EN BANC

G.R. No. 212719 - INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON,

MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS,
SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V.
CRUZ, ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P.
MbNDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN 0.
CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO,
JOSENEL ALVARAN, and CRISENCIO NERI, JR., Petitioners; ATTY.
I

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., Petitioner-Intervenor; WILLIAM M.

MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, and ARESENIO C.
CABANILLA, Petitioners-Intervenors v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE
LIMA, Department of Justice; and SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS
11, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondents;
1

G.R.. No. 214637 - REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA,

JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V. OMERES, PASCUA B.
GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON,
WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, and ROMEO R.
MACOLBAS, Petitioners v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA,
D~partment of Justice; SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
DJpartment of the Interior and Local Government; ACTING
DIRECTOR FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, Bureau of Corrections;
an~ JAIL CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY
MAMARIL, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Respondents.

Promulgated:
June 25, 2019
I

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1

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN,J.:

I concur with the finding that Rule I, Section 4 of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is invalid. I add that it is,
as · separately raised in the Petitions, void ab initio as it violates the due
pr9cess and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As such, applying
the prospectivity rule amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment for those
currently serving their penalties before the law took effect insofar as they are
treated differently from others. ,f
Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

Indeed, Section 4 is not only invalid based on Article 22 1 of the

Revised Penal Code alone, but the Constitution itself. In my view, Article
22 finds its anchor on Article III, Section 12 and Article II, Section 11 3 of the
Constitution.

Respondents allege that this case is not justiciable and that this Court
does not have jurisdiction over the remedies that petitioners availed of.

They are mistaken.

To recapitulate, the courts' authority to "settle justiciable

controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights" 4 is an aspect of judicial power that is anchored on
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.

Judicial review, as an aspect of judicial power, is the competence to:

(1) settle actual controversies and enforce rights conferred by law; and (2)
determine grave abuse of discretion by any government instrumentality.
Jurisprudence refers to these two (2) judicial powers as the courts'
traditional and expanded powers of judicial review, respectively. 5

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 22 provides:

jJ
ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in
so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined
in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
CONST., art. III, sec. I provides:
SECTION I. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
CONST., art. II, sec. 11 provides:
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. I 68, 173 (I 966) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc].
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 137-139 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc] and Araullo v.
Aquino Ill, 737 Phil. 457, 525-527 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
 Concurring Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

The courts' traditional power of judicial review applies whether the

offense alleged violates a statute or the Constitution, or both. Clearly, the
source of rights that are legally demandable and enforceable may be a
constitutional provision, a statute, or an administrative issuance. The
traditional power of judicial review may not involve a constitutional
question.

Thus, a trial court may simply determine the facts based on the
evidence presented, and interpret and apply the relevant law invoked.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for mandamus may
entail a reading of the relevant law and its application to a given set of facts.
In such cases, when there is concurrent jurisdiction and when only a statute
is involved, this Court will seriously inquire as to whether the judicial
principle of respect for the hierarchy of courts should be applied.

If only Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is involved here, as the

majority seems to have ruled in the ponencia of my esteemed colleague,
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, then the consolidated Petitions could
have been considered as petitions for mandamus. Thus, the issue would
simply have been whether respondents had a legal duty to implement the
rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

In such case, reference to Province of North Cotabato v. Government

of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 6
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 7 and Araullo v. Aquino JJI8 would not have been
necessary.

However, in my reading of the pleadings, the constitutionality of the

questioned provision implementing Republic Act No. 10592 was raised.
Specifically, petitioners claim that the provision and its non-implementation
to those serving their sentence or preventively detained before the law took
effect violate the due process and equal protection clauses. In my view, we
should also rule on these issues. After all, Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code is founded on the concepts of fairness enshrined in the due process
clause and non-discrimination expressed in the equal protection clause.

