VOL.

104, MAY 19, 1981 479

Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
No. L-34395. May 19, 1981. *

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and
the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCKS DE LEGARDA, respondents.
Appeal; In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised. In an
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether
the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal issue to be
resolved in this appeal.
Property; Succession; In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant
inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by
operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said
property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
________________

* SECOND DIVISION

480

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
Same; Same; Same. So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime)
from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva)in favor of another ascendant, the
reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmission of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to
the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant.
Same; Same; Same. The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3)
the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
Same; Same; The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property and holds title
subject to a resolutory condition. The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if
the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and

of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.
Same; Same; The reservee has only an inchoate right. He cannot impugn a conveyance
made by the reservor. On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would
become absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee. The reservee cannot impugn
any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the
property be recognized by the purchaser.
481

VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 481

Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
Same; Same; A reservee may sell his right but may not renounce it. There is a holding

contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96). And there
right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only
if and when the reservee survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
Same; Same; Case at bar involve a reserva troncal. In the instant case, the properties
in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her
death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda
were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Same; Same; All reservees are equally entitled to share in reserva troncal. This Court
noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservee it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice
why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-
5).

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

AQUINO, J.:

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and
damages and holding, as not subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her
mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No.
73335). The facts are as follows: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito
Legarda y Tuason, died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
his widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs
of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943.
Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially
to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. The said properties consist of the following:
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company,
Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260,
80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203,
48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
l/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now
Quezon City; l/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of
Baguio;
l/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila
registry of deeds;
l/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael described in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
l/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of
deeds (Streets and Estero);
483
VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 483
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of the registry of deeds of Tayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as
co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten identical documents
wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in
favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren
in all). The document reads:

he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la

recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.

Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit.

casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Roces.

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the
estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of
their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de
Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.
484
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed

properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground
that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena

Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20,
1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and
rties
are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the ex elusion of her three daughters and her three sons
(See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. In this
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that
the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error
contend that the lower court fired in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the
estate of her daughter Filomena Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary
shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding
that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim
is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of

petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved
only the issue of
485
VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 485
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal
issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving
factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon
those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Roces Vda.
de Legarda could dispose of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from
her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the
reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the
reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first
impression. It was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and
other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature
of reserva troncal, also called lineal familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in
descanting on the nature of reserva troncal, which together with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the
n ownership
caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain
family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is
incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which
fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and
inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission,
restored the reserva troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and
Castan Tobeñas, has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article
891, which reads:

por titulo lucrativo de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservar los que
hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que esten dentro del tercer

the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said

In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property

from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by
another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant,
and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another
ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
487
VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 487
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within
the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobeñas. Derecho
Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus, where one Bonifacia
Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the
death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of
his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister
from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous
title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within
the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco)from
which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.
1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31,
1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs.
Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserva troncal
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas
mpedir que, por un azar de la
vida, personas extrañas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran

203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. In
that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victoriano.
Pedro died in 1902,
488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan,
the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her
name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-
in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half
share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac.
When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father,
Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacieto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children.
It was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of
Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and
Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and maternal aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who
belonged to the line from which said onehalf portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac, 114
Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva tronval are found in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and
Gutierrez vs. Halcita, 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs.
Galang, 48 Phil. 601, Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the
one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property
last revoked by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil.
186, 190)
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordu inherited property from her mother,
Basilio Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her
489
VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 489
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property
was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within
the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They
cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives
within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to
the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree
from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship
and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient
gives nothing in return such as donation and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (Sienes
vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject
to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased
the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
ked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295: Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279.)
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
a retro in a pacto de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.

condition, meaning that if at the time of the r

transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees
(Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono vs.
Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent
right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would
become absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can
require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser
(Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciat
property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo
vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the reservor (Sienes
vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property. J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
491
VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 491
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose,
they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while
the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no
part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
reservista but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject
to the condition that they must survive the (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI,
Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited
by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
 Hence, upon the death, the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus
Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could
convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within
the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in
the second degree, her three daughters and three sons.
As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the
reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by
all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case
are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently,
to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
reservista)
together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no
ce nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant
has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the
predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot
part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of a (reservee).

In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife
Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two
inherited pro-
493
 VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 493
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila

inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. In her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her
deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de
Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued
Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties,
which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III, which the latter had
inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.

be disposed of in
by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part

alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reservee, to one-
seventh of the properties. The other six-sevenths portions were adjudicated to the
other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this
case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during

of the prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of

the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains
its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The
reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the
only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased
ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not
reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal
line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her
sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who
belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that
 That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor
willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of
the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of
the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property

relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to
only one reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is
likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there
is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived
of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose
of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the
relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by

the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from
the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the
condition that they must
495
VOL. 104, MAY 19, 1981 495
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due
to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the
-

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by

death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees,
the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the
said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva
troncal and not in
Cano vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1,
4).

adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable
properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito
F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their
respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Concepcion Jr., is on leave. Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in
the Second Division.
Petition granted.
496
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila
Notes. The requisite conditions for tax purposes before a court may issue an

paid; (2) when sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the inheritance tax and
all other obligations of the estate; or (3) when the payment of the said tax and all
other obligations has been provided for. (Vera vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 408)
The cause of action of the reservee of a piece of property subject of reserva troncal
does not arise until the reservor dies (Chua vs. Court of First Instance, 78 SCRA 412)
For purposes of reserva troncal there is gratuitous transfer when the recipient does
not give anything in return and it matters not that the property is subject to prior
charges, such as an order of the court imposing the payment of a certain sum of money
owned by the deceased. (Chua vs. Court of First Instance, 78 SCRA 412)
cession of rights in favor of the legatees and heirs named in the will cut
off whatever claims they may have had to the properties of the estate for distribution
(Corpus vs. Corpus, 7 SCRA 817)
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the

interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. (Abut vs.
Abut, 45 SCRA 326)
Inability among the heirs to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original
compromise among them and any of the latter is justified in finally seeking a court
order for the approval and enforcement of such compromise. (De Borja vs. Vda. de
Borja, 46 SCRA 577)
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings it it had already been closed, and not through an independent action,
which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long
497

VOL. 104, MAY 25, 1981 497

People vs. Argel
ago distributed and disposed of. (Guilas vs. Judge of Court of First Instance, 43 SCRA
111; Macias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251)
 In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750).
When land is reservable property it is obligatory to reserve such property for the
benefit of the real heir. (Aglibot vs. Mañalac, 4 SCRA 1030)

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