University of Georgia

From the SelectedWorks of Cas Mudde

2015

Vox Populi or Vox Masculini? Populism and

Gender in Northern Europe and South America
Cas Mudde, University of Georgia
Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Diego Portales University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/96/

 Patterns of Prejudice, 2015
Vol. 49, Nos. 1–2, 16–36, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1014197

Vox populi or vox masculini? Populism and

gender in Northern Europe and South America

CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER

ABSTRACT Conceptually, populism has no specific relationship to gender; in fact,

gender differences, like all other differences within ‘the people’, are considered
secondary, if not irrelevant, to populist politics. Yet populist actors do not operate in a
cultural or ideological vacuum. So perhaps it is the national culture and broader
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ideology used by populists that determine their gender position. To explore this
argument, we compare prototypical cases of contemporary populist forces in two
regions: the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom) and the Dansk
Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’s Party) in Northern Europe, and the Partido Socialista
Unido de Venezuela (PSUV, United Socialist Party of Venezuela) and the Bolivian
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement for Socialism) in South America.
Populists in Northern Europe are predominantly right-wing, yet mobilize within
highly emancipated societies, while populists in South America are mainly left-wing
and mobilize in strongly patriarchal societies. Our analysis provides a somewhat
muddled picture. Although populists do not necessarily have a clear view on gender
issues, the latter are clearly influenced by ideology and region. While left-wing
populists tend to be relatively progressive within their traditional South American
context, right-wing populists mainly defend the status quo in their progressive
Northern European context. However, in absolute terms, the relatively high level of
gender equality already achieved in Northern Europe is at least as advanced as the
one proposed by the populists in South America.

KEYWORDS gender, Northern Europe, populism, radical right, sexism, South

America

A s with so many political phenomena, populism is mostly associated with

(powerful) men. This applies most notably to populist actors, from Latin
American populist presidents like Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina or Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela to European populist leaders like Silvio Berlusconi in
Italy or Jörg Haider in Austria. But in some cases even the populist masses are
predominantly male: for example, most parties of the populist radical right
(PRR) in Europe have an electorate in which men clearly outnumber women.
Moreover, particularly in Latin America, populists have often been seen as
prime examples of machismo politics, the antithesis of feminism, promoting
sexist ideas and policies, hindering rather than advancing women’s political

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 17

and social rights and position. Nevertheless, conceptually, populism has no

specific relationship to gender; in fact, gender differences, like all other
differences within ‘the people’, are considered secondary, if not irrelevant, to
populist politics. Yet populist actors do not operate in a cultural or ideological
vacuum. So perhaps it is the national culture and broader ideology used by
populists that determine their gender position.
To be able to explore this argument, we need to compare populist actors
that are on different sides of the ideological spectrum and operate in different
national cultures with respect to gender norms. We find these in the populists
in Northern Europe, who are predominantly right-wing yet mobilize within
highly emancipated societies, and the populists in South America, who are
mainly left-wing but mobilize in strongly patriarchal societies. We selected
four prototypical cases of the contemporary populist forces in these two
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regions: the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom) and the
Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’s Party) in Northern Europe, and the
Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV, United Socialist Party of
Venezuela) and the Bolivian Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement for
Socialism) in South America. Using a broad variety of primary and secondary
sources, including official party documents (such as party platforms and
leader speeches), we have analysed these four populist actors on the basis of
their representation of women, their preferred gender equality policies, and
their discourse on women.1
Our comparative analysis shows that the relationship between populism
and gender politics is highly dependent on the cultural context in which
populist actors operate. Given that they are normally interested in winning
votes (like most political actors), it is not surprising that populists are inclined
to take mainstream positions on aspects that are not central to their own
agenda. However, populism never appears in a pure form, but rather in
combination with other sets of ideas, which also influence the overall agenda
that populist forces end up defending. In short, in practice the gender politics
of populist actors are influenced by a combination of the national culture and
accompanying ideology rather than by populist ideology itself.

Theoretical framework

Populism is a bitterly contested concept that has been defined in a broad

variety of ways in place and time. While this is not the place to go into this
debate, it should be noted that particularly strong differences exist between
the study of populism in Europe and in Latin America. In the latter,

1 Given the fact that this article is, first and foremost, meant as a theoretical contribution
—and that it covers a broad spread of populist actors and still has to meet the usual
word limit—the individual analyses of the four actors are presented in a fairly concise
and, therefore, limited manner. Consequently, the gender politics of each individual
populist actor deserves much further study.
 18 Patterns of Prejudice

definitions tend to stress either the economic or the organizational aspects of

populism, whereas European definitions focus predominantly on the political
aspects. In recent years some convergence has started to develop in the field,
among both European scholars and between scholars of the two regions, but
it would go much too far to claim an emerging consensus. That said, our
definition reflects this growing convergence and has been successfully
applied to both regions.2
In line with all contributions to this special issue, we define ‘populism’ as a
thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt
elite’, and that holds that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general will) of the people.3 While this might appear an overly broad
concept to some, the definition actually excludes most political actors in the
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world. The two main oppositions of populism are elitism and pluralism.
Elitism is the mirror-image of populism, in that it shares the overall outlook
on society but instead sees ‘the elite’ as pure and ‘the people’ as corrupt, and
wants politics to represent elite opinions and values. Pluralism, in sharp
contrast, believes that society consists of various heterogeneous and cross-
cutting groups, and that politics should be based on compromises between
these groups.
Our definition of populism says nothing about gender issues and roles. In
fact, one would assume that ‘the people’ include both men and women and
that the differences between them, as all other differences within the category
of ‘the people’, are secondary to the primary battle between ‘the people’ and
‘the elite’. As Ernesto Laclau has pointed out, populist constituencies and
leaders are usually quite ambiguous about who precisely constitutes ‘the
people’.4 They put much more emphasis on the idea that ‘the elite’ is
interested in constructing artificial divisions within ‘the people’ in order to
impede their unification. Accordingly, populists normally spare no effort in
attacking their enemy, usually depicted as a corrupt group of powerful actors
working against ‘the general will’. In short, as populism is based first and
foremost on a Manichaean distinction between ‘the pure people’ and ‘the
corrupt elite’, it does not hold a specific position on gender issues and roles.
There is a possibility that a populist view on gender does exist, however,
even if it is secondary to the primary anti-elite struggle. For example, populists
could have a gendered perception of their primary struggle, in which ‘the
people’ are described in traditional masculine terms, and ‘the elite’ in

2 See Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Exclusionary vs. inclusionary
populism: comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America’, Government and
Opposition, vol. 48, no. 2, 2013, 147–74; and Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira
Kaltwasser (eds), Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2012).
3 Cas Mudde, ‘The populist zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no. 4, 2004,
541–63 (543).
4 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso 2005).
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 19

traditional feminine terms; in other words, the enemy could be feminized.

