Interpretation of Statute
Interpretation of Statute
Interpretation of Statute
FACULTY OF LAW
PROJECT
Interpretation of Statute
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I have taken efforts in this project however it would not have been possible without
the kind support and help of many individuals, websites and books. I would like
to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.
Khushbu Gupta
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1. Introduction
2. Meaning of Statutory interpretation
3. Need for Statutory interpretation
4. Rules of Statutory interpretation
5. Primary Rules of Statutory interpretation
5.1. Literal Rule of interpretation
5.2. Golden Rule of interpretation
5.3. Mischief Rule of interpretation
5.4. Purposive Approach
6. Secondary Rule of Statutory interpretation
7. Conclusion
8. References
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INTRODUCTION
The enacted laws, mainly the modern acts and rules, which are drafted by legal experts and it
could be anticipated that the language used will leave little room for interpretation. But the
experience of all those who have to bear and share the task of application of the law has been
different.1 In every legislation there is the potential for words and phrases to create uncertainty or
ambiguity which can only be resolved by judicial interpretation. 2 Statutory interpretation
concerns the role of judges when trying to apply the Rules or an Act of Parliament to an actual
case. The wording of the Act may seem to be clear when it is drafted and checked by Parliament,
but it may become problematic in the future.3
The general rules of statutory interpretation are not regulated by parliament, but have been
developed by the Judges. The Interpretation Act 1978 does not provide notes for interpretation
but simply provides standard definitions of common provision. Generally, there are three
approaches to statutory interpretation, these are the Literal, Golden and Mischief Rule. A
purposive approach is also operative. These rules are knon as primary rules of statutory
interpretation. Apart from it there are secondary also for interpretation of statute.
The term interpretation means “To give meaning to”. The term interpretation has been derived
from the Latin term ‘interpretari’, which means to explain, expound, understand, or to translate.
Interpretation is the process of explaining, expounding and translating any text or anything in
written form. This involves an act of discovering the true meaning of the language which has
been used in the statute.
According to Salmond, “Interpretation is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”4
1
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT. AIR 1965 SC 1636, p. 1644
2
Brock v DPP, [1997] 161 JP 412
3
https://www.slideshare.net/ronithimatlal/slides-approachestostatutoryinterpretation
4
Salmond, Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p. 152
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Statutory interpretation is the act or process of interpreting and applying legislation. 5 These are
the principles developed by the courts for interpreting statutes. This is also referred to as
statutory construction. Interpretation is necessary when case involves ambiguous aspects of a
statute. It is the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute. For
interpreting a statute intention of the legislature should be taken into account. The statute should
be read in its whole context. If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it irrespective of
consequences. Interpretation of Statutes is required for two basic reasons: legislative language
and legislative intent.
According to Blackstone the fairest and rational method for interpreting a statute is by exploring
the intention of the Legislature through the most natural and probable signs which are ‘either the
words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the
law’.6
In the case of R.S. Nayak v A.R. Antulay7, Supreme Court held that “if the words of the Statute
are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural
meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event
of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self-defeating.”
The same principle was followed in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs,
Bombay8 and held “Where the words and the intention of the legislature is clear and there is no
ambiguity there is no scope for court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the
statutory provisions.”
The meaning of law in a statute should be clear and explicit, but this is not always achieved.
There are a number of factors which can lead to an unclear meaning which are as follows:
5
https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/statutory-interpretation/
6
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 1, p.59
7
AIR 1984 SC 684
8
2002)4 SCC 297
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1. A broad term – There may be words designed to cover several possibilities and it is left to
the user to judge what situations fall within it. “type known as the pit bull terrier” in
Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. What does this word mean?
2. Ambiguity – A word may have two or more meanings and it may not be clear which
meaning should be used.
3. A drafting error – The parliamentary council which drafted the original Bill may have
made an error that has not been noticed by Parliament. This is more likely to occur where
a Bill has been amended several times during debates.
4. Wording may be inadequate – There may be many ways in which the wording may be
inadequate, for example, a printing error, or another error such as the use of a word with a
wide meaning which is not defined.
5. New developments – New technology may mean that an old Act of Parliament does not
apparently cover present-day situations. e.g. in technology. In Royal College of Nursing v
DHSS9 “medical practitioner” now includes nurses for the purposes of abortion
6. Certain words not used – The draftsmen may refrain from using certain words that they
regard as being implied. The problem here is that users may not realise that this is the
case.
7. Failure of legislation to cover a specific point – The legislation may have been drafted in
detail, with the draftsman trying to cover every possible contingency. Despite this,
situations could arise which are not specifically covered.
8. Changes in the use of language – The meaning of words can change over the years e.g.
original bill, e.g. the meaning of as a bill is “passenger” in amended on its Cheeseman v
DPP10 way through Parliament.
