THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY

Author(s): R. W. SMITH
Source: Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory , October 1970, No. 35 (October
1970), pp. 17-29
Published by: Berghahn Books

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41801858

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 THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY

by R. W. SMITH

One of the prerequisites of stability in a political system, and one of

the most widespread phenomena of political life, is the voluntary
acceptance of political decisions that are legitimate, that is, in con-
formity with the values and beliefs of the society. Any political system
that rests entirely and exclusively on force is a possibility for the
short run only. As Rousseau pointed out, no ruler can maintain his
position, and no political system its stability, until 'force has been
transformed into right and obedience into duty'.1 When a person
believes a political order to be legitimate, he tries to live up to its
rules as a matter of moral obligation. 'Power graced with the quality
of right evokes man's responsive sense of duty.'2 In a legitimate politi-
cal system, the decisions of the governors are 'accepted and obeyed
because they are felt to be justified' by standards common to 'both
those who command and those who obey'.3
In view of the crucial importance of the concept of legitimacy4 for
the study of comparative politics, I propose to re-examine Max
Weber's classic analysis of the concept in an attempt to show where
his treatment of it can be clarified and extended. In the first part of
this paper, I shall briefly present Weber's own analysis. In the second
part I shall discuss the recent criticisms and clarifications made by
David Easton and Talcott Parsons. I shall conclude with a con-
sideration of some problems neglected or ignored by Weber, but
closely related to the over-all problem of legitimacy.
1

Weber's Theory of Legitimacy

The motives for maintaining a system of authority may be material
or ideal, or some combination of the two. That is to say, authority
rests on self-interest and/or a sense of legitimacy.5 No system of
authority, however, will voluntarily limit its appeal to material
advantage as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance. Every such
system will attempt to establish and cultivate belief in its legitimacy.
'But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type
of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee
it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally.
Equally fundamental is the variation in effect.'6 Weber thus believes
it useful to classify the types of authority according to the kind of
claim to legitimacy typically made by each.
There are, Weber says, three pure types of legitimate authority.

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18 THEORIA

The validity of
1. Rational g
patterns of n
authority und
2. Traditional
sanctity of im
status of tho
authority); or
3. Charismatic
exceptional s
individual pe
revealed or or

Rational - Lega
Rational-legal
in which obed
order. To a lar
There is, in p
status : the per
his delineated s
with no more
separate from
regarded as a
the individual
requires long p
bureaucratic ca
is a normal ca
Remuneration
treasury. In W
other type of o
and reliability.
Some of the c
dency toward
promotion of
Weber's view, t
communicatio
Traditional Auth
In a tradition
person of the c
of authority.
personal order,
accustomed obl
either of two

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THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 19

free personal choice. This latter sphere

rests primarily on the fact that obligatio
loyalty have an unspecified character. B
can be deliberately created by legislati
thus claimed to have always been in force
become known. The chief's administrative staff lacks almost all of the
characteristics of the bureaucratic staff. It does not consist primarily
of officials, but of personal retainers, many of whom are members of
the family or favorites. In place of an office, there is a status, with no
clear-cut distinction between the sphere of authority and private
capacity. There are seldom any delineated powers. Technical training
is not usually required as a qualification for serving the chief.
Payment is not in the form of salaries, but by appropriation of fiefs or
benefices. Often the costs of administration are met from means
which are not distinguishable from personal property.
The effect of traditional authority is to discourage education and
rational calculation. Various aspects of traditionalism combine to
greatly hamper economic development: arbitrariness of the chief,
substantive regulation of economic activity, and modes of financing
administration.

Charismatic Authority 10
In the beginning charismatic authority is highly unstructured,
being identified not with a society, but with an individual. The
charismatic leader is set apart from ordinary men by what is re-
garded as exceptional, if not supernatural, qualities. His charisma is
dependent on its recognition by members of society, but he always
regards those who ignore or deny his powers as delinquent in moral
duty. But if proof of his qualifications fails, if he is for long un-
successful, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear.
The charismatic leader is a revolutionary, setting his personal legiti-
macy against that of the institutionalized order. He preaches, creates,
or demands personal trust in him and his revelation. If he is success-
ful, there will result a radical alteration of attitudes, a new orientation
towards the world.
The administrative staff is chosen in terms of their own charis-
matic qualities; they are not officials, but disciples. 'There is no such
thing as "appointment" or "dismissal", no career, no promotion.
There is only a "call" at the instance of the leader on the basis of
charismatic qualifications of those he summons.' There is no hier-
archy - the leader may intervene at any moment. There are no rules
of a formal kind; rather there is the pattern of 'It is written . . . , but
I say unto you . . . '. There is no definite sphere of authority and
competence; no salary or benefice. The disciples tend to live in a

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 20 THEORIA

communistic r
order, living f
tional or ration
income by con
Charismatic a
the routine and
both rational
bound to analy
precedents tho
however, is for
personal char
and trust.

