officer or private person.

Both elements concurred here, as it has been

established that petitioner’s vehicle figured in a hit and run—an offense
committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person, who then
sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that “presence”
does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also
when he “hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED scene.”

Padilla vs. Court of Appeals Same; Same; Same; A suspect cannot defeat the arrest which has been
set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was
*
G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997. confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.—It is appropriate
to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat
the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA,
warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the
action. The exigent circumstances of—hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime—all created a
situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court
Criminal Procedure; Warrant of Arrest; Arrest Without Warrant When acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had
Lawful.—Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: more than mere “reasonable and articulable” suspicion that the occupant of
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a
person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the person to be arrested is peace officer.
a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is Same; Same; Same; The arresting police officers acted upon verified
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.—Besides,
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified
Same; Same; Same; It must be stressed that “presence” does not only under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was
require that the arresting person sees the offense but also when he hears the no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene.—Paragraph and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at
(a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen saw for
is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate
the presence of the arresting number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and
railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer’s personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner’s Pajero was indeed the
_______________
vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police
* THIRD DIVISION.
officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.

404
403

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 403 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.—Furthermore, in
accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objec tion, defect or irregularity possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence that an M-16 rifle
Petitioner’s belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated
information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, as in the case of petitioner.
placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by Same; Same; Constitutional Law; To justify nullification of the law,
applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution not a
Same; Searches and Seizures; Well-settled instances when a doubtful and argumentative implication.—Moreover, every law has in its
warrantless search and seizure of property is valid.—The five (5) well- favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the
settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
are as follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law,
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
jurisprudence, 2. seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the
are: (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b). recently, the Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution.”
be where they are; (c). the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d).
“plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search, 3. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the Appeals.
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal           Raval and Lokin, Robert A. Padilla, Philip Jurado, R.A.V.
activity, 4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search. Saguisag and Gina C. Garcia for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
Criminal Law; P.D. 1866; Two requisites to establish crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm.—The crimes involving illegal possession of FRANCISCO, J.:
firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions
the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. were found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @
Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
Same; Same; Evidence; The Court has ruled that either the testimony
of a representative of or a certification from the PNP Firearms and “(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919
Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any with six (6) live ammunitions;
firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element
of illegal possession of firearm.—In several occasions, the Court has ruled 406
that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Office
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
405 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals

“(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4)
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 405 long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
“(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals (8) ammunitions; and
“(4) Six additional
1 live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber
(FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice revolver.”
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession
of firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we reiterated that such certification is Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992,
sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal
discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to
2
possession of firearms3 and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 thru the _______________
following Information:
5 The warrant of arrest dated December 8, 1992 was issued by Judge Rosete. Later,
“That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, an order recalling all warrant of arrest against petitioner was issued by Judge
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- Maximiano Asuncion of RTC Quezon City. (RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 34).
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously 6 Petitioner posted a personal bail bond of P200,000.00 furnished by FGU
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Insurance Corporation (RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 37).
Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short 7 Rule 116, Section 1(c) “If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional
magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.”
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro 8 Petitioner was assisted by his then lead counsel Dean Antonio Coronel
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having (appearance withdrawn April, 1993 to serve his suspension by the Supreme Court,
the necessary authority and permit4 to carry and possess the same. RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 260) and Atty. Philip Jurado. The prosecution was represented
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.” by Angeles City Prosecutor Antonio G.P. Fausto and his Assistant, Rufino Antonio.
9 Order dated January 20, 1993, RTC Records, Vol. I, pp. 59 and 75.
10 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 57.
_______________
11 RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 48.
1 Investigation Report dated October 26, 1992 of SPO1 Rene Jesus T. Gregorio of 12 RTC Records, Vol. II, p. 828.
the Angeles City, Philippine National Police (PNP), (RTC Records, Vol. 1, p. 9). 13 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. CR-16040. Atty. Jurado withdrew his
2 CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, appearance as petitioner’s counsel on October, 1994 when the appeal was pending
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF before the CA. His signature, however still appeared on some pleadings for petitioner
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN (CA Rollo, p. 429). Rene A. V. Saguisag and Associates entered their appearance
THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITIONS OR EXPLOSIVES;
AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF 408

AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.

