitute an abuse of a dominant position, 28 January 2020,
https://www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/the-termination-of-a-contract-with-a-competitor-did-not-constitute-an-abuse-of-a-dominant-
position/; Swedish Competition Authority (2020), Press Release, Continued Competition in the Recycling Industry, 21 January 2019,
https://www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/continued-competition-in-the-recycling-industry/.

 27
3.6.2. Exclusivity provisions and other exclusionary abuses aimed at slowing down or
limiting repairability, longevity or recyclability of products
Dominant market players may also attempt to impose exclusivity clauses to trading partners to exclude
such alternative providers from the market. For instance, a waste management company may attempt to
contractually impose on waste producers to only source services from it.
Box 3.6. Exclusivity obligations in the waste management of electrical and electronic devices
Italian Competition Authority
The Italian competition authority (AGCM) found that Erion, a company operating in the market of the
collection and management of electrical and electronic devices, abused its dominant position by
engaging in three types of conduct:
• Imposing a most favoured nation clause on waste management suppliers, demanding that they
apply the best price to Erion when providing transport services and waste-treatment fees, as
long as Erion is their largest supplier of electrical and electronic devices to be processed. Erion’s
large market position (around 70%) enables it to meet the condition;
• Applying below-cost prices for the environmental contributions it collects from electronics
producers. This was possible, according to AGCM, because of Erion’s use of surplus budget
from previous financial years, an advantage available to it because of its large market presence,
and that also violated the “no waste, no fee” principle;
• Adopting exclusivity clauses in its bylaws, according to which producers could not join
competing waste management systems.
The AGCM considered that the combination of these three behaviours could prevent entry and exclude
competitors from the market. It accepted remedies proposed by Erion to address the concerns.
Source: Italian Competition Authority, A544 – Erion WEEE, https://www.agcm.it/dettaglio?db=41256297003874BD
&uid=6AD18FE62F7ECF1DC125884400438182&view=&title=A544-ERION%20WEEE/CONDOTTE%20ANTICONCORRENZIALI
&fs=Abuso%20di%20posizione%20dominante.
In some cases, the imposition of exclusivity provisions may be unproblematic, because, for instance, they
are justified by the need for the dominant player to adopt long-term investments specific to that commercial
relationship and needed to fulfil its requirements. A period of exclusivity may be required to ensure that
important investments are recouped (e.g., investments in the infrastructure to set up an exhausted batteries
stewardship take-back scheme in exchange for the obligation to only use that scheme). 33 However, the
use of long-term clauses may also create significant barriers to entry, building a framework known as “long-
term capacity booking” (Fumagalli, Motta and Calcagno, 2018[47]). See, for an example in relation to
sustainability, Box 3.7.

28 
Box 3.7. Electric vehicles charging sector

United Kingdom CMA
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) undertook a market study in the context of the UK's
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 28% by 2035 and achieve Net Zero by
2050. The study, focusing on public and private charging for passenger vehicles, was published in July
2021. It focused on two main questions: how to develop a competitive sector while attracting private
investment for growth (supply side), and how to strengthen the confidence of users of electric vehicle
charge points in the service and its infrastructures (demand side).
The study identified three areas of concern on the supply side. First, there is patchy growth in the sector
with weak infrastructure investments in remote areas. Second, there is limited competition on
motorways, with one main provider and barriers to entry, such as constraints on electricity grid capacity
and long-term exclusive contracts, resulting in the risk of “charging deserts”. Third, there are demand-
side problems including reliability issues (such as damaged charging points) and difficulties in accessing
charge points due to different payment methods, pricing comparison challenges, and potential lock-in
risks due to bundling and subscription services in different formats.
Recommendations to address the situation included, among others, building infrastructure to meet the
demand, address consumers’ trust concerns, accelerating grid connections, enhancing strategic
investments, and lowering connection costs.
Following the study, the CMA also opened investigations in the supply of electric vehicle charge points
on or near motorways to address monopolistic practices. The investigation concerned long-term
exclusive agreements between the Electric Highway Company and three motorway service area
operators and revealed concerns that the long-term agreements could foreclose competing charge
point operators from contracting with motorway service area operators. Commitments offered by
Electric Highway included:
• Not enforcing exclusive rights in contracts with the three motorway service area operators after
2026 and reducing the duration of exclusive rights for the following period;
• Not enforcing exclusive rights in those contracts if the relevant sites have received funding aid
from the UK Government under the Rapid Charging Fund (so as to allow competing charge
point operators to access those sites).
Sources: UK CMA, Electric Vehicle Charging Market Study - Final Report, 23 July 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/electric-vehicle-charging-market-study-final-report/final-report; UK CMA, Press Release, CMA
to open up electric vehicle charging competition on motorways, 17 November 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-to-open-up-
electric-vehicle-charging-competition-on-motorways.
Other examples of possible abuses may include instances of discriminatory pricing or discounts that are
aimed at excluding as efficient circular economy competitors, cases of a dominant non-circular economy
player offering tied products to exclude from the market the circular economy product, or cases of a
dominant non-circular economy player imposing commercial conditions on customers that prevent them
from providing a more recyclable, repairable, or durable product. 34
There may also be other ways for the circular player to make it harder for competing recyclers to enter the
market for the collection, sorting and treatment of waste. In an investigation for possible abuse of
dominance, the Spanish competition authority, CNMC, imposed interim measures on the dominant player
Ecoembes to ensure publicity and transparency of the tender relating to plastic waste recycling services.
The authority also limited the volume that could be contracted out to an individual recycler with the auction
in certain markets.35

 29
Problematic may also be all anticompetitive practices that prevent modularity or repairability by design, as
they may prevent entry in neighbouring markets or aftermarkets (for instance, maintenance or repair
services) where the dominant player also operates. The importance of these anticompetitive concerns is
shown by some regulatory initiatives in different countries aimed at reinforcing the right to repair of
consumers. For example, the 2021 President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the
American Economy encourages the FTC to make use of its rulemaking power against “unfair anticompetitive
restrictions on third-party repair or self-repair of items, such as the restrictions imposed by powerful manufacturers that prevent farmers
from repairing their own equipment”36 but also to fight the restrictions imposed by big tech on the diagnostics,
distribution of spare parts and repairing.37 Similarly, regulatory initiatives on the right to repair are a central
part of the New Consumer Agenda and the Circular Economy Action Plan in the European Union.38
3.7. Merger control
Competition authorities may be called to scrutinise anticompetitive mergers that also jeopardise circularity-
enhancing outcomes. Theories of harm that may threaten both competition and circularity at the same time
may include:
• Unilateral effects in circularity differentiated products. As consumers may increasingly prefer
circular products, that will more and more become a parameter of competition for companies. This
is illustrated by those cases where companies engage in anticompetitive agreements to suppress
competition on that parameter (see, for examples relating to sustainability and circularity
respectively, (OECD, 2021[39]), Box 3.3, and Box 3.2). Similarly, after a merger, companies relieved
of competitive pressure exercised by competitors on that parameter, may unilaterally degrade the
quality/circularity of that product, as well as potentially impose higher prices, or lower innovation or
output. For instance, this could be the case of an acquisition between suppliers of salvage vehicles
raising concerns about a possible reduction in the amount of salvage vehicles available to suppliers
of recycled parts (see, for an analysis of these concerns in a concrete case, the UK CMA, Copart,
Inc./Green Parts Specialist Holdings Ltd (Hills Motors) merger).39
Box 3.8. Remondis/DSD merger

German Bundeskartellamt
In 2019, the German Bunsderkartellamt prohibited the acquisition by Remondis, the largest German
waste management companies, of Duales System Holding (DSD), the largest dual system provider,
active in recycling services for packaging waste management for manufacturers, importers and
retailers. See, for an analysis of the DSD licence fee system, Box 2.2 above.
The analysis revealed concerns that the merger would enable Remondis to raise prices for collection,
sorting and reprocessing services in the packaging waste management sector for DSD competitors, to
raise prices on the market for dual systems for packaging recycling, as well as creating a dominant
position in the sale of recycled hollow glass cullet like drink bottles and food jars.
Remedies offered by the parties were not found to dispel the German competition authority’s concerns.
A subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court.
Source: German Bundeskartellamt, Press Release, Bundeskartellamt prohibits Remondis/DSD merger, 11 July 2019,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/11_07_2019_Remondis_DSD.html;jsessionid=22A2
DCF7ECD8A2CF38AC2B539A449E44.1_cid378?nn=3591568; Case VI-Kart 3/19 (V) before the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf.

