ART Eemeren 2015

Argumentation (2016) 30:1–23
DOI 10.1007/s10503-015-9377-z
Identifying Argumentative Patterns: A Vital Step

in the Development of Pragma-Dialectics
Frans H. van Eemeren1,2,3
Published online: 23 September 2015

The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue on argumen-

tative patterns in discourse, more in particular on argumentative patterns with
pragmatic argumentation as a main argument that are prototypical of argumentative
discourse in certain communicative activity types in the political, the legal, the
medical, and the academic domain. It situates the studies of argumentative patterns
reported in these papers in the pragma-dialectical research program. In order to be
able to do so, it is first explained in which consecutive stages the pragma-dialectical
theorizing has developed, what the study of argumentative patterns involves, and
why the identification of argumentative patterns represents a vital stage in the
development of pragma-dialectics. The description of the theoretical innovations
that are introduced and the exposition of their relationship with the standard and
extended pragma-dialectical theory create a conceptual and terminological frame-
work for understanding the background and the rationale of the current research
projects.
Keywords Argumentative characterization Argumentative pattern Extended

pragma-dialectics Institutional precondition Pragmatic argumentation
Prototypical argumentative pattern Standard pragma-dialectics Stereotypical
argumentative pattern Strategic manoeuvring
& Frans H. van Eemeren

[email protected]
1
University of Amsterdam, Groenburgwal 53, 1011 HS Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2
Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
3
ILIAS, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
2 F. H. van Eemeren
1 Introduction
When I started, together with Grootendorst, developing the pragma-dialectical

theory of argumentation in the 1970s, our primary interest was to develop adequate
tools for enhancing the quality of the ways in which people justify their views and
analyse and critically review the justifications of views they encounter. A
methodical reflection on the conduct of argumentative discourse seemed therefore
crucial to us. Our master plan for developing our theoretical approach involved
progressing step by step from designing an abstract model of normatively ideal
argumentative discourse to dealing with the intricacies of the broad variety of
argumentative practices constituting argumentative reality. Starting from the basics,
we planned to flesh out the pragma-dialectical theory in such a way that gradually
more and more properties of actual argumentative discourse would be taken into
account.
Characteristically, in the pragma-dialectical approach, argumentation is studied
both from a communicative perspective, inspired by pragmatic insights from
ordinary language philosophy, speech act theory and discourse analysis, and from a
critical perspective, inspired by dialectical insights from critical rationalism and
dialogue logic (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004). By carrying out a
research program integrating descriptive and normative insights, in the pragma-
dialectical theory a commitment to empirically adequate description is methodically
linked with a critical stance towards argumentative practices (van Eemeren 1987).
As a consequence, the pragma-dialectical approach of argumentation differs
considerably not only from formal and informal logical approaches concentrating
primarily on the normative treatment of reasoning problems, but also from the
primarily descriptive and explanatory approaches of argumentative discourse
favoured in communication studies, rhetoric and linguistics.1
This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue of Argumentation on
prototypical argumentative patterns in argumentative discourse. It explains that the
identification of argumentative patterns represents a vital stage in the development
of the theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics and situates the studies of
argumentative patterns reported in the various papers in the pragma-dialectical
research program. I will describe how, starting from an ideal model for conducting a
critical discussion, the theorizing has been systematically brought closer to the
complexities of situated argumentative discourse in actual argumentative practices.
Section 2 is devoted to the ‘‘standard’’ pragma-dialectical theory, consisting of the
model and the rules for critical discussion, on which all further developments are
based. In Sect. 3, analytical and empirical research aimed at consolidating the
standard theory is discussed. Section 4 throws light on the ‘‘extended’’ pragma-
dialectical theory based on the introduction of the notion of strategic maneuvering,
which adds a rhetorical dimension to the theory. Section 5 introduces the
experimental research of effectiveness-through-reasonableness connected with the
1
The meta-theoretical starting points of pragma-dialectics, which serve as its methodological premises,
can in fact be seen as constructive responses to what we considered to be shortcomings of other
approaches (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, pp. 4–18; van Eemeren et al. 2014, pp. 523–527).
123
Identifying Argumentative Patterns: A Vital Step in the… 3
extended pragma-dialectical theory. Section 6 makes clear how including strategic

maneuvering in the treatment of argumentative discourse has led to taking account
of the institutionally conventionalized contexts in which the discourse takes place.
Section 7 is devoted to the institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering
associated with such conventionalized contexts. Section 8 discusses the prototypical
argumentative patterns resulting from taking the institutional preconditions into
account in conducting argumentative discourse in specific communicative activity
types. Section 9 focuses on the topic of this special issue, argumentative patterns
with pragmatic argumentation as main argument. Section 10, finally, introduces the
various contributions to this issue concentrating on prototypical argumentative
patterns containing argumentation in the political, the legal, the medical and the
academic domain.
2 The Pragma-Dialectical Standard Theory
In order to clarify what is involved in viewing argumentative discourse as aimed at

resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, we developed an ideal model of a
critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984; van Eemeren et al. 2014,
pp. 527–533). In a critical discussion the parties attempt to reach agreement about
the acceptability of the standpoint at issue by finding out whether or not this
standpoint is tenable against critical doubt and other criticism in view of certain
mutually accepted starting points.2 In the model of a critical discussion we specified
the four stages that are to be distinguished in the resolution process and the speech
acts constituting the argumentative moves instrumental in each of these stages.
In the pragma-dialectical theory we have depicted the standards of reasonable-
ness applying to argumentative discourse as rules for critical discussion (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 135–157). Together, the rules for critical
discussion constitute a dialectical procedure for the performance of speech acts. To
resolve a difference of opinion on the merits, the speech acts performed by the
protagonist and the antagonist of the standpoint at issue must comply in each stage
with all the rules. Any violation of any of the rules by any of the parties at any stage
of the discussion frustrates or hinders the process of resolving a difference of
opinion on the merits. Every argumentative move in which this happens we
therefore consider a ‘‘fallacy’’.3
The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion serves heuristic and
analytic functions in dealing with interpretation problems that may arise in
analysing argumentative discourse. It indicates what to look for in reconstructing
argumentative discourse from a resolution-minded perspective and in what way the
2
A critical discussion reflects the Socratic dialectical ideal of testing any form of conviction rationally,
not only descriptive statements but also value judgments and practical standpoints about actions.
3
The instrumentality of the rules for critical discussion in distinguishing counterproductive moves
demonstrates their ‘‘problem-validity’’ as a code of conduct (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1994). In
order to serve in practice as tools for resolving differences of opinion on the merits, the rules also need to
be ‘‘conventionally valid’’. van Eemeren et al. (2009) have shown that these standards of reasonableness
are to a large extent intersubjectively accepted and can therefore lay claim to conventional validity.
123
4 F. H. van Eemeren
discourse can be most appropriately analysed from this perspective. The model also
serves a critical function by providing, through the rules for critical discussion, a
coherent set of norms for determining in which respects an argumentative move
deviates from the course that is conducive to resolving a difference of opinion on
the merits. Due to its heuristic, analytic and critical functions, the pragma-dialectical
model of a critical discussion constitutes an adequate basis for developing practical
guidelines for the conduct, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.
3 Consolidation of the Standard Theory
More often than not, in argumentative discourse certain indispensable components

