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Afr.j. polit. sci. (1997), Vol. 2 No. 1, 122-139

Elections in Zimbabwe:
The ZANU (PF) Hegemony and its
Incipient Decline
Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe*

Abstract
This contribution seeks to explain the ruling ZANU (PF) party's electoral hege-
mony by outlining and analysing Zimbabwe 'sfive general elections since 1979 and
the two presidential elections since 1990. In this regard, the paper argues that the
ruling party is experiencing a gradual decline in elite cohesion which is manifested
in the electoral challenge of independent candidates coming from the ruling party
itself. This phenomenon of independent candidates could have far-reaching
consequences in overcoming the present state of weak political opposition in
Zimbabwe. The paper therefore suggests a scenario in which a viable opposition
could comefrom a splinter group inside the ruling ZANU (PF) itself not unlike the
major ZAPU/ZANU split of 1963.

Introduction
Observers of the Zimbabwe political scene are likely to assume that Zimbabwe
was, until the 1990s, a one-party state. This is because for the better part of the
1980s Zimbabwe's political leadership and the ruling party aggressively advo-
cated a one-party system. The socialist ideology which the leadership proclaimed
during this period also reinforces this view. The fact, however, is that Zimbabwe
has never been a one-party state, before or after independence in 1980. It is true that
Zimbabwe has been, for all practical purposes, a de facto one-party state. But this
tendency has always been there both during the colonial period and after indepen-
dence.1 After independence there was a strong drive towards de jure one-party
government; but this never materialised. Consequently, general and presidential
elections have been held at regular intervals. The problem, however, is that even

1027-0353 © 199?African Association of Political Science

 Elections in Zimbabwe 123

though Zimbabwe has never foreclosed multi-party electoral opportunities, the

power structure has limited such opportunities by maintaining and perpetuating a
one-party psychology for the first eleven years of independence. This, as we shall
discuss, was abandoned in 1991.
To date, including the 1979 "internal settlement" elections, Zimbabwe has had
five general elections, the first in 1979; the second in 1980; the third in 1985; the
fourth in 1990; and the fifth in 1995. The two presidential elections were held in
1990 and 1996. Although these elections have always been contested by different
parties, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front [ZANU
(PF)] party has held electoral hegemony since the independence elections of 1980.
While voter turn out was very high in the elections of the 1980s, there was a sharp
decline in voter turn out in the 1990s. This decline has not been only in parliamen-
tary and presidential elections, but has also been reflected in local government
elections. Since the incorporation of Patriotic Front—Zimbabwe African People's
Union [PF-ZAPU] party into the ruling ZANU (PF) party, the remaining opposi-
tion parties have been very weak. Under these circumstances, it is only independent
candidates who have emerged to challenge the electoral hegemony of ZANU (PF).
In this essay, we seek to explain the ruling ZANU (PF) party's electoral
hegemony by analysing Zimbabwe's five general elections since 1979 and the two
presidential elections since 199O.We argue that the ruling party is experiencing a
gradual decline in elite cohesion which has resulted in electoral challenges by
independent candidates from the ruling party itself, and that this independent
candidates phenomenon could have far reaching consequences in overcoming the
weakness of organised opposition to ZANU (PF).
The concept of elite cohesion as used in this essay refers to the strong sense of
unity or 'sticking together' of the core leadership group in an organisation — in this
case, the ZANU (PF). The core leadership group inside the ZANU (PF) includes
members of the politburo, central committee, and (after the 1980 elections) its
parliamentary caucaus. Membership of these three top party structures invariably
overlaps; therefore its core leadership is relatively small, involving about a
hundred men and women. Many factors explain elite cohesion within the ZANU
(PF) immediately before and after the 1980 independence election. The most
obvious of this was the need to win the historic election of that year. But perhaps,
a more important factor during this period was the fact that the party's leadership
did not trust the intentions of the country's white-only political elite, that was
concentrated in the Rhodesian Front party, and their African allies of the "internal
settlement". Nor did they trust the elites of the PF-ZAPU who were theirchief rival
for power in independent Zimbabwe. The distrust, paticularly of PF-ZAPU,
worsened soon after the independence elections leading to the conflict in
Matebeleland. The dissident activities in Matebeleland and parts of the Midlands
were viewed by the ZANU (PF) as a challenge to and a test of the party's will and
124 Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe

capacity to rule. This challenge reinforced the need for elite cohesion up to the
merger of these two leading nationalist parties in 1987. After this period dissent and
opposition were transferred into the party itself; and the party became increasingly
pre-occupied with such internal dissent, criticism and opposition. The increase in
such contradictions within the ZANU (PF) itself and the party's apparent inability
to resolve them satisactorily has weakened elite cohesion resulting in the
phenomenon of independent candidates. Therefore, it could be argued that elite
cohesion is a function of external threats to the survival of an organisation. As such
threats are minimised, sustaining elite unity becomes problematic.