In the exercise of our traditional power of judicial review for

constitutional adjudication, this Court only passes upon the constitutionality
of a statute if "it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties ;J
concemed." 9 A controversy is deemed justiciable if the following are f
6 589 Phil. 387 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
7
391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
8
737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
9
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 809 (1955)
[Per J. Bengzon, En Banc].
Concurring Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

present: ( 1) an actual case or controversy over legal rights, which require the
exercise of judicial power; (2) standing or locus standi to bring up the
constitutional issue; (3) the constitutionality issue was raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) resolving the constitutionality issue is essential to the
disposition of the case or its !is mota. 10

Additionally, an actual case or controversy is present when the issues

raised are ripe for adjudication or the challenged statute has a direct, adverse
effect on the party that raised its constitutionality. Absent an actual case or
controversy, this Court's decision would be a mere advisory opinion that "is
inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the
entire system of the Rule of Law." 11 Angara v. Electoral Commission 12
explained the reason behind the requirement of justiciability of a
constitutional issue:

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren

legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. 13

On the other hand, this Court's expanded power of judicial review

requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion by any
government branch or instrumentality. This expanded power is often
mistaken for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. But the expanded power is decidedly more
expansive than a Rule 65 petition, which is limited to the review of judicial
and quasi-judicial acts. 14

Nonetheless, despite this Court's broad power under its expanded

power of judicial review, an actual case or controversy, or "a legally
demandable and enforceable right[,] must exist as basis, and must be shown
to have been violated" 15 for the case to be justiciable.

!
10 Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 63--M (1993) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
11 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416,661 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
En Banc].
12
63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
13
Id. at 158-159.
14
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., et al., 802 Phil. 116, 142 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
15
Id. at 140.
·concurring Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

Here, petitioners want to strike down Rule I, Section 4 of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592, which
states:

SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these

Rules provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant
of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof
and require the creation of a Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant
of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be
prospective in application.

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and

of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in
application as these privileges are likewise subject to the management,
screening and evaluation of the MSEC.

Rule V, Section 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations directs

the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, and wardens of local government units to create
a committee that will manage, screen, and evaluate the entitlement of
inmates to good conduct time allowance:

SECTION 3. Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee

(MSEC).-

a. The Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP and Wardens

of various provinces, cities, districts and municipalities are
mandated to assess, evaluate and grant time deduction to a
deserving prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final
judgment, in the form of [good conduct time allowance],
[special time allowance for loyalty] and [time allowance for
study, teaching and mentoring] as prescribed by these Rules
through the creation of the MSEC.

b. The composition of the MSEC shall be determined by the

Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP or Wardens of
Provincial and Sub-Provincial, District, City and Municipal
Jails, respectively. Membership shall not be less than five (5)
and shall include a Probation and Parole Officer, and if
available, a psychologist and a social worker.

c. The MSEC shall prepare minutes of every meeting to record

each proceeding.

After considering the inmates' conduct and behavior, the

Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee recommends the
J
appropriate good conduct time allowance to which a detained or convicted
Concurring Opinion 6 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

prisoner is entitled. 16 The authorized official 17 then acts on this

recommendation. Once granted, the time allowances shall be irrevocable. 18

Petitioners are correct that the prospective application of Republic Act

No. 10592 robs them of the opportunity to avail of the good conduct time
allowance and substantially decrease their time behind bars.

In ruling that an actual case or controversy existed in this case, this

Court cited Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre 19 and reasoned that there was no need to
"wait for the implementing evil to befall" 20 before people could question an
illegal or unconstitutional act, because "[by] the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act." 21

We should read Pimentel, Jr. more carefully.

