- STATE IMMUNITY

o DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY IS NOT ABSOLUTE

 Under Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not
be sued without its consent. However, needless to say, the rule on State
immunity from suit is not absolute. The State may be sued with its consent.
The State's consent to be sued may be given either expressly or impliedly.

Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law.

Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be
subjected to suit when the State enters into a contract. In this situation,
the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a
waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that PTRI is not immune from suit.
First, PTRI entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of
Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants with
E.A. Ramirez. It is likewise not disputed that the cause of action of E.A.
Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach of the subject Contract. In
other words, PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability arising
from a contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from
suit finds application.

Too, PTRI descended to the level of a contracting party by entering into

the subject Contract. By entering the contract itself, there arose situation
wherein legal action may arise from the execution of the agreement and
incorporating provisions on the procedures to be undertaken in settling
legal disputes. PTRI, thus, also manifested unequivocally its consent to be
subjected to suit with respect to disputes arising from the subject
Contract. (PHILIPPINE TEXTILE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DR.
CARLOS TOMBOC, FEDELITO A. RUFIN, ENGR. MAY S. RICO,
ET AL, v. COURT OF APPEALS and E.A. RAMIREZ
CONSTRUCTION, INC. rep. by its President ENGR. EDUARDO A.
RAMIREZ G.R. No. 223319, October 9, 2019)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW
o MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES ARE THOSE THAT CEASE TO
PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
will be of no practical use or value.

Here, The Court's ruling on whether Matibag was illegally dismissed has
a practical value as it will affect her entitlement to reinstatement and
backwages. If the Court decides that she was illegally dismissed, she
stands to receive backwages and considered as having served as Deputy
Executive Director from March 2, 2011 until April 7, 2017. However, if
the Court holds otherwise, she is not entitled to reinstatement and
backwages and her dismissal from her position shall be considered as
 valid. (DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD v. MARIA BELEN
ANGELITA V. MATIBAG, G.R. No. 210013, January 22, 2020)

 An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable

controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead
or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is
not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. There are
recognized exceptions to the rule; thus, the Court has seen fit to decide
cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.

The issue raised has not been rendered moot and academic by the
conclusion of the 2016 elections. An action is considered "moot" when it
no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already
been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless
the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing
for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events. There are recognized exceptions to the rule; thus, the
Court has seen fit to decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; third, when
the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The present case falls within the fourth exception. For this exception to
apply, the following factors must be present: (1) the challenged action is
in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action. (PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY
OPERATORS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 223505,
October 3, 2017)

o A WRIT OF MANDAMUS SHALL ONLY ISSUE TO COMPEL THE

PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTERIAL ACT
 The writ of mandamus shall only issue to compel the performance of a
ministerial act, or "one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of an act done." Thus, mandamus will not lie to
compel the performance of a discretionary act.

Here, Marzan freely and knowingly vacated her former position as

Department Head of the CPDO, Marzan's reinstatement thereto
constitutes a discretionary act which cannot be compelled through a writ
of mandamus. (MAREY BETH D. MARZAN v. CITY
GOVERNMENT OF OLONGAPO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO,
ANGIE SOCORRO S. BARROGA, AND ARCHITECT TONY KAR
BALDE III, G.R. No. 232769, November 03, 2020)
 o ONCE A DECISION ATTAINS FINALITY IT BECOMES THE LAW OF
THE CASE
 Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case
irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court —
not even the Supreme Court — has the power to revise, review, change or
alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk
of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-
judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.

In light of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA and the CSC that
petitioners could no longer question the Adjudication Committee's
decision as they have failed to appeal the same in the manner prescribed
by law. The decision has become final and executory as to them and no
court, not even this Court, has the power to revise, review, change or alter
it.

By the time petitioners filed the appeal with the CSC, the decision of the
Adjudication Committee had already become final and executory and
could no longer be disturbed. Following Rule II, Section 37 of MC 19, as
amended by Resolution No. 07-0244, a judgment attains finality by the
lapse of the period for taking an appeal without such appeal or motion for
reconsideration having been filed. (MINA C. NACILLA v. MOVIE
AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD,
G.R. No. 223449, November 10, 2020)

- CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
o EN BANC DOES NOT MEAN FULL MEMBERSHIP OF THE
COMMISSION
 An en banc does not mean full membership of the Commission matter
must be acted upon by the en banc of a body or tribunal has been
interpreted to mean that it reaches a decision as a collegial body, and not
necessarily, as an entire body.

The COA explained that there were only two sitting members of the
Commission Proper when the Resolution was promulgated. The term of
then COA Chairman Carague had expired and the President had yet to
appoint his replacement. Still, the Resolution was promulgated en banc,
albeit by only two members of the Commission Proper, since that was the
full composition at that time. (THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY UNDERSECRETARY RAFAEL E.
SEGUIS, FRANKLIN M. EBDALIN, MA. CORAZON YAP-
BAHJIN, EVA G. BETITA, JOCELYN BATOON-GARCIA, AND
LEO HERRERALIM, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER DFA PERSONNEL WITH WHOM THEY SHARE A
COMMON AND GENERAL INTEREST V. THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 194530, July 07, 2020)

o THE POWER OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC TO PROMULGATE

RESOLUTIONS IS SANCTIONED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
 The power of the Commission en banc to promulgate the Resolution is
sanctioned by the 1987 Constitution. Section 6, Article IX-A thereof
expressly grants each Constitutional Commission en banc to promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of
 its offices. However, such rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. . (THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
REPRESENTED BY UNDERSECRETARY RAFAEL E. SEGUIS,
FRANKLIN M. EBDALIN, MA. CORAZON YAP- BAHJIN, EVA G.
BETITA, JOCELYN BATOON-GARCIA, AND LEO
HERRERALIM, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER DFA PERSONNEL WITH WHOM THEY SHARE A
COMMON AND GENERAL INTEREST V. THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 194530, July 07, 2020)

o SINCE THE COA FAILED TO SHOW BAD FAITH ON THE

APPROVING OFFICERS THE ALLEGED REFUND SHOULD NOT BE
PERSONALLY IMPOSED ON THEM
 Since the COA failed to show bad faith on the approving officers, the
alleged refund should not be personally imposed on them, they being in
good faith that recipients richly deserved such benefits and the officers
relied merely on the yearly basis of granting additional allowances,
without them being informed by the COA or DBM that such disbursements
were illegal.