3 The Information was filed by Special Counsel Irin Zenaida S. Buan and was 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-1083 of Branch 61 of the Angeles City R.T.C.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
presided by Judge David R. Rosete.
4 RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion
407 to cancel petitioner’s bail bond. The resolution of this motion was
incorporated in the now assailed 14 respondent court’s decision
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 407 sustaining petitioner’s conviction, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed
5

The lower court then6 ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond
application for bail. During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance
7

plea of not guilty 8was entered for petitioner after he refused, upon Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional
9

advice of counsel, to make any plea. Petitioner waived in writing Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest
10

his right to be present in any and all stages of the case. of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant
judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
charged and sentenced him to an “indeterminate penalty from 17 appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance
11 as minimum, to 21

years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.” Petitioner filed his herewith. 15

12

notice of appeal on April 28, SO ORDERED.”

13 1994. Pending the appeal in the
16
respondent Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced that
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. On
the conviction
August 9, 1995 he filed17a “motion for reconsideration (and to recall
the warrant of arrest)” but the same was 18denied by respondent
court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution, copy of which was 20 One supplemental petition was filed on October 9, 1995 signed by Padilla, Jurado and
received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, Saguisag. The other supplemental petition was filed on October 11, 1995 and signed by the
September 28, petitioner filed the instant peti- Raval Suplico and Lokin Office.
21 Signed by Padilla, Jurado and Saguisag.
22 Solicitor-General’s Comment on the application for bail.
_______________
23 Padilla vs. CA and People, (Resolution), G.R. No. 121917, July 31, 1996.
as new counsel (CA Rollo, p. 58). Appellant’s brief, however, was also signed by 24 Rollo, pp. 258, 282.
his brother Robert A. Padilla and Gina C. Garcia (CA Rollo, p. 146). 25 Rollo, pp. 312-339.
14 The 23-page CA (Special Tenth Division) decision promulgated on July 21, 26 Counterstatement of Facts, Appellee’s Brief filed with the CA by the Solicitor-General
1995 was penned by Justice Antonio P. Solano with Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and (CA Rollo, pp. 230-240).
Conchita Carpio-Morales, concurring. (Rollo, pp. 50-72).
15 CA Decision, p. 23; Rollo, p. 50. 410
16 Registry Return Receipt, attached to p. 343 of the CA Rollo.
17 Registry Receipt stamped August 9, 1995. See CA Rollo, pp. 403-430. 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
18 CA Rollo, pp. 463-464.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
409
ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 409
highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid.) In the local
19
vernacular, he said thus: ‘ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota
tion for review on certiorari with application for bail followed
20 by makaaksidente ya.’ (p. 7, ibid.). True enough, immediately after the vehicle
two “supplemental petitions”
21 filed by different counsels, a “second had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
supplemental petition” and an urgent motion for the separate 22
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp.
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor-General 7-8, ibid.) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something
sought the denial of the application for bail, to which 23 the Court
(p. 8, ibid.). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked ‘oy ta
agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. The Court na’ signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9,
also granted the Solicitor-General’s motion to file a consolidated ibid).
comment24on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file “Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the
his reply. However, after his vigorous resistance and success on the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt
intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid.). Manarang, being a member of both the
thorough exposition of petitioner’s guilt in his 55-page Brief in the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council,
respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles
turnabout by filing a “Manifestation
25 In Lieu Of Comment” praying City (p. 10, ibid.). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio
for petitioner’s acquittal. controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid.). By
The People’s detailed narration of facts, well-supported by the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the
evidence26 on record and given credence by respondent court, is as place of the accident taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid.).
follows: “Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the
vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid.).
“At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique “He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid.).
Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as
from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the
interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, radio once again (p. 34, ibid.) reporting that a vehicle heading north with
plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN,
_______________ June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of
the second radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City
19 The petition was signed by the Raval Suplico and Lokin Law Office.
with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p. 20, ibid.). One of the units of the
PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake ibid.). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that
Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle
SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately boarded a behind the vehi-
mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the
south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going 412
to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid.). It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the
distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid.). 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

