Tim Mapes Motion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
)
UNITED STATES )
) No. 21 CR 345
v. )
) Judge John Kness
TIMOTHY MAPES )
)
DEFENDANT TIM MAPES’

MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Tim Mapes hereby moves this Court for an order staying further
proceedings in this action, including ruling on pending post-trial motions and
sentencing, pending the resolution by the United States Supreme Court of James E.
Snyder v. U.S., Case No. 23-108. A decision in Snyder is expected in or around June
2024. Last week, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Snyder, a
case that is anticipated to impact legal issues underpinning this case. Therefore, a
stay of this action will serve the orderly administration of justice. Mr. Mapes will
suffer substantial hardship if he is required to litigate post-trial motions, and proceed
to sentencing, based on issues which the Supreme Court is currently considering in
Snyder, and which, depending on the outcome in Snyder, may require re-litigation
and re-sentencing. Said differently, if the Supreme Court were to upend Seventh
Circuit precedent on the federal bribery statute, it would likely have direct relevance
to the perjury and obstruction allegations in this case. The government’s
investigation was about the alleged bribery of Speaker Madigan by executives at
1
ComEd. If the Supreme Court limits the federal bribery statute in Snyder, that will
likely have an enormous effect on, among other things, questions of materiality that
this Court is considering or, at the very least, calculations concerning sentencing. In
contrast, the Government will not be harmed by a relatively brief stay while the
Supreme Court considers Snyder in the coming term.
I. Legal Standard
It is well-established that a district court has discretionary power to stay
proceedings before it. Landis v. North Amer.Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“The power
to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.”); Munson v. Butler, 776 F. App’x 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2019)
(A district court “has inherent power to exercise its discretion to stay proceedings to
avoid unnecessary litigation of the same issues.”). A decision regarding a stay “calls
for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-255. A pending matter that may impact the
legal issues underlying a case provides valid basis for a stay. See Mediterranean
Enters. Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (the court “may,
with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the
parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent
proceedings which bear upon the case.”). A pending Supreme Court decision, where
certiorari has been granted, on a legal issue that would impact the outcome of the
case provides ample basis for the granting of a stay. See Chowdhury v. Worldtel
2
Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding in abeyance the
resolution of an appeal pending Supreme Court ruling on another case involving the
same statute).
In determining whether to issue a stay, a Court must weigh the possible
damage that may result from granting a stay, the hardship or inequity which the
party must suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice
including simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law that could
be expected to result from a stay. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55. All of those factors
weigh toward granting a stay here.
II. Argument
Tim Mapes was charged with perjury and obstruction of justice stemming from
his testimony before the Special January 2019 Grand Jury. In the words of the
Government in Mr. Mapes’ indictment, that Grand Jury was investigating whether
Michael McClain sought “to obtain for others private jobs, contracts, and monetary
payments from ComEd, in order to influence and reward Public Official A in
connection with Public Official A’s role as Speaker of the Illinois House of
Representatives.” Count 2 of Indictment, at Section 1(e). Mr. Mapes was charged with
lying about his knowledge of Mr. McClain’s interactions with Mr. Madigan regarding
these topics.
Throughout this case, there was no evidence that Tim Mapes had any
knowledge of any bribery in which Mr. McClain, Mr. Madigan, or anyone else engaged
in a quid pro quo, trading action by Madigan for favors or payments. Similarly, in
3
U.S. v. Michael McClain et. al., a separate criminal case in which Mr. McClain was
charged and convicted along with three other defendants, there was also no evidence
presented regarding any quid pro quo bribe.
Rather, the Government’s theory—in the Grand Jury, in Mr. Mapes’
prosecution, and in Mr. McClain’s prosecution—was that ComEd and others made
payments or benefits in the hope of “infuenc[ing] and reward[ing]” a government
official. See Mapes Indictment, p.8.
Whether that “gratuity” theory of bribery is, in fact, criminal, is the legal
question at issue in Snyder. Specifically, the Supreme Court has taken up the
question of specifically, “whether Section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments
in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without
any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.” Snyder, Pet’n for Certiorari at I
(August 1, 2023) (attached hereto as Exhibit A).
This Court should stay all proceedings in this matter, including any decision
on pending post-trial motions, and sentencing proceedings, until the Supreme Court
issues a decision in Snyder, because Snyder has significant implications for this case.
In the event the Court concludes that 18 U.S.C. §666 criminalizes only quid pro quo
bribery and not gratuities, it would be fatal to the verdict in this case.
The purpose of a special grand jury, like the one that indicted Tim Mapes, is
to “inquire into offenses against the criminal laws of the United States alleged to have
been committed within that district” 18 U.S.C. §3332(a). By the government’s own
description, the Special January 2019 Grand Jury was investigating, and ultimately
4
charged McClain and others, with conduct that consisted solely of the sort of
“gratuity,” non-quid pro quo conduct that is at issue in Snyder.
If the Supreme Court determines that this sort of conduct is not criminal under
18 U.S.C. §666, then the Grand Jury’s investigation did not pertain to criminal
activity, and whatever Mr. Mapes testified to regarding those topics in the grand jury
cannot constitute obstruction of justice. One of the elements of obstruction of justice
is materiality. If the very matters that the grand jury was investigating were not
criminal, then Mr. Mapes’ testimony could not have been material. Materiality
presumes that it is capable of interfering with or impeding a grand jury’s work. If the
grand jury itself was investigating non-criminal matter, then any testimony from Mr.
Mapes could not have interfered or impeded its charge to “inquire into offenses
against the criminal laws.” 18 U.S.C. §3331.
At the very least, a ruling in Snyder that gratuities do not violate Section 666
would require a new trial for Mr. Mapes. The jury would be entitled to know, and the
defense entitled to argue, that the alleged bribery being investigated by the
government was not, in fact, illegal conduct, and therefore that Mr. Mapes’ allegedly
obstructive testimony could not have been material. If in fact the Supreme Court
determines that the actions described by the government as being “criminal” were
not, then the jury’s verdict, coming after an incorrect statement of the law and legally
improper argument, would necessitate a new trial.
The Supreme Court’s pending ruling in Snyder also has significant
implications for sentencing in this case. The Sentencing Guidelines regarding
5
obstruction of justice instruct that “if the offense involved obstructing the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply §2X3.1 (Accessory after the
Fact) in respect to that criminal offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than
that determined above.” Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2J1.2. The
government’s version of the offense invokes this provision, arguing that “Pursuant to
Guideline §§ 2J1.2(c), 2J1.3(c), because the offense involved the investigation or
prosecution of a bribery offense for which the resulting offense level is greater,
Guidelines § 2X3.1(a)(1), and 2C1.1(a)(2) apply, resulting in a base offense level of 6.”
Gov’t. Version at p. 7-8, attached as Ex. B. The Supreme Court’s determination of
whether, in fact, the investigated and prosecuted “bribery offense” is actually
criminal conduct therefore has direct implications for Mr. Mapes’ sentencing and a
determination of the appropriate guideline range.
Given these significant impacts of the pending Snyder ruling on the issues
underpinning this case, the balance of factors favors strongly toward a stay of these
proceedings. The hardship to Mr. Mapes would be acute: he would be compelled to
spend resources in continuing to brief post-trial motions and preparing for
sentencing, would experience the hardship of going through sentencing and
potentially even beginning to serve a term of imprisonment, only to have to go back
to the starting line and do it all over again once Snyder is decided in just a few
months. By contrast, the harm to the Government from a stay is nil. The Supreme
Court’s decision is expected fairly shortly, and this stay will be of limited duration.
Even if the ruling in Snyder validates the Government’s theory of the law of bribery,
6
there will be no meaningful hardship to the government in hitting the pause button
and resuming the briefing of post-trial motions and preparation for sentencing for a
few months. Rather than proceeding with sentencing and then potentially re-
litigating those issues after a decision by the Supreme Court next June, it would be
a more efficient use of judicial resources to stay these proceedings until after the
Court makes its determination.
***
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Tim Mapes respectfully requests a stay
of all proceedings in this matter, including resolution of the pending post-trial
motions and any sentencing proceedings, until the Supreme Court issues its decision
in Snyder.1
Dated: December 18, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Kathleen Hill

Andrew C. Porter
Kathleen Hill
Sarah L. Bakker
SALVATORE PRESCOTT PORTER &
PORTER
1010 Davis St.
Evanston, IL 60201
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
(312) 283-5711
1
The parties have met and conferred and the government has expressed opposition to the present
motion.
7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 18, 2023, I caused copies of the foregoing to
be served on all counsel of record by electronic mail.
/s/Kathleen Hill
One of the Attorneys for Tim Mapes
8
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Exhibit A
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#:8683
No.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
JAMES E. SNYDER,
PETITIONER,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
ANDRÉA E. GAMBINO LISA S. BLATT

53 W. Jackson Blvd. Counsel of Record
Chicago, Illinois 60604 SARAH M. HARRIS
(312) 322-0014 AARON Z. ROPER
KARI M. LORENTSON
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
680 Maine Avenue SW
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 434-5000
[email protected]
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QUESTION PRESENTED
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for
a state or local official to “corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] …
or accept[] … anything of value from any person, intend-
ing to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any”
government business “involving any thing of value of
$5,000 or more.”
The question presented, on which the circuits are di-
vided, is:
Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., pay-
ments in recognition of actions the official has already
taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo
agreement to take those actions.
(I)
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II
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from the following proceedings:

• United States v. Snyder, No. 21-2986 (7th Cir. June
15, 2023) (affirming conviction)
• United States v. Snyder, No. 2:16-cr-160 (N.D. Ind.
Oct. 14, 2021) (entering judgment of conviction)
There are no other proceedings in state or federal
trial or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related
to this case within the meaning of this Court’s Rule
14.1(b)(iii).
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III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS BELOW ..........................................................1

