REL: 12/2/11

Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance

s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s ,
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334)
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made
b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012

2100838

Steven Chess

v.

Wade Burt

Appeal from C h i l t o n C i r c u i t Court

(CV-10-900024)

BRYAN, J u d g e .

Steven Chess appeals f r o m an o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e summary-

j u d g m e n t m o t i o n o f Wade B u r t . 1
We r e v e r s e a n d remand.

C h e s s a l s o p u r p o r t s t o a p p e a l f r o m an o r d e r d e n y i n g h i s
1

summary-judgment m o t i o n . "However, s u b j e c t t o e x c e p t i o n s n o t
h e r e a p p l i c a b l e , a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s do n o t r e v i e w t h e d e n i a l o f
2100838

F a c t u a l Background and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y

On M a r c h 17, 2008, R i c h a r d A. Grammer ("Richard") a n d S.

D i a n e Grammer ( " D i a n e " ) m o r t g a g e d a p a r c e l o f r e a l p r o p e r t y i n

Chilton County ("the p r o p e r t y " ) t o P e a c h t r e e Bank t o s e c u r e

t h e payment o f a p r o m i s s o r y n o t e i n the p r i n c i p a l amount o f

$ 2 1 4 , 3 8 7 . 6 3 . On J a n u a r y 28, F e b r u a r y 4, a n d F e b r u a r y 11, 2010,

P e a c h t r e e Bank p u b l i s h e d a n o t i c e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y w o u l d be

s o l d a t a f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e on F e b r u a r y 18, 2010.

On F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, D i a n e executed a document titled

"Assignment o f S t a t u t o r y R i g h t o f Redemption from F o r e c l o s u r e "

("the F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t " ) . I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e

F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t stated:

"This Assignment of Statutory Right of

R e d e m p t i o n f r o m F o r e c l o s u r e ... i s made a n d e n t e r e d
i n t o b y a n d b e t w e e n [ D i a n e ] a n d [ C h e s s ] on t h i s t h e
1 6 t h d a y o f FEBRUARY, 2010.

"RECITALS

"WHEREAS, [ D i a n e ] owns [the p r o p e r t y ] ; and

"WHEREAS, [ t h e p r o p e r t y ] i s e n c u m b e r e d b y a
m o r t g a g e a n d i s now s u b j e c t t o f o r e c l o s u r e , a n d
[Diane] d e s i r e s t o a s s i g n t h e i r [sic] statutory
r i g h t o f redemption t o [Chess].

a summary-judgment m o t i o n . " Buco B l d g . C o n s t r u c t o r s , I n c . v .

Mayer E l e c . S u p p l y Co., [Ms. 2090573, Dec. 10, 2010] So.
3d. , ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) .

2
2100838

"NOW, THEREFORE, i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Ten D o l l a r s

($10.00) and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,
i n hand p a i d t o [Diane] by [Chess], [ D i a n e ] does
h e r e b y g r a n t , b a r g a i n , s e l l , a s s i g n , t r a n s f e r and
s e t o v e r u n t o [Chess] a l l o f [Diane's] r i g h t o f
redemption from f o r e c l o s u r e o f t h a t c e r t a i n mortgage
e x e c u t e d by RICHARD GRAMMER AND S. DIANE GRAMMER t o
PEACHTREE BANK on t h e 17 day o f MARCH, 2008 ...
t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l o t h e r r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t o f
[ D i a n e ] i n and t o t h e p r o p e r t y

(Capitalization i n original; emphasis added.)

On F e b r u a r y 18, 2010, P e a c h t r e e Bank h e l d a foreclosure

sale. Burt, who b i d $300,000, was the highest bidder a t the

foreclosure s a l e , and t h e a u c t i o n e e r executed a foreclosure

deed c o n v e y i n g t h e p r o p e r t y to Burt.

On M a r c h 17, 2010, C h e s s s u e d B u r t , seeking t o redeem t h e

property. Chess's complaint alleged that, by v i r t u e o f the

February 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t , Chess was a transferee of

Diane's r i g h t t o redeem the property and, t h e r e f o r e , had a

r i g h t t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y u n d e r § 6 - 5 - 2 4 8 ( a ) ( 5 ) , A l a . Code

1975. 2
C h e s s ' s c o m p l a i n t f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t he h a d demanded

2
Section 6-5-248(a)(5) provides:

"(a) Where r e a l e s t a t e , o r any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n ,

is s o l d t h e same may be redeemed b y :

"(5) Any transferee of the interests of the

3
2100838

t h a t B u r t p r o v i d e him w i t h a w r i t t e n statement of the charges

t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y and t h a t B u r t h a d f a i l e d t o r e s p o n d t o

that demand w i t h i n 10 d a y s . In a d d i t i o n , Chess's complaint

alleged that Burt's f a i l u r e t o r e s p o n d t o C h e s s ' s demand f o r

a written statement of the lawful charges to redeem the

property within 10 d a y s h a d r e l i e v e d C h e s s o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n

to tender payment of the amount required to redeem the

property when he filed h i s complaint and had effected a

forfeiture o f B u r t ' s r i g h t t o c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r any p e r m a n e n t

i m p r o v e m e n t s made t o t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t h e f o r e c l o s u r e sale. 3

debtor or mortgagor, e i t h e r before or a f t e r the

s a l e . A t r a n s f e r o f any k i n d made b y t h e d e b t o r o r
mortgagor will accomplish a transfer of the
i n t e r e s t s of that party."
3
Section 6-5-252, A l a . Code 1975, provides:

"Anyone d e s i r i n g and e n t i t l e d t o redeem may make

w r i t t e n demand o f t h e p u r c h a s e r o r h i s o r h e r
t r a n s f e r e e s f o r a statement i n w r i t i n g of the debt
and a l l l a w f u l c h a r g e s c l a i m e d b y h i m o r h e r , and
s u c h p u r c h a s e r o r t h e i r t r a n s f e r e e s s h a l l , w i t h i n 10
d a y s a f t e r s u c h w r i t t e n demand, f u r n i s h s u c h pe r s o n
^ , , ^ 1 - , T,,,-;-!--!-^^ - p , , , , ^ - ; ^ ! - , ^ , , ^ 1 - , ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

m a k i n g t h e demand w i t h a w r i t t e n , i t e m i z e d s t a t e m e n t
o f a l l l a w f u l c h a r g e s c l a i m e d b y h i m o r h e r . The
r e d e e m i n g p a r t y must t h e n t e n d e r a l l l a w f u l c h a r g e s
to the purchaser or h i s or her t r a n s f e r e e . I f the
purchaser or h i s or her transferee f a i l s to f u r n i s h
a w r i t t e n , i t e m i z e d statement of a l l l a w f u l charges
w i t h i n 10 d a y s a f t e r demand, he o r she s h a l l f o r f e i t
all claims or right to compensation for

4
2100838

Answering, Burt denied t h a t C h e s s had a r i g h t t o redeem

the property, denied that Burt had failed to provide Chess

with a w r i t t e n statement of lawful charges w i t h i n 10 days

after Burt r e c e i v e d Chess's demand, averred that Burt had

provided Chess with a w r i t t e n statement of lawful charges

w i t h i n 10 d a y s a f t e r B u r t r e c e i v e d C h e s s ' s demand, and averred

that Chess had not responded to t h a t w r i t t e n statement of

l a w f u l charges w i t h i n the time a l l o w e d by A l a b a m a law.

On S e p t e m b e r 8, 2010, C h e s s amended h i s c o m p l a i n t (1) t o

a l l e g e t h a t B u r t was c l a i m i n g t h a t c e r t a i n charges c o n s t i t u t e d

improvements to the property f o r which he was entitled to

compensation as a c o n d i t i o n of redemption and (2) to claim

t h a t B u r t was not e n t i t l e d t o compensation f o r those charges.

On December 13, 2010, C h e s s moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t

d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t he was e n t i t l e d t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y f o r a

t o t a l o f $300,783.76, w h i c h c o n s i s t e d o f t h e $300,000 B u r t had

paid to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale and

recording fees and property taxes Burt had paid. Chess

i m p r o v e m e n t s , and t h e p a r t y so e n t i t l e d t o redeem
may, on t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e 10 d a y s , f i l e h i s o r
her complaint without a tender to enforce h i s or her
r i g h t s u n d e r t h i s a r t i c l e and f i l e a l i s p e n d e n s
w i t h the probate c o u r t . "

5
2100838

a s s e r t e d t h a t Burt had f o r f e i t e d h i s r i g h t t o compensation f o r

any permanent improvements made t o t h e p r o p e r t y since the

foreclosure s a l e by f a i l i n g t o p r o v i d e Chess w i t h a w r i t t e n

statement of lawful charges w i t h i n 10 d a y s after Burt had

r e c e i v e d C h e s s ' s demand f o r s u c h a s t a t e m e n t . Chess supported

h i s summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h h i s a f f i d a v i t a n d an e x c e r p t

from B u r t ' s d e p o s i t i o n . Chess's a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d :

" I am t h e P l a i n t i f f , S t e v e n C h e s s , i n t h e above
s t y l e d case. T h i s matter i s a redemption o f r e a l
e s t a t e . I have p u r c h a s e d a n d o b t a i n e d t h e r i g h t o f
redemption from former owner D i a n e Grammer. I
e m a i l e d t o Wade B u r t on M a r c h 2 a n d h a n d - d e l i v e r e d
t o h i s home ( a c c e p t e d b y a l a d y t h a t a n s w e r e d t h e
d o o r ) t h e demand f o r l a w f u l c h a r g e s . F u r t h e r , I s e n t
by c e r t i f i e d mailed [ s i c ] a demand f o r l a w f u l
c h a r g e s t o Wade B u r t w h i c h was s i g n e d f o r on M a r c h
3, 2 0 1 0 . 4

" I d i d n o t r e c e i v e a r e s p o n s e u n t i l M a r c h 18
w h i c h i s more t h a n 10 d a y s a f t e r my d e l i v e r y .

" I n d e p o s i t i o n Mr. B u r t s t a t e s t h a t he went t o

a t t o r n e y B i l l Latham t o prepare a response, and then
was s e n t t o a t t o r n e y J a c k s o n a n d he s i g n e d a l e t t e r
and l e f t . He d i d n o t know when t h e l e t t e r was
mailed. Attached hereto as E x h i b i t ' A ' t o my
a f f i d a v i t i s t h e e n v e l o p e w h i c h was r e c e i v e d b y me
on M a r c h 18.

"The purpose o f t h i s a f f i d a v i t i s to establish

4
The certified-mail receipt indicates that Burt's
s e c r e t a r y s i g n e d f o r Chess's l e t t e r on M a r c h 2, 2010, r a t h e r
t h a n M a r c h 3, 2010.