411
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals

cle of appellant (p. 14, ibid.). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 411 which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands
raised, a gun (Exhibit ‘C’) tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed
“Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message (P. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid.). SPO2
from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former’s
which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid.). SPO2
March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it
SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid.). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid.). After disarming
to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was
number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid.). angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid.). By that time, a crowd had formed
“In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which at the place (p. 19, ibid.). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and
figured in the hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid.).
the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia in Kristo “While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO
church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12,
15, 1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO
Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being
was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid.). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid.). He pointed out to
found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the
vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached railing and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid.). Appellant, however,
them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid.). arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by
Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident. holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right
Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11, ibid.). When hand saying ‘iyan, kinuha ang baril ko’ (pp. 13-15, ibid.). Because
Manarang was in front of Tina’s Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had appellant’s jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an
figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina’s armalite rifle tucked in appellant’s back right pocket (p. 16, ibid.). SPO
Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking
hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from
followed it (p. 15, ibid.) towards the Abacan bridge. appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid.). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying
“Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented
Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of
twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded appellant’s vehicle (pp. 16-17, ibid.). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit
their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver’s seat. It had a long magazine
and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid.). They cut into the path of filled with live bullets in a semiautomatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid.). He asked
the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid.). appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily
“SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (p. 12, that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid.). SPO Mercado modified the
TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms
number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid.). The driver (p. 28, ibid.). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights
rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. (pp. 28-29, ibid.).
They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13,
 413 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 413
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solici tor-General’s change of
heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his
“The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake
arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest
Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid.) where appellant voluntarily
of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit ‘L’) with a
Abacan bridge illegal. 28
single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid.) loaded with
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black
bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
(Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid.). After appellant had been person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the
Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating that he personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid.). He was not able to produce any permit arrested has committed it;
to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
TSN, January 25, 1994). a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
“On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit ‘F’) was issued by temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The
Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M- Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has
16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not attempting to commit an offense,
29 (ii) in the presence of the arresting
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid.). A second officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has
Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that been established that petitioner’s vehicle figured in a hit and run—an
the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person,
Padilla (p. 10, ibid.).” who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point
that “presence” does not only require that the arresting person sees
Petitioner’s defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal
the offense, but also when he “hears30the disturbance created thereby
and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
AND proceeds at once to the scene.” As testi-
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2)
that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the _______________

penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel 28 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
27 29 People v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court is 30 US v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516, 519, citing 3 Cyc., 886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S. E.,
convinced that petitioner’s guilt of the crime charged stands 613; Dilger v. Com., 11 S. W., 651; State v. McAfee,

_______________ 415

27 Consisting of about 4,000 pages.

VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 415
414
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
fied to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of fires followed by a articulable” suspicion that the36 occupant of the vehicle has been
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante
to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson)
using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest
sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to was proper as he was again actually committing another offense
the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 (illegal possession of firearm
37 and ammunitions) and this time in the

Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned 31 near the bridge who presence of a peace officer.
effected the actual arrest of petitioner. Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
by arguing that the policemen32who actually arrested him were not at committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the
nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner’s Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen38 saw
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its
was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken dangling plate number (PMA 77739 as reported by Manarang), and the
rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting
are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an
arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, _______________
could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian
may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. 33 United States v. Gordils, 982 F2d 64, 69 (1992).
Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success 34 See People v. de Lara, 55 SCAD 190, 196; 236 SCRA 291, 297 (1994).
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It 35 United States v. Lopez, 989 F2d 24, 26 (1993); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein 798, 806-7 (1982); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-9 (1967).
involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long 36 United States v. King, 990 F2d 1552, 1557 (1993); United States v. Place, 462
list of unreported and unsolved crimes. U.S. 696, 702 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980).
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like 37 See People v. Fernandez, 57 SCAD 481 (1994); Higbee v. City of San Diego,
petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in 911 F2d 377, 379 (1990).
motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was 38 Eighty km/hr or higher. (TSN, Ibid., p. 3).
confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take 39 Exh. “B” and its sub-markings—Picture of the vehicle driven by petitioner
which showed the dangling plate number and the damaged hood and railings.