of the resolution process are left unexpressed because they are considered clear or
self-evident—and sometimes for less honorable reasons. Constitutive parts of the
difference of opinion, the procedural and material starting points, the relations
between different arguments put forward in defense of a standpoint, and the way in
which individual arguments are supposed to support the standpoint at issue may not
have been explicitly articulated. In particular in argumentative discourse that is a
monologue some crucial ingredients of the resolution process remain concealed. In
all these cases, the missing elements need to be recovered through a reconstructive
analysis.
The model of a critical discussion is a heuristic and analytic tool in reconstructing
argumentative discourse by serving as a ‘‘template’’ that constitutes a point of
reference and ensures that the discourse can be reconstructed in terms of
argumentative moves relevant to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits.
Based on the pragma-dialectical standard theory, in the reconstruction process
various kinds of ‘‘reconstruction transformations’’ can be carried out (van Eemeren
1986). The reconstruction is to result in an ‘‘analytic overview’’ that highlights
those, and only those, elements in the discourse that are pertinent to a well-balanced
critical evaluation.
In pragma-dialectics the required analytical tools needed to be developed to
enable analysts to achieve an adequate analytic overview. Among the tools
developed are a method for making unexpressed premises explicit and typologies of
argument schemes and argumentation structures that can be used to identify the
relationships between argumentative moves (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992).
Fundamental pragma-dialectical instruments for exploiting these tools are the so-
called rules of communication (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 49–52).
The rules of communication are based on an integration of an amended version of
Searle’s felicity conditions for the performance of speech acts in communication
and an amended version of the Gricean maxims for the conduct of verbal
interaction. When a rule of communication seems to be violated while the ‘‘general
principles’’ of communication and interaction may be assumed not to be abandoned,
the analyst is to make an effort—just like ordinary listeners and readers do—to
reconstruct the implicit and indirect speech act involved in such a way that the
violation is remedied and the reconstructed speech act agrees with the rules of
communication (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 52–59). This analytic
123
policy also applies to the reconstruction of unexpressed premises (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992, pp. 60–72).
In order to investigate the connections of pragma-dialectics with argumentative
reality, empirical research is required. The ‘‘qualitative’’ empirical research we have
carried out has focused primarily on the way in which argumentative moves relevant
to a critical discussion manifest themselves in argumentative reality (van Eemeren
et al. 1993). In the Indicator Project, we systematically examined the clues for
reconstructing argumentative moves by means of qualitative empirical research (van
Eemeren et al. 2007). Our central goals were to identify the words and expressions
that arguers use to indicate the functions of the various moves they make, to classify
these moves in accordance with the argumentative functions they can have in the
various stages of the resolution process, and to determine under which conditions
they fulfil these functions. In examining systematically the ways in which
argumentative moves are realized in argumentative reality we took as our point
of departure the notion of ‘‘dialectical profiles’’, introduced by van Eemeren and
Houtlosser (2007). Dialectical profiles specify the kinds of moves that can be
instrumental in realizing the specific tasks of the discussants at a particular point in
the discussion and the ‘‘dialectical routes’’ in which these moves are included. The
dialectical routes are specifications of the series of ‘‘analytically relevant’’ moves
that can be made in the argumentative exchange that is portrayed.
To establish the necessary connection between the pragma-dialectical theory and
argumentative reality, since the mid-1980s we have also been engaged in
quantitative empirical research of an experimental nature. Initially this research
concentrated on the extent to which in argumentative reality the recognition of
argumentative moves is facilitated or hampered by factors in the presentation (e.g.,
van Eemeren et al. 1984, 1989, 2000). Next, the clues for the recognition of indirect
argumentation provided by the context were taken into account.
In order to determine the ‘‘intersubjective validity’’ of the pragma-dialectical
standards for critical discussion, in a comprehensive research project, Conceptions
of Reasonableness, we concentrated for more than 10 years on ordinary arguers’
assessments of argumentative moves. This resulted in the monograph Fallacies and
Judgments of Reasonableness (van Eemeren et al. 2009). The general aim of the
project was to check to what extent ordinary arguers judge the reasonableness of
argumentative moves according to norms that match the norms expressed in the
rules for critical discussion. The general conclusions that can be deduced from the
research results are that the pragma-dialectical discussion rules are intersubjectively
valid to quite a high degree and that there are no spectacular differences in degree of
intersubjective validity between the rules (van Eemeren et al. 2009, pp. 222–224).
Based on this indirect evidence, the rules may therefore lay claim to conventionally
validity, both individually and as a group.
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6 F. H. van Eemeren
4 The Extended Pragma-Dialectical Theory
After the standard theory had thus been consolidated, the pragma-dialectical
research has moved on from the ideal model of a critical discussion to the concrete
manifestations of the manifold practices of argumentative discourse. At the end of
the twentieth century, I set about, together with Houtlosser, to strengthen the
connection with argumentative reality in a fundamental way by including an
account of the ‘‘strategic design’’ of argumentative discourse in the theorizing (van
Eemeren 2010). The aim of including this vital but unexplored facet of
argumentative discourse in the theorizing was to extend the available analytic and
evaluative tools in such a way that more profound reconstructions and more realistic
assessments of argumentative discourse can be given, which can at the same time be
accounted for more thoroughly.4
Considering that for explaining the strategic design of argumentative discourse,
next to the dialectical dimension of reasonableness predominant in the standard
theory, the rhetorical dimension of effectiveness needed to be incorporated in the
theorizing, we started in the 1990s the Strategic Maneuvering Project (van Eemeren
and Houtlosser 2002). Our starting point was the ‘‘argumentative predicament’’ of
real-life argumentative discourse that, in every argumentative move that is made,
aiming for effectiveness and maintaining reasonableness always need to go together.
Because of the tension inherent in pursuing simultaneously these two objectives,
‘‘strategic maneuvering’’ is required to keep the balance. In case arguers in their
pursuit of effectiveness neglect their commitment to reasonableness and violate one
or more of the rules for critical discussion, their strategic maneuvering ‘‘derails’’
into fallaciousness (van Eemeren 2010, p. 198).
Adopting the theoretical notion of strategic maneuvering involves adding a
rhetorical dimension to the theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics. It is our
considered opinion that the dialectical and the rhetorical perspectives on argumen-
tative discourse are not incompatible, and can even be complementary (van
Eemeren 2013). In our view, studying the pursuit of rhetorical effectiveness in
argumentative discourse is in fact only worthwhile if it concerns effectiveness
reached within the boundaries of dialectical reasonableness, while setting dialectical
standards of reasonableness in argumentation theory is only of any practical
significance if it is combined with examining how rhetorical tools for achieving
effectiveness are brought to bear. This is why we think that the future of
argumentation theory lies in a constructive integration of the dialectical and the
rhetorical perspectives (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 87–92). In bringing about such an
integration in pragma-dialectics, the notion of strategic maneuvering is the primary
theoretical tool.5
4
Including an account of the strategic design in the theorizing is also helpful in developing more
sophisticated methods for improving the conduct of argumentative discourse, both orally and in writing.
5
Albeit in different ways, the rapprochement between dialectical and rhetorical approaches to
argumentation is also stimulated by communication scholars such as Wenzel (1990) and informal
logicians such as Tindale (2004).
123
5 Empirical Research of Effectiveness Through Reasonableness
The introduction of the theoretical notion of strategic maneuvering in the extended

pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has opened up new venues for empirical
research. In 2010, we have started a comprehensive research project, Hidden
Fallaciousness. In this project we carry out a series of experiments concerning the
relationship between the arguers’ aiming for rhetorical effectiveness and their
complying with dialectical standards of reasonableness. In these experiments we
they start from three theoretically-motivated hypotheses which are strongly
supported by pertinent empirical data (van Eemeren et al. 2012a).6
First, since they generally prove to know which contributions to a discussion are
to be considered reasonable and which contributions unreasonable, ordinary arguers
are to a certain extent aware of what their dialectical obligations involve. If they
were not aware of any such standards of reasonableness, there could not be a
rational relationship in their strategic maneuvering between aiming for effectiveness
and maintaining reasonableness. The fact that, in practice, they commit themselves
to standards of reasonableness equivalent with the pragma-dialectical standards (van
Eemeren et al. 2009, p. 206) makes it possible to substantiate more precisely what
reasonableness means to them.
Second, ordinary arguers assume that, in principle, the other party in the
discussion will be committed to the same kind of dialectical obligations as they are.
If they did not start from this assumption, it would be pointless for them to appeal to
the other party’s standards of reasonableness by putting forward argumentation to
justify their standpoints in order to resolve the difference of opinion between them
and the other party. The fact that they assume that there are shared standards of
reasonableness makes it possible to connect their standards of reasonableness with
their aiming for effectiveness vis-à-vis the other party.
Third, ordinary arguers prefer—and assume their interlocutors to prefer—that
contributions to the discussion that do not comply with supposedly shared standards
for critical discussion will be regarded as unreasonable and that those who offend
these standards can be held accountable for being unreasonable. If they did not
wish the prevailing standards to be put into effect, their argumentative efforts would
be pointless. The fact that arguers turn out to give a prescriptive meaning to
reasonableness when taking part in argumentative practices, and expect their
interlocutors to do the same, makes it possible to interpret the connection between
reasonableness and effectiveness in such a way that reasonableness may, in
principle, be expected to lead to effectiveness—even if in some cases reasonable-
ness would not be the only factor (and not necessarily the most influential factor)
that brings about effectiveness. Correlatively, if reasonableness is lacking or
deficient, effectiveness may be expected to suffer.
Against the background of these considerations, we concluded that it makes
sense for argumentation theorists to examine the relationship between
6
The three hypotheses are closely connected with the theoretical views on the relationship between
reasonable argumentation and effectiveness in the sense of convincingness expounded in van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (1984).
123
8 F. H. van Eemeren
reasonableness and effectiveness empirically. In this empirical research, we defined

‘‘effectiveness’’ of an argumentative move as realizing the ‘‘inherent’’ interactional
(perlocutionary) effect that is conventionally associated with performing the speech
act by which that argumentative move is made (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
1984, pp. 24–29). In order to serve its purposes optimally, pragma-dialectical
effectiveness research concentrates on the pursuit of intentional effects of strategic
maneuvering on the state of the addressee’s dialectical commitments that are, or
can be, externalized.7 It focuses in the first place on effects achieved by reasonable
means which are based on an adequate understanding of the functional rationale of
the argumentative moves and depend on rational considerations on the part of the
addressee.8 Steering the research in this way agrees with the pragma-dialectical
view of reasonableness as a necessary condition for convincingness—the rational
version of persuasiveness (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, p. 48).
In light of the finding that discussion moves that are from our theoretical
perspective fallacious are also judged unreasonable by ordinary language users, it
might seem remarkable that when such moves occur in argumentative discourse the
fallacies appear many times not to be noticed by the participants. A striking example
of a fallacy that is easily overlooked is the ‘‘abusive variant’’ of the argumentum ad
hominem. When rating the reasonableness of clear cases of this fallacy in an
experimental situation ordinary arguers overwhelmingly judge it to be a very
unreasonable discussion move (van Eemeren et al. 2009, p. 206). Nevertheless, in
real life argumentative discourse this fallacy remains in a great many cases
undetected. Such striking discrepancies need to be explained.
In ‘‘The disguised abusive ad hominem empirically investigated’’, we have
argued that in certain cases the abusive ad hominem can be analyzed as a mode of
strategic maneuvering in which this fallacy takes on a reasonable appearance
because it mimics legitimate critical reactions to authority argumentation (van
Eemeren et al. 2012b). When co-arguers present themselves wrongfully as experts
in a certain field, or claim to be trustworthy when in fact they are not, attacking them
personally about that is a perfectly legitimate and reasonable move. As a
consequence of the fact that there happen to be special cases like these, it may
not always be immediately clear whether a personal attack must be seen as
reasonable critique or as a fallacious ad hominem move. In two experiments we
have systematically tested the hypothesis that abusive ad hominem attacks are seen
as substantially less unreasonable by ordinary arguers when these attacks are
presented as if they are critical reactions to authority argumentation in which the
7
This type of effectiveness research constitutes the critically inspired pragma-dialectical complement to
the prevailing (non-dialectical) persuasion research. Our preference for the label ‘‘effectiveness research’’
rather than ‘‘persuasiveness research’’ is motivated by the fact that, unlike the term persuasiveness, the
term effectiveness is not exclusively connected with the argumentation stage but also pertains to
argumentative moves made in other discussion stages (e.g. proposing starting points, stating the outcome
of the discussion).
8
See the analysis of ‘‘interactional’’ (perlocutionary) effects in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984,
pp. 63–74) and van Eemeren (2010, pp. 36–39).
123
person attacked wrongly parades as an authority. In both experiments the hypothesis