Charismatic au
exists only as
prophetic reli
in their early
established, or
gives way to t
that then driv
charismatic au
the part of th
existence and
blems are solv
traditional or r
trate how this is so : If the new leader is chosen on the basis of lots or
oracles, his legitimacy is dependent on the technique of selection,
which involves a form of legalization. If the leader is chosen, like
the Dalai Lama, on the basis of certain qualities which mean he is the
reincarnation of the original leader, then there is a bias in favor of
traditionalism. Similar examples could be given for the administra-
tive staff. But for the most part, a combination of the two types of
authority is likely to result.

Theory of Social Change

Max Weber viewed the pattern of rational-legal authority as a
distinctive achievement or characteristic of the modern institutional
order. He viewed the progression of history as a trend toward the
'de-mystification' of the world; a progression from the traditional
with its primitive religions, crude technologies, and functional
diffuseness toward a period of general rationality and science, with
highly specified functional roles, discipline, and legal imperspnalism.
But this process was not automatic, nor was there any certainty that
the legal-rational order could maintain itself. Let us look more closely

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THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 21

at the three types of authority structu

change.
Weber saw that social change depends to a high degree on the
stability of the structure of authority. But no form of authority is
safe from the challenge of charismatic authority, nor indeed from its
own inherent tendencies toward change.11 Change is in two directions
or tends to be: from the traditional to the rational, and from the
rational to the traditional. If charismatic authority successfully
challenges traditional authority, this may produce only a new tradi-
tionalism, or it may, on the other hand, lead to rational authority.
But even if the charismatic is routinized into a rational-legal pattern,
there is still a precarious possibility that this new pattern will break
down and return to the traditional. This can happen through an
inherent tendency of the rational-legal structure or through the
intermediate influence of a charismatic movement. The segregation of
roles and the impersonalism on which the rational-legal structure
depends are hard to maintain. These requirements of the authority
pattern rest on an artificial division of the human personality, and
can only be maintained by discipline. Or the official may become so
bound up with bureaucratic rules that he treats them as a source of
traditional authority. Though Weber does not mention what con-
ditions favor the rise of charismatic movements, there is no reason to
suppose that they would not arise under a rational-legal structure of
authority and, in fact, we know they do (Hitler, DeGaulle). A success-
ful challenge of rational authority by the charismatic, however, might
well return the authority structure to a new form of traditionalism.
II

The Easton Critique 12

David Easton maintains that Weber's classification of the types of
legitimacy has serious limitations for purposes of understanding
political change. By change is meant, in this context, transformations
in the bases of legitimacy of the authority structure. Easton argues
that Weber views change largely from the point of view of the holders
of authority - the chief and his administrative staff - and the
various symbols connected with their roles. The subjects of authority,
on the other hand, 'play a very shadowy part' in the processes of
change. This emphasis springs from Weber's 'typical overemphasis
on the influence of great men in history'.
In the second place, Weber approaches the problem from a formal
level, despite his concern for the motivations of the actor. He offers
only a 'gross description of principles of legitimacy and the various
types of authority structures to which they correspond'. Even if we
assume with Weber that all the factors of the social environment

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22 THEORIA

contribute to t
leaders appear
nothing but a f
lem of how ch
What is neede
problem of le
authorities, th
will 'significa
ready to give
he thinks, help
Such an analy
of authority
analysis. By c
members of t
image of the a
Up to a certa
pectations may
point, then a
actually take p
plish the task.
tance between
dissemination
The 'discrepan
does provide a
dex brings tog
social structur
system. By con
'we have a met
of these multi
Easton is corr
in his belief
analysis. Easto
mars his own
this were a ch
legitimacy. In
procedural mat
tional system
necessarily me
to measure the
Weber's analys