The assessment of the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the

performance of official functions and proof thereof will be done by the
Court on a case-to-case basis. As applied to the instant case, petitioners,
approving and certifying officers, need not refund the disallowed amounts
inasmuch as they acted in good faith.

In support of their good faith, petitioners aver that it has been a

customary scheme of the municipality to grant additional allowances
during year-end period and which act is legally anchored on yearly
appropriation ordinance by the sanggunian. Similar scheme is also
practiced in all government agencies, local or national.

On such previous disbursements of the municipality, there were no

disallowances issued by the COA or DBM, hence, the municipal officials
believed in good faith that such grant of additional allowances were legal
and allowed. It was only on June 26, 2014 when the NDs were issued and
the Municipality was informed. That is why, since 2014, petitioners never
granted additional allowances anymore to its employees. (MARIO M.
MADERA, BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE, CARISSA D. GALING,
AND JOSEFINA O. PELO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
AND COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, G.R. No. 244128,
September 08, 2020)

o COMELEC IS GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION POWERS

NECESSARY AND INCIDENTAL TO ENSURING FREE, ORDERLY,
HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS
 The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion or exceed its
jurisdiction in including (private security service providers) PSSPs and
(private security agencies) PSAs within the ambit of those persons
required to secure written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry,
and transport firearms and other dangerous weapons outside their place
of residence, work, or within public places during the election period.

In previous cases, the Court has already recognized the obvious and
unequivocal intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the law to
grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary and incidental to achieve
the objective of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
 elections. (PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND
PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017)

o THE COMELEC’S SETTING OF A THRESHOLD FOR THE

ELECTIONS IS A NON-ISSUE DURING THE REVISION PROCESS
 The setting of the threshold for the 2016 elections is the function of the
COMELEC. However, this is a non-issue during the revision process. The
purpose of the revision proceedings is simply to conduct a physical
recount of the ballots and thereafter provide both parties the opportunity
to register their objections and claims thereon. Other than the registration
of claims and objections of the parties, the purpose of the revision process
is simply to recount the votes of the parties; and this is implemented by
mimicking (or verifying/confirming) how the VCMs read and counted the
votes during the elections. (FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R.
MARCOS, JR. v. MARIA LEONOR "LENI DAANG MATUWID"
G. ROBREDO, P.E.T. Case No. 005, September 18, 2018)

o CSC MAY REVOKE APPOINTMENTS

 In instances of reorganization, there is no encroachment on the discretion
of the appointing authority when the CSC revokes an appointment on the
ground that the removal of the employee was done in bad faith. In such
instance, the CSC is not actually directing the appointment of another but
simply ordering the reinstatement of the illegally removed employee.

As early as Gayatao v. Civil Service Commission, which is analogous to

this case, the Court already ruled that in instances of reorganization,
there is no encroachment on the discretion of the appointing authority
when the CSC revokes an appointment on the ground that the removal of
the employee was done in bad faith. In such instance, the CSC is not
actually directing the appointment of another but simply ordering the
reinstatement of the illegally removed employee.

In the case at bar, the Court found that the reorganization of the Province
of Zamboanga del Sur was tainted with bad faith. First, the sheer number
of appointments f ound to be violative of RA 6656 is astounding. As
initially observed by the CSCRO, no less than ninety-six (96) of the
appointments made by Gov. Cerilles violated the rule on preference and
non-hiring of new employees embodied in Sections 4 and 5 of the said
law. While the relative scale of invalidated appointments does not
conclusively rule out good faith, there is, at the very least, a strong
indication that the reorganization was motivated not solely by the interest
of economy and efficiency, but as a systematic means to circumvent the
security of tenure of the ninety-six (96) employees affected. Second,
Respondents were replaced by either new employees or those holding
lower positions in the old staffing pattern - circumstances that may be
properly appreciated as evidence of bad faith pursuant to Section 2 and
Section 4 of RA 6656. Significantly, Gov. Cerilles plainly admitted that
new employees were indeed hired after the reorganization. Moreover, the
Court notes that the positions of Respondents were not even abolished.
However, instead of giving life to the clear mandate of RA 6656 on
preference, Gov. Cerilles terminated Respondents from the service and
forthwith appointed other employees in their stead. Neither did Gov.
Cerilles, at the very least, demote them to lesser positions if indeed there
was a reduction in the number of positions corresponding to Respondents'
previous positions. This is clear indication of bad faith.
 All told, the Court finds that the totality of the circumstances gathered
from the records reasonably lead to the conclusion that the reorganization
of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur was tainted with bad faith. For this
reason, following the ruling in Larin, Respondents are entitled to no less
than reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights
and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of their separation
until actual reinstatement; or, in the alternative, in case they have already
compulsorily retired during the pendency of this case, they shall be
awarded the corresponding retirement benefits during the period for
which they have been retired.(CERILLES v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 180845, November 22, 2017)

o THE CSC IS THE SOLE ARBITER OF CONTROVERSIES RELATING

TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
 The CSC's jurisdiction over civil service disputes is settled. Sections 2(1)
and 3 of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states that the powers of the
CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, include having
jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all
employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. It is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service. (MINA C. NACILLA v. MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, G.R. No. 223449,
November 10, 2020)

- GOCCs
o GOCCs ARE ALWAYS SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION AND
CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT
 GOCCs, like the SSS, are always subject to the supervision and control of
the President. That it is granted authority to fix reasonable compensation
for its personnel, as well as an exemption from the SSL, does not excuse it
from complying with the requirement to obtain Presidential approval
before granting benefits and allowances. As this requirement was not
complied with, the disallowance of these amounts was proper.

Under our system of government all executive departments, bureaus, and

offices are under the control of the President. This is embodied in Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that, “The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”

Thus, petitioner has to comply with Section 3 of M.O. No. 20 which

provides that any increase in salary or compensation of GOCCs/GFis that
is not in accordance with the Salary Standardization Law shall be subject
to the approval of the President. This is notwithstanding the power
granted to the Board of Directors of the SSS to establish and fix a
compensation and benefits scheme for its employees.

