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    Picazo 2022 On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics

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    Gustavo Picazo argues that there are no "fundamental metaphysical truths" as John D. Greenwood conceives of them. Picazo introduces a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics. Absolute metaphysical claims attempt to describe ontology universally, while relative claims are restricted to a particular domain or theory. Picazo believes the idea of absolute truths is untenable, and views about social groups persistence should be considered relative, not fundamental, metaphysical claims. If anything should not persist, it is the idea of absolute metaphysics as a respectable academic pursuit.

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    Picazo 2022 On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics

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    Gustavo Picazo argues that there are no "fundamental metaphysical truths" as John D. Greenwood conceives of them. Picazo introduces a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics. Absolute metaphysical claims attempt to describe ontology universally, while relative claims are restricted to a particular domain or theory. Picazo believes the idea of absolute truths is untenable, and views about social groups persistence should be considered relative, not fundamental, metaphysical claims. If anything should not persist, it is the idea of absolute metaphysics as a respectable academic pursuit.

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    Gustavo Picazo argues that there are no "fundamental metaphysical truths" as John D. Greenwood conceives of them. Picazo introduces a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics. Absolute metaphysical claims attempt to describe ontology universally, while relative claims are restricted to a particular domain or theory. Picazo believes the idea of absolute truths is untenable, and views about social groups persistence should be considered relative, not fundamental, metaphysical claims. If anything should not persist, it is the idea of absolute metaphysics as a respectable academic pursuit.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    2 views3 pages

    Picazo 2022 On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics

    Uploaded by

    gfdezdp
    Gustavo Picazo argues that there are no "fundamental metaphysical truths" as John D. Greenwood conceives of them. Picazo introduces a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics. Absolute metaphysical claims attempt to describe ontology universally, while relative claims are restricted to a particular domain or theory. Picazo believes the idea of absolute truths is untenable, and views about social groups persistence should be considered relative, not fundamental, metaphysical claims. If anything should not persist, it is the idea of absolute metaphysics as a respectable academic pursuit.

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    of 3

    ON THE PERSISTENCE OF

    ABSOLUTE METAPHYSICS
    Gustavo PICAZO

    ABSTRACT: Greenwood (2019) casts doubts upon whether a certain view about social
    groups (the view that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership, by
    virtue of the maintenance of their structure or function) is a fundamental metaphysical
    truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social
    groups. In this note, I introduce a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics,
    and argue that there are no ‗fundamental metaphysical truths‘ (as Greenwood conceives
    of them) at all. If there is one thing that should not persist here, it is absolute
    metaphysics.
    KEYWORDS: John D. Greenwood, absolute metaphysics, relative metaphysics,
    metaphysics of social groups, metaphysical truth, theoretical truth

    John D. Greenwood (2019) evaluates ‗the common view that social groups
    persist throughout changes in their membership, by virtue of the maintenance of
    their structure and/or function‘ (Abstract). He argues that ‗Despite the initial
    plausibility of this claim, there are reasons to doubt that this is a metaphysical
    truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social
    groups‘ (§I, my italics). Greenwood‘s argument is based on two fictional
    counterexamples: ‗the Mooseville College Philosophy Department‘ and a
    motorcycle club called ‗The Ravens.‘ After a brief discussion of them, with special
    emphasis on how the members of these groups see themselves, Greenwood
    concludes that ‗continuity of structure and/or function is neither sufficient nor
    necessary for the persistence of social groups‘ (§II).
    Having done that, Greenwood goes on to consider one possible objection to
    his argument: what the members of these groups would say about themselves
    might be different from what neutral observers would say. However, he remarks,
    ‗Two reasonable responses suggest themselves‘ to such an objection:
    One is that it all depends upon theoretical explanatory considerations, as
    to whether one has to appeal to compositional or structural/functional
    similarities or differences to explain continuities or discontinuities in
    earlier and later behavior. The second is that there is no fact of the
    matter, since our judgment in these matters depends upon the subjective
    weight we place on continuity of composition versus continuity of

