Waskito 2020 IOP Conf. Ser. Earth Environ. Sci. 557 012069

IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science
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Maritime Safety International Conference IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Earth and Environmental Science 557 (2020) 012069 doi:10.1088/1755-1315/557/1/012069
Risk Assessment of Subsea pipeline using standard DNVGL-

RP-F107
R Waskito1, K B Artana1,2, E Pratiwi1,2

1
Department of Marine Engineering, Faculty of Marine Technology, Institut
Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember, Surabaya, Indonesia
2
Center of Excellence in Maritime Safety and Marine Installation (PUI KEKAL),
Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember, Surabaya, Indonesia
Email: [email protected]
Abstract. To avoid fuel scarcity, exploitation activities must be carried out to meet the needs
of oil in Indonesia. In the process of oil exploitation, facilities are needed to carry out a fluid
transfer system from one place to another. One way to carry out the process of fluid transfer at
an offshore location is the use of an underwater piping system. However, in the transfer of
fluid from one place to another there is a danger that can cause failures in the pipeline system.
For example, if an underwater gas pipeline is in the shipping lanes, international and national
vessels, there is a possibility of danger that could occur due to a third party. In making this
thesis the risk assessment is assessed using the DNVGL-RP-F107 standard. Based on the
DNVGL-RP-F107 standard, hazards that may occur in underwater gas pipelines are hazards
caused by falling or dropped anchors, anchored dragged pipes and destroyed ship (ship
sinking). In risk assessment using the DNVGL-RP-F107 standard, the consequence analysis
conducted refers to the damage to the subsea pipeline. After getting the analysis results from
the index values that have been made, proceed with making a risk representation using the Risk
Matrix. Pipelines that have been evaluated and representations in the risk matrix are in the
ALARP zone (as low as reasonably practical) and in acceptable zone.
1. Introduction
In order to avoid scarcity, exploration activities are conducted to look for new sources of oil because
demand in Indonesia is always increasing. However, the demand that will continue to rise is not
accompanied by production capacity and the availability of resources that should be higher than
needed. To carry out fuel production activities, a fluid transfer system is needed to move the fluid
from one place to another. The process of fluid transfer at offshore locations requires an underwater
pipeline system or subsea hose that is vulnerable to damage to the underwater gas pipeline. Pipeline is
the part that most often fails at an oil production unit. This is because the pipeline is the largest part of
the unit so the chances of failure are also large compared to other equipment. As for several things that
can cause leakage or damage to the underwater pipeline, namely due to corrosion, fractures or cracks
due to earthquake or landslides, third party damage, corrosion components, pipe design components,
components operational inaccuracies, as well as the characteristics of hazardous products and their
distribution factors.
Hazard Identification must be done systematically and must be able to cover all possible dangers
that might occur in the subsea pipeline. There are many things that are taken into consideration in
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classifying the hazard identification. As explained above, the danger that occurs in the offshore
pipeline is one of the bases in conducting Hazard Identification. One of them already has a Hazard
Identification standard for hazards that might endanger the submarine pipeline, the Standard DNVGL-
RP-F107.
DNVGL-RP-F107 standard presents a risk-based approach to assessing accidental external pipeline
protection. Recommendations are given for pipe damage capacity and alternative protection measures
and for assessment of the frequency of damage and its consequences. Alternative pipeline protection
measures are also presented. Where information is applicable, specific values or calculation
procedures are recommended. If the information is not available, then a qualitative approach is
provided in the Standard.
In this thesis, Company x’s underwater gas pipeline data is used. (Jabung Block, Jambi), data of
ships in the vicinity of the Berhala Strait and underwater pipeline to be held. Company x’s has 3 pipes
that deliver fluid from onshore to offshore. The data collection is done by observation and by
conducting a literature study.
From the occurrence of failures in the operation of the pipeline as well as the advantages and
disadvantages in the use of oil and gas pipelines, the risk assessment must be carried out to determine
the level of danger, and appropriate mitigation action measures to prevent any losses caused.
2. Methods
Risk assessment carried out includes the calculation of the frequency and consequences of hazards that
might occur. For each potential hazard analyzed, the potential impact on the pipeline is evaluated
using quantitative analysis which refers to the DNVGL-RP-F107 [3]. In this case study the problem
limitation given is the risk that occurs in the offshore pipeline due to external activities or third parties.
Frequency is used to describe the possibility per unit time of the event that occurred. Frequency
assessment aims to get the possibility that the ship will conduct a hazardous event at a certain time.
Before calculating these frequencies, a risk scenario must be designed. The speed of the ship, the
opportunity for the ship to be in a critical area, the time it takes for the ship to pass through the critical
area and the opportunity for the ship to drop anchor or the chance of the ship sinking on the pipe is
used as a reference in calculating the frequency at each hazard that may arise. Then the frequency
calculation results are grouped based on the frequency ranking of DNV-RP-F107 which is used as a
reference.
Table 1. Frequency rank DNVGL-RP-F107