30 
• Increased buyer power. As circularity hinges on the re-use of materials, it is important to preserve
the incentives of involved actors to sell the by-product as an alternative to its disposal. This may be
affected by transactions that create monopsony power or significantly strengthen buyer power of
the purchasers of the recyclable material (OECD, 2021[39]). This is because the less competition on
the purchasing market exists, and the lower the price of the recyclable materials is, the lower the
incentives to recycle it may be, as opposed to simply discarding it. Some of these concerns
emerged in the Aurubis/Metallo merger (see Box 3.9), which involved the largest European copper
producer and the biggest copper recycler worldwide. One of the elements of the analysis conducted
by the European Commission was whether the larger buyer power post-merger would enable the
new entity to reduce copper scrap prices and whether that could stifle the incentives to recycle this
material.
Box 3.9. Aurubis/Metallo

European Commission
The acquisition of Metallo Group, an innovative important player in the copper scrap refining market, by
Aurubis, the biggest copper producer in Europe, was approved by the European Commission in 2020.
The merger was carefully analysed and it was found that it did not give raise to a significant impediment
of effective competition in the recycling of copper.
An important part of the analysis was the concern relating to the horizontal overlap in the purchase of
copper scrap that could increase the buyer power of the merged entity and allow to reduce prices paid
to industrial producers of copper scrap as an inevitable waste of their production. The concern was that
those lower copper scrap prices (equivalent to higher costs for the sellers) would be passed-on in the
form of higher prices to final consumers, which would hurt incentives to recycle this by-product.
Evidence showed, however, that significant competition to buy copper scrap would remain in place after
the merger, also outside of Europe, and that therefore prices would not be significantly affected.
The European Commission, therefore, considering (i) the existence of different relevant markets of
copper scrap and its uses; and (ii) the availability of alternative suppliers and purchasers of copper
scrap, concluded that there was a low risk of competition concerns in the post-merger scenario.
Potential efficiencies related to the technology investments in improved metal extraction from the copper
scrap, also relevant to the circular economy, were not found decisive for the clearance.
Source: European Commission (2020), M. 9404 – Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding, 1 July 2020, C (2020) final,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m9409_3908_3.pdf.
• Unilateral innovation effects. Merger may distort companies’ incentives to compete on innovation
for the circular economy, for instance to slow down or divert away investments or research for
technologies that allow a better use of the primary materials, which means lower need for new
extractions (see Box 3.9 and (OECD, 2021[39])).
• Green killer acquisitions. There is also a risk that circular economy players may be either taken
off the market by incumbent non-circular economy players to alleviate competitive pressure on their
current products (via so-called “green killer acquisitions”) or acquired to eliminate the target’s R&D
investments which may threaten the buyer (“green killer reverse acquisitions”) (Crawford, Valletti
and Caffarra, 2020[48]; OECD, 2023[42]; OECD, 2021[39]).
• Vertical effects. These effects may emerge as a result of a transaction between firms which
operate at different levels of the supply chain. They typically entail input or customer foreclosure

 31
theories of harm. An example would be the case of a merger entity operating in the supply of
salvage vehicles refusing to supply such input (total foreclosure) or increasing the price or
deteriorating the quality of the recyclable parts (partial foreclosure) to downstream customers
operating in the sale of green parts.40
3.7.1. Circularity-enhancing merger remedies
As important a role the consideration of circular economy may play in the assessment of a transaction,
equally important might be the role played by competition authority when accepting remedies, which may
shape the market for the following years. This will manifest particularly prominently in cases that threaten
access to indispensable facilities or that threaten innovation in circular products, and which may be
corrected by imposing remedies aimed at maintaining or enhancing the level of investments in circular
product quality or the choice of circular products (see, for example, CADE’s Videolar-Innova merger below,
Box 3.10). In Austria, remedies were imposed, in the context of a 50/50 joint venture, to provide non-
discriminatory access to storage facilities to third parties for the recycling of waste wood, otherwise very
expensive to transport.41
Box 3.10. Videolar/Innova merger

Brazilian Competition Authority
This case was firstly analysed in 2014 when the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE) approved the
case with commitments. Videolar acquired Innova, both operating in the plastic resin market,
specifically the polystyrene (PS) and the styrene monometer (MS). One of the remedies imposed at
that time was that the merged company should keep the same PS production volume in two of the
cities they had industrial plants for the following ten years. CADE also imposed the obligation to invest
a percentage of the company’s turnover in R&D to develop new types of plastic resins.
Following a decrease of the resins output, the General-Superintendence (SG) considered that the
parties failed to comply with their obligation and re-opened the scrutiny of the transaction in 2019,
suggesting blocking the merger and the divestment of the production plants. CADE’s Tribunal initially
agreed, but in 2021 a new appeal was brought by the parties.
CADE’s Tribunal decided favourably on the appeal, with the majority of votes, concluding that the
detangling of the merger would have a negative impact on the market and that the volume quota
obligation would not solve competition concerns in the PS selling market. To address the horizontal
effects and the loss of innovation concerns relating to future product quality improvements, the parties
committed to investing a higher amount of their turnover from the sale of PS “in the improvement and
development of plastic resins, both in terms of product and distribution (logistics, packaging, etc.) and the sustainability of
the material (collection, recycling and treatment of the materials) or a combination of materials”. The investment
obligations will be monitored by a trustee for five years.
Source: CADE (2022) Videolar/Innova case CADE clears the acquisition of Innova by Videolar,
https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-clears-acquisition-of-innova-by-videolar.
3.8. Efficiency gains, benefits to consumers, and pro-competitive justifications
Competitive assessments in cases with an impact on circular economy markets may involve an
examination of anticompetitive harm and efficiencies. Common criteria in many jurisdictions for allowing an
otherwise anticompetitive agreement or conduct is that the agreement or conduct i) bring benefits to
consumers; ii) is needed to originate the benefits or the benefits cannot be obtained with a lesser restriction
of competition; iii) the efficiencies offset the harm; and iv) some competition is left in the market.

32 
For merger control, recurrent requirements across jurisdictions include that the benefits must go to
consumers, they must originate from the transaction and be supported by clear evidence.
In the evaluation of efficiencies arising in circular economy markets, competition authorities may be
confronted with several questions that may require to be addressed within the traditional competitive
assessment:
• What types of circularity-enhancing efficiencies may be considered in the assessment?
• Can the assessment consider benefits arising to non-consumers, such as citizens in other
jurisdictions?
• How far away in time can the benefits arise for them to be considered transaction-specific or for the
agreement or conduct to be considered necessary to produce them?
3.8.1. What types of circularity-enhancing efficiencies may be considered in the

assessment?
There are a number of circularity-enhancing efficiencies that may arise from agreements, behaviour and
transactions with an impact on the circular economy. These may include, for example, choice and quality
improvements, for instance as regards the enhanced recyclability, durability and repairability of the product.
They may include innovation improvements, such as the introduction of new process or product innovation
and technologies that enable circularity. Further, they may include cost savings on raw materials thanks to
enhanced recyclability, increased economies of scale and scope, R&D synergies that address innovation
spillovers, or enabled interoperability that delays product obsolescence.
For instance, the 2022 EU Vertical Guidelines explicitly refers to information that may be exchanged to
implement a vertical agreement and be considered necessary to produce efficiency gains, namely to
improve the production or distribution of the product. It includes “technical information relating to the contract goods
or services, including information relating to the registration, certification, handling, use, maintenance, repair, upgrading or
recycling of the contract goods or services, notably where such information is required to comply with regulatory measures, and
information that enables the supplier or buyer to adapt the contract goods or services to the requirements of the customers.”42
Similarly, as mentioned above, some anticompetitive restrictions may be justified by the need to protect
investments, address hold-up43 or free-rider problems, or cope with the first-mover disadvantage
(Serafimova and Hörnig, 2023[25]).
The Egyptian competition authority noted that, while anticompetitive concerns arose by the concentration
of the two largest ride-hailing companies in the Uber/Careem merger, circularity and sustainability
efficiencies could emerge. As a result of the use of data analytics and algorithms, these would, for example,
include optimized vehicle routing, reduced under-utilisation of vehicles, reduced emissions and reduced
negative environmental effects (OECD, 2023[46]).
In some cases, it may, however, be more complex to determine whether any consideration should be given
to non-economic benefits (or, more precisely, efficiencies of non-immediate economic nature). These may
include, for example, extraction reduction that is not directly linked to cost savings on raw materials,
prevention of soil degradation, landfill waste reduction, reduced negative impacts on biodiversity or natural
resources and so on. The focus of circularity on productive efficiency, however, suggests that, in many
cases, benefits arising in circular economy cases will also be economic efficiencies, likely more so, for
example, than in other types of sustainability cases.
3.8.2. Can the assessment consider benefits arising to non-consumers, such as citizens
in other jurisdictions?
This is the issue of the consideration of out-of-market effects,44 which most often arises in relation to
sustainability rather than circular economy markets, for instance with regard to the reduction of greenhouse

