Accountability of Public Officers

Accountability

The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government springs

exclusively from the trust reposed by the public means that continuance in
office is contingent upon the extent to which one is able to maintain that trust.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Regalado, G.R. Nos. 208481-82, February 7, 2018)

As a final note, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored

rule that a "[p]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice
and lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is not
intended to be mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are
enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing
administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service. Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust,
are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully,
and to the best of their ability. (Sabio v. Field Investigation Office [FIO], Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229882, February 13, 2018)

It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases

are independent from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative
prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence
required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as
the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other. Hence, the exoneration in the
administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice
versa. (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018)

[Note: In the case at bar, the administrative case for grave misconduct
filed against petitioner and the present case for simple robbery are separate
and distinct cases, and are independent from each other. The administrative
and criminal proceedings may involve similar facts but each requires a different
quantum of evidence. In addition, the administrative proceeding conducted was
before the PNP-IAS and was summary in nature. In contrast, in the instant
criminal case, the RTC conducted a full blown trial and the prosecution was
required to proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure petitioner's
conviction. Furthermore, the proceedings included witnesses who were key
figures in the events leading to petitioner's arrest. Witnesses of both parties
were cross-examined by their respective counsels creating a clearer picture of
what transpired, which allowed the trial judge to have a better appreciation of
the attendant facts and determination of whether the prosecution proved the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861,
April 23, 2018)]

Clearly, whether or not a person is a director or an officer of a

corporation, so long as he or she is the party responsible for the offense, he or
she is the party that ought to be charged. Thus, while the Board of Directors is
primarily responsible for the sale, respondents may still be held liable for
offenses if they knowingly entered into, facilitated, or participated in their
execution and ensured their implementation. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No.
199625, June 6, 2018)

The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations was filed only
on October 28, 2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the
submission of the SALN for 1990, and 12 years after the April 30, 1992
deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1991. With the offenses charged
against the petitioner having already prescribed after eight years in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the informations filed against the petitioner
were validly quashed. (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018)

This Court's ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan cannot exonerate

petitioners from criminal liability. Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of
offices may, in good faith, rely to a certain extent on the acts of their
subordinates "who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."
This is based upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot be expected to
examine every single document relative to government transactions. xxx. The
application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official
has no foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or
her to investigate or exercise a greater degree of care. In a number of cases,
this Court refused to apply the Arias doctrine considering that there were
circumstances that should have prompted the government official to inquire
further. (Abubakar v. People, G.R. Nos. 202408, 202409, and 202412, June 27,
2018)

[Note: In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate

petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, or Guiani from criminal liability. There were
circumstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries on
the transactions subject of this case. (Abubakar v. People, G.R. Nos. 202408,
202409, and 202412, June 27, 2018)]

Impeachment

Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive

remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other
remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a
quo warranto proceeding. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

―The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different.

In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or
unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is
the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in a different manner, the
crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of
whether or not respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be
considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand,
impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain impeachable offenses.
To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable
offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of
this case shall be based on established facts and related laws. Simply put,
while respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal
from office.‖ (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
 Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under
the Rules on quo
warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, xxx, judgment shall be
rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom,
xxx.‖ In short, respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to
cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the
other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable
offenses shall result to [sic] the removal of the respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a
person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot
legally hold or occupy. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office
only by impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,
Cuenca v. Fernan, In Re Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Marcoleta v. Borra. It
should be stressed, however, that none of these cases concerned the validity of
an impeachable officer's appointment. Lecaroz involved a criminal charge
against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment
cases filed against impeachable officers principally for acts done during their
tenure in public office. Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his
office or whether his appointment was void was not an issue raised before the
Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during their
incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an
offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar, to qualify for their positions, they cannot be
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing
the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling
therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action can
never be filed against an impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement,
the Court is presumed to have been aware of its power to issue writs of quo
warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018)

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of
a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated
cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court
took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed
against respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition, had
taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein
prayed for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President
of the Republic temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity. In fact, in the said cases, there was not
even a claim that respondent therein was disqualified from holding office and
accordingly challenged respondent's status as de jure 14th President of the
Republic. By entertaining the quo warranto petition, the Court in fact
determined whether then President Estrada has put an end to his official
status by his alleged act of resignation. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018)

The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory

construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect. We have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of
a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity
is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option
to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the
removal. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the

Constitution allows the institution of a quo warranto action against an
impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds
distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a
public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called
impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made

absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport [sic] to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments

even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even
when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality
or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she
fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an officer
commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he
can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly
disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and
ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising
sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office
through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of
the Constitution. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a

person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or
the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or
exercise of the office.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the

legislature to determine whether the public officer committed any of the
impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It
does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or
challenge the legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the
impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official
from office. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions may be filed

against the President and Vice-President under the PET Rules "only because
the Constitution specifically permits" them under Section 4, Article VII.
According to respondent, no counterpart provision exists in the Constitution
giving the same authority to the Court over the Chief Justice, the members of
the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman. Respondent, thus,
asserts that the Constitution made a distinction between elected and
appointive impeachable officials, and limited quo warranto to elected
impeachable officials. For these reasons, respondent concludes that by
constitutional design, the Court is denied power to remove any of its members.