6
2100838

t h a t I d i d n o t r e c e i v e a r e s p o n s e t o my demand f o r
l a w f u l c h a r g e s i n t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s as p r o v i d e d b y l a w . "

In the excerpt from Burt's deposition submitted in

support of Chess's motion, Burt testified that he d i d n o t

receive a l e t t e r f r o m C h e s s a t h i s h o u s e a n d t h a t , b e c a u s e he

lived alone, there was no one a t h i s h o u s e who could have

accepted Chess's l e t t e r i n h i s absence. Burt f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d

t h a t h i s s e c r e t a r y had s i g n e d f o r a l e t t e r f r o m C h e s s t h a t was

d e l i v e r e d t o B u r t ' s b u s i n e s s a d d r e s s , t h a t he t o o k t h e l e t t e r

t o an a t t o r n e y , and t h a t the attorney p r e p a r e d and m a i l e d a

letter t o Chess responding t o Chess's letter. Burt further

testified that sometime a f t e r he r e c e i v e d Chess's l e t t e r he

saw C h e s s a t a r e s t a u r a n t a n d a s k e d h i m i f he w o u l d s e l l h i s

r i g h t t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y t o B u r t . The e x c e r p t from Burt's

d e p o s i t i o n does n o t c o n t a i n any t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t i n g t h e d a t e

when B u r t r e c e i v e d Chess's l e t t e r from h i s s e c r e t a r y .

On J a n u a r y 10, 2 0 1 1 , B u r t amended h i s answer t o a s s e r t as

a d e f e n s e t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t was invalid

because Diane's s t a t u t o r y r i g h t of redemption d i d not e x i s t

until t h e m o r t g a g e was f o r e c l o s e d on F e b r u a r y 18, 2010, two

days after Diane had executed the February 16, 2010,

assignment.

7
2100838

On January 14, 2011, Burt f i l e d a pleading i n opposition

to C h e s s ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n i n w h i c h he asserted that

he h a d r e s p o n d e d t o C h e s s ' s demand f o r a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t o f

l a w f u l c h a r g e s on M a r c h 10, 2010, and t h a t a genuine i s s u e of

m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t e d r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r C h e s s had a right to

redeem t h e property.

On January 18, 2011, the trial court held a hearing

r e g a r d i n g C h e s s ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e trial

c o u r t d i d not r u l e on t h e m o t i o n a t t h a t time.

On February 7, 2011, Burt filed a counterclaim against

Chess. I n h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m , B u r t ( 1 ) a l l e g e d t h a t R i c h a r d had

a s s i g n e d h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y t o B u r t on

A p r i l 22, 2010 ("the A p r i l 22, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t " ) i n exchange

for Burt's paying him $50,000 and (2) sought a judgment

determining that Burt was entitled to redeem t h e property.

Along with his counterclaim, Burt tendered a check in the

amount o f $376,679.02 made p a y a b l e to the t r i a l c o u r t ' s c l e r k .

On A p r i l 5, 2011, B u r t moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t w i t h

r e s p e c t t o b o t h C h e s s ' s c l a i m a g a i n s t h i m and h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m

a g a i n s t C h e s s . F i r s t , B u r t a s s e r t e d t h a t he was e n t i t l e d to a

summary judgment with respect to Chess's claim seeking

8
2100838

redemption of the p r o p e r t y because, B u r t s a i d , Chess d i d not

have a r i g h t t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y . T h i s was so, a c c o r d i n g t o

Burt, because the February 16, 2010, assignment did not

effectively convey Diane's statutory right to redeem the

property to Chess because she had executed i t before the

f o r e c l o s u r e had a c t u a t e d h e r s t a t u t o r y r i g h t o f r e d e m p t i o n on

February 18, 2010, and because the February 16, 2010,

a s s i g n m e n t was not supported by c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Second, Burt

asserted that he was entitled to a summary judgment with

respect to Chess's c l a i m seeking redemption of the property

because, Burt said, he had provided Chess with a written

statement of the lawful charges within 10 days after he

r e c e i v e d C h e s s ' s demand f o r s u c h a s t a t e m e n t and C h e s s d i d n o t

have a v a l i d e x c u s e f o r f a i l i n g t o t e n d e r t h e amount necessary

to redeem t h e property when he filed h i s complaint seeking

redemption o f t h e p r o p e r t y . T h i r d , B u r t a s s e r t e d t h a t he was

entitled to a summary judgment with respect to his claim

seeking redemption o f t h e p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e , he s a i d , ( 1 ) C h e s s

did n o t have a r i g h t t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y and ( 2 ) B u r t d i d

have a r i g h t t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y by v i r t u e o f t h e A p r i l 22,

2010, assignment and had tendered the amount necessary to

9
2100838

redeem t h e p r o p e r t y when he f i l e d h i s counterclaim seeking

redemption of the p r o p e r t y .

On April 28, 2011, Chess moved f o r leave to f i l e an

amended c o m p l a i n t a c c o m p a n i e d b y a p r o p o s e d amended c o m p l a i n t .