Ranking Description Annual Frequency
1 Likelihood of event considered negligible. < 10-5
2 Event rarely expected to occur. 10 -4 > 10-5
Unlikely for a single pipeline, but may happen
3 once a year given a large number 10 -3 > 10-4
of pipelines.
Event individually may be expected to occur
4 during the lifetime of the pipeline. (Typically,
10 -2 > 10-3
a 100year storm)
Event Individually may be expected to occur
5
more than once during lifetime > 10-2
After analysing the frequency to get the rank frequency to be plotted on the risk matrix, is to
determine what consequences might occur to get the magnitude of the Coefficient Rank. DNVGL-RP-
F107 classifies the potential consequences that occur in the offshore pipeline, namely classification
2
based on safety, economic loss, and environment impacts. Consequence ranking is used to estimate the
consequences of accidents on underwater pipelines. The DNVGL-RP-F107 standard uses the ranking
of consequences that can be seen in Table 2 as follows:
Table 2. Consequence rank DNVGL-RP-F107

Conditional Probability
Dent / Diameter (%) Damage description
D1 D2 D3 R0 R1 R2
<5 Minor damage 1.0 0 0 1.0 0 0
Major damage
5-10 Leakage anticipated 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1 0
Major damage.
10-15 Leakage and rupture 0 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.2 0.05
anticipate.
Major damage.
15-20 Leakage and rupture 0 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.25
anticipated.
> 20 Rupture. 0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.7
Based on the frequency ranking and the ranking of consequences that have been made before then
the risk matrix can be made from the underwater pipeline risk assessment. In the DNVGL-RP-F107
standard, the risk matrix used is 5 x 5. In the DNVGL-RP-F107 standard’s matrix risk there is an area
called ALARP (As low as Reasonably practicable). This DNVGL-RP-F107 risk matrix can be seen in
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Risk matrix standard DNVGL-RP-F107, 2017
After conducting a risk and risk analysis within the risk matrix in the ALARP zone, it is necessary
to reduce the risk by conducting an evaluation. In this thesis will analyse potential hazards that may
occur, such as sinking vessels.
3. Calculation and Results

In this final project, company X’s underwater gas pipeline data is used (Jabung Block, Jambi).
Company X’s 3 underwater pipes that have different fluid transfer functions. These pipes include the
3
following Condensate Pipe (NPS 10 X 8.74mm WT (API 5L-X52)), Propane Pipe (NPS 8 X 8.18mm
WT (API 5L-X52)), and Butane Pipe (NPS 6 X 7.11mm WT (API 5L-X52)). The underwater gas
pipeline which has a Condensate Fluid transfer function has the following specifications:
Table 3. Condensate pipe

CONDENSATE PIPE DATA
Pipe Description: NPS 10
Pipe Type: 5L-X52
Pipe Outside Diameter: 10 Inch
Pipe Inside Diameter: 245.26 mm
Wall Thickness: 8.74 mm
SYMS: 358520000 N/m2
Pipe Concreate Coating: Fusion Bonded Epoxy
Concreate Coating Thickness: 25 mm
Table 4: Propane pipe

PROPANE PIPE DATA
Pipe Type: 5L-X52
SYMS: 358520000 N/m2
Table 5: Condensate pipe

BUTANE PIPE DATA
Pipe Type: 5L-X52
SYMS: 358520000 N/m2
Based on the location of the pipeline that stretches from Jambi to the FPSO owned by company x
data on vessel activity passing around the submarine gas area can be obtained to calculate the
frequency and consequences of DNVGL-RP-F107. Data on the number of ships passing around the
underwater pipeline is needed to calculate the frequency and consequences explained in DNV-RP-
F107. The vessel data to be used is the number of ships passing through the pipe, the ship's speed, the
ship's length, the ship's width, and the anchor weight. The data is obtained by observing and
conducting related literature studies (Table 6).
Table 6. Ship data