The grant of authority to fix reasonable compensation, allowances, and

other benefits in the SSS' charter does not conflict with the exercise by the
President, through DBM, of its power to review how reasonable such
compensation is, and whether it complies with relevant laws and rules.
Neither is there any merit in the claim that the SSS' charter supersedes the
provisions of P.D. 1597, M.O. No. 20, s. 2001, Joint Resolution No. 4, s.
2009, and EO No. 7, s. 2010. Nothing in its charter explicitly repeals
 these laws, and there is no irreconcilable conflict between them. Hence,
there is no implied repeal.

Thus, the COA did not err in finding that the SSS is subject to the
requirement of Presidential approval through DBM; this requirement was
not complied with. Hence, the disallowance of these amounts was proper.
(SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R.
No. 243278, November 3, 2020)

o THE OGCC IS THE PRINCIPAL LAW OFFICE OF GOCCs

 The Administrative Code of 1987 explicitly designates the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) as the principal law office of
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and their
subsidiaries, grants it control and supervision over all legal departments
or divisions thereof, and empowers it to promulgate rules and regulations
to effectively implement the objectives of the office of the OGCC. In turn,
the OGCC shall handle all cases of the GOCCs, unless the legal
departments of its client government corporations or entities are duly
authorized or deputized by the OGCC.

Rule 5, Section 1 of the Rules Governing the Exercise by the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel of its Authority, Duties and Powers as
Principal Law Office of all GOCCs (2011 OGCC Rules) states that the
OGCC shall handle all cases by the GOCCs, unless the legal departments
of its client government corporations or entities are duly authorized or
deputized by the OGCC.

This Court had earlier occasion to tackle this question in Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Teresita Panlilio-Luciano, which authority was cited in
the Letters of Authority issued by the OGCC, where it was already
definitively held that the LBP Legal Department was not precluded from
participating as counsel for LBP, as long as the OGCC consents to such
participation, and the said Legal Department acts under the control and
supervision of the OGCC.

Here, there is no serious dispute that the OGCC had, in fact, directly
participated as counsel for LBP when it filed its Manifestation and
Confirmation of Authority before the RTC, attaching thereto the Letters of
Authority it had earlier issued which authorized the lawyers in the LBP
Legal Service Group to handle the instant case. To be sure, subsequent
pleadings and motions in the RTC and in this Court were filed by the
OGCC as the lead counsel of LBP, with the LBP Legal Services Group
acting as collaborating counsel thereof. These filings of the OGCC clearly
and unequivocally demonstrate the OGCC's control and supervision over
the actions of the LBP Legal Services Group, and its approval of the
actions already undertaken by the latter. (LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES JOSE AMAGAN AND AURORA
AMAGAN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE TRADE NAME AND
STYLE "A & J SEAFOODS AND MARINE PRODUCTS," AND
JOHN DOE, G.R. No. 209794, June 27, 2016)

- LOCAL GOVERNMENT
o LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE GRANTED LOCAL AUTONOMY
 Local chief executives and local legislative bodies are necessarily given
enough elbow room to navigate and respond to the different community-
based needs and challenges that vary per constituency.
 The crucial flexibility of these offices, designed no less by RA 7160, is
defeated when each decision that they make on behalf of their
constituency pursuant to their corporate powers are constantly threatened
by prospects of criminal backlash after the fact.

Private respondents' act of authorizing, entering into and ratifying the

Compromise Agreement are well within their authorities under R.A. 7160.
Private respondents considered entering into the Compromise Agreement
in order to settle the longstanding case once and for all, and secure for
the province a majority interest over the subject properties that,
otherwise, would have remained in legal limbo. The whereas clause of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Resolution No. 38, which authorized private
respondent Garcia to negotiate the said Compromise Agreement, provides
for private respondents' purpose which is to secure and guarantee the
province's interest, against the prospect of protracted uncertainty.
Without showing any evil motive on the part of private respondents, this
act appears to be in full consonance with their sworn duties and authority.
Also, Section 468(a) of R.A. 7160 authorizes the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to pass resolutions and ordinances for the welfare of the
province. Private respondents' objective of securing on behalf of the
Province of Bataan majority interest over the subject properties falls
squarely within the definition of protecting the "general welfare" of their
constituents, as defined under Section 16 of R.A. 7160. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) G.R. Nos. 190728-29, November 18, 2020)

o LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MAY ENTER INTO COMPROMISE

AGREEMENTS
 Entering into the Compromise Agreement is within the corporate powers
of the local government unit represented by private respondents provided
under RA 7160. Section 468(a) of R.A. 7160 authorizes the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to pass resolutions and ordinances for the welfare of the
province.

Private respondents' act of authorizing, entering into and ratifying the

Compromise Agreement are well within their authorities under R.A. 7160.
Private respondents considered entering into the Compromise Agreement
in order to settle the longstanding case once and for all, and secure for
the province a majority interest over the subject properties that,
otherwise, would have remained in legal limbo. The whereas clause of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Resolution No. 38, which authorized private
respondent Garcia to negotiate the said Compromise Agreement, provides
for private respondents' purpose which is to secure and guarantee the
province's interest, against the prospect of protracted uncertainty.
Without showing any evil motive on the part of private respondents, this
act appears to be in full consonance with their sworn duties and authority.
Also, Section 468(a) of R.A. 7160 authorizes the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to pass resolutions and ordinances for the welfare of the
province. Private respondents' objective of securing on behalf of the
Province of Bataan majority interest over the subject properties falls
squarely within the definition of protecting the "general welfare" of their
constituents, as defined under Section 16 of R.A. 7160. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) G.R. Nos. 190728-29, November 18, 2020)
 o ORDINANCES MUST BE PASSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
 Time and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the concerned
LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents
of the State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of
their principal, the State. Substantively, the ordinance (i) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not
prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable. Necessarily, therefore,
ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause may not
subvert the State's will by contradicting national statutes.

Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance

constitutes a valid exercise of its police power. This claim is erroneous.
Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is
incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the
State. In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the
control and regulation of the use of water may be made subject of a city
ordinance under the regime of the Water Code - a national statute
governing the same subject matter. However, the privilege to appropriate
and use water is one which is exclusively granted and regulated by the
State through water permits issued by the NWRB.