 33
gas emissions. In relation to the circular economy, this issue should be more unlikely to arise, because
most of the economic effects mentioned above (cost savings, economies of scale and scope, R&D
synergies, interoperability, etc.) will tend to benefit the same category of consumers that is potentially
affected by the anticompetitive harm.
Out-of-market effects in these cases would most likely come about in association with the above-mentioned
non-economic impacts of the conduct or transaction. Examples could possibly include extraction reduction
that is not linked to cost savings on raw materials, soil enhancement, landfill waste reduction and so on.
These would be more difficult to take into account for competition authorities in the traditional competitive
assessment, particularly in the lack of specific safe harbours, presumptions or guidelines recommending
otherwise (see for examples of such guidelines, Section 4).
If an agreement or conduct, however, is also shown to bring about significant benefits of economic nature
that are related to the maximisation of productive efficiency relating to the circular economy, these could be
presumed to benefit the relevant categories of consumers. A determination in this sense has been made, for
example, by the Austrian legislator, in a recent amendment to the Cartel Act (see, for details, Box 4.1).
Such agreements or conduct would likely benefit consumers in the form of enhanced choice of circular
products or enhanced circular quality of the product, which may include the non-use value of the product, 45
regardless of whether the immediate positive externalities of the specific conduct or agreements are also
felt elsewhere. For example, one could think about a voluntary agreement to phase out a certain type of
non-recyclable plastic from the manufacturing process that makes the product more recyclable, but also
more expensive. Such an agreement will likely bring about the benefits of reduced plastic production and
plastic waste (quite likely arising in a different jurisdiction than the one where the competition restriction
takes place), but also of enhanced recyclable quality of the product for the same consumers that
compensates for the price increase.
One question arising in many jurisdictions will therefore be whether, in the lack of stated preferences by
consumers for the recyclable product, that could be considered by the competition authority as an increase
in quality offsetting the price increase. This is the recurring problem of consumers behavioural biases,
which may mean that revealed preferences of consumers do not fully show how much they value circular
products.46 Such biases may have to be considered by the competition authority in their assessment in
order to determine whether the agreement or conduct effectively lead to benefits for those consumers, 47 at
least until significant information asymmetries continue to affect consumer goods (Volpin, 2020[44]). As
noted by (Serafimova and Hörnig, 2023[25]), “A the CLSC [closed-loop supply chain] operators are able to build upon the
knowledge of consumers’ preferences when the latter returns the input of the product, it may be easier for businesses to show the
existence of individual use value benefits, e.g. also through customer satisfaction surveys showing increased customer
satisfaction.”
This, however, does not mean that circularity benefits cannot also be considered to fall within the categories
of collective benefits when recognised by the relevant competition authority.48
3.8.3. How far away in time can the benefits arise for them to be considered transaction-
specific or for the agreement or conduct to be considered necessary to produce them?
It is possible that efficiencies relating to circular economy market may take some time to materialise. In
these cases, competition authorities may apply a discounting criterion, by means of which the further away
in time the efficiencies materialise, the stronger the demonstration of the causal link with the agreement,
conduct or transaction may have to be. A similar question arises, for example, in relation to sustainability
agreements, where some competition authorities have shown to remain open to consider such future
benefits.49
For a full analysis of the benefits and risks connected to these questions in relation to sustainability, see
(OECD, 2021, pp. 17-19[39]).

34 
4 Competition advocacy and the

circular economy
In addition to enforcement, competition authorities may make use of several other powers to promote and
support the transition to a circular economy. As the interaction between competition and other relevant
policies (such as industrial strategy, innovation, trade and finance policies) is very close, it is difficult to
overestimate the importance of a whole-of-government approach that is built on principles of effective
competition for the green transition (OECD, 2023[42]).
Particularly important may be the protection of investments in innovation and ensuring that regulatory
constraints do not create undue obstacles to the circular economy. Specifically with regards to financial
policies for the green transition, competition authorities can also contribute by addressing businesses’
anticompetitive conduct that prevents access to investments to develop circular initiatives, products and
technologies.
Competition authorities can thus interact with governments and businesses to ensure that the most market-
friendly solutions are adopted to promote a circular economy. Competition advocacy can thus support the
maximisation of the use of State resources and private investments in the transition to a circular economy.
Some practical examples of such initiatives are listed below.
4.1. Enforcement guidelines, comfort letters and regulatory sandboxes
Competition authorities may issue guidelines to ensure that the uncertainty as to the application of
competition law is not an obstacle to pro-competitive sustainability initiatives and to the promotion of a
circular economy or is not perceived as such by businesses. For instance, sustainability guidelines or
studies have been issued or are under discussion at the European level, 50 as well as, for example, in the
UK,51 Austria,52 the Netherlands,53 Greece,54 Germany,55 Spain,56 and Japan.57

 35
Box 4.1. The Austrian Cartel Law Amendment and Guidelines on Sustainability Co-operations
The Austrian Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde adopted guidelines following an amendment to its cartel law
specifically introducing a sustainability exemption. Such an exemption allows to presume, in the
presence of an agreement falling under the Austrian Cartel Act which yields consumers’ benefits (i.e.,
improvements to the production or distribution of goods or technical or economic progress) and that
demonstrably and significantly contributes to “an ecologically sustainable or climate-neutral economy”, that such
benefits are enjoyed by consumers (i.e., a fair share of those benefits are enjoyed by them).
The 2022 Guidelines, published by the Austrian Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde after a public consultation,
include a specific reference to the circular economy, explaining that a contribution to “an ecologically
sustainable or climate-neutral economy” includes the “transition to a circular economy”. A contribution is considered
to be made
“if products’ durability, reparability, upgradability, reusability or recyclability, or the manner in which they
are provided are improved, and the consumption of resources is therefore reduced. Such a contribution
may also be made if the quantities of waste produced or incinerated are reduced, or the reuse and recycling
of waste is improved. A reduction of hazardous substances in materials and products may also contribute
to the transition of a circular economy.”
Source: Austrian Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, Guidelines on the Application of Section 2 para. 1 Cartel Act to Sustainability Co-operations
(Sustainability Guidelines), September 2022, https://www.bwb.gv.at/en/news/detail/afca-publishes-final-guidelines-on-sustainability-
agreements-for-companies.
In addition to ensuring that they do not actively discourage pro-competitive initiatives that foster circularity,
competition authority may also be able to perform individual assessments or to provide informal guidance
in specific cases. For example, the Australian regime enables the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) to clear collective initiatives, taking into account the potential anticompetitive harm
and the public benefit deriving from the conduct. With this power, the ACCC has in the past authorised tyre
and batteries stewardship schemes to the purpose of coordinating safe discarding of such products and to
benefit the circular economy (for a detailed explanation of the Australian authorization regime, see note by
Australia58 and OECD (2021, pp. 43-44[39])).59
Authorities operating in self-assessment regimes, such as in the EU, may still discretionarily allow
companies to request ad hoc guidance in specific instances, which may lead to the issuance of comfort
letters,60 or other green lighting mechanisms.61 Further, in Greece, the Hellenic Competition Commission
developed a “sandbox for sustainability and competition”, i.e. a protected space where “industry [can]
experiment with new business formats that aim to realize more quickly and efficiently sustainability goals, and which involve
cooperation between competing undertakings or even more permanent changes in market structure in order to be accomplished”
(OECD, 2021[49]).
Competition authority may also ensure that they do not actively discourage or, when individual assessment
or informal guidance is requested, explicitly allow collective private initiatives between competitors in
relation to finance for the circular economy, such as banking or insurance alliances, that do not have
anticompetitive effects on the market. For example, recently concerns have been raised in the US that
collective initiatives in insurance, asset management and banking sectors aimed at progressively
withdrawing coverage to fossil fuel projects may infringe antitrust rules. 62 Depending on the case,
competition authorities may assess whether there are genuine reasons to fear antitrust liability or whether
it is possible to reassure the involved players on the legitimacy of their initiatives aimed at promoting the
circular economy.