In h i s proposed amended c o m p l a i n t , Chess ( 1 ) alleged that

D i a n e h a d e x e c u t e d a s e c o n d a s s i g n m e n t o f h e r r i g h t t o redeem

the p r o p e r t y t o h i m on May 14, 2010 ("the May 14, 2010,

assignment"), a n d ( 2 ) c l a i m e d t h a t he h a d a r i g h t t o redeem

the p r o p e r t y b a s e d on t h e May 14, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t . The r e c o r d

does not i n d i c a t e whether the t r i a l court ruled on that

motion.

Also on April 28, 2011, Chess answered Burt's

counterclaim with a general denial and supplemented his

summary-judgment m o t i o n . I n t h e supplement t o h i s summary-

judgment m o t i o n , Chess conceded that Diane's s t a t u t o r y right

of redemption d i d not e x i s t on F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, when she

e x e c u t e d t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t ; h o w e v e r , he a r g u e d

that, because t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t stated that

Diane a s s i g n e d t o Chess her statutory right of redemption

"together with a l l other r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t o f [ D i a n e ]

i n a n d t o t h e p r o p e r t y , " t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t h a d

10
2100838

conveyed Diane's equity of redemption, which did exist on

February 16, 2010, t o Chess. He further argued that the

foreclosure on F e b r u a r y 18, 2010, (1) had e x t i n g u i s h e d the

e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n he h a d a c q u i r e d f r o m D i a n e b y v i r t u e o f

the F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t and (2) had a c t u a t e d the

s t a t u t o r y r i g h t o f r e d e m p t i o n t o w h i c h he was e n t i t l e d as t h e

t r a n s f e r e e of Diane's e q u i t y of redemption.

On May 6, 2 0 1 1 , C h e s s f i l e d a pleading i n opposition to

Burt's summary-judgment m o t i o n i n w h i c h he i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e

a r g u m e n t s he h a d made i n s u p p o r t o f h i s own summary-judgment

motion.

On May 11, 2 0 1 1 , B u r t filed a pleading i n opposition to

Chess's motion f o r leave t o amend h i s c o m p l a i n t , asserting

that Chess had f a i l e d t o show good cause f o r a l l o w i n g the

amendment. Also on May 11, 2011, Burt filed a brief in

opposition to Chess's supplement to his summary-judgment

motion i n which Burt argued that the February 16, 2010,

assignment had not conveyed e i t h e r Diane's s t a t u t o r y r i g h t o f

redemption or her e q u i t y of redemption t o Chess. On May 12,

2011, t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e l d a h e a r i n g r e g a r d i n g B u r t ' s summary-

judgment m o t i o n .

11
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On May 17, 2011, Chess filed a pleading i n which he

r e i t e r a t e d h i s argument t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, assignment

h a d c o n v e y e d D i a n e ' s e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n t o C h e s s . On May 18,

2011, Chess moved t o s t r i k e B u r t ' s amended a n s w e r , w h i c h B u r t

had f i l e d on J a n u a r y 10, 2 0 1 1 . The r e c o r d on a p p e a l does not

i n d i c a t e t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d on t h a t m o t i o n .

On M a r c h 20, 2011, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d o r d e r s d e n y i n g

C h e s s ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n and g r a n t i n g B u r t ' s summary-

judgment motion without s t a t i n g i t s r a t i o n a l e . Chess timely

a p p e a l e d t o t h e supreme c o u r t , w h i c h t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o

this c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975.

S t a n d a r d of Review

"We r e v i e w a summary judgment de novo. A m e r i c a n

L i b e r t y I n s . Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 825 So. 2d 786
(Ala. 2002).

"'We a p p l y t h e same s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w t h e
t r i a l c o u r t used i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether the
evidence p r e s e n t e d to the t r i a l court
c r e a t e d a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t .
Once a p a r t y m o v i n g f o r a summary judgment
establishes that no genuine issue of
m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s , the burden s h i f t s t o
the nonmovant to present substantial
evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact. "Substantial evidence" i s
" e v i d e n c e o f s u c h w e i g h t and q u a l i t y t h a t
f a i r - m i n d e d persons i n the e x e r c i s e of
i m p a r t i a l judgment can r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h e
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . "

12
2100838

I n r e v i e w i n g a summary j u d g m e n t , we v i e w
t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o
t h e nonmovant and e n t e r t a i n s u c h r e a s o n a b l e
i n f e r e n c e s as t h e j u r y w o u l d have b e e n f r e e
t o draw.'

"Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.[ v. DPF

A r c h i t e c t s , P . C . ] , 792 So. 2d [369] a t 372 [(Ala.
2000)] (citations omitted), quoted i n American
L i b e r t y I n s . Co., 825 So. 2d a t 790."

P o t t e r v. F i r s t R e a l E s t a t e Co., 844 So. 2d 540, 545 (Ala.

2002).

Analysis

The first issue we must resolve i s whether Burt was

e n t i t l e d t o a summary judgment w i t h r e s p e c t t o Chess's claim

s e e k i n g t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y b a s e d on h i s argument t h a t t h e

F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t d i d n o t c o n v e y a r i g h t t o redeem

t h e p r o p e r t y t o C h e s s . B u r t a r g u e d t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010,

assignment d i d not convey a right t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y to

Chess f o r two r e a s o n s . F i r s t , he a r g u e d t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e o f

t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t p u r p o r t e d t o a s s i g n t o Chess

only Diane's statutory right of redemption, which d i d not

e x i s t b e f o r e t h e f o r e c l o s u r e and, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y

16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t conveyed n o t h i n g t o Chess. Second, Burt

a r g u e d t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t was n o t a v a l i d

conveyance because, he said, i t was not supported by

13
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consideration. Thus, i n order to resolve the issue whether

B u r t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary j u d g m e n t b a s e d on h i s a r g u m e n t

t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, assignment d i d not convey a r i g h t

to redeem the property to Chess, we must resolve two

subissues: (1) w h e t h e r t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010,

assignment was sufficient to convey a right to redeem the

property t o Chess and ( 2 ) , i f so, whether the February 16,

2010, a s s i g n m e n t was s u p p o r t e d by consideration.