_______________ 417

12 S. E., 435; State v. Williams, 15 S. E., 554; and Hawkins v. Lutton, 70 N. W.,
483. VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 417
31 TSN, February 13, 1993, Enrique Manarang, pp. 5-11.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
32 This hit and run incident was the subject of a different complaint against
petitioner.
police officer’s personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
416 petitioner’s Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified
40

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals objection, defect or irregularity attending
41 an arrest must be made
33 34 before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner’s belated challenge
action. The exigent circumstances of—hot pursuit, a fleeing thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his
suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime participation in the trial and by presenting his 42 evidence, placed him

—all created35 a situation in which speed is essential and delay in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying
43

improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.
forcible stop since they had more than mere “reasonable and
 We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of thoroughfares furnishes
which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled44instances when a warrantless search and
_______________
seizure of property is valid, are as follows:
45 Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched
_______________ for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.
40 See People v. Woolcock, 314 Phil. 81 (1995). 46 People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997; People v. Figueroa, 248
41 People v. Rivera, 315 Phil. 454; People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 737; People v. SCRA 679 (1995); People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756; People vs. Malmstedt, 198
De Guia, 227 SCRA 614; People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 (1993); People v. de SCRA 401; People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388; People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220;
Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 (1993); People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 (1990). People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122; People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681; Manipon v.
42 People v. Lopez, 315 Phil. 59 citing De Asis v. Romero, 41 SCRA 235 (1971); Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267.
See also People v. Nitcha, 310 Phil. 287 (1995) citing People vs. Hubilo, 220 SCRA 47 Mapp v. Warden, 531 F2d 1167; United States v. Griffin, 530 F2d 739; United
389 (1993); People v. Samson, 244 SCRA 146; Zacarias v. Cruz, 141 Phil. 417 States v. Hilstrom, 533 F2d 209, 429 U.S. 982, 97 S Ct 498; U.S. v. Pacelli, 470 F2d
(1969), citing US v. Grant, 18 Phil. 122, 147; Doce v. Branch II of the CFI of Quezon, 67, 415 U.S. 983, 93 S Ct 1501; Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S Ct
22 SCRA 1028, 1031, citing Carington v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 and US v. Grant, 2022; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S Ct 2022, 2037-38.
supra. 48 Harris v. US, 390 US 234; People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431.
43 In Re Letter of Freddie Manuel, 54 SCAD 97, 99, 235 SCRA 5 (1994); People 49 People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995); People v. Fernandez, supra, citing
v. Dural, 42 SCAD 213, 223 SCRA 201 (1993); Palanca v. Querubin, 141 Phil. 432 People v. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980); People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122;
(1969). Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336.
44 Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996. The fifth
being customs search. 419

418
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 419
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
50 cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity.
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
45
4. consented warrantless search, and
under Section 12, Rule 12646 of the Rules of Court and by
5. customs search.
prevailing jurisprudence,
2. seizure
47 of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which In conformity with respondent court’s observation, it indeed appears
are: that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner’s firearms and
ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that
51
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver
official duties; and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police view” of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver
who had the right to be where they are; and magazine tucked in petitioner’s waist and back pocket
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his
(d). “plain view” 48justified mere seizure of evidence without Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
further search. armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as
49
they took a casual glance at the52 Pajero and saw said rifle lying
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the horizontally near the driver’s seat. Thus it has been held that:
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
“(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing 57 People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1944).
their duties as police officers for53 the apprehension of the guilty person and 58 United States v. Saffeels, 982 F2d 1199, 1206 (1992); Michigan v. Long, 463
the taking of the corpus delicti.” U.S. 1032, 1034-5 (1983).
59 United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F2d 1216, 1222 (1993); United States v.