JURISDICTION ................................................................1
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED ......................2
STATEMENT .....................................................................2
A. Statutory and Factual Background ................5
B. Procedural History ...........................................7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........13
I. The Circuits Are Split 5-2 on Whether
Section 666 Criminalizes Gratuities ....................14
II. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally
Important and Squarely Presented ....................19
III. The Decision Below Is Incorrect .........................23
CONCLUSION .................................................................28
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IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014) ..................... 25
Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106 (2023) ............ 27
Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020) ................. 25
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) ........................ 26
McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016) ..... 25, 27
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) ................... 21
United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009) ..... 17
United States v. Agostino,
132 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1997) ...................................... 12
United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1995) ....... 16
United States v. Coles,
2023 WL 1865349 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2023) ................. 20
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) ................ 27
United States v. Fernandez,
722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) ................ 14, 15, 18, 22-24, 28
United States v. Ganim,
510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007) .................................... 16, 24
United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2005) ......... 17
United States v. Griffin,
154 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 1998) ........................................ 14
United States v. Grossi,
143 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 1998) ........................................ 20
United States v. Hamilton,
46 F.4th 389 (5th Cir. 2022) ...... 15, 16, 18-20, 23, 25, 28
United States v. Hamilton,
62 F.4th 167 (5th Cir. 2023) ............................ 18, 19, 22
United States v. Hawkins,
777 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2015) .................................. 12, 17
United States v. Jackson,
688 F. App’x 685 (11th Cir. 2017) ............................... 18
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Page
Cases—continued:
United States v. Jennings,
160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998) ................................ 16, 25
United States v. Johnson,
874 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2017) ........................................ 17
United States v. Lindberg,
39 F.4th 151 (4th Cir. 2022) ............................. 16, 18, 23
United States v. McClain,
2022 WL 488944 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2022) .................. 20
United States v. McNair,
605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) .................................... 17
United States v. Porter,
886 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2018) ........................................ 17
United States v. Reichberg,
5 F.4th 233 (2d Cir. 2021) ............................................ 20
United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2021) ...... 20
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal.,
526 U.S. 398 (1999) ..................................... 13, 23, 24, 27
United States v. Zimmermann,
509 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2007) .................................. 17, 24
Statutes and Regulation:
18 U.S.C.
§ 201 ................................................... 2, 15, 16, 20, 23, 24
§ 201(b) ......................................................... 15, 17, 23-25
§ 201(c) ......................................................... 13, 15, 23, 24
§ 666 ......................................................... 2-5, 9, 10, 12-28
§ 666(a) .................................................................... 15, 18
§ 666(a)(1)(B) ............................ 2, 5, 7, 12, 17, 21, 23, 26
§ 666(a)(2) ...................................................... 3, 16, 21, 26
§ 666(b) ...................................................................... 5, 20
26 U.S.C. § 7212 .................................................................... 8
28 U.S.C. § 1254 .................................................................... 2
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VI
Page
Statutes and Regulation—continued:
Ind. Code § 7.1-5-5-2 .......................................................... 26
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-1 ...................................................... 25
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-2 ...................................................... 25
2022 Census of Governments,
85 Fed. Reg. 80764 (Dec. 14, 2020) ............................. 20
Other Authorities:
Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad
Definitions of Bribery Make Things Worse,
84 Fordham L. Rev. 463 (2015) ................................... 18
As Courts Split, Novel Question for 5th Circuit Centers
on Quid Pro Quo, Tex. Law. (Aug. 25, 2022) ............ 18
George D. Brown, Stealth Statute—Corruption, the
Spending Power, and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666,
73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 247 (1998) ............................. 20
Mark S. Gaioni, Note, Federal Anticorruption Law in
the State and Local Context: Defining the Scope of
18 U.S.C. § 666, 46 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 207
(2012) ............................................................................. 18
Bob Kasarda, FBI Continues Probe into Portage Mayor,
Nw. Ind. Times (July 31, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/2bbtkdzb......................................... 7
Nat’l Ass’n of State Ret. Admin’rs, Employment
(June 2023), https://tinyurl.com/5xbn7xx5 ................ 21
Official Corruption Prosecutions Drop Under Trump,
TRAC Reports (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/bde5jfuw ................................. 19, 20
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VII
Page
Other Authorities—continued:
Theodore Richardson, Note, The Road to Hell Is Paved
with Vague Intentions: Prosecutorial Development
of 18 U.S.C. § 666 and Its Effect on Local Officials,
10 Tex. A&M L. Rev. Arguendo 28 (2023)................. 21
Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, Section 666: The Beast in
the Federal Criminal Arsenal,
39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 673 (1990) .................................... 19
Jeff Schultz, FBI Returns to County, Eyes Portage
Mayor, Chesterton Trib. (July 22, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/2v562655 ......................................... 7
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Resource Manual § 1001
(Jan. 2020) ..................................................................... 25
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-46.100
(Jan. 2020) ..................................................................... 21
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of Just. Stat., FY 2021
Number of Defendants in Cases Filed: 18 U.S.C.
§ 666, https://bjs.gov/fjsrc ............................................. 5
Stephanie G. VanHorn, Comment, Taming the Beast:
Why Courts Should Not Interpret 18 U.S.C. § 666 to
Criminalize Gratuities, 119 Penn State L. Rev. 301
(2014) ............................................................................. 18
Justin Weitz, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: 18
U.S.C. § 666 After Skilling v. United States, 14
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 805 (2011) ....... 18, 20, 23
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In the Supreme Court of the United States
JAMES E. SNYDER,
PETITIONER,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner James E. Snyder respectfully petitions for

a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The court of appeals’ opinion (Pet.App.3a-45a) is re-
ported at 71 F.4th 555. The court of appeals’ order deny-
ing rehearing en banc (Pet.App.1a-2a) is unreported. The
district court’s order denying the motion for acquittal
(Pet.App.53a-69a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on June 15,
2023, and denied rehearing en banc on July 14, 2023.
(1)
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Pet.App.1a-3a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) provides:
Whoever … corruptly solicits or demands for the ben-
efit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything
of value from any person, intending to be influenced or re-
warded in connection with any business, transaction, or
series of transactions of such organization, government, or
agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more …
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 666 are reproduced in full, infra,
Pet.App.184a-191a.
STATEMENT
This case presents an exceptionally important, out-
come-determinative question concerning the scope of the
most prosecuted federal public-corruption statute: 18
U.S.C. § 666. That statute makes it a crime for state and
local officials to “corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] … or ac-
cept[] … anything of value” in order to be “influenced or
rewarded in connection with” government business “in-
volving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B).
The circuits are deeply divided over whether section
666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of
actions the official has already taken or committed to take
where the official did not agree to take those actions in ex-
change for payment. In the First and Fifth Circuits, gra-
tuities are not criminal. To secure a section 666 conviction,
the government must instead prove that the official and
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the payor agreed to exchange something of value for offi-

cial action. In other words, the government must prove a
quid pro quo bribe like paying a legislator to vote for a bill.
In direct conflict, the Seventh Circuit below, joined by
the Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, do not
require a quid pro quo and permit convictions for gratui-
ties. While section 666 requires that the official act “cor-
ruptly,” those circuits and the government read that word
to require only that officials knew they were getting some-
thing of value that was intended to reward them. That ca-
pacious interpretation risks chilling an enormous range of
legitimate conduct. A constituent might donate to the
campaign of a politician who took an action the constituent
likes. Or a real-estate agent might offer a deal on a condo
to a city housing official whose policies helped the agent
weather a recession. In five circuits, those actions are il-
legal, and officials can be prosecuted for accepting dona-
tions or gifts.
Courts, commentators, and even the government rec-
ognize that 5-2 circuit split. And the split is entrenched
and intractable. Circuits on both sides have acknowledged
the conflict, and declined to reconsider their positions en
banc. The battle lines are drawn, and only this Court can
break the logjam and restore uniformity on the meaning
of an important federal criminal statute.
This circuit split is also manifestly important. Millions
of state and local officials nationwide fall within section
666’s scope. And a parallel provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(2), criminalizes payments to a state or local offi-
cial, reaching anyone who gives anything of value to public
officials too. Whether people may spend years in federal
prison should not turn on the happenstance of where they
reside. Yet, as it stands, public servants, constituents, and
others in New York, Chicago, and Miami can spend up to
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ten years in prison for conduct that is not a federal crime

in Boston or Houston. The current arbitrary disparity
cries out for this Court’s resolution.
Moreover, the government’s reading of section 666
risks chilling a wide range of constitutionally protected
conduct. Absent a quid pro quo requirement, section 666’s
reach is amorphous, sweeping up wide arrays of First
Amendment-protected interactions with government offi-
cials. Officials and citizens across the country should not
be left guessing when the everyday hustle and bustle of
local politics becomes a federal crime. And federalism
principles counsel strongly against reading section 666 to
permit federal prosecutors to micromanage how state and
local officials campaign, carry out their jobs, and interact
with constituents.
This case is the ideal vehicle to resolve this critical and
recurring question. Petitioner James Snyder, the former
Mayor of Portage, Indiana, was convicted under section
666 for accepting $13,000 from a truck company after the
company successfully won bids to sell garbage trucks to
the City. Mayor Snyder maintains that this payment was
a valid transaction with his consulting business, as the
truck company’s owner testified at trial. Regardless, the
government does not allege that Mayor Snyder agreed to
rig the bidding process in exchange for $13,000. The gov-
ernment instead alleged Mayor Snyder both approached
the company and received the payment after the bidding
was complete, i.e., that Mayor Snyder received a gratuity.
Thus, at trial, the government repeatedly disavowed
any obligation to prove a quid pro quo. The district court
rebuffed Mayor Snyder’s requests to dismiss the indict-
ment, instruct the jury that section 666 does not cover gra-
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tuities, or grant acquittal. And the Seventh Circuit af-

firmed Mayor Snyder’s section 666 conviction solely on a
gratuity theory, recognizing that the same conduct would
not be a federal crime in the First and Fifth Circuits. This
Court should grant certiorari now to resolve this en-
trenched, intolerable conflict.
A. Statutory and Factual Background
1. Every year, the federal government prosecutes
nearly 100 individuals under 18 U.S.C. § 666, the govern-
ment’s most prosecuted public-corruption statute. See
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of Just. Stat., FY 2021 Number
of Defendants in Cases Filed: 18 U.S.C. § 666,
https://bjs.gov/fjsrc. Section 666 makes it a felony punish-
able by up to 10 years’ imprisonment for state or local of-
ficials to steal state- or local-government property or ac-
cept or demand bribes. Section 666 equally applies to pri-
vate individuals who bribe officials.
As relevant here, section 666 makes it a crime for
state and local officials to “corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] …
or accept[] … anything of value …, intending to be influ-
enced or rewarded in connection with” government busi-
ness “involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.” 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). So long as some component of the
state or local government received over $10,000 in federal
funding the previous year, officials of that State or locality
face potential prosecution under section 666. Id. § 666(b).
2. This case arises from the federal government’s sec-
tion 666 prosecution of petitioner James Snyder, the for-
mer mayor of Portage, Indiana. Set on the shores of Lake
Michigan, Portage—population 38,000—elected Mayor
Snyder in November 2011. He ran on improving garbage
collection and working with local businesses to spur Por-
tage’s economic recovery after the 2008 recession.
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Once in office, Mayor Snyder got to work addressing

