Social Justice Research, Vol. 12, No.

2, 1999

The World is More Just for Me than Generally:

About the Personal Belief in a Just World
Scale's Validity
Claudia Dalbert

Differences between personal and general belief in a just world were studied in
four questionnaire studies and one experiment. Personal just world belief could
reliably be differentiated from general just world belief, and subjects endorsed
more strongly the personal compared to the general just world belief. Moreover,
personal belief in a just world predicted subjective well-being and self-esteem, and
this positive impact was independent of general just world belief and favorable
self-perceptions. Finally, the more subjects were aware of their own unfairness, the
more the personal belief in a just world showed a negative impact on self-esteem.
Results give evidence to the just world beliefs' character as world views and as
indicators of a personal contract between individual and social world.
KEY WORDS: just world belief; fairness; self-perception; well-being; self-esteem.

People are motivated to believe in a just world where people generally get what
they deserve (Lerner, 1965). This belief enables people to confront their physical
and social environment as though it were stable and orderly (Lerner and Miller,
1978). Therefore, the belief in a just world serves important adaptive functions
and individuals are motivated to protect this belief. The strength of the belief in a
just world varies between individuals (Rubin and Peplau, 1973, 1975). It is well
documented that a strong belief in a just world fosters the denial of observed injus-
tice in situations with broad social and political unfairness (for a review, Furnham
and Procter, 1989). However, when confronted with more specific prosocial sit-
uations in which substantial help is possible, belief in a just world and prosocial

1 Department of Educational Psychology, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, D-06099 Halle

(Saale); phone: +49+345-55-23811; fax: +49+345-55-27244 (e-mail: [email protected]
halle.de).

79
0885-7466/99/0600-0079$ 16.00/0 C 1999 Plenum Publishing Corporation
80 Dalbert

commitment are positively related (Bierhoff et al., 1991; Lerner, 1970; Lerner and
Simmons, 1966).
Recently, the belief in a just world's positive impact on mental health was
investigated in several ways. During one's life course, individuals gather experi-
ences about themselves as well as about the world in which they are living. This
knowledge results in personal theories about reality, which serve as individual
cognitive filters and influences the preconscious perception, evaluation, and mem-
ory of events (Cantor, 1990; Epstein, 1990). Thereby, these cognitive schemata
form an important fundament for individual functioning. These schemata rarely
comprise exact descriptions of reality, more often they consist of positive illu-
sion, which serve the maintenance of one's mental health (Taylor and Brown,
1988).
One basic schema deals with the construction of a benevolent and meaningful
world (Beck et al, 1981; Epstein, 1990). The belief in a just world could be
interpreted as an indicator of such a fundamental world theory. The belief in a just
world, like other positive illusions, should contribute to the maintenance of one's
mental health. Consequently, the relationship between belief in a just world and
subjective well-being, as well as self-esteem as important mental health dimensions
(Becker, 1986; Dalbert, 1992b), were in the center of studies investigating the belief
in a just world's impact on mental health (Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Dalbert,
1996; Lipkus et al., 1996; Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987; Lerner and Somers,
1992; Libow and Doty, 1979).
There are at least three lines of argumentation in support of the hypothesis that
the belief in a just world should have a positive impact on mental health. Firstly,
the belief in a just world is seen as a positive illusion that encourages people to
see their world as meaningful. This increases their feelings of competence and
control, which fosters a positive outlook on one's future (Lerner, 1978) as well as
a positive reconstruction of one's life course (Lipkus and Siegler, 1993). These
positive impressions should result in a stable mental health, namely in a positive
subjective well-being and a strong self-esteem. A second argument stresses the
role of just world beliefs for people normally engaged in their everyday activities.
The belief in a just world, in which other people behave fairly and in which oneself
gets what one deserves can be interpreted as an important precondition for one's
actions. This belief allows people to feel relatively safe about not to being treated
unfairly as far as they themselves "play it straight." The more people believed in
a just world, the less they were stressed and threatened by a laboratory math task
and the better were their results (Tomaka and Blascovich, 1994). Furthermore, the
belief that good deeds will be rewarded equips people in need to invest in their
own good future, as was evidenced by Zuckerman (1975). Finally, recent experi-
ments support the hypothesis that the belief in a just world fosters investment in
long-term goals (Hafer, in press). These examples furnish evidence of the belief
in a just world's positive impact on one's daily functioning, which should result in
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 81

positive mental health. A third argument about the belief in a just world's impact
on mental health deals with the coping processes of victims of an unjust fate. Be-
cause the belief in a just world serves important adaptive functions, victims of an
unjust fate are motivated to defend their belief in a just world. Some of these just
world-motivated coping reactions can sustain one's mental health. For example,
the more unemployed subjects believed in a just world, the lower the probability
that they ruminated about the "why me?" question, and for those not ruminating
about this question, the belief in a just world was negatively correlated with the
subjects' depression (Dalbert, 1997). However, not all just world motivated coping
reactions (e.g., just world motivated internal attributions) support the victim's sub-
jective well-being (Dalbert, 1996). Therefore, belief in a just world and subjective
well-being can be independent of one another within samples of victims of an
unjust fate.
The more just world research concentrates on the mental health area, the more
a differentiation between a general and a more personal belief in a just world may
become important. Lerner and Miller (1978) argued that general and personal belief
should be differentiated as have others (Furnham and Procter, 1989; Hafer and
Olson, 1993). The more personal an experience of injustice, the more threatening
and the more it will be denied. Injustices and discriminations will be more strongly
denied in one's own group than in other groups (Dalbert and Yamauchi, 1994);
one's own discrimination will be more strongly denied than discrimination of one's
group (Taylor et al., 1990); and one's own superior fairness will be emphasized
(Farwell and Weiner, 1996; Messick et al., 1985). Consequently, the belief in a just
world in general and the belief in one's own fate as just should be differentiated
as well, and individuals should endorse more strongly the belief in a personal just
world compared to a general just world. Moreover, the personal belief in a just
world compared to the general belief in a just world should be more important in
predicting mental health and coping. A first empirical test of this distinction was
provided by Lipkus et al. (1996). Their study evidenced that the personal belief
in a just world (here: belief in a just world for self that was based on the Lipkus'
just world scale, 1991) could successfully be differentiated from a belief in a just
world for others, and that the belief in a just world for self was more important in
predicting psychological well-being.
In the following studies personal belief in a just world was assessed with a
newly developed personal belief in a just world scale. The aims of the following
four questionnaire studies were a test of the new scale's properties, a replication
of Lipkus et al.'s main results (1996), and an enlargement of the mental health
dimensions predicted by belief in a just world. The general belief in a just world can
be assessed with the General Belief in a Just World Scale developed by Dalbert et al.
(1987; studies with the English version of this scale, e.g., Dalbert and Yamauchi,
1994; Furnham and Beard, 1995). One construction target of this general just
world scale was to disentangle the belief in a just world and the endorsement of
82 Dalbert

the equity principle as a just distribution principle (Dalbert, 1982). The mix of
both constructs was seen as one reason for the heterogeneity of the original belief
in a just world scale (Rubin and Peplau, 1973, 1975). The tendency to mingle
both may be a cultural bias as is evidenced by a significant correlation (Dalbert,
1996) between the endorsement of the equity principle and Lipkus' just world scale
(1991), which was not true for Dalbert et al.'s just world scale (1987). Based on
Dalbert et al.'s general just world scale (1987) the Personal Belief in a Just World
Scale was developed. In Study 1, the hypothesis that the items describing general
and personal belief in a just world form two homogeneous, but distinct scales was
tested. Afterwards, mean differences between both scales and their correlations
with several mental health indicators were tested.
Besides life satisfaction as the well-being dimension most consistently cor-
related with belief in a just world (Dalbert, 1998; Lipkus et al., 1996), mood
level ("how do I usually feel?") as emotional well-being indicator was assessed
(Study 2 and 4; e.g., Dalbert, 1992a). In addition, actual positive and negative
moods ("how did I feel in the last week?") were measured in the Study 4. The
relationship between general just world belief and variables describing the actual
mood state of the subjects was investigated several times, but remained unclear.
No direct relationship between general just world belief and negative actual mood
or depression was found in studies with different samples like unemployed indi-
viduals (Dalbert, 1993a; 1996), mothers of a disabled child (Dalbert, 1996), or
students (Dalbert, 1993a; Lipkus et al., 1996). Benson and Ritter (1990) observed
a positive (maladaptive) relationship between just world belief and depression in
unemployed subjects, but a negative (adaptive) relationship within a sample of
employed individuals. On the other hand, evidence for a significant and positive
relationship between general just world belief and actual positive mood was re-
ported by Bulman and Wortman (1977), Lerner and Somers (1992), and Dalbert
(1993a). Additionally, self-esteem as another important mental health dimension
(Becker, 1986) was measured (Studies 3 and 4). Personal belief in a just world
and self-esteem should be positively and stronger correlated than general belief in
a just world and self-esteem, which in fact were only slightly or nonsignificantly
correlated in other studies (Dalbert, 1993a, 1996).
People tend to describe themselves as fairer than others (Farwell and Weiner,
1996; Messick et al., 1985). Favorable self-perceptions like behaving fairly are
part of one's self-concept and should positively affect one's self-esteem. The more
subjects are aware of their own fair behavior, the better their self-esteem should
be. In contrast to self-perceptions, beliefs in a just world depict world theories.
Therefore, the beliefs in a just world's positive impact on one's self-esteem should
be independent of a possible effect of favorable self-perceptions such as behaving
fairly. By contrast with being aware of one's own fair behavior, the effects of
conceding own unfair behavior on self-esteem are far less clear. For example, unfair
behavior may be motivated by self-interest and may be interpreted as assertive
behavior, or own unfairness may be seen as hurting other people and may be
The World Is More Just for Me than Generally 83

interpreted as expression of a bad character. Thus, positive as well as negative

main effects on self-esteem are both possible.
The role of unfairness becomes clearer if the interaction of self-perceptions
and just world beliefs are considered. Beliefs in a just world should have positive
impacts on self-esteem as long as the individuals see themselves as fair subjects.
Nice people should behave fairly in a just world. What happens if subjects are
aware of their own unfair behavior? If subjects do not believe in a just world,
their own unfairness maybe justified in terms of self-interest. However, the more
subjects believe in a just world, the more own unfairness should threaten their self-
esteem. Behaving unfair in a just world is against the personal contract (Lerner,
1977) and cannot be justified.
In summary, three hypotheses about the beliefs in a just world and self-
perceptions were tested in an experiment. Self-esteem should be better the more
subjects are aware of their own fair behavior and the more they endorse the beliefs
in a just world. However, self-esteem should be lower the more one is aware of one's
own unfairness and at the same time believes in a just world. The predicted effects
should be more true for the personal compared to the general just world belief.
Overall, the following hypothesis were to be tested in the four questionnaire
studies and one experiment described in the subsequent paragraphs, (a) The belief
that oneself is treated fairly can reliably be differentiated from the belief that the
world is generally a just place, (b) Individuals endorse more strongly the belief in
a personal just world than in a general just world, (c) The personal belief in a just
world compared to the general just world belief correlates more strongly with sub-
jective well-being and self-esteem, (d) Beliefs in a just world have positive impacts
on one's self-esteem independent of favorable justice-related self-perceptions, and
this is especially true for the personal belief in a just world, (e) The more subjects
are aware of their own unfairness, the more the (personal) belief in a just world
has a negative impact on self-esteem.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE STUDIES

In the next section, the results of four questionnaire studies are presented.
Subjects of each study came from different German universities or colleges. None
had psychology as major, but most of them were enrolled in introductory psy-
chology courses. In all studies, the subjects completed the belief in a just world
questionnaire, which consists of the two just world scales' items in random order. In
Study 1, the just world beliefs' factor structure was explored and the mean dif-
ference was tested. In the following studies, self-report measures of mental health
were administered additionally and, besides the replication of the first study's
results, the correlational pattern of the just world beliefs and the mental health
indicators were tested. In Study 4, the results of Study 2 and 3 should be replicated
and extended.
84 Dalbert

METHOD

Sample 1: 247 female students took part in the study. The age varied between
19 and 50 years (M = 24.1; SD = 4.75).
Sample 2: 149 (58 male and 91 female) students took part in the study. The
age varied between 19 and 40 years (M = 24.5; SD = 4.64).
Sample 3: 65 (46 male and 19 female) students took part in the study. The
age varied between 19 and 60 years (M = 25.6; SD = 6.42).
Sample 4: 171 (62 male and 105 female; missing data: n = 4) students took
part in the study. The age varied between 19 and 42 years (M = 24.5; SD = 4.834).
Questionnaires: Study 1 was a large scale study in which the just world
questionnaire was included comprising the six items of the General Belief in
a Just World Scale (Dalbert et al., 1987) and the seven items of the Personal
Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1993b) in random order (see Table I). In

Table I. Factor Loadings (1 > .30) for the Two Factor Model of the General and the Personal Belief
in a Just World Scale (Oblimin Rotation)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
N =240 N = 202 N = 143

Item (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)

(1) I think basically the world is a just place. .66 .54 .70
(2) I believe that, by and large, people get what .70 .62 .66
they deserve.
(3) I am confident that justice always prevails .71 .84 .85
over injustice.
(4) I am convinced that in the long run people .60 .73 .57
will be compensated for injustices.
(5) I firmly believe that injustices in all areas .53 .61 .74
of life (e.g., professional, family, politics)
are the exception rather than the rule.
(6) I think people try to be fairly when .44 .66 .43
making important decisions.
(7) I believe that, by and large, I deserve .43 .40 .49
what happens to me.
(8) I am usually treated fairly. .70 .86 .83
(9) 1 believe that I usually get .53 .30 .74 .78
what I deserve.
(10) Overall, events in my life are just. .82 .84 .81
(11) In my life injustice is the exception .81 .65 .71
rather than the rule.
(12) I believe that most of the things .76 .81 .81
that happen in my life are fair.
(13) I think that important decisions that are .73 .61 .91
made concerning me are usually just.
Explained variance after rotation. 26.5 19.0 29.7 22.5 32.2 22.1
a .82 .68 .83 .78 .87 .73
Factor correlation. .33 .48 .37
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 85

Study 2 subjects first answered the 13-item just world questionnaire. The second
questionnaire consisted of 15 items, and did not describe a just world belief or
mental health. This questionnaire served as a filler and will not be discussed in this
study. The last questionnaire was the 13-item Trait Well-Being Inventory (Dalbert,
1992b), consisting of a German version of the mood level scale of Underwood and
Froming (1980) with 6 items (a = .87) and the 7 items General Life Satisfaction
Scale (Dalbert el al., 1984) describing satisfaction with one's present and past life
and with one's future perspectives (a = .90). The items of this life satisfaction scale
are comparable with the items of the life satisfaction scale developed by Diener
et al. (1985) at the same time. As in Study 2, subjects of Study 3 first answered the
just world questionnaire followed by a filler questionnaire consisting of 15 items,
which will not be discussed in this study. The last questionnaire was the self-
esteem scale of the Frankfurt Self Concept Scales (Deusinger, 1986) consisting
of ten items (a = .85), which are comparable to the items of Rosenberg's Self-
Esteem Scale (1965). In Study 4 subjects first answered the 13-item just world
questionnaire followed by a filler questionnaire consisting of 18 items, which
will not be discussed in this study. The third questionnaire consists of the 13-item
Trait Well-Being Inventory (Dalbert, 1992b; mood level: a = .85; life satisfaction:
a = .82) already used in Study 2, and the 10-item self-esteem scale of the Frankfurt
Self Concept Scales (a = .87; Deusinger, 1986) already used in Study 3 in random
order. Subjects responded to all other items so far on a 6-point Likert-type scale
ranging from strongly disagree (=1) to strongly agree (=6). Finally, actual positive
and negative mood states were measured with German scales (Dalbert, 1992b)
partly adopted from the Profile of Mood States (McNair et al., 1971) consisting of
11 adjectives measuring negative mood (a = .88; sadness: 3 items; hopelessness:
3 items; tiredness: 4 items) and 6 adjectives measuring positive mood (a = .94)
"in the last week." The adjectives were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale with
endpoints 1 "not at all" to 7 "very strong." Thereby, positive mood level and actual
positive mood differ by their response format as well as their time framing with
mood level asking generally without time framing and actual positive mood asking
for mood in the last week. The unweighted scale means were used as scale values
with high values indicating a strong construct.

RESULTS

Structure of the Just World Beliefs—Study 1

A principal component analysis was done with the 13 just world items. The
factor solution revealed three eigenvalues >1 (4.09, 1.82, 1.32, .88). In line with
the theoretical considerations, two factors were interpreted. These two factors
explained 45.5% of the variance. The oblimin rotated factor solution revealed the
expected pattern; factor loadings are depicted in Table I. The first factor was best
86 Dalbert

described by the seven personal just world items with factor loadings varying
between 1 = .43 and 1 = .82. The second factor was marked by the six general
just world items with factor loadings varying between 1 = .44 and 1 = .71.
The mean was built over the six general just world items to measure general
belief in a just world (a = .68), and the scale mean over the seven personal just
world items was used to measure belief in a personal just world (a = .82). Here,
and for all other scales reported throughout this paper, a scale mean was defined
as missing with more than one item value missing. If only one item value was
missing, the scale mean was built over the remaining items. Both just world scales
correlated significantly (r = .37; p < .001), and subjects believed more strongly
in a personal (M = 3.99; SD = .79) than in a general just world (M = 2.34; SD =
.77;t(l,246) = -29.51;p < .001).

Structure of the Just World Beliefs—Replication 1

A total of 214 subjects participated in Study 2 and 3, and this sample was
used for replication 1. The principal component analyses revealed three eigenvalues
> 1 (5.27, 1.51, 1.09, .90). The results of the subsequent oblimin rotation of the
2 factor solution are depicted in Table I. In line with the theoretical considerations,
two factors were interpreted. Again, the first factor was best described by the
seven personal just world items, and the second factor was marked by the six
general just world items. As in the first study, subjects believed more strongly in
a personal (M = 4.20; SD = .77) than in a general just world (M = 2.65; SD =
.93;t(l, 210) = -26.88; p < .001), and the just world scales were significantly
correlated (Study 2: r = .54; p < .001; Study 3: r = .53; p < .001).

Structure of the Just World Beliefs—Replication 2

Sample 4 was used for replication 2. The factor solution revealed three eigen-
values >1 (5.06, 2.00, 1.08, .95). In line with the theoretical considerations, two
factors were interpreted. The results of the principal component analyses with
subsequent oblimin rotation are depicted in Table I. Again, the first factor was
best described by the seven personal just world items and the second factor was
marked by the six general just world items. As in the other studies subjects believed
more strongly in a personal (M = 3.95;5D = .93) than in a general just world
(M = 237-SD = .82;t(l,155) = -21.00; p < .001), and the just world scales
were significantly correlated (r = .42; p < .001). In total, the first study's result
were successfully replicated in two independent samples.

Intel-correlations

The correlations between the just world scales and the well-being dimen-
sions (Study 2) and self-esteem (Study 3) are depicted in Table II. A priori t-tests
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 87

Table II. Correlations (r) and Regression Models for Mood Level, Life Satisfaction, and Self-esteem
on General and Personal Belief in a Just World in Studies 2 and 3
Predictor R R2 -change T P r

Mood level (Ftota, = 21.891; df= 2/143; p < .001)

General belief in a just world .35 .13C 1.626 .106 .35c
Personal belief in a just world .48 .ll c 4.513 <.001 .47c
Life satisfaction (Ftotal = 28.545; df= 2/143; p < .001)
General belief in a just world .39 .15C 1.770 .079 .39C
Personal belief in a just world .53 .14C 5.219 <.001 .52C
Self-esteem (Ftotal = 6.287; df= 2/61; p = .003)
General belief in a just world .31 .10a 1.059 .294 .31a
Personal belief in a just world .41 .07a 2.314 .024 .39*
a
p < .05.
b
p < .01.
c
p < .001.

revealed that none of the five variables were related to subjects' gender (ps > .25).
Additionally, a priori moderated regression analyses showed that none of the six
relationships between just world beliefs and well-being or self-esteem differed be-
tween men and women (ps for the interaction terms > .08). Personal belief in a just
world was more strongly correlated with mood level and life satisfaction than was
general belief in a just world (mood level: z = 1.71; p = .044, 1-tailed; life sat-
isfaction: z = 1.90; p = .029, 1-tailed; Olkin and Siotani, 1964). However, both
beliefs in a just world correlated significantly, but equally high with self-esteem
(z = .72; p = .236, l-tailed; Olkin and Siotani, 1964).
In order to test whether personal belief in a just world could independently
contribute in explaining the well-being indicators and self-esteem, stepwise mul-
tiple regression analyses were done, with general belief in a just world entered in
the first step and personal belief in a just world entered in the second step. These
multiple regression analyses revealed (see Table II) that personal belief in a just
world could explain a significant amount in mood level (+11%), life satisfaction
(+14%), and self-esteem (+7%), in addition to the amount already explained by
the general belief in a just world. Moreover, general belief in a just world could no
longer contribute in explaining mood level, life satisfaction, or self-esteem when
controlled for personal belief in a just world.
For the three dependent variables tested here, personal belief in a just world
was more important in predicting mental health than general belief in a just world.
The more subjects believed that they are usually treated fairly, the better their mood
level and self-esteem and the more they were satisfied with their life in general.
This showed true when controlled for general belief in a just world.
The correlations between the just world scales and the five mental health
dimensions measured in Study 4 are depicted in Table III. A priori t-tests revealed
that none of the seven variables were related to subjects' gender (ps > .35), and
a priori moderated regression analyses showed that none of the ten relationships
88 Dalbert

Table III. Correlations (r) and Regression Models for Mood Level, Life Satisfaction, Self-esteem,
Actual Positive and Negative Mood on General and Personal Belief
in a Just World in Study 4
Predictor R R2-change T P r

Mood level (F total = 15.031; df= 2/153; p < .001)

General belief in a just world .35 .13C 3.221 .002 .34C
Personal belief in a just world .41 .04* 2.650 .009 .33C
Life satisfaction (Ftotal = 19.806; df = 2/153; p < .001)
General belief in a just world .28 .08C 1.392 .166 .27C
Personal belief in a just world .45 .13C 4.966 <.001 .44C
Self-esteem (F total = 8.512; df= 2/153; p < .001)
General belief in a just world .18 .03a .756 .451 .19a
Personal belief in a just world .32 .07a 3.352 .001 .31C
Actual positive mood (F total = 5.799; df= 2/150; p = .004)
General belief in a just world .23 .05b 1.972 .050 .23b
Personal belief in a just world .27 .02 1.680 .095 .22b
Actual negative mood (Ftotal = 1.908; df= 2/152; p = .152)
General belief in a just world .13 .02 -1.096 .275 -.14
Personal belief in a just world .16 .01 -.998 .320 -.13
a
p < .05.
b
p < .01.
c
p < .001.

between just world beliefs and mental health differed between men and women
(ps for the interaction term >. 15). Personal belief in a just world was significantly
stronger correlated with life satisfaction and slightly stronger with self-esteem than
was general belief in a just world (life satisfaction: z = 2.16; p = .015, 1-tailed;
self-esteem: z = 1.46; p = .072, 1-tailed; Olkin and Siotani, 1964). However,
personal and general belief in a just world were equally strongly correlated with
mood level and actual positive mood, and both were not significantly correlated
with actual negative mood.
Again, stepwise multiple regression analyses were done with general belief
in a just world entered in the first step and personal belief in a just world entered
in the second step. These multiple regression analyses revealed (see Table III) that
personal belief in a just world could explain a significant amount in mood level
(+4%), life satisfaction (+13%), self-esteem (+7%), and a marginally significant
amount in actual positive mood (+2%; p = .095) in addition to the amount already
explained by the general belief in a just world. On the contrary, general belief in
a just world could only independently contribute in explaining mood level and
actual positive mood when controlled for personal belief in a just world.

EXPERIMENT

The questionnaire studies evidenced that personal and general belief in a just
world could clearly be differentiated. Moreover, the results give support to the
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 89

hypothesis that the personal compared to the general just world belief correlates
more strongly with subjective well-being and self-esteem. In the following exper-
iment, subjects were made aware of their fair or unfair behavior and the following
hypotheses were tested: Self esteem should be better (a) the more subjects are
aware of their own fair behavior, and (b) the more subjects endorse the personal
belief in a just world. However, (c) the more subjects are aware of their own unfair
behavior, the more the personal belief in a just world should have a negative impact
on self-esteem.

Method

Sample 1

Subjects were 108 students (n = 50 male; n = 58 female); none had psychol-

ogy as major. The age varied between 18 and 57 years (M = 24.6; SD = 6.08).

Procedure

In order to stimulate justice-related (un)favorable self-perceptions, a proce-

dure introduced by Messick et al. (1985) in its German version tested by Bierhoff
(1996) was used. In the fairness condition subjects described behavior that they
would label fair. Additionally, they were instructed to begin their description with
"I" if they think that they show this behavior more often than other people and
to begin their description with "Other" if they think that others show this be-
havior more often. In the unfairness condition subjects were asked to describe
behavior that they would label unfair. Subjects in the control condition were asked
to give a list of their daily routines. All subjects were given 5 minutes to finish
this task. Thirty-four subjects fulfilled the fairness condition, 36 subjects were
asked to describe the unfair behavior, and 38 subjects participated in the control
condition.

Dependent Variables

After completing the first task, subjects were asked to participate in a question-
naire study. In this study, they first answered the justice questionnaire comprising
the six items of the General Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert et al., 1987;
or = .65) and the seven items of the Personal Just World Scale (Dalbert, 1993b;
a = .79) in random order. Afterwards, self-esteem was measured with the ten-item
scale of the Frankfurt Self Concept Scales (Deusinger, 1986; a = .84). Subjects
responded to all items on 6-point Likert-type scales ranging from strongly disagree
(= 1) to strongly agree (=6). The unweighted scale means were used as scale values
with high values indicating a strong construct.
90 Dalbert

Results

Experimental Control

Two-way ANOVAs, with condition (fairness vs. unfairness) and gender as

between-subjects factors, were done for the number of "I" and "Other" at the
beginning of each example. For "I" a main effect for condition was revealed,
F(l,66) = 10.65, p = .002 (14.5% variance explained); the gender's main effect
(p = .238) as well as the interaction term (p = .688) were not significant. As
described by other studies (Bierhoff, 1996; Messick et al., 1985) subjects in the
fairness condition gave more examples starting with "I" (M = 2.21;SD = 1.92)
than subjects in the unfairness condition (M = .97; SD = 1.00). For "Other" a
main effect for condition, F(l,66) = 6.54, p = .013 (9.7% variance explained),
as well as for gender, F(1,66) = 4.22, p = .044 (5.4% variance explained),
was revealed; the interaction term was not significant (p = .274). Subjects in the
unfairness condition gave more examples starting with "Other" (M = 2.39; SD =
2.26) than subjects in the fairness condition (M = 1.12;SD = 1.59), and women
(M = 1.54;5D = 2.23) started more descriptions with "Other" than men (M =
.70; SD = 1.17). Overall, subjects showed the expected tendency toward favorable
self-perceptions.

Experimental Effects

The effects of the experimental conditions were depicted by the four com-
posites of a dummy variable for the condition weighted by the number of "I" or
the number of "Other," respectively. Both beliefs in a just world were indepen-
dent of the experimental conditions (ps > .11). As expected, self esteem was
higher the more the subjects described themselves as fair in the fairness condition
(r = .24; p = .012; other ps > .37).
Overall, self-esteem and personal belief in a just world were positively corre-
lated (r = .19; p = .056; general just world belief: r = -.06; p = .543). The in-
teraction between personal just world belief and the self-perceptions within the dif-
ferent experimental conditions were tested by a stepwise multiple regression with
self-esteem as criteria. In the first step, the weighted variables for the experimen-
tal conditions were entered (fairness-I; fairness-Other; unfairness-I; unfairness-
Other), personal just world belief was included in the second step, and the four
interaction terms followed in the final step. A comparable moderated regression
analysis was done with general belief in a just world. The results of the accepted
regression (p < .05) is given in Table IV.
No main effect or interaction effect was observed for the general belief in
a just world (ps > .35). Personal belief in a just world and its interaction with
unfavorable self-perceptions in the unfairness condition could explain 9% of the
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 91

Table IV. Regression Model for Self-esteem on the Experimental Conditions Weighted by "1" or
"Other", Respectively, General or Personal Belief in a Just World, and Their Interaction Terms
(accepted model; p < .05)

Predictor R R2-change b T P
(Ftotal = 4.356; df= 4/101; p = .003)
Fairness-"I" .24 .06a .12 2.859 .005
Unfairness-"I" .24 .00 .97
a
Personal belief in a just world .33 .05 .36
Personal belief X Unfairness-"I .38 .04a -.24 -2.208 .029
(Constant) 3.30
Condition Regression equation Personal belief Self-esteem

Control condition 3.30 + .36 personal belief 3.76 4.65

5.00 5.10
Fairness condition/"I" = 0 3.30 + .36 personal belief 3.76 4.65
5.00 5.10
Fairness condition/"!" = 3 3.66 + .36 personal belief 3.76 5.01
5.00 5.46
Unfairness condition/"I" = 0 3.30 + .36 personal belief 3.76 4.65
5.00 5.10
Unfairness condition/"I" = 3 6.21 - .36 personal belief 3.76 4.86
5.00 4.41
a
p < .05.

self-esteem's variance in addition to the 6% already explained by the favorable

self-perceptions in the fairness condition (see above). The regression equations for
the different experimental conditions as well as the expected values for self-esteem
under different conditions and a high (M + SD) or low (M - SD) personal belief in
a just world are depicted at the bottom of Table IV. As can be seen from these equa-
tions, the personal belief in a just world had the same positive effect (b = .36) on
self-esteem in (a) the control condition, (b) in the fairness condition in addition to
the expected positive effect of a favorable self-perception, and (c) in the unfairness
condition as long as no unfavorable self-perception could be observed ("I" = 0).
In these three conditions, self-esteem was better the more subjects endorsed the
belief in a personal just world. However, the more unfavorable self-descriptions
were given ("I show unfair behavior"), the stronger the negative effect of personal
belief in a just world on self-esteems. Perceiving oneself as behaving unfair in a
world in which one usually is treated fairly seems to be a serious threat to one's
self-esteem.

DISCUSSION

The overall result pattern supports the hypothesis that personal and general
belief in a just world should be differentiated. The factor pattern evidenced triplicate
92 Dalbert

with a total of 632 subjects that a 2-factor model with one factor underlying the
general just world items and another factor underlying the personal just world items
was most appropriate in explaining the observed item-intercorrelations. Moreover,
individuals were more convinced of a personal compared to a general belief in a
just world, which was true in all four studies.
This clear structural figure was accompanied by a convincing validity pattern.
Overall, the four questionnaire studies revealed that the personal compared to
general belief in a just world better predicted mental health. Mental health was
indicated by actual positive and negative mood, mood level, life satisfaction, and
self-esteem. The more the subjects endorsed the personal belief in a just world
the better their actual positive mood, their mood level and their self-esteem was
and the more they were satisfied with their life. Three of these dimensions were
tested twice. In both analyses the correlation with life satisfaction was significantly
higher for personal compared to general belief in a just world; the correlation with
mood level and self-esteem was stronger for personal compared to general belief
in a just world only in one of both tests. A sharp exception was actual negative
mood, which was not correlated with both just world beliefs.
The results of the multiple regression analyses were unanimous. Personal
belief in a just world could independently contribute in predicting mental health
when controlled for general just world belief. This was true in six out of seven tests.
In the case of actual positive mood, there was only a tendency in the hypothesized
direction. In total, personal belief in a just world seems to contribute particularly
to the subjects' mental health. On the contrary, general just world belief could not
independently contribute in explaining mental health when controlled for personal
just world belief. This was true in five out of seven tests. These results support
the notion that the personal belief in a just world compared to general belief
in a just world is more important in explaining mental health. Moreover, when
controlled for personal just world belief, general just world belief is independent
of subjective well-being or self-esteem. Or to state it otherwise, it seems to be
the common variance of general and personal just world belief that establishes
the positive relationship between general just world belief and well-being or self-
esteem, and it is only the personal belief in a just world that shares unique variance
with mental health.
The experiment's results are well in line with the hypotheses. The more sub-
jects described themselves as behaving fairly more often than other people, the
better their self-esteem. However, the experimentally induced awareness of one's
own fair or unfair behavior did not alter the beliefs in a just world themselves. This
result pattern gives evidence to the notion that the beliefs in a just world depict world
views that cannot be altered by self-perceptions. In line with the questionnaire stud-
ies' results, it was again the personal and not the general belief in a just world that
showed a positive impact on self-esteem; and the personal belief in a just world's
positive effect was not reduced by the positive impact of favorable self-perceptions
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 93

on self-esteem. The more the subjects endorsed the personal belief in a just world,
the better their self-esteem was, and this was equally true for the three experi-
mental conditions as long as no unfavorable self-descriptions were given. More-
over, for the general belief in a just world, no such effects were observed. Once
more, the results emphasize the notion that the personal compared to the gen-
eral belief in a just world is more important in explaining self-esteem and well-
being. Furthermore, the experiment's results underline that an unfavorable self-
perception can qualify the personal belief in a just world's effect on self-esteem.
Thereby, the different character of self-perceptions and world views is further
highlighted.
Behaving unfairly in a personal just world seems to reduce one's self-esteem.
The more subjects describe themselves as behaving unfair more often than other
people the stronger the negative impact of personal belief in a just world on self-
esteem was. The belief in a just world can be interpreted as indicating a personal
contract (Lerner, 1977) between the subject and his/her social world. The more
subjects endorse the belief in a just world, the higher the obligatory nature of the
personal contract should be. The personal contract regulates the interdependence
between the subject and its social world in important ways. This contract includes
the obligation to strive for justice with one's own reactions and, as a consequence,
one can trust in being treated fairly by others. Describing oneself as behaving un-
fairly in a world in which one usually is treated fairly violates this personal contract
and, consequently, seems to be a serious threat to one's self-esteem. Behaving un-
fairly in a personal just world supports the notion that one is a less valuable person.
Behaving unfairly in an unfair world did not affect the self-esteem. Those perceiv-
ing themselves as behaving more unfairly than others and with a weak belief in a
personal just world did not significantly differ in their self-esteem from subjects
giving no such self-descriptions at all. The less one believes in a just world, the
less one feel obliged to behave fairly and, consequently, unfair behavior is not
against the rules. Unfair behavior in an unfair world can be seen as motivated by
justified self-interest. The result pattern clearly evidenced that unfair behavior is
not per se a threat to one's self-esteem. It depends on whether the unfairness vi-
olates the individual's personal contract. Moreover, this underlines that the belief
in a just world must be taken into account for fully understanding the meaning of
(un-)fairness for the individual him/herself.
For further differentiation between a personal and a general belief in a just
world, subjects' relationships with different coping reactions could be tested. Just
world research has evidenced that the more subjects believed in a general just world,
the lower was the probability of describing oneself as a victim of discrimina-
tion (Lipkus and Siegler, 1993), the less procrastination (Ferrari and Emmons,
1994) or wishful thinking (Rim, 1986) could be observed, and the higher the
probability of problem-orientation was (Rim, 1986). The more the victims of a
critical life event believed in a general just world, the less they evaluated their
94 Dalbert

fate as unfair (Dalbert, 1996), the lower the probability of ruminating about the
"why me?" question (Dalbert, 1997), and the higher the probability of blam-
ing oneself for one's burdening fate (e.g., Dalbert, 1996; Kiecolt-Glaser and
Williams, 1987). The personal compared to the general belief in a just world
should better explain just world motivated coping reactions. Further investigations
of the relationship between just world beliefs and coping have additionally high-
lighted the relationship between just world beliefs and negative mood (Dalbert,
1996, 1997). Coping reactions particularly mediate the just world beliefs' effect
on negative mood, which may be especially true for personal belief in a just
world.
Overall, the results support the notion that the general and personal belief
in a just world should be disentangled (see Appendix for the separate scales).
Individuals were convinced that the world is more just for them personally than in
general, and the personal compared to the general belief in a just world was more
important in explaining mental health. Therefore, in further studies examining
the personal instead of the social consequences of (un-)fairness, the belief in a
personal just world should be taken into account. Finally, the beliefs in a just
world's character as world view and as indicator of a personal contract between
individual and the social world was highlighted.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Josef Held, Gunter L. Huber, Jurgen Roth (Study 1), Peter K. Warndorf
(Study 2; Experiment), and Johannes E. Brunner (Study 4) for their assistance in
collecting the data and Joachim Stober for helpful comments.

APPENDIX

Justice

Below you will find various statements. Most likely, you will strongly agree with
some statements, and strongly disagree with others. Sometimes you may feel more
neutral.
Read each statement carefully and decide to what extent you personally agree or
disagree with it. Circle the number which corresponds to this judgement. Make
sure you circle a number for every statement.
The World is More Just for Me than Generally 95

Justice

Below you will find various statements. Most likely, you will strongly agree with
some statements, and strongly disagree with others. Sometimes you may feel more
neutral.
Read each statement carefully and decide to what extent you personally agree or
disagree with it. Circle the number which corresponds to this judgement. Make
sure you circle a number for every statement.
96 Dalbert

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