Accordingly, the Assailed Ordinance mandates all heavy industries

operating along Batangas Bay to use seawater in the operation of their
respective facilities, and install desalination plants for this purpose.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively

contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto
Batangas City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water
which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the
NWRB. By enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in
excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed
Ordinance ultra vires.

Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and void.
Thus, it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies with the
other substantive requirements for a valid ordinance. (CITY OF
BATANGAS v. PHILIPPINE SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION and SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V.,
G.R. No. 195003, June 07, 2017)

- WARRANTS
o STATE INTRUSION ON A CITIZEN’S PRIVACY TO BE JUSTIFIED
MUST BE BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE PERSONALLY
DETERMINED BY A JUDGE
 In turn, a warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2)
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such
judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
 At the heart of these requisites, however, is that the intrusion on a citizen's
privacy — whether it be in his own person or in his house — must be
based on probable cause determined personally by the judge. In other
words, the magistrate authorizing the State-sanctioned intrusion must
therefore himself or herself be personally satisfied that there is probable
cause to disturb the person's privacy.

It is immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge

examined the complainant only, or the witness only, and not both the
complainant and the witness/es. The primordial consideration here is that
the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the
particular individual's privacy.

In granting Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari, the CA reasoned that the

text of the Constitution used the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or,"
which thus "shows its clear intent to really require both applicant and the
witness to be personally examined by the issuing judge.

Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the CA, in invalidating the search
warrant subject of this case, focused on a word used by the Constitution
— "and" — and then ruled that it was the intent of the Constitution that
both the applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be
examined by the judge before any warrant may be issued.

As stated at the very outset, this conclusion of the CA is neither supported

by jurisprudence, nor by the spirit which animates the right.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO REY E. GABIOSA,
SR. G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020)

o IN SITUATIONS INVOLVING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES, LAW ENFORCERS CANNOT ACT SOLELY ON THE BASIS
OF CONFIDENTIAL OR TIPPED INFORMATION
 In situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, "law enforcers
cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip
is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that
will arouse suspicion.”

Here, At around 1pm, the RPSB hotline received a text message, stating
that the subject male person was wearing a collared white shirt with
green stripes, red ball cap, and was carrying a blue sack on board a
passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
A joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post.

With the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive

warrantless search, considering that the police officers failed to rely on
their personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and
anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant
Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A.
ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)

o WARANTLESS EXTENSIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE IS

PERMISSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE OFFICERS MADE IT UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE
  There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in
the absence of a search warrant, including the search of a moving vehicle.

Nonetheless, search of a moving vehicle is not applicable in this case.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a
warrant as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection."

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible only

when "the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction."

In this case, the target of the search was not the passenger jeepney
boarded by Sapla nor its cargo or contents. The target was the person
who matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB
Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes,
red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack. Therefore, the search cannot be
characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.

Even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a

moving vehicle, the operation cannot be deemed a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC SALIBAD Y
MALLARI G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)

- RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

o IN ASSESSING WHETHER PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF CASES WAS VIOLATED, THE COURT MUST FIRST
EXAMINE WHETHER THE OMBUDSMAN FOLLOWED THE
SPECIFIED TIME FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION. FAILURE TO COMPLY SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO THE PROSECUTION WHO MUST ESTABLISH THAT THE
DELAY IS REASONABLE AND JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
 In assessing whether petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated, the recent case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan dictates that the
Court first examine whether the Ombudsman followed the specified time
periods for the conduct of the preliminary investigation. If the
Ombudsman exceeded the prescribed period, the burden of proof shifts to
the State. While the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman does not
provide a period within which the preliminary investigation should be
concluded, the periods provided under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
finds suppletory application.

Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

provides that the investigating prosecutor has 10 days "after the
investigation xxx to determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold
the respondent for trial." Section 4 states that "within 5 days from his
resolution, the investigating prosecutor shall forward the record of the
case xxx to the Ombudsman or his deputy xxx, who shall act on the
 resolution within 10 days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately
inform the parties of such action."

In this case, the Ombudsman failed to observe said period. The Complaint
was filed on June 21, 2013. Respondents were directed to file their
counter-affidavits on July 19, 2013, which they did from September 12,
2014 to May 20, 2015. However, from the date the last counter-affidavit
was filed, the case remained stagnant for 2 years and 2 months, until the
investigating officer issued a Resolution on July 17, 2017, finding
probable cause. (NANCY A. CATAMCO (FORMERLY NANCY C.
PEREZ) v. SANDIGANBAYAN SIXTH DIVISION; OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 243560-62 & G.R. Nos. 243261-63, July 28, 2020)

o THE ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION MUST BE

RESPECTED DESPITE “CLOGGED DOCKETS” OF THE RULING
BODY
 The Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind the "steady stream of
cases that reach their office" despite the Court's recognition of such
reality. "Steady stream of cases" and "clogged dockets" are not talismanic
phrases that may be invoked at whim to magically justify every case of
long delays in the disposition of cases. It should still be subject to proof as
to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the
right to speedy disposition of cases as a fundamental right.

Citing Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, "for the purpose of determining

whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced
from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation." Thus, the case is deemed initiated only upon
the filing of the complaint in 2011. The case had become dormant until
2016 when the Ombudsman approved the resolution, finding probable
cause against them. Thus, there is an unexplained delay of 5 years from
the time the counter-affidavits were filed to the termination of the
preliminary investigation through the approval of the Ombudsman's
resolution finding probable cause. (PETE GERALD L. JAVIER AND
DANILO B. TUMAMAO v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020)

o RIGHT TO APPEAL IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL, NATURAL, OR

INHERENT RIGHT. IT IS STATUTORY IN NATURE.
 The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a
statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide
limitations or qualifications thereto. Therefore, the assailed Resolution
does not violate a person's right to due process and the Constitutional
mandate that free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Save for truly indigent
litigants, the Constitution does not provide that judicial access must be
free at all times.

Payment of filing fees has always been recongized as ssential in our

jurisdiction, and has always been recognized as an allowable limitation to
the right to appeal.