However, to underpin this kind of distinction, populism needs the help of
other factors. For instance, in previous research we have shown that the main
differences between contemporary populist forces in Latin America and
Europe stem from their employment of specific ideological features that are
related to the grievances existing in each of these regional contexts.5 In line
with this finding, we believe that whether or not populist actors and followers
have a gendered characterization of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ depends
mainly on two factors: the cultural setting in which they operate and the other
ideological features to which they adhere. For the sake of clarity, it is worth
explaining each of these factors briefly.
By comparing prototypical cases of contemporary populism in Northern
Europe and South America we are considering two world regions that differ
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in many aspects. Making broad generalizations about each of these regions is

always complicated, as there are also many differences within them.
Nevertheless, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the views on gender issues
and roles in Northern Europe are much more emancipated than those in
South America.6 This means that we are comparing populist forces working
in very different cultural settings, particularly when it comes to gender
norms. Accordingly, we argue that, given that populist actors roughly express
the ‘popular’ views on gender issues and roles—as expressed in their
respective country—they adopt a masculine position in South America and
a relatively gender-equal approach in Northern Europe.
Our comparative analysis is not only interesting due to the different
cultural contexts in which populist forces operate, but also because we
contrast very different manifestations of populism. As a thin-centred
ideology, populism seldom exists alone; in most cases, populist actors
combine their populism with other ideologies, such as other thin-centred
ideologies like nationalism or thick ideologies like socialism.7 The literature
on populism generally distinguishes between right-wing populism in Europe
and left-wing populism in Latin America. We here use ‘left’ and ‘right’
following the Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio, who sees the distinction to
be principally based on support for equality.8 Assuming that the affiliated
ideology of populists primarily drives their view on gender issues and roles,
we expect that populist parties in Northern Europe would not give that much

5 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Populism’, in Michael Freeden, Lyman
Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2013), 493–512 (499–500).
6 See, for example, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and
Cultural Change around the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).
7 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1996).
8 Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, trans. from the
Italian by Allan Cameron (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996).
 20 Patterns of Prejudice

centrality to the issue of gender equality, while populist forces in South

America would emphasize support for gender equality as it is a form of
equality.

Populism in Northern Europe and South America

Before we compare the relationship between populism and gender in the two
regions, let us first briefly introduce the populist actors that we study in this
paper and explain why we decided to focus the analysis on two particular
cases for each region. Populism is a relatively new phenomenon in Western
Europe. Although some populist movements emerged in Western Europe
shortly after the Second World War (most notably Poujadism in France),
populist forces have only come to the fore in Northern Europe in the 1970s,
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with the rise of the Progress parties in Denmark and Norway. Today, right-
wing populist parties exist throughout Europe. The literature tends to
distinguish between two subtypes of right-wing populism: neoliberal popu-
lism, which combines populism with neoliberalism, and national populism,
which combines populism with nationalism.9 We focus here specifically on
the subtype of national populism, which is the more successful of the two in
Europe, and in particular on the populist radical right. PRR parties share an
ideology that combines at least the following three features: nativism,
authoritarianism and populism. Whereas nativism is a combination of
nationalism and xenophobia, and strives for a monocultural state hostile to
‘alien’ influences, authoritarianism is the belief in a strictly ordered society, in
which infringements of authority are severely punished.10
While Northern Europe does not refer to a precisely drawn geographical
territory, like Scandinavia or South America, it is a term often used to describe
a group of countries that are all part of Germanic or Nordic culture: most
notably, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The
most important PRR parties in Northern Europe are the DF in Denmark and
the Dutch PVV. Both parties belong to the set of principal political parties in
their respective countries in terms of electoral support and political influence.
The DF has been the supporting party of three consecutive minority
governments between 2001 and 2011, whereas the PVV performed the
same function for a Dutch minority government between 2010 and 2012. In
the last parliamentary elections, both the DF and the PVV came in third, with
12.3 and 10.1 per cent of the votes, respectively. One difference between these
two parties, however, is that the DF was co-founded (in 1995) by a woman,
Pia Kjærsgaard, who led the party until 2012, while the PVV leader (and only
official member) is a man, Geert Wilders. This difference allows us also to

9 Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan 1994).
10 See Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2007), ch. 1.
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 21

investigate whether the sex of the populist leader has an effect on the
relationship between populism and gender issues and roles.
South America is a well-established geographical concept, referring to a
region with a relatively similar history and culture. The continent has a long
history of populism, dating back to the 1930s. In recent years, following the
right-wing neo-populist period of the late 1980s to the early 1990s, a new
‘wave’ of populism that is (again) left-wing has swept through South
America. The current examples of South American populism are attempting
to implement a new model of development that is at odds with the
‘Washington consensus’.11 Leaders like (the late) Hugo Chávez in Venezuela,
Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador have developed a
populist ideology that criticizes ‘the elite’ for their support of free-market
policies, which have been allegedly implemented against the will of ‘the
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people’. From this perspective, neoliberal reform programmes are seen as one
of the main causes of political alienation, and growing state intervention is
defined as a necessary measure to improve the integration of excluded sectors
of society.
In this contribution we will analyse two of the main examples of this
contemporary left-wing populist wave in more detail: Hugo Chávez and the
PSUV in Venezuela, and Evo Morales and the MAS in Bolivia. A comparison
of these two cases is particularly interesting, because there is at least one
important difference between them. While the former has been organized
from above, and has been highly dependent on the figure of the late Chávez,
the latter has strong grassroots networks with an important level of political
autonomy from the party leadership.12 Hence, an analysis of these two cases
can perhaps also help us identify whether the gender dynamic in populist
leftist parties in contemporary Latin America is related to the type of link that
they maintain to civil society.