was confirmed.9
6 Taking the Institutional Context of Argumentative Discourse

into Account
Because strategic maneuvering does not take part in an idealized critical discussion
but in the multi-varied communicative practices that have developed in argumen-
tative reality, in the extended pragma-dialectical theory due account needs to be
given of the macro-context of the institutional environment in which the
argumentative discourse takes place. We do so by relating our treatment of
strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse immediately to the ‘‘commu-
nicative activity types’’ that have established themselves in the various commu-
nicative domains in response to the institutional exigencies of the domain. These
communicative activity types have been conventionalized in accordance with the
needs of the institutional macro-context (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 129–162).10
It is through the use of the appropriate ‘‘genres’’ of communicative activity,11
varying from adjudication in the legal domain and deliberation in the political domain
to disputation in the academic domain, that communicative activity types are designed
to serve their rationale: the ‘‘institutional point’’ reflecting the exigency in response to
which the activity type has come into being. The institutional point of a parliamentary
debate, for instance, is reaching a well-considered decision on a policy proposal. To
complicate matters, in realizing the institutional point of ‘‘hybrid’’ communicative
activity types several genres of conventionalized communicative activity are activated
together. In a political interview, for instance, deliberation is intrinsically combined
with disseminating information to realize the institutional point of enlightening the
audience or readership (van Eemeren to be published).
The way in which communicative activity types are conventionalized to make
their institutional point can be explicit and highly formalised in constitutive and
regulative rules, as is usual in adjudication in the legal domain. The convention-
alization may also be partly implicit and formalised to a lesser degree in looser
regulations of some kind, as is often the case in deliberation in the political domain.
The conventionalization might even be only informal and simply reflect established
practices, as is customary in communion-seeking in the interpersonal domain.
The next step we had to take in our research program was to explore the
consequences engaging in a particular communicative type has for the conduct of
9
Both in the original test and in the replication straightforward abusive attacks are consistently rejected
as unreasonable discussion moves and legitimate personal attacks are invariably considered reasonable.
The ‘‘disguised’’ abusive attacks presented as responses to a wrong use of authority however are judged as
substantially less unreasonable than the overtly fallacious direct attacks.
10
Communicative activity types are in pragma-dialectics defined as communicative practices whose
conventionalization serves the specific communicative needs instigated by the institutional exigencies of
a certain domain (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 139–145).
11
Fairclough characterizes a ‘‘genre’’ of communicative activity broadly as ‘‘a socially ratified way of
using language in connection with a particular type of social activity’’ (1995, p. 14).
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10 F. H. van Eemeren
argumentative discourse (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 144–159). The ideal model of a
critical discussion can be instrumental in characterizing the particular ways in
which, depending on the specific institutional requirements that must be fulfilled,
the argumentative dimension is substantiated in the various communicative activity
types. Using the model of a critical discussion in all cases as the analytical point of
reference not only ensures a coherent and consistent appreciation of the
argumentative dimension, but it also creates unity in the comparison between
different communicative activity types.12
Taking the four stages of a critical discussion as the point of departure, four focal
points can be identified that need to be taken into account in an argumentative
characterization of a specific communicative activity type (van Eemeren 2010,
p. 146).13 These four focal points are the empirical counterparts of the four stages of
the process of resolving a difference of opinion in contextualized argumentative
discourse: the initial situation (confrontation stage), the starting points (opening
stage), the argumentative means and criticisms (argumentation stage), and the
outcome of the exchange (concluding stage). Starting from this division helps us to
determine in the argumentative characterization in what way exactly the constitutive
stages of the process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits are
represented in a certain communicative activity type.
Because communicative activity types impose certain extrinsic constraints on the
possibilities for strategic maneuvering, it is necessary to take the conventionaliza-
tion of the communicative activity type in which the argumentative discourse takes
place into account when analyzing and evaluating strategic maneuvering. Together,
the institutional point and the conventionalization determine the ‘‘institutional
preconditions’’ for strategic maneuvering in a particular communicative activity
type. In pragma-dialectics we distinguish between ‘‘primary’’ institutional precon-
ditions, which are as a rule official, usually formal, and often procedural, and
‘‘secondary’’ institutional preconditions, which are as a rule unofficial, usually
informal, and often substantial (van Eemeren and Garssen 2010, 2011).
As is indicated by the conventionalization determining the institutional
preconditions, in a particular communicative activity type certain modes of
strategic maneuvering will be suitable—or not suitable, as the case may be—to
realizing the institutional point of the activity type. Since an argumentative
characterization of the communicative activity type makes clear in what way
exactly the argumentative discourse is conventionalized to serve the institutional
point of the activity type, this characterization provides an appropriate point of
departure for tracing methodically the ways in which the possibilities for strategic
maneuvering are in practice affected by the communicative activity type.
From communicative activity type to communicative activity type the scope of
the possibilities available for strategic maneuvering in each of the empirical
counterparts of the critical discussion stages may vary. In some communicative
12
Diversity is then not the relativistic point of departure, but a reality-based outcome of a systematic
comparison of the various manifestations of argumentative reality.
13
An argumentative characterization of a communicative activity type is only worthwhile when it is
inherently, essentially or predominantly argumentative or argumentation incidentally plays an important
part.
123
activity types, for instance, the participants will be allowed more room for defining
the initial situation in accordance with their own preferences than in others. A
similar variety may exist with regard to the choice of procedural and material
starting points, the choice of argumentative means and kinds of criticism, and the
outcomes of the argumentative exchange. In each particular case, all three aspects of
strategic maneuvering can be affected by the need to comply with the institutional
preconditions (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 93–127). There may be constraints on the
topical choices that are allowed, on the adaptation to audience demand that is
regarded appropriate, and on the presentational devices that are permitted. Although
these constraints are in principle a limitation of the possibilities for strategic
maneuvering, they may also create special opportunities for strategic maneuvering
to some of the participants.
7 Institutional Preconditions for Strategic Maneuvering
After having included strategic maneuvering in extended pragma-dialectics we

further strengthened the connection between the theory and argumentative reality by
incorporating the contextual dimension of the communicative activity types in the
theorizing. In examining argumentative practices we concentrate on four domains: (1)
the legal domain, often seen as the proving ground for theorizing about argumentation
and since the 1980s a focal point of pragma-dialectical research; (2) the political
domain, vital for the use of argumentation in public life and central to stimulating
laymen’s interest in argumentation theory; (3) the medical domain, moving on from
paternalistic decision-making by doctors to informed consent based on argumenta-
tion; and (4) the academic domain, viewed as the pinnacle of certainty by outsiders but
in fact pervaded by argumentation. Our general research aims are in all cases: (1) to
identify the institutional preconditions constraining the possibilities for strategic
maneuvering in specific communicative activity types; (2) to identify the prototypical
argumentative patterns resulting from realizing the institutional point of specific
communicative activity types in accordance with the institutional preconditions.
Characteristically, in the legal domain the communicative practices have been
strongly conventionalized. In a law case, the procedural and material starting points
defining the legal counterpart of the opening stage of a critical discussion are
generally to a large extent predetermined institutionally rather than determined by
the parties in mutual deliberation. To identify the institutional preconditions for
strategic maneuvering in communicative activity types in the legal domain, pragma-
dialecticians examine how these activity types can be characterized argumenta-
tively. Next they try to establish how, in the various kinds of legal practices, the
parties involved, including the judge, operate in conducting their argumentative
discourse and what room for strategic maneuvering they have (Feteris 2009).
Pragma-dialectical research concerning the political domain was initiated by a
discussion of the role of argumentation in democracy (van Eemeren 2002). A
comprehensive research project examining the influence of institutional precondi-
tions on confrontational strategic maneuvering was carried out by van Eemeren,
Houtlosser, van Laar, and some PhD researchers. Andone (2013), for one, set out to
123
provide an argumentative explanation of the way in which politicians react in