With respect to the f i r s t subissue, Chess concedes that

Diane's statutory right of redemption did not exist on

F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, when she e x e c u t e d t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010,

assignment; however, he argues that the language of the

February 16, 2010, assignment was broad enough to convey

D i a n e ' s e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n , w h i c h d i d e x i s t on F e b r u a r y 16,

2010, t o him. Specifically, he argues t h a t the language of

t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t n o t o n l y p u r p o r t e d t o a s s i g n

him Diane's s t a t u t o r y r i g h t of redemption but a l s o " a l l o t h e r

right, t i t l e and i n t e r e s t o f [ D i a n e ] i n and t o t h e property,"

w h i c h he s a y s was b r o a d enough t o encompass D i a n e ' s e q u i t y o f

redemption. He further argues that the foreclosure on

February 18, 2010, extinguished the e q u i t y of redemption he

14
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had acquired from Diane b y means o f t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010,

assignment but actuated the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t of redemption t o

which he was e n t i t l e d as a t r a n s f e r e e of Diane's equity of

redemption under 6-5-248(a). We agree.

"Alabama c l a s s i f i e s i t s e l f as a ' t i t l e ' s t a t e

w i t h r e g a r d t o mortgages. E x e c u t i o n o f a mortgage
p a s s e s l e g a l t i t l e t o t h e m o r t g a g e e . The m o r t g a g o r
i s l e f t w i t h an e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n , b u t upon
payment o f t h e d e b t , l e g a l t i t l e r e v e s t s i n t h e
m o r t g a g o r . The e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n may be c o n v e y e d
by t h e m o r t g a g o r , a n d h i s g r a n t e e s e c u r e s o n l y an
e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n . The payment o f a m o r t g a g e d e b t
by t h e p u r c h a s e r o f t h e e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n i n v e s t s
s u c h p u r c h a s e r w i t h t h e l e g a l t i t l e . The e q u i t y o f
redemption i n e i t h e r case, however, i s e x t i n g u i s h e d
by a v a l i d f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e , a n d t h e m o r t g a g o r o r
h i s vendee i s l e f t o n l y w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y r i g h t o f
redemption."

T r a u n e r v. L o w r e y , 369 So. 2d 5 3 1 , 534 ( A l a . 1979) ( c i t a t i o n s

o m i t t e d ; emphasis added).

Upon R i c h a r d a n d D i a n e ' s e x e c u t i o n o f t h e mortgage, they

conveyed legal title to the property t o P e a c h t r e e Bank and

r e t a i n e d an e q u i t y o f r e d e m p t i o n . See T r a u n e r v. L o w r e y . "The

e q u i t y of redemption i s a valuable interest, a legal estate

and may be sold or transferred to another." McGowan v.

W i l l i a m s , 241 A l a . 588, 590, 4 So. 2d 164, 166 ( 1 9 4 1 ) . S e c t i o n

6-5-248(a)(5) provides t h a t " [ a ] t r a n s f e r o f any k i n d made b y

the debtor or mortgagor will accomplish a t r a n s f e r of the

15
2100838

i n t e r e s t s of t h a t p a r t y . " (Emphasis added.)

Given (1) that Diane's equity of redemption was an

interest i n the property that could be conveyed before the

foreclosure and (2) that § 6-5-248(a) provides that "[a]

transfer of any kind" by the mortgagor "will accomplish a

t r a n s f e r o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h a t p a r t y , " we conclude that the

l a n g u a g e i n t h e F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, assignment s t a t i n g t h a t i t

assigned to Chess not only Diane's statutory right of

redemption but also " a l l other right, title and i n t e r e s t of

[Diane] in and to the property" was sufficient to convey

Diane's e q u i t y of redemption to Chess.

S e c t i o n 6-5-248(a)(5) p r o v i d e s t h a t the persons entitled

t o redeem p r o p e r t y t h a t has been s o l d a t a f o r e c l o s u r e sale

include "[a]ny transferee of the i n t e r e s t s of the debtor or

m o r t g a g o r , e i t h e r b e f o r e o r a f t e r t h e s a l e . " (Emphasis added.)

M o r e o v e r , § 6-5-248(b) p r o v i d e s that " [ a ] l l p e r s o n s named o r

enumerated i n s u b d i v i s i o n s (a)(1) through ( a ) ( 7 ) may exercise

the right of redemption granted by this article within one

year from the date of the sale." Accordingly, we conclude

that, i f the F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t was supported by

consideration, C h e s s was a transferee of Diane's equity of

16
2100838

r e d e m p t i o n u n d e r § 6 - 5 - 2 4 8 ( a ) ( 5 ) by v i r t u e o f t h e F e b r u a r y 16,

2010, a s s i g n m e n t and t h a t , as a t r a n s f e r e e of Diane's equity

of redemption before the foreclosure, he was entitled to

exercise a statutory right of r e d e m p t i o n when h i s e q u i t y of

r e d e m p t i o n was extinguished upon f o r e c l o s u r e on February 18,

2010.