The Electoral System

The majority of black Zimbabweans were enfranchised by the Zimbabwe-Rhode-
sia "internal settlement" Constitution which produced the short-lived Muzorewa
government of 1979. Thus, for the black majority, electoral politics essentially
began in 1979. The electoral system used for this election was proportional
representation (PR) based on the party list system according to which seats in the
National Assembly were allocated in proportion to the number of votes that each
contesting party won in each of the country's eight provinces. This is the first time
in the electoral history of this country the PR system was used. A threshold of 5%
was used for allocating seats in each province. This PR system was again used in
the 1980 independence general elections, but was abandoned in the 1985 elections
and replaced with the single member district (SMD) or first-past-the-post, winner-
takes-all system used during the colonial era. This has been the electoral system
used in all subsequent elections.
Several reasons were given for introducing the PR system for both the "internal
settlement" and the independence elections. The major reason was the security
situation prevailing in the country at the time. It should be recalled that by 1979,
most parts of the country was contested territory between Rhodesian security
forces and nationalist fighters. This made the delimitation of constituencies
entailed in single member district electoral systems very difficult and hazardous.
As the end of the war approached constiutency delimitation was considered to be
time-consuming for a people impatient to exercise the vote for which they had
waited and fought for many years. Another reason given for PR, advanced
especially by white Rhodesian politicians, was that PR is more conducive to
democratic representation. They conveniently argued that in a plural society such
as Zimbabwe, the PR system prevented one group from having a monopoly of
power either in the national legislature or in the cabinet.2
Many political engineers, particularly for Africa in the 1990s, have argued that
the PR system is not only more democratic than SMD, but that it is also an effective
mechanism for managing and accommodating ethnic and other cleavages in plural
societies. (Horowitz, 1991; 1993 : 18-38; Lijphart, 1990 : 2-13; 1993 : 146-158;
 Elections in Zimbabwe 125

Nohlen, 1996 : 103-121). For Zimbabwe, in particular, Jonathan Moyo (1992 :

156-162) has strongly argued in favour of the PR system for the simple reason that
it is most suitable for societies which are in the process of developing a democratic
culture.'
However, mainstream nationalists were sceptical of PR; they saw it as a play
being used by white politicians to prevent a clear electoral victory by African
nationalists; so that whites would form a coalition government with moderate and
pliable African personalities and parties.4 By and large, in accepting PR the
nationalists (particularly of the Patriotic Front led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua
Nkomo) did so only as a temporary and emergency measure. Their preference for
the first-past-the-post electoral system was made known during the 1979 Lancaster
Conference and that they intended rewriting the Electoral Act with the view of
introducing the constituency based SMD system if they won the independence
elections.5

Elections
The temptation in any discussion of elections in Zimbabwe is to start from the 1980
independence election; but we are convinced that electoral politics for the vast
majority of Zimbabweans started with the so-called "internal settlement" election
of 1979. This is when the franchise was extended to the majority of the African
people. Moreover, many major patterns and characteristics of Zimbabwe electoral
politics are traceable from this election. For instance, besides universal adult
suffrage, such institutions and mechanisms as bicameral parliament, reserved seats
for whites only, the election supervisory commission, election directorate, the
practice of inviting international election monitors, voter education, polling
procedures, the use of "indelible" ink, etc., which have become a prominent feature
of subsequent elections were all introduced in the 1979 election.

The 1979 Election

Five political parties contested the elections of 1979 under the PR party list system
using the threshold of 5% in the eight provinces. The total common roll poll was
1,852,772 out of an estimated voting population of 2.9 million. Thus, 64.45% of
potential voters cast their vote. Bishop Abel Muzorcwa's United African National
Council [UANC] won a clear majority capturing 51 of the 72 common roll seats;
Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU] (Sithole) came second with 12 seats,
and Chief Kaisa Ndiweni came third with 9 seats, mainly in the two Matebeleland
provinces, his home area. The total electoral strength of each party taking part in
the 1979 elections is shown in Table 1. Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) and Joshua
Nkomo'sPF-ZAPU (together representing the mainstream nationalist movement)
then based in and fighting a guerrilla war from exile, did not take part in these
elections. This boycott cast a huge shadow of doubt as to the legitimacy of the
126 Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe

Table 1: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: Results of the 1979 Election

Party Valid Votes % of Valid Votes Seats Won

UANC (Muzorewa) 1,212,639 67 51

ZANU (Sithole) 262,928 15 12

UNFP (Ndiweni) 194,446 11 9
ZUPO (Chirau) 114,570 6 —
NDU (Chiota) 1,870 1 —
Total 1,786,453 100.00 72

Estimated voting population: 2,900,000.