The Parsons C
By far the mo

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THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 23

been made by Talcott Parsons.13 It is, the

to note some of the clarifications that Pa
Weber's analysis of legitimacy. To begin
tion about the pure types of authority. G
is not empirical, but an ideal type, is it a
type? More specifically, how far do the d
a particular type of authority? Is functio
example, necessarily related only to the r
a necessary characteristic of the other tw
necessities of theoretical and empirical st
make a fundamental re-examination of
ideal types.
Next Parsons notes that Weber treats th
as analytically autonomous from the re
other words, Weber failed to systematica
generalized social system. In Parsons' v
account of the principal variables of so
prior to the treatment of such specia
authority.16 Although Parsons does not b
difficulty which causes Weber to treat
organization of authority as a change in
comes to regard legal rules as a kind of
does not mean that from society's viewpo
authority is legitimate in terms of the tr
next point that Parsons makes, which is
goes beyond it to a fundamental clari
analysis.
The base line of Weber's analysis, Pars
traditional authority.17 In this authority p
ty are not clearly defined, there is little
political position and a generally supe
formally defined administrative structure
authority deviate in two directions from
rational-legal is the consequence of a p
political from non-political functions in
is then no longer that of a diffuse sup
delineated function embodied in the co
matic deviates from the traditional, not by
tiation, but by questioning the legitim
order.
At this point, it is well to recall that W
dealing with legitimation - that is, ap
values. But Parsons concludes that 'Weber's classification is not one
of types of legitimation in terms of different types of values, but on

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 24 THEORIA

the one hand,

reference to po
stitutionalizati
are a function
analytically in
applied to any
done what he
(role status) fo
authority to qu
Parsons, furt
broader than
A pattern of au
general values
degree of funct
authority is ex
and the counte
Ill

Some Neglected Problems

In this section I wish to deal briefly with some problems that are
related to legitimacy, but which were to a large extent ignored or
neglected by Weber in his own analysis of legitimacy.
Weber's typlogy of the modes of legitimacy seems incomplete in
important respects. It does not help us to see, for example, the
qualitative differences between, say, a stable democracy and a
stable monarchy : both might very well contain substantially the same
blend of traditional, legal, and charismatic justification of the politi-
cal order, and yet the very form of government would introduce
qualitative differences in the way the members oriented themselves
toward the political world.20 For where a high degree of participation
is allowed, an active (masculine) relationship to society develops;
where it is not permitted, more passive (feminine) relationships come
into existence.21 In other words, by spreading responsibility for the
system, democracy turns the participants into creators of legitimacy;
by confining responsibility to the rulers, monarchy turns the subject
into a consumer of legitimacy.22 Monarchical man accepts his society
and accepts it as a given ; democratic man comes to understand his
political world - what it means, how it is created and how it is
maintained. Consequently, monarchical legitimacy is more fragile
than democratic legitimacy. Less subject to change, it nevertheless
shatters more easily.
Moreover, Weber seems not to have exhausted the types of answers
which can be given as to why a particular order is justified, that is,
legitimate. I shall, in fact, suggest that there are at least two other

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THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 25

possible bases of legitimacy. Before doing

sary to consider a suggestion along th
Dahl.23 Dahl argues that the authority
separate type of authority, 'not necessari
legality, and ordinarily . . . neither tra
this is true, then not only has Weber m
more importantly, the technical expe
authority and rulership. Technological
in a scientific but in an ethical sense a
Dahl's argument, however, is that he equa
ty. But as Weber points out, in any sit
the motive for compliance may be r
consideration of either authority or inter
fact generally follow the advice of the te
cian, the engineer, the broker? Because it
because we believe that it is in our intere
technical expert as expert does not pos
appears to because Dahl confuses interest
does not mean that technological soc
does mean that any influence the tech
their capacity as experts will rest on util
Having rejected the notion of technica
that Weber is correct in viewing the auth
example of legal authority. Weber is m
fuses the rational and the legal forms
category. For the rational (if perhaps f
by Plato, Marx, the Social Darwinists an
appeal to legality: their claims stem not f
procedure, but rather from a belief that
such a way that they have a knowledge o
Weber had himself, at one time, separ
legal, treating them as different grounds
political order.25 A political order could
rational belief in its absolute value, thus
absolute commitment'; or it might be j
established in a manner which is recogniz
lays a claim to knowledge; the latter claim
correct' and 'imposed by accepted pro
Weber later abandon the distinction be
legal, actually defining the former in ter
in part because of the example he chos
form of legitimacy - a belief in natural l
commitment that is involved in the ratio
traditional, charismatic, and, to some ext

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26 THEORIA

each type of le
seems necessar
the legal : the
cannot be red
the man of kn
to base the wo
case, unfortun
of the Stoics,
structuring of
who believed
over what is la
bility between
to reject the
the charisma
unlike the dem
not personal,
rational term
course, does no
'crimes of pas
'crimes of logi
Weber is at le
if not of its ef
Rousseau thou
imposed the l
here, of cours
ideas which t
procity, self-r
subject under
charismatic lea
presents us wi
from the mass
consent to tha
seems not to
university and
rule, but rathe
rejected in fa
new form of l
is involved, in
pation can ta
content of m
few) begin to
occurs: since
it were, from
society, the la