_______________ Franco, 981 F2d 470, 473 (1992); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-1 (1981).
60 United States v. $639,558.00 in United States Currency, 955 F2d 712-715-16
50 United v. Rem, 984 F2d 806, 812 (1993); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, supra, (1992); United States v. Holifield, 956 F2d 665, 669 (1992); United States v. Arango,
at p. 1220; United States v. McCoy, 977 F2d 706, 710 (1992); United States v. Rusher, 879 F2d 1501, 1505 (1989).
966 F2d 868, 874 (1992); United States v. Parker, 928 F2d 365-69 (1991). 61 United States v. Tarazon, 989 F2d 1045, 1051 (1993).
51 Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, citing People v. Exum, 382 Ill.
204, 47 N.E. 2d 56, 59. 421
52 TSN, SPO Mercado, July 1, 1993, p. 5.
53 Concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto in Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 421
776 cited in People v. Cruz, ibid., at 141 and People v. Acol, ibid.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
420 62
with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a
search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith,
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
-
“Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently
54 found in cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
-
plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.” offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the
-
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments
63 or the
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. Anent his
assorted55 magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the
second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of
police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated
56 a waiver of his violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent
right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to authorized to possess and carry the64 subject firearms and ammunition
quash 57the information estopped him from assailing any purported as evidenced by a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly
defect. issued by PNP Supt.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products
of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle
_______________
of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can
still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first 62 Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969).
instance). Once the lawful arrest
58 was effected, the police may 63 People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557, 566.
undertake a protective search
59 of the passenger compartment and 64 Exhibit “1”—Alleged Mission Order of Petitioner contains the following:
containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s
60 grabbing
distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the Republic of the Philippines
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched Department of Interior and Local Government
(vehicle)
61 was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate Headquarters Philippine National Police
control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous Lianga, Surigao, del Sur

29 Sept. 1992
_______________
Mission Order
54 People v. Evaristo, supra. Number 29-9-92-B
55 TSN, March 8, 1993, SPO Ruben Mercado, pp. 32-35. To: PSUPT GREGORIO DUREMBES
56 In People v. Doro, 223 SCRA 19 the Court said that the accused therein waived      SO ROBIN C. PADILLA
his right against the warrantless search when he voluntarily opened the package      -P O S T-
containing illegal drugs. See also People v. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221.      I. PROCEED TO: Camp Crame, NCR, Recom 1-12-Baguio City
      II. PURPOSE: To intensify Int’l. coverage and to negotiate the imdte. surrender magazines; Exh. “O”—1 short magazine.
of Father Frank Navarro (rebel priest), believed attending conference in Baguio City.
(CPP/NPA). 423