36 
4.2. Power to issue opinions to Governments
Many competition authorities are endowed with the power to provide opinions to Government on planned
reforms or individual pieces of regulation. This power allows them to influence Governments and to ensure
they consider the principles of competitive neutrality and of competition when adopting new pieces of
legislation.
A recent example of the usefulness of this power is provided by the French Competition Authority, which
gave its opinion on the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the exclusivity rights granted to
the eco-organisms for organising the chain of plastic packaging recycling.
Box 4.2. Opinion of the French Competition Authority on EPR for household packaging
The French Minister of Economics, Finance and Recovery recently requested the opinion of the French
Competition Authority on a draft order aimed at modifying the requirements of producer responsibility
organisations for the recycling of household packaging.
The Order of 15 March 2022 provided eco-organisations with the exclusive rights to organise the
collection and recycling of some types of household plastic waste that met specific conditions. This is
aimed at facilitating the achievement of plastic retrieval and recycling goals quickly, allowing eco-
organisations to structure their investments and to focus on plastic waste that are not or not very
recyclable.
The French Competition Authority in the use of its power of providing an opinion on a proposed piece
of legislation looks at whether any anticompetitive restrictions can originate by the reform and, if it finds
any, it balances it against the public interest that the provision aims at serving, checking whether the
restrictions are necessary and proportionate to reach that objective.
In this case, it found that the granting of exclusive rights to organise the retrieval of household waste
could lead to foreclosure effects that may prevent new entry in the markets of retrieval and recycling of
plastic materials. According to the authority, “this exclusivity is likely to restrict competition between recovery
operators, limit the choice of the local authorities in their recovery options and deprive them of the profit generated by the
marketing of this waste”.
It therefore recommended to include a time limitation on the granting of the exclusivity right that would
not exceed end of 2029. It also advised to include a review mechanism that would allow to monitor the
implementation of the new system in 2025.
The authority also examined the Government’s proposal to include a balancing mechanism according
to which eco-organisations with small market share upstream would be ensured a presence in the
downstream market. The mechanism would aim at better distributing take-back and recycling
obligations between eco-organisations and in a way that is proportionate to their upstream market
shares. This mechanism was found by the authority to be disproportionate in that it would risk
strengthening the market position of the Citeo group in a market already characterised by significant
barriers to entry.
Source: French Competition Authority, Opinion 22-A-05 of 16 June 2022 on the balancing mechanism provided for by the draft amending
order on the approval procedure and specifications for eco-organisations in the household packaging,
https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/fr/avis/relatif-au-mecanisme-dequilibrage-prevu-par-le-projet-darrete-modificatif-relatif-la-
procedure.

 37
4.3. Market studies
One very effective way in which competition authorities may support the circular economy is with market
studies (sometimes referred to as market investigations, market enquiries, or fact-finding surveys) of
relevant sectors. They typically involve a thorough analysis of a specific market, in consultation with
relevant stakeholders, and may result in recommendations to improve competition. The notion of “market”
in market studies may be broader than the one typically applied in competition enforcement and may extend
to a whole sector or practices across different products (OECD, 2020[50]).
Market studies to support the circular economy may be initiated to conduct analysis of legislation to ensure
that it respects the principles of competition or serve as information-gathering tools to improve knowledge
of a specific sector, analyse widespread practices for potential anticompetitive issues, or understand
demand-side issues that affect competition. Competition authorities can therefore conduct market studies
to understand whether there are barriers to private investments that can be addressed by them or by
government measures or advise governments to help minimise market distortions from policy and
regulatory interventions aimed at supporting the circular economy, for example by promoting access to
credit for circular start-ups or new technologies.
Several OECD countries (such as, for instance, Germany, 63 Sweden,64 Italy,65 Spain66 and the United
Kingdom67) have undertaken studies or are currently analysing the electric vehicle plugging sector, as a
result of governmental commitments to reduce or block sales of non-electric vehicles in the future. The
European Commission has also just published an extensive study in the market for electric vehicle charging
across different EU countries, with a deeper focus on four European markets (Ireland, Italy, Croatia and
Belgium).68
This can be done for markets of particular relevance to the circular economy, such as it was done recently
by, for example, by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), which launched a fact-finding survey of the
polyethylene terephthalate (PET) bottle recycling sector, to investigate concerns that some companies or
trade associations may restrain competition in the household and the business PET recycling; 69 the
Spanish CNMC, which opened a market study on packaging waste management, 70 and the German
Bundeskartellamt, which conducted a sector probe into waste collection, revealing high levels of
concentration and high barriers to entry in the collection and transport of household waste and decreased
intensity of competition.71
4.4. Competition-friendly procurement in circular markets
Competition authorities also have an advocacy role in influencing the design of competitive tenders for
public procurement that is pro-circular economy. This is very important, for instance, in relation to the waste
management sector or other sectors where services can be offered via procurement contracts.
Evidence from different countries shows that competitive tendering of household waste management is
associated with significant cost savings and does not lead to a decline in quality. A 2006 study conducted
by the Irish Competition Authority analyses evidence from the US, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, and
Canada, and concludes that “Competitive tendering does not lead to a lower quality of collection service; [it] yields significant
cost savings compared to provision by public authorities” (Irish Competition Authority, 2006[51]).
The specific conditions with which the tendering procedure is conducted are also fundamental to ensure
competitive outcomes and competition authorities may provide guidance on what tender rules may be
adopted to enable them. For instance, in Germany, the Bundeskartellamt recommended the largest waste
management player, DSD, to amend its tender rules to prevent large companies to cluster together to win
the bid (so they would instead submit competing bids), and to enable smaller companies to participate in
the tender by tendering out different services separately.72

38 
In quickly developing technological areas, it may be important to ensure that tender criteria are formulated
in a way that allows competition from new providers and incentivise the participation of alternative
technologies. This can be done by focusing the tender on solution-oriented requirements rather than
technology-specific approaches (OECD, 2021[39]).
4.5. Competition assessment and other ways to reduce regulatory barriers
The circular economy may be characterised by significant amount of regulation, which may be important
to set hygiene, safety and quality standard but may also impose important constraints on business
operators. The industries involved are often very sensitive to technological changes and may exhibit
significant levels of innovation, such as the impact of clean tech, and that may require a certain amount of
flexibility in the regulatory framework or, at least, its revisiting for fitness of purpose should be undertaken
at frequent intervals (OECD, 2023[42]).
In a recent study on regulation and competition, the UK CMA found that countries with more pervasive
product market regulation typically enjoy lower levels of competition and that the most detrimental type of
regulation is that which creates or increases barriers to entry. The study also finds that “there is insufficient
prominence given to the impact of proposed regulation on dynamic competition and the process of innovation in the template used
by government officials to produce Regulatory Impact Assessments. In cases where competition is not sufficiently considered,
there is a higher risk that a regulatory measure could have major unintended impacts on competition and innovation in a market”
(CMA, 2020[52]).
One example is the one of building code requirements for structural concrete. This is a standard that is
aimed at preserving safety in construction and, as such, it is of fundamental importance to public policy. If
unduly detailed, however, its requirements may prevent other types of product from being brought to the
market, and research investments to be poured into them (Gates, 2021[53]).
It may be important that competition authorities contribute to ensure that regulation in sectors that are
important for the circular economy are not unduly burdensome for the market players and do not create
obstacles to investments and new entry. This may include industries where circular innovation and
technologies are prominent but also markets with indirect pervasive effects across economies such as
energy and transport (OECD, 2021[39]). In some cases, particularly in those areas where technological
developments occur very fast, it may be helpful to introduce sunset clauses for new regulation to allow its
re-evaluation over time or to dispose ex ante their rolling back after a fixed period of time (CMA, 2020[52];
OECD, 2023[42]).
The OECD published a Competition Assessment Toolkit which is aimed at helping governments, regulators
and competition authorities to review regulation with the purpose of reducing the costs of doing business
and enabling market entry.