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THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 27

however, that rules lose their honou

what is lost in transcendence is more t
understanding and personal involvem
away from elitist forms of legitimacy s
on the members of society as person
charged with shaping their own live
within themselves and more responsibl
regard for others and for society as a w
One final point. Weber, in practice , lim
to a discussion of political authority. Ye
could be applied to any form of organiz
the underlying social structure has mu
political structure. Why then does h
apparently arbitrary way ? He does thi
concern with the question of violence
essence of the political association, acc
to violence, and its claim to use viol
organizations, on the other hand, are p
using violence against their member
legitimacy compelling only when it is re
to ignore a number of important quest
macy might otherwise suggest to us.
example, are commonly found in pri
they affect the structure, function, an
tion? Are private associations simply
duplicating, on the level of authority, t
is characteristic of the particular politi
does the discrepancy come about and
individual, the association, and the socie
a problem of socialization, what is th
process within private associations?
though, is something far more compe
science. The problem of legitimacy is
meaningful world and one's relation
Weber says, by an 'inner compulsion
meaningful cosmos and to take up a
other words, seeks meaning and salv
suffering continually drive one on to h
of the world. At bottom, then, the pro
blem of theodicy. And for Weber the p
prime evil was violence.
IV
Conclusion
Where do we go from here? Do we devise a new theory of legiti-

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 28 THEORIA

macy along no
attempt to imp
and that is w
theory might
Weber remark
ten, twenty, f
it is the very m
Yet Weber's th
conception of
and utility tha
who are sharp
end up, wheth
rather than o v
Binder, have
limited in imp
results with th
what we now
Weber; buildi
College of Wil
Virginia , U.S.

REFERENCES

1 The Social Contract , Bk. I, Ch. 3.

2 Charles W. Hendel, 'An Exploration of the Nature of Authority', in Carl J
Friedrich, ed., Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 16
3 Samuel H. Beer, 'The Analysis of Political Systems', in Samuel H. Beer an
Adam B. Ulam, ed., Patterns of Government , 2d ed. (New York: Random
House, 1962), p. 22.
4 For a history of the concept, see Dolf Sternberger, Legitimacy , Internation
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillian and Free Press
1968), Vol. 9, pp. 244-48.
5 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization , ed. by Talcott
Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 126-32, 324-28.
6 Ibid., p. 325.
7 Ibid.., p. 328.
8 Ibid., pp. 329-41.
9 Ibid., pp. 341-58.
10 Ibid., pp. 358-92.
11 See Talcott Parsons, 'Introduction , in Weber, op. cit., pp. 56-86.
12 See David Easton, 'The Perception of Authority and Political Change', in
Friedrich, op. cit., pp. 170-96.
13 In the Structure of Social Action (New York : Free Press, 1949) ; 'Introduction',
to Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free
Press, 1947); and 'Introduction', to Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964).
14 Parsons, 'Introduction', in Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization , p. 75.
15 Ibid., p. 16.
16 Ibid.
17 Parsons, 'Authority, Legitimation, and Political Action', in Friedrich on.
cit., pp. 212-13.

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THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY 29

18 Ibid., p. 213.
19 Ibid., p. 211.
20 Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political A
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 30.
21 Tocqueville s remark in Democracy in Am
York: Vintage, 1954), Vol. 1, p. 258, is inte
passing from a free country into one which is
the change; in the former all is bustle and a
seems calm and motionless. In the one, am
topics of inquiry; in the other, it seems as i
repose in the enjoyment of advantages alread
22 Cf. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of t
(New York: Free Press, 1965).
23 Op. cit., p. 30.
24 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization . dd. 124-27. 324-27.
25 Ibid., pp. 130-31.
26 Ibid., pp. 115-18.
27 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, trans. Anthony Bower
(New York: Vintage, 1956).
28 See Piaget, op. cit.
29 Weber, 'Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions', in H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1958). o. 334.
30 Weber, The Sociology of Religion, p. 117.
31 Weber, 'Science As A Vocation', in Gerth and Mills, op. cit., d. 138.
32 See, for example, Dolf Sternberger, op. cit. ; Guglielmo Ferrero, The Principles
of Power (New York: Putnam, 1942); Carl Schmitt, Legalitat und Legitimität
(Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1932).
33 Carl Joachim Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of
Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), Ch. 13.
34 Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1962), Ch. 2.

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