Total poll: 1,852,772 (64% of voting population).
Spoilt papers: 66,319 (4% of votes cast).
Source: Masipula Sithole, "The General Elections, 1979-1985," in Ibbo Mandaza
(ed.),Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1985. (Dakar:
CODESRIA, 1986), p. 79.

elections thereby necessitating the "all-party" Lancaster House Constitutional

Conference towards the end of 1979 at which a Constitution for an independent
Zimbabwe was agreed.

The 1980 Independence Election

Similarly, the independence elections of 1980 were conducted under the propor-
tional representation system for reasons of security and expediency. Again, a 5%
threshold was used in allocating seats in the eight provinces. A total of nine parties
contested these elections held over a period of three exciting days, 27-29 March
1980. However, only three parties, Mugabe's ZANU (PF), Nkomo's PF-ZAPU,
and Muzorew's UANC won seats. ZANU (PF), which won 57 of the 80 common
roll seats, emerged the clear winner, capturing 63% of the popular vote. Nkomo's
PF-ZAPU with 24% of the popular vote came second, winning 20 seats. Muzorewa's
UANC came third with 8% of the popular vote, capturing the remaining^ seats.
The other six parties together polled 5% of the popular vote. The total valid votes
were 2,649,529. No party boycotted the election this time. Table 2 shows the results
of the 1980 independence election.

The 1985 Elections

The first post-independence elections were held in 1985. These elections were now
held on single-member-district (SMD) constituency basis or "winner take all"
following the anticipated amendment to the Electoral Act. A total of six political
 Elections in Zimbabwe 127

Table 2: Zimbabwe: Results of the 1980 Election

Party Valid Votes % of Valid Votes Seats Won

ZANU (PF) (Mugabe) 1,668,992 63 57

PF - ZAPU (Nkomo) 638,879 24 20
UANC (Muzorewa) 219,307 8 3
ZANU (Sithole) 53,343 2 —
ZDP (Chikerema) 28,181 1 —
NFZ (Mandaza) 18,794 1 —
NDU (Chiota) 15,056 1 —
UNFP (Ndiweni) 5,796 0 —
UP AM 1,181 0 —
TOTAL 2,649,529 100% 80

Estimated voting population: 3,000,000.

Total Poll: 2,702,275 (94% voter turnout).
Spoilt Papers: 52,746 (2% of votes cast).

Source: Masipula Sithole, "The General Elections, 1979-1985," in Ibbo Mandaza

(ed.),Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1985. (Dakar:
CODESRIA, 1986), p. 83.

parties contested in these elections. The same pattern as in the 1980 elections was
repeated, except that Muzorewa now lost his three seats to Mugabe's party, which
won 64 seats, but in turn lost one seat to Sithole's party in the eastern Chipinge
district, the home of the latter's ethnic Ndau. Nkomo's PF-ZAPU won every single
constituency in Matebeleland where the Delimitation Commission had allocated
15 seats. PF-ZAPU lost the 5 seats it had won in the 1980 party-list poll mainly in
the Midlands province where the Shona-Ndebele mix is substantial, and where, in
turn, the 1985 constituencies had presumably been gerrymandered.6
Out of a total of 2,893,285 valid votes cast, 77% went to Mugabe's ZANU (PF),
19% to Nkomo's PF-ZAPU, while 1 % went to Sithole's ZANU faction. However,
Muzorewa's UANC polled 2.238% (almost double what Sithole's party won) but
did not secure a single seat. Sithole's party was the beneficiary of the SMD
electoral system. (We shall comment on this later). Table 3 shows the results of the
1985 parliamentary elections. Again, no party boycotted this election, although
Sithole had gone into voluntary exile leaving a surrogate candidate.7
128 Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe

The 1990 Election

The 1990 general election took place after the unity accord between ZANU (PF)
and PF-ZAPU, traditionally the main opposition parties in Zimbabwean politics.
Five political parties contested, but a new opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity
Movement (ZUM) led by Edgar Tekere was the main opposition. It was formed in

Table 3: Zimbabwe: Results for the 1985 Election

Party Valid Votes %of Valid Votes Seats Won

ZANU (PF) (Mugabe) 2,233,320 77 64

PF ZAPU (Nkomo) 558,771 19 15
ZANU (Sithole) 36,054 1 1
UANC (Muzorewa) 64,764 2 —
NDU (Chiota) 295 0 —
NFZ (Mandaza) 81 0 —
TOTAL 2,893,285 100% 80

Registered voters: 3,500,000.

