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interpretation oF statu
THEORIES OF INTERPRETAION OF STATUTE

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SUBMITTED TO: SIR SAIFULLAH

Contents
INTRODUCTION:.................................................................................................2
THE THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:......................................2
 Textualism.................................................................................................2
 Purposivism...............................................................................................2
Textualism:..................................................................................................... 2
There are several common justifications for textualism....................................2
California. In Hurtado 1884:...............................................................................3
Facts:..................................................................................................................3
Judgment:..........................................................................................................3
Where Textualism Falls Short............................................................................3
Purposivism.................................................................................................... 4
Lanco Anpara Power Limited v. the State of U.P...............................................5
Facts...................................................................................................................5
Judgment...........................................................................................................5
Use of the Rule of Purposive Interpretation: Limitations..................................6

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INTRODUCTION:
According to its dictionary meaning, interpretation is an act of explaining the
meaning of a thing. In legal context, interpretation means the act of interpreting
and deciphering the intent behind a statute. The term ‘interpretation’ has its
roots in the Latin word ‘interpretari’ which means to explain, or to translate. The
main aim of interpreting a statute is to determine the intention behind the law.

THE THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

 Textualism
 Purposivism

Textualism:
"Textualists look for meaning in the governing text, accord to that text the
meaning it has had since its birth, and reject judicial conjecture about both the
drafters1' extratextually derived objectives and the acceptability of the fair
reading's predicted consequences," they say. Textualists depend on the common
interpretation of the words in the statute and generally established canons of
statutory construction rather than reviewing legislative history or enquiring into
the aim of a statute. Textualists can use dictionary meanings to figure out what
statutory language means.

There are several common justifications for textualism.

 First, textualism constrains judicial discretion, thereby limiting “the

tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their oxtualwn
policy preferences.”
 Second, confining the interpretive task to what is fairly discernable from
the text will encourage more precisely drafted laws.69 As a result,

https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-
Statutes-1.pdf

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 textualism “will provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater
predictability and greater respect for the rule of law.”
 Third, textualism is the only principled and coherent method of
statutory interpretation because any search for legislative intent is
futile. The notion that there is a discernable legislative intent is “pure
fantasy,” as “most legislators could not possibly have focused on the
narrow point before the court,” and “the few who did undoubtedly had
varying views.” Judges should look for the meaning of the text, not the
intent of the legislature.

California. In Hurtado 1884:

Facts:

One of the most well-known opinions to rely on textualism is the 1884 opinion in
Hurtado v. California. In Hurtado, the Court determined that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require an indictment by the grand
jury as a prerequisite to criminal prosecution by a state. The Court relied on the
text of the Fifth Amendment, which also contained the "due process of law"
language contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, to render its decision. The
Court explained that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
also contained express language requiring a grand jury, which implied that due
process did not include such a right.

Judgment:

In Hurtado, the Court ultimately found that it was bound to apply the "due
process" language in the same sense and with no greater extent" (p. 535) than it
was used by the Fifth Amendment. However, several years later in Powell v. State
of Alabama, the Court clarified that the Hurtado doctrine was simply an "aid to
construction" that "must yield to more compelling considerations whenever such
considerations exist" (p. 67)

Where Textualism Falls Short

Notwithstanding the ability of the textualist approach to deal with a substantial

amount of interpretation with minimal analysis of contextual information, the
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effort falls short. The residue of interpretation left for pragmatics is simply too
great for textualism to work. The problems radiate from the core fact that
textualism, however well-motivated, is by definition a know-nothing approach; it
requires that we intentionally ignore exactly the kind of additional contextual
information that we use routinely and unselfconsciously in everyday life to
understand communications. The Court repeatedly states that words must be
understood in their context, and that words that may seem unclear on their face
become clear when one understands their context." but textualist methodology
limits the notion of "context" to the statutory language surrounding the disputed
words and sometimes to other sections.2

Purposivism
One way of using the phrase "statutory purpose" could refer to the subjective
intentions of the legislature, but the phrase can be used in another way to refer
to the "objective purpose of a statute"the purpose that a reasonable, public-
spirited, or ideal legislature would have had if it had passed the statute. 3
Anyone familiar with how actual legislatures operate in the "real world" will
realize that the actual purposes of legislators concerned with raising money and
pleasing constituents may be quite different from the idealized purposes of
reasonable legislators. Real-world legislators may pass legislation to favor a
politically powerful special interest group, whereas an ideal legislature will always
have a purpose that advances the public good.
As I am using the term "purposivism" it refers to the approach to statutory
interpretation that maintains that the legal effect of a statute should be
determined by the objective purpose of the statute. That is, statutes should be
interpreted to have their reasonable meaning even if that meaning diverges from
the plain meaning of the text or the subjective intentions of the actual lawmakers.

Lanco Anpara Power Limited v. the State of U.P.

2

The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 99 n.34 (1995); M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of
Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PrT. L. REV. 373
3
https://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2017/05/theories-of-statutory-interpretation.html

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Facts:
In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was tasked with determining the
legality of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of
Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and the Building and Other
Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996, which imposed a building cess
liability on Factory owners (who were registered under Section 6 of the Factories
Act). The Court had to interpret an exclusionary clause in section 2 (1) (d) of the
BOCW Act, which defined "building and construction work." The clause stated,
among other things, that it does not include "any building or other construction
work to which the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, or the Mines Act, 1952
apply." The Supreme Court began by considering the underlying goals of both of
these statutes in order to interpret them. According to the BOCW Act's Statement
of Objects and Reasons, the goal of the Act was to address a specific need, namely
the welfare of the unorganized labor class participating in construction (who were
not protected under the Factories Act's provisions), which had to be met and not
ignored. It was discovered that, although having registered under the Factories
Act, the relevant Factory would only be subject to its rules and the workers would
only be able to obtain the required rights and safeguards after the manufacturing
process began. As a result, the construction workers who were employed there to
build that plant would not cooperate.

Judgment

• As a result, while acknowledging the BOCWWC Act, 1996 as social legislation

aimed at protecting the interests of construction workers, the Court applied a
purposive interpretation to the clause, holding that registration under the
Factories Act served a different purpose and that the respective factory would
not fall within the scope of the exclusionary clause, and the liability to pay the
BOCWWC Act's4 building cess could be legally imposed on them.

http://www.kcjm.in/bocw-act-labour-welfare-cess-and-its-applicability-and-implications-for-construction-
industry/#:~:text=BOCW%20ACT%20requires%20that%20employer%20of%20establishment%20must,of%20the
%20cost%20of%20construction%20by%20the%20employer.

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Use of the Rule of Purposive Interpretation: Limitations

Besides, there are some other safeguards as well, which must be kept in mind.
Although the purposive rule has been an important tool of interpretation, it is
generally accepted that its application is limited. In theory, there are two limits.
Firstly, this approach should only be applied where there is uncertainty in the
words of the statute and secondly, it should only be used to employ such a
meaning that the respective words of the statute would be reasonably capable of
bearing. The courts should not use the purposive approach to make a law
consistent with Parliamentary intent if Parliament has failed to effectively state
that intent in the statute. “a purposive approach should not be made an excuse
for starting with the underlying purpose, and then forcing the words into a
preconceived and strained construction to fit that assumption 5”. Ordinarily, the
stage of applying this rule arrives after a plain meaning has been given to the
words of the statute, and the same leads to absurdity, injustice, or anomaly. This
should be the course of action, rather than the other way round, where one,
initially itself perceives the statute, from the eyes wearing spectacles tainted with
the objects and purposes of the statute.

…………………………………………………….

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8 See generally Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV.