REL: 03/29/2013

Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

1090638

Clay C. S l a g l e v. B e v e r l y Ross e t a l . Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CV-09-1846) Court

On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g PER CURIAM. On rehearing, Clay C. Slagle moves this Court to as a that

"disqualify"

Robert Bernard

Harwood, J r . , f r o m s i t t i n g

S p e c i a l J u s t i c e on t h i s c a s e on t h e g r o u n d , among o t h e r s ,

1090638 he i s currently bases this engaged i n the private solely practice of law.

Slagle

argument

on t h e t e x t
1

of A r t . VI, provides: his

147(a), A l a . Const. "No judge o f any

1901 ( O f f . R e c o m p . ) , of t h i s engage state

which

court

shall,

during

continuance receive salary In

i n office,

i n the practice service

of law or except the added.)

any r e m u n e r a t i o n f o r h i s j u d i c i a l and a l l o w a n c e s a u t h o r i z e d Slagle i s contending

by l a w . " (Emphasis that,

effect,

notwithstanding the

p r o v i s i o n i n 12-2-14, A l a . Code 1975, f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f " m e m b e r [ s ] o f t h e b a r " t o s i t as S p e c i a l circumstances, from engaging the Constitution i n the private prevents Justices such i n certain

an a p p o i n t e e We reject

practice

of law.

Slagle's In

contention. Johnson v. Board of Control of the Employees'

R e t i r e m e n t System 1999), t h i s Court

o f Alabama, observed:

740 So. 2d 999, 1011-12 ( A l a .

"Under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e J u d i c i a l A r t i c l e , c o n s t r a i n t s a r e p l a c e d upon a j u d g e ' s a c t i v i t i e s only 'during h i s continuance i n o f f i c e . ' 6.08(a). I n 1980, t h i s C o u r t a d o p t e d a 'Commentary' t o t h e Canons o f J u d i c i a l E t h i c s t o make i t c l e a r that

Before the o f f i c i a l recompilation o f t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , 147 was f o u n d a t 6.08 o f Amendment No. 328, A l a . Const. 1901.
1

1090638 retired 6.08. j u d g e s do n o t ' c o n t i n u e i n o f f i c e ' The Commentary r e a d s : under

" ' R e t i r e d and s u p e r n u m e r a r y j u s t i c e s or judges are not c o n t i n u i n g in office u n d e r 6.08 o f Amendment 328, C o n s t i t u t i o n of Alabama o f 740 So. 2d a t 1011-12 The section Johnson of 1901.'" (emphasis quoted of of added). from the Commentary Ethics to the

Court

Alabama's with the is

Canons Canons a

Judicial Judicial Associate

concerning Special The

"Compliance Justice

Ethics." Justice.

Harwood

retired

Commentary makes i t c l e a r t h a t S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood i s n o t "continuing thus, in office" f o r purposes of A r t . VI, 147(a);

t h e p r o h i b i t i o n i n 147 on e n g a g i n g i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f

l a w does n o t a p p l y t o h i m . S e c t i o n D o f t h e " C o m p l i a n c e " p o r t i o n o f A l a b a m a ' s Canons o f J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , p e r t a i n i n g t o " R e t i r e d and Judges," r e i n f o r c e s the n o t i o n impediment Justice. Supernumerary an

t h a t p r a c t i c i n g law i s not

t o a r e t i r e d j u d g e o r J u s t i c e s e r v i n g as a S p e c i a l In p a r t , that section provides:

"(2) Retired and s u p e r n u m e r a r y j u s t i c e s or j u d g e s , who a r e s e r v i n g p a r t t i m e on t h e Supreme C o u r t o r on e i t h e r o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r on any c i r c u i t c o u r t o r d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e s t a t e , i n an a c t i v e d u t y s t a t u s , s h a l l be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y

1090638 w i t h a l l o f t h e s e Canons, e x c e p t Canon 5 C ( 3 ) , D, F, G and Canon 6C. E,