Total Poll: 2,972,146 (84% voter turnout).
Spoilt papers: 78,861 (3% of votes cast).

Source: Masipula Sithole, "The General Elections, 1979-1985," in Ibbo Mandaza

(ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1985. (Dakar:
CODESRIA, 1986), p. 90.

1989 amidst speculation that Zimbabwe would be declared a one-party state after
the 1990 elections. ZUM enjoyed widespread national appeal, the first opposition
party to do so after independence. Although it was thoroughly defeated (winning
2 seats against the ZANU (PF)'s 117 of the 120 contested seats) in an election,
which was once more held under the winner-takes-all SMD system. ZUM won
18% of the popular vote. This would have meant at least 20 seats for ZUM, had the
elections been held on a national party-list or proportional representation system.8
The results of the 1990 elections (held after the 1987 ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU
merger), still reflected a tendency towards ethnic voting in the sense that the united
party had the common sense not to put up Shona candidates in Ndebele constitu-
encies, and vice versa. Moreover, notwithstanding ZUM's national appeal, its two
seats were won in Manicaland, home province of its leader Edgar Tekere, where
it naturally polled the highest number of votes. Again, the Chipinge constituency
retained its loyalty to Sithole's party, though its leader was still in exile.
 Elections in Zimbabwe 129

Table 4: Zimbabwe: Results of the 1990 Elections (Parliamentary)

Party Valid Votes % of Valid Votes Seats Won

ZANU (PF) (Mugabe) 1,690,071 81 117

ZUM (Tekere) 369,031 18 2
ZANU-Ndonga (Sithole) 19,448 1 1
UANC (Muzorewa) 9,667 1 —
NDU 498 0 —
Independents (7) 9,478 5 —
Total 2,098,193 100% 120

Registered Voters: 4,800,000.

Total Poll: 2,237,524 (54% voter turnout).
Spoilt Votes: 134,336 (6% of votes cast).

Source: Computed from data in Jonathan Moyo, Voting for Democracy:

Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe. (Harare: University of Zimbabwe
Publications, 1992), pp. 166-181.

Also important to note about the 1990 election is the decline in voter turnout.
From 84% in the 1985 election, the turnout had dropped to 54% in 1990, a
significant drop of 30%. This phenomenon would be repeated in subsequent
elections, both parliamentary and presidential, as well as in local government
elections, particularly in urban areas.9 Equally significant about the 1990 elections
is the rather high percentage of spoilt votes — 6% of the total poll. In the 1979
election, the spoilt vote was 4%; in 1980, it was 2%; and in 1985, it was
3%. The 6% spoilt votes recorded in the 1990 election represents a 200% increase
of spoilt votes from the 1980 election. The number of spoilt votes rose
from 6% in 1990 to an all time high of 8% in the 1995 election. (See Table 5).

The 1995 Election

The 1995 general election was the first election to be boycotted since the
independence election of 1980. However, a total of six political parties took part,
with only two parties and one independent candidate winning seats. ZANU (PF)
again won overwhelmingly. It captured 117 seats and 76% of the valid votes cast
in a national poll of 1,482,660. This represented a voter turnout of 57% of total
registered voters which was estimated at 2,600,000 in a population of nearly 5
million potential voters. This means that almost half of the voting population did
not vote.10
130 Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe

Sithole's ZANU (Ndonga) won 2 seats, capturing 93,546 or 6% of the total valid
poll. Although Dumbutshena's FPZ polled 88,223 or 6% of the valid votes, it did
not win any seat. ZANU (Ndonga) was the beneficiary of a constituency based
SMD electoral system. Moreover, the two constituencies (Chipinge North and
Chipinge South) had the largest concentration of Sithole's ethnic Ndau who
constitute about 330,000 or 3% of the country's nearly 11 million people.
Dumbutshena, like Mugabe, is a Zezuru; invariably his party must share the ethnic
Zezuru vote with ZANU (PF) in regions where there is a large concentration of
Zezurus. The Zezuru constitute about 18% of the African population. Although the
national capital Harare is multi-ethnic, it is largely Zezuru." Dumbutshena
contested Florence Chitauro of ZANU (PF) in the Harare Central constituency and
won 3,858 or 29% of the vote to Chitauro's 9,417 or 71 %. Sithole on the other hand,
won 15,400 or 76 % to ZANU (PF)'s Edgar Musikavanhu who polled 4,722 or 24%
in the Chipinge South constituency.
A significant development in the 1995 parliamentary election is the number of
independent candidates. There were no independent candidates in the three
preceeding elections; but there were twelve in the 1990 elections. In the 1995
elections the number of independent candidates rose to twenty-nine, one of them
winning against a ZANU (PF) candidate against the wrath of both the party and
Mugabe.12 The phenomenon of independent candidates also pervades municipal
elections where some of such candidates won in city council and mayoral elections
defeating the ruling ZANU (PF) candidates."
Voter turnout continued to decline and the percentage of spoilt votes rose from
Table 5: Zimbabwe: Results of the 1995 Elections (Parliamentary)

