This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-

lication in the following source:

Silver, Jon & Alpert, Frank (2003) Digital dawn : a revolution in movie
distribution? Business Horizons, 46(5), pp. 57-66.

This file was downloaded from: ❤tt♣✿✴✴❡♣r✐♥ts✳q✉t✳❡❞✉✳❛✉✴✹✶✶✾✵✴

c Copyright 2003 Elsevier.

Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as

copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0007-6813(03)00072-7
“Digital Dawn: A Revolution in Movie Distribution?”

Business Horizons Vol. 46, Issue 5. Sept-Oct. 2003 pp. 57-66

Jon Silver

Lecturer, School of Marketing

Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane QLD 4111 Australia

[email protected]

Frank Alpert

Associate Professor, School of Business

University of Queensland, Brisbane QLD 4111 Australia
[email protected]
“Digital Dawn: A Revolution in Movie Distribution?”

Abstract

How will the digital technology revolution impact the movie business? Hollywood developed a

highly successful industrial system that has functioned well for almost a century in the sense that

it enabled the Major film studios to largely control and dominate the industry. However, the new

digital technology may now be propelling Hollywood toward the biggest technological transition

since the creation of the studio system almost a century ago. For example, Major Hollywood

studios are already beginning to provide video-on-demand (VOD) digital distribution of movies

over the Internet. This article examines what is happening, and why. It sets out the background

and the incipient changes already occurring. It makes an argument regarding the fundamental

strategic dynamics, that acetate film was the key to the control of the Hollywood system, and

speculates about how a shift away from acetate film to digital video may transform that system.

The focus is on the impact on how the Major studios release and market their movies, and how

new market and marketing opportunities for the low-budget independent filmmaking sector may

arise.

1
Introduction

As the world grows more affluent and globalization continues, there has been an enormous

growth in the entertainment industry all around the world. (Eliashberg and Shugan 1997).

Indeed, total worldwide spending on cinema tickets alone is approaching US $20 billion.

Powerful Hollywood studios known as the “Majors” (as in the “Major” movie studios) have long

dominated the movie industry, but can that dominance continue in a rapidly changing world?

Will new digital technologies create a “digital dawn” of a broadened flourishing of filmmaking

around the world by independent producers? Or will the Majors manage the new technologies to

move into “digital dominance,” and continue their market leadership, without suffering the fate of

the major railroad companies bypassed by the development of the airlines?

Who are the Majors? The big seven Hollywood studios (Disney, Fox, MGM/UA, Paramount,

Sony (Columbia/Tristar), Universal and Warners) and their distribution arms are collectively

described as “the Majors” and are members of the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of

America). All other producers are technically independent, although highly successful “Mini-

Majors” like New Line, Miramax and Revolution are either subsidiaries of the Majors or have

close affiliations. Many other Hollywood-based independents have long-established strategic

alliances with the Majors and operate essentially as satellites supplying product to them.

Independent filmmaking is an important economic activity(Cicchetti 1995). Most of the movies

produced each year are independent features, but independent filmmakers working outside the

Hollywood system find it difficult to achieve a theatrical release in international markets outside

their own home territory, because they cannot secure a global distribution deal (Dale 1997,

Dickson 2001). This is because an industry structure (and related marketing practices) have
2
evolved over eight decades creating systemic barriers that have severely disadvantaged smaller

independent companies in all three key industry sectors – production, distribution and exhibition.

The movie industry is however, undergoing fundamental change and the Internet is at the heart of

the new distribution models that are emerging. This article first overviews the current situation

in the movie industry, then examines factors driving change, and finally speculates on likely

futures for the industry.

Figure 1

MOVIE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

Production Distribution Exhibition

The Production Sector

The producer finds and develops the script, controls the copyright, secures distribution, raises

production finance, engages the cast and crew, manages the project to completion and helps

promote the finished movie.

The Distribution Sector

The film distributor acquires, promotes and exploits movies through appropriate distribution

channels (cinemas, home video, cable TV, satellite TV, network TV) around the world. The

Majors are vertically integrated and operate their own domestic distribution arms in the US and

work together in strategic alliances in international markets.

3
The Exhibition Sector

Cinemas/Theatres exhibit movies to paying audiences. Box office (ticket) revenue is split

between the distributor and exhibitor on a formula basis leaving a much smaller percentage for

the exhibitor, so for them, candy bar revenues are critical. While nominally independent, the

cinemas’ need to fill their movie theatres (“bums on seats”) puts them at the mercy of the Majors’

dominance over content and its distribution and marketing.

Figure 2

CURRENT MODEL FOR FILM DISTRIBUTION RELEASE SEQUENCE

Producer’s Movie Distributor Exhibitor – Theatrical Release

Home Video – Rental / Sell-through

Pay-per-view

Cable TV / Satellite TV

Free-to-air Network TV

Syndicated TV

Other ancillary markets

4
There has traditionally been a time-based flow through the distribution channels, starting with

theatrical release and taking up to several years to flow through each stage of distribution all the

way all around the world.

Pre-1990, the non-theatrical markets (video rental, cable, satellite, free-to-air TV) were

considered to be ancillary markets. However, in the nineties, the home video market that had

been built on library rentals, experienced explosive growth following the introduction of “sell-

through” videos and when combined with the global penetration of subscription television, the

fundamental economics of the industry were changed. Each year, less than half of the total films

produced even receive a theatrical release; most go straight to video or they are made-for-TV.