Secondly, petitioners were already given an opportunity to be heard even

before their appeals to the Director were returned for non-payment of
docket fees. The disallowances were the subject of separate AOMs. The
 Auditor issues an AOM, requesting the head of office or his duly
authorized representative to submit justification or comment thereon
within 15 days from receipt of the memorandum. The comment or
justification is necessary before the Auditor can make any conclusion.
Clearly, the auditee is given the opportunity to defend himself from the
charges of irregular disbursements.

Petitioners were given this very opportunity. After post-audit, the Resident
Auditor issued separate AOMs, indicating his observations and
recommendations and requested the management's reply or comments
thereto. Unsatisfied with the management's justifications, the Resident
Auditor issued the subject NDs. The Commission correctly concluded that
petitioners had the opportunity to present their side prior to the
disallowance of the subject transactions. Hence, there can be no denial of
due process, for in administrative proceedings, procedural due process
only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard.

Should he fail to have the AOM reconsidered and an ND is subsequently

issued, the auditee is given the right to appeal said ND. The exercise of
this right to appeal may be conditioned on the payment of legal fees, but
this is hardly iniquitous. The Court has held, time and again, that the right
to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory
privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or
provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or
qualifications thereto. (THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, REPRESENTED BY UNDERSECRETARY RAFAEL E.
SEGUIS, FRANKLIN M. EBDALIN, MA. CORAZON YAP-
BAHJIN, EVA G. BETITA, JOCELYN BATOON-GARCIA, AND
LEO HERRERALIM, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER DFA PERSONNEL WITH WHOM THEY SHARE A
COMMON AND GENERAL INTEREST V. THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 194530, July 07, 2020)

o DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF CASES MUST BE COMMENSURATE

WITH THE REASON THEREOF
 The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of
the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen
by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating
the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has
been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The
concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be
a flexible concept.

The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. It took
the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor more than eight years from the filing of
the complaints to dismiss without prejudice the complaints. The issue on
venue in libel cases is neither a novel nor difficult one. The more than
eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather
routine issue is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMADO "JAKE" P.
MACASAET G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018)
 o A DISMISSAL PREDICATED ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO
SPEEDY TRIAL UPON HISOWN MOTION OR EXPRESS CONSENT
AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL WHICH WILL BAR ANOTHER
PROSECUTION OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.
 It is incumbent upon the State and the private complainants, where
applicable, to exert reasonable efforts to prosecute the case, especially in
cases where the accused is incarcerated. The Court understands that
there are instances of delay in the ordinary course of the trial, but the
delay here shows that the prosecution and the private complainants failed
to exert the reasonable efforts to even present any evidence. The reason
for their failure is likewise unsubstantiated.

Furthermore, in instances where the State has been given every

opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to do so, it cannot claim to
have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its evidence. Such
failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an acquittal of
the accused even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the
case. The effect of such dismissal is at once clear. Following the
established jurisprudence, a dismissal predicated on the right of the
accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts
to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused for the
same offense. This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal, upon the
motion or with the express consent of the accused, will not be a bar to the
subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL DOMINGO, G.R. No. 204895,
March 21, 2018)

- DUE PROCESS OF LAW

o THE BILL OF RIGHTS CANNOT BE INVOKED AGAINST PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS OR IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO PARTICIPATION
BY THE STATE EITHER THROUGH ITS INSTRUMENTALITIES OR
PERSONS ACTING ON ITS BEHALF
 Said provision is part of the Bill of Rights under the 1987 Constitution,
which was intended to preserve and guarantee the life, liberty, and
property of persons against unwarranted intrusions of the State. Absent
government interference, the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against
private individuals or in cases where there is no participation by the State
either through its instrumentalities or persons acting on its behalf.

While Bote was a municipal mayor at the time of the incident, the records
are bereft of any indication that he was acting as such, or on behalf of or
upon authority of the State. As factually found by the CA, Bote was acting
in his personal capacity, and the incident arose from a private dispute
between Bote and SPCPI involving a private property. SCPCI may find
redress through a civil or criminal suit, but not through an administrative
one.

Therefore, there can be no "culpable violation of the Constitution" for

which Bote may be administratively disciplined. For lack of cause of
action, the administrative charge should be dismissed. (VIRGILIO A.
BOTE V. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES, INC., G.R. No.
203471, September 14, 2020)

- ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
o QUANTUM OF PROOF NEEDED IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
  The specific act for which petitioner is being called to account has
nothing to do with budget preparations and any act related to it leading
up to the enactment of an appropriation ordinance by the sanggunian.
Therefore, there is no substantial evidence to hold petitioner
administratively liable.

In order to establish administrative liability for misconduct, there must be

a nexus between the public official's acts and the functions of his or her
office. Indeed, while the quantum of evidence in administrative cases does
not require that it be overwhelming or preponderant in order to be
considered substantial, this does not sanction drawing a nexus that is
tenuous or rests on shaky grounds. (CECILIA Q. REJAS v. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DIOSDADO N. DITONA,
REPRESENTED BY EDWIN N. DITONA G.R. Nos. 241576 &
241623, November 03, 2020)

o IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES, THE ONLY INQUIRY IN

DETERMINING LIABILITY IS WHETHER THE RESPONDENT,
THROUGH HIS INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS, COMMITTED THE CHARGES
AGAINST HIM THAT RENDER HIM ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
 Conspiracy as a means of incurring liability is strictly confined to
criminal cases; even assuming that the records indicate the existence of a
felonious scheme, the administrative liability of a person allegedly
involved in such scheme cannot be established through conspiracy,
considering that one's administrative liability is separate and distinct from
penal liability. Thus, in administrative cases, the only inquiry in
determining liability is whether the respondent, through his individual
actions, committed the charges against him that render him
administratively liable.