Portage’s waste-management problems. The Mayor
tasked the Assistant Superintendent of Streets, a friend,
with overseeing the public bidding process to secure more
efficient automatic, side-loading garbage trucks.
Pet.App.4a, 172a. In 2013, after the Portage Board of
Works reviewed bids, Portage awarded two contracts
worth $1.125 million to Great Lakes Peterbilt, a local truck
company owned by brothers Robert and Stephen Buha.
Pet.App.27a. For the first contract, awarded in January
2013, Peterbilt was the only fully responsive bidder.
Pet.App.28a.
Later in 2013, Mayor Snyder learned that Peterbilt
had an unused truck Peterbilt might sell the City at a dis-
count. 3/16/2021 Tr. 1530:13-15, 1531:9-13, D. Ct. Dkt. 594.
Mayor Snyder asked the City Attorney whether Portage
could purchase the truck outright. 3/18/2021 Tr. 2066:16-
34, D. Ct. Dkt. 596. The City Attorney responded that
public bidding was required, and the Board of Works
opened a second round of public bidding for more garbage
trucks. Pet.App.28a. In December 2013, the Board
awarded Peterbilt that contract too. Pet.App.28a.
Around the same time, Mayor Snyder sought to sup-
plement his approximately $62,000 salary as mayor. As a
father of four and owner of a mortgage company hit by the
Great Recession, Mayor Snyder was financially strapped
and owed tax penalties to the IRS. Pet.App.56a; 3/9/2021
Tr. 162:5-7, D. Ct. Dkt. 589. Consistent with Indiana law,
which does not forbid small-town mayors from pursuing
other employment, Mayor Snyder began offering consult-
ing services.
After both bids had closed, Mayor Snyder approached
the Buhas to discuss what services he could provide their
company. Mayor Snyder maintains that Peterbilt hired
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him to perform insurance and technology consulting. He

initially sought $15,000 for his services, but Peterbilt
agreed to a lesser amount of $250 per week for a year.
Pet.App.29a; 3/18/2021 Tr. 1931:8-19. In January 2014,
Peterbilt paid Mayor Snyder $13,000 upfront for a year’s
consulting. Pet.App.29a. The government disputes that
the $13,000 was for consulting services and says the pay-
ment was instead a gratuity. But the government agrees
that Mayor Snyder did not approach the Buhas about
money until after Portage awarded the contracts.
3/18/2021 Tr. 2090:18-22.
In late 2013, the FBI began investigating Mayor
Snyder after Portage’s Superintendent of Streets and
Sanitation approached the FBI with concerns that truck
contracts were being steered to Peterbilt. 1/24/2019 Tr.
85:1-3, D. Ct. Dkt. 337; 3/11/2021 Tr. 762:4-20, D. Ct. Dkt.
591. A three-year investigation ensued, during which the
government arranged with Mayor Snyder’s brother to
wear a wire and record conversations with the Mayor.
1/29/2019 Tr. 219:14-17, D. Ct. Dkt. 359.
By mid-2014, the investigation had become public,
with the local press extensively reporting on the FBI’s re-
view of City contracts and requests for Mayor Snyder’s
campaign-finance records. 1 Nonetheless, in November
2015, the citizens of Portage reelected Mayor Snyder.
B. Procedural History
1. In November 2016, the federal government in-
dicted Mayor Snyder in the Northern District of Indiana
for two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) and one
1
See Bob Kasarda, FBI Continues Probe into Portage Mayor, Nw.
Ind. Times (July 31, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/2bbtkdzb; Jeff Schultz,
FBI Returns to County, Eyes Portage Mayor, Chesterton Trib. (July
22, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/2v562655.
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tax-obstruction count under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).

Pet.App.102a. The indictment alleged that Mayor Snyder
received a $13,000 payment from Peterbilt after Portage
had awarded Peterbilt the two contracts. Pet.App.101a-
102a. Separately, the indictment alleged that Mayor
Snyder solicited bribes in connection with a towing con-
tract; a jury later acquitted Mayor Snyder of that count.
Pet.App.5a. Finally, the government charged Mayor
Snyder with obstructing IRS tax collection by omitting in-
formation on personal tax forms and routing payments
through multiple bank accounts. Pet.App.18a-19a.
Initially, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of Indiana handled the prosecution. But in 2017,
Mayor Snyder’s lawyer, Thomas L. Kirsch II, was con-
firmed as U.S. Attorney for that District (eventually be-
coming a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit). Thus, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Northern District of Illinois took over the prosecution.
Pet.App.5a-6a n.1.
In January 2018, Mayor Snyder’s defense team
learned that the government had seized over 100,000
emails from Mayor Snyder, including some 300 privileged
communications between then-attorney Kirsch and
Mayor Snyder. Pet.App.177a. Mayor Snyder sought to
dismiss the indictment or disqualify the prosecution team
based on the government’s intrusion into the attorney-cli-
ent relationship. Pet.App.156a. While questioning “the
prudence of [the government’s] actions” and acknowledg-
ing that the government’s filter team had a “semblance of
the fox guarding the hen house,” the district court denied
the motion. Pet.App.165a, 178a.
2. Due to prosecutorial “irregularities” at his first
trial, Pet.App.143a, Mayor Snyder was ultimately tried
twice for the alleged gratuity from Peterbilt. At no point
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during either trial did the government allege a quid pro

quo whereby Mayor Snyder agreed to accept $13,000 in
exchange for delivering bid awards to Peterbilt.
Quite the contrary, during the first trial, the govern-
ment insisted that, “under 666, the government does not
have to prove a quid pro quo.” 1/22/2019 Tr. 168:6-8, D.
Ct. Dkt. 343. At oral argument on motions to dismiss be-
fore the second trial, the government reiterated that it
“didn’t have to prove a quid pro quo under 666.” 8/24/2020
Tr. 68:19, D. Ct. Dkt. 403. And at the start of the second
trial, the government reaffirmed to the court: “We don’t
have to prove a quid pro quo under 666.” 3/8/2021 Tr.
74:22-23, D. Ct. Dkt. 588.
Likewise, the district court repeatedly rebuffed
Mayor Snyder’s contention that section 666 requires a
quid pro quo agreement. Instead, the court held that the
statute covers gratuities—payments in recognition of ac-
tions the official has already taken or planned to take,
without any quid pro quo. Pet.App.162a. Before the first
trial, Mayor Snyder moved to dismiss the section 666
counts, arguing that the statute does not criminalize gra-
tuities. Pet.App.161a. At the second trial, Mayor Snyder
proposed a jury instruction that would have defined bribe,
reward, and gratuity to clarify that bribes and rewards re-
quire “prior agreement” while gratuities do not.
Pet.App.38a; Proposed Jury Instructions 8, D. Ct. Dkt.
458. The jury would have been instructed to acquit Mayor
Snyder if it found only a gratuity. Pet.App.38a. And after
the second trial, Mayor Snyder moved for acquittal be-
cause the government had not shown a quid pro quo bribe.
Pet.App.38a. At each turn, the district court denied
Mayor Snyder’s motions, citing Seventh Circuit precedent
holding that section 666 applies to gratuities without any
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requirement that the government prove a quid pro quo ex-

change. Pet.App.38a.
3. Under those legal parameters, Mayor Snyder’s
first trial proceeded in January and February 2019. The
jury acquitted Mayor Snyder of violating section 666 by
allegedly soliciting bribes in connection with Portage’s
towing contracts. Pet.App.5a. But the jury convicted
Mayor Snyder of violating section 666 based on the
$13,000 payment from Peterbilt. Pet.App.4a-5a. The jury
also convicted on the tax count. Pet.App.5a.
On Mayor Snyder’s motion, the district court ordered
a new trial on the section 666 count involving the $13,000
payment, citing “several irregularities on behalf of the
government” that “pushed the envelope” too far.
Pet.App.143a, 151a. The government “introduced several
pieces of evidence that had not previously been provided
to Mr. Snyder’s attorneys.” Pet.App.144a. The govern-
ment also used “too much” second-hand testimony from
an FBI agent, including testimony about the Buhas.
Pet.App.144a. Because the Buhas did not testify but were
“central players,” the FBI agent’s testimony acted as a
“sword to pit the non testifying witnesses’ words against
Mr. Snyder,” and a “shield” to protect the agent from
cross-examination. Pet.App.144a-145a.
The court also reasoned that the government “sur-
prised” Mayor Snyder and the court midtrial by refusing
to call the Buhas or grant them immunity. Pet.App.145a-
146a. While the Buhas “vehemently den[ied]” to the grand
jury that their payment to Mayor Snyder had anything to
do with the garbage-truck contracts, they now refused to
testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. Pet.App.146a. In
granting a new trial, the district court criticized the gov-
ernment’s apparent “gamesmanship” in “discourag[ing]
the Buhas from testifying.” Pet.App.145a n.8.
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4. In March 2021, the government retried Mayor