Hollywood controls the value chain through vertical integration

In the earliest days of the industry, the Majors were able to master the art of making

commercially successful movies and to develop an industry with critical mass that has traded

almost unchallenged by serious international competition. They have maintained their market-

dominant positions through business strategies involving vertical integration and the development

of massive economies of scale in both production and distribution that provide high barriers to

entry to outsiders.

Today, the Major movie studios are now part of very large and diverse media corporations -

AOL-Time-Warner, Viacom, Vivendi-Universal, Sony, Disney and News Corporation. These

media giants also own many of the entertainment industry’s other important distribution channels

including TV networks (ABC, CBS and Fox), leading music companies (Universal, Sony and

Warner), book publishers (Harper Collins, Simon & Schuster, Houghton Mifflin) and theme

parks. (Disney, Universal, Warner and MGM).

5
Their core business is “software” – creation of movie content in different forms that can then be

exploited further down the value chain where the bulk of the profits are made, in distribution

(video, cable and TV) and in retail (merchandising, music soundtracks, books, computer games,

theme parks). A major blockbuster success like “Spiderman” that made US $800 million

worldwide in the cinemas also built brand awareness that generated substantial additional

revenues in these other markets and media. Conversely, the Majors are also prepared to use a

movie’s release in the first market, the movie theatres, as a loss-leader because as a brand

building exercise it will facilitate large revenues through the exploitation of the brand further

down the value chain (Dale 1997, Duncan 1998 a).

The movie business is volatile, expensive and high-risk.

The ongoing success of Hollywood has been founded on the seemingly unending ability of the

Major studios to create an endless stream of hit movies and this provides an ongoing competitive

edge over smaller, non-aligned independent producers.

Average film production budgets have spiraled from $9.8 million in 1980 to an average of $58.8

million in 2002 (for a Major studio movie). This has been mainly due to a combination of rising

salaries for top movie stars who can command $20 million per movie and to the use of costly

digital special effects that enhance the entertainment value and help position the movie as a

major event. The global marketing costs of launching movies can also exceed the production

budget.

Past failures of big budget movies like Cleopatra and Heavens Gate threatened the very financial

viability of the Majors that backed them. Today, the financial risk for big budget movies, like

“Pearl Harbor” ($150 million), are so high that the Majors’ have changed their business strategy.

Historically, they financed in-house production of between 25-30 movies per year. Today they

6
are actually making fewer but much bigger budget movies that have the potential to become

blockbusters, which can be exploited in all markets and media from theatres to music soundtracks

to theme parks and merchandising. The Majors “pick up” (buy) independently produced product

to maintain a broad film portfolio in order to keep their distribution pipelines full of new movies

that will be attractive to theatrical, video and television markets.

The business rationale is that profit margins from maintaining a larger in-house production

portfolio are now not large enough due to the spiraling production and marketing costs. The

Majors find it is more profitable to buy the other movies that they need to feed their distribution

companies from high profile Hollywood based independent producers who operate basically as

satellites of the Majors. These “independents,” raise their own production finance for their

movies (which may include partial or total finance from the studio). This leaves the Majors to

focus more on “the delivery” of the movies to the market, through their distribution networks and

through their marketing (consistent with Friedman and Furey’s (2000) emphasis on channel

focus).

In sum, the volatility of the movie business and risk is managed through a strategy of

diversification, vertical integration and careful financial management. The studios control their

cash flow and their costs by controlling each part of the value chain(Dale 1997, Dickson 2001).

They own substantial film libraries that provide a recurring source of income through ongoing

sales to the post-theatrical media (cable, satellite, network TV).

Today, the combined revenues for the non-theatrical markets for the average movie have become

larger than the initial release of a movie in the theatrical market. These revenues are now so large

that the production and marketing costs for movies that even fail at the box office can often be

recovered from non-theatrical revenue streams. Television needs an ongoing supply of fresh new

7
product and so the Majors keep their product pipeline full and each of them distribute 25-30 new

movies annually, which are sold in packages to non-theatrical markets.

In standard distribution practice, the theatres and film distributor recoup all expenses and fees

before net profits (if there are any) filter back to the actual production company. Vertical

integration and control of distribution channels means that each business unit within that value

chain can legitimately deduct a series of sequential fees, charges and business expenses on the

movie as it progresses through the value chain during the life of the product. Vertical integration

provides the Majors with the benefits of large economies of scale and the ability to manage

content and risks that are unavailable to smaller independent companies.

The combined production output from the Majors and “mini-Majors” was 350 movies in 1998.

By comparison, the annual output in European Union countries rose to 666 films in 1997, in the

Far East 663 films were made, and the Indian film industry (“Bollywood”) makes over 800

movies each year. Whilst independents make more movies, more than two thirds of all films

released into theatres come from the distribution arms of the Major studios. In spite of increased

production output, most “foreign” national film industries experienced a decline in actual

domestic box office market share in their own territories during the nineties. This was due to the

marketing power of the Majors who continue their historic dominance of global film markets by

controlling the channels of distribution. For example, in 2002, the seven Majors released a total

of 220 movies and the top 19 movies accounted for 36% of the total annual box office in North

America. Exhibitors rely heavily on blockbusters to fill their theatres and so the Majors dominate

and can exploit the distribution channel to optimal advantage.

How do independent films fare in such an industry landscape?