political interviews to the interviewer’s accusation that they have taken on a
standpoint which is inconsistent with a standpoint they advanced earlier.
Mohammed (2009) examined the Prime Minister’s responses to critical questions
by members of the opposition in Prime Minister’s Question Time in the British
House of Commons. Tonnard (2011) gave an account of presentational tactics used
by politicians in their strategic maneuvering to get the priority issues of their party
discussed in Dutch parliament when they are not on the agenda. In a related project,
focusing on the contextual conditions of political discussion forums on the Internet
affecting the way in which the participants react critically, Lewinski (2010)
examined how on-line technologies create new possibilities for public debate.
Meanwhile, van Eemeren and Garssen had started in 2009 a comprehensive research
project examining the institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering in argumen-
tative exchanges in the European Parliament. So far, their research has concentrated in the
first place on the impact of ‘‘the European predicament’’. The European predicament is a
secondary institutional precondition involving the extrinsic constraint silently imposed
upon Members of the European Parliament that they are supposed to serve at the same
time the European cause and to satisfy their electorate by protecting the national interests
of their home countries (van Eemeren and Garssen 2010, 2011).14
In the medical domain, pragma-dialecticians examine the strategic maneuvering
that is needed to comply with institutional preconditions in health communication
(Snoeck Henkemans 2011). In medical consultations, for instance, doctors are under
the obligation to make clear to their patients that their judgments and advices are
sound, but doctor and patient differ as a rule considerably in medical knowledge and
experience. Doctors need to take this institutional precondition into account in their
strategic maneuvering, for instance, when they decide bringing their own authority to
bear (Labrie 2012; Pilgram 2015). The relationship between strategic maneuvering
and institutional preconditions has also been examined in advertisements promoting
medical drugs (Wierda 2015) and in health brochures promoting the target audience
to eat less, exercise more, have safe sex, etc. (van Eemeren 2013; van Poppel 2013).
Pragma-dialectical research concerning the institutional preconditions an aca-
demic context imposes on the strategic maneuvering is still in its infancy. A first
effort to adapt the theoretical instruments of pragma-dialectics for implementation in
this type of communicative activity types is made by Wagemans (2011) with regard
to the reconstruction and evaluation of argumentation from expert opinion.
8 Prototypical Argumentative Patterns
The initial situation in the communicative activity types that have come into being
in the various communicative domains revolves around different kinds of
differences of opinion. The types of standpoints at issue vary from evaluative and
14
Still other pragma-dialectical research projects focus on argumentative discourse in Dutch Parliament
(Plug 2010, 2011) and the use of pragmatic argumentation in lawmaking debates in British Parliament
(Ihnen Jory 2010, 2012).
123
prescriptive standpoints to descriptive standpoints, while there are also hybrid

standpoints in which descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive elements go together.
In combination with the specific starting points that are characteristic of a particular
communicative activity type or cluster of communicative activity types, the specific
characteristics of the initial situation will lead to specific kinds of argumentative
exchanges in the empirical counterpart of the argumentation stage and to specific
kinds of outcome of the discussion.
The differences between the kinds of argumentative exchanges that develop or
are likely to develop in the various kinds of communicative activity types are not
only caused by differences between the kind of difference of opinion (varying from
a formally defined mixed dispute in a law case to an informal non-mixed difference
in a medical consult), the types of standpoints at issue (varying from a prescriptive
standpoint in a parliamentary policy debate to a descriptive standpoint in a scientific
discussion), and the procedural and material starting points (varying from explicitly
established starting points in a law case to largely implicit starting points in a
personal chat), but also by the specific requirements pertaining to the way in which
the exchange between argumentation and criticism is to take place (varying from
strongly regulated exchanges in a parliamentary debate to exchanges largely
determined by the participants in a private discussion) and the kinds of outcome that
are to be reached (varying from a final verdict of the judge in a law case to a change
of mind of one of the parties or the maintenance of the initial situation in a private
discussion).
In view of the kind of difference of opinion to be resolved, the type of standpoint
at issue and the specific procedural and material starting points the parties must act
upon in the communicative activity types concerned, different types of argumen-
tation can be helpful in reaching the kind of outcome that is aimed for. In the
communicative activity types associated with specific communicative domains
certain types of argument schemes will be pre-eminently instrumental in reaching
the desired kind of outcome. Depending on the critical questions pertaining to the
(sub)type(s) of argument scheme(s) employed in the main argument(s) in support of
the standpoint at issue,15 in the particular shape these critical questions take in the
communicative activity type at hand,16 specific kinds of critical reactions need to be
anticipated or responded to in the argumentative exchanges that take place.17
In the legal domain, in an argumentative exchange taking place in the
communicative activity type of a law case, characteristically, ‘‘symptomatic’’
argumentation supported by ‘‘analogy’’ argumentation may be used to legitimize a
15
In the subtypes of the argument schemes used in the various subtypes of a certain type of
argumentation the critical questions pertaining to that scheme will be specified in somewhat different
ways.
16
The relevant critical questions need to be envisaged in the implementation pertinent to the use of the
argument scheme concerned in the specific macro-context of the communicative activity type.
17
It depends on the micro-, meso-, macro- and intertextual context, the logical and pragmatic inferences
that can be drawn and the available general and specific background information (van Eemeren 2010,
pp. 17–19), which particular critical questions are by institutional convention required to be answered in a
certain communicative activity type.
123
legal verdict.18 This means that in such a case the specific types of critical questions
are pertinent that are associated with symptomatic argumentation and analogy
argumentation. In the political domain, in an argumentative exchange taking place
in the communicative activity type of a parliamentary debate, the use of
‘‘pragmatic’’ argumentation is a characteristic way to defend a policy standpoint,
and the pertinent critical questions can be specified accordingly.19 In the academic
domain, in an argumentative exchange taking place in the communicative activity
type of a scientific discussion, using certain subtypes of ‘‘causal’’ argumentation is a
characteristic way to establish the truth of a scientific claim, and the pertinent
critical questions are those associated with the particular (sub)type of causal
argumentation that is used.20
In conducting an argumentative exchange, the arguers are supposed to take the
institutional preconditions of the communicative type and the critical reactions into
account that are pertinent in the communicative activity type concerned when a
certain argument scheme is being used. Doing so will result in the creation of what I
have named a specific argumentative pattern in the discourse (van Eemeren to be
published).21 Such an argumentative pattern is characterized by a constellation of
argumentative moves in which, in order to deal with a particular kind of difference
of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint a particular argument
scheme or combination of argument schemes is used in a particular kind of
argumentation structure.22 Next to relatively simple, ‘‘basic’’ argumentative
patterns, covering only the first level of defence of a standpoint by the main
argument or main arguments, in analysing argumentative practices more elaborated
argumentative patterns can be distinguished, covering also further levels of defence
and having varying degrees of complexity.23
18
Then it is first argued by means of symptomatic argumentation that dealing with a case in a certain
way is justified because it is covered by a certain rule, and next by analogy argumentation that the case is
similar to other cases to which the rule applies. Whether the symptomatic argumentation is supported by
analogy argumentation or by some other type of argumentation depends on the kind of problem that needs
to be solved. If a decision is to be made that requires a judge to make an exception to a general rule,
pragmatic argumentation can be instrumental.
19
Then it is argued by means of the pragmatic subtype of causal argumentation that a measure should be
taken because it will lead to a result the acceptability of which is beyond any doubt. If the acceptability
needs to be motivated all the same, this can most simply be done by means of ‘‘symptomatic’’
argumentation. However, when such support is necessary, the argumentation loses its pragmatic force of
straightforward effectiveness.
20
Then it is argued by means of a certain subtype of causal argumentation that a thesis should be
accepted because it is based on an established causal relationship.
21
The occurrence an argumentative pattern can be explained by taking account of the institutional point
and the institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering in the (cluster of) communicative activity
type(s) concerned in combination with the critical questions pertaining to the argument schemes that are
used and the way in which the responses to these critical questions are supposed to hang together.
22
The argumentative patterns that can be observed in argumentative discourse can be viewed as
empirical analogues of the patterns of analytically relevant moves in a critical discussion that are on
theoretical grounds distinguished in dialectical profiles. For the notion of a dialectical profile see van
Eemeren (2010, pp. 98–100).
23
The term level of defense refers to the distinction between the defense of a main standpoint (first level),
the defense of (a reason serving as) a substandpoint (second level), the defense of (a reason for a reason
serving as) a subsubstandpoint (third level), etc. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, Chapter 7).
123
Although some argumentative patterns occurring in argumentative reality may