While the Office of the Ombudsman's factual findings tend to demonstrate

a sequence of irregularities in the procurement of the LPOHs, this does
not ipso facto translate into a conspiracy between every person involved
in the procurement process. For conspiracy to be appreciated, it must be
clearly shown that there was a conscious design to commit an offense;
conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the
part of cohorts. Conspiracy is never presumed. In this case, there is a
sheer dearth of evidence on Lukban's participation in the alleged
conspiracy to defraud the government. (MANSUE NERY LUKBAN v.
OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES G.R. No. 238563,
February 12, 2020)

o THE COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY YIELDED AND ACCORDED

GREAT RESPECT TO THE INTERPRETATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES OF THEIR OWN RULES
 NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under its special and technical forte, and possessing the
necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is in the best
position to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court
has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation
by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. (GMA
NETWORK, INC. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 192128 & 192135-36, September 13, 2017)
- ELECTION LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICERS
o DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION APPLICATION
 For the doctrine of condonation to apply, the malfeasance, misfeasance or
non-feasance committed by the elective official should have a direct
relation to his official function or have adversely affected the performance
of his official duties.

While Bote was a municipal mayor at the time of the incident, the records
are bereft of any indication that he was acting as such, or on behalf of or
upon authority of the State. As factually found by the CA, Bote was acting
in his personal capacity, and the incident arose from a private dispute
between Bote and SPCPI involving a private property. SCPCI may find
redress through a civil or criminal suit, but not through an administrative
one. (VIRGILIO A. BOTE V. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX
PROPERTIES, INC., G.R. No. 203471, September 14, 2020)

o PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST AND PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

EMPLOYEES MUST AT ALL TIMES BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
PEOPLE
 A public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

Jandayan signed a roster of troops and disbursement voucher to support

the liquidation of the cash advance. Further, he actually received the
funds even though he had no authority to do so. Worse, he failed to show
where the money went. His acts, taken together with that of his co-
respondents show an utter disregard of the trust reposed in him as a
public officer and for which he should be held liable. (FACT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION BUREAU MILITARY AND OTHER LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICES (FFIB-MOLEO) V. MAJOR ADELO B.
JANDAYAN (RET.) G.R. No. 218155, September 22, 2020)

o A PUBLIC OFFICER SHALL NOT BE CIVILLY LIABLE FOR ACTS

DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, UNLESS
THERE IS CLEAR SHOWING OF BAD FAITH, MALICE, OR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE
 A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance
of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice
or gross negligence. The civil liability under Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, including the treatment of their liability as
solidary under Section 43, arises only upon a showing that the approving
or certifying officers performed their official duties with bad faith, malice
or gross negligence.

The determination of whether good faith and regularity in the

performance of official functions may be appreciated in favor of
approving/certifying officers will be done by the Court on a case-to-case
basis. Towards this end, the Court finds that there are attendant
circumstances which support the conclusion that Collado acted in good
faith. No ill will or self-interest may be attributed to Collado in her
erroneous computation of liquidated damages. (EMERITA A.
COLLADO v. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR G.R. No. 193143,
December 01, 2020)
o MISCONDUCT HAS BEEN DEFINED AS A TRANSGRESSION OF
SOME ESTABLISHED AND DEFINITE RULE OF ACTION, MORE
PARTICULARLY, UNLAWFUL BEHAVIOR OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE
BY A PUBLIC OFFICER.
 Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. To amount to grave misconduct the
elements of corruption, flagrant disregard of an established rule, or
willful intent to violate the law must be proved by substantial evidence;
otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Meanwhile, flagrant disregard
of an established rule has been demonstrated in cases were the
respondent's propensity to ignore the rules is clearly manifested by his or
her actions. (ATTY. ALDO P. TURIANO v. ASK FORCE ABONO,
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE (FIO) OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 222998, December 09, 2020)

o DETERMINATION OF PRESENCE OF DISHONESTY IS A QUESTION

OF INTENTION
 Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth,
which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive,
or betray, or intent to violate the truth. Dishonesty - like bad faith - is not
simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention.

The Court finds no substantial evidence to hold Turiano administratively

liable for dishonesty. While only 514 liters/bottles of fertilizers were
initially ordered and delivered the following day it is undisputed that all
the fe1iilizers were subsequently received by Iriga City. This is so alleged
in the complaint and also supported by other evidence. The Court is, thus,
inclined to rule that the Acceptance and Inspection Reports do not distort
the number of fertilizers delivered to and received by Iriga City, neither
did Turiano exhibit a disposition to deceive in signing the said documents.
(ATTY. ALDO P. TURIANO v. ASK FORCE ABONO, FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE (FIO) OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 222998, December 09, 2020)

o IN DETERMINING IF CERTAIN CONDUCT IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE

BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT
THE QUESTIONED CONDUCT TARNISHES THE IMAGE AND
INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE
 Dishonesty is the "concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of
integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray and an
intent to violate the truth." Although there is no concrete definition of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, jurisprudence
instructs that for an act to constitute such an administrative offense, it
need not be related to or connected with the public officer's official
functions. What is essential is that the questioned conduct tarnishes the
image and integrity of his public office.

Gaspar cannot therefore be held administratively liable for having signed

an accurate report. There is nothing in the WTCD Report that shows that
Gaspar distorted or concealed the truth, or that he caused serious damage
to the government or that he abused his authority as the WTCD Report
reflected that the helicopters failed to meet the NAPOLCOM
specifications. His conduct did not also tarnish the image and integrity of
his public office, thus his act of signing an accurate report is not
considered as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
(CLAUDIO DELOS SANTOS GASPAR, JR., v. FIELD
 INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. No.
229032, June 16, 2021)

o APPROVING AND CERTIFYING OFFICERS MAY BE EXCUSED FROM

SOLIDARY LIABILITY TO RETURN DUE TO GOOD FAITH
 The Court reiterates the recent case of Madera v. COA (Madera) where it
prescribed the Rules on Return to clarify the effect of good faith on the
liability to refund amounts which were disallowed by the COA. In the said
case, Administrative Code of 1987 is guiding with respect to the liability
of subordinate officers or employees for acts done in good faith in the
performance of duties. From this, the Court must look into the nature of
the participation of the officers concerned and the existence of badges of
good faith.