Independent films are lower budget, often made without a major movie star and without special

effects to attract audiences, and most have non-English dialogue. These factors combine to limit

8
the commercial potential in the all-important US market. The majority of independent producers

around the world also don’t have the strategic relationship with the Major studios that many high-

profile Hollywood-based producers enjoy. They have to finance their films from other sources

and seek distribution from smaller, independent film companies who lack the marketing power

and influence of the Major distributors.

About 15-16 new major feature films are introduced into the US theatrical marketplace each

week. The pressure for available theatre screens from the major distributors means that even

when a small independent film does gain a theatrical release, in most cases it isn’t supported by a

major marketing campaign and if it doesn’t open successfully over the first weekend it is quickly

replaced. The Majors have their pick of the best available release-dates from theatre chains that

rely on them for regular product. The Majors book their future releases well in advance, by the

end of summer 2001, the following summer of 2002 was already 60% booked by the Major

studios - a practice that limits theatrical release opportunities for small independent films.

The proportion of all national screens that can be occupied by a new first-run independent title

varies considerably from as low as 0.6 % for Japan and 1.17% in Italy up to 13.4% in Belgium

and 13.8% in Australia. The EU average is around 7.5% (Screen Digest 2001).

The root cause: Acetate film

Hollywood derives its power from an entire industry structure that has evolved based around the

use of acetate film as the fundamental medium of exchange. Film is expensive to buy, to develop,

to transport, to store and to maintain and this favors the major studios whose size and diversity

9
enables them to achieve huge economies of scale in their global distribution networks and

marketing - an advantage not available to smaller independents (Melick 2000).

How will the digital revolution impact on the industry?

If acetate film is the root cause of Hollywood dominance, then the new digital technologies could

revolutionize all sectors - production, distribution and exhibition. Remember Schumpeter’s

“creative destruction” based on innovation (Schumpeter 1975, Scherer 1984).

“Digital freedom”: the production sector

Many of the spectacular special effects have underpinned the recent commercial success of

blockbuster movies were unimaginable even a decade ago.

Filmmaking is the only art form where the artist, with rare exceptions, has personally been unable

to afford the cost of the materials necessary to create their art. However, with digital technology,

even a 3 minute film produced by two filmmakers on their home computer using hardware and

software bought for under US$10,000 can have amazing special effects worthy of a Hollywood

blockbuster. www.405themovie.com is about a jet aircraft making a crash landing on a LA

freeway. It became an instant cult classic on the Internet attracting over 4 million downloads in

three years. The introduction of low cost digital video cameras has lowered the cost of

filmmaking and provided almost universal access. The next generation of moviemakers are

already honing their skills on sophisticated but cheap digital video equipment.

10
Some powerful Hollywood producers believe that the transition to digital production and

distribution will in fact democratize the industry (Swanson 2000), in the sense of giving

filmmakers (who would otherwise be denied distribution) a voice by enabling them to find an

audience for their films over the Internet.

“Digital democracy”: the distribution sector

The really revolutionary potential for change in business practices in the movie industry lies in

the distribution sector, with the introduction of 1) Internet film distribution e.g. video-on-demand,

and 2) digital cinema. In the movie industry, film distribution costs are high. Distributors

typically charge a distribution fee in the range of 30% - 40% of the gross film receipts to

distribute acetate feature films around the world.

The big attraction of digital is in the area of cost reduction. Digital delivery is expected to save

the Majors alone between US$700-800 million per annum (Perenson 2001, Goldsmith 1999).

Current annual distribution costs for Hollywood based on film as the medium is estimated at $1.2

billion. Digital delivery will mean that distributors save US$2000 on every print of the film plus

the shipping costs to the theatres of around US$300 for each individual print (Brewin 2000).

Global movie release and “day and date” across all media

With digital distribution, a global release of a movie becomes a real and possibly commercially

attractive possibility. With acetate film as the basic industry medium, it is currently cost

prohibitive to realistically consider a global release for most movies. The marketing costs (known

in the movie industry as P&A - prints and advertising) are too high. A global digital theatrical

release would however yield two distinct benefits that are currently not available. Firstly, with a

global release, simultaneous worldwide box office takings would help for faster recoupment of

the massive movie production budgets than currently available through regionally staggered

11
release patterns. This would help reduce borrowings and interest due to financiers. Secondly,

some of the potential impact of piracy could be reduced if the movie is launched simultaneously

into the global marketplace. A version from an early-release country could no longer be pirated

for a later-release country.

An interesting new option available through the exploitation of Internet distribution technology is

to release a movie “day and date” with the cinema release in all media and in all markets

simultaneously around the world (i.e. theatrical, home video, pay TV etc). The major objection

to this strategy is likely to be: Will a day and date global release cannibalize sales in non-

theatrical media? The key issue here is, are the primary market segments different for theatrical,

home video, PayTV/Satellite TV, VOD etc? Even if the likely viewing segment for a given

movie is the same across some channels, that segment may still participate across channels

anyway. There could be less cannibalization than synergy, and enormous economies of scale in

promotion because the movie needs only to be promoted once (i.e., not promoted anew each time

it is released through a new channel). Would it not be more efficient if movie distribution could

eliminate the staff overhead that currently exists in maintaining separate marketing teams for

each of those media markets around the world?

Internet film distribution can also cut out the middleman

Direct distribution of movies over the Web provides incredible new opportunities, for Majors and

independents alike. With the introduction of video-on-demand (VOD), rather than licensing its

movies to a third party website operator, five of the Majors are offering movies as digital

downloads (like a video rental) from their own website – Movielink.com, but they keep all of the

money. (Sweeting 2000) Put another way, the Internet and World Wide Web provide businesses

with the opportunity to disintermediate the value chain and eliminate the middleman (Chircu and

Kauffman 2000, Brandtweiner 1998, Gelman 1996). “The Economist” observed that “more

12
capacity means more revenue from the same content. Everything-on-demand means greater

convenience for consumers, and hence bigger sales. And the retailer’s margin is up for

grabs.”(Duncan 1998 b)

In August-September 2001, two different consortiums consisting of all of the Majors studios

announced plans to provide digitally delivered VOD services direct to the consumer over the

Internet. Universal, Paramount, Sony Entertainment (Columbia-TriStar), Warner Brothers and

MGM/UA combined to form MovieFly which was later launched as Movielink.com in November

2002 (Orwall 2001) whilst Disney and Fox initially teamed in the second consortium to form

Movies.com (Healey and Verrier 2001) but Fox later withdrew. Worried by the popularity at that

time of Napster and the threat of digital piracy, Movielink executives admitted that they were

motivated to move quickly in order to head off a similar problem for movies on the Web by

providing a business where consumers can obtain movie content online legitimately (Rich 2001).

Movielink’s VOD services are based on an open-access IP (Internet protocol) based system that

relies on consumers that want to use VOD having broadband access to the Internet (Bond 2001).

In 2002, the US market was 16.8 million broadband households (15.4% penetration of TV

households) and there were 5.5 million VOD households (5% penetration) generating $480

million annual revenues. A McKinsey report on broadband media entitled “Look before you

leap” indicated that 40 million households will gain access to broadband in the next three to five

years (Christofferson and Gatzke 2001).

With Movielink, for a fee that has parity with pay-per-view by cable or satellite, consumers are

able to download movies in the form of a digitally compressed and encrypted file to their hard

drive where it can remain for a 30-day period. Once the file is opened, the movie needs to be

played within 24 hours and can be viewed on either a PC or a television that is connected to the

13
PC. The consumer uses either Windows Media Player or Real Networks Real Player to play the

movie, which takes between 20 and 40 minutes to download.

The studios selected downloading as the preferred VOD approach because it not only offers

greater picture quality than streaming video on the Internet, but also enables the studios to

provide similar on-screen functions that an existing VCR or DVD player offers e.g. start, stop,

rewind. The studios appear to see VOD as a new and complimentary distribution channel.

Movies are available at about the same time as they are currently offered on pay-per-view TV

(30-45 days after the video release), a strategy designed to protect the studios highly profitable

Home Video/DVD business operations by minimizing the danger of cannibalization of their

home video market (Orwall 2001).

The Majors are now able to establish direct relationships with VOD customers, monitoring their

purchasing behavior on line and developing consumer profiles to use for highly targeted direct

marketing pitches. Never before have the studios been able to develop direct relationships with

movie goers, and this could help to make marketing expenditures much more effective and

efficient in the longer term (Sweeting 2001). A major constraint to the arrival of VOD has been

download lag time. Today’s download times are however getting shorter as compression software

performance improves.

At the same time that the Majors launched their VOD services, a software innovation called

Adam’s Platform emerged that may herald a technical solution to the streaming problem and

could yet render the Majors’ download-encrypted delivery strategy obsolete. A successful

demonstration of the Adam’s Platform was witnessed by independent observers (Deloitte

consultants, movie industry executives and Hollywood Reporter staff). They saw full screen

video streamed in real time from a server 1,000 kilometres away using Internet protocols and a

standard PC, analogue phone line and modem. What made the demonstration remarkable was

14
that “the images were far superior to the usual video streaming experienced over the Net, even

though (Adam) Clark used only a slow, 28.8 kps modem, a generic graphics card and a basic

Apple MacIntosh G4” (Cochrane and Van Niekerk 2001). That a simple 28.8 kbps modem could

deliver such fast and high quality images undermines the need for broadband.(George 2001)

The CEO of Media World Broadcasting recently confirmed that the company is launching

Adam’s Platform commercially in mid-2003. It will not only provide a faster, better service to

consumers, it is also potentially a cheaper technical solution than the VOD download option

because it needs no piracy encryption software. And, if it is mass marketed effectively, it means

that every independent filmmaker has the potential to distribute their films from their own website

direct to the consumer and bypass the middleman.

Whether the Adam’s Platform proves in practice to be the great compression breakthrough, or it

is an invention by someone else at a slightly later time, it would appear that streaming VOD with

its immediacy and freedom from piracy may well be here soon.

Figure 3

MODEL FOR DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER INDEPENDENT MOVIES-ON-DEMAND

Independent Film Internet Distribution Independent movies-on-demand

available direct to consumer’s
home PC or to an Internet
enabled large screen TV offering
streaming or digital download
options using broadband cable or
satellite transmission delivery

A new distribution paradigm?

The VOD paradigm itself is, in fact, not new. Internet film distributors like Atom Films and

IFilm have distributed short films online direct-to-consumers for some years, and Cinema

Now.com, SightSound.com and MovieFlix.com currently stream movies for public consumption

15
over the Web, though none of these have yet achieved major commercial success. The key

problem to-date has been image quality and that gets back to the issue of broadband access and

compression algorithms.