Pimentel, Jr. involved the propriety of Sections 1 and 4 of

Administrative Order No. 372. Section 1 required government agencies,

16
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule V, sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Procedures for the Grant of Good Conduct Time Allowance. - The following
procedures shall be followed in the grant of GCT A:
I
a. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall give special considerations to satisfactory
behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in
rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work activities or
accomplishment of exemplary deeds. It is understood that in all instances, the detained or
convicted prisoner must faithfully obey all prison/jail rules and regulations;
b. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall each create the MSEC or such appropriate
number of MSECs tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behavior or conduct of a
detention or convicted prisoner;
c. After due consideration of the behavior or conduct shown by a detained or convicted prisoner,
the MSEC shall then recommend to the appropriate official the appropriate GCT A that may
be credited in favor of said prisoner ranging from the minimum of the allowable credit to the
maximum credit thereof;
d. Acting on the recommendation of the MSEC, the appropriate official named in Section I of
Rule VIII hereof shall either:
I. Approve the recommendation and issue a certification granting GCT A to the prisoner for
the particular period;
2. Disapprove the recommendation if the prisoner recommended is not qualified to be
granted the benefit or that errors or irregularities attended the evaluation of the prisoner;
or
3. Return the recommendation, without action, for corrections as regards the name, prison
number or other clerical or inadvertent errors, or for the further evaluation of the conduct
or behavior of the prisoner concerned.
e. The appropriate official concerned shall ensure that GCT As are processed each month and
that there is proper recording of a prisoner's good behavior in the jail or prison records.
17
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule VIII, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION I. Who Grants Time Allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the following
officials shall grant allowances for good conduct:
a) Director of the Bureau of Corrections;
b) Chief if the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology; and/or
c) Warden of a Provincial, District, City or Municipal Jail.
18
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592(2014), Rule VIII, sec. 2.
19
391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
20
Ponencia, p. 10.
21
Id. citing Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
·concurring Opinion 7 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled

corporations, and local government units to implement measures that would
reduce their annual expenditure for non-personal services by at least 25%.
On the other hand, Section 4 ordered that 10% of the internal revenue
allotment released to local government units be withheld. 22

Pimentel, Jr. upheld the validity of Section 1 as a legitimate exercise

of the executive branch's supervisory power insofar as it directs government
instrumentalities and local government units to undertake cost reduction
measures in response to the economic difficulties facing the nation.
Pimentel, Jr. clarified that despite its tone, Section 1 was merely advisory,
and was not mandatory. Thus, no legal sanction would be meted on a
government instrumentality or local government unit that failed to submit its
own planned cost reduction measures. 23

However, Pimentel, Jr. struck down Section 4 for directly

contravening the constitutional mandates that the internal revenue allotment:
( 1) should be released directly to the concerned local government unit every
quarter; and (2) cannot be the subject of any lien or holdback by the national
government. 24

In arguing for the ripeness of the Petition in Pimentel, Jr., this Court
declared that the mere violation of the Constitution or any statute "is enough
to awaken judicial duty." 25 Nonetheless, it admitted that the issue of
prematurity was not raised by any of the parties. 26 Furthermore, an actual
case or controversy existed in Pimentel, Jr. because the directive to withhold
10% of the internal revenue allotment was immediately executory and would
cause a direct and adverse effect on the local government units, as
represented by petitioners-intervenors League of Provinces of the
Philippines and League of Leagues of Local Governments. 27 Hence, it was
not the mere passage of Administrative Order No. 372 that was objected to
in Pimentel, Jr., but its direct detrimental effect on local government units
and their fiscal autonomy.

As with Pimentel, Jr., there is a similar immediate danger here.

Petitioners will suffer a direct injury under Republic Act No. 10592's
Implementing Rules and Regulations. While the entitlement to time credits
is not automatic and is contingent upon the Management, Screening and
Evaluation Committee's positive assessment of an inmate's application for /J
time credits, the law's prospective application means that an inmate's !
22
Id. at 97.
23 Id. at 104-105.
24 Id. at 105-106.
25
Id. at 107.
26
Id. at 108.
27
Id. at 94.
Concurring Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 212719 and"214637

application for time credits will be dismissed outright and will not even be
considered by the recommending authority.

II

I also concur with the ponencia 28 that Rule I, Section 4 of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 violates the
well-entrenched principle that laws are applied prospectively. Nonetheless,
penal laws that are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect, as
contained in Article 22 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Moreover, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not the sole basis
for the invalidity of Republic Act No. 10592' s prospective application. It
also violates the inmates' constitutional rights to equal protection of the
laws 30 and against "cruel, degrading[,] or inhuman punishment." 31

Equal protection is covered under the mantle of due process, as unfair

discrimination goes against the very nature of justice and fair play. Equal
protection demands that similar subjects be treated similarly; to do otherwise
would be to confer an unwarranted favor to some at the expense of others
who are similarly situated. 32

The equal protection clause ensures equality, not identity of rights.