Ship Frequency Range Length Beam Anchor Draft
No Ship Type
Description /Year DWT (m) (m) Mass (Ton) (m)
TANKER (For Size Medium
1 48 50000 205 29 8.7 16
Lifting Oil) Range (MR)
TANKER (For Size Aframax
2 48 80000 245 34 12.9 20
Lifting Oil) (LR)
TANKER (For
3 Size VLGC 24 55000 226 37 8.7 12
Lifting LPG)
4
4 TUGBOAT Tanker Tug 360 1000 56 14 1 6

BULK CARRIER
5 Size Ultramax 48 62000 200 32 4.6 6.6
(For Lifting Coal)
6 PASSANGER SHIP Ferries 60 15000 146 24 2.5 5.6
7 CONTAINER 600 TEus 36 8250 115 21 1.9 5.3
8 FISHING VESSEL - 480 < 50 25 6 0.48 3
The frequency calculation is obtained from the possibility of the ship passing around the subsea
pipeline and experiencing an emergency condition until it sinks around the critical sinking zone
(CSZ). Where CZS is the amount of twice the length of the ship with the diameter of the ship plus the
thickness of the
Table 7. Ship sinking frequency calculation
Ship Velocity
No Code Equation Description Unit
0.25 knot 0.5 knot 0.75 knot
1 A - Ship Length m 205 205 205
2 B - Ship Velocity m/s 0.1286111 0.257222 0.3858333
3 C - Diameter Pipa m 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524
4 D - Concrete Thickness m 0.025 0.025 0.025
2A + C +
5 E Critical Sinking Zone m 410.2024 410.2024 410.2024
2D
(A + E) /
6 F Ship time at CSZ s 4783.4316 2391.7177 1594.4772
B
7 G - Vessel Cross Pipe in year - 48 48 48
8 H FxG Total Ship time in CSZ s 229604.72 114802.45 76534.906
9 I - Cruise line width m 2000 2000 2000
10 J E/I Dropping Anchor in CSZ - 0.2051012 0.2051012 0.2051012
11 K - Time of year s 31536000 31536000 31536000
12 L H/K Ship at CSZ - 0.0072807 0.0036404 0.0024269
13 M Failed Engine Chances - 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002
14 N Impact vessel Chances - 50% 50% 50%
15 O Hull Damage after impact - 24% 24% 24%
16 P Sinking ship after hull impact - 9% 9% 9%
JxKxM
Total ship chances sink in
17 Q xNxOx - 3.225E-10 1.613E-10 1.075E-10
CSZ
P
18 - RANK - 1 1 1
Coating of the pipe. Then the ship crashed (collision), causing flooding on the hull of the ship. If
the ship is made of steel, the ship will sink and hit the pipe below. With the limitations of the data
held, several assumptions were taken to provide a limitation on the frequency assessment. Speed 0.25
knots, 0.5 knots and 0.75 knots are assumed at the frequency assessment due to the ship's speed when
sinking.
In general, in conducting frequency assessments, annual frequency calculations are performed.
Where the annual frequency calculation is done with the following formula:
(1)
= Annual frequency of ships sinking and hitting pipes.
5
= The chance of the ship is in the CSZ area.

= Opportunity of Ship in an emergency situation.
= Opportunity for collision ship when the ship fails engine.
= Chance of damage to ship hull during collision.
= The chance of the ship sinking after damage to the hull.
= Chance of ship sinking in CSZ area.
value is the chance of sinking the ship in the CSZ area. Where the P6 value is obtained by
calculating the CSZ width. Which CSZ value is obtained from the formula as follows:
(2)
CSZ = Critical Sinking Zone