The nature of digital and the World Wide Web lowers the barriers to entry

The actual nature of the World Wide Web lowers the barriers to entry because unlike the real

world where land and transportation channels are private or public property that can be owned,

blocked or controlled - nobody owns the Internet and nobody controls it. The Net is accessible to

everybody with a PC and the relatively modest financial resources needed to develop a website.

Unlike real-world distribution, where small films may be blocked and never be offered a

theatrical release, the Majors simply cannot stop an independent distributor like an Atom Films or

an individual producer from developing a web site and distributing their own movies direct to the

consumer. Sufficient money, effective brand building and a Web-savvy promotional strategy then

become the key success factors to marketing a movie on the Web.

Whilst the Majors would likely view VOD as a sustaining technology, in this context, the Internet

has the potential to become a disruptive technology, Web delivery of movies seems to fit the

typical pattern that Clayton Christensen observed in his research (Christensen 1997).

Christensen’s central thesis asserts that even the best companies can fail because they do

everything right. They listen to their customers and invest in new technologies but can still lose

market leadership when they confront disruptive changes in technology and market structure. He

cites examples of such innovations overshooting the market i.e. leaping ahead of their market’s’

current needs and the result is insufficient demand from their best customers to make the new

product profitable. Consequently, the market leader terminates its interest in the new product,

which in turn creates opportunity for other smaller firms to find a niche in the market to exploit

16
the new technology. This tends to occur at the low quality end of the market where new uses for

the product are found by an entirely different set of customers.

Web distribution of movies has already spawned many start-up businesses that distribute and

exhibit short films and old feature films on the Web. The Majors have to-date, showed no

interest in this tier of the market because it does not appear to serve the mass movie going

audience and there is little apparent possibility of current business models generating large

enough profits. For the Majors to become involved at this point in time could be an irrational

investment on their part and would be out of alignment with their existing value networks.

The technology also appears to be overshooting the market. The software available to view

movies over the Web is relatively easy to use and broadband enables consumers to download

movies of near DVD quality, but mass audiences viewing habits still currently revolve around a

trip to the movie theatre, renting a video or watch movies available on TV. A standard “diffusion

of innovation” S curve may occur over time, starting with adoption by innovators, through early

adopters, the middle majority, and lastly, the laggards (Rogers 1995).

Yet, these websites like CinemaNow.com Atom Films and IFilm.com appear to already be

developing communities of users interested in consuming this type of product and are therefore

fulfilling an entertainment need of what is currently a niche audience. The “switching costs”

(Porter 1980) for this segment of innovators and early adopters are relatively low.

The infrastructure switching costs required are a broadband Internet connection to enable a

quality viewing experience on a home computer. Other switching costs for this particular

segment are also likely to be relatively low because this Internet-savvy segment is unlikely to be

“put-off” by consuming movies in a non-theatre environment. They actively are seeking out this

experience.

17
From the general consumer perspective, the emotional switching costs are likely to be higher (the

choice between consuming movies on a home PC versus the more familiar and social big screen

theatre experience). However, more people around the world now consume movies at home on a

small screen (TV, video, cable, satellite) than they do watching them in theatrical release.

Switching costs for “self distribution” on the Internet for established producers who are

commercially successful and well networked into the Hollywood Majors are high. There will be

little incentive for them to see “web delivery” of movies as little more than another embryonic

ancillary marketing channel. Standard film distribution contracts from the Majors require

producers to agree to give the distribution company all rights, across all media, so it is likely that

most high profile producers will NOT switch because it is not in their interest as producers to do

so. Seeking to withhold potentially lucrative future VOD rights from a distribution deal with one

of the Majors would risk alienating the producer from the studio that was backing them.

Digital democracy in distribution ?

Is commercially successful self-distribution by independent filmmakers feasible? With digital

distribution capabilities becoming available, the independent producer who has not got a

distribution deal for their film has three options.

1) They can choose to self distribute their film over the Web on their own website (Lancaster

and Conti 2001).

2) They can find an existing on-line distributor who will exploit this channel on their behalf.

e.g. www.IFilm.com www.atomfilms.com www.cinemanow.com .

3) They can partner with other independents in the formation of a co-operative online

distribution company that agrees to market the film and to take their future films for

Internet distribution.

18
Self-distribution – salvation for the small independent?

For ultra low budget films vying for a release in the theatrical market, an absence of movie stars,

a short product lifecycle, enormous pressure for available theatre screens in a crowded market

and high marketing launch costs are all significant barriers to them achieving that goal and

becoming a hit.

Direct to consumer, self-distribution over the Web therefore may in future present a real

commercial alternative for independents with very low budget films that are unable to obtain a

theatrical distribution deal or sales to other ancillary markets like TV, cable, or video. At present,

unless the movie has extraordinary commercial qualities that can be effectively exploited in the

marketing launch (e.g. Blair Witch), the economics of a theatrical release just don’t work for ultra

low budget features, which is why they find it almost impossible to obtain a distribution deal.

It may in future become a more profitable business model for independent producers of ultra low

budget movies to by-pass traditional channels and self-distribute their movie on the Internet

direct to the consumer or to independent theaters. However, there will be challenges of skillfully

designing and promoting their website, and breaking through the clutter or “digital chaos” of

perhaps thousands of independent movie websites that overwhelm, confuse and put-off

customers.