Gender representation in populist parties

If one thinks of populism, one tends to think of strong, male presidents like
Rafael Correa in Ecuador and party leaders like Jean-Marie Le Pen in France.
There are, however, also several examples of female populist leaders. While
some have attained most of their power because of personal relations to a
male leader, like Marine Le Pen in France or Keiko Fujimori in Peru (although
both also clearly have their own qualities and power bases), others have made

11 See, among others, Kirk A. Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative
Perspective (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2010); and Kenneth
M. Roberts, ‘Repoliticizing Latin America: the revival of populist and leftist
alternatives’, Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas, November 2007.
12 Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, ‘Latin America’s “left turn”: a framework for
analysis’, in Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (eds), The Resurgence of the Latin
American Left (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2011), 1–28 (13).
 22 Patterns of Prejudice

a career without the help of such a male ‘patron’: think of Pauline Hanson in
Australia, Pia Kjærsgaard in Denmark and, of course, Sarah Palin in the
United States. That said, in this section, we look at the role of women in
contemporary populist movements and parties in Northern Europe and
South America, in particular at their levels of representation in (supra-)
national parliaments.

Northern Europe

PRR parties in Europe are, for the most part, Männerparteien (men’s parties),
and the parties in Northern Europe are no exception.13 They are predomi-
nantly led by men, represented by men and supported by men. Interestingly,
this is almost equally the case for parties with female leaders, like the Danish
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DF. Even those parties led by strong female politicians are predominantly
represented by men within the various party organs and parliaments, and
their electorates reflect the usual 2:1 male dominance.14
The Folketing is among the most gender-equal parliaments in the world.
The current parliamentary average is 39 per cent, that is, 70 out of 179 MPs are
women. Somewhat surprisingly, like other Scandinavian countries, Denmark
has seen its gender imbalance stabilize over the past decades.15 The first
parliamentary faction of the DF, which broke off from the larger faction of the
neoliberal populist Progress Party in 1995, counted four members, including
one woman, Pia Kjærsgaard. Since then it has increased its total number of
MPs and the percentage of women MPs of its faction to a high of 25 and 40
per cent in 2007 (see Table 1). The representation of women in the DF
parliamentary faction has been 31 per cent (1998), 41 per cent (2001), 38
per cent (2005), 40 per cent (2007), and 36 per cent (2011); only in 1998 and
2011 was it below the average of all other parliamentary parties (-7 per cent
and -3 per cent, respectively), while in 2001 (+3 per cent) and 2007 (+1 per
cent) it was slightly higher (in 2005 it was average).16 In the current Folketing
the female representation in the DF faction is 36 per cent, which is 3 per cent
below the parliamentary average of 39 per cent. However, as has always
been the case with regard to women representation in the Folketing,
and other parliaments around the world, there are ‘significant partisan

13 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, ch. 4.

14 The sex gap of the DF electorate has actually closed significantly since the party became
a supporting party of the minority government in 2001, which is in line with the thesis
that women voters are more influenced by a party’s ‘acceptability’. See Mudde, Populist
Radical Right Parties in Europe, ch. 4.
15 See Christina Fiig, ‘Women in Danish politics: challenges to the notion of gender
equality’, in Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley (eds), Women and Politics around the
World: A Comparative History and Survey, 2 vols (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO 2009), II,
311–28.
16 See Anders Ravik Jupkås, ‘Feminization of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavia:
the Männerparteien thesis revisited’, 2014, unpublished manuscript, 8.
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 23

Table 1 Number of female and total MPs and MEPs of the DF and the PVV, 1995–2014

National parliament (lower house) European parliament

Danish People’s 1995 1998 2001 2005 2007 2011 1999 2004 2009 2014
Party (DF) 1/4 4/13 9/22 9/24 10/25 8/22 0/1 0/1 1/2 1/4
Party for 2006 2010 2012 1999 2004 2009 2014
Freedom (PVV) 1/11 4/24 3/15 1/4 1/4

differences’.17 For example, women’s representation in the various parties in

the current legislature ranges from 62 per cent in the Socialistisk Folkepart
(Socialist People’s Party) and 59 per cent in the Radikale Venstre (Social
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Liberal Party) to 32 per cent in Venstre (Liberal Party) and DF.18 Interestingly,
of the three parties with a female party leader, two had factions with women’s
representation below the parliamentary average: the DF and the Socialde-
mokraterne (Social Democratic Party) at 35 per cent.
Like the DF, the PVV emerged out of a split within the parliament, when
Geert Wilders left the conservative Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
(VVD, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and founded his one-man
Groep Wilders (Group Wilders) faction in 2004. Given that Wilders is the
only official member of the PVV, the party is almost completely identified
with him, and therefore has a strongly masculine image. This wasn’t helped
by the fact that the PVV had just 1 woman out of 11 MPs (9 per cent) in its first
parliamentary period (2006–10). However, since then it has increased this
percentage to 17 per cent in its second period (2010–12), and 20 per cent in the
current parliament (see Table 1). Still, the PVV has always been well below the
parliamentary average. In fact, in the period 2010–12, it had the second lowest
percentage of women, after the notorious, orthodox Protestant, Staatkundig
Gereformeerde Partij (SGP, State Reformed Party), which had to be forced by
the Dutch court in 2006 to accept female party members and which believes
that the Bible forbids women from leading men. In the current parliament, the
average is 39 per cent and there are only two factions with lower percentages
of women than the PVV: the SGP and the pensioners’ party 50PLUS.19
The situation in the European Parliament is even worse, which is in part a
consequence of the much smaller size of the factions (see Table 1). For

17 Fiig, ‘Women in Danish politics’, 317.

18 This excludes the four one-person factions in the current Folketing, of which two are
(all) women and two are (all) men. All data are from the official Folketing website at
www.thedanishparliament.dk (viewed 8 November 2014).
19 ‘Onderzoek: Diversiteit in de Tweede Kamer 2012’, available on the Pro Demos website
at www.prodemos.nl/content/download/6098/29889/file/Onderzoek%20diversiteit%20
TK2012%20definitief.pdf (viewed 8 November 2014).
 24 Patterns of Prejudice

example, the DF has been represented in the European Parliament since 1999,
but was a one-member faction in the first two legislatures. In 2009 the second
elected MEP for the DF was a woman who left the party and faction in 2011.
In 2014 the DF became the biggest Danish party in the European elections,
gaining 4 seats, of which only one went to a woman (25 per cent). The PVV
gained its first entry in 2009 and its four-member faction included one woman
(25 per cent). Interestingly, she was placed lowest on the list and only got a
seat because Geert Wilders, who also had been elected, declined to take up
his seat.20 In 2014 the PVV again gained 4 seats of which one was taken up by
a woman. The European Parliament has had on average about 30 per cent
female members.21 This represents generally low to very low figures, with the
exception of the 50 per cent of the DF in 2009–14.
In conclusion, the descriptive representation of women in the PRR factions
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of the national and supranational parliaments in Northern Europe is low and

(much) lower than the national averages. While the percentage is higher for
the party with a female leader (DF), this is only the case in the national
parliament. Moreover, this is consistent with the finding that more
established and successful parties tend to achieve better gender representa-
tion.22 Finally, while the PVV clearly stands out from all other Dutch parties
with a medium- or large-sized parliamentary faction, the DF does not
compare that badly with some other (right-wing) parties in the national
parliament.