Snyder exclusively for the $13,000 payment from Peter-
bilt. The government proceeded on two theories; neither
required establishing a quid pro quo promise to award
contracts in exchange for payment. First, the government
claimed that after Peterbilt won the garbage-truck con-
tracts, Mayor Snyder approached the Buhas requesting
money, which the government characterized in closing ar-
gument as “asking for a reward.” 3/18/2021 Tr. 2091:9-11.
Alternatively, the government argued that Peterbilt
paid Mayor Snyder $13,000 because he was “a man of in-
fluence.” Id. at 2093:19-25. But the government never
identified any later acts that Mayor Snyder purportedly
took or contemplated for the Buhas’ benefit. Indeed, the
government opposed Mayor Snyder’s request to admit ev-
idence that Peterbilt lost multiple City bids after the
$13,000 payment. U.S. Resp. to Mots. in Limine 27, D. Ct.
Dkt. 454. In doing so, the government disclaimed that the
payment “was solicited or received by [Snyder] in ex-
change for Peterbilt being awarded contracts in later bid
processes.” Id.
The government also repeatedly mentioned the
$13,000 payment alongside the Buhas’ earlier campaign
contributions to Mayor Snyder, although the government
recognized that those contributions were perfectly legal.
3/9/2021 Tr. 134:25-135:4; 3/18/2021 Tr. 1977:24-1979:8,
2079:23-2081:18.
At the second trial, the government afforded the
Buhas immunity from prosecution but did not call them as
witnesses. D. Ct. Dkt. 497, 498. When the defense called
Robert Buha, he testified that Mayor Snyder approached
the Buhas after the second contract to discuss the Mayor’s
financial troubles and request money to pay off a tax debt
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and holiday expenses. 3/18/2021 Tr. 1999:9-22. Buha tes-

tified that Peterbilt agreed to pay Mayor Snyder $13,000
as upfront payment for the Mayor’s insurance and tech-
nology consulting—not for any reason relating to Peter-
bilt’s truck contracts. Pet.App.36a; 3/18/2021 Tr. 1931:13-
19; 3/17/2021 Tr. 1894:1-7, D. Ct. Dkt. 595. Peterbilt’s con-
troller likewise testified that Buha consulted Mayor
Snyder about the Affordable Care Act’s impact on the
business. 3/12/2021 Tr. 1139:6-1140:1, D. Ct. Dkt. 592.
And an FBI agent testified that an email exchange be-
tween Mayor Snyder and Robert Buha showed that
Mayor Snyder indeed put the Buhas in touch with busi-
ness contacts. 3/16/2021 Tr. 1609:8-16; 1613:12-1614:2.
The jury convicted Mayor Snyder. Pet.App.46a. The
district court sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment
on the section 666 and tax counts. Pet.App.47a-48a.
Mayor Snyder appealed.
5. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Pet.App.4a. As rel-
evant here, the court “held that § 666(a)(1)(B) ‘forbids tak-
ing gratuities as well as taking bribes.’” Pet.App.39a
(quoting United States v. Hawkins, 777 F.3d 880, 881 (7th
Cir. 2015)). The court acknowledged a 5-2 circuit split and
hewed to its precedent interpreting section 666 to encom-
pass more than quid pro quo bribery. Pet.App.39a. The
court explained that quid pro quo bribery encompasses
agreements to exchange something of value “for influence
in the future.” Pet.App.37a. By contrast, a gratuity is “a
reward for actions the payee has already taken or is al-
ready committed to take.” Pet.App.37a (quoting United
States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997)).
The court reasoned that the term “rewarded” in sec-
tion 666 offered “a strong indication that § 666 covers gra-
tuities as well as bribes.” Pet.App.40a. The court also ex-
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pressed the view that section 666’s requirement that a re-

ward be paid or received “corruptly” mitigated the admit-
tedly “odd” sentencing disparity between state, local, and
federal officials convicted under gratuity theories.
Pet.App.41a. Finally, the Seventh Circuit stated that lim-
iting section 666 to quid pro quo bribes would create its
own disparity because federal law would then criminalize
gratuities paid to federal officials (in 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)),
but not state or local officials. Pet.App.41a.
The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc.
Pet.App.1a-2a. The district court has ordered Mayor
Snyder to surrender to federal custody on October 16,
2023. D. Ct. Dkt. 605.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This petition is an ideal vehicle for resolving an en-
trenched and widely recognized 5-2 split over the scope of
the most widely used federal public-corruption statute. As
the Seventh Circuit and the government acknowledged
below, the circuits are divided on whether 18 U.S.C. § 666
criminalizes gratuities or only quid pro quo bribes.
Gratuities are payments in appreciation for actions al-
ready taken or to be taken—say, campaign contributions
for delivering on specific campaign promises, or prizes be-
stowed for exemplary performance of civic duties. Under
the government’s interpretation, these payments are “cor-
rupt[]” and therefore illegal so long as the official knows
the payment is “forbidden,” Pet.App.41a, i.e., that the con-
tribution or bribe occurred because of the official action.
Bribes instead require “a quid pro quo—a specific intent
to give or receive something of value in exchange for an
official act.” United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999). Five circuits hold that
section 666 criminalizes gratuities. But the First and Fifth
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Circuits hold that section 666 covers only quid pro quo
bribes.
This question is squarely presented, outcome deter-
minative, recurring, and important. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed Mayor Snyder’s conviction based solely on its
holding that section 666 covers gratuities, and the govern-
ment repeatedly disclaimed having to prove a quid pro quo
at trial. Section 666 is the most prosecuted federal public-
corruption statute and covers millions of state and local
officials nationwide. In five circuits, those officials can
spend up to ten years in federal prison for conduct that is
not a federal crime in two circuits. That arbitrary divide
cries out for this Court’s intervention. Whether public
servants like Mayor Snyder spend years in federal prison
should not turn on geographic happenstance.
I. The Circuits Are Split 5-2 on Whether Section 666 Crimi-
nalizes Gratuities
Below, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that cir-
cuits have reached “contrary decisions” about whether “18
U.S.C. § 666 applies to gratuities.” Pet.App.39a-40a. As
the Seventh Circuit documented, the split is 5-2.
Pet.App.39a. Only this Court can restore uniformity to
this vitally important federal criminal law.
1. The First and Fifth Circuits hold that section 666
criminalizes only quid pro quo bribery, not gratuities.
In the First Circuit, “§ 666 does not criminalize gratu-
ities.” United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2013). As that court has explained, “[t]he core difference
between a bribe and a gratuity” is that a bribe requires a
“quid pro quo, or the agreement to exchange [a thing of
value] for official action.” Id. at 19 (quoting United States
v. Griffin, 154 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 1998)). If the official
did not agree to receive a payment until “after th[e] act
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has been performed,” the payment is by definition a gra-

tuity, not a bribe, because there can be no agreement to
perform an act that already happened. Id.
The First Circuit recognizes that “most circuits to
have addressed this issue” disagree. Id. at 6. But the “text
of § 666, as well as its legislative history and purpose, do
not support the argument that Congress intended the
statute to reach gratuities.” Id. at 25. Starting with the
text, the First Circuit homed in on section 666’s similarity
to the federal-official bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
Id. at 23-24. Like section 201(b), section 666 requires that
defendants act “corruptly.” Id. at 21. “[A]ny payment
made ‘corruptly’ is a bribe,” so that word strongly signals
that section 666 is limited to bribes. Id. at 24. For federal
officials, Congress criminalized gratuities in an entirely
separate subsection, 201(c), which does not use the word
“corruptly.” Id. at 23. The First Circuit deemed “it un-
likely that Congress would condense two distinct offenses
[in § 201] into the same subsection in § 666.” Id. at 24-25.
The First Circuit also deemed “critical” the “distinct
penalties” in sections 201 and 666. Id. at 24. Federal offi-
cials who accept gratuities face only 2 years in prison un-
der section 201(c), but the government’s reading of section
666 leaves state and local officials who accept gratuities
exposed to 10 years in prison. The First Circuit found that
“dramatic discrepancy” “difficult to accept.” Id.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that section 666
is limited to quid pro quo bribery because the First Circuit
has “the better approach under the plain language of
§ 666(a).” United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389, 397
(5th Cir. 2022). Section 666 “tracks closely” section 201(b),
the federal-official bribery statute, “with the matching
‘corruptly’ and ‘intent to influence’ language.” Id. Fur-
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ther, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the “hoard of constitu-

tional problems” with the government’s “broad reading,”
including “First Amendment, federalism, and due-process
concerns.” Id. at 398 n.3. To the extent doubt remained,
the court invoked the rule of lenity. Id. at 397-98 n.2.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit is “skeptical” that section
666 covers gratuities, but has not definitively taken sides.
United States v. Lindberg, 39 F.4th 151, 171 n.17 (4th Cir.
2022). That court recognizes that “[i]ncluding gratuities
within the ambit of § 666(a)(2)” is “at odds with the textual
requirement that one most act ‘corruptly.’” Id. And deci-
sions extending section 666 to gratuities “blur the long
standing distinction between bribes and illegal gratuities”
by “abandon[ing] the traditional meaning of ‘corrupt in-
tent,’” which ordinarily “criminalizes only bribes.” United
States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. In stark contrast, five circuits—the Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh—hold that section 666 ex-
tends to gratuities, no quid pro quo exchange required.
Start with the Second Circuit, which has long inter-
preted section 666 to “appl[y] to both illegal gratuities and
bribes.” United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.
1995). That court first reached that conclusion in a case
involving a predecessor version of section 666. Id. But the
Second Circuit has since extended that interpretation to
the current section 666, holding that “the current statute
continues to cover payments made with intent to reward
past official conduct.” Id. Thus, the Second Circuit reads
section 666 to “impose criminal liability for both kinds of
crime proscribed by § 201: bribery and illegal gratuities.”
United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).
The Sixth Circuit likewise emphasizes that section 666
“says nothing of a quid pro quo requirement to sustain a
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conviction, express or otherwise.” United States v. Abbey,

560 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2009). While a quid pro quo is
“sufficient to violate the statute, it is ‘not necessary.’” Id.
at 520 (quoting United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th
Cir. 2005)); accord United States v. Porter, 886 F.3d 562,
565 (6th Cir. 2018).
The Seventh Circuit too has “repeatedly held that
§ 666(a)(1)(B) ‘forbids taking gratuities as well as taking
bribes,’” including in the decision below. Pet.App.39a (cit-
ing Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 881; United States v. Johnson,
874 F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2017)). In that court’s view,
“[t]he statutory language ‘influenced or rewarded’ easily
reaches both bribes and gratuities.” Pet.App.38a. While
the Seventh Circuit recognizes “contrary decisions by the
First and Fifth Circuits,” the court has not been “per-
suaded to overrule [its] decisions holding that § 666 ap-
plies to gratuities.” Pet.App.39a-40a.
The Eighth Circuit holds the same: “Section
666(a)(1)(B) prohibits both the acceptance of bribes and
the acceptance of gratuities intended to be a bonus for tak-
ing official action.” United States v. Zimmermann, 509
F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2007). That court has therefore af-
firmed convictions for “accepting gratuities rather than
bribes” because the government is “not required to prove
any quid pro quo.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit also has “expressly h[e]ld” that
“§ 666 does not require a specific quid pro quo,” aligning
itself “with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.” United States
v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010). In that
court’s view, “§ 666 sweeps more broadly than …
§ 201(b),” the federal-official bribery statute. Id. at 1191.
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3. Courts, commentators, and even the government

widely recognize the conflict. The Fourth Circuit has ex-
plained that “it is not settled law that § 666 covers gratui-
ties” because “there is a circuit split on the issue.” Lind-
berg, 39 F.4th at 171 n.17. Judge Ho, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc in the Fifth Circuit, high-
lighted “an admitted circuit split” on whether section 666
“criminalize[s] gratuities to local officials.” United States
v. Hamilton, 62 F.4th 167, 170 (5th Cir. 2023). And below,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the Second, Sixth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits took “the same position” as the Sev-
enth, while the First and Fifth Circuits had issued “con-
trary decisions.” Pet.App.39a. Other circuits recognize
the split as well. Hamilton, 46 F.4th at 396; Fernandez,
722 F.3d at 6; United States v. Jackson, 688 F. App’x 685,
694 (11th Cir. 2017).
Commentators also highlight this split. Law-review
articles bemoan the “widening” “circuit split” over section
666’s application to gratuities. Justin Weitz, Note, The
Devil Is in the Details: 18 U.S.C. § 666 After Skilling v.
United States, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 805, 829,
831 (2011). Others note that “circuits courts have long
grappled” with “whether § 666(a) criminalizes both brib-
ery and illegal gratuities,” and “split” on that question. As
Courts Split, Novel Question for 5th Circuit Centers on
Quid Pro Quo, Tex. Law. (Aug. 25, 2022). 2
2
Accord Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Def-
initions of Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 463, 471
n.42 (2015); Stephanie G. VanHorn, Comment, Taming the Beast:
Why Courts Should Not Interpret 18 U.S.C. § 666 to Criminalize Gra-
tuities, 119 Penn State L. Rev. 301, 304 (2014); Mark S. Gaioni, Note,
Federal Anticorruption Law in the State and Local Context: Defin-
ing the Scope of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 666, 46 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 207,
220-21 (2012).
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The government has acknowledged the split too. In

the Fifth Circuit, the government noted that “most cir-
cuits agree that Section 666 is not limited to quid-pro-quo
bribery,” but the First Circuit holds “that Section 666 is
limited to bribes.” U.S. Br. 20-21, Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389
(No. 21-11157). Below, the government laid out the 5-2
split in full. C.A. U.S. Br. 53 & n.8. And just last month,
the government observed that the First and Fifth Circuits
“hold that § 666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities,”
but that interpretation is “inconsistent with the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Snyder,” i.e., this case. U.S. Consoli-
dated Resp. to Pretrial Mots. 63, United States v. Madi-
gan, No. 22-cr-115 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2023), ECF No. 74.
The conflict is undeniable.
II. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important and
Squarely Presented
Section 666’s application to gratuities is a question of
exceptional importance. Section 666 is the most prose-
cuted federal public-corruption statute. Yet the split
means that state and local officials within some circuits
can spend ten years in federal prison for conduct that is
not a federal crime elsewhere. Only this Court can fix that
perverse disuniformity in the application of a major fed-
eral criminal statute. And this case presents an optimal
vehicle for resolving the split.
1. Public corruption is “an area of obvious public con-
cern.” Hamilton, 62 F.4th at 170 (Ho, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). And section 666—“the beast
in the federal criminal arsenal” 3—is the number one most
prosecuted federal public-corruption statute. See Official
3
Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, Section 666: The Beast in the Federal
Criminal Arsenal, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 673 (1990).
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Corruption Prosecutions Drop Under Trump, TRAC Re-

ports (Oct. 15, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/bde5jfuw. In
2018, the Justice Department brought nearly three times
more cases under section 666 than under the federal-offi-
cial statute, section 201. Id. And in recent years, the gov-
ernment has routinely brought gratuity cases under sec-
tion 666. 4 Indeed, the government has used the decision
below to double down on those efforts. In opposing the
dismissal of a gratuity case against the former Speaker of
the Illinois House last month, the government cited the
decision below a dozen times. Madigan U.S. Resp. 45, 47-
48, 57, 62-63.
Section 666’s enormous sweep makes the statute “one
of the federal government’s principal weapons … against
state and local corruption.” George D. Brown, Stealth
Statute—Corruption, the Spending Power, and the Rise
of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 247, 252 (1998).
So long as the state or local government receives more
than $10,000 in federal funds, the State or locality’s offi-
cials are subject to section 666. See United States v.
Grossi, 143 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(b)). Thus, the officials of all 50 States and “the vast
majority” of America’s 90,000 local governments are sub-
ject to federal prosecutors’ oversight. Weitz, supra, at
816; 2022 Census of Governments, 85 Fed. Reg. 80764,
80764 (Dec. 14, 2020). All told, some 20 million Americans
work for state and local governments and face potential
prosecution under section 666. See Nat’l Ass’n of State
4
E.g., Hamilton, 46 F.4th at 394; United States v. Reichberg, 5 F.4th
233, 238 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645, 660 (2d
Cir. 2021); United States v. Coles, 2023 WL 1865349, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 9, 2023); United States v. McClain, 2022 WL 488944, at *5-6
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2022).
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Ret. Admin’rs, Employment (June 2023), https://tinyurl

.com/5xbn7xx5.
Meanwhile, section 666 provides “federal prosecutors
with nuclear-grade statutory weapons.” Theodore Rich-
ardson, Note, The Road to Hell Is Paved with Vague In-
tentions: Prosecutorial Development of 18 U.S.C.
§ 666 and Its Effect on Local Officials, 10 Tex. A&M L.
Rev. Arguendo 28, 41 (2023). The statute’s aim, in the gov-
ernment’s words, is to “protect the integrity of the vast
sums of money distributed through Federal pro-
grams.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-46.100 (Jan.
2020). But this Court has held that the charged conduct
need not “affect[] federal funds.” Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997). Here, for example, the gov-
ernment did not have to prove that Portage’s garbage
trucks were funded by or even implicated the federal gov-
ernment. The fact that Portage as a whole took $10,000
sufficed.
Nor does the statute “limit the type of bribe of-
fered”—any “valuable consideration” suffices. Id. Sec-
tion 666 also reaches public officials and payors alike, cov-
ering both “accept[ing]” and “giv[ing]” unlawful pay-
ments. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), (2). Both officials and
payors face up to ten years in federal prison. Id. And it
does not matter whether the payment actually goes to the
official. Section 666 covers soliciting, demanding, giving,
offering, or agreeing to give “anything of value” to “any
person.” Id.
Given section 666’s breadth in other regards, it is es-
pecially important to keep the statute’s substantive cover-
age clear and narrow. Otherwise, state and local officials
nationwide will be left guessing whether federal prosecu-
tors will view everyday interactions with constituents as
federal crimes. And donors, constituents, and others face
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uncertain risks whether campaign contributions and gifts

can be recharacterized as illegal “gratuities.” Infra pp. 26-
27.
2. This case is the ideal vehicle for resolving the cir-
cuit split. The Seventh Circuit was squarely presented
with whether section 666 applies to gratuities, acknowl-
edged the circuit split, and affirmed Mayor Snyder’s sec-
tion 666 conviction solely on the gratuity theory.
Pet.App.38a-41a. Indeed, the government repeatedly told
the district court at both trials that it did not “have to
prove a quid pro quo.” 1/22/2019 Tr. 168:6-8; 8/24/2020 Tr.
68:19; 3/8/2021 Tr. 74:22-23. Had Mayor Snyder served
the people of Portland, Maine (in the First Circuit) or
Plano, Texas (in the Fifth), his conviction would have been
vacated. But because he was elected by the citizens of
Portage, Indiana (in the Seventh), he faces 21 months in
federal prison. Geography should not determine whether
a public servant goes to federal prison.
No further percolation is necessary. Circuits have
acknowledged each other’s conflicting interpretations and
declined to reconsider their precedent. The First Circuit
created the conflict by holding that section 666 does not
reach gratuities, notwithstanding “most circuits[’]” oppos-
ing view. Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 6. Last year, the Fifth
Circuit widened the conflict, siding with the First Circuit
and then denying rehearing en banc 9-7 over a forceful dis-
sent. Hamilton, 62 F.4th at 167-68 (Ho, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). And below, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the First and Fifth Circuit’s “con-
trary decisions” but declined “to overrule [its] decisions
holding that § 666 applies to gratuities” or revisit the ques-
tion en banc. Pet.App.2a, 39a-40a. Only this Court can
break the stalemate and restore uniformity to federal law.
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III. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

Section 666 criminalizes only quid pro quo bribes—
corrupt exchanges like paying a governor to veto a bill, or
giving a housing inspector a luxury watch in exchange for
a passing grade. The statute does not cover gratuities—
payments for actions already taken or planned, like donat-
ing to the governor’s campaign in approval of the veto or
buying the inspector a nice case of wine after her report is
submitted. The Seventh Circuit’s contrary holding con-
flicts with the statutory text, history, and structure, and
raises a panoply of constitutional concerns.
1. Section 666’s text does not reach gratuities. State
and local officials may not “corruptly solicit[,] demand[,]
… accept[,] or agree[] to accept, anything of value from
any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in con-
nection with” government business. 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). “[A]ny payment made
‘corruptly’ is a bribe” requiring a quid pro quo. Fernan-
dez, 722 F.3d at 23. Proscribing gratuities under section
666 would therefore be “at odds with the textual require-
ment that one must act ‘corruptly’ to run afoul of the stat-
ute.” Lindberg, 39 F.4th at 171 n.17.
Section 666’s history and structure reinforce that con-
clusion. Section 666 is “the stepchild” of the federal-offi-
cial bribery statute, section 201. Fernandez, 722 F.3d at
20 (quoting Weitz, supra, at 816). Section 201 separately
criminalizes bribes (in 201(b)) and gratuities (in 201(c)).
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404-05. Section 666 “tracks
closely with § 201(b)’s bribery provision, with the match-
ing ‘corruptly’ and ‘intent to influence’ language.” Ham-
ilton, 46 F.4th at 397. By contrast, section 201(c)’s gratu-
ity provision asks whether the payment was “for or be-
cause of” the official act, with no “corruptly” requirement.
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Because “§ 666 is more like § 201(b),” not 201(c), “the sen-

sible conclusion” is “that Congress meant for § 666” to
cover only bribes, not gratuities. Id. at 398.
Sections 201 and 666’s maximum penalties confirm
that section 666 does not criminalize gratuities. Section
201 dictates a fifteen-year maximum sentence for federal-
official bribery, but only two years for federal-official gra-
tuities. That disparity reflects the offenses’ “relative seri-
ousness.” Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405. Congress con-
siders quid pro quo bribery far worse than gratuities.
But section 666 contains a single ten-year maximum,
which, on the government’s reading, applies to both bribes
and gratuities. State and local officials who accept gratu-
ities (and people who give them) face up to ten years in
prison while their federal counterparts face only two
years. Given the federal government’s far greater inter-
est in corruption among federal officials, that “dramatic
discrepancy”—a five-times greater penalty on state and
local officials—is inexplicable. Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 24.
Even the Seventh Circuit below found the difference
“odd.” Pet.App.40a.
The circuits that hold that section 666 covers gratui-
ties have focused on the statute’s use of the word “re-
warded.” E.g., Pet.App.40a-41a; Ganim, 510 F.3d at 150;
Zimmermann, 509 F.3d at 927. Because section 201(b)’s
bribery provision does not contain that word, courts have
reasoned that Congress’ use of “rewarded” in section 666
“is a strong indication that § 666 covers gratuities as well
as bribes.” Pet.App.40a. But for federal officials, Con-
gress did not reach gratuities by simply adding the word
“rewarded” to section 201(b). Instead, Congress in section
201(c) omitted the word “corruptly” and criminalized the
acceptance of “anything of value personally for or because
of any official act” (emphasis added). It would be bizarre
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for Congress to otherwise transplant section 201(b)’s lan-

guage to section 666 and use “rewarded” to swallow gra-
tuities. Rather, “rewarded” clarifies “that a bribe can be
promised before, but paid after, the official’s action on the
payor’s behalf.” Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1015 n.3.
2. Reading section 666 to cover gratuities also creates
“a hoard of constitutional problems.” Hamilton, 46 F.4th
at 398 n.3. To start, this Court presumes that Congress
has not intruded on “areas of traditional state responsibil-
ity” like “local criminal activity” absent a “clear state-
ment.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014)
(citation omitted).
That federalism rule carries added force in public-cor-
ruption cases. Federal prosecutors do not “set[] stand-
ards of good government for local and state officials.”
McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 577 (2016) (ci-
tation omitted). While the Seventh Circuit questioned
why Congress would criminalize gratuities to federal but
not state and local officials, Pet.App.41a, “not every cor-
rupt act by state or local officials is a federal crime.” Kelly
v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020). As the gov-
ernment has cautioned elsewhere, section 666 should not
be read to “[f]ederalize many state offenses in which the
Federal interest is slight or non-existent.” U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Crim. Resource Manual § 1001 (Jan. 2020).
Yet the government’s capacious prohibition on gratu-
ities would run roughshod over States’ “prerogative to
regulate the permissible scope of interactions between
state officials and their constituents.” McDonnell, 579
U.S. at 576. Indiana, for example, has chosen to criminal-
ize both quid pro quo bribery, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-
2(a)(2), (4), and various “official misconduct” offenses, id.
§ 35-44.1-1-1(2)-(3). For Alcohol and Tobacco Commission
employees, Indiana explicitly bans “receiv[ing] a gratuity”
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from anyone licensed by the Commission. Id. § 7.1-5-5-2.

And the Indiana State Board of Accounts, which ensures
the integrity of the State and local governments, investi-
gates conduct like the allegations against Mayor Snyder.
States and localities do not need the U.S. Department of
Justice to keep city garbage-truck contracts clean.
The government’s interpretation also risks chilling
substantial First Amendment-protected activity. Take
campaign contributions, which allow individuals “to par-
ticipate in the public debate through political expression
and political association.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S.
185, 203 (2014). In that context, “Congress may target
only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corrup-
tion.” Id. at 207.
Yet the government’s gratuity theory sweeps much
farther, reaching any “reward for actions the payee has
already taken or is already committed to take.”
Pet.App.37a (citation omitted). On that definition, it is
hard to see what contribution is not a gratuity. Donors
presumably support candidates who take actions they like.
And because section 666 applies equally to politicians re-
ceiving funds and donors providing them, 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B), (2), the swath of potentially covered con-
duct is massive.
Suppose a grandmother writes “Thank you for sup-
porting our troops” on a donation check to a governor who
fought to keep a military base open. Or say the head of a
nurses’ union hosts a gala honoring a state public-health
official who “stood up for our healthcare heroes” by sup-
porting vaccine mandates. Those acts “reward” public of-
ficials for past conduct and thus risk ten years in federal
prison for both the official and the grateful constituent.
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That ambiguous scope risks “chilling effect[s]” on pro-

tected speech. See Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct.
2106, 2114 (2023).
Further, the government’s construction of section 666
poses major vagueness concerns. Criminal laws must give
“fair notice” to avoid the risk of “arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement.” McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 576 (citation
omitted). Yet, as above, the breadth of conduct potentially
meeting the government’s definition of a gratuity is
sweeping. As this case illustrates, any time a public serv-
ant accepts private employment (think: every ex-state leg-
islator turned lobbyist), federal prosecutors might recast
those payments as gratuities for actions taken in office.
The Seventh Circuit brushed aside these concerns,
reasoning that section 666’s prohibition on acting “cor-
ruptly” requires that the payment be taken “with the
knowledge that giving or receiving the reward is forbid-
den.” Pet.App.41a. That circularly assumes that what “is
forbidden” is clear. But the government’s interpretation
leaves section 666’s scope amorphous in the first place.
Courts cannot “construe a criminal statute on the assump-
tion that the government will use it responsibly.” McDon-
nell, 579 U.S. at 576 (citation omitted).
To the extent doubt remains, the rule of lenity re-
solves “ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal statute
… in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Davis, 139
S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019). When a public-corruption statute
can “linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe
or a scalpel,” it “should reasonably be taken to be the lat-
ter.” McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 576 (quoting Sun-Diamond,
526 U.S. at 412). Section 666 is best read not to cover gra-
tuities. At minimum, “reasonable doubts” about section
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666’s meaning compel reading the statute not to criminal-

ize gratuities. Hamilton, 46 F.4th at 397-98 n.2; accord
Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 40 (Howard, J., concurring).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDRÉA E. GAMBINO LISA S. BLATT

53 W. Jackson Blvd. Counsel of Record
Chicago, IL 60604 SARAH M. HARRIS
(312) 322-0014 AARON Z. ROPER
KARI M. LORENTSON
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
680 Maine Avenue SW
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 434-5000
[email protected]
AUGUST 1, 2023
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Memorandum
United States Attorney
Northern District of Illinois
Subject Date
United States v. Timothy Mapes September 26, 2023
No. 21 CR 345
To: From:
Kelly Kwong Diane MacArthur
United States Probation Officer Julia Schwartz
230 South Dearborn Street Assistant U.S. Attorneys
Suite 3400 219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604 Fifth Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604
GOVERNMENT’S VERSION OF THE OFFENSE
On May 26, 2021, defendant Timothy Mapes was charged in a two-count

indictment with perjury and attempted obstruction of justice after he lied during his
grand jury appearance on March 31, 2021. Dkt. 1. Mapes was convicted on both
counts on August 24, 2023, after a jury trial that lasted approximately 2 ½ weeks.
Dkt. 124, 125. The jury reached unanimous agreement as to each of the false
statements alleged in the indictment. Dkt. 125.
I. CHARGED CONDUCT
On March 31, 2021, defendant Timothy Mapes appeared before a federal grand
jury and was asked questions as part of a public corruption investigation involving
former Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives Michael Madigan and his
close confidant Michael McClain. GX1 (audio of Mapes’ grand jury testimony), GX424
(transcript of Mapes’ grand jury testimony). 1 At the time, the government was
investigating various corrupt schemes, including Madigan’s solicitation of bribes and
gratuities from the utility company, Commonwealth Edison (“ComEd”), and
McClain’s and others’ efforts to secure those and other illicit payments for Madigan’s
benefit.
Mapes had served as Speaker Madigan’s Chief of Staff for 25 years and had
known McClain for decades. For that reason, the government sought to elicit
1 Government exhibits that were admitted during the trial are identified as “GX.” Citations
to the trial transcript are identified as “Tr.”
information from Mapes concerning Madigan’s use of McClain as an agent to perform