     III. DURATION: FROM: 29 Sept to 31 Oct. 1992

VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 423
422
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Appellant’s contention is predicated on the assumption that the
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject
firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in
Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the
Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit. Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, “Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof
(2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm 65 of his authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The preliminary investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of
first element66 is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him,
ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession via a valid present any proper document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality,
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced
to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel informed the
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject
evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial
reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these
afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not
On this score, we lift from respondent court’s incisive observation. even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
Thus: “Even in appellant’s Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution
rested contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
_______________ authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.
“At the initial presentation of appellant’s evidence, the witness cited was
IV. AUTHORIZE TO WEAR THE FOLLOWING UNIFORM/ATTIRE: one James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent
(x) KHAKI ( ) HBT (x) CIVILIAN Gumtang was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was
V. AUTHORIZED TO CARRY THE FOLLOWING FIREARMS: LIC OR MR not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the
MAKE KIND CAL SER NO AMMO defense found Superintendent 67Gumtang who appeared in court without
subpoena on January 13, 1994.”
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIC or MR issued Firearms & Ammos The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the
-x-x-x-x-x-x-x Nothing Follows x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner’s alternative excuses
that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or
RECOMMENDED BY:           APPROVED BY: that they were owned by
Sgd. RODIALO A. GUMTANG
SUPT (CSP) PNP
_______________
Deputy & S-4
67 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 18-19; Rollo, pp. 67-68.
65 People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996; People vs. Lualhati,
234 SCRA 325 (1994); People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992). 424
66 Exh. “C”—357 Smith and Wesson with bullets; Exh. “D”—M-16 armalite with
magazine; Exh. “K”—M-16 magazine; Exh. “L”—Pietro Berreta; Exh. “N”—2 long
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED unauthorized source, petitioner’s Mission Order and Memorandum
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. 72 Besides, the
Mission Order covers “Recom 1-12-Baguio City,” areas outside
Supt. Gumtang’s area of responsibility73 thereby needing prior
the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
approval “by next higher Headquarters” which is absent in this
Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their
case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the
innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity
Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:
to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question
and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare “No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without
him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply
itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially
explicit in providing that: taken up in that unit’s property book, and that report of such action has been
reported to higher AFP authority.”
“VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement
units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Had petitioner’s Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no
Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to reason why he cannot present the corresponding certification as well.
avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding. What is even more peculiar is that petitioner’s name, as certified
“IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in
confidential instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian
not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event,
68 this Mission Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of
Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such violation.” a Mission Order, a fact admitted
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
_______________
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted. Witness 71 Issued by PNP Director-General Cesar Nazareno, March 21, 1991. Its pertinent
for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his provision states as follows:
signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared 69 “3.a. Only Unit Commanders/Chiefs of Offices are authorized to issue Mission
further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his behalf. His Orders to their respective personnel while in the official performance of duties. Such
surname thereon,
70 we note, was glaringly misspelled as MOs shall be valid only within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Unit
“Durembes.” In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Commander/Chief of Office concerned.
Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and “c. MOs of PNP personnel performing mission outside AOR must be approved by
Memorandum Receipts under the Guide- next higher Headquarters.”
72 Exhibit “1.”
_______________ 73 See Note 71, supra.

68 Exhibit “1”; Exhibit “Y.” 426

69 TSN, Supt. Gregorio Durendes, February 10, 1994, p. 11.
70Exhibit “1” for the Defense; Exhibit “U” (Rebuttal) for the Prosecution.
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
425 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
74
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 425 by petitioner’s counsel. The implementing rules of P.D. 1866
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
71
lines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. PNP Supt. “No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the
Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner’s Mission Order and same to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the
Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and
Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the
agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law with Serial No. TCT 8214?
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which “A. Yes, sir.
specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and —
that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its
equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at “Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not
75
— listed in the names of the accused in this case?
higher levels of command.” 77
“A. Yes, sir.
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice —
likewise provides as follows:
x x x      x x x      x x x
“If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed
service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the And the certification which provides as follows:
government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular
compensation for the service they are rendering.” Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
That petitioner’s Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
fabricated pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the Camp Crame, Quezon City
Firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP
“PNPFEO5           28 November 1992
_______________
“C E R T I F I C A T I O N
74 Ethel Ignacio, Chief of the Non-Uniform Personnel Section of the PNP, testified
“TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
that petitioner’s name is not in the Plantilla of Personnel. Counsel for petitioner
admitted that the latter is “not in the plantilla.” (Rollo, p. 357; CA Decision, p. 14;
“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St.,
TSN, Ethel Ignacio, July 25, 1994, pp. 4-6).
Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and
75 April 28, 1984 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D.
1866 issued by the PC-INP Chief and DirectorGeneral.
_______________
427
76 Sr. Inspector Jose Mario Espino, of the PNP Headquarters in Camp Crame,
Quezon City issued the certification dated November 28, 1992 and December 11,
VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 427 1992. (Exhibits “F” and “G”; TSN, March 4, 1993, Jose Mario Espino, pp. 7, 9, 14-

Padilla vs. Court of Appeals 17).