Hence, it is not required for a statute to affect every single person the same
way. 33 Since a classification is a tacit recognition of an existing inequality
or difference, its validity shall be upheld if it is based on a reasonable or
rational basis:

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that

28
29
Ponencia, pp. 17-20.
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 22 provides:
f
ARTICLE 22. Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in
so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined
in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
3
° CONST., art. III, sec. I provides:
SECTION I. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
31
CONST., art. III, sec. 19(1) provides:
SECTION 19. (]) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
32 The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 298 Phil. 502, 512-513 (] 993) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
33 See Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 158 Phil. 60 (1974) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
Goncurring Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 34

Thus, a valid classification must contain the following requisites to

hurdle the test of reasonableness: (1) it is based on substantial differences;
(2) it is relevant to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing
conditions; and (4) it equally applies to all members of the same class.

Here, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.

10592 states that the award of time credits to detained or convicted prisoners
was meant to:

a) redeem and uplift valuable human material towards economic and

social usefulness;
b) level the field of opportunity by giving an increased time allowance to
motivate prisoners to pursue a productive and law-abiding life; and
c) implement the state policy of restorative and compassionate justice by
promoting the reformation and rehabilitation of prisoners,
strengthening their moral fiber and facilitating their successful
reintegration into the mainstream of society. 35

Yet, by directing a prospective application of the statute, the

Implementing Rules and Regulations distinguishes prisoners who were
detained or convicted before Republic Act No. 10592 took effect from those
who were detained or convicted after its effectivity.

Respondents explain that a prospective application was necessary in

light of the "new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good
conduct time allowance" 36 and the "creation of a Management, Screening
and Evaluation Committee[.]" 37 But the supposed innovations and new
procedures are mere modifications or reiterations of practices already in
place even before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10592, as the
ponencia 38 has exhaustively discussed. Even the creation of the
Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee as a recommendatory ;J
body was not a new innovation, as a Classification Board was already f
34
Id. at 87.
35
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. I 0592 (2014 ), Rule II, sec. I.
36
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 (2014), Rule I, sec. 4.
37
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. I 0592 (2014), Rule I, sec. 4.
38
Ponencia, pp. 20-23.
Concurring Opinion 10 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 2146)7

recommending time allowances and implementing its approved

recommendations. 39

Thus, if the statute's intention was to "redeem and uplift valuable

human material towards economic and social usefulness[,]" 40 there was no
reasonable basis to distinguish between the detained or convicted prisoners
before and after Republic Act No. 10592 took effect. Not only was the
distinction irrelevant to the statute's purpose, it also unjustly treats similarly
situated prisoners under different standards, all because it used the arbitrary
metric of when they were detained or convicted.

Likewise, the unreasonable discrimination created by the law's

Implementing Rules and Regulations violates petitioners' right against
"cruel, degrading[,] or inhuman punishment." 41

Republic Act No. 10592 aims to uphold the State policy of restorative
and compassionate justice by promoting prisoner rehabilitation and
successful reintegration into mainstream society. But despite its avowed
purpose, it capriciously denies the same opportunity of rehabilitation and
reintegration to a big segment of the inmate population.

This blatant discrimination amounts to a cruel and unusual

punishment, creating a disproportionate impact42 on inmates who were
detained or incarcerated prior to Republic Act No. 10592' s enactment. They
end up serving sentences lengthier than inmates who were convicted after
Republic Act No. 10592 took effect, despite committing similar crimes.

Although not a penalty, the prospective application of Republic Act

No. 10592 penalizes inmates by withholding from them the benefits of the
good conduct time credits without any justifiable reason, squarely placing it
under the constitutional ban for being "flagrantly and plainly oppressive[.]" 43

Finally, the prospective application of Republic Act No. 10592 does

not advance its guiding policy of restorative and compassionate justice. This
is because it implies that all inmates detained or convicted prior to its
effectivity can no longer be rehabilitated for a successful reintegration into
society, effectively trampling upon their dignity as human beings.

I
39
Id. at 24.
40
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. I 0592 (2014), Rule II, sec. I.
41
CONST., art. Ill, sec. 19.
42
J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017, 837
SCRA 160,196 [Perl. Peralta, En Banc].
43
People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647,655 (1953) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc].
'Concurring Opinion 11 G.R. Nos. 212719 and 214637

As such, Section 4 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

Republic Act No. 10592 must be struck down, and its retroactive application
be allowed to benefit prisoners who are not habitual criminals.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petitions and Petitions-in-

Intervention.

Associate Justice

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