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Principles of statutory interpretation gp singh pdf

Principles of statutory interpretation singapore. G.p. singh principles of statutory interpretation. General principles of interpretation of statutes in india. General principles of interpretation of statutes.
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97 in stock GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14e 2016/GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14e2016/CHAPTER 1 BASIC PRINCIPLES/1. MEANING OF INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION CHAPTER 1BASIC PRINCIPLES1. MEANING OF INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION Enacted laws, specially the modern
Acts and Rules, are drafted by legal experts and it could be expected that thelanguage used will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But the experience of all those, who have to bearand share the task of application of the law, has been different. 1 It is quite often that we find courts and lawyers busy inunfolding the meaning of
ambiguous words and expressions and resolving inconsistencies. 2 The age old process of application of the enacted law has led to formulation of certain rules of interpretation or construction.
Interpretation of alegal provision and its application to a set of facts are two different exercises requiring different approaches. Whileinterpretation of a legal provision is always independent of the facts of any given case, the application of a statutoryprovision would always depend on the exact facts of a given case.
3 "By interpretation or construction is meant", says SALMOND: "the process by which the courts seek to ascertain themeaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed". 4 It has been said thatthere is a distinction between the two expressions. 5 As explained by COOLEY: "Interpretation differs from
constructionin that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense which their author isintended to convey; and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey.Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expressionof the text from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in spirit though not within the letterof the law." 6 This distinction, however, "has been largely relegated to the realm of academic discussion", 7 and has beencriticised as 'erroneous'. 8 Even conceding that there may be some abstract distinction
between the two, it cannot bedoubted, as was observed by WHITE, J. that "in common usage interpretation and construction are usually understoodas having the same significance". 9 It may be added that the present work has followed this common usage and the twoexpressions, hereinafter, have been used as synonymous. 1 "It is general judicial
experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two viewsare often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision making is often very difficult and delicate.": ( Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1965 SC
1636 [LNIND 1965 SC 28], p. 1644 :1965 (2) SCR 908 [LNIND 1965 SC 28] : (1965) 56 ITR 365 [LNIND 1965 SC 28] ).2 In some cases the Draftsman has been severely criticised. Regarding section 22(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1939, (UK) it was said that thesection was so obscure that "the Draftsman must have been of unsound mind": [ Kirby v.
Leather, (1965) 2 All ER 441, p. 445 (CA)(DANCKWERTS, LJ)]. Referring to section 45 of the General Rate Act, 1967, LORD WILBERFORCE said: "The section is a labyrinth, aminefield of obscurity" [ Vandyk v. Oliver (Valuation Officer), (1976) 1 All ER 466, p.
470 (HL)]. In dealing with section 23-A of theIncome-tax Act, 1922, the Supreme Court observed: "The Act contains many mind twisting formulae but section 23-A along with someother sections takes the place of pride amongst them" : [ CIT, Gujarat v. Distributors (Baroda) (Pvt.) Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 288 [LNIND 1971SC 472], p. 291 : 1972 (1) SCR 726
[LNIND 1971 SC 472] : (1972) 4 SCC 353 [LNIND 1971 SC 472] ]. For other cases see note 31, pp.33, infra and ALLEN, Law in the Making, 7th Edition, pp. 484-86.3 Sudevanand v. State, through CBI, (2012) 3 SCC 387 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 383], pp. 397, 398.4 SALMOND, Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p. 152. In the words of GRAY: 'The process by
which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer orlayman, who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from the words of a statute-book a meaning which he eitherbelieves to be that of the Legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called by us 'Interpretation'and by the Germans 'Ausle-gung'.'The Nature and Sources of
the Law, 2nd Edition, p. 176. According to CROSS: 'Interpretation is the process by which the courts determine Page 1 the meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before them:' Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edition, p.

34.5 In re, Sea Customs Act, AIR 1963 SC 1760 [LNIND 1963 SC 403], p. 1794 (HIDAYATULLAH, J.) : 1964 (3) SCR 787 [LNIND 1963SC 403].6 COOLEY,Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, p. 97; referred in In re Sea Customs Act , AIR 1963 SC 1760 [LNIND 1963 SC 403], p. 1794: (1964) 3 SCR 787 [LNIND 1963 SC 403]. See further Corpus Juris
Secondum , Vol. 82, p. 529; CRAWFORD,Statutory Construction, pp.240-41; D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner, AIR 1977 SC 842, p. 849 : (1977) 2 SCC 273 : (1977) 2 SCR 392; TheCommissioner of Wealth Tax v. Hashmatunnisa Begum, AIR 1989 SC 1024 [LNIND 1989 SC 29], p. 1029 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 43 : (1989)176 ITR 98.7
CRAWFORD,Statutory Construction, p. 241.8 SUTHERLAND,Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edition, Article 4504, p. 319.9 United States v. F.W. Keitel, 211 US 370, p.
386: 53 Law Ed 230, p. 240. 'Although there is some distinction between them, they are sohard to disentangle that they cannot afford a suitable basis for discussion.' DIAS, Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, p. 105. GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14e 2016/GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14e2016/CHAPTER 1 BASIC
PRINCIPLES/2. INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE CHAPTER 1BASIC PRINCIPLES2.

INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE A statute is an edict of the Legislature 10 and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the'intention' of its maker.
A statute is to be construed according 'to the intent of those that make it' 11 and 'the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature--the mens or sententia legis '. 12 The expression 'intention of the Legislature' is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used by the Legislature objectively determinedwith the guidance
furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. 13 If a statutory provision is open to more thanone interpretation the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the Legislature, 14 inother words the 'legal meaning' 15 or 'true meaning' 16 of the statutory provision. The task is often not an easy one and
thedifficulties arise because of various reasons. To mention a few of them: Words in any language are not scientificsymbols having any precise or definite meaning, and language is but an imperfect medium to convey one's thought,much less of a large assembly consisting of persons of various shades of opinion. It is impossible even for the
mostimaginative Legislature to forestall exhaustive situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statutewhere its application may be called for. The function of the courts is only to expound and not to legislate. The numerousrules of interpretation or construction formulated by courts are expressed differently by different judges and
supportmay be found in these formulations for apparently contradictory propositions.The problem of interpretation is a problem of meaning of words and their effectiveness as a medium of expression tocommunicate a particular thought. A word is used to refer to some object or situation in the real world and this object orsituation has been assigned a
technical name referent. 'Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental referencesto referents.' 17 But words of any language are capable of referring to different referents in different contexts andtimes. 18 Moreover, there is always the difficulty of borderline cases falling within or outside the connotation of a word.Language, therefore, is
likely to be misunderstood.

In ordinary conversation or correspondence it is generally open forthe parties to obtain clarification if the 'referent' is imperfectly communicated. The position is, however, different in theinterpretation of statute law. A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the individual opinions of the legislators, notPage 2 even by a resolution of the entire
Legislature. After the enacting process is over, the Legislature becomes functus officio so far as that particular statute is concerned, so that it cannot itself interpret it. The Legislature can no doubt amend orrepeal any previous statute or can declare its meaning but all this can be done only by a fresh statute after going throughthe normal process of
law making. 19 There are no doubt references that in good old days it was permissible for the judges to go to the Legislature and enquire what they meant, where the language of an Act was ambiguous orcontradictory but happily enough the practice is dead and bygone and there is no hope of its revival. 20 The courts have,therefore, to look
essentially to the words of the statute to discern the 'referent' aiding their effort as much as possible bythe context. Apart from controversies as to the limits of the context outside the statute, there is a difficulty arising out of 'fringe' meaning of words. There may be certain objects or situations which may without any controversy fall within thecontent
of a word, but there may be many others on or near the borderline in respect of which it may be a matter of doubt and serious argument whether they are within or outside the connotation of the word. It is, therefore, said thatwords, in addition to a hard central core of meaning have a "penumbra, a dim fringe"; 21 and cases falling within or nearto
this fringe are apt to give rise to a sharp difference of opinion. No one will dispute that the structure in which theHigh Court of Madhya Pradesh is located is a 'building' but it may be a matter of surprise to find that an open platformhaving no wall or roof is a building 22 whereas a brick kiln (a pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side) is not
abuilding.
23 Again, the assumption that a massive building like one housing the High Court is a 'structure' may itself bedebated. Indeed, it was seriously though unsuccessfully argued in the House of Lords that a large substantial permanenttwo storey building was not a structure. 24 Further, a question may arise which may be answered differently in
differentcontexts whether 'building' includes land over which the superstructure stands or whether it is confined to thesuperstructure. 25 To take another example, the question, whether a railway workman who was engaged in cleaning andoiling a permanent way, was engaged in repairing it, was answered in the negative by a margin of three to two
in theHouse of Lords. 26 The core of such problems is indicated by LORD JOWITT, L.C. in the following words: "Thequestion is essentially one of degree and that it is impossible to fix any definite point at which 'maintenance' ends and'repair' begins". 27 To the same effect are the words of LORD CRANWORTH, L.C.: "There is no possibility
of mistaking midnight for noon; but at what precise moment twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine." 28 Facedwith such problems the courts although conscious of a dividing line, do not attempt to draw it for reasons of practicalimpossibility and decide the particular case in hand as falling within or outside the purview of the relevant words
of thestatute, after laying down a working line or more appropriately some general working principles. 29 But in doing so thecourts should avoid laying down so-called tests to be applied in every case for the danger in prescribing and designatingtests is that it may divert attention from the language used in the statutory provision and encourage an
approach notintended by the Legislature. 30 Legislation in a modern State is actuated with some policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate some publicbenefit. 31 The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived frompast and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general
words to cover similar problems arising infuture. 32 But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future inwhich the application of the legislation in hand may be called for, and, words chosen to communicate such indefinite'referents' are bound to be, in many cases lacking in clarity and
precision and thus giving rise to controversial questionsof construction. 33 This analysis later met the approval of the Supreme Court. 34 In all real controversies of construction if it were open to consult the Legislature as to its intention, the answer of mostof the legislators in all probability will be: 'such a problem never occurred to us, solve it as best
as you can, consistentwith the words used, and the purpose indicated by us in the statute'. 35 The legislative intent in such cases is a fictionrepresenting the attitude of judges in arriving at a solution by striking a balance between the letter and spirit of thestatute without acknowledging that they have in any way supplemented the statute. 36 That the
duty of judges is toexpound and not to legislate is a fundamental rule, but this is now and has ever been merely an 'aspiration'. There is amarginal area in which the courts 'mould or creatively interpret legislation' and they are thus 'finishers, refiners andpolishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further
processing'. 37 In decidingthat 'repair' does not include cleaning and oiling; 38 that there is notional extension of employment in the phrase 'accidentarising out of and in the course of employment; 39 that the word 'accident' in the same phrase includes murder; 40 thatPage 3

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