But while the approving and certifying officers may be excused from the
solidary liability to return due to good faith, passive recipients or payees
of the disallowed CNAI may not be excused on the same ground. There
being no grounds to excuse return by the remaining petitioners-payees of
the CNAI they respectively received, the Court is constrained to require
them to refund said amounts. (N. CELESTE, EDGAR M. BUTED,
DANILO V. GOMEZ, LUZVIMINDO CAGUIOA, LELITO
VALDEZ, RENATO P. MILLAN, CATALINA DE LEON,
ROBERTO Q. ABULE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No.
237843, June 15, 2021)

o NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZENS WHO HAVE LOST THEIR

FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP BY REASON OF NATURALIZATION MAY
QUALIFY TO RUN FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE IF THE TWO
REQUISITES ARE MET
 In order that a natural-born Filipino citizen, who has lost his or her
Filipino citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad, may qualify to run
for elective public office in the Philippines, must 1) re-acquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. Vergara took her Oath of Allegiance in accordance
with R.A. 9225. The Oath exists and was duly executed. Petitioner failed
to prove any defect in its notarization or that such defect, if any, renders
the document void. Vergara 's presentation of the original of her IC No.
06-12955, the existence and genuineness of which are not contested, is
prima facie proof that she complied with the requirements of R.A. 9225 to
reacquire her Philippine Citizenship. (PHILIP HERNANDEZ PICCIO
v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND ROSANNA VERGARA G.R. No., October 05, 2021)

o AN OMISSION OR MISDECLARATION IN ONE’S SALN QUALIFIES

AS DISHONESTY WHEN IT IS ATTENDED WITH MALICIOUS
INTENT TO CONCEAL THE TRUTH
 While mere omission from or misdeclaration in one's SALN per se do not
constitute Dishonesty, an omission or misdeclaration qualifies as such
offense when it is attended with malicious intent to conceal the truth, as
Dishonesty implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. When a
public officer's accumulated wealth is manifestly disproportionate to his
lawful income and such public officer fails to properly account for or
explain where such wealth had been sourced, he becomes administratively
liable for Dishonesty.
 When a public officer's accumulated wealth is manifestly disproportionate
to his lawful income and such public officer fails to properly account for
or explain where such wealth had been sourced, he becomes
administratively liable for Dishonesty. In this case, the disproportion
between Leovigildo and Marina's declared income (P10,841,412.28) and
the acquisition cost of the Disputed Assets (P23,717,226.89) is too stark to
be ignored. (LEOVIGILDO A. DE CASTRO v. FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. 192723, June 05,
2017)

o PERMITS AND LICENSES ISSUED BY THE MAYOR, THOUGH

DISCRETIONARY, MUST BE PURSUANT TO LAW AND ORDINANCE
 The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits is not ministerial,
it is discretionary. While a discretionary power or authority of Corazon,
as the then Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, is involved in this
case, its exercise must be pursuant to law and ordinance. The mayor must
act on the application for a business permit, and as correctly pointed out
by the Sandiganbayan, the action expected of the mayor was either to
approve or disapprove the same. When Corazon referred to her lawyer,
Atty. Pangilinan, Corazon did not act according to law or ordinance.
Indeed, she failed to cite any law or ordinance which required her to do
so. (CORAZON M. LACAP v. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017)

o A SHERIFF DOES NOT HAVE DISCRETION TO EXPEND A STEP IN

THE EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENT
 Although it is conceded that the primary duty of a sheriff is to execute
writs placed in his hands with reasonable celerity and promptness, speed
should never compromise the rudiments of justice and fair play. It is not
for respondent Sheriff to decide whether or not an important step in the
execution of judgment is expendable. It bears stressing that every step in
the Rules forms part of procedural due process that is guaranteed by no
less than the Constitution. (ROLANDO SOLIVA v. REYNALDO
TALEON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10,
DIPOLOG CITY, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, A.M. No. P-16-3511,
September 06, 2017)

o A JUDGE’S FAILURE TO OBSERVE PROCEDURE ON THE RAFFLE

OF CASES IS SIMPLE NEGLECT
 For failure to observe the procedure on the raffle of cases pursuant to
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Judge Dating is guilty of simple neglect of duty
which is defined as the "failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard
of a duty due to carelessness or indifference." (FERRER, JR. v.
DATING A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478, November 8, 2017)

o THE COURT HAS THE DISCRETION TO TEMPER THE HARSHNESS

OF JUDGEMENT AGAINST COURT PERSONNEL
 It is the State's policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. The conduct of court personnel, from
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach
and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to
free them from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. However, while
the Court has the duty to discipline its employees, it also has the
discretion to temper the harshness of judgment with mercy. (OFFICE OF
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. COBARRUBIAS AND
BRAVO, A.M. No. P-15-3379, November 22, 2017)
o COURT PERSONNEL ARE NOT REQUIRED TO RELINQUISH OTHER
POSTS OUTSIDE OF THEIR PROFESSION
 To require respondent Basada to relinquish his post as president of the
homeowners' association so that he could fully devote his time in his
duties and functions as Court Legal Researcher would effectively deprive
him of his freedom of association guaranteed by Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[t]he
right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged." (ISAGANI R. RUBIO v.
IGMEDIO J. BASADA, COURT LEGAL RESEARCHER II,
BRANCH 117, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], PASAY CITY,
OCA IPI No. 15-4429-P, December 06, 2017)

o ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY REQUIRES A PROPER CHARGE AS

WELL AS NOTICE AND HEARING
 While there is an apparent intersection between respondent Villafuerte's
duties as Member of the BAC Secretariat and his duties as a member of
the bar, the Court cannot hold him liable for violations of the latter as he
was never properly charged for the same nor was he given the opportunity
to respond to any such charges. The Court held that it is not prepared to
punish respondent Villafuerte for merely discharging the ministerial
functions of his office as Member of the BAC Secretariat, especially when
such acts were made pursuant to the instructions of his superiors.
(PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE-CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
AND DETECTION GROUP (PNP-CIDG) v. P/SUPT. ERMILANDO
VILLAFUERTE, G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, September 18, 2018)

o A SHERIFF’S DISREGARD OF THE RULES ON EXECUTION OF

JUDGMENT IS NEGLECT OF DUTY
 A judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the
prevailing party; and sheriffs are the ones primarily responsible for the
execution of final judgments. Thus, they are expected at all times to show
a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, disregard of the rules on execution of judgment is
tantamount to neglect of duty. Thus, Respondent Sheriff’s failure to make
a return on the writ of execution to the Clerk or Judge issuing the Writ
makes him or her liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. (ASUNCION Y.
ARIÑOLA v. ANGELES D. ALMODIEL, JR., Interpreter II,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Masbate City, Masbate, A.M. No. P-
19-3925, January 7, 2019)

o LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE DOCUMENTS BEING SIGNED DOES