South America

Although there have been several populist leaders, movements and parties in
South America, little has been written about the relationship between
populism and gender in this region. In this regard, one of the few cases
that has received more attention is the neoliberal regime of Alberto Fujimori
in Peru (1990–2000), because he could count on the support of poor women
and fostered a process of elite change in favour of women.23
While it is true that Chávez and Morales have been prone to making
masculine appeals to the electorate (see below), it is important to look at the

20 As a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty, the Netherlands was awarded an extra seat in
the European Parliament in 2010, which went to the PVV. That seat was taken up by a
man, which lowered the rate of female representation to 20 per cent.
21 Willy Beauvallet and Sébastien Michon, ‘General patterns of women’s representation at
the European Parliament: did something change after 2004?’, trans. from the French by
Yves Bart, 1 May 2009, paper presented at the ECPR’s Fourth Pan-European Conference
on EU Politics, Riga, Latvia, 25 September 2008, available on the PRISME University of
Strasbourg website at http://prisme.u-strasbg.fr/workingpapers/WPBeauvalletMichon
2009.pdf (viewed 8 November 2014).
22 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, ch. 4.
23 Stéphanie Rousseau, Women’s Citizenship in Peru: The Paradoxes of Neopopulism in Latin
America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009).
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 25

Table 2 Female representation in the Senate of Bolivia and National Assembly of

Venezuela, 2005–16

Senate of Bolivia (Cámara de Senadores of the Asamblea Legislativa

Plurinacional de Bolivia)

Party Parliamentary period

2005–10 2010–15

MAS 1 8.4% 12 46%

Others 0 0% 4 40%

National Assembly of Venezuela (Asamblea Nacional de la República Bolivariana

de Venezuela)
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Party Parliamentary period

2005–10 2011–16

PSUV 24 14.8% 21 12.96%

Others 3 1.85% 6 3.7%

political parties that have supported them. The representation of women in

the parliaments of Bolivia and Venezuela actually increased after Morales and
Chávez came to power. Moreover, their left-wing parties (MAS and PSUV,
respectively) have more women MPs than the other parties in their respective
parliaments. In Venezuela the PSUV had 15 per cent women in the 2005–10
legislature, and has 13 per cent in the current parliament, which compares
very favourably to the pathetic 2 and 4 per cent of the other parties,
respectively.24 The increase in women representatives is particularly striking
in Bolivia, in which the percentage of MAS female MPs went from 8 to a
stunning 46 per cent, while that of the other parties went from a shameful 0 to
a very respectable 40 per cent.25 While this is undoubtedly related, at least in
part, to the introduction of a gender quota, it is important to note that a quota
had already been introduced at the end of the 1990s, but was set at only 33 per
cent for the lower house and 25 per cent for the Senate.26
In short, in South America, the left-wing populist parties perform (much)
better in terms of women’s descriptive representation than other parties in the

24 Calculations based on information on the website of the Asamblea Nacional de la

República Bolivariana de Venezuela, available at www.asambleanacional.gob.ve (viewed
11 November 2014).
25 Calculations based on information on the website of the Vicepresidencia del Estado
Plurinacional/ Presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, available at www.
vicepresidencia.gob.bo/spip.php?page=parlamentarios (viewed 11 November 2014).
26 Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Political Power and Women´s Representation in Latin America
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2010), 50.
 26 Patterns of Prejudice

region. This is in contrast to Northern Europe, where the right-wing populist

parties perform (well) below average, although not always much worse than
other right-wing parties. At the same time, in absolute terms, the differences
are not so great: on average, women’s descriptive representation is 27 per cent
within MAS and 14 per cent within PSUV, which is not much different from
the roughly 30 per cent of the DF and the 15 per cent of the PVV.

Policy positions on the role of women

Even if populist movements and parties are mostly led by men, mostly
represented by male party members and mostly supported by male voters,
this does not in itself mean that they hold traditional views on gender roles
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and relations. After all, most progressive legislation on gender equality was
introduced by male politicians and supported by predominantly male
legislatures (as a consequence of the lack of powerful women). So what is
the position of populist parties on gender issues and what kind of policies are
supported with regard to gender (in)equality? As the introduction to this
special issue points out, this is not a trivial question, since it is unclear
whether populist forces present a consistent picture of what should count as
women’s interests.

Northern Europe

In one of the few studies on European ‘extreme right’ parties and gender, the
editors make a distinction between a ‘traditional’ and a ‘modernized
traditional’ image of women.

The one corresponds to the traditional feminine clichés, that women have the
responsibility for raising the kids and housework, and have more empathy
and placidity (Friedfertigkeit), a greater instinct to protect etc. The second image
of women, on the other hand, takes into account that women are economically
independent (or want to be), (want to) have a professional career, and that
family responsibility for children and the household are not a woman’s only
purposes in life.27

Importantly, both traditional and modernized traditional women believe in

different gender roles, and that women are the ones mainly responsible for
home and family, for which they are predestined because of their natural,
reproductive ability.