Party Valid Votes % of Valid Votes Seats Won

ZANU (PF) (Mugabe) 1,126,822 76 117

ZANU-Ndonga (Sithole) 93,546 6 2
FPZ (Dumbutshena) 88,223 6 —
Zimbabwe Aristocrats 147 0 —
Independents (29) 62,085 41
Total 1,370,676 120

Registered Voters: 2,600,000

Total Poll: 1,482,660
Spoilt Votes: 111,984 (8% of votes cast).

Source: Computed from election results published in The Herald, 11 April 1995.
 Elections in Zimbabwe 131

6% recorded in the 1990 elections to 8% in 1995. One would have expected that,
at least by 1990, the Zimbabwe electorate would have learned from their experi-
ence of previous elections the civic culture of casting the ballot paper properly. But
it is as if to say, the more the electorate vote the less they know how to cast a valid
vote. It is plausible that spoilt votes are indeed a protest vote.14

The 1990 Presidential Elections

In 1987, Zimbabwe amended its constitution and introduced an executive presidency
that would be elected directly by the people every six years starting from 1990.
Previously, Zimbabwe had a titular president who was elected by an electoral
college comprising the Senate (scraped in 1987) and Parliament (expanded in
1990). The office of prime minister, which previously had executive power, was
abolished. Accordingly, Zimbabwe held its first presidential election ever in 1990.
There were two candidates in this election, ZANU (PF)'s Robert Mugabe and
ZUM's Edgar Tekere. As in the 1990 parliamentary election (held simultaneosly
with the presidential election) 54% registered voters cast their vote. ZANU (PF)
and Mugabe won yet another crushing victory with Mugabe wining 83% of the
valid votes compared to Tekere's 17%. Table 6 shows the results of the 1990
presidential election.

Table 6: Zimbabwe: Results of the 1990 Elections (Presidential)

Candidate Party Valid Votes % Valid Votes

R.G. Mugabe ZANU (PF) 2,026,976 83

E.Z. Tekere ZUM 413,840 17
Total 2,440,816 100% —

Registered Voters: 4,800,000.

Total Poll: 2,587,204 (54% voter turnout).
Spoilt Votes: 146,388 (6% of votes cast).
Source: Computed from data in Jonathan Moyo, Voting for Democracy: Elec-
toral Politics in Zimbabwe. (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publica-
tions, 1992), p. 182.

The 1996 Presidential Election

Although there were now over a dozen political parties on the Zimbabwe political
landscape, only two put up candidates to challenge ZANU (PF)'s Robert Mugabe.
Most of the other opposition parties boycotted the elections which they
claimed were being held on an uneven playing field. Even those which registered
132 Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe

their participation [(Muzorewa of the newly formed United Parties (UP) and
Sithole of ZANU (Ndonga)] later withdrew from the contest for similar reasons.
The boycott notwithstanding the election still went ahead as scheduled with both
Muzorewa and Sithole on the ballot." Mugabe was returned to power with
1,404,501 or 93% valid votes in a poor voter turnout of 32% of an estimated voting
population of 5 million. Muzorewa attracted 72,600 votes or 5%, while Sithole
came third with 36,960 or 2%.
It is clear from the analysis and tables above that ZANU (PF) has clearly
dominated the Zimbabwean electoral landscape since the 1980 independence
elections (whether contesting them alone, as in 1980 and 1985, or after the unity
with PF-ZAPU, as in 1990 and 1995). The question is: What explains this ZANU
(PF) electoral hegemony and weak opposition parties?

ZANU (PF) Hegemony: Towards An Explanation

Many authoritative accounts have been written on the fate of the opposition in
Zimbabwe's one-party dominant regime. These accounts have been critical of the
ruling ZANU (PF) regime's attitude and behaviour towards opposition parties
since independence. The use of state institutions, especially the Central Intelli-
gence Organization (CIO), police, army, and the media (daily newspapers, radio
and television) have been cited. But equally, if not more, important is the fact that
up to mid-1992, the ruling party was financed from public funds through the now
nominally defunct Ministry of Political Affairs which received approximately
Z$50 million every year and operated from a multi-storey, multi-million dollar
headquarters in Harare, the nation's capital. No other party had access to these
funds. Under increasing criticism, this Ministry was abolished, but the financing
of the ruling party continued under the Political Parties (Finance) Act of 1994
under which a party that has at least 15 seats in Parliament is entitled to public
funds. Currently, only 3 seats in Parliament belong to the opposition, undoubtedly
a very weak opposition.
Moreover, the ruling ZANU (PF) has consistently remained to the left of
Zimbabwe's political spectrum before and after independence. It has skilfully
articulated populist policies on land, employment, indigeni/.ation of the economy,
and on any and everything, particularly on the eve of each election year. No other
party has portrayed a more nationalist position than ZANU (PF). It above all has
a shrewd and articulate spokesman in the person of its leader, President Robert
Mugabe through whom the party has remained ingrained in the minds of the masses
of the people.16