D = Pipe Diameter
T = Concrete Thickness
W = Max Anchor Width
Figure 2. ETA ship sinking frequency
6
In the assessment of the frequency of sinking ships (Ship Sinking), an analysis was also carried out
on 8 different groups of ships and 3 different pipes. In the following table is an example of the
assessment of the frequency of a sinking ship (Ship Sinking) on one of the types of ships, namely
Tanker A to the condensate pipe (NPS10).
As can be seen in the table above, the assessment of ship sinking frequencies on Condensate pipes
(NPS10) frequency per year. The danger of sinking vessels (Ship Sinking) at subsea pipeline facilities
is still below 10- 5 for all speed scenarios that are there (0.25 knots, 0.5 knots, and 0.75 knots). Based
on the calculation results in this table, the frequency of the Tanker A ship sinking on the NPS10
condensate pipe can be concluded to be ranked 1 which refers to the frequency ranking of DNVGL-
RP-F107.
In this final project the results of frequency calculation will be presented using event tree analysis
(ETA). Event tree analysis can be seen above.
By using the same frequency assessment of the danger of sinking ships (Ship Sinking), then the
assessment of the frequency of sinking vessel can be done on 7 other types of ships. The following can
be seen in the table below summarizes the frequency assessment of sinking vessels (Ship Sinking) on
3 different pipes and 8 types of vessels.
Table 8. Frequency of ship sinking for condensate pipe 10”

Frequency of ship sinking for condensate pipe 10”
Frequency Rank
Type of Vessel
0.25 0,5 0,75
Tanker A 3,22683E-10/ Rank 1 1,61341E-10/ Rank 1 1,07561E-10/ Rank 1
Tanker B 4,608E-10/ Rank 1 2,304E-10Rank 1 1,536E-10/Rank 1
Tanker C 1,96067E-10/ Rank 1 9,80336E-11/Rank 1 6,53557E-11Rank 1
Tugboat 4,84173E-11/Rank 1 2,42087E-11/Rank 1 1,61391E-11/Rank 1
Bulk Carrier 3,07143E-10/ Rank 1 1,53572E-10/Rank 1 1,02381E-10/Rank 1
Passenger Vessel 2,04692E-10/ Rank 1 1,02346E-10/Rank 1 6,82306E-11/Rank 1
Container 7,62332E-11/ Rank 1 3,81166E-11/Rank 1 2,54111E-11/Rank 1
Fishing Vessel 4,84173E-11/ Rank 1 2,42087E-11/Rank 1 1,61391E-11/Rank 1

Frequency Rank
Type of Vessel
0.25 0,5 0,75
Tanker B 4,6072E-10/ Rank 1 2,3036E-10/Rank 1 1,53573E-10/Rank 1
Tanker C 1,9603E-10/ Rank 1 9,80153E-11/Rank 1 6,53435E-11/Rank 1
7

Frequency Rank
Type of Vessel
0.25 0,5 0,75
Tanker B 4,60641E-10/ Rank 1 2,30321E-10/Rank 1 1,53547E-10/Rank 1
Tanker C 1,95994E-10/ Rank 1 9,79969E-11/Rank 1 6,53312E-11/Rank 1
The value of the consequence of a dropped anchor using the DNVGL-RP-F107 standard at an
underwater pipeline facility needs to be carried out several calculations, as follows:
Figure 3. Ship sinking
Ek = Kinetic energy which can be absorbed by the protective

EE = Effective energy anchor when hitting underwater pipe
E = The amount of energy the pipe receives from falling anchor.
Table 11. Consequences calculation
8
By using the same consequence assessment of the danger of sinking ships (Ship Sinking), then the
assessment of the consequence of sinking vessel can be done on 7 other types of ships. The following
can be seen in the table below summarizes the frequency assessment of sinking vessels (Ship Sinking)
on 3 different pipes and 8 types of vessels.
Table 12. Consequence ship sinking for condensate pipe 6”,8”,10”

Type of Vessel Effective Energy Frequency Rank
Tanker A 5436200.48 5
9
Tanker B 16701215.98 5
Tanker C 6047589.02 5
Tugboat 6976.98 5
Bulk Carrier 1060145.19 5
Passenger Vessel 221050.31 5
Container 89169.54 5
Fishing Vessel -2628.04 5
This damage categories value is calculated based on the ranking of consequence in DNVGL-RP-
F107 standard. On Tanker A and Pipa Condensate (NPS10), the damage categories consequence
values are obtained as in the table below:
Table 12. Damage categories