The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges

that the Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions against impeachable
officers, albeit respondent limits them to the President and Vice-President. This
admission refutes the very position taken by respondent that all impeachable
officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a
"privileged class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment. To
be sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish between elected and appointed
impeachable officers.

Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart

provision to paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article VII for members of this Court or
the Constitutional Commissions does not mean that quo warranto cannot
extend to non-elected impeachable officers. The authority to hear quo warranto
petitions against appointive impeachable officers emanates from Section 5(1) of
Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without
qualification as to the class of public officers over whom the same may be
exercised. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a

quo warranto action questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to
assume office. These qualifications include age, citizenship and professional
experience - matters which are manifestly outside the purview of impeachment
under the above-cited provision.

Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from

Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution which gives this Court its quo
warranto jurisdiction, or from Section 4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the
Constitution which designates the Court as the sole judge of the qualifications
of the President and Vice-President. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

Section 2 of Article XI provides that the impeachable officers may be

removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. Lack of qualifications for appointment or election is
evidently not among the stated grounds for impeachment. It is, however, a
ground for a quo warranto action over which this Court was given original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. The grant of jurisdiction was not
confined to unimpeachable officers. In fact, under Section 4, paragraph
7 of Article VII, this Court was expressly authorized to pass upon the
qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Thus, the proscription
against the removal of public officers other than by impeachment does not
apply to quo warranto actions assailing the impeachable officer's eligibility for
appointment or election. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on
the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)
 Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's
qualifications is the function of quo warranto. For this reason, impeachment
cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R.
No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

To disabuse wandering minds, there is nothing violative or intrusive of

the Senate's power to remove impeachable officials in the main Decision. In
fact, in the said assailed Decision, We recognized that the Senate has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. We have extensively
discussed therein that the Court merely exercised its Constitutional duty to
resolve a legal question referring to respondent's qualification as a Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. We also emphasized that this Court's action
never intends to deprive the Congress of its mandate to make a determination
on impeachable officials' culpability for acts committed while in office. We even
explained that impeachment and quo warranto may proceed independently and
simultaneously, albeit a ruling of removal or ouster of the respondent in one
case will preclude the same ruling in the other due to legal impossibility and
mootness. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)

Sandiganbayan

It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer having a

salary grade below 27, whose appeal from the RTC's ruling convicting him of
six (6) counts of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public
Documents falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 8249 (prior to its amendment by RA 10660) xxx.
Thus, since petitioner's case properly falls within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, his appeal was erroneously taken to the CA. (Dizon v.
People, G.R. No. 227577, January 24, 2018)

[Note: This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the foregoing error is
not primarily attributable to petitioner, since the duty to transmit the records
to the proper court devolves upon the RTC. xxx. Hence, all things considered,
the Court finds that petitioner's filing of the Motion to Endorse beyond the
original fifteen (15)-day period - much more the erroneous transmittal of the
case to the CA by the RTC - should not be taken against him, else it result in
the injudicious dismissal of his appeal. (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 227577,
January 24, 2018)]

It must be noted at the outset that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
over the decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions
of law. (Venezuela v. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018)

Nevertheless, in as early as 1959, forfeiture in favor of the State of any

property in an amount found to have been manifestly out of proportion to a
public officer or employee's salary or to the latter's other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, has been sanctioned under
Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379). Forfeiture proceedings under R.A. 1379 are
civil in nature and actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution,
and damages for ill-gotten wealth, as in this case, are also called civil forfeiture
proceedings. Similar to civil cases, the quantum of evidence required for
forfeiture proceedings is preponderance of evidence. (Republic v. Cuenca, G.R.
No. 198393, April 4, 2018)

[Note: To recover the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed

by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, former President
Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. l and thereby gave birth to the
PCGG with the task of recovering "all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship." The recovery of the reputed
ill-gotten wealth was both a matter of urgency and necessity and the right of
the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties eventually found flesh
under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution. (Republic v. Cuenca, G.R. No.
198393, April 4, 2018)]

Ombudsman

Jurisprudence has so far settled that dismissal based on the grounds

provided under Section 20 is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of
the evaluating Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman evaluating the
administrative complaint. Clearly, as the law, its implementing rules, and
interpretative jurisprudence stand, the dismissal by the Ombudsman on
grounds provided under Section 20 is applicable only to administrative
complaints. Its invocation in the present criminal case is therefore misplaced.
(Espaldon v. Buban, G.R. No. 202784, April 18, 2018)

[Note: Sec. 4. Evaluation. - Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall
be evaluated to determine whether the same may be dismissed outright for any
of the grounds stated under Section 20 of Republic Act No.
6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall
be discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman
concerned; xxx. (Note Administrative Order No. 17, amending Administrative
Order No. 7, clarifying Section 20 of RA 6770, which, provides: The Office of the
Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that: (1) The
complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in
bad faith; (4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject
matter of the grievance; or (5) The complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of.) (See Espaldon v. Buban, G.R.
No. 202784, April 18, 2018)]

Contrariwise, the procedure in criminal cases requires that the

Ombudsman evaluate the complaint and after evaluation, to make its
recommendations in accordance with Section 2, Rule II of the Administrative
Order No. 07 xxx. Thus, the only instance when an outright dismissal of a
criminal complaint is warranted is when Orders would show that the
Ombudsman found the complaint to have suffered from utter lack of merit. In
fact, the assailed Orders are empty except for the citation of Section 20 as basis
for outright dismissal. It is thus inaccurate and misleading for the Ombudsman
to profess that the criminal complaint was dismissed only after the conduct of
a preliminary investigation, when the complaint never reached that stage to
begin with. Clearly, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when
it evaluated and consequently dismissed a criminal complaint based on
grounds peculiar to administrative cases and in an unexplained deviation from
its own rules of procedure. (Espaldon v. Buban, G.R. No. 202784, April 18,
2018)

It must be stressed that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a

constitutional commission. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April
24, 2018)

To the point of being monotonous, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution refers

exclusively to the constitutional commissions; thus, such proscription as to the
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity of a member
applies only to the constitutional commissions and cannot extend to the
Ombudsman and the deputies. Indeed, Art. XI of the Constitution does not
provide for such a prohibition. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131,
April 24, 2018)

In our review of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case of death,
resignation, removal or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the new
Ombudsman shall be appointed for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3) of R.A.
No. 6770 is consistent with sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far as
it provides to the Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve for a term of seven
years. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)

In Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman (528 Phil. 42, 51 [2006]), we

held that the Office of the Ombudsman may, for every particular investigation,
decide how best to pursue each investigation. This power gives the Office of the
Ombudsman the discretion to dismiss without prejudice a preliminary
investigation if it finds that the final decision of the COA is necessary for its
investigation and future prosecution of the case. It may also pursue the
investigation because it realizes that the decision of the COA is irrelevant or
unnecessary to the investigation and prosecution of the case. Since the Office
of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying treatment of similarly
situated investigations cannot by itself be considered a violation of any of the
parties' rights to the equal protection of the laws. Nor in the present case, can
it be considered a violation of petitioner's right to due process. (Pasok v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 218413, June 6, 2018)

Thus, no matter the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may

act on the matter. Moreover, it may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of
public officials, which may be discovered from any source. xxx. However, if the
"the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance," the Ombudsman may choose not to investigate the administrative
act complained of. xxx. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770 uses the word
"may" which signifies that it is permissive and not imperative. The power of the
Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person without any
personal interest in the case is, thus, discretionary. xxx. Thus, the
Ombudsman may prosecute or investigate the complaint with or without the
complainant's personal interest in the outcome of the case. xxx. Thus, the law
allows the filing of cases to the Ombudsman against public officers by any
complainant. The Ombudsman is a tool to maintain this faith. (Canlas v.
Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

… not all may appeal to question a decision of the Ombudsman. (Canlas

v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

[Note: In administrative cases filed under the Civil Service Law, an

allowed appeal may only be brought by
the party adversely affected by the decision. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No.
199625, June 6, 2018)]

Thus, the Ombudsman's decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the

complaint or imposes the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month salary.
Otherwise, it may be appealed to the Court of Appeals under the requirements
and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. (Canlas v. Bongolan,
G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)

[Note: In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12,
2010 Decision exonerated respondents. Thus, Canlas has no right to appeal
this Decision. He has no other recourse. ―The right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and
in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law expressly
granting such right." (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)]

[Note: Generally, a decision by the Ombudsman absolving respondents is

unappealable. However, if it is shown that the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion, then the complainant may file a Rule 65 Petition with the
proper court. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018)]