The Gukurahundi Policy17

To some extent, the reasons outlined above in their combination explain ZANU
(PF) hegemony and weak opposition in Zimbabwe. But, in our view, what accounts
 Elections in Zimbabwe 133

Table 7: Zimbabwe: Results of the 1996 Elections (Presidential)

Candidate Party Valid Votes % Valid Votes

R.G. Mugabe ZANU (PF) 1,404,501 93
E.T. Muzorewa UP 72,600 5
N. Sithole ZANU (Ndonga) 36,960 2
Total 1,514,061 100% —

Registered Voters: 4,900,000.

Total Poll: 1,557,558 (32% voter turnout).
Spoilt Votes: 43,491 (3% of votes cast).

Source: Computed from election results published in The Herald, 20 March 1996.
The results from four provinces were not published, therefore not
included in the computation. Numerous efforts to get this data from the
Registrar General's Office were to no avail. Moreover, the voters rolls for
this election were reported to be in "shambles." See also note 9.

for ZANU (PF) dominance and a weak opposition is largely the ruling party's
Gukurahundi policy adopted during the latter part of the liberation war — in 1979,
to be precise — and was continued until the early 1990s. This was an undisguised,
intolerant, commandist, and deliberately violent policy towards the opposition. By
this policy the opposition was rendered impotent.
Gukurahundi is a colloquial expression, which in Shona means "the storm that
destroys everything". The peasants, from whom the expression or concept comes,
use it with awe because gukurahundi is an early storm that "destroys everything",
crops and weeds, huts and forests, the good and the bad, including people and
beasts. After gukurahundi, usually nature ushers in a new ecological order. Such
were the intended consequences of ZANU (PF)'s revolutionary policy as it
evolved in the 1970s (ironically) from the countryside.
Based in neighbouring Mozambique (1975-79), ZANU (PF) "officially" adopted
Marxism-Leninism as its ideology in 1977. It declared the year 1979 "Gore
reGukurahundi" (The Year of the Storm) — the revolutionary storm that would
finally destroy the white settler regime; the "internal settlement puppets"; and
finally, the capitalist system. A new socio-economic and political order guided by
Marxist-Leninist principles was to replace the "old order". Gukurahundi was a
policy of annihilation; annihilating the opposition (black and white). Accordingly,
an "enemies list" was published in mid-1979 in which ranking personalities of the
"internal settlement" parties were singled out for liquidation.
134 Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe

The momentum of gukurahundi swept Mugabe and his party to power in the
independence election of 1980. The instrument which ZANU (PF) used during the
build-up to the election was the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA), its military wing. Subsequently, it used its youth and women's league
for political mobilization during and between the successive general elections that
have occurred every five years since the 1980 election. Both of these outfits have
had a "commandist" political culture that is perpetuated by their paramilitary style
of organization. Moreover, the youth wing is mostly led by former ZANLA
combatants. But, by and large, the party lost many of its cadres into the army where,
under British instructors, they were groomed into a "professional" rather than
"political" army. Hence, when faced with a PF-ZAPU opposition in Matebeleland
(1982-87), the ZANU (PF) government created the notorious Fifth Brigade
trained by North Koreans instead of relying solely on the newly created national
army. Significantly, the Fifth Brigade was commonly referred to as gukurahundi
with pride by its sponsors, and with resentment and fear by the objects of the evil
storm in Matebeleland.
Most leading personalities of PF-ZAPU and the former ZIPRA were sacked
from government and from the national army, while others were detained. In 1984,
Joshua Nkomo, the PF-ZAPU leader, fled into temporary exile in England in the
wake of discoveries of arms caches in farms owned by PF-ZAPU. These farms and
other properties were confiscated by the ZANU (PF) government in a triumphant
match into Matebeleland. Following that, the general elections of 1985 were
arranged and held in an atmosphere of the civil strife in Matebeleland. The excesses
of that civil war were so gruesome that the findings of a presidential commission
of inquiry into the conduct of this conflict were not published.18 It was under these
circumstances that Nkomo, on 22 December 1987, signed a unity accord in which
his party merged with ZANU (PF).
It can be said, therefore, that the fate of the opposition was decided during the
war of liberation in the 1970s. With a philosophy of annihilation, complimented
with the monopoly of state power at independence, it became impossible for the
opposition to function as a viable political entity. But by the end of the 1980s,
ZANU (PF) had began to experience cracks in "elite cohesion", thus opening up
space for the opposition in the 1990s.