19
Figure 4

MODEL FOR DIGITAL EXHIBITION THAT BY-PASSES BLOCKED CHANNELS

Independent Independent Independent

movie Producer’s Exhibitor’s
digitized and Film website in-house
uploaded Or server for
Independent digital
Distributor’s projection to
website paying
audiences

On-line distributors – the cybermediary

For those independent filmmakers not knowledgeable enough to market a website themselves,

they could seek out an on-line independent distributor with a recognizable brand name and

engage their services. These distributors could either pay a rental fee to Movielink or

CinemaNow to use their online distribution system or alternatively they could use streaming

software to deliver their movies as VOD. Streaming enables consumers to watch a piece of the

movie while the rest of it “buffers” behind that segment and downloads in real time, so a

broadband connection is essential.

These online distributors will need to build brand awareness and brand equity in order to attract

the traffic needed to sustain their business (Keller 1998). Companies like IFilm are already well

placed to begin to evolve into online feature film distribution for small independently produced

features. If they can develop these sites as a recognizable portal for low budget independent

films, their websites can become “attractors” for the online movie viewer community that likes

non-mainstream movies, this can facilitate the development of a market that could take off. Like

20
all Internet based businesses, most of these online film distribution companies are struggling to

survive and find a business model that will make them economically viable. But by building

brand names now with the “innovator buyers”, future technological developments may allow

them a head start into leading the way into a future mass market.

A model for co-operative on-line film distribution

The original United Artists might serve as a model for a third option (Brown 2001). UA was an

independent distribution company formed in 1918 by four of the biggest movie personalities of

the day because they the Majors were taking too much of the profit on the movies that they made.

Similarly, a number of independents today might choose to work together co-operatively to

partner in an on-line distribution entity for marketing purposes in the way that milk co-operatives

often market product on behalf of farmers.

“Digital hegemony”: The majors strike back

“Digital hegemony” might be a counter strategy used by the Majors if the “Digital Democrats”

begin to succeed in developing a commercially successful new market by attacking the lower

ends of their key market segments. In the late eighties the Majors began to acquire the most

successful art film distributors to remove the competition, they might apply the same tactics to

the emerging Web distribution firms in order to protect their position and achieve a digital

dominance.

However, as Christensen warns, with a disruptive technology, by the time the established firms

take an interest in the emerging market it is often too late.

21
Digital Cinema

The benefits of digital cinema include the elimination of film prints, lower handling costs, lower

theatre construction costs in future; more consistent image quality, improved sound, more

efficient response to demand, potential new revenue sources for exhibitors and new release

options. (Baughman 2000) In the exhibition sector, the massive cost of conversion of theatre

equipment on a global basis is the critical issue and who pays for the transitioning costs is the

subject of hot debate in the industry. Conversion is estimated to occur over a 10-20 year time

frame with film playing alongside digitally projected content at cinemas during the transition

years. (Crabtree 2001) Estimates of the up-front transitioning costs to theater chains to convert to

digital are US $150,000-$200,000 per screen for the digital projectors, with an extra $100,000

required to provide the necessary server that enables the system to run from a central

processor.(Hanrahan 2000, Perenson 2001) Digital projector costs are however expected to

reduce significantly over ten years.

Marketing and Programming implications

Digital delivery over the Web can facilitate the emergence of digital cinema on the one hand and

provide a video-on-demand service direct to the consumer on the other. For filmmakers, the Web

is a global marketplace through which films can be exhibited to international audiences 24/7.

Mahadevan proposes that the Internet economy has “divided the overall market structure into

three broad structures; portals, market makers and product/service providers” (Mahadevan 2000).

Portals build communities and play the primary role of funneling customers in a targeted manner

towards sites of interest. Market Makers differ in that they possess a lot of domain knowledge

and provide value through relationships based on transactional security and trust. Product/service

22
providers gain their edge by customizing their information system and processes to match

customer’s requirements.

Under the current business models, Atom Films and IFilm and many other smaller on line

distributors are effectively de-facto portals. They have developed their own brands and provide

the retailing intermediary value of pre-screening for product quality. In doing so, they are

developing a brand identity for some of the generation of emerging filmmakers whose talents can

be viewed by downloading their films. Some of the filmmakers on display may go on to achieve

bigger things in the industry if they get “discovered”.

Hollywood’s undeniable marketing supremacy and the collective confidence of the studios were

badly shaken by the huge commercial success of the low budget horror movie “The Blair Witch

Project” (Lyman 2001). The real business lesson in this instance was that a small independent

producer and distributor could outwit and out-think the Hollywood marketing juggernaut by

using street smart, below-the-line guerilla marketing tactics and by exploiting the marketing

potential of the Internet effectively.

In the wake of potential “digital chaos”, not only may movie portals emerge to cut down the

overwhelming number of choices consumers may face, but opinion leaders (movie critics) may

play a huge role. The quality independent film could be submitted to them and if it earned their

recommendation and they provided a hyperlink, there could be a flow-through of traffic to the

movie website. Consider the impact of a website bearing the imprimator “Roger Ebert

Recommends…”

New flexibility for programming and increased theatre profitability?

Greater flexibility and diversity in theatre programming should also occur as a result of digital

distribution over the Web. By eliminating the cost of a “print” and replacing it with digital

23
distribution, it would reduce some of the financial loss suffered by a Major due to a box office

failure. This might enable the theatre to expedite the removal of that movie instead of having to

wait until the end of the minimum run, thus freeing up valuable screen time. This would signal a

fundamental shift in power back to the theatre operator. This in-turn, should result in more

flexible and diverse programming that can be customized to specifically suit local market tastes.