27 Helga Amesberger and Brigitte Halbmayr, ‘Einleitung’, in Helga Amesberger and

Brigitte Halbmayr (eds), Rechtsextreme Parteien—eine mögliche Heimat für Frauen?
(Opladen: Leske + Budrich 2002), 17–26 (20). Translations, unless otherwise stated,
are by the authors.
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 27

Like all PRR parties, the DF stresses the importance of the traditional family
for society in its party programme: ‘Denmark depends on the conditions
families are offered. The ties of intimacy between husband and wife and
children and parents are the pillars of Danish society and of great importance
for the future of the country. Therefore, families must be guaranteed the best
possible preconditions.’28 Similarly, the PVV emphasizes the crucial import-
ance of the family, that is, to raise and educate children and future citizens,
but it does not emphasize the specific role of the mother in this process.29
While both parties want the state to encourage families to have (many) more
children, Islamophobia sometimes trumps national(ist) concerns. For
example, the DF and PVV want to limit state child support (kinderbijslag) to
only the first two children; the PVV also wants to stop child support to people
living abroad, clearly targeting immigrants who have returned to their
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country of origin. Finally, the PVV opposes any further cuts to childcare.30
Abortion is not a major concern for the parties. The PVV does not mention
abortion in its election programmes, and seems internally divided on the
issue. While some of its MPs had suggested limiting the term for abortions,
from the current 24 weeks to 18 and even 12 weeks, they later accepted the
24-week term for abortions that are medically indicated. For other abortions,
however, PVV MPs still want to limit the term and they want people to pay
for their own procedure.31 The DF made no mention of abortion in its early
programmes and only included it in 2009. Its position is summarized on its
website: ‘The Danish People’s Party is in favour of the current abortion law.
However, we feel it is worrying that so many people choose to have an
abortion. Although people should have the right to choose an abortion.’32
In most cases the populist radical right seems to accept existing gender
roles in their societies. According to the DF, Denmark is a country with ‘real
gender equality’. At the same time, the party admits that ‘full gender equality’
is not yet achieved.33 While both parties support full gender equality, they
don’t consider it a high priority and, even more importantly, they don’t want
the state to ‘force’ society to become more equal. The PVV, in particular,

28 ‘The party program of the Danish People’s Party’, October 2002, available on the Dansk
Folkeparti website at www.danskfolkeparti.dk/The_Party_Program_of_the_Danish_
Peoples_Party (viewed 11 November 2014).
29 See Partij voor de Vrijheid, Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2010–2015: De agenda van hoop en
optimisme: Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010–2015 (The Hague: PVV 2010); and Geert
Wilders, Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring (The Hague: Groep Wilders 2005).
30 Partij voor de Vrijheid, Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2012–2017: Hún Brussel, óns
Nederland (The Hague: PVV 2012), 25.
31 See, for example, Jaco van Lambalgen, ‘Vrouw in het nieuws’, Opzij, April 2008; and
Gijs Herderscheê, ‘PVV: abortus moet moeilijker’, Algemeen Dagblad, 27 April 2011.
32 ‘Abort’ (in Danish), on the Dansk Folkeparti website at www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Abort.asp
(viewed 11 November 2014).
33 See Anders Ravid Jupkås, ‘Preliminary research note on populist (radical) right in
Scandinanvia and gender issues’, 2014, unpublished manuscript, 4.
 28 Patterns of Prejudice

opposes all ‘“positive” discrimination, “affirmative action” or other diversity

nonsense (diversiteitsgeneuzel)’.34 In essence, neither party considers women to
be a ‘weak’ group that needs state protection. Even if some acknowledge that
‘full’ gender equality is not yet achieved, not even within the ‘native’
population, they argue that women can take care of it themselves and don’t
need to be protected by the state.35 This is radically different for the Muslim
immigrant population, however.
Increasingly gender issues have become almost exclusively tied to the
overarching issue of immigration or, better, integration. It is here that right-
wing populist parties most strongly profess their defence of the equality of
man and woman. The DF and PVV have both embraced gender equality most
enthusiastically as a weapon against the alleged ‘Islamization’ of Europe. The
PVV sees its defence of ‘women’s emancipation’ primarily in light of the
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perceived ‘mass immigration’ into and ‘Islamization’ of the Netherlands.36

This process, according to Wilders’s prologue to the 2010 party programme,
‘flushes decades of women emancipation through the toilet’.37 The PVV ‘thus’
opposes ‘Islamic gender apartheid’ and wants female genital mutilation to be
severely punished.38 Despite all the rhetoric, this debate is more about
national culture than about gender equality for the right-wing populist
parties. This can be seen most clearly in Denmark: ‘The Danish People’s Party,
which has only in a very few instances supported policies of gender equality
for ethnic Danish women, often argues that gender equality is a “Danish
value” which in its view contrasts with the perceived oppression of women in
migrant families.’39 Still, perhaps in an effort to give more legitimacy to its
defence of gender equality within the immigration debate, the DF has included
a whole new chapter on gender equality in its 2009 party programme, which
also speaks to the issue outside of the context of immigration.40
In conclusion, gender equality and women’s issues feature only rarely in the
election manifestos of PRR parties in Northern Europe and, when they do, it

34 Partij voor de Vrijheid, Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2012–2017, 25.

35 See also Susi Meret and Birte Siim, ‘Gender, populism and politics of belonging:
discourses of right-wing populist parties in Denmark, Norway and Austria’, in Birte
Siim and Monika Mokre (eds), Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European
Public Sphere (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), 78–96.
36 See also Sarah L. de Lange and Liza Mügge, ‘Gender and right-wing populism in the
Low Countries: ideological variations across parties and time’, in these pages.
37 Partij voor de Vrijheid, Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2010–2015, 6.
38 Ibid., 15.
39 Birte Siim and Anette Borchorst, ‘The multicultural challenge to the Danish welfare
state: tensions between gender equality and diversity’, in Janet Fink and Åsa Lundqvist
(eds), Changing Relations of Welfare: Family, Gender and Migration in Britain and
Scandinavia (Aldershot: Ashgate 2010), 133–54 (145); see also Susi Meret, ‘The Danish
People’s Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a
Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support’, PhD dissertation,
Aalborg University, 2009.
40 See Meret and Siim, ‘Gender, populism and politics of belonging’.
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 29

is traditionally in the section on ‘family politics’ and increasingly under

‘immigration’. On family policies, the image of women depicted by the
parties is not typically traditional, but it does stress the importance of families
and of the different roles of men and women. The women’s issues that are
discussed as part of the immigration debate are clearly neither traditional nor
modernized traditional, but instead emphasize the (liberal) equality between
men and women as a national value. At the same time, both the DF and PVV
discuss family issues and the job market in gender-neutral terms and seem to
be content with the policy status quo, which, in Denmark and the
Netherlands, reflects a comparatively high degree of gender equality.
Essentially, the parties consider gender equality as a defining feature of the
national culture, which has to be defended against ‘foreign’ influences, most
notably Islam.
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South America