77 TSN, Sr. Inspector Jose Mario Espino, March 4, 1993, p. 14.

declaring that petitioner’s confiscated 76firearms are not licensed or 428

registered in the name of the petitioner. Thus:

“Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
— what did you find, if any? Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
“A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered
owner of one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License
TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked whether it is No. RL M76C4476687.
registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the “Further certify that the following firearms are not registered
caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the with this Office per verification from available records on file this
same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or
Office as of this date:
registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
“Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
— Robin C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
 “However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in
number 35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-
Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re- subversive context” and adds that respondent court should have
Registered License. applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms
“This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of since the
84 reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
Angeles. exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21
“FOR THE CHIEF, FEO: years for simple illegal possession of85 firearm is cruel and excessive
in contravention of the Constitution.
(Sgd.) The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law
Sr. Inspector, PNP
78 at the time of appellant’s commission of the offense86 for it is a rule
Chief, Records Branch” that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the 87
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands.
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of
And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying
a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and
P.D. 1866
Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of
any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable 79 doubt the
_______________
second 80element of illegal possession of firearm. In People vs.
Tobias, we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show 81 People vs. Mesal, 313 Phil. 888.
that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, 82 TSN, Jose Mario Espino, March 4, 1993, p. 20.
the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess 83 People vs. Cahindo, G.R. No. 121178, January 27, 1997; People vs.
was Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996; People vs. Angeles, 315 Phil. 23;
People vs. Remoto, 314 Phil. 432.
_______________ 84 Supplemental petition, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 84-86.
85 Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution.
78 Exhibit “F.” In Exhibit “G,” petitioner’s alias, “Robinhood C. Padilla,” was
86 Article 7, Civil Code.
checked and yielded the same information found in Exhibit “F” quoted above.
87 See: People v. Limaco, 88 Phil. 36; People v. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244.
79 Mallari vs. CA and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 110569, December 9,
1996 citing People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996. Such and 430
similar certifications were declared adequate by the Court in Rosales vs. CA, 255
SCRA 123 (1996); People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82, 97 (1994).
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
80 G.R. No. 114185, January 30, 1997.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
429

which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 429 Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for
simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to
overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification
81 may
appellant’s erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not
even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence that an M-16
ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol,
82 akin to the
confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, as in the case “It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. ‘The fact that the
petitioner’s conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
none was presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the unusual.’ (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held
trial court and respondent court83which, as a rule, are accorded by the that to come under the ban, the punishment must be ‘flagrantly and plainly
Court with respect and finality. oppressive,’ ‘wholly disproportionate88to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community.’ ”
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it “In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been
is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that alleged or proved. In accordance94 with the doctrine regarding special laws
determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that explained in People v. Simon, although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived 89 to be harsh, are not special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code,
cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex
in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there “This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance
must be a clear and unequivocal breach90 of the Constitution, not a with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription
doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the 91 under the law, shall be the maximum of the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court.
Just recently, the Court _______________

92 People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361, 367-368.

_______________
93 255 SCRA 532 (1996).
88 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647. 94 234 SCRA 555.
89 Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., 202 SCRA 405, 417.
432
90 Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30, 55.
91 Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648; Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., 202 SCRA 405.
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
431
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 269, MARCH 12, 1997 431 range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is,
prision95mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms 92

[are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution...” WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
Appellant’s grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty Appeals sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the
should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is
wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is
within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief MODIFIED to “ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws. SO ORDERED.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed
by respondent court (17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion           Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and
temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as Panganiban, JJ., concur.
maximum), we reduce
93 the same in line with the fairly recent case of
People v. Lian where the Court en banc provided that the Judgment affirmed with modification.
indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of
firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should Note.—Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) person of the accused must be made before he enters his pleas,
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. (People vs. Rivera, 245
as maximum. This is discernible from the following explanation by SCRA 421 [1995])
the Court:
——o0o——
 _______________

95 People v. Jian, 255 SCRA 532, 542.

433

© Copyright 2023 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.