Fractured "Elite Cohesion" and the Future19

The hitherto mammoth and monolithic party began to show cracks in the latter part
of the 1980s. Edgar Tekere, the then outspoken Secretary General of ZANU (PF),
was the first leader to be expelled from the party in 1987 when he became
increasingly vocal in his criticism of the party. He founded his Zimbabwe Unity
Movement (ZUM) in 1989, the first party to be formed in nine years of indepen-
dence, and the first party to pose a real challenge to ZANU (PF) after PF-ZAPU
 Elections in Zimbabwe 135

merged with ZANU (PF). ZUM contested both the general and presidential
elections of 1990, an election in which the ZANU (PF) leadership had hoped to run
unchallenged and establish a one-party state. The violence perpetrated against the
opposition during the 1990 election was the worst in an election year since
independence, culminating in the shooting of Patrick Kombayi who dared chal-
lenge Vice-President, Simon Muzenda in the Midlands city of Gweru.
The decline in party "elite cohesion" continued to grow, as criticism and
challenge of the party from within persisted. Margaret Dongo, ZANU (PF)
member in the 1990-1995 parliament, defied the party after the politburo refused
to nominate her for the 1995 parliamentary elections. She ran as an independent
candidate and lost, but cried foul. She petitioned the courts and won. A by-election
was called and she won in the mainly working class Harare South constituency in
the nation's capital by a 3 to 1 margin. Similarly, Lawrence Mudehwe defied the
politburo, contested the executive mayoral race in the important eastern border city
of Mutare and won against the favoured party candidate. Following these court and
election victories, successful petitions were lodged at the courts for the nullifica-
tion of more city council and executive mayoral election results on grounds that
there had been "irregularities" in the elections. The important cities of Chitungwiza,
Harare and Masvingo are good examples.20
Perhaps the most interesting (if not most important) manifestation of a rupture
in "elite cohesion" is that epitomised by the charismatic politburo member, Dr.
Eddison Zvobgo, from Masvingo, a province traditionally crucial to ZANU (PF)
politics. In a widely read and debated speech delivered at an international
conference in Harare in November 1995, Zvobgo called for the re-democratization
of the Zimbabwe Constitution, particularly the aspects pertaining to the powers of
the Executive President, which he had ironically drafted in 1987 when he was
Minister for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.21 In 1996, Zvobgo sustained serious
leg injuries in a car accident, and was dropped from the post of Minister of Mines
to Minister-Without-Portfolio in a cabinet reshuffle in May following the April
1996 presidential election. The ostensible reason was that he was in London
receiving medical attention. On his return, however, Zvobgo told the press that he
was "fit for a cabinet post" but there was no response from the President's office;
at least not publicly.
The ruling elite's response to such tendencies has been to expel critics and
opponents from the party: Tekere in 1989; Dongo in 1995; Mudehwe in 1996.
While Tekere formed his own party, ZUM, Dongo has not, at least not for now. But
she is emerging as the rallying point for the "second independence movement" —
a kind of "liberation" from the ruling party. Whether Zvobgo awaits the fate of
Tekere and Dongo (being expelled from the party) remains to be seen. But some
would argue that he might miss his moment the longer he waits, if he has not missed
it already. Whether it is around Dongo, Zvobgo, or someone else, or a combination
136 Masipula Sit hole and John Makumbe

and permutation thereof, it is likely that the ZANU (PF) electoral hegemony will
be broken from within. The independent candidates phenomenon is but an early
manifestation of this scenario.
Finally, the greatest asset ZANU (PF) has had, thus far, is its leader, President
Mugabe himself. He isdisciplined, articulate, learned, and a very shrewd politician.
But he is now 75. Therefore, the choice of his successor and the manner in which
this is done is likely to determine who will be able to galvanize the independents
and the weak opposition groups into a strong political party outside ZANU (PF).
In this scenario, a viable opposition is likely to emerge from a splinter group inside
the ruling ZANU (PF) itself, not unlike the major ZAPU/ZANU split of 1963.