With respect to the second subissue, i . e . , whether the

F e b r u a r y 16, 2010, a s s i g n m e n t was s u p p o r t e d by consideration,

C h e s s a r g u e s t h a t i t was s u p p o r t e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n b e c a u s e i t

recited that the consideration f o r Diane's e x e c u t i n g i t was

"Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable

c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " Under Alabama law, that recited consideration

is sufficient consideration to support the conveyance of

Diane's e q u i t y of redemption to Chess. See, e.g., Taylor v.

J o n e s , 285 A l a . 353, 357, 232 So. 2d 601, 605 (1970) (holding

t h a t r e c i t a t i o n o f one d o l l a r and o t h e r v a l u a b l e consideration

as consideration f o r d e e d s was sufficient consideration to

support the c o n v e y a n c e s e f f e c t e d by the deeds). Accordingly,

we conclude that the February 16, 2010, assignment was

s u p p o r t e d by consideration.

Having determined t h a t the language of the February 16,

17
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2010, a s s i g n m e n t was sufficient to convey Diane's e q u i t y of

redemption to Chess before the foreclosure and that the

February 16, 2010, conveyance was supported by sufficient

consideration, we conclude that Burt was not entitled to a

summary j u d g m e n t b a s e d on h i s a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e February 16,

2010, a s s i g n m e n t d i d n o t c o n v e y a r i g h t t o redeem t h e property

to Chess.

The next issue we must resolve is whether Burt was

e n t i t l e d t o a summary j u d g m e n t w i t h respect to Chess's claim

seeking redemption of the property b a s e d on Burt's argument

t h a t C h e s s f a i l e d t o t e n d e r t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o redeem t h e

property when he filed his complaint seeking redemption. As

t h i s c o u r t p o i n t e d o u t i n S k e l t o n v. J&G, LLC, 922 So. 2d 926,

931 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005):

" S e c t i o n 6 - 5 - 2 5 3 ( a ) [ , A l a . Code 1975,] p r o v i d e s ,

in pertinent part, that '[a]nyone e n t i t l e d and
d e s i r i n g t o redeem r e a l e s t a t e u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s
o f t h i s a r t i c l e must a l s o pay o r t e n d e r t o the
p u r c h a s e r or h i s or her t r a n s f e r e e the purchase
p r i c e p a i d a t t h e s a l e , ... and a l l o t h e r l a w f u l
charges.' '[I]n order to redeem under the
[ r e d e m p t i o n ] s t a t u t e [ s ] [ , § 6-5-247 e t s e q . , A l a .
Code 1975] one must e i t h e r a v e r a payment o r t e n d e r
o f a l l t h e amounts r e q u i r e d by t h e s t a t u t e , o r show
a v a l i d e x c u s e f o r f a i l u r e t o do s o . ' Moore v.
H o r t o n , 491 So. 2d 921, 923 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) .

"Section 6-5-256, A l a . Code 1975, provides:

18
2100838

"'Upon t h e f i l i n g o f any c o m p l a i n t as
p r o v i d e d i n t h e s e s e c t i o n s and p a y i n g i n t o
c o u r t t h e amount o f p u r c h a s e money a n d t h e
i n t e r e s t n e c e s s a r y f o r r e d e m p t i o n and a l l
l a w f u l charges, i f the w r i t t e n statement
thereof has been f u r n i s h e d or, i f not
f u r n i s h e d , o f f e r i n g t o pay such debt o r
p u r c h a s e p r i c e and a l l l a w f u l c h a r g e s , t h e
circuit court shall take jurisdiction
thereof and s e t t l e and a d j u s t a l l the
r i g h t s a n d e q u i t i e s o f t h e p a r t i e s , as
provided i n t h i s a r t i c l e . ' "

( F o o t n o t e o m i t t e d . ) However,

" [ u ] n d e r t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f § 6-5-252 a n d §
6-5-256, [ A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , ] i t i s c l e a r t h a t a
r e d e m p t i o n e r i s e x c u s e d f r o m t e n d e r a t t h e t i m e he
f i l e s t h e c o m p l a i n t t o redeem where he h a s t i m e l y
furnished the purchaser with a demand for a
s t a t e m e n t o f l a w f u l c h a r g e s a n d t h e 10-day s t a t u t o r y
period f o r response has expired without the
purchaser f u r n i s h i n g the redemptioner the statement
o f l a w f u l c h a r g e s . Our supreme c o u r t h a s so h e l d i n
S h e a l y v. G o l d e n , 897 So. 2d 268 ( A l a . 2004) (as
m o d i f i e d on d e n i a l o f r e h e a r i n g ) , a n d P u r c e l l v.
S m i t h , 388 So. 2d 525 ( A l a . 1980) ( b o t h r e c o g n i z i n g
t h a t , upon t i m e l y demand made b y t h e r e d e m p t i o n e r ,
the purchaser's f a i l u r e to timely f u r n i s h the
redemptioner w i t h the statement of l a w f u l charges
e x c u s e s t e n d e r and f o r f e i t s t h e p u r c h a s e r ' s r i g h t t o
payment f o r improvements); see a l s o Harris v.
Bradford, 245 A l a . 434, 17 So. 2d 145 (1944)
( f a i l u r e of the purchaser t o f u r n i s h the statement
o f d e b t a n d l a w f u l c h a r g e s upon demand made b y t h e
redemptioner relieves the redemptioner of the
n e c e s s i t y o f m a k i n g t e n d e r o f t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e and
l a w f u l c h a r g e s as a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o t h e
m a i n t e n a n c e o f an a c t i o n t o e x e r c i s e t h e s t a t u t o r y
r i g h t o f r e d e m p t i o n ) ; Lee v. Macon C o u n t y Bank, 233
A l a . 522, 172 So. 662 (1937) ( t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e
purchaser to timely f u r n i s h the redemptioner, w i t h i n