South America has seen several populist leaders in power, who have tried to
implement new policies in different areas. Regarding gender, it is difficult to
determine whether populist presidents follow a specific pattern. While it is
true that Perón extended the right of suffrage to women, he also promoted a
traditional image of women as mothers and did not support a feminist
agenda.41 Contemporary populists like Morales and the recently deceased
Chávez are also characterized by an ambivalent position on gender equality.
While they have favoured the integration of women into politics, they tend to
employ a masculine language (see below), in which there is not much space
for feminist demands. Nevertheless, the policies that their governments have
implemented aim to guarantee women autonomy and equality.
Chávez and the PSUV have supported the construction of a new Venezuela
that would be a role model for other societies concerned with ‘transcending
capitalism’ and moving towards the ‘socialism of the 21st century’. The
Chavista project seeks, in particular, to give voice to discriminated groups
and empower excluded sectors, such as the poor and women. Indeed, in his
famous talk show Aló Presidente, which was broadcast on Venezuelan state
television and radio station every Sunday, Chávez said: ‘Without the true
liberation of women, a full liberation of people would be impossible. I am
convinced that an authentic socialist also ought to be an authentic feminist.’42
This idea is in line with the overall mission of Chávez’s ‘Bolivarian
Revolution’, that is, the development of a (true) participatory democracy in

41 Karen Kampwirth, ‘Introduction’, in Karen Kampwirth (ed.), Gender and Populism in

Latin America: Passionate Politics (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
2010), 1–24 (4).
42 Hugo Chávez, 8 March 2009, quoted in Hanna Katriina Rantala, ‘What are the gender
implications of the Bolivarian Revolution? Liberation, equality and gender in present-
day Venezuela’, POLIS Journal, vol. 2, 2009, 1–46 (1).
 30 Patterns of Prejudice

which the people play an active role on a regular basis and have the means to
tackle existing forms of discrimination and foster socio-economic equality.
Not by coincidence, the so-called libro rojo (red booklet) of the PSUV states
the following on the subject of women:

The Bolivarian Revolution recognizes the historical role that women have
exercised in our history in general and the revolutionary process in particular,
and therefore it promotes public policies that guarantee gender equity. The
party rejects any type of discrimination against women and does not allow her
use as sexual object or merchandise.43

While it is true that Chávez and the PSUV frequently exalt the role of women
and talk about the struggle for gender equality in Venezuela, the main topic is
inevitably socialism and the defence of the Bolivarian Revolution. In other
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words, feminism is certainly on the agenda of Chavismo, but its relevance

fluctuates over time.
Evo Morales and the MAS have also shown their support for the
transformation of gender relations. A good example of this gender friendly
approach can be found in the new constitution of the country, prepared by a
constituent assembly, in which women rights’ activists were keen participants.
For instance, Article 48 declares that

the state will promote the incorporation of women into the work force and
guarantee the same remuneration as men for work of equal value, both in the
public and the private sphere. Women cannot be discriminated against or
dismissed from their jobs because of their marital status, pregnancy, age,
physical traits or the number of their children.44

Moreover, Article 66 holds that ‘sexual and reproductive rights are guaran-
teed for women and men’, while Article 210 states that ‘the internal election of
candidates and leaders of citizens’ organizations and political parties will be
regulated and supervised by the Plurinational Electoral Organ, which will
guarantee the equal participation of men and women’.45
Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to say that gender issues were at
the centre of attention of Morales’s government. His administration is above
all focused on alleviating poverty, fostering the better inclusion of the
indigenous population and advancing a new approach to foreign affairs to
counteract the influence of the United States in Latin America. Moreover,
while it is true that some policies on gender equality have been discussed and
to a certain extent implemented by Evo Morales since his coming to power in

43 Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, Libro Rojo (Caracas: PSUV 2010), 30.
44 República del Bolivia, Constitución de 2009, available on Georgetown University’s Political
Database of the Americas at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.
html (viewed 12 November 2014).
45 Ibid.
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 31

2005, this has been a conflicted process because of a struggle between two
groups.46 On the one hand, there is a faction of indigenous, lower-class and
rural women who campaign for the ‘decolonization’ of the country on the
assumptions that the subordination of women is of colonial origin and that
aboriginal culture is based on notions of gender complementarity. On the
other hand, there is a faction of liberal, middle-class and urban women who
oppose the legitimization of indigenous sociopolitical practices, institutions
and norms because, in their view, aboriginal culture is characterized by male-
dominated structures. Given that these two groups of female activists try to
influence the government, any policy debate and reform on women’s rights
opens up an arena of contestation in which Morales does not want to interfere
directly. As Stéphanie Rousseau found in her detailed analysis,47 in the
discussions on the content of the new constitution of Bolivia, which was
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approved by a referendum in 2009, the indigenous and feminist organizations

presented different proposals on gender issues, and Morales did not take
sides in this specific debate. Therefore, as already noted in the introduction to
this special issue, the diversity of women as a collective, and the fact that there
are different types of feminisms, means that women often hold conflicting
views on gender issues.48

A gendered discourse?

Surprisingly, particularly given the longstanding interest in populist dis-

course and style, little research has been done on the possible gendered
aspects of populism. One of the few scholars to have explicitly dealt with the
relationship between machismo and populism in South America is the
anthropologist Xavier Andrade. In his fascinating ethnographic study of
Guayaquil, the largest city in Ecuador, he notes: ‘One of the most intriguing
aspects of the populist tradition in Guayaquil is the extent to which populist
leaders convert hegemonic notions of masculinity into a powerful, albeit
imaginary, weapon for popular redemption against the oligarchy and/or the
ruling elites.’49 Similarly, Ov Cristian Norocel finds, in his innovative study of
the PRR Sweden Democrats, that the party ‘accommodates a centrally located
heterosexual masculinity embodied by the “conservative son” conceptual

46 Anders Burman, ‘Chachawarmi: silence and rival voices on decolonisation and gender
politics in Andean Bolivia’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, 2011, 65–91.
47 Stéphanie Rousseau, ‘Indigenous and feminist movements at the Constituent Assem-
bly in Bolivia: locating the representation of indigenous women’, Latin American
Research Review, vol. 46, no. 2, 2011, 5–28.
48 See Niels Spierings, Andrej Zaslove, Liza Mügge and Sarah de Lange, ‘Gender and
populist radical-right politics: an introduction’, in these pages.
49 Xavier Andrade, ‘Machismo and politics in Ecuador: the case of Pancho Jaime’, Men
and Masculinities, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001, 299–315 (307).
 32 Patterns of Prejudice

metaphor’ in its attempts to (re)define Swedishness.50 To what extent can we

find gendered discourse in the cases under scrutiny?