Notes
* Masipula Sithole is Associate Professor in the Department of Political and
Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe; John Makumbe lecturers
at the same institution.
1. For instance, Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern) ruled Southern
Rhodesia for 20 years before taking on federal politics as Prime Minister of
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. Ian Smith and his
Rhodesia Front (RF) party ruled Rhodesia for 16 years until the eve of
majority rule in 1979. Robert Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party have ruled
Zimbabwe since independence (for 17 years so far).
2. This notwithstanding the fact is that from its inception in 1890 as Southern
Rhodesia, the country has been aplural society. White politicians conveniently
came to this realization only 90 years latter! See also footnote 3 below.
3. Moyo accepts the argument that PR might incapacitate decision-making
through hung parliaments. However, he argues that this "does not apply to
countries which are in transition to democracy and which are generally
characterized by a weak civil society." (Moyo, 1992 : 61). Moreover,
experience has shown that developed countries (United States and Britain)
are not immune to hung parliaments, notwithstanding the SMD electoral
system.
4. Every other party seemed to gang up against the "militant" ZANU (PF).
Some, especially local white and foreign governments, even speculated on
a factional arithmetic designed to deprive ZANU (PF) of victory. See
Gregory (1981 : 68).
5. One participant in the Lancaster House negotiations said: "Most of us didn't
bitch about this one because we knew we were going to change it the moment
we got into power. Moreover, we were in a hurry to get that power. We didn' t
want to lose momentum through the long process of drawing up constituen-
cies, counting the number of adults and registering them."
6. In the 1980 election under proportional representation PF-ZAPU got four
 Elections in Zimbabwe 137

seats in the Midlands and one in the adjacent Mashonaland West. In the 1985
election, many areas known to have large concentrations of Ndebele were
split to include them in largely Shona dominated areas.
7. In 1984, Sithole went into voluntary exile after an attempt on his life.
Goodson Sithole was the surrogate candidate in the 1985 election.
8. SeeMoyo, 1992: 156-163.
9. Inastudyofthe 1990e!ection,Makumbe(1992 : 179-188) argued that while
the decade of the 1980s in Zimbabwe's political development was marked by
"politicization" and "participation," the 1990s and beyond would be marked
by "de-politicization" and "de-participation."
10. The reliability of figures for the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential
elections is questionable since the voters rolls were reported to be in
"shambles", even by the Election Supervisory Commission. See The Herald,
March 14, 1995, and also Report of Election Supervisory Commission on the
1995 General Elections.
11. Ethnicity is salient in six sub-ethnic groups in Zimbabwe politics: the
Karanga (22%), Zezuru (18), Manyika (13%), Korekore (12%), Rozwi (9%),
and Ndau (3%). The Ndebele are 19%. For an analysis of the Zimbabwe
ethnic milieu and politics, see Sithole in Glickman (1995 : 122-160).
12. For an analysis of this and related elections, see Sithole (1996 : 2-6).
13. For example, the executive mayoral election in the city of Mutare was won
by an independent against the ruling party's candidate, and recently, in a
Council by-election in Mbare in the city of Harare, another independent
candidate defeated the ruling party's candidate.
14. For instance, reports from reliable sources say that several spoilt ballot
papers were inscribed with: "This is not an election," "The election is already
rigged," "The results are already known," "There is no democracy in
Zimbabwe," etc.
15. The Electoral Act requires that a candidate must lodge notice of his intention
to withdraw at least 21 days before the election. Muzorewa and Sithole
announced their withdrawal only a few days before election day.
16. For instance, the nationalist position, defined as "struggle against domina-
tion by whites and foreigners" still motivates the African people politically.
Mugabe has periodically taunted whites and foreigners, particularly on the
land issue and indigenization of the economy as a whole.
17. See also Sithole (1993: 1997). For the difficulties and dynamics of transform-
ing ZANU (PF) from a liberation movement to the custodian of democratic
values, see Makumbe (1996 : 33-42).
18. This Report was to await when its publication would not open up wounds that
were in the process of healing as a result of the 1987 unity between ZANU
(PF) and PF-ZAPU.
 138 Masipula Sit hole and John Makumbe

19. While we agree that the ZANU (PF) regime has been authoritarian, Makumbe's
work stresses more on the continuing authoritarian character of the regime;
Sithole's work stresses more the signs and symptoms of the erosion of this
authoritarianism. See Makumbe's forthcoming work, One Step Forward and
Two Steps Backward (to be published in Harare by University of Zimbabwe
Publications) and Sithole (1997 : 127-41).
20. The strategy of using the courts in the fight for democracy in Zimbabwe has
produced a new political concept, "Democratization by litigation." See
Makumbe's concluding Chapter in his One Step Forward and Two Steps
Backward: The Zimbabwe 1995-1996 Elections.
21. See Eddison J.M. Zvobgo, "An Agenda for Democracy, Peace and Sustain-
able Development in the SADC Region" (address delivered to parliamentar-
ians at the CPA/IPU Joint Dinner, at Miekles Hotel, Harare, 14 November
1995).

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