well be incidental, certain argumentative patterns can be typical of the way in which
argumentative discourse is generally conducted in a specific communicative activity
type or cluster of communicative activity types. This is in principle the case when
the argumentative pattern concerned is immediately connected with the institutional
preconditions for strategic maneuvering pertaining to the communicative activity
type that is examined. Such ‘‘prototypical’’ argumentative patterns, whose
occurrence can be explained by the institutional preconditions prevailing in the
communicative activity type in which they occur (van Eemeren and Garssen 2014),
are of particular interest to pragma-dialectical researchers focusing on determining
the context-dependency of argumentative discourse.24 These prototypical argumen-
tative patterns result from the use of modes of strategic maneuvering that are pre-
eminently instrumental in reaching the institutional point of a communicative
activity type in accordance with its institutional preconditions while the specific
critical questions pertinent in view of the institutional conventions of the
communicative activity type are responded to.25
Pragma-dialectical research into strategic maneuvering is currently aimed at
identifying the various prototypical argumentative patterns coming about as a
consequence of the institutional preconditions for strategic maneuvering applying to
the various kinds of argumentative practices in the legal, political, medical, and
academic domain.26 In disclosing through qualitative empirical research the
prototypical argumentative patterns which are functional in certain domains of
argumentative reality, we make use of the various theoretical instruments developed
in pragma-dialectics, such as the typologies of differences of opinions (single or
multiple mixed or non-mixed), of standpoints (descriptive, evaluative, prescriptive),
of argument schemes (causal, comparison, symptomatic), and of argumentation
structures (single, multiple, coordinative, subordinative) (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992). The argumentative patterns manifesting themselves in the
discourse in specific constellations of argumentative moves are described in terms
of the categories and subcategories distinguished in these typologies.
24
In speaking of a prototypical argumentative pattern I refer to a pattern that is characteristic of the
communicative activity type in which it occurs because it is pre-eminently instrumental in realizing the
institutional point of the communicative activity type. It stands to reason that it may be expected that in
practice such an instrumental argumentative pattern will indeed be found in specimens of the
communicative activity type. However, being prototypical does not necessarily mean that the pattern
occurs frequently in this communicative activity type, let alone that it will always be present. If one thinks
that the term prototypical is too strongly connected with absolute or relative frequency, it can be replaced
by the term characteristic or some other term that does not carry this quantitative connotation.
25
The underlying assumption is that in principle protagonists may be supposed to aim for making the
strongest case in the macro-context concerned by trying to advance a combination of reasons that will
satisfy the antagonist through leaving no critical doubts unanswered, using the argument schemes they
consider most effective in the situation at hand and advancing all multiple, coordinative and subordinative
argumentation necessary to respond to the critical reactions the antagonist may be expected to come up
with.
26
Identifying prototypical argumentative patterns makes clear what kind of evaluation is required in
assessing the argumentative discourse concerned and what exactly this evaluation involves. In addition,
prototypical argumentative patterns can be helpful in teaching arguers how to conduct certain
argumentative practices.
123
In the qualitative empirical research concerning prototypical argumentative

patterns I am currently carrying out together with Andone, Feteris, Garssen, Snoeck
Henkemans and Wagemans, prototypical argumentative patterns are identified that
are functional in specific communicative activity types in the political, legal,
medical and academic domain. With the help of our analysis of the institutional
preconditions pertaining to the various communicative activity types concerned we
make clear why these argumentative patterns occur and how they occur. It is worth
noting that in practice there may be various argumentative patterns that are
prototypical of a particular communicative activity type or cluster of communica-
tive activity types.
In actual argumentative practices, some prototypical argumentative patterns may
occur more frequently than others and in specific (clusters of) communicative activity
types or specific kinds of instantiations of a specific communicative activity type
certain prototypical argumentative patterns may even be dominant in a quantitative
sense. To investigate this quantitative dimension of argumentative patterns, the
qualitative research we are carrying out will in the near future be followed by empirical
research of representative corpuses of argumentative discourses in which the
frequencies of occurrence of the various prototypical argumentative patterns are
determined. In addition, comparisons of frequencies will be made between the various
communicative activity types and communicative domains. In this way we will be able
to establish which argumentative patterns that are prototypical of a certain
communicative activity type or cluster of communicative activity types may be
regarded as stereotypical in an absolute or relative sense.27
Systematically documenting the institutional diversification of argumentative
practices in this way will provide empirically-based insight in the proliferation of
argumentative reality. It will also pave the way for a more thorough account of the
relationship between context-independency and context-dependency in argumenta-
tive discourse than has been provided by earlier studies in argumentation theory
(e.g., Toulmin 2003). Because these issues are so fundamental and the way in which
they should be approached has been a matter of continual debate, we expect that the
insights gained from our research will be of vital significance to argumentation
theory as a discipline.
9 Argumentative Patterns with Pragmatic Argumentation as Main