Northern Europe

Although right-wing populists are regularly portrayed as sexists in the media,

almost all the strident examples in the literature and media are taken from
Eastern and Southern Europe. Among the most machismo European popu-
lists are undoubtedly the Italians, most notably former three-time Italian
premier Silvio Berlusconi—whose relentless sexism led tens of thousands of
Italians to sign a petition entitled ‘this man offends us—stop him’— and Lega
Nord leader Umberto Bossi, (in)famous for his outrageous ‘slogan’, La Lega
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Nord ce l’ha duro (‘The Northern League has a hard-on’).

In Northern Europe populists do not have a particularly masculine, let
alone machismo or sexist, discourse. That this is the case for the DF, which has
been led by a woman for most of its existence, is perhaps not so surprising.
Still, Pia Kjærsgaard has done little to challenge traditionally gendered
discourse and language; for example, she used the male title ‘formand’
(chairman) throughout her period as party leader. She also explicitly
expressed her distaste for feminism (or, in her terms, ‘elite feminists’ and
‘gender communists’) and often presented herself politically as an ‘ordinary
housewife’.51 This was in line with the DF discourse on women, which often
emphasized women as mothers, before a change was evident, at least since
2009, when the party discourse started to portray women more and more as
workers.52
Despite the fact that the PVV is a very male-dominated party, often simply
reduced to party leader Geert Wilders, the discourse is very similar to that of
the DF. Most of it is remarkably gender-blind and the main populist
distinction between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ is likewise not really explicitly
gendered. This, of course, also means that it does not contest the current more
masculine discourse. As far as ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ are explicitly
discussed, it is largely in gender-neutral and mostly moral terms. An
interesting example is Geert Wilders’s favourite rhetorical device, which is
to refer to ‘the Dutch people’ as ‘Henk and Ingrid’, two common, if somewhat
dated, Dutch first names for a man and a woman, respectively. In classic
nativist fashion, he further contrasts the Dutch people with the immigrant

50 Ov Cristian Norocel, ‘Constructing radical right populist resistance: metaphors of

heterosexist masculinities and the family question in Sweden’, NORMA: Nordic Journal
for Masculinity Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, 169–83 (181).
51 See Jupkås, ‘Feminization of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavia’, 7; and Susi
Meret, ‘Female charismatic leadership and gender: Pia Kjærsgaard and the Danish
People’s Party’, in these pages.
52 See Jupkås, ‘Feminization of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavia’, 13.
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 33

population, by arguing that ‘Henk and Ingrid pay for Ali and Fatima’,53 two
common immigrant names in the Netherlands.
It is almost exclusively in the context of immigration or, as the parties
prefer, ‘Islamization’ that the traditional image of the woman as vulnerable
and a potential victim is expressed. While most stories about immigration and
crime, intrinsically linked in the discourse of most right-wing populists, are
not explicitly gendered, several do focus in particular on a threat to women.
For example, in his ‘Declaration of Independence’, Geert Wilders referred to
‘the freedom for your mother to walk safely on the street at night’ (our
emphasis).54 Similarly, the 2011 DF propaganda video I Am Denmark shows
images of a (white) woman and (white) children behind the slogan ‘protect my
own culture’ (our emphasis).55
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South America

Without a doubt, populism in South America is characterized by a machismo

discourse. In fact, the discourse of Juan Perón was anything but feminist, since
he tended to have an essentialist notion of women as mothers and even
beauty queens.56 As Michael Conniff has noted: ‘Virtually all populists
assumed roles as paternal figures to their followers: National leadership
metaphorically mirrored familial relationships… . The president was father,
the first lady mother, and the citizenry the children.’57 More contemporary
cases of populism in South America employ not only masculine images, but
also vulgar language as a demonstration of the proximity between the
populist leader and the masses.
In this regard, the recent case of Hugo Chávez is interesting, as he had
developed a discourse in which women were depicted as active, rather than
passive, and as essential actors in the revolutionary process that the country
was and is experiencing. According to Gioconda Espina and Cathy Rakowski,
Chávez’s discourse reinforced women’s traditional roles as self-sacrificing
mothers and wives and, at the same time, looked to empower women as
agents of change in the struggle against the establishment. This image of
women is at the heart of Chavista rhetoric.58 In fact, women have been
depicted as crucial actors not only because of their contribution in terms of

53 Partij voor de Vrijheid, Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2010–2015, 17.

54 Wilders, Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring, 1.
55 The video (in English) is available on the official Danish People’s Party website at www.
danskfolkeparti.dk/Principprogram_andre_sprog (viewed 9 December 2014).
56 Kampwirth, ‘Introduction’, 9.
57 Michael L. Conniff, ‘Epilogue: new research directions’, in Michael L. Conniff (ed.),
Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa: Alabama University Press 1999), 191–204 (199).
58 Gioconda Espina and Cathy A. Rakowski, ‘Waking women up? Hugo Chávez,
populism, and Venezuela’s “popular” women’, in Kampwirth (ed.), Gender and
Populism in Latin America, 180–201 (194).
 34 Patterns of Prejudice

popular mobilization in favour of Chávez, but also due to their participation

in local projects, such as soup kitchens run by women, where needy children
and single mothers from the shanty towns receive one free meal a day.59 As
Kate Paarlberg has pointed out: ‘Chávez’s statements about women … seem
to rely on a certain interpretation of what revolutionary womanhood looks
like. It is maternal, it is relational, and its bravery is altruistic and noble, in
defense of others.’60 In this sense, the Chavista rhetoric tends to politicize the
traditional role of women, rather than condemn it, and promote new patterns
of gender relations.
Moreover, there is little doubt that the Chávez discourse is distinguished by
sexism and continuous references to masculinity. A good example of this can
be found in one of his speeches in 2005, in which he suggested that US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suffered from ‘sexual frustration’, while,
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in another of his speeches, he blew Rice a kiss and said ‘don’t mess with me,
girl’.61 These kinds of allusions and ‘jokes’ were quite common in Chávez’s
public speeches. Paraphrasing the terminology of Pierre Ostiguy, the Chavista
project continuously appeals to the population’s ‘low instincts’, whereby a
macho way of life is praised, sexual minorities are discriminated against and
gender stereotypes are reproduced. Thus, much of Chávez’s rhetoric was
paternalistic, exalted his virility and was homophobic.62
Despite the influence of feminist movements on his government, Evo
Morales has developed a populist discourse with very traditional images of
women, who are depicted primarily as mothers. For instance, in a speech given
on International Women’s Day (8 March 2006), he said: ‘To see a woman is
always to see a symbol of affection and honesty … To talk about women is
always to talk about family unity. Personally, when I see a woman I see my
mother…’63 At the same time, Morales is aware of the importance of women for
his political project and, in consequence, he usually alludes to indigenous and
poor women as key actors in and supporters of his government.
In short, Chávez and Morales have used a very similar discourse in which
women are, on the one hand, heralded as important actors in their political
projects and, on the other hand, reduced primarily to self-sacrificing mothers.
In addition, Morales seems to base his model of the perfect revolutionary