" ( 3 ) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s and j u d g e s , who a r e s e r v i n g f u l l t i m e a t t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e c h i e f j u s t i c e , on t h e Supreme C o u r t o r on e i t h e r o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r on any c i r c u i t c o u r t o r d i s t r i c t court i n t h e s t a t e , i n an a c t i v e duty s t a t u s , s h a l l be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y w i t h a l l o f t h e s e Canons." Canon 5F o f t h e Canons o f J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , f r o m w h i c h r e t i r e d or former J u s t i c e s or judges s e r v i n g that "[a] judge should not p a r t - t i m e are practice law." exempted, Thus,

states

s e c t i o n D(2)

o f t h e " C o m p l i a n c e " p o r t i o n o f t h e Canons c l e a r l y serves part-time comply with the or a

p r o v i d e s t h a t a r e t i r e d j u d g e o r J u s t i c e who on the Supreme Court is not required to

p r o h i b i t i o n on p r a c t i c i n g law Justice. In contrast, on t h e a

i m p o s e d on a f u l l - t i m e j u d g e i s serving on

r e t i r e d j u d g e who

full-time basis

Supreme C o u r t must c o m p l y w i t h p r o h i b i t i o n i n Canon 5F Justice Harwood was not

a l l the the to

Canons, i n c l u d i n g t h e practice of law.

concerning appointed

Special

s e r v e as a J u s t i c e i n t h i s c a s e and c o n s e q u e n t l y , he practice of law. the foregoing, we i s not

on a f u l l - t i m e b a s i s ; private

e x p e c t e d to r e f r a i n from the

B a s e d on

conclude that

the

fact

that of

S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood i s e n g a g e d i n t h e p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e 4

1090638 l a w does n o t d i s q u a l i f y h i m f r o m s i t t i n g as a S p e c i a l in this case. S l a g l e ' s motion i s denied. OVERRULED. P a r k e r , and Murdock, J J . , and Justice

MOTION DENIED; APPLICATION Moore, C . J . , a n d S t u a r t , Harwood,

S p e c i a l J u s t i c e , * concur. Shaw, M a i n , and Bryan, J J . , concur i n part and

Bolin, dissent

i n part.

Wise, J . , recuses h e r s e l f .

* R e t i r e d A s s o c i a t e J u s t i c e R. B e r n a r d Harwood, J r . , was a p p o i n t e d on May 1, 2012, t o s e r v e as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e i n regard to t h i s appeal. A l t h o u g h he was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e o r a l a r g u m e n t i n t h i s c a s e , he h a s v i e w e d a v i d e o r e c o r d i n g o f t h a t o r a l argument.

1090638 BOLIN, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g I concur in denying i n part Clay and d i s s e n t i n g C. Slagle's i n part). motion to

"disqualify" Special

J u s t i c e B e r n a r d Harwood.

I continue to issued the

a g r e e w i t h J u s t i c e Shaw's w e l l r e a s o n e d s p e c i a l w r i t i n g on original submission; therefore, for I dissent

from

overruling

of the a p p l i c a t i o n

rehearing.

1090638 SHAW, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g I concur in i n part Clay and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) . C. Slagle's motion to

denying

" d i s q u a l i f y " S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood; I a d h e r e t o my i n t h i s m a t t e r i s s u e d on o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n , a n d I

dissent therefore

d i s s e n t from the o v e r r u l i n g o f the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r rehearing.

1090638 MAIN, J u s t i c e I concur (concurring i n denying i n part and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) . to d i s q u a l i f y Special

the motion

J u s t i c e Harwood, b u t I d i s s e n t f r o m o v e r r u l i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n for rehearing.

1090638 BRYAN, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t ) . on t h i s C o u r t when t h i s case was

I was n o t y e t s i t t i n g decided original

o r i g i n a l l y ; therefore, submission.

I d i d n o t v o t e on t h i s c a s e on the a p p l i c a t i o n materials including

However, i n r e v i e w i n g

f o r rehearing,

I have c o n s i d e r e d

both the rehearing

and t h e m a t e r i a l s s u b m i t t e d a video of the recording opinion

on o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n ,

o f o r a l argument. issued on

I concur i n the h o l d i n g that

application f o r rehearing

a d d r e s s e s t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Harwood issue. However, opinion I agree completely with Justice and I a l s o Shaw's agree

dissenting

on o r i g i n a l

submission,

w i t h p o r t i o n s o f J u s t i c e M a i n ' s d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n on o r i g i n a l submission. Therefore, I d i s s e n t from the o v e r r u l i n g o f the

rehearing a p p l i c a t i o n . As Justices Shaw and Main noted i n their dissenting

o p i n i o n s , the language used by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t h e Alabama Open M e e t i n g s A c t , 36-25A-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 1975 Act"), i s ambiguous of a with regard to i t s effect a upon ("the the or a

deliberations subcommittee.

governmental

body,

committee,

This

C o u r t must l o o k t o l e g i s l a t i v e

intent to 957 So.

resolve the ambiguity.