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10 d a y s a f t e r s u c h w r i t t e n demand i s made on t h e
purchaser, a w r i t t e n i t e m i z e d statement of the debt
and l a w f u l c h a r g e s c l a i m e d b y t h e p u r c h a s e r a n d
r e q u i r e d f o r redemption r e s u l t s i n the purchaser's
f o r f e i t i n g a l l c l a i m s or r i g h t t o compensation f o r
improvements; a l s o the redemptioner i s e n t i t l e d t o
file a bill t o enforce the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t of
redemption w i t h o u t a t e n d e r by s i m p l y o f f e r i n g t o
pay p u r c h a s e r ' s debt and a l l l a w f u l c h a r g e s ) . "

S k e l t o n v. J&G, L L C , 922 So. 2d a t 932 (footnote omitted).

Thus, i n order to resolve the issue whether Chess was

required t o t e n d e r payment for a l l lawful charges when he

filed h i s c o m p l a i n t s e e k i n g r e d e m p t i o n , we must r e s o l v e t h e

i s s u e whether B u r t p r o v i d e d Chess w i t h a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t o f

l a w f u l charges w i t h i n 10 d a y s a f t e r demand.

" [ I ] n P u r c e l l v. S m i t h , 388 So. 2d [525] a t 528

[ ( A l a . 1 9 8 0 ) ] , o u r supreme c o u r t h e l d t h a t when a
r e d e m p t i o n e r m a i l s t h e demand f o r l a w f u l c h a r g e s ,
' [ t ] h e t e n - d a y p e r i o d [ u n d e r § 6-5-252] f o r r e s p o n s e
by t h e p u r c h a s e r must b e g i n t o r u n f r o m a c t u a l
r e c e i p t b y t h e p u r c h a s e r o f t h e demand. ' I n so
h o l d i n g , o u r supreme c o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t where
e i t h e r t h e r e d e m p t i o n e r o r t h e p u r c h a s e r r e l i e s on
t h e v a g a r i e s o f modern m a i l d e l i v e r y t o f u r n i s h t h e
o t h e r p a r t y w i t h t h e demand o r t h e s t a t e m e n t o f
lawful charges, that reliance cannot a d v e r s e l y
a f f e c t i m p o r t a n t r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t y t o whom t h e
demand o r t h e s t a t e m e n t o f l a w f u l c h a r g e s i s s e n t .
P u r c e l l v. S m i t h , 388 So. 2d a t 528. I f t h e v a g a r i e s
o f t h e m a i l d e l i v e r y a f f e c t an i m p o r t a n t r i g h t o f
e i t h e r p a r t y , i t must a f f e c t t h e r i g h t o f t h e p a r t y
who i s r e l y i n g on t h e m a i l f o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h §
6-5-252. P u r c e l l v. S m i t h , 388 So. 2d a t 528.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , i n P u r c e l l o u r supreme c o u r t s t a t e d :

20
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"'[A] demand f o r a s t a t e m e n t o f l a w f u l
c h a r g e s , s e n t b y m a i l , i s deemed made when
r e c e i v e d b y t h e p u r c h a s e r . The b u r d e n o f
c o m p l i a n c e r e s t s upon t h e r e d e m p t i o n e r a n d
any d e l a y i n t h e m a k i n g o f t h e demand must,
s i m i l a r l y , a f f e c t h i s r i g h t r a t h e r than
t h a t o f t h e p u r c h a s e r upon whom t h e demand
i s made. S i n c e t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f i m p o r t a n t
r i g h t s depends upon t h e t i m e l i n e s s o f a
r e s p o n s e , t h e p u r c h a s e r c a n n o t be p e n a l i z e d
by t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f t h e m a i l s a n d t h e
b u r d e n r e s t s on t h e r e d e m p t i o n e r t o make a
w r i t t e n demand, b y w h a t e v e r mode, w i t h i n
t h e s t a t u t o r y t i m e l i m i t . Of c o u r s e , t h e
p u r c h a s e r may n o t i n t e n t i o n a l l y d e f e a t t h e
p r i v i l e g e t o redeem. See Hudson v. M o r t o n ,
231 A l a . 392, 165 So. 227 ( 1 9 3 6 ) . '

" P u r c e l l v. S m i t h , 388 So.2d a t 528-29."

S k e l t o n v . J&G, L L C , 922 So. 2d a t 933 (emphasis added).

T h u s , t h e 10-day p e r i o d f o r B u r t t o p r o v i d e C h e s s w i t h a

w r i t t e n statement o f l a w f u l c h a r g e s b e g a n r u n n i n g on t h e d a t e

Burt actually r e c e i v e d Chess's letter demanding a written

statement o f l a w f u l c h a r g e s . C h e s s ' s a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d t h a t he

hand d e l i v e r e d a copy o f h i s l e t t e r t o B u r t ' s house and l e f t

it with a lady there; however, Burt testified in his

deposition t h a t he l i v e d a l o n e a n d t h a t t h e r e was no one a t

h i s h o u s e who c o u l d have a c c e p t e d t h e l e t t e r i n h i s absence.