59 Sujatha Fernandes, ‘Barrio women and popular politics in Chávez’s Venezuela’, Latin
American Politics and Society, vol. 49, no. 3, 2007, 97–127 (108–12).
60 Kate Paarlberg, ‘Sold out? Venezuela’s Boliviarianas and the struggle for women’s
emancipation’, paper presented at the conference ‘Social Movement Governance, the
Poor, and the New Politics of the Americas’, University of South Florida, Tampa, 2–4
February 2011, 15.
61 José Pedro Zúquete, ‘The missionary politics of Hugo Chávez’, Latin American Politics
and Society, vol. 50, no. 1, 2008, 91–121 (100).
62 Pierre Ostiguy, ‘Argentina’s double political spectrum: party system, political identities,
and strategies, 1944–2007’, Kellogg Institute Working Paper, no. 361, October 2009.
63 Evo Morales, quoted in Stéphanie Rousseau, ‘Populism from above, populism from
below: gender politics under Alberto Fujimori and Evo Morales’, in Kampwirth (ed.),
Gender and Populism in Latin America, 140–61 (154).
 CAS MUDDE AND CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER 35

woman on (his interpretation of) ‘the’ indigenous woman, which is less the
case with Chávez. However, the latter used a much more cruel and dominant
sexist discourse with regard to women (and sexual minorities) than Morales.

Populism and gender: a (first) assessment

The relationship between populism and gender has so far received very little
scholarly attention, both in Europe and Latin America. We have provided a
first comparative analysis of the situation in Northern Europe and South
America, with the aim of highlighting the factors that determine the views on
gender issues and the roles of populist actors. This has led to a somewhat
muddled picture. Regarding the various expectations, only the one that
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gender issues and roles will not prove to be very important to populism finds
strong support. Both in theory and practice, populists do not hold a strong
position on gender issues. Gender issues feature explicitly relatively seldom
in populist programmes and propaganda, irrespective of accompanying
ideology and geographical region. We also found no evidence of an explicitly
gendered interpretation of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, although further
analysis of the discourse is certainly warranted.
The influence of ideology and region is less straightforward to determine. In
terms of female representation in the national parliaments, the left-wing
populists of South America do better than the right-wing populists of Northern
Europe, at least in relative terms, that is, compared to non-populist actors
within their country. Whereas Northern European populists almost always fall
below the national averages, South American populists are (well) above it. This
would support the claim that ideology rather than culture (region) is more
important for the position on gender issues of populists. In other words,
whether populists adopt a left or right ideology seems to be a key element for
understanding the degree to which they promote the reduction of gender gaps
in their own parties. Nevertheless, national culture is probably relevant for the
implementation of sex-specific quotas and, consequently, populist actors
operating in more emancipated societies have to show a relatively open
approach towards women’s descriptive representation. Seen in this light, it is
worth noting the intersectionality of these views: namely, gender interacts with
other categories, such as class and race, that have different meanings and
relevance across societies. Therefore, the views of populist forces on gender
issues and roles must be analysed in conjunction with their views on other
identities. In effect, Ernesto Laclau rightly points out that the rise of populism
involves the articulation of a chain of equivalence between various groups that
normally have different and even sometimes antagonistic identities.64
Finally, it is worth pointing out that South American populists tend to
advance gender equality in their country, while Northern European populists

64 Laclau, On Populist Reason.

 36 Patterns of Prejudice

merely support the status quo, but also stress the importance of families. In fact,
PRR parties in Europe usually employ gender arguments to defend traditional
values, while radical leftist actors in Latin America normally employ the
concept of gender to advance a more progressive agenda. That said, the status
quo in Northern Europe is at least equal to the proposed positions in South
America. In terms of discourse, culture seems to clearly trump ideology, as the
left-wing populists in patriarchal South America are much more sexist and
traditional than the right-wing populists in emancipated Northern Europe.
In short, the relationship between populism and gender is relatively weak,
but highly complex. Given the growing number of prominent female populist
leaders (such as Siv Jensen, Keiko Fujimori, Marine Le Pen, Roxana Miranda
and Sarah Palin, among others) and the almost universal gender gap in the
electorate of populist parties, the relationship between gender and populism
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has probably become the most relevant of the many understudied issues
related to populism. In addition to comparative and national studies of
specific groups within one geographical area, such as the other contributions
to this special issue, we will need more comparative studies that cross
ideological and regional boundaries, to further parse out the relative influence
of cultural and ideological factors. We hope this article has provided a useful
example of such a study.

Cas Mudde is an Associate Professor in the Department of International

Affairs at the University of Georgia. He is the author of Populist Radical Right
Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press 2007), and editor of Political
Extremism (Sage 2014, 4 volumes), Youth and the Extreme Right (IDEBATE 2014),
and Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?
(Cambridge University Press 2012). He is currently writing (with Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser) Populism: A Very Short Introduction, to be published by
Oxford University Press in 2016, and (with Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler) The Israeli
Settler Movement: Assessing and Explaining Social Movement Success, under
contract with Cambridge University Press. In August 2015 he will become
co-editor of the European Journal of Political Research. Email: [email protected]

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser is an Associate Professor in the School of Political

Science at the Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago de Chile. He is the
co-editor (with Cas Mudde) of Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or
Corrective for Democracy? (Cambridge University Press 2012) and (with Juan
Pablo Luna) of The Resilience of the Latin American Right (Johns Hopkins
University Press 2014). His research has been published in the journals
Democratization, Government and Opposition and Political Studies, among others.
He is currently writing (with Cas Mudde) Populism: A Very Short Introduction, to
be published by Oxford University Press in 2016. He wishes to acknowledge
support from the Chilean National Fund for Scientific and Technological
Development (FONDECYT project 1140101) and the Chilean Millennium
Science Initiative (project NS130008). Email: [email protected]