Level Dent/Diameter Range of Impact Energy
Level 1 < 5% kJ < 1.40
Level 2 5% - 10% kJ 1.40 - 3.96
Level 3 10% - 15% kJ 3.96 - 7.28
Level 4 15% - 20% kJ 7.28 - 11.21
Level 5 > 20% kJ 11.21 >
Based on the parameter values that have been obtained, it can be concluded that the assessment of
the consequences due to the drop anchor of the Tanker A type vessel in the Condensate pipe (NPS10),
is ranked 5th because the energy received is more than 11.21 kJ. This is because the energy value that
can be absorbed by concrete coating is 13100 kJ, while the impact energy value is 5449300 kJ.
After calculating and ranking frequency and consequences due to Dropped Anchor and Ship
Sinking using the DNVGLRP-F107 standard, the next step is to incorporate the ranking of frequencies
and consequences into the risk matrix 5 x 5. After entering the frequency and consequence ranking
into the risk matrix, it can be seen risk of damage to the underwater pipeline due to possible hazards.
If the risk is in the acceptable zone, then mitigation efforts are not necessary but periodic inspection
efforts are required. If the risk is in the ALARP zone, mitigation efforts may be undertaken but not
mandatory. If the risk is in the not acceptable zone then mitigation efforts are needed to reduce the
frequency and consequence value so that after mitigation is carried out, the risk can be in the
acceptable zone.
Consequence Rank
1 2 3 4 5
5
Frequency Rank
4
3
2
1 XXX
< 5% 5%-10% 10%-15% 15%-20% > 20%

Figure 4. Risk matrix
10
In the risk matrix due to the Dropped Anchor underwater pipeline readings on the risk matrix found
that the type of Tanker A and Condensate pipe (NPS10) are at the risk level of the ALARP category.
4. Conclusion
Based on the frequency and consequence calculation, company x’s underwater pipe can be concluded
the risk level on risk matrix for all the types of ships are in the ALARP condition. Under these
conditions it can be concluded that risk mitigation is not necessary, due to conditions ALARP risk is
still acceptable, so mitigation is not needed. However, the frequency level must be maintained and
ensured to remain in that condition by conducting periodic inspections of medium underwater gas
pipelines reviewed.
References
[1] DNVGL-RP-F107. (2017). Risk Assessment of Pipeline Protection (May 2017 ed.).
[2] Artana, K. B. (2013). Penilaian Risiko Jalur Pipa Gas Dengan Menggunakan DNV-RPF- 107,
Studi Kasus: Husky-CNOOC Madura Ltd., Pasuruan - Jawa Timur. Surabaya
[3] Artana, K. B. (2009, Januari). Penilaian Resiko Pipa Gas Bawah Laut Ujung Pangah-
Gresik Dengan Standar DNV-RP-107. Jurnal Teknik Mesin.
[4] Nuraini, I. P. (2016). Analisis Risiko Pipa Bawah Laut Akibat Tarikan Jangkar Dengan Metode
Monte Carlo : Studi Kasus Jaringan Pipa Bawah Laut Tunu Field, Blok Mahakam,
Kalimantan Timur.
[5] Wicaksono, N. M. (2019). Penilaian Risiko Pipa Gas Bawah Laut Menggunakan Metode Kent
Muhlbauer dan Standar DNVGL-RP-F107
[6] Widhiastuti, N. L. (2019). Penilaian Risiko Instalasi Pipa Gas Bawah Laut Kangean
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PAPER • OPEN ACCESS You may also like

- Fatigue Life Analysis on The Local

This content was downloaded from IP address 165.225.116.86 on 15/09/2023 at 02:09

Risk Assessment of Subsea pipeline using standard DNVGL-

R Waskito1, K B Artana1,2, E Pratiwi1,2

Table 1. Frequency rank DNVGL-RP-F107

Table 2. Consequence rank DNVGL-RP-F107

Figure 1. Risk matrix standard DNVGL-RP-F107, 2017

3. Calculation and Results

Table 3. Condensate pipe

Table 4: Propane pipe

Table 5: Condensate pipe

Table 6. Ship data

4 TUGBOAT Tanker Tug 360 1000 56 14 1 6

= Annual frequency of ships sinking and hitting pipes.

= The chance of the ship is in the CSZ area.

CSZ = Critical Sinking Zone

Figure 2. ETA ship sinking frequency

Table 8. Frequency of ship sinking for condensate pipe 10”

Table 9. Frequency of ship sinking for condensate pipe 8”

Table 10. Frequency of ship sinking for condensate pipe 6”

Figure 3. Ship sinking

Ek = Kinetic energy which can be absorbed by the protective

Table 11. Consequences calculation

Table 12. Consequence ship sinking for condensate pipe 6”,8”,10”

Table 12. Damage categories

< 5% 5%-10% 10%-15% 15%-20% > 20%

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