Moreover, Chess d i d n o t submit any e v i d e n c e indicating that

Burt himself actually received the l e t t e r Chess allegedly

21
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delivered to a lady at Burt's house. Likewise, although

Chess's a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d t h a t he h a d e - m a i l e d a c o p y o f h i s

letter to Burt, C h e s s d i d n o t s u b m i t any e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g

that Burt actually received that copy of the l e t t e r . The

record contains a c e r t i f i e d - m a i l r e c e i p t i n d i c a t i n g t h a t , on

March 2, 2010, B u r t ' s secretary signed the c e r t i f i e d - m a i l

receipt f o r a copy o f Chess's l e t t e r that Chess had s e n t t o

Burt's business address by c e r t i f i e d mail. The r e c o r d also

contains evidence i n d i c a t i n g that Burt a c t u a l l y received that

copy of the l e t t e r from h i s s e c r e t a r y ; however, the record

does not i n d i c a t e the date when B u r t received i t from h i s

secretary. C o n s e q u e n t l y , we c o n c l u d e t h a t a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f

material fact e x i s t s regarding t h e d a t e when B u r t actually

received Chess's letter demanding a written statement of

lawful charges.

Thus, because a genuine issue of material fact exists

regarding t h e d a t e when B u r t a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d C h e s s ' s letter

demanding a written statement of lawful charges, a genuine

issue of material fact exists regarding whether Chess was

r e q u i r e d t o t e n d e r t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y

when he f i l e d h i s c o m p l a i n t s e e k i n g redemption. Accordingly,

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B u r t was not entitled t o a summary j u d g m e n t w i t h r e s p e c t to

Chess's c l a i m s e e k i n g redemption b a s e d on B u r t ' s argument t h a t

C h e s s was n o t e n t i t l e d t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e he had

f a i l e d to tender t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o redeem t h e property

when he f i l e d h i s c o m p l a i n t seeking redemption. Therefore, we

r e v e r s e t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f B u r t w i t h r e s p e c t t o

Chess's c l a i m s e e k i n g redemption. 5

The next issue we must resolve is whether Burt was

entitled to a summary judgment with respect to his

c o u n t e r c l a i m seeking redemption o f t h e p r o p e r t y . Chess argues

t h a t B u r t was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a summary j u d g m e n t w i t h r e s p e c t

to B u r t ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m seeking redemption b e c a u s e , Chess s a y s ,

he was e n t i t l e d t o redeem t h e property.

If C h e s s , who sought redemption before Burt, i s e n t i t l e d

to redeem t h e p r o p e r t y , B u r t w o u l d n o t be e n t i t l e d t o redeem

it u n d e r § 6 - 5 - 2 4 8 ( d ) . S e c t i o n 6-5-248(d) p r o v i d e s :

"(d) When any debtor, mortgagor, their

transferees, their r e s p e c t i v e spouses, children,
h e i r s , o r d e v i s e e s redeem, a l l r e c o r d e d j u d g m e n t s ,

5
We n o t e t h a t , b e c a u s e , as d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , a g e n u i n e
i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r C h e s s was
r e q u i r e d t o t e n d e r t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y
when he f i l e d h i s c o m p l a i n t s e e k i n g r e d e m p t i o n t h e t r i a l c o u r t
p r o p e r l y d e n i e d C h e s s ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n .

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r e c o r d e d mortgages, and r e c o r d e d l i e n s i n e x i s t e n c e
at the time of the s a l e , are r e v i v e d a g a i n s t the
r e a l e s t a t e redeemed a n d a g a i n s t t h e r e d e e m i n g p a r t y
and f u r t h e r r e d e m p t i o n b y some p a r t y o t h e r t h a n t h e
mortgagor or debtor under this article is
precluded."

(Emphasis added.)

The plain language o f § 6-5-248(d) indicates that, i f

Chess, who i s a t r a n s f e r e e of a mortgagor, i s entitled to

redeem t h e p r o p e r t y , B u r t w o u l d n o t be e n t i t l e d t o redeem t h e

p r o p e r t y because B u r t i s a t r a n s f e r e e of a mortgagor rather

than a mortgagor or debtor — o n l y a mortgagor o r debtor can

redeem after a transferee of a mortgagor has redeemed.

Accordingly, because (1) B u r t i s not e n t i t l e d t o redeem t h e

p r o p e r t y i f Chess i s e n t i t l e d t o redeem t h e p r o p e r t y a n d ( 2 ) ,

as d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t exists

r e g a r d i n g whether Chess i s entitled t o redeem the property,

B u r t was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a summary judgment d e t e r m i n i n g that

he i s entitled t o redeem the property. See § 6-5-248(d).

Therefore, we r e v e r s e t h e summary judgment i n favor of Burt

with respect to h i s counterclaim seeking redemption of the

property.

Conclusion

In summary, we reverse the order of the t r i a l court

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granting Burt's summary-judgment motion, a n d we remand t h e

cause f o r further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Our r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s a p p e a l b a s e d on t h e i s s u e s discussed

above pretermits discussion of the other issues r a i s e d by

Chess.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Thompson, P . J . , and Pittman, Thomas, a n d Moore, J J . ,

concur.

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