 39
5 Conclusions
To ask whether competition is compatible with the circular economy is also to ask whether our current
economic model is at odds with the long-term conservation of our planetary resources. The above analysis
showed that there are various ways in which competition policy and circular economy goals dovetail and
reinforce each other.
Although competition alone does not necessarily drive the adoption of circular business models, there is a
significant alignment between the goals of the circular economy and competition. Both encourage
businesses to increase resource efficiency and to maximize inputs and raw materials value. To the extent
that productive efficiency and an efficient use of natural resources coincide, competition is therefore one of
the organic drivers of the shift to a circular economy.
As a result, the activity of competition authorities can provide a fundamental contribution to the transition
to a circular economy, including where regulatory action may be missing or insufficient, within the current
analytical framework and by means of the traditional tools.
Specifically, competition policy can support the circular economy in at least three ways. First, competition
authorities can consider the impact of anticompetitive agreements, conduct and mergers on the circular
economy, ensuring that they prohibit initiatives that dampen productive efficiency and competition. The
move from a linear to a circular economy will also be demand-led, as informed consumers will opt more
and more for products issued by a circular economy and companies will increasingly compete to provide
them. Competition agencies can thus use their enforcement tools to prevent non-circular economy players
from hindering circular economy competitors and from artificially staggering the release of the more
recyclable version of their own products to protect the market shares coming from the non-circular ones.
They can also prohibit circular economy players from foreclosing input or customers to other circular
players and ensure that they do not collude to slow down the release of the modular, recyclable or
repairable version of their products.
Second, competition authorities may ensure that they allow consumers to reap the circularity benefits
yielded by several forms of pro-competitive business co-operation, such as standardisation and R&D
agreements. Competition authorities can provide concrete guidance to businesses on how competition law
can consider and, when appropriate, facilitate unproblematic circular economy initiatives, such as with
exemptions or by issuing guidelines exemplifying what pro-competitive collaborations contribute to circular
economy goals.
Since both the circular economy and competition promote productive efficiency, it is relatively easy to
integrate circular economy considerations into the current competition analysis framework. In many cases,
behaviour and transactions that harm competition will lead to negative effects on the circular economy and,
vice versa, circularity efficiency gains will also be pro-competitive. This recognition is particularly important
for competition authorities that may find obstacles in fully considering sustainability efficiencies within their
current frameworks (for instance, as regards out-of-market effects), because they will conceivably be able
to consider circularity effects with more ease.
Third, competition policy can be used as a proactive tool to support the transition to a circular economy.
Competition authorities can engage in advocacy efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the
value of competition principles for a well-functioning circular economy among policymakers, businesses,

40 
consumers, and other stakeholders. This can be done, for instance, by issuing opinions to inform
government action, by conducting market studies in strategic sectors, by influencing the design of
competitive tenders in circular economy markets, and by monitoring regulatory barriers that may unduly
hinder competition, innovation and circularity.

 41
Endnotes
1
See for more details, https://ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/articles/we-need-to-talk-about-renewables-part-
1#:~:text=Building%20the%20renewable%20energy%20sector,principles%20of%20a%20circular%20econo
my.
2
See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/10/7-surprising-facts-to-know-about-the-circular-economy-
for-cop26/. See also the WWF, Living Planet Report 2016,
http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/lpr_living_planet_report_2016.pdf. See
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/10/7-surprising-facts-to-know-about-the-circular-economy-for-
cop26/. See also the WWF, Living Planet Report 2016,
http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/lpr_living_planet_report_2016.pdf.
3
For a fuller discussion on de-growth theory, see, among others, (Latouche, 1989[63]), Chapter 9 of (Aghion,
Antonin and Bunel, 2021[12]), (Raworth, 2017[59]), (Hickel, 2021[60]), (Schmelzer, Vetter and Vansintjan,
2022[61]) and (Pisani-Ferry and Mahfouz, 2023, pp. 45-52[71]).
4
For a definition of productivity gains, see (OECD, 2021[64]), which defines them as “the ability to produce more
output by better combining inputs, owing to new ideas, technological breakthroughs and augmented business models. These
transform the production of goods and services, fostering economic growth and rising living standards and well-being”.
5
For a discussion see for example, Chapter 9 of (Aghion, Antonin and Bunel, 2021[12]) and (Raworth, 2017[59]).
6
Article 2, para. 1 of the Japanese Basic Act on establishing a sound material-cycle society defines the
concept as “a society where the consumption of natural resources is minimized and the environmental load is reduced to the
greatest extent possible, by preventing or reducing the generation of waste […] and by promoting proper cyclical use and disposal
of products”. See https://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/docs/files/20120301-28.pdf.
7
See https://www.env.go.jp/recycle/3r/initiative/en/index.html.
8
See https://ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/the-circular-economy-in-detail-deep-dive.
9
Recycling instead of dumping lithium-ion batteries into landfills also avoids significant toxic chemicals
leakage that contaminates water, reducing externalities and saving significant amounts of money for
society on water treatment and health, see, for instance, Jacobson (2022, p. 63[57]). Such batteries are
used in products such as electronics, toys, wireless headphones, handheld power tools and electric
vehicles.
10
The value of information sharing in this area is also highlighted by the fact that, at the time of writing,
several proposals have also been put forward to introduce digital product passports in the EU to enable
market players to share, along with the product, written information relating to its manufacturing and
recyclability across the entire value chain (including, for instance, carbon footprint, material composition,
percentage of recycled materials used, or recycling guidelines). See https://hadea.ec.europa.eu/calls-
proposals/digital-product-passport_en;
https://circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/sites/default/files/cisl_digital_products_passport_report_v6.pdf.

42 
11
See BBC News, 2 December 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-suffolk-30302961.
12
See Jessica Aldred, Supermarket goes green with tomato power, 28 January 2008,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2008/jan/28/supermarketgoesgreenwithto.
13
See https://circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/good-practices/make-most-these-beets-increasing-
diversity-and-building-resilience-sugar-industry.
14
On the role of digital platforms in the circular economy, for example, see (Blackburn, Ritala and Keränen,
2022[70]).
15
X-efficiency is also recognised as the level of efficiency in the production of output given a certain amount
of input based on behaviour and performance.
16
For an analysis of the relationship between competition and innovation, see also (OECD, 2023[66]).
17
See, for an example of governmental target setting on waste minimisation, the UK summary of targets
in their 25-year environment plan, 23 February 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/25-year-
environment-plan/25-year-environment-plan-our-targets-at-a-glance.
18
For a detailed analysis of why regulation is typically considered the preferable way to deal with
externalities and in which circumstances competition policy may be a complementary tool, see (OECD,
2021[39]).
19
See also Margrethe Vestager, Speech, EVP Vestager keynote speech at the Global Competition Law
Conference: Competition policy for greater resilience and effective transition, 20 April 2023, Brussels,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2381: “Antitrust rules should support the
green transition. But when an entire industry aims to become more sustainable, the very mechanism by which competition keeps
prices low can make the transition more difficult. If a company must incur higher costs in order to achieve a better sustainability
outcome, it can face a ‘first mover' disadvantage - the more competitive the market, the greater this disadvantage can be. That
means there are times when cooperation can be a good thing. This is when a market failure is not fully addressed by regulation,
so there is space for private actions to complement. We want to enable these actions, but we want to draw a clear line around
what constitutes greenwashing: the last thing Europe needs is cartels using sustainability as a cover for illegal collusion.”
20
See, for instance, US FTC In the Matter of Rambus, Inc., 2006-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), 2 August 2006,
75364 4, stating that “[t]ypically, the procompetitive benefits of standard setting outweigh the loss of market competition. For
this reason, antitrust enforcement has shown a high degree of acceptance of, and tolerance for, standard-setting activities.” See
also European Commission, Draft guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, https://competition-
policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c3388b84-153b-4848-a920-
31ed69e74c0a_en?filename=draft_revised_horizontal_guidelines_2022_all_languages.zip, para. 465,
and (OECD, 2014[62]).
21
European Commission, Draft guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, https://competition-
31ed69e74c0a_en?filename=draft_revised_horizontal_guidelines_2022_all_languages.zip , para. 477.
22

 43
31ed69e74c0a_en?filename=draft_revised_horizontal_guidelines_2022_all_languages.zip, para. 466.
23
31ed69e74c0a_en?filename=draft_revised_horizontal_guidelines_2022_all_languages.zip, para. 561,
which states that “In order to contribute to sustainable development, […] Competitors may […] wish to agree to harmonise
packaging materials to facilitate recycling or harmonise packaging sizes (and hence product content) to reduce waste.”
24
25
See, for a fuller analysis of purchasing agreements, also (OECD, 2022[55]).
26
27
ACM, Press Release, ACM investigates purchasing cartel for reusable waste, 20 February 2020,
https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/acm-onderzoekt-inkoopkartel-herbruikbare-afvalstoffen.
28
Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/720 of 10 May 2022 on the application of Article
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and
concerted practices, C/2022/3015, OJ L 134, 11.5.2022, p. 4–13, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/720/oj.
29
European Commission, Guidelines on vertical restraints, C/2022/4238, 30 June 2022, OJ C 248, p.1-85,
para. 144.
30
para. 316: “Such vertical agreements with buyers may be pro-competitive, as the long-term non-compete
obligation may be necessary for the investment to take place at all, or for it to take place on the foreseen
scale or within the foreseen time”.
31
For example, in the EU, see judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 November 1998, Oscar Bronner v
Mediaprint, Case C-7/97, para. 41 and judgment of the General Court of 10 July 1991, Radio Teelfis
Eireann (RTE) v Commission, case T-69/89, EU:T:1991:39, para. 73. The “essential facility doctrine” has
been developed by the US jurisprudence in United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis, Supreme
Court (1912). See also MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2004);
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1360-61 (D.D.C. 1981);
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 152021 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S.
585 (1985).
32
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, amended by 2023/C 116/01, C/2023/1923, OJ C 116,

44 
31.3.2023. See consolidated version, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-

03/guidance_paper_article_102_redline_post_amending_communication.pdf, paras. 80 ss.
33
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, amended by 2023/C 116/01, C/2023/1923, OJ C 116,
31.3.2023. See consolidated version, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
03/guidance_paper_article_102_redline_post_amending_communication.pdf, para 46.
34
For examples and further details in relation to environmental considerations and unilateral conduct, see
(Kingston, 2011[68]).
35
CNMC, Press Release, The CNMC adopts interim measures to ensure publicity and transparency for
the upcoming auctions of PET and HDPE plastic waste organised by Ecoembes, 29 December 2022,
https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/editor_contenidos/Notas%20de%20prensa/2022/20221229_NP_M
C-Ecoembes_en_GB.pdf. For the main proceedings, see https://www.cnmc.es/expedientes/s002121.
36United States’ White House, Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 9
July 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-
promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/.
37 United States’ White House, Fact Sheet on the Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the
American Economy, 9 July 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-
economy/#:~:text=and%20repair%20tools.-
,In%20the%20Order%2C%20the%20President%3A,your%20own%20devices%20and%20equipment.
38
By supporting repairing choices throughout the whole product lifecycle, and as part of the broader
objectives of the European Green Deal, they aim at i) promoting repairability of products at the design
phase (Ecodesign for Sustainable Products regulation, Directive 2009/125/EC,
https://commission.europa.eu/energy-climate-change-environment/standards-tools-and-labels/products-
labelling-rules-and-requirements/sustainable-products/ecodesign-sustainable-products_en); ii) promoting
transparency and consumers’ awareness to empower them to make better purchasing choices (Proposal
for a Directive on empowering consumers for the green transition, https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-
travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/sustainable-consumption_en#empowering-the-consumer-for-
the-green-transition; and iii) eliminating obstacles that make it more expensive or difficult for consumers to
access repair services.
39
See UK CMA, Copart, Inc./Green Parts Specialist Holdings Ltd (Hills Motors), Issues statement, 13
January 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63c16c34d3bf7f580ca8fc75/Copart_Hills_M
otors_-_Issues_Statement_.pdf.
40
See, for an analysis of these concerns in a concrete case, the UK CMA, Copart, Inc./Green Parts
Specialist Holdings Ltd (Hills Motors), Issues statement, 13 January 2023,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63c16c34d3bf7f580ca8fc75/Copart_Hills_Motors_-
_Issues_Statement_.pdf.
41
Bundeskartellanwalt (BMJ) zieht Prüfungsantrag zum Gemeinschaftsunternehmen zwischen
Saubermacher und Pölzleitner zurück und genehmigt somit den Zusammenschluss mit Auflagen, 8 March
2023, https://www.bwb.gv.at/news/detail/bundeskartellanwalt-bmj-zieht-pruefungsantrag-zum-

 45
gemeinschaftsunternehmen-zwischen-saubermacher-und-poelzleitner-zurueck-und-genehmigt-somit-
den-zusammenschluss-mit-auflagen.
42
para. 99(a).
43
European Commission, Guidelines on vertical restraints, C/2022/4238, 30 June 2022, OJ C 248, p. 1-
85, para. 316.
44
For a detailed description of out-of-market effects and how they may be taken into account in the
competition analysis, please refer to (OECD, 2021, pp. 17-18[39]).
45
See, for an analysis of non-use value and related examples, European Commission (2022), Draft
Revised Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, 1 March 2022, https://competition-
31ed69e74c0a_en?filename=draft_revised_horizontal_guidelines_2022_all_languages.zip.
46
See, for a full analysis of the effects of consumer behaviour biases in the context of sustainability and
competition, (OECD, 2021[39]).
47
See, for instance, European Commission (2022), Draft Revised Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, 1
March 2022, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c3388b84-153b-4848-a920-
48
31ed69e74c0a_en?filename=draft_revised_horizontal_guidelines_2022_all_languages.zip, para. 601 ss.
49
See, for instance, UK Competition and Markets Authority (2023), Draft Guidance on the application of
the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 to environmental sustainability agreements, CMA
177, 28 February 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-guidance-on-environmental-
sustainability-agreements.
50
European Commission (2022), Draft Revised Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, 1 March 2022,
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c3388b84-153b-4848-a920-
51
UK Competition and Markets Authority (2023), Draft Guidance on the application of the Chapter I
prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 to environmental sustainability agreements, CMA 177, 28 February
2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-guidance-on-environmental-sustainability-
agreements and UK Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) (2021), “Environmental Sustainability
Agreements and Competition Law”, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-
sustainability-agreementsand-competition-law/sustainability-agreements-and-competition-law.
52
Austrian Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, Guidelines on the Application of Section 2 para. 1 Cartel Act to
Sustainability Co-operations (Sustainability Guidelines), September 2022,
https://www.bwb.gv.at/en/news/detail/afca-publishes-final-guidelines-on-sustainability-agreements-for-
companies.

46 
53
Dutch ACM (2021), Second Draft of the Guidelines on Sustainability Agreements,
https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/second-draft-version-guidelines-on-sustainability-
agreements-oppurtunities-within-competition-law.pdf.
54
Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) (2020), Staff Discussion Paper, Competition Law &
Sustainability, https://www.epant.gr/en/enimerosi/competition-law-sustainability.html and Hellenic
Competition Commission (HCC) and Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) (2021),
Technical Report on Sustainability and Competition,
https://www.epant.gr/en/enimerosi/publications/sustainability/item/1284-technical-report-on-
sustainabilityand-competition.html.
55
Bundeskartellamt (2020), Offene Märkte und nachhaltiges Wirtschaften - Gemeinwohlziele als
Herausforderung für die Kartellrechtspraxis,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Diskussions_Hintergrundpapier/AK_Kartellr
echt_2020_Hintergrundpapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2..
56
Spanish CNMC (2020), Position Paper in the context of the European Commission's public consultation
on how competition policy can contribute to the Green Deal, available at
https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/editor_contenidos/Notas%20de%20prensa/2020/SPANISH%20C
OMPETITION%20AUTHORITYs%20COMMENTS%20EU%20CALL%20FOR%20CONTRIBUTION%20
ON%20HOW%20COMPETITION%20RULES%20AND%20SUSTAINABILITY%20POLICIES%20WORK
%20TOGETHER_0.pdf.
57
Japan Fair Trade Commission (2023), Draft of Guidelines Concerning the Activities of Enterprises, etc.
toward the Realization of a Green Society under the Antimonopoly Act, 13 January 2023,
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2023/January/230118.html.
58
OECD (2023), Competition in the Circular Economy – Note by Australia,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2023)32/en/pdf.
59
OECD (2020), Sustainability and Competition - Note by Australia and New Zealand,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2020)62/en/pdf and Australian Competition & Consumer
Commission, Authorisation AA1000476 of 4 September 2020, Battery Stewardship Council. See also
Gaetano Lapenta and Matteo Giangaspero (2021), Greening Antitrust: Lessons from the ACCC’s
Authorisation of a Recycling Co-Operation Agreement, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpab072.
60
For instance, see the legislative amendment in Greece of Article 37A of the Law 3959/2011, according
to which the President of the Hellenic Competition Commission may, under proposal of the Directorate-
General for Competition and at the party’s request, issue a no-action letter based on public interest
grounds, including for the implementation of sustainable development targets. For an analysis, see
Alexandra Mikroulea and Triantafyllia Mavridopoulou, Greece: Introducing Comfort Letters and Tackling
Attempts to Collude and Signalling, Concurrences, February 2023,
https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2023/international/greece-introducing-comfort-
letters-and-tackling-attempts-to-collude-and.https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-
2023/international/greece-introducing-comfort-letters-and-tackling-attempts-to-collude-and. See also, in
the context of sustainability initiatives, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (2023), Draft Guidance
on the application of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 to environmental sustainability
agreements, CMA 177, 28 February 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-guidance-