    LOGOS & EPISTEME, XIII, 4 (2022): 417-419


    doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme202213434
    Gustavo Picazo
    structure and/or function. But neither response supports the view that it
    is a fundamental metaphysical truth that social groups persist throughout
    changes in their membership, or that social groups persist because of
    continuities of structure/function. (§II, my italics)
    In this discussion note, I do not want to focus on the question of the
    persistence of social groups, but on the contrast that Greenwood draws between a
    theoretical truth and a metaphysical truth (which he also calls ‗a fundamental
    metaphysical truth‘ [§II, just quoted] and ‗a fundamental truth about the
    metaphysics of social groups‘ [§I]). From what we have just read, it seems clear
    that, for Greenwood, neither ‗theoretical explanatory considerations‘ nor ‗the
    subjective weight we place on continuity of composition versus continuity of
    structure and/or function‘ pertains to fundamental metaphysical truths about social
    groups. Thus, it appears that such truths, as Greenwood conceives of them, lie
    outside the scope of what can be determined by means of theoretical or subjective
    considerations. And this being so, we must ask ourselves: how could metaphysical
    truths about social groups be determined if not by reference to theoretical or
    subjective considerations? Indeed, how could such truths come to be known,
    stated, or even glimpsed if not by reference to human considerations of one kind or
    another? The answer is, of course, that they could not.
    I welcome Greenwood‘s doubts about the view that it is a fundamental
    metaphysical truth that social groups persist through changes in their membership
    or because of continuities of structure/function. But I would like to invite him to
    extend such doubts to any view about social groups – in fact, to any view
    whatsoever. To that end, I suggest we distinguish between ‗absolute‘ (or
    ‗fundamental‘) metaphysical claims and ‗relative‘ (or ‗local‘) ones. Both absolute
    and relative metaphysical claims concern matters of ontology, such as the
    repertoire of existing objects of a particular kind or the existence and persistence
    conditions for those objects. However, the former are meant to hold unrestrictedly,
    while the latter are restricted to a particular fragment of discourse at a given time.
    Thus, absolute metaphysical claims attempt to describe the ontology of ‗the world
    in itself‘, while relative metaphysical claims simply address the ontology of a
    particular domain of knowledge at a particular point in time (or of a particular
    theory, viewpoint, etc). Applying this distinction, a ‗theoretical truth‘ about the
    existence or persistence conditions of social groups within a particular theory (or
    with respect to our current best social science) will be regarded as a local
    metaphysical truth, that is, a metaphysical truth relative to that theory (or to our
    current best social science).

    418
    On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics

    In Picazo (2021a, §6.5), I have elaborated on a distinction similar to that


    between absolute and relative metaphysics, and in (Picazo 2021b, 2021c, 2021d), I
    have discussed at length a major philosophical preconception (semantic Platonism)
    that leads to the neglect of such distinctions. On reflection, the idea that there are
    absolute metaphysical truths – ie metaphysical truths that transcend any human
    consideration – is easily seen to be untenable. Hence, the claim that social groups
    persist through changes in their membership (or because of continuities of
    structure/function) can be ruled out as a fundamental metaphysical truth, simply
    because there are no such truths. But we could still hold that the claim is true of
    our current best social science (on the basis of, among other things, theoretical
    explanatory considerations) or of a particular viewpoint (depending on the
    subjective weight we place on continuity of composition versus continuity of
    structure and/or function). If there is one thing that should not persist here, at least
    as a respectable academic endeavour, it is absolute metaphysics.1

    References
    Greenwood, J. D. 2019. ―On the Persistence of Social Groups.‖ Philosophy of the
    Social Sciences 50 (1): 78–81.
    Picazo, G. 2021a. ―New Foundations (Natural Language as a Complex System, or
    New Foundations for Philosophical Semantics, Epistemology and
    Metaphysics, Based on the Process-Socio-Environmental Conception of
    Linguistic Meaning and Knowledge).‖ Journal of Research in Humanities
    and Social Science 9 (6): 33–44.
    Picazo, G. 2021b. ―The Long Shadow of Semantic Platonism, Part I: General
    Considerations.‖ Philosophia 49 (4): 1427–1453.
    Picazo, G. 2021c. ―The Long Shadow of Semantic Platonism, Part II: Recent
    Illustrations.‖ Philosophia 49 (5): 2211–2242.
    Picazo, G. 2021d. ―The Long Shadow of Semantic Platonism, Part III: Additional
    Illustrations, from a Collection of Classic Essays.‖ Disputatio. Philosophical
    Research Bulletin 10 (17): 19–49.

    1 In the preparation of this paper, I received help from Samuel Cuello Muñoz, Daniel García
    Simón, Peter Kingston and Proof-Reading-Service.com.

    419

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