Argument
Let us now turn to the specific theme of this special issue: argumentative patterns
with pragmatic argumentation as a main argument. According to the pragma-
dialectical approach, argument (sub)schemes are to be distinguished from each
27
Thus I have made a terminological distinction between prototypical argumentative patterns
characteristically used in realizing the institutional point of a certain communicative activity type and
stereotypical argumentative patterns, which are not only prototypical but also occur frequently in the
communicative activity type concerned. Generally, prototypical argumentative patterns can be brought to
light by means of qualitative empirical research; stereotypical argumentative patterns can only be
detected by means of quantitative research.
123
other when, due to the critical questions pertinent to the argument (sub)scheme, they
initiate a dialectical route in argumentative discourse that is different from the
dialectical routes initiated by other (sub)schemes. Pragmatic argumentation is a
subtype of causal argumentation because the pertinent critical questions are in some
sense specifications of the critical questions pertinent to the general argument
scheme of causal argumentation.
In pragmatic argumentation the standpoint that an action should be carried out (or
should not be carried out) is defended by pointing out that the result of carrying out
this action is desirable (or that the result of carrying out this action is undesirable).
The ‘‘positive’’ variant of pragmatic argumentation defends a positive standpoint
(‘‘Action X should be carried out’’), the ‘‘negative’’ variant defends a negative
standpoint (‘‘Action X should not be carried out’’). The pragma-dialectical
definition of the argument scheme of pragmatic argumentation in its positive
version is as follows:
1 Standpoint Action X should be carried out
1.1 Because Action X will lead to positive result Y
(1.1’) And (Actions of type X [such as X] that lead to positive results of type
Y [such as Y] must be carried out)
Argumentation that is pragmatic is to be evaluated in accordance with the critical
questions pertinent to the specification of the argument scheme of causal
argumentation in this subscheme. This results in the following critical questions:
(a) Do actions of type X lead to results of type Y?

(b) Is result Y really positive (i.e., desirable)/negative (i.e., undesirable)?
(c) Does action X not have any major negative (i.e., undesirable)/positive (i.e.,
desirable) side-effects?
As in other cases, the way in which these critical questions are implemented
depends on the context of the communicative activity type in which the pragmatic
argumentation concerned is used. If, when pragmatic argumentation has been
advanced, certain critical questions are anticipated or responded to in the discourse,
more complex argumentation will come into being, with a more complicated
argumentation structure.
If in a certain argumentative practice the circumstances in which pragmatic
argumentation occurs call for it, the list of critical questions must sometimes be
expanded. As a sequel to question (a), for instance, the question can then be asked
whether result Y could not be achieved more easily or more economically by other
actions. As a sequel to question (b), the question can be asked whether another result
(of type Z) would not be even more positive (i.e., more desirable) than results of
type Y, such as Y. As a sequel to question (c), the question can be asked whether the
negative (i.e., undesirable) side-effects can be prevented or suppressed, etc.
Depending on the exigencies of the macro-context, in the various kinds of
argumentative practices the critical questions (a), (b) and (c) may be asked and
responded to—or anticipated and responded to. This does not mean, however, that
all these critical questions will always be dealt with. In some cases it will be
123
unnecessary to deal with a certain critical question because it is already clear that
there is mutual agreement about the answer. It may also be the case that a particular
critical question is not explicitly dealt with—or is explicitly dealt with—for
rhetorical reasons of effectiveness. The same might apply to the critical questions
added to the list because of the need for expansions motivated by the circumstances
in which the argumentation occurs. In all cases, when they are implemented in a
particular activity type the general critical questions need to be specified, amended
and supplemented in accordance with the institutional requirements of the macro-
context.
It is a distinctive feature of pragmatic argumentation that it can only be
instrumental in offering conclusive support of a prescriptive standpoint if, in the
case of a positive standpoint, the positive character (i.e., desirability) of the result
that is aimed for is clearly beyond doubt (or, in the case of a negative standpoint, the
negative character, i.e., undesirability). In a political macro-context, for instance,
the positive character of the result that is, according to the standpoint, to be achieved
is often evident. Who would, for instance, object to the proposal of a policy measure
leading to higher employment rates? If, for some reason or other, to some or all of
the addressees the desirability of the result is not so obvious, this desirability needs
to be motivated. However, when the desirability of the action that is proposed is no
longer beyond doubt, the argument loses its pragmatic force.
In the macro-contexts of the legal domain it is generally a necessary requirement
that the desirability of the action that is proposed will be explicitly motivated. In the
political domain it may happen that it is not the positive value of the result to be
achieved by the action (i.e., its desirability) as such that is at issue, but the relative
value of this result compared with another result, which could be achieved by taking
another action. This can, for example, be the case when the actions concerned have
different positions in the existing value hierarchy or when the parties involved in the
discussion favour different value hierarchies. The latter occurs, for instance, when
for the protagonist fighting unemployment is the main problem while the audience
(or a relevant part of the audience) considers putting an end to the budget deficit
more important.28
Because of their relevance to the acceptance of the argumentation, the critical
questions pertaining to pragmatic argumentation are likely to be anticipated in the
discourse. This applies, of course, in the first place to the critical questions (in their
specific contextual implementation) that are most pertinent in the institutional
context in which the discourse takes place. In argumentative discourse taking place
in communicative activity types in domains in which pragmatic argumentation is
pre-eminently called for, such as the political domain and the legal domain, such
anticipation of pertinent critical questions is likely to be expected. Due to the need
to satisfy the institutional preconditions and to respond to the critical questions that
are to be anticipated, the prototypical argumentative patterns coming into being in
these domains may involve a combination of pragmatic argumentation with other
28
This may in the cases concerned lead to an amendment of the first critical question going with
pragmatic argumentation so that is made relative to achieving some other result: ‘‘Is the result Y’ really
more positive, i.e., more desirable, than positive result Z’, so that actions are preferable that lead to
achieving the latter?’’.
123
types of (coordinatively or subordinatively linked) argumentation. As a conse-