 47
on-environmental-sustainability-agreements, para. 7.3 ss. and the Dutch ACM (2021), Second Draft of the
Guidelines on Sustainability Agreements, https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/second-draft-
version-guidelines-on-sustainability-agreements-oppurtunities-within-competition-law.pdf, para. 71. This
regime had also been used by the European Commission in the context of Covid-19 agreements, Comfort
letter of 08 April 2020, COMP/OG – D(2020/044003),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/medicines_for_europe_comfort_letter.pdf.https://www.gov.uk/go
vernment/consultations/draft-guidance-on-environmental-sustainability-agreements, para. 7.3 ss. and the
Dutch ACM (2021), Second Draft of the Guidelines on Sustainability Agreements,
https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/second-draft-version-guidelines-on-sustainability-
agreements-oppurtunities-within-competition-law.pdf, para. 71. This regime had also been used by the
European Commission in the context of Covid-19 agreements, Comfort letter of 08 April 2020, COMP/OG
– D(2020/044003), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/medicines_for_europe_comfort_letter.pdf.
61
See, for instance, European Commission, Press Release 8 July 2021 ‘Antitrust: Commission fines car
manufacturers EUR 875 million for restricting competition in emission cleaning for new diesel passenger
cars’. See also, (OECD, 2020[36]).
62
FT, US banks threaten to leave Mark Carney’s green alliance over legal risks,
https://www.ft.com/content/0affebaa-c62a-49d1-9b44-b9d27f0b5600.
63
German Bundeskartellamt, Preliminary findings of sector inquiry into charging infrastructure, 12 October
2021, https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen
/2021/12_10_2021_charging_stations_%20Preliminary%20findings.html; Charley Connor, Germany
studies e-mobility charging sector, 9 July 2020, https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/germany-
studies-e-mobility-charging-sector.
64
Olivia Rafferty, GCR, Sweden launches electric charging market study, 2 February 2023,
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/sweden-launches-electric-charging-market-study.
65
AGCM, 2023, A557 - Italian Competition Authority: investigation initiated against Enel for possible abuse
of dominant position in the e-mobility sector’, https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2023/4/A557.
66
See Spanish CNMC, Press Release, 22 February 2023, https://www.cnmc.es/prensa/estudio-recarga-
vehiculo-electrico-20230222.
67
UK CMA, Electric Vehicle Charging Market Study - Final Report, 23 July 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/electric-vehicle-charging-market-study-final-report/final-
report.
68
European Commission, Charles River Associates, Competition Analysis of the Electric Vehicle
Recharging Market across the EU27 + the UK, https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
04/kd0323122enn_electric_vehicles_study.pdf; Margrethe Vestager, Speech, EVP Vestager keynote
speech at the Global Competition Law Conference: Competition policy for greater resilience and effective
transition, 20 April 2023, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner
/detail/en/speech_23_2381https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2381.
69
PaRR, JFTC surveys PET bottle recycling sector, 8 February 2023, https://app.parr-
global.com/intelligence/view/intelcms-qx27qz.

48 
70
See Spanish CNMC, Press Release, 22 February 2023, https://www.cnmc.es/prensa/estudio-residuo-
envases-consulta-publica-cnmc-20220222.
71
German Bundeskartellamt, Sektoruntersuchung - Erfassung von Haushaltsabfällen, December 2021,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Sektoruntersuchungen/Sektoruntersuchung
_Haushaltsabfaelle.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3; German Bundeskartellamt, Press Release,
Decreasing competition in the collection and transport of domestic waste, 21 December, 2021,
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2021/21_12_2021_SU_H
aushaltsabfaelle.html?nn=3591568.
71
See DG Competition, Issues of Competition in Waste Management Systems,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/waste_management.pdf.

 49
References
Aghion, P., C. Antonin and S. Bunel (2021), The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic [12]
Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations, Harvard University Press.
Ahlers, J. et al. (2021), Analysis of Extended Producer Responsibility Schemes, [31]

https://adelphi.de/system/files/mediathek/bilder/adelphi_study_Analysis_of_EPR_Schemes_J
uly_2021.pdf (accessed on 13 April 2023).
Blackburn, O., P. Ritala and J. Keränen (2022), “Digital Platforms for the Circular Economy: [70]
Exploring Meta-Organizational Orchestration Mechanisms”, Organization and Environment,
https://doi.org/10.1177/10860266221130717/ASSET/IMAGES/LARGE/10.1177_1086026622
1130717-FIG2.JPEG.
Blind, K., S. Petersen and C. Riillo (2017), “The impact of standards and regulation on innovation [41]
in uncertain markets”, Research Policy, Vol. 46/1,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.11.003.
Bocconi University, Ellen MacArthur Foundation and Intesa Sanpaolo (2021), The circular [7]
economy: a de-risking strategy and driver of superior risk-adjusted returns,
https://emf.thirdlight.com/link/29wifcw68gx1-yw31dj/@/preview/1?o (accessed on
11 May 2023).
Carlton, D. and J. Perloff (1994), Modern Industrial Organisation, Harper Collins. [69]
Cecere, G. and N. Corrocher (2016), “Stringency of regulation and innovation in waste [35]
management: an empirical analysis on EU countries”, Industry and Innovation, Vol. 23/7,
pp. 625-646, https://doi.org/10.1080/13662716.2016.1195253.
CMA (2020), Regulation and Competition - A Review of the Evidence. [52]
Competition & Markets Authority (2021), Environmental Sustainability Agreements and [56]
Competition Law, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-sustainability-
agreements-and-competition-law/sustainability-agreements-and-competition-law (accessed
on 24 March 2021).
Crawford, G., T. Valletti and C. Caffarra (2020), “‘How tech rolls’: Potential competition and [48]
‘reverse’ killer acquisitions”, Vox EU CEPR, https://cepr.org/voxeu/blogs-and-reviews/how-
tech-rolls-potential-competition-and-reverse-killer-acquisitions (accessed on 14 May 2023).
Desrochers, P. and S. Leppälä (2010), “Industrial Symbiosis: Old Wine in Recycled Bottles? [27]
Some Perspective from the History of Economic and Geographical Thought”,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160017610375441, Vol. 33/3, pp. 338-361,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0160017610375441.
Dolmans, M. (2020), “Sustainable Competition Policy”, Competition Law & Policy Debate, Vol. 5- [43]
6/4-1, pp. 4-23.

50 
Dunne, N. (2015), Competition Law and Economic Regulation -Making and Managing Markets, [33]
Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/competition-law-and-
economic-regulation/E04AE766B9E8C0E6CD81CDF0FDFFACC4 (accessed on
12 May 2023).
Ekins, P. et al. (2019), The Circular Economy: What, Why, How and Where, OECD, [21]
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/Ekins-2019-Circular-Economy-What-Why-
How-Where.pdf (accessed on 24 April 2023).
Farmer, T., P. Shaw and I. Williams (2015), “Destined for indecision? A critical analysis of waste [19]
management practices in England from 1996 to 2013”, Waste Management, Vol. 39, pp. 266-
276, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.WASMAN.2015.02.023.
Forti, V. et al. (2020), The Global E-waste Monitor - Quantities, Flows and the Circular Economy [22]
Potential.
Fumagalli, C., M. Motta and C. Calcagno (2018), Exclusionary Practices, Cambridge University [47]
Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139084130.
Gates, B. (2021), How to Avoid a Climate Disaster: The Solutions We Have and the [53]
Breakthroughs We Need, Penguin Random House.
Geissdoerfer, M. et al. (2017), “The Circular Economy – A new sustainability paradigm?”, Journal [15]
of Cleaner Production, Vol. 143, pp. 757-768, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.12.048.
Hickel, J. (2021), Less is more: how degrowth will save the world. [60]
IEA (2021), The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, [3]
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions (accessed
on 11 May 2023).
Inderst, R. and S. Thomas (2021), “Reflective Willingness to Pay - Preferences for Sustainable [45]
Consumption in a Consumer Welfare Analysis”, https://www.wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/dateien_abteilungen/abt_fin/Dokumente/PDFs/Allgemeine
_Dokumente/Inderst_Downloads/Neuere_Arbeiten_seit2015/Inderst_and_Thomas_Reflective
_WTP_5_July_2021.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2021).
Irish Competition Authority (2006), Submission to the Department of the Environment, Heritage [51]
and Local Government - (Response to Consultation Paper “Regulation of the Waste
Management Sector”, https://www.ccpc.ie/business/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2017/04/S_06_007-Waste-Regulation.pdf (accessed on
17 April 2023).
Jacobson, M. (2022), No Miracles Needed, Cambridge University Press, [57]

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009249553.
Kingston, S. (2011), Greening EU Competition Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, [68]
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511758522.
Kirchherr, J., D. Reike and M. Hekkert (2017), “Conceptualizing the circular economy: An [14]
analysis of 114 definitions”, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Vol. 127, pp. 221-232,
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RESCONREC.2017.09.005.
Latouche, S. (1989), La décroissance. [63]