C i t y o f B e s s e m e r v. M c C l a i n ,

1090638 2d 1061, 1074-75 his dissent ( A l a . 2006) . As J u s t i c e M a i n explained i n

on o r i g i n a l

s u b m i s s i o n , t h e A c t was d r a f t e d t o

ensure p u b l i c access t o the d e l i b e r a t i v e processes of p u b l i c bodies. original Moreover, The c o n s t r u c t i o n submission is o f t h e A c t i n t h e main o p i n i o n inconsistent with that on

purpose. County

i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e Montgomery

B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e were an i n t e n t i o n a l a t t e m p t t o circumvent respectfully rehearing the requirements from of the Act.

Therefore,

dissent

overruling

the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r

i n this

case.

F u r t h e r m o r e , Montgomery C o u n t y B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n member C h a r l o t t e Meadows a c k n o w l e d g e d as much i n a s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p r e s s t h a t was a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e : " I t was c l e a r t h e o n l y r e a s o n t o f o r m t h e s e s u b - g r o u p s was t o a v o i d t h e m e d i a a n d t h e p u b l i c . " She a l s o t e s t i f i e d : " I t h i n k we met i n t h o s e g r o u p s i n t h o s e t y p e s o f s e t t i n g s s o we c o u l d s p e c i f i c a l l y a v o i d t h e m e d i a , a n d I t h i n k t h a t ' s w r o n g . " T h e s e s t a t e m e n t s c o n f i r m my o p i n i o n t h a t t h e B o a r d ' s a c t i o n s were an i n t e n t i o n a l a t t e m p t to circumvent p u b l i c access t o the d e l i b e r a t i v e processes of the Board.
2

10

1090638 HARWOOD, S p e c i a l J u s t i c e Following the (statement of nonrecusal). Justice

recusal in this

case of A s s o c i a t e

A. K e l l i W i s e , t h e C h i e f

J u s t i c e o f t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t

r e q u e s t e d t h a t I , as a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e o f t h e C o u r t , t r a n s f e r from i n a c t i v e s t a t u s t o a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s pro tempore f o r the s p e c i a l and as a r e s t r i c t e d purpose of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s Justice. I was to have no other duties case or

Special

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o r a u t h o r i t y , and my a u t o m a t i c a l l y upon t h e i s s u a n c e in the case. I accepted that in the

" a c t i v a t i o n " would cease

of the c e r t i f i c a t e of judgment a s s i g n m e n t , as without I have done being on any

several

occasions

past,

there

a t t e n d a n t m o n e t a r y r e m u n e r a t i o n o r o t h e r emolument o f t o be provided. Following the Court my p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the June 15, 2012, per

service

curiam opinion I voted with

of the an

issued

i n which

five-member m a j o r i t y , application for

t h e a p p e l l a n t , C l a y C. In

Slagle, f i l e d with the

rehearing.

conjunction

that

a p p l i c a t i o n , Mr.

S l a g l e , through h i s attorney,

Honorable

M a r k G. M o n t i e l , f i l e d h i s " M o t i o n f o r D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n a n d / o r R e c u s a l o f R e t i r e d J u s t i c e B e r n a r d Harwood f r o m P a r t i c i p a t i o n in this Case on Application for Rehearing on Behalf of

11

1090638 Plaintiff/Appellant Mr. Montiel asserted from Clay C. Slagle." In that motion,

three grounds f o r "the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n this case of Retired Justice Bernard

and/or

recusal

Harwood."

F i r s t , he c i t e d and s e t o u t i n f u l l 147, A r t . V I , (formerly 6.08 o f Amendment That section

C o n s t i t u t i o n o f A l a b a m a o f 1901 No. 328

t o the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n

of 1901).

states: "Sec. 147. Prohibited activities.

" ( a ) No j u d g e o f any c o u r t o f t h i s s t a t e s h a l l , d u r i n g h i s c o n t i n u a n c e i n o f f i c e , engage i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f l a w o r r e c e i v e any r e m u n e r a t i o n f o r h i s j u d i c i a l s e r v i c e e x c e p t t h e s a l a r y and a l l o w a n c e s a u t h o r i z e d by law. " ( b ) No j u d g e , e x c e p t a j u d g e o f a p r o b a t e c o u r t , s h a l l s e e k o r a c c e p t any n o n j u d i c i a l e l e c t i v e o f f i c e , o r h o l d any o t h e r o f f i c e o f p u b l i c t r u s t , e x c e p t i n g s e r v i c e i n the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of the s t a t e or f e d e r a l governments. " ( c ) The supreme c o u r t s h a l l a d o p t r u l e s o f c o n d u c t and c a n o n s o f e t h i c s , n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , f o r the judges of a l l c o u r t s of t h i s S t a t e . " Next, Retired Mr. Montiel "contends that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of to the

J u s t i c e Harwood i n t h i s c a s e w i t h o u t n o t i c e

p a r t i e s and i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n the due process requirements of state and

violates federal

12

1090638 constitution. U.S., 129 S. See C a p e r t o n v. (2009)." that A.T. Massey C o a l Co., Inc.,

C t . 2252

L a s t l y , Mr.