There are certain general principles of interpretation which have been applied by Courts from
time to time. These rules are divided into two parts:
a) Primary Rules
9
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS 1981
10
Cheeseman v DPP 1990
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b) Secondary Rules
These rules each take different approaches to interpretation of a statute. Some judges prefer one
rule, while other judges prefer another. Some judges also feel that their role is to fill the gaps and
ambiguities in the law whilst others think that it should be left to Parliament as the supreme law-
maker. As the rules can result in very different decisions
11
https://olatunde-lawnotes.blogspot.com/2008/03/essay-statutory-interpretation.html
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In the case of Pritipal Singh v. Union of India12, it was held that there is a presumption that
the words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and
inexactly.
R v Judge of the City of London Court 13, Lord Esher: “If the words of the Act are clear then
you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing
to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity.”
In Fisher v Bell14, the defendant, a shopkeeper, displayed in his window a flick knife with a
price ticket, and was prosecuted for “offering for sale” an offensive weapon contrary to the
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The High Court said the phrase “offer for sale”
was to be taken literally, in accordance with its meaning in contract law, and that the
shopkeeper’s display of the weapon was no more than an invitation to treat. It was presumed
that Parliamentary draftsmen know technical legal language thus common law expression
was not altered.
In Whitelely v Chappel15, the statute made it an offence for anyone during election to
impersonate another person who was entitled to vote. The defendant impersonated a dead
person and the court found him not guilty since it used the narrow literal rule because a dead
person was not entitled to vote.
Criticism of this rule: Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the
erroneous assumption that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading
justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. This is the
oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because judges may not
legislate.
2. GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION
The golden rule is an extension of the literal rule and has both a narrow and broad application
and is used where the literal rule creates an absurdity. Narrow golden rule says if [words] are
capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond
this you cannot go. Broad golden rule says where words have a clear meaning, but following
12
AIR 1982 SC 1413, P. 1419
13
[1892] 1 QB 273
14
1960] 3 All ER 731
15
(1868) 1 WLR 565
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them would lead to a repugnant situation. The court will modify the words of the statute to
avoid this horrible situation.
Sarkar v Pradeep Kumar Sarkar16, the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are
possible of the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be preferred.
In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.17, The Supreme Court held that the cardinal
rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is by giving to the words
their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to
absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same.
R v Allen18 is an example of the narrow approach of the golden rule. The wording of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 had to be given a different interpretation for the crime
of bigamy, because the way it was written meant that the crime could never be committed.
The court used the golden rule and held that ‘marry’ meant ‘to go through a marriage
ceremony’.
Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum19, supplied wide meaning to the term ‘within the
iddat period’ appearing in S.3(a) of Protection of Rights Divorce Act, 1986, as the
maintenance not only limited to iddat period but also beyond that. As the purpose of the act
to address the plight of the divorced Muslim women
Criticism of this rule: The United Kingdom Law Commissions20 commented in their report
that “The rule provided no clear means to test the existence of the characteristics of
absurdity, inconsistency or inconvenience, or to measure their quality or extent.”
It suffers from the same difficulties as the literal approach vis a lack of wider contextual
understandings of “meanings.” The idea of “absurdity” covers only a very few cases. Most
cases involve situations where difficult choices have to be made between several fairly
plausible arguments, not situations where the words lead to obvious absurdities.
3. MISCHIEF RULE OF INTERPRETATION
16
AIR 1997 Cal 197
17
AIR 1955 SC 376
18
(1872) LR 1 CCR 367
19
(1985) 2 SCC 556
20
“The Interpretation of Statutes”, (Law Com No 21) (Scot Law Com No 11), Report No 21, paragraph 80 (1969).
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The mischief rule allows judges slightly more discretion. It looks at the gap or the mischief
the statute was intended to cover.21 The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that
attempts to determine the legislator’s intention.
In Heydon’s Case22, where it was stated that there were four points to be taken into
consideration when interpreting a statute:
a) What was the common law before the making of the act?
b) What was the “mischief and defect” for which the common law did not provide?
c) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?
d) What is the true reason for the remedy?
Elliot v Grey23, the defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its
battery removed. He was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using
an uninsured vehicle on the road. The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the
road as clearly it was not drivable. It was held: The court applied the mischief rule and held
that the car was being used on the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance
would be required in the event of an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were
compensated when injured due to the hazards created by others.
In the case of Corkery v Carpenter24, the Licensing Act 1872 stipulated that it was an offence
to be drunk in charge of a carriage. Whilst no direct reference was made to bicycles, the court
ruled that Corkery was guilty as the term “carriage” could also be applied to a bicycle.
4. Purposive Approach
This approach has emerged in more recent times. Here the court is not just looking to see
what the gap was in the old law, it is making a decision as to what they felt Parliament meant
to achieve while framing a new statute. It is the modern version of mischief rule.
Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation 25, in this case court
said “we sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of ministers and carry it out, and
21
https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/rules-of-statutory-interpretation-constitutional-law-
essay.php
22
[1584] 3 CO REP 7
23
[1960] 1 QB 367
24
[1951] 1 KB 102
25
[1950] 2 All ER 1226
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we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it
up to destructive analysis.”
This attitude was criticized on appeal by the House of Lords. Lord Simmons called this
approach ‘a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of
interpretation’. He went on to say that ‘if a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending
Act’.
There are certain rules which come under secondary rules of interpretation. These rules are slso
known as subordinate rules of statutory interpretation. These rules are as follows:
1. Noscitur a sociis: “Noscere” means to “know” and “sociis” means “association”. Thus,
Noscitur a Sociis means knowing from association. Thus, under the doctrine of "noscitur a
sociis" the questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its
association with other words within the context of the phrase. When a word is ambiguous, its
meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.
According to Maxwell, "this rule means that when two or more words susceptible to
analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate
sense.”
Prior v Sherwood26, the court held that a prohibition against betting in any “house, office
room or place” did not extend to public lane.
2. Ejusdem generis: When a list of two or more specific descriptors are followed by more
general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted
to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them e.g. vehicles in "cars, motor
bikes, motor powered vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense and therefore cannot
be interpreted as including air planes. The ejusdem generis, or ‘of the same genus’ rule, is
similar though narrower than the more general rule of noscitur a sociis. It operates where a
broad or open-ended term appears following a series of more restrictive terms in the text of a
statute. Where the terms listed are similar enough to constitute a class or genus, the courts
26
[1906] HCA 29
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will presume, in interpreting the general words that follow, that they are intended to apply
only to things of the same genus as the particular items listed.
In UP State Electricity Board vs Hari Shankar27, Supreme Court held that the following
conditions must exist for the application of this rule:
a) The statue contains an enumeration of specific words
b) 2. The subject of the enumeration constitute a class or a category,
c) The class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration,
d) A general term is present at the end of the enumeration,
e) There is no indication of a different legislative intent
3. Utres magis valeat quam pereat: This means that the courts tries to ensure the validity of a
statute rather than making it futile or redundant.
In Manchester Ship Company v Manchester Race Course Company28, it was observed that
unless the words in the statute were absolutely senseless, the judge must find some meaning
to the words and should not simply declare it to be void for uncertainty.
4. Reddendo Singula Singulis: When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the
phrase refers only to the last word, e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital.
In the case of Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs K Rangappa Baliga29, in the construction of the
Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads, "Provided that no bill or amendment
for the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or moved in the legislature of a state
without the previous sanction of the President". It was held that the word introduced applies
to bill and moved applies to amendment.
5. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: This rule means “Mention of one or more things of
a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all other members of the class.”
Rex v Secretary of State for the Home Department 30, Section 2 (3) of Immigration Act stated
the word ‘parent’ means the mother of an illegitimate child, by implication excluded the
father.
27
AIR 1979 SC
28
[2019] UKSC 46
29
1969 AIR 504
30
[1987] 1 All ER 940 at 955--956
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CONCLUSION
Every nation has its own judicial system, the purpose of which to grant justice to all. The court
aims to interpret the law in such a manner that every citizen is ensured justice to all. To ensure
justice to all the concept of canons of interpretation was expounded. These are the rules which
are evolved for determining the real intention of the legislature.
It is not necessary that the words used in a statute are always clear, explicit and unambiguous and
thus, in such cases it is very essential for courts to determine a clear and explicit meaning of the
words or phrases used by the legislature and at the same time remove all the doubts if any.
Hence, all the rules mentioned in the article are important for providing justice.
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REFERENCES
1. https://www.legalbites.in/law-notes-interpretation-meaning-and-nature-of-interpretation/
2. https://olatunde-lawnotes.blogspot.com/2008/03/essay-statutory-interpretation.html
3. https://www.slideshare.net/ronithimatlal/slides-approachestostatutoryinterpretation
4. https://blog.ipleaders.in/rules-of-statutory-interpretation/
5. https://blog.ipleaders.in/rules-interpretation-statutes/
6. https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/statutory-interpretation/
7. https://www.slideshare.net/sundarsasane/rules-of-statutory-interpretation
8. https://alison.com/course/1244/resource/file/resource_39-14896844291768952309.pdf
9. https://www.slideshare.net/ronithimatlal/slides-approachestostatutoryinterpretation
10. https://www.slideshare.net/LegalEyres/statutory-interpretation
11. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1545/Enabling-Statute:-Rules-of-
Interpretation.html
12. www.indiankanoon.org
13. https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/statutory-
interpretation.php
14. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/golden-rule-interpretation/
15. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/mischief-rule-statutory-interpretation/
16. https://www.open.edu/openlearn/ocw/mod/oucontent/view.php?id=68342§ion=3.5
17. https://www.academia.edu/33812893/Secondary_Rules_of_Interpretation
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