Exhibitors would then be able to expand their range of programming to include non-mainstream

independent films, foreign films, documentaries, short films or even “live” sporting and

entertainment events. These could be screened in digital cinemas as long as they originate on, or

were transferred to digital video tape or recordable DVD, for Internet delivery to the theatre so

that viewers may enjoy the big screen theatre experience. This is potentially a revolution in the

role of the exhibitor.

Improved local marketing at the cinema level

Local marketing practices should also improve and so too could returns to the producer. “By

diversifying and increasing the product supply, digital technologies will create an avenue for

theatres to choose product on a more competitive basis. Promotions will shift from a focus on mass-

marketing to targeted local campaigns that encourage development of a one-to-one relationship

between theatre and patron” (Melick 2001).

Conclusion

Industry leaders like George Lucas and Francis Ford Coppola are championing the cause of

digitally produced movies to replace film as the industry medium. They see both new creative

opportunities from the digital filmmaking process that traditional film cannot provide as well as

more flexibility in actual production and cost savings. The revolutionary potential of digital

technology for the movie industry however will likely occur with the ability to distribute movies

directly to movie theatres over the Internet and also direct to the consumer’s home with VOD.

24
124 digital cinema screens were operating around the world in 2002. It is a reality. It is

beginning to happen now.

The Major studios stand to save US $700–$800 million per year through digital distribution to

theatres, although the issue of who should pay for the transitioning costs is as yet unresolved.

And as the broadband market grows in size, the studios should add additional lucrative revenue

streams through their new VOD services. Intenet distribution provides the opportunity for

Majors to exploit their movies on a global basis and release them “day and date” across all

theatrical and non-theatrical media if that optimizes sales and profits.

The exhibition sector now faces the prospect of growing pressure from the Majors to convert to

digital cinema over the next two decades. The elimination of film prints and replacement by

digital transmission direct to the cinemas undermines the historic rationale for the minimum play

clause in the standard licensing agreement between the distributor and the exhibitor. This could

help to free up screen time for the exhibitor when movies that fail at the box office after they are

launched are removed much more quickly and replaced by other product that may prove to be

commercially more successful. This in turn might shift the balance of power in favor of

exhibitors who often lack sufficient leverage within the distribution channel to greatly influence

the distributor’s decisions. This would also provide incentive for the exhibitor to become more

actively involved in local marketing and in selecting independent productions most suitable for

their market.

In production and distribution, for small independents and emerging filmmakers the

comparatively low cost of digital video production opens up the filmmaking possibilities to a

much wider mass market. Digital distribution and developments like VOD and Adams Platform

open up new possibilities of relatively cheap access via the World Wide Web to global markets

for those independents unable to gain access to global audiences for their movies via other

25
channels. The Internet is potentially a level playing field for the independent filmmaker. It

reduces barriers to entry by being accessible to all and not being owned or controlled by any

central authority or by private corporations. Digital products are by their nature, far cheaper to

distribute than tangible products if the technology for effective delivery exists. The Web provides

the channel and the means of delivery is provided by software developments like the Adams

Platform.

Will the “digital dawn” bring about “digital freedom” in film production and a proliferation of

interesting new independent films, made accessible to viewers on the Internet through a “digital

democracy” in distribution, or will the ensuing clutter lead to “digital chaos”? Alternatively, will

the Majors yet again retain their industry dominance through new ventures like Movielink or

through “(digital) hegemony” by simply acquiring successful digital brands?

Current players in the movie industry can either plan for these potential scenarios, or be sidelined

by them. New players can seize the opportunities, or watch the opportunities pass them by.

26
References

Baughman, Steve. 2000. Entertainment industry to spend $ 3 billion by 2005 to convert 21,000
theatres to digital. SRI Consulting Business Intelligence. Menlo Park, CA. Press release May 30,
2000), http://www.sric-bi.com/press/2000-05-30.shtml accessed online on September 21, 2000.

Bond, Paul. 2001. Consortium of studios taking VOD plunge. Hollywood Reporter. (August 17)
accessed on August 19, 2001 at 1.22pm.
www.hollywoodreporter.com/hollywoodreporter/frontpage/brief_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=10
17355

Brandtweiner, Roman. 1998. Risks and Challenges for Retailers: The Value Chain
Transformation: A European Perspective. Proceedings of the Americas conference on
information systems. Baltimore 1998.

Brown, Colin. 2001. Screen comment: send out the clones. Screen Daily. August 16, 2001,
http://www.screendaily.com/story.asp?storyid=5618&st=clones&s=3 accessed August 20, 2001
at. 6.33am.

Chircu, Alina, M. and Kauffman, Robert. J. 2000. Electronic intermediaries and networks in
business-to-Business Electronic Commerce. International Journal of Electronic Commerce. 4:4
(Summer): 7-42

Christensen, Clayton. 1997. The innovator’s dilemma. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Christofferson, Scott ,A. and Gatzke, Michael .A. 2001. Broadband media: look before you leap.
The McKinsey Quarterly accessed online on August 2, 2001 at 6.41am.
http://www.mckinsey.de/knowmatters/media/media_index.htm

Cicchetti, Charles. 1995. The economic consequence of independent film making.

American Film Marketing Association. (January) accessed on line at:
http://www.hoovers.com/offsite/1,1061,,00html?url=http://www.afma.com.

Cochrane, Nathan, and van Niekerk, Mike. 2001. Sending TV down the phone line. (2001) The Age.
(May 19) accessed on August 31, 2001 at www.theage.com.au/daily/980519/infotech1.html
6.24pm. Also at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/bear-cave/other/bion/compression.html

Crabtree, Sheigh. 2001. Differing views from tech panel. Hollywood Reporter. (May 21): 3.

Dale, Martin. 1997. The movie game. London: Cassell.

Dickson, Andrew. 2001. The state of cinema. August 20, 2001

http://www.frictionmagazine.com/artful/film/cinema_state.asp

27
Duncan, Emma. 1998 a. Technology and entertainment: a brand new strategy. The Economist.
349/8095 London (November 21): S5-S10.

Duncan, Emma. 1998 b. Technology and entertainment: a digital future. The Economist.
349/8095. London (November 21): S14-S16.

Eliashberg, Jehoshua, and Shugan, Steven.M. 1997. Film critics: Influencers or predictors?
Journal of
Marketing. 61/2 (April): 68-78.

Friedman, Lawrence G., and Furey, Timothy.R. 2000. The Channel Advantage. Oxford:
Butterworth
Heinemann.

Forde, Leon. 2001. Free digital conversion offer for US theatres only. Screen Daily. (March 9)
http://www.screendaily.com/story.asp?storyid=4235&st=free+digital+conversion&s=3

Gelman, R. 1996. Disintermediation and the Internet Government information quarterly. 13:1.

George, Sandy. 2001. Australia rehearses video-on-demand revolution. Screen Daily. (August 30)
www.screendaily.com/shtml_files/story5733.shtml accessed online August 31, 2001 at 6.40am.

Goldsmith, Jill. 1999. ShowEast: Who picks up the digital check? Variety. (October 25): 9.

Goodridge, Mark. 2001. Hollywood logs on with on-line studio coalition. Screen Daily. (August
17) http://www.screendaily.com/story.asp?storyid=5621&st=hollywood+logs+on&s=3 accessed
August 20, 2001 at 6.21am.

Grove, Chris. 2000. Spotlight: Cinema expo digital dilemma Euro exhibitors question cost,
security
Factors. Variety. (June 19): 43.

Hanrahan, John. 2000. Spotlight: Greater Union for tech arm, digitally delivered films top
priority.”
Variety. (May 1): 70.

Healey, Jon, and Verrier, Richard. 2001. Disney, Fox join in Web film venture. Los Angeles
Times.
(September 6) accessed online on October 10, 2001 at 7.04pm.
www.latimes.com/business/la-000071927sep06.story?coll=la-headlines-business accessed on

Kaufman, Debra. 2001. Building momentum. Hollywood Reporter. (May 3): S-6.

Keller, K. L. 1998. Strategic brand management. New York : Prentice-Hall.

Lancaster, Kurt, and Conti, Cynthia. 2001. Building a home movie studio and getting your films
on-line. New York: Billboard Books.

28
Lyman, Rick. 2001. Tolkein trilogy producers promote movie on the Internet.
Akron Beacon Journal. (January 12) accessed online on January 23.
www.ohio.com/bj/fun/movie/reviews/2001/January12/docs/011917.htm .

Mahadevan, B. 2000. Business models for Internet based e-commerce: an anatomy.

California Management Review. 42/4 (Summer): 55-69.

Melick,Greg. 2000. Digital killed the celluloid star? MovieMaker. (May): 40-43.

M.P.A. 2002. US Entertainment Industry: 2002 MPA market statistics. Motion Picture
Association of America Economic Review. http://www.mpaa.org/useconomicreview/

Orwall, Bruce. 2001. Five Hollywood studios enter venture to offer feature films over Internet.
Wall Street Journal. (August 17) accessed online on August 19, 2001 at 7.06am.
http://public.wsj.com/sn/y/SB99800191535363627.html.

Perenson, Melissa J. 2001. Focus check. Hollywood Reporter. (June 19): 12.

Porter, Michael. E. 1980. Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and
Competitors. New York : The Free Press, a division of MacMillan Publishing Co.

Rich, Laura. 2001. Hollywood studios form venture to distribute movies over the Web.
The Industry Standard (August 17) accessed August 18, 2001 at 1.20pm
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28750,00.html

Rogers, Everett M. 1995. Diffusion of innovations. 4th Edition. New York: The Free Press.

Scherer, F.M. 1984. Innovation and growth: Schumpeterian perspectives. Cambridge,

Massachusettes and London: The MIT Press.

Schumpeter. Joseph A. 1975. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper.

Screen Digest 1997. Film production and distribution: a shifting balance. Screen Digest.
(May) http://www.screendigest.com/yp_97-05.htm accessed August 23, 2001 at 11.59 am.

Swanson, Tim. 2000. Special supplement: EVariety January 2001 Francis Ford Coppola’s radical
and gutsy visions are taking shape and taking off. Variety. (December 18): 3.

Sweeting, Paul. 2000. The backend digital could break the chains that bind studios profits.
Variety. (April 10): 19.

Why Mega Movies Make Sense. 1998. Canadian Business. (8 May) : 71.

www.405themovie.com

Zhu, Kevin. 2001. Internet-based Distribution of Digital Videos: The Impact on the Motion
Picture Industry. EM - Electronic Markets. (12): 2001

29
Hard copies of web citations are available from the authors.

30