M o n t i e l avers

" [ r ] e t i r e d J u s t i c e Harwood a l s o has m a i n t a i n e d an a c t i v e law p r a c t i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g s t a t e a g e n c i e s and b o d i e s , g o v e r n e d b y t h e A l a b a m a Open M e e t i n g s Act, during h i s retirement. This p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e o f law a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s u g g e s t s a p o s s i b l e b i a s or c o n f l i c t r e g a r d i n g the i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s case. The p r o b a b i l i t y o f a c t u a l b i a s on t h e p a r t o f t h e j u d g e i s t o o h i g h t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y tolerable. See C a p e r t o n v. A.T. M a s s e y C o a l Co., Inc., U.S. , 129 S. C t . 2252." Mr. from Montiel requests case Mr. by [my] t h a t I "be own order d i s q u a l i f i e d or or that of the recused Court." order,
3

this

Addressing

Montiel's

three

grounds

i n reverse

submit the f o l l o w i n g : Mr. Montiel's belief that I have "maintained and b o d i e s , [my] The an active

law p r a c t i c e r e p r e s e n t i n g s t a t e a g e n c i e s by t h e A l a b a m a Open M e e t i n g s A c t , d u r i n g s i m p l y a m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n on h i s p a r t .
3

governed

retirement," i s

o n l y s t a t e agency

Mr. M o n t i e l g r a c i o u s l y s t a t e s i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s motion that " [ w ] h i l e undersigned c o u n s e l has t h e highest p e r s o n a l r e g a r d and r e s p e c t f o r R e t i r e d J u s t i c e Harwood, t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s t h i s d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n and/or recusal." R e c i p r o c a l l y , I have t h e h i g h e s t p e r s o n a l r e g a r d f o r Mr. M o n t i e l , a c k n o w l e d g i n g h i s l o n g and a c c o m p l i s h e d l e g a l c a r e e r e n c o m p a s s i n g n o t o n l y e x t e n s i v e e x p e r i e n c e as a p r i v a t e p r a c t i t i o n e r , b u t a l s o h i s s e r v i c e as a s t a t e c i r c u i t j u d g e and on t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s . 13

1090638 o r body I have represented d u r i n g my retirement i s Shelton Tuscaloosa. as a

S t a t e Community C o l l e g e , b a s e d i n my hometown o f I was at a l l times, commencing with my

appointment on

Special Justice i n this

c a s e , up t o t h e p r e s e n t ,

retainer

as c o u n s e l f o r S h e l t o n S t a t e .

The Alabama Open M e e t i n g s A c t ,

c o d i f i e d as 36-25A-1 e t s e q . , Code o f A l a b a m a 1975, a p p l i e s to "governmental bodies." Shelton State is not a

" g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y " as t h a t t e r m 36-25A-2(4)); of rather,

i s d e f i n e d b y t h e A c t (see adjunct of the Alabama

i t i s an

Department

Postsecondary

Education,

which,

i n turn, i s Education.

s i m p l y a department o f t h e Alabama Department o f The Alabama State Board of Education State directs no

and c o n t r o l s or

Shelton

State,

and

Shelton

has

independent Rather,

s e p a r a t e g o v e r n i n g b o a r d , body, o r commission.

i t is through

d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e A l a b a m a B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n that Board's directives to the c h a n c e l l o r of the

Alabama

Department o f P o s t s e c o n d a r y I do n o t o t h e r w i s e

Education. and b o d i e s ,

represent " s t a t e agencies

g o v e r n e d b y t h e A l a b a m a Open M e e t i n g s A c t . " With case respect t o t h e i s s u e o f my participation i n this been

as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e w i t h o u t

advance n o t i c e h a v i n g

14

1090638 given to parties how s u c h t o the appeal o f my a p p o i n t m e n t , I do n o t t h e due By

perceive process

l a c k o f advance n o t i c e " v i o l a t e s

requirements

o f s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . "

l o n g and w e l l j u s t i f i e d t r a d i t i o n , t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e r e g u l a r J u s t i c e on t h e C o u r t t o whom an a p p e a l i s a s s i g n e d f o r i n i t i a l a n a l y s i s a n d i s s u a n c e o f an o p i n i o n o r o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n a n d t h e i d e n t i t i e s o f t h e J u s t i c e s s e r v i n g on t h e same d i v i s i o n o f the Court as t h a t J u s t i c e , which J u s t i c e s w i l l be v o t i n g i n