 51
Laubinger, F. et al. (2022), “Deposit-refund systems and the interplay with additional mandatory [26]
extended producer responsibility policies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 208,
OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a80f4b26-en.
Livingstone, L. et al. (2022), “Synergies and trade-offs in the transition to a resource-efficient and [4]
circular economy”, OECD Environment Policy Papers, No. 34, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/e8bb5c6e-en.
Macmillan, R. (2019), Competition for-the-market: Enforcement issues with concession contracts, [30]
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2019)12/en/pdf (accessed on 26 April 2023).
McCarthy, A., R. Dellink and R. Bibas (2018), “The Macroeconomics of the Circular Economy [9]
Transition: A Critical Review of Modelling Approaches”, OECD Environment Working Papers,
No. 130, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/af983f9a-en.
Motta, M. (2004), Competition Policy, Cambridge University Press, [34]

https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511804038.
Mulvaney, D. et al. (2021), “Progress towards a circular economy in materials to decarbonize [58]
electricity and mobility”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 137, p. 110604,
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.RSER.2020.110604.
Nordhaus, W. (2021), The spirit of green : the economics of collisions and contagions in a [67]
crowded world, Princeton.
OECD (2023), Competition and Innovation - A Theoretical Perspective, [40]

https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-a-theoretical-perspective-
2023.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2023).
OECD (2023), Competition in the Circular Economy - Note by Egypt, [46]

https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2023)43/en/pdf (accessed on 23 May 2023).
OECD (2023), Pro-Competitive Policies for a Sustainable Economy, [42]

https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/high-level-symposium-on-procompetitive-policies-for-a-
sustainable-economic-recovery.htm (accessed on 23 April 2023).
OECD (2023), The Relationship between Competition and Innovation, [66]

https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/the-relationship-between-competition-and-
innovation.htm (accessed on 12 May 2023).
OECD (2022), Purchasing Power and Buyers’ Cartels, [55]

https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/purchasing-power-and-buyers-cartels.htm. (accessed
on 26 April 2023).
OECD (2021), Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement. [39]
OECD (2021), Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement - Note by Greece, [49]

OECD (2021), OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2021, OECD Publishing, Paris, [64]
https://doi.org/10.1787/f25cdb25-en.

52 
OECD (2021), Policy scenarios for a transition to a more resource efficient and circular economy, [8]
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/policy-scenarios-for-a-transition-to-a-more-
resource-efficient-and-circular-economy_c1f3c8d0-en (accessed on 11 May 2023).
OECD (2021), “Towards a more resource-efficient and circular economy - The role of the G20”, [2]
https://www.oecd.org/environment/waste/OECD-G20-Towards-a-more-Resource-Efficient-
and-Circular-Economy.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2023).
OECD (2020), Co-operation between competitors in the time of COVID-19, [36]

https://www.oecd.org/competition/Co-operation-between-competitors-in-the-time-of-COVID-
19.pdf (accessed on 14 November 2020).
OECD (2020), Sustainability and Competition - OECD Competition Committee Discussion Paper, [17]
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/sustainability-and-competition-2020.pdf (accessed on
23 March 2021).
OECD (2020), Using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues, [50]
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/using-market-studies-to-tackle-emerging-competition-
issues.htm (accessed on 24 May 2023).
OECD (2019), Business Models for the Circular Economy: Opportunities and Challenges for [28]
Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9dd62-en.
OECD (2019), Competition for-the-market, [29]

https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2019)7/en/pdf (accessed on 25 April 2023).
OECD (2019), Global Material Resources Outlook to 2060: Economic Drivers and Environmental [1]
Consequences, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307452-en.
OECD (2016), Extended Producer Responsibility: Updated Guidance for Efficient Waste [32]
Management, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264256385-en.
OECD (2015), Material Resources, Productivity and the Environment, OECD Green Growth [20]
Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264190504-en.
OECD (2014), Intellectual Property and Standard Setting - Note by the United States, [62]
OECD (2013), Waste Management Services, https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Waste- [24]

management-services-2013.pdf (accessed on 23 April 2023).
PACE (Platform for Accelerating the Circular Economy) (2019), A New Circular Vision for [23]
Electronics - Time for a Global Reboot.
Palgrave Macmillan (ed.) (2015), Waste to wealth: The circular economy advantage, Palgrave [6]
Macmillan, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137530707.
Pisani-Ferry, J. and S. Mahfouz (2023), Les incidences économiques de l’action pour le climat, [71]
https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/2023-incidences-
economiques-transition-climat-rapport-de-synthese_0.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2023).
Raworth, K. (2017), Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. [59]
Schinkel, M. and L. Treuren (2021), “Corporate Social Responsibility by Joint Agreement”, [38]
Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2021-01, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3878784.

 53
Schmelzer, M., A. Vetter and A. Vansintjan (2022), The future is degrowth: a guide to a world [61]
beyond capitalism.
Serafimova, M. and J. Hörnig (2023), “Circular supply chains - Where the need for coordination [25]
meets competition law”, European Journal of Consumer Law 1, pp. 69-85.
Siderius, T. and T. Zink (2022), “Markets and the Future of the Circular Economy”, Circular [54]
Economy and Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43615-022-00196-4.
Terzi, A. (2022), Growth for Good, Harvard University Press, [65]

https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674258426 (accessed on 12 May 2023).
Tirole, J. (2022), Socially Responsible Agencies, https://www.tse- [37]

fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/by/tirole/socially_responsible_agencies_071222.p
df (accessed on 23 April 2023).
UN Environment (2019), Global Resources Outlook, https://www.unep.org/news-and- [11]

stories/story/were-gobbling-earths-resources-unsustainable-rate (accessed on 11 May 2023).
Velenturf, A. and P. Purnell (2021), “Principles for a sustainable circular economy”, Sustainable [18]
Production and Consumption, Vol. 27, pp. 1437-1457,
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SPC.2021.02.018.
Volpin, C. (2020), “Sustainability as a Quality Dimension of Competition: Protecting Our Future [44]
(Selves)”, Competition Policy International,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/sustainability-as-a-quality-dimension-of-
competition-protecting-our-future-selves/#_edn42 (accessed on 29 March 2021).
Wang, K. (2022), “Circular Economy as a Climate Strategy: Current Knowledge and Calls to [10]
Action”, World Resources Institute Working Paper,
https://pacecircular.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/Circular-Economy-as-a-Climate-Strategy-
paper-11.22-PACE-WRI-CH-NREL.pdf (accessed on 24 April 2023).
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common Future: Report of the [16]
World Commission on Environment and Development,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf
(accessed on 19 May 2023).
Yamaguchi, S. (2022), “Securing reverse supply chains for a resource efficient and circular [5]
economy”, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, No. 2022/02, OECD Publishing,
Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6ab6bb39-en.
Zachmann, G. (2022), The Role of Competition in the Transition to Climate Neutrality, Bruegel, [13]
https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/WP-11-2022-240622.pdf (accessed on
23 May 2023).

www.oecd.org/competition

Competition in The Circular Economy 2023

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Competition in The Circular Economy 2023

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Competition in The Circular Economy 2023

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

COMPETITION IN THE

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

3 Competition enforcement issues in the circular economy 20

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

4 Competition advocacy and the circular economy 34

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2 The relationship between circular

2.1. Circular economy and sustainability

Figure 2.1. Circular business models value chains

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2.2. Circularity as resource efficiency

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2.3. Circular economy market characteristics and competition dynamics

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2.4. Sources of market power in the circular economy

2.4.1. Infrastructures, economies of scale, and network effects

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Box 2.1. Deposit-return system for non-reusable packaging in Romania

2.4.2. Vertical integration as barriers to entry and local markets

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2.4.3. Intellectual property rights

Box 2.2. German waste disposal system

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2.5.1. Creation of incentives for an efficient use of resources

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

2.5.3. Development of circular economy business models

2.5.4. Pro-competitive collaboration and exploitation of synergies

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Box 2.4. Agreement among soft-drink producers to reduce plastic production

2.5.6. Market creation

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

3 Competition enforcement issues in

3.2. Agreements and exchange of commercially sensitive information to slow

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Box 3.2. Restrictive agreements on recycling end-of-life vehicles

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Korean Fair Trade Commission

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Box 3.4. Car batteries cartels

3.4. Vertical restrictions

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

3.5. Hub and spoke type of arrangements

3.6. Abuses of dominant position

3.6.1. Refusal to supply or provide access to indispensable infrastructure by the dominant

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Swedish Competition Authority

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

Box 3.7. Electric vehicles charging sector

COMPETITION IN THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY © OECD 2023

3.7. Merger control

Box 3.8. Remondis/DSD merger