NOT JUSTIFY LACK OF DILIGENCE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES
 As ranking officials in their respective offices and as members of the
CESB, petitioners certainly cannot justify the lack of diligence in the
performance of their functions as CESB members by the mere expediency
of claiming that they did not know the documents they were signing or
that they were unable to verify the relevant CESB Resolutions before
signing because the documents were "lumped together." (PROCESO T.
DOMINGO, ANGELITO D. TWAÑO and SUSAN M. SOLO v.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., G.R.
Nos. 226648-49, March 27, 2019)
 o COURT PERSONNEL MUST STRICTLY OBSERVE OFFICIAL WORK
HOURS
 Court personnel must devote every moment of official time to public
service; the conduct and behavior of court personnel should be
characterized by a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as
they mirror the image of the court; and court personnel must strictly
observe official time to inspire public respect for the justice system. Public
officials and employees must observe the prescribed office hours and the
efficient use of every moment thereof for public service if only to
recompense the government and ultimately the people who shoulder the
cost of maintaining the judiciary. The investigations revealed that Durban
was in the lobby of the Hall of Justice and not in his work station during
office hours. Clearly, he failed to strictly observe the prescribed working
hours. (RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT OF JUDGE ENRIQUE
TRESPECES ON THE 25 FEBRUARY 2015 INCIDENT
INVOLVING UTILITY WORKER I MARION M. DURBAN,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BR. 9, ILOILO CITY,
ILOILO, A.M. No. 15-09-102-MTCC. June 26, 2019)

- ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
o DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WRIT OF KALIKASAN AND WRIT OF
CONTINUING MANDAMUS
 For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional

right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity;
and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to

health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that
their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a
violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of
violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to
bad air quality. Further, petitioners were not able to show that
respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited.
(VICTORIA SEGOVIA et. al. v. THE CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMISSION, et. al., G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017)

- FREEDOM OF RELIGION
o STUDENTS MAY BE EXEMPTED FROM PARTICIPATING IN SCHOOL
OR RELATED ACTIVITIES DUE TO RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS
 In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED allowed for the exemption of
teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related
activities due to compliance with religious obligations. The enforcement
of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty
by a tribunal, board, officer, or person.
 The Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their
individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless
necessary to protect its citizens from injury or when public safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience requires it. In this case, the Court failed to see
how public order and safety will be served by the denial of petitioner
Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there any showing that
petitioner Valmores' absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to
the rights of others. (DENMARK S. VALMORES v. DR. CRISTINA
ACHACOSO AND DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, G.R. No. 217453,
JULY 19, 2017)

- DELEGATION OF POWERS
o NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE
ENACTMENT OF THE K TO 12 LAW.
 There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the
K to 12 Law. In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein. The sufficient
standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce
the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented. Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and
appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential terms and
conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to
the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. (COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND
STAFF OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, G.R. Nos.
216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 & 218465, October 9,
2018)

- FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

o POWER TO EXPROPRIATE MAY BE DELEGATED TO
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PUBLIC OFFICIALS, AND QUASI-PUBLIC
ENTITIES
 As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains
primarily to the legislature. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government. However, the power to expropriate is
not exclusive to Congress. The latter may delegate the exercise of the
power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities.
In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities,
and other persons and entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and
is only a delegated power. In fact, even as to municipal corporations, it
has been held that they can exercise the right of eminent domain only if
some law exists conferring the power upon them.

With the right of eminent domain not being an inherent power for private
corporations, whose right to expropriate is granted by mere legislative
fiat, the delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain is restrictively
limited to the confines of the delegating law. The scope of this delegated
legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating
 authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of
the delegating law. Therefore, with respondent NGCP's power to
expropriate being a mere delegated power from Congress by virtue of
R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's exercise of the right of eminent
domain over the subject property must conform to the limits set under the
said law. Since respondent NGCP is only allowed to expropriate private
property, necessarily, it has no authority to expropriate the subject
property. (PNOC ALTERNATIVE FUELS CORPORATION v.
NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 224936, September 4, 2019)

- MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
o A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY IS ENDOWED WITH THE
POWERS OF A CORPORATION, INCLUDING THE POWER TO SUE
AND BE SUED IN ITS CORPORATE NAME AND THE RIGHT TO OWN,
HOLD AND ADMINISTER THE LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
TRANSFERRED TO IT, WITH OPERATIONAL AUTONOMY, AND
PART OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT MACHINERY ALTHOUGH
NOT INTEGRATED WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTAL FRAMEWORK.
 Instrumentality is defined as "any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter."

While Section 3 of R.A. 7227 recognizes the BCDA as a body corporate

with the attribute of perpetual succession and vested with the powers of a
corporation and Section 5 of R.A. 7227 vests the BCDA with the power,
among others, to succeed in its corporate name, to sue and be sued in
such corporate name and to adopt, alter and use a corporate seal which
can be judicially noticed, these provisions do not make the BCDA a
corporation, either a stock or nonstock corporation as defined under the
Corporation Code as well as the Revised Corporation Code - they merely
endow the BCDA with all or full corporate powers so that it can enjoy
operational autonomy. And, since its capitalization provision, Section 6 of
R.A. 7227, cannot qualify the BCDA as a stock or nonstock corporation,
then it is an Instrumentality under Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code as well as Government
Instrumentality with Corporate Powers (GICP)"/Government Corporate
Entity (GCE) under Section 3(n) of R.A. 10149.

Given this, the Court recognizes the BCDA as a GICP or GCE vested or
endowed with the powers of a corporation, including the power to sue and
be sued in its corporate name and the right to own, hold and administer
the lands that have been transferred to it, with operational autonomy, and
part of the National Government machinery although not integrated
within the departmental framework. (JOSE M. ROY III v.
CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA, THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)