t h e a p p e a l , a r e n o t d i s c l o s e d i n a d v a n c e t o t h e p a r t i e s t o an appeal. attempts for That n o n d i s c l o s u r e i s d e s i g n e d t o a v o i d any t a r g e t e d at outside influence during the deliberative appeal. process

the p a r t i c u l a r to cast

When a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e h a s b e e n vote in a case where t h e

appointed

the deciding

participating

regular Justices are evenly divided, the l o g i c

b e h i n d n o n d i s c l o s u r e i n advance o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e S p e c i a l Justice Mr. is even more compelling. citation With respect of this to

Montiel's concluding

i n support

ground

f o r r e c u s a l , Caperton 868 to (2009), locate

v . A.T. M a s s e y C o a l Co., I n c . , 556 U.S. a n d I am unable

I have c a r e f u l l y r e a d t h a t c a s e , i n i t s d i s c u s s i o n of due-process

considerations himself

i n v o l v e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether a judge s h o u l d recuse

15

1090638 or h e r s e l f , that would o r be d i s q u a l i f i e d relate from sitting, any statements of the

to the issue

o f advance

notice

appointment Finally, Constitution

of a Special

Justice i n a particular

case.

t u r n i n g to the p r o s c r i p t i o n s t a t e d i n 147(a), o f A l a b a m a o f 1901, my focus i s i n i t i a l l y upon

t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r I , as a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e who i s s e r v i n g p a r t t i m e on t h e C o u r t a t t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e , f o r t h e s o l e purpose of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a particular case, thereby

become a " j u d g e o f [ t h a t ] c o u r t ... d u r i n g h i s c o n t i n u a n c e i n o f f i c e , " i n t h e c o n t e x t i n which t h o s e terms a r e e n v i s i o n e d i n 147(a). I n Johnson v. B o a r d of C o n t r o l of t h e Employees'

R e t i r e m e n t S y s t e m o f A l a b a m a , 740 So. 2d 999 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) , t h e Court was called upon to decide whether a retired circuit judge

j u d g e , who d e s i g n a t e d on h e r o a t h o f o f f i c e as a r e t i r e d t h a t she was t o be " i n a c t i v e " a n d who i m m e d i a t e l y assumed "holding Art. appointed office as a federal district

thereafter judge, was

two o f f i c e s

of p r o f i t , "

i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f 280, of 1901. The Court

XVII,

Constitution

o f Alabama

concluded that " i t i s c l e a r that r e t i r e d , the judiciary who are governed

i n a c t i v e members o f Retirement

by t h e J u d i c i a l

S y s t e m , a r e n o t h o l d i n g an o f f i c e , o r e x e r c i s i n g any power o f

16

1090638 the S t a t e , u n l e s s either full-time or u n t i l they r e t u r n t o a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s , or part-time." 740 So. 2d a t 1012. The

C o u r t was c a l l e d upon s o l e l y retired, the

t o answer t h e q u e s t i o n whether a

i n a c t i v e member o f t h e j u d i c i a r y who was g o v e r n e d b y Retirement System was holding an office of

Judicial

profit.

The c o n t r a s t t h e C o u r t made w i t h a r e t i r e d member o f

t h e j u d i c i a r y who r e t u r n e d t o a c t i v e - d u t y s t a t u s , e i t h e r f u l l t i m e o r p a r t - t i m e , was d i c t u m , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e e x t e n t it implicitly opined as t o t h e s t a t u s of r e t i r e d that

judges

returning t o active-duty status, without

making a d i s t i n c t i o n

b e t w e e n t h o s e who d i d s o " f u l l - t i m e " a n d t h o s e who d i d s o o n l y "part-time." The p r e c i s e q u e s t i o n now c o n f r o n t i n g me h a s b e e n d i r e c t l y answered by t h e Court, however, by i t s a d o p t i o n o f t h e Canons

o f J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , w h i c h became e f f e c t i v e F e b r u a r y 1, 1976, and, 1980. as t o t h e " C o m p l i a n c e " s e c t i o n , were last amended i n

I t i s t o be n o t e d t h a t s u b s e c t i o n

(c) o f 147 o f t h e

C o n s t i t u t i o n o f A l a b a m a o f 1901 mandates t h a t " [ t ] h e supreme court s h a l l adopt r u l e s o f conduct and canons o f e t h i c s , n o t with the provisions of this of this Constitution, for

inconsistent

judges of a l l courts

State."