quence, rather than being single and pragmatic in toto, the argumentation structure
then becomes complex and the pragmatic argumentation is included in a more
elaborate argumentative pattern.
Let us turn to the communicative activity type of a general parliamentary debate
in the European parliament for an example. In their study ‘In varietate concordia’,
van Eemeren and Garssen (2010) have shown that in such a debate pragmatic
argumentation in support of a prescriptive standpoint is prototypically supported by
means of (symptomatic) argumentation by example, by means of (symptomatic)
authority argumentation or by means of descriptive analogy argumentation.
According to their observations, it depends on the nature of the causal claim
involved in pragmatic argumentation whether argumentation by example or analogy
argumentation will be used in its support. If the causal claim is general, it needs to
be defended by argumentation by example. Singular causal claims on the other hand
can be defended by means of analogy argumentation. As a case in point, van
Eemeren and Garssen mention the defence of the claim that the United States should
adopt a policy of gun control defended by the pragmatic argumentation that this
policy leads to a safer social environment. This defence can be readily supported by
means of descriptive analogy argumentation in which the situation in the United
States is compared to the situation in Canada, where gun control proves to lead to
fewer casualties. The causal claim is in this case a specific one, referring only to the
United States. Had the causal claim been general, as in ‘‘Gun control generally leads
to fewer casualties’’, instead of analogy argumentation, argumentation by example
would have been needed.
The study of other communicative activity types in other domains makes clear
that pragmatic argumentation can also be defended by still other types of
argumentation. In health communication in the medical domain, for instance,
pragmatic argumentation can be supplemented with other pragmatic arguments.
These other pragmatic arguments may concern other consequences that will occur.
Alternatively, pragmatic argumentation can be supplemented by symptomatic
argumentation concerning the positive or negative qualities of a drug that is
discussed. In the latter case, the argument in which the positive or negative qualities
are mentioned is in its turn prototypically supported by means of other symptomatic
argumentation, such as a argumentation from authority referring to experience
expertise.
10 Argumentative Patterns Containing Pragmatic Argumentation
The contributions to this issue share a pragma-dialectical perspective on argumen-

tative discourse and are all based on the theoretical framework I have just explained.
In all of them prototypical argumentative patterns are examined in which pragmatic
argumentation plays a vital role. In all cases, this pragmatic argumentation is
embedded in prototypical argumentative patterns that depend on institutional
preconditions applying to specific communicative activity types or clusters of
communicative activity types. The argumentative patterns that are discussed are
123
prototypical of certain communicative activity types belonging to the political

domain, the legal domain, the medical domain, and the academic domain.
The aim of Bart Garssen’s paper, ‘Problem-solving argumentative patterns in
plenary debates of the European Parliament’, is to describe the way in which
argumentative patterns come into being in plenary debates over legislative issues.
Garssen shows that such argumentative patterns depend for the most part on the
problem-solving argumentation that the ‘‘rapporteur’’ of the parliamentary com-
mittee report regarding a certain issue has put forward in the opening speech.
Starting from the observation that the argumentation that is advanced can be
pragmatic problem-solving argumentation or complex problem-solving argumen-
tation, Garssen examines the most prominent prototypical argumentative patterns in
the contributions of the Members of parliament to the plenary debate. His research
is based on an inventory of the arguments that can be used to support or attack the
initial problem-solving argumentation put forward by the rapporteur.
In ‘Argumentative patterns in the political domain’, Corina Andone concentrates
on the case of European parliamentary committees of inquiry. She examines the
argumentative patterns resulting from combining pragmatic argumentation in which
a recommendation is made with arguments in which the majority is invoked.
Andone focuses on argumentative patterns that can be found in inquiries into the
activity of the Equitable Life Assurance Society by European parliamentary
committees of inquiry. By incorporating legal and political insights about the
activities of these parliamentary committees into a pragma-dialectical approach, she
provides an analysis of the selected argumentative patterns that reveals which
standpoints in the recommendations that are made are supported by which
arguments and how these arguments relate to each other. In addition, Andone’s
analysis explains the argumentative choices that are made.
In ‘Prototypical argumentative patterns in a legal context’, Eveline Feteris
addresses prototypical argumentative patterns in the context of legal justification in
which pragmatic argumentation is used in hard cases. First, she discusses the
function of pragmatic argumentation in the legal domain and its implementation in
prototypical argumentative patterns. She explains the dialectical function of the
various parts of the complex argumentation that is advanced by characterizing them
as argumentative moves put forward in reaction to certain forms of critique. Then,
on the basis of the famous Holy Trinity case, she shows the way in which the
pragmatic argumentation used by the U.S. Supreme Court is incorporated in
prototypical argumentative patterns that come into being in dealing with the
institutional preconditions of the case.
In ‘Argumentative patterns in over-the-counter medicine advertisements’,
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans discusses an argumentative pattern including
pragmatic argumentation that is prototypical for the communicative practice of
over-the-counter medicines advertisements in the domain of health communication.
First, she identifies a basic argumentative pattern of this type of advertisement.
Next, she presents an overview of various types of extensions of this basic pattern.
Finally, she makes clear how the basic pattern and its extensions can be analysed as
the result of strategic choices by the advertisers concerning the type of
123
argumentation that is advanced, the argumentation structure and the presentation of

the argumentation.
In ‘Argumentative patterns in scientific explanations’, Jean Wagemans claims
that in the academic domain the practice of justifying scientific explanations
generates argumentative patterns in which several types of argumentation may play
a role. In order to describe these patterns, he explores the institutional conventions
regarding scientific explanations as reflected in influential works on the philosophy
of science. First, he describes a basic pattern for justifying scientific explanations.
Then, he presents two types of extensions of this pattern, which he derives from
philosophical accounts of requirements for the quality of explanations and the
choice of the best explanation respectively. With regard to the latter extension, he
make clears what role pragmatic argumentation plays in justifying the choice of a
particular explanation.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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made.
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Argumentation (2016) 30:1–23

Identifying Argumentative Patterns: A Vital Step

Frans H. van Eemeren1,2,3

Published online: 23 September 2015

Abstract This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue on argumen-

Keywords Argumentative characterization Argumentative pattern Extended

& Frans H. van Eemeren

When I started, together with Grootendorst, developing the pragma-dialectical

extended pragma-dialectical theory. Section 6 makes clear how including strategic

2 The Pragma-Dialectical Standard Theory

In order to clarify what is involved in viewing argumentative discourse as aimed at

3 Consolidation of the Standard Theory

More often than not, in argumentative discourse certain indispensable components

4 The Extended Pragma-Dialectical Theory

5 Empirical Research of Effectiveness Through Reasonableness

The introduction of the theoretical notion of strategic maneuvering in the extended

reasonableness and effectiveness empirically. In this empirical research, we defined

person attacked wrongly parades as an authority. In both experiments the hypothesis

6 Taking the Institutional Context of Argumentative Discourse

7 Institutional Preconditions for Strategic Maneuvering

After having included strategic maneuvering in extended pragma-dialectics we

provide an argumentative explanation of the way in which politicians react in

8 Prototypical Argumentative Patterns

prescriptive standpoints to descriptive standpoints, while there are also hybrid

Although some argumentative patterns occurring in argumentative reality may

In the qualitative empirical research concerning prototypical argumentative

9 Argumentative Patterns with Pragmatic Argumentation as Main

(a) Do actions of type X lead to results of type Y?

types of (coordinatively or subordinatively linked) argumentation. As a conse-

10 Argumentative Patterns Containing Pragmatic Argumentation

The contributions to this issue share a pragma-dialectical perspective on argumen-

prototypical of certain communicative activity types belonging to the political

argumentation that is advanced, the argumentation structure and the presentation of

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