sensitive tasks. Mapes had worked for Madigan for decades and was a member of
Madigan’s close inner circle, and thus had information that would have been useful
to the grand jury’s investigation.
After he was served a subpoena for grand jury testimony, Mapes, through his
defense attorney, asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in response to the grand jury subpoena. On March 24, 2021, about a week before
Mapes testified in the grand jury, Chief Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer entered an order
granting him derivative use immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002. GX422. The order
compelled Mapes to testify before the grand jury, prevented him from his asserting
any fifth amendment privilege through the grant of immunity, and provided that no
testimony or evidence presented by Mapes to the grand jury through his testimony
could be used against him other than if he lied under oath. GX422. On March 31,
2021, Mapes appeared before Chief Judge Pallmeyer, who admonished him that the
order required him to testify truthfully before the grand jury and that, if he failed to
do so, he could face prosecution. GX423.
Mapes appeared before the grand jury later the same day. GX1, GX424. As the
jury found, Mapes lied repeatedly during his grand jury testimony, including about
the nature of the long-term, multi-year relationship between Michael Madigan and
Michael McClain. Information about the close relationship between these two men
would have helped the government’s investigation. But Mapes lied in an attempt to
derail an ongoing federal grand jury investigation into the corrupt activities of
Madigan and McClain and to protect his two friends.
Below are just some of the lies Mapes told in the grand jury, in an effort to
impede the grand jury’s investigation. Throughout his testimony, Mapes’ clear goal
was to ensure that the government did not learn any useful or new information about
Madigan, McClain, and their relationship to one another.
Lies About McClain’s Work for Madigan
As charged in the indictment, and established at trial, Mapes lied multiple

times about his knowledge of Madigan’s interactions with McClain and the work and
assignments Madigan gave McClain from 2017 to 2019. Dkt. 125. In fact, Mapes
claimed that McClain would not have told him anything he discussed with Madigan
and that Mapes did not know whether McClain did any work for Madigan during that
timeframe. Id. This was plainly false.
The government presented dozens of exhibits showing that McClain and

Mapes discussed Madigan’s interactions with McClain at length, in the context of
sexual harassment allegations in Springfield, leadership appointments, committee
appointments, political fundraising, and more. E.g., GX36, GX66, GX72, GX73, GX75,
2
GX282, GX375, GX374, GX376, GX380. The trial testimony made clear that Mapes
knew McClain performed work, or “assignments,” for Madigan. Indeed, McClain told
him so in multiple calls. E.g., GX3, GX17, GX51, GX57, GX58. Mapes even gave
McClain assignments from Madigan while Mapes was Madigan’s Chief of Staff. GX7,
GX251, GX294. In addition, multiple witnesses testified about McClain’s work as
Madigan’s agent, including former Representative Greg Harris, former
Representative Lou Lang, Representative Bob Rita, and lobbyist and former Madigan
staff members Tom Cullen, Will Cousineau, and Craig Willert. Mapes’ lies were
brazen and obvious and designed to ensure the government did not get any useful
information.
Mapes also lied about Madigan’s and McClain’s efforts to transfer a piece of
land in Chinatown in Chicago from state to private ownership, so that Madigan’s law
firm could get lucrative tax law work. Efforts to transfer this parcel of land were
encompassed within the government’s public corruption investigation. 2 Mapes
claimed to have no knowledge of the land transfer, or McClain’s role in it, other than
one innocuous conversation with a legislator. GX424 at 143-146. But McClain
specifically told Mapes he was working on the property transfer as one of his Madigan
“assignments.” GX17. This was but one example of the many lies Mapes told about
McClain’s work for Madigan.
Lies About Passing Messages
Mapes also lied when he claimed not to be aware of whether McClain acted as
a messenger for Madigan in 2017 or 2018. Dkt. 125.
The evidence at trial showed that Mapes was well aware of McClain’s role as
a messenger for Madigan. E.g., GX265, GX70. As an example, Mapes had an informal
meeting with FBI representatives in Springfield on January 24, 2019. GX425. Not
only did Mapes speak to McClain that same day (GX433), Mapes also told McClain
about a conversation he had with Madigan’s criminal attorney, Sheldon Zenner,
concerning the FBI meeting. GX78. Mapes made it clear why he was giving this
information to McClain; he was “reporting in” so that Madigan knew about his law
enforcement contact. The call also showed that Mapes was aware of the government’s
investigation into Madigan in the Northern District of Illinois. McClain and Mapes
discussed whether Zenner was surprised by the FBI contact in the Central District of
Illinois. Mapes said that Zenner “thought it a little unusual . . . But he does, he has
the same view that it’s being precipitated by what’s going in, on in the Northern
District.” GX78. The call thus showed Mapes’ loyalty to Madigan and his interest in
keeping Madigan’s attorney apprised of his contacts with law enforcement, both
directly and by “reporting in” to McClain in his capacity as a messenger for Madigan.
2Madigan and McClain were later charged for their participation in this corrupt scheme.
United States v. Madigan et al., No. 22 CR 115 (N.D. Ill.) (Blakey, J.) [Dkt. 1].
3
Mapes lied about this call in the grand jury, when he claimed he just talked to
Zenner for recommendations for counsel and for “informational” purposes because
Zenner “might have perspective.” GX424 at 89-92. Mapes claimed he was just seeking
his and McClain’s “friendly advice.” GX424 at 102. This was a lie. Mapes sought to
“report in” to McClain and Madigan to show his loyalty. Indeed, Mapes even denied
informing anybody in Madigan’s orbit (which included McClain) about his contact
with Zenner. GX424 at 92.
Lies About Communications with Between McClain and Lou Lang
Mapes also lied when he claimed not to know what interactions McClain had
with former Representative Lou Lang from 2017 to 2019. GX424 at 112-113, 114-15.
In the fall of 2018, McClain asked Lang to resign from public office on Madigan’s
behalf, after Lang had been accused of sexual harassment earlier that year. This
brewing scandal was big news, and McClain kept Mapes filled in every step of the
way. GX16, GX57, GX368, GX369, GX58, GX59, GX60. As one example, McClain told
Mapes, “I gotta tell [Lang] that he’s gotta move on. That the has no future in the
House.” GX60. Mapes joked: “Will you be wearing your big boy pants that day?” GX60.
After McClain had finished the job, McClain advised Mapes that Lang would step
down from office and would advise Madigan of his decision to step down. GX66. This
is an example of one of the many lies Mapes told about McClain’s sensitive work for
Madigan.
Lies About Communications with Between McClain and Bob Rita
Mapes told similar lies when he was asked about Representative Bob Rita.
McClain worked with Rita for years on gaming legislation, at Madigan’s request. In
the grand jury, Mapes claimed to have no idea whether McClain interacted with Bob
Rita between 2017 and 2019. GX424 at 114. But Mapes was well aware of McClain’s
assignment to work with Rita on gaming. E.g., GX57; Tr. 276-292 (testimony of
Representative Rita).
Mapes and McClain had multiple conversations about McClain’s work with
Rita on gaming legislation. E.g., GX84. One of those calls was intercepted on May 16,
2018, when Mapes was Madigan’s Chief of Staff. McClain reported that “Speaker
asked me if I’d come back once a week and meet with Rita.” Mapes responded, “Right,”
and said that Madigan had asked him to remind McClain of the request. Mapes also
asked McClain to talk to Rita about an email Rita’s secretary had sent: “Glass just
popped in to see me and said that Rita’s secretary is sending out notes to people about,
to gaming lobbyists, about what they want in a bill and what is their breaking point.”
Mapes said that Madigan “would say that maybe Rita needs some further direction,”
and that “that’s too much to be putting in a document that is, uh, subpoenable by a
U.S. Attorney’s office or somebody.” GVO Exh. A (unredacted version of GX8). This
4
last line was redacted at trial, 3 but the entire call is relevant to sentencing. Mapes’
guidance that Madigan would not want a representative sending emails that could
be subpoenaed by a U.S. Attorney’s Office shows that Mapes was working to protect
Madigan from criminal scrutiny years before his grand jury testimony.
Lies About McClain’s Retirement
Mapes also falsely testified that he did not discuss what McClain did after his
retirement from lobbying in 2016. GX424 at 65. In one 2018 phone call, Mapes joked
that McClain “still [was] not retired.” GX37. And McClain relayed his ongoing work
relationship with ComEd to Mapes (GX17, GX87), in addition to all the work he was
doing for Madigan.
II. RELEVANT CONDUCT
As discussed below, Mapes is assigned certain offense level enhancements

because he knew the underlying bribery scheme that the grand jury was investigating
involved—at a conservative minimum—more than two bribes totaling more than
$550,000 and less than $1,500,000. Specifically, when he testified, Mapes knew (i)
the investigation involved more than one bribe; and (ii) that the value of the bribe
payments was at least approximately $725,000.
First, Mapes knew about the indictment of Mike McClain and three other
ComEd executives and lobbyists in November 2020, approximately four months
before Mapes testified. The McClain indictment detailed numerous alleged bribes,
and even tallied the amounts of those bribes, for a total of $725,000. See Exhibit B to
the Government’s Version (indictment in United States v. McClain et al., No. 20 CR
812 (N.D. Ill.) (Leinenweber, J.)). Mapes admitted during his grand jury testimony
that he was aware of the indictment and that he had read newspaper reports
concerning the grand jury’s investigation. See GX424 at 34, 92-93, 141, 143-144. This
testimony was consistent with numerous email exchanges between Mapes and others
(including McClain) about the criminal investigation, which demonstrates that
Mapes was aware of the public aspects of the investigation. See GX393-396, GX398,
GX402-GX404, GX406-GX410, GX415, GX418.
In fact, Mapes emailed McClain about the deferred prosecution agreement

between the government and ComEd just days after the filing became public. GX418.
In the deferred prosecution agreement, ComEd agreed to pay a fine of $200 million
on account of its participation in the illegal activity, and admitted that the value of
the benefit received by the company was more than $150 million. United States v.
3This intercepted call was admitted at trial, with redactions, as Government Exhibit 8.
Exhibit A to the Government’s Version of the Offense is an unredacted version of the excerpt.
5
Commonwealth Edison Company, No. 20 CR 368 (N.D. Ill.) (Kness, J.) [Dkt. 3 at 6-7;
id. at A-12].
In addition, other evidence demonstrates that Mapes knew about ComEd’s

efforts to corruptly influence Madigan before the investigation became public, and
that Mapes played a role in the corrupt hiring scheme. Exhibit C to the Government’s
Version is an intercepted call between McClain and co-conspirator John Hooker dated
February 11, 2019, before the government’s investigation concerning ComEd became
public. During the call, Hooker and McClain discussed the renewal of co-conspirator
Jay Doherty’s contract for 2019. Doherty’s contract included payments intended for
multiple “subcontractors.” These “subcontractors” were Madigan associates who were
indirectly paid by ComEd, starting as early as 2011, but who did little or no work for
the company. McClain told Hooker why the subcontractors were paid: “We had to
hire these guys because Mike Madigan came to us. That’s it’s that simple.” Hooker
agreed, “[t]hat’s how simple it is.” Hooker boasted that the Doherty subcontractor
arrangement was “clean for all of us.” As McClain explained, because the
subcontractors were not paid directly by ComEd, they did not have to worry about
whether the newest Madigan subcontractor, Mike Zalewski (a former Alderman and
associate of Madigan’s), was “doing any work or not.” Hooker laughed in agreement,
and said, “That’s right.” McClain responded, “That’s why we set it up like this, John.”
Hooker stated, “We came up with this plan and between him, our friend, and, and,
and, and, uh, Tim, and the alderman, they thought it was great.” Hooker later said
it again: “we came up with it but they thought it was great once they heard it.” GVO
Exh. C. The evidence collected by the government during its investigation readily
established that the phrase “our friend” was a coded reference to Michael Madigan
that was employed by McClain, Hooker, and others. Mapes was the only member of
Madigan’s close inner circle with the name “Tim.” This call demonstrates that Mapes,
as Madigan’s right-hand man, knew about the corrupt arrangement to hide ComEd’s
payments to Madigan’s associates, who were being paid in return for no work, and
that Mapes thought it was a “great” idea from its inception in 2011.
III. HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS
As discussed above, Mapes served as Chief of Staff to Madigan for

approximately 25 years, before his abrupt retirement on June 6, 2018, after Mapes
was accused of sexual harassment. During his 25 years of service, Mapes was a loyal
member of Madigan’s close inner circle. Representative Bob Rita described the
relationship between Madigan, Mapes, and McClain as a “pyramid,” with Madigan
at the top and Mapes and McClain as the points of the triangle—essentially co-equal
number 2s to Speaker Madigan. Tr. 267.
The circumstances surrounding Mapes’ departure, and more generally the way
in which he ran the Illinois House of Representatives as Chief of Staff are relevant
for sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), as they concern the defendant’s history and
6
characteristics. Exhibit D to the Government’s Version is a report prepared by

Margaret Hickey of Schiff Hardin LLP in August 2019, titled Illinois House of
Representatives, Office of the Speaker: Investigations, Analysis & Recommendations
Regarding Workplace Culture. Ms. Hickey’s firm was engaged by the Speaker’s Office
to investigate certain sexual discrimination and sexual harassment claims involving
employees of the Illinois House of Representatives, including Mapes. GVO Exh. D at
1. Ms. Hickey made the following findings regarding Mapes:
We found sufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Mapes

did not “discharge [his] duties” as the Chief of Staff and
Clerk of the House “in a courteous and efficient manner”
when he made several inappropriate comments to or
around Ms. Garrett. While Mr. Mapes’s comments were of
varying levels of inappropriateness, and some comments
were open to interpretation, Mr. Mapes unequivocally
violated the Speaker’s Policies when he dismissed and
mocked Ms. Garrett for coming forward with her serious
concerns about potential sexual harassment. Mr. Mapes’s
comment also undermined the efficient performance of his
duties, because it meant that Ms. Garrett no longer felt
comfortable voicing her concerns about workplace
harassment to him or others. This allowed Mr. Mapes’s
behavior to continue unchecked until Ms. Garrett’s press
conference, which led to the quick and unplanned
resignation of Mr. Mapes.
Id. at 3. Ms. Hickey’s findings are discussed in more detail in her report. Id. at 5-7,
69-88.
The government may supplement the record with additional information

concerning Mapes’ history and characteristics prior to sentencing.
IV. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Offense Level Calculations
1. Grouping. Pursuant to Guidelines §§ 3D1.2(b), (c), and (d),

Count One and Count Two are grouped together.
2. Offense Level
Pursuant to Guideline §§ 2J1.2(c), 2J1.3(c), because the offense involved the

investigation or prosecution of a bribery offense for which the resulting offense level
7
is greater, Guidelines § 2X3.1(a)(1), and 2C1.1(a)(2) apply, resulting in a base offense

level of 6.
Pursuant to Guideline § 2C1.1(b)(1), a 2-level increase is appropriate because

the underlying offense involved more than one bribe.
Pursuant to Guideline § 2C1.1(b)(2) and § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H), a 14-level increase is

appropriate, because the value of the payments was known or reasonably known to
be more than $550,000 and less than $1,500,000. 4
Pursuant to Guideline § 2C1.1(b)(3), a 4-level increase is appropriate because

the offense involved an elected public official, namely, former Speaker Michael
Madigan.
B. Criminal History Category
Based on the facts known to the government, defendant’s criminal history

points equal zero and defendant’s criminal history category is I.
C. Anticipated Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Range
Based on the facts now known to the government, the anticipated offense level
is 26. When combined with the anticipated criminal history category of I, the
anticipated advisory guidelines range is 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment, in addition
to any supervised release, fine, and restitution the Court may impose. 5
V. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
Mapes’ lies in the grand jury were calculated to thwart the government’s
investigation of a massive scheme calculated to corrupt the government of this State
at the highest levels. The criminal activity was pervasive, long-lasting, and involved
bribes calculated to reap benefits for ComEd and for the intended beneficiary of these
illicit payments—Michael Madigan. By lying to protect Madigan and his close
associate, McClain, and hinder the government’s investigation, Mapes harmed the
4As noted above, this is a conservative assessment of the applicable Guideline range, because
the public information available to Mapes prior to his testimony, which he acknowledged he
was familiar with, was that the benefit to be obtained by ComEd easily exceeded $100 million.
See Guideline § 2C1.1(b)(2) (referencing benefit to be obtained from bribery).
5The government is aware that the Sentencing Commission has proposed an amendment to
the Guidelines to establish a 2-point reduction in a defendant’s offense level if they have zero
criminal history points. As this proposed amendment is still subject to Congressional action
and is not final, the government does not analyze its application here. Should it apply, the
defendant’s offense level would be 24 and his advisory guideline range would be 51 to 63
months.
8
people of the State of Illinois and the integrity of the grand jury process, which relies
on witnesses’ truthful testimony.
VI. PENALTIES
In accord with Title 18, United States Code, Section 3013, Mapes will be
assessed $200 on each count of conviction, in addition to any other penalty imposed.
VII. INVESTIGATING AGENCY
The investigating agency is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agent

Ryan McDonald may be reached at (312) 421-6700.
cc: Andrew Porter

Kathleen Hill
Attorneys for Defendant

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Case: 1:21-cr-00345 Document #: 135 Filed: 12/18/23 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:1975

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DEFENDANT TIM MAPES’

proceedings in this action, including ruling on pending post-trial motions and

suffer substantial hardship if he is required to litigate post-trial motions, and proceed

to sentencing, based on issues which the Supreme Court is currently considering in

to the perjury and obstruction allegations in this case. The government’s

investigation was about the alleged bribery of Speaker Madigan by executives at

Supreme Court considers Snyder in the coming term.

It is well-established that a district court has discretionary power to stay

parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent

In determining whether to issue a stay, a Court must weigh the possible

weigh toward granting a stay here.

payments from ComEd, in order to influence and reward Public Official A in

presented regarding any quid pro quo bribe.

Rather, the Government’s theory—in the Grand Jury, in Mr. Mapes’

payments or benefits in the hope of “infuenc[ing] and reward[ing]” a government

official. See Mapes Indictment, p.8.

question of specifically, “whether Section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments

(August 1, 2023) (attached hereto as Exhibit A).

“gratuity,” non-quid pro quo conduct that is at issue in Snyder.

cannot constitute obstruction of justice. One of the elements of obstruction of justice

against the criminal laws.” 18 U.S.C. §3331.

improper argument, would necessitate a new trial.

The Supreme Court’s pending ruling in Snyder also has significant

implications for sentencing in this case. The Sentencing Guidelines regarding

investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply §2X3.1 (Accessory after the

that determined above.” Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2J1.2. The

Guideline §§ 2J1.2(c), 2J1.3(c), because the offense involved the investigation or

Gov’t. Version at p. 7-8, attached as Ex. B. The Supreme Court’s determination of

whether, in fact, the investigated and prosecuted “bribery offense” is actually

determination of the appropriate guideline range.

proceedings. The hardship to Mr. Mapes would be acute: he would be compelled to

spend resources in continuing to brief post-trial motions and preparing for

sentencing, would experience the hardship of going through sentencing and

potentially even beginning to serve a term of imprisonment, only to have to go back

Court makes its determination.

of all proceedings in this matter, including resolution of the pending post-trial

Dated: December 18, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Kathleen Hill

be served on all counsel of record by electronic mail.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ANDRÉA E. GAMBINO LISA S. BLATT

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

OPINIONS BELOW ..........................................................1

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner James E. Snyder respectfully petitions for

Pet.App.1a-3a. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

the payor agreed to exchange something of value for offi-

ten years in prison for conduct that is not a federal crime

tuities, or grant acquittal. And the Seventh Circuit af-

Once in office, Mayor Snyder got to work addressing

him to perform insurance and technology consulting. He