The C o u r t h a s d e c l a r e d

17

1090638 that "'[t]he Canons are not merely guidelines the for proper of re 740

judicial Judicial

conduct. Ethics 465 1011. have So.

I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d that the force 355 and e f f e c t of

Canons In

law.'

Sheffield, So. 2d a t The

2d

350,

( A l a . 1984)."

Johnson,

s e c t i o n o f t h e Canons e n t i t l e d Judicial Ethics" provides,

"Compliance

With part,

the as

Canons o f follows:

i n pertinent

"B. Judge P r o Tempore. A j u d g e p r o t e m p o r e i s a p e r s o n who i s a p p o i n t e d t o a c t t e m p o r a r i l y as a judge. "(1) W h i l e a c t i n g as s u c h , a j u d g e p r o t e m p o r e i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y w i t h Canon 5 C ( 3 ) , D, E, F, and G, and Canon 6C.
"

"D.

R e t i r e d and S u p e r n u m e r a r y

Judges.

"(1) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s or j u d g e s , who a r e n o t s e r v i n g on t h e Supreme C o u r t o r on e i t h e r o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r on any c i r c u i t c o u r t o r d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e s t a t e , i n an a c t i v e d u t y s t a t u s , s h a l l n o t be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y w i t h any o f t h e s e Canons. "(2) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s or j u d g e s , who a r e s e r v i n g p a r t t i m e on t h e Supreme C o u r t o r on e i t h e r o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r on any c i r c u i t c o u r t o r d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e s t a t e , i n an a c t i v e d u t y s t a t u s , s h a l l be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y w i t h a l l o f t h e s e Canons, e x c e p t Canon 5 C ( 3 ) , D, E, F, G and Canon 6C. 18

1090638 "(3) R e t i r e d and supernumerary j u s t i c e s and j u d g e s , who a r e s e r v i n g f u l l t i m e a t t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e c h i e f j u s t i c e , on t h e Supreme C o u r t o r on e i t h e r o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r on any c i r c u i t c o u r t o r d i s t r i c t court i n t h e s t a t e , i n an a c t i v e d u t y s t a t u s , s h a l l be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y w i t h a l l o f t h e s e Canons." (Emphasis It intended is supplied.) certain the that the Alabama Supreme including Court D(2) of fully the

that

Canons i t a d o p t e d ,

C o m p l i a n c e s e c t i o n , were n o t of the Constitution, as

i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the subsection

provisions (c) 147. Court

m a n d a t e d by

T h a t b e i n g so, concluded that retired C o u r t ...

i t i s f u r t h e r c l e a r and t h e r e was who was

c e r t a i n t h a t the

a s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between a serving "part time one on who the was Supreme "serving Supreme

Justice

i n an a c t i v e d u t y s t a t u s , " and r e q u e s t of the active duty

f u l l time at the Court ... i n an

c h i e f j u s t i c e , on t h e Whereas an

status."

activated

J u s t i c e s e r v i n g f u l l - t i m e w o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l y w i t h a l l the Canons, a retired Justice serving only part-time is E,

s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted from c o m p l y i n g w i t h F, G, and Canon 6C. on Canon 5F, the with

Canon 5 C ( 3 ) , D,

which a r e t i r e d Court in an

Justice duty Law.

serving

part-time

Supreme

active

s t a t u s need not

c o m p l y , r e a d s as f o l l o w s : "F.

P r a c t i c e of

19

1090638 A judge the should not practice law." Thus, i t is inescapable a retired with

that

A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has serving part-time on the

concluded that

Justice the

C o u r t may, law.

consistent

Canons o f J u d i c i a l The Supreme Court

Ethics, practice of Connecticut

reached

similar 980 a

conclusion A.2d 845

i n Honulik

v. Town o f G r e e n w i c h , 293

Conn. 641, "whether

(2009), i n which i t a d d r e s s e d the justice, by virtue of performing

issue limited 293

retired

judicial 654

acts, necessarily i s holding n. 15, 980 A. 2d a t 854 n.

that o f f i c e . " That Court

Conn. a t

15.

reasoned:

"The d e c i s i o n of the Supreme C o u r t o f New H a m p s h i r e [ i n C l a r e m o n t S c h o o l D i s t r i c t v. G o v e r n o r , 142 N.H. 737, 712 A.2d 612 ( 1 9 9 8 ) , ] p r o v i d e s d i r e c t support f o r the n o t i o n t h a t temporary performance of d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e does n o t equate w i t h holding that office. Other state courts, in addressing claims pertaining to p o s t r e t i r e m e n t j u d i c i a l a c t i v i t y t h a t concededly are d i s t i n c t f r o m t h o s e a t i s s u e h e r e and i n C l a r e m o n t School District, also have acknowledged the d i s t i n c t i o n between performance of j u d i c i a l d u t i e s and s t a t u s as j u d i c i a l o f f i c e h o l d e r . See, e.g., S t a t e ex r e l . W i l c o x v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 208 Mont. 351, 358, 678 P.2d 209 (1984) ( ' r e t i r e d d i s t r i c t judge c a l l e d i n [pursuant to p r o v i s i o n a l l o w i n g f o r t e m p o r a r y a s s i g n m e n t o f r e t i r e d j u d g e s ] does n o t become a s e c o n d i n c u m b e n t i n t h a t o f f i c e , b u t s i m p l y exercises t h e p o w e r s o f a d i s t r i c t j u d g e on a t e m p o r a r y b a s i s ' ) ; W e r l e i n v. C a l v e r t , 460 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.1970) ('A r e t i r e d j u d g e a s s i g n e d to a c t i v e d u t y i s a u t h o r i z e d t o e x e r c i s e the powers of an o f f i c e w h i l e s e r v i n g on a s s i g n m e n t . He does n o t 20

1090638 by v i r t u e o f t h e a s s i g n m e n t , h o w e v e r , h o l d an o f f i c e ....') ( r e h . d e n i e d December 31, 1 9 7 0 ) ; N e l s o n v. M i l l e r , 25 U t a h 2d 277, 288, 480 P.2d 467 (1971) ('we see no constitutional conflict between mandatory retirement for age and legislative a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r c a l l i n g a judge back i n t o s e r v i c e upon a " c a s e - t o - c a s e " b a s i s ' ) . " 293 Conn. a t 655-56, 980 A. 2d a t 855 (footnote omitted). At

a n o t h e r p o i n t i n i t s o p i n i o n , t h e Supreme C o u r t o f observed:

Connecticut

" F i n a l l y , o t h e r c o u r t s ' j u r i s p r u d e n c e as t o what c o n s t i t u t e s an ' o f f i c e ' i s i n s t r u c t i v e . I n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. H a r t w e l l , 73 U.S. (6 W a l l . ) 385, 393, 18 L.Ed. 830 ( 1 8 6 7 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , in interpreting a criminal statute proscribing e m b e z z l e m e n t by c e r t a i n o f f i c i a l s , a r t i c u l a t e d a formula to apply i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether a p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an ' o f f i c e . ' A c c o r d i n g t o t h e Supreme C o u r t , ' [ a ] n o f f i c e i s a p u b l i c s t a t i o n , o r employment, conferred by the appointment of government. The t e r m e m b r a c e s t h e i d e a s o f t e n u r e , duration, emolument, and duties.' Id. As one c o m m e n t a t o r has n o t e d , t h e H a r t w e l l f o r m u l a t i o n i s descriptive rather than prescriptive, and contemplates a continuum. J. O'Connor, 'The Emoluments C l a u s e : An A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t I n t r u d e r i n a F e d e r a l i s t C o n s t i t u t i o n , ' 24 H o f s t r a L.Rev. 89, 109 (1995). Thus, 'a position characterized by s u b s t a n t i a l t e n u r e , d u r a t i o n , e m o l u m e n t s , and d u t i e s i s the p a r a d i g m a t i c o f f i c e ; c o n v e r s e l y , a p o s i t i o n p o s s e s s i n g none o f t h e s e a t t r i b u t e s w o u l d r e s i d e a t t h e o t h e r end o f t h e c o n t i n u u m as c l e a r l y a nonoffice.' Id." 293 Conn. a t 657-58, 980 A. 2d a t 856 (footnotes omitted).

21

1090638 In serving on t h e C o u r t f o r the limited case, I have purpose of

participating

i n a particular

no " t e n u r e " as and t h e r e

s u c h ; t h e r e i s no e x t e n d e d d u r a t i o n o f my s e r v i c e ; are no e m o l u m e n t s .

I am n o t o b l i v i o u s t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 1 2 - 1 8 - 7 ( b ) A l a . Code 1975, a n d p e r t i n e n t parts of 12-18-10(e), A l a . Code

1975, w h i c h r e a d a s f o l l o w s : S e c t i o n 1 2 - 1 8 - 7 ( b ) : "The r e t i r i n g j u s t i c e o r j u d g e , upon b e i n g r e t i r e d , s h a l l t a k e t h e o a t h o f o f f i c e as a r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r j u d g e a n d t h e r e u p o n become an e x t r a o r a d d i t i o n a l judge o f t h e s t a t e . T h e r e a f t e r , on t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e , t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e o f one o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r t h e G o v e r n o r , any s u c h r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r j u d g e may s e r v e on t h e Supreme C o u r t , on e i t h e r o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r on a n y c i r c u i t c o u r t i n t h e s t a t e . Such r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r j u d g e , when s e r v i n g on a c o u r t i n t h e absence o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e r e g u l a r j u s t i c e o r j u d g e , as t h e c a s e may b e , s h a l l have a n d e x e r c i s e a l l t h e d u t i e s a n d f u n c t i o n s o f the regular justice o r judge f o r whom he i s s u b s t i t u t i n g . When s e r v i n g on a c o u r t f o r r e a s o n s o t h e r than t h e absence o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e r e g u l a r j u s t i c e or judge, the d u t i e s o f a r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r j u d g e s h a l l be a s p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e when s e r v i n g on t h e Supreme C o u r t o r b y t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e when s e r v i n g on a c o u r t o f a p p e a l s o r b y t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e , when s e r v i n g i n a c i r c u i t court; provided, that nothing contained i n this provision s h a l l prevent the Chief Justice from a s s i g n i n g a j u s t i c e o r a judge t o s p e c i a l temporary duty i n other courts. A r e c i t a l i n the minutes of the c o u r t t h a t a r e g u l a r j u s t i c e o r judge i s absent or d i s q u a l i f i e d and t h a t a r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r judge i s s i t t i n g i n h i s place at the request of the Chief

22

1090638 J u s t i c e , t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e o f one o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s o r t h e G o v e r n o r s h a l l be c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e of h i s a u t h o r i t y t o a c t . " Section 12-18-10(e) ( i n p e r t i n e n t part) : "Every j u s t i c e o r j u d g e who has r e t i r e d p u r s u a n t t o t h i s a r t i c l e may, on t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e , the p r e s i d i n g judge of a c o u r t o f appeals or the G o v e r n o r , be c a l l e d t o a c t i v e d u t y s t a t u s a n d , when s e r v i n g w i t h t h e Supreme C o u r t o r c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s , s h a l l p e r f o r m s u c h d u t i e s as may be p r e s c r i b e d b y the C h i e f J u s t i c e or t h e p r e s i d i n g judge o f t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s w i t h w h i c h he i s s e r v i n g a n d , when s e r v i n g i n a c i r c u i t c o u r t , s h a l l perform such d u t i e s as may be p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e in the c i r c u i t "
"

"A r e t i r e d j u s t i c e o r j u d g e o f one o f t h e c o u r t s of appeals o r c i r c u i t judge, w h i l e s e r v i n g w i t h t h e Supreme C o u r t o r one o f t h e c o u r t s o f a p p e a l s f o r reasons other than the absence o r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f a j u s t i c e o r j u d g e , s h a l l p e r f o r m s u c h d u t i e s as may be p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e when s e r v i n g w i t h t h e Supreme C o u r t , o r as p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e p r e s i d i n g judge of the court o f appeals w i t h which he may be s e r v i n g . " All I know concerning the circumstances underlying my case on As

a p p o i n t m e n t as a S p e c i a l J u s t i c e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s is that, as stated at the conclusion "Wise, clear of the opinion herself." of

original Justice

deliverance, Parker made

J . , recuse[d]

i n h i s "Statement

Recusal" i n City

appended t o t h e o p i n i o n o f B e s s e m e r v. M c C l a i n ,

on a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g

957 So. 2d 1061, 1085 ( A l a . 2 0 0 6 ) , a 23

1090638 J u s t i c e may being I e l e c t to recuse himself or h e r s e l f w i t h o u t there

any b a s i s f o r h i s o r h e r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n . to, and am guided by by the in the final

Regardless, analysis, Court the in

revert

deliberate adopting

determination

Alabama

Supreme

t h e Canons o f J u d i c i a l E t h i c s , "not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h [the] C o n s t i t u t i o n , " t h a t a r e t i r e d J u s t i c e "not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

the p r o v i s i o n s of

s e r v i n g on t h a t C o u r t , " p a r t - t i m e " may, [the] Constitution," practice In decline consideration to of law.

a l l the

above,

I,

for

my

part, vote on

recuse myself for rehearing.

from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Because the motion in

application

question [my] to this

a s k s t h a t I be own order or

" d i s q u a l i f i e d o r r e c u s e d f r o m t h i s c a s e by that of the Court," I will not presume of

a n t i c i p a t e t h e C o u r t ' s own issue.

a n a l y s i s and

determination

24