India's Limited War Doctrine

IDSA Monograph Series
No. 10 December 2012
INDIA'S LIMITED
WAR DOCTRINE
THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR
ALI AHMED
INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE: THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR | 1
IDSA Monograph Series

No. 10 December 2012
INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE

THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR
ALI AHMED
2 | ALI AHMED
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
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in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
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ISBN: 978-93-82169-09-3
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Monograph are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or the Government of
India.
First Published: December 2012
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To
Late Maj Gen S. C. Sinha, PVSM
4 | ALI AHMED
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................... 7
1. INTRODUCTION .................................... 9
2. DOCTRINAL CHANGE ............................. 16
3. THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR .................. 42
4. CONCLUSION ....................................... 68
REFERENCES ......................................... 79
6 | ALI AHMED
*
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This monograph is the outcome of my fellowship at IDSA in 2010-

12. I am thankful to the Cluster Coordinator, Brig (Retd.) Rumel
Dahiya, and members of the Military Cluster for their support. I
am deeply grateful to former Director-General, Mr Narendra
Sisodia for his encouragement. The monograph was made possible
by the IDSA providing me an intellectually stimulating working
environment, world class infrastructure, competent support staff
and an inspiring set of colleagues. The monograph draws on the
research for my doctoral dissertation in International Politics at
Jawarharlal Nehru University, which the IDSA was kind enough
to grant me permission to pursue alongside my fellowship. I stand
greatly indebted to my Supervisor, the very capable and always
kind Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan. I thank the three anonymous
referees for their comments that have helped improve the
manuscript and the copyeditor for making the monograph readable.
However, despite the advantages I have had in preparing the
monograph, there are the inevitable lacunae for which I am solely
responsible.
Ali Ahmed
8 | ALI AHMED
1. INTRODUCTION
Introduction
India developed its Limited War doctrine in the wake of the Kargil
War. Officially, the land warfare doctrine dates to publication of
Indian Army Doctrine in 2004. It was for a period of time, in the
century’s first decade, colloquially referred to as ‘Cold Start’. The
doctrine per se is for conventional war, but embedded in it are the
tenets of Limited War. The understanding is that whether a war is
‘Limited’ or ‘Total’ would depend on political aims of the conflict
and their strategic and operational translation. Since political aims,
can reasonably, only be limited in the nuclear age, the doctrine
can be taken as being a Limited War doctrine.
The doctrine has evolved from the military developments of the

past four decades. While India’s earlier doctrine - post the 1971
War period - had been a defensive one, organisational and doctrinal
innovations in the eighties served to enhance the offensive content
of military doctrine. Initially, changes were prompted by the
necessity of conducting conventional operations under conditions
of perceived nuclear asymmetry. This took the form of
mechanisation, deemed as more suited to a nuclear battlefield. The
doctrine was one of conventional deterrence comprising a dissuasive
capability (deterrence by denial) along with a counter offensive
capability (deterrence by punishment). In the light of Pakistan’s
acquisition of nuclear capability by the late eighties, the counter-
offensive-capability, embodied by strike corps operations, became
problematic. This was capitalised on by Pakistan to enhance its
sub-conventional provocations taking advantage of the ‘stability/
instability paradox’. Consequently, India was forced, among other
reasons, to adapt its offensive capability to bring its conventional
edge back into the reckoning. The idea was to reinforce
conventional deterrence and in case that was found wanting, then
to be in a position to execute coercion or compellence as required.
10 | ALI AHMED
Doctrinal development has been driven by the military experience

since the mid-eighties. The period witnessed the crises of 1987 and
1990 and the peace enforcement operation in Sri Lanka. Internal
conflict in Kashmir reached a climax with the Kargil War of 1999.
Pakistan’s proxy war culminated in the parliament attack that
prompted Indian coercive diplomacy, and Operation Parakram,
in 2001-02. Conflicts in the Gulf in 1991 and 2004 and Operation
Enduring Freedom which showcased the changes in the character
of conventional war influenced thinking. Organisational changes
and equipment acquisitions prompted by the revolution in military
affairs accelerated during this period. Cumulatively, these have
led to considerable doctrinal evolution. However, it was overt
nuclearisation that had the most profound effect and made conflict
limitation an overriding imperative.
An offensive and proactive capability that under-grids the war
doctrine speaks of a readiness to go to war, and, further, to take
the war to the enemy. The conventional doctrine and the nuclear
doctrine combined go beyond deterrence, to potentially enable
coercion through offensive deterrence. The nuclear doctrine posits
‘massive’ punitive retaliation in its 2003 formulation by the Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS). This expansive formulation, it
would appear, is designed for enhancing the deterrent effect and
push up the Pakistani nuclear thresholds. Doing so enables the
leveraging of India’s conventional advantages in case Pakistani sub-
conventional provocations are emboldened by nuclearisation.
Pakistan’s offensive posture at the sub-conventional level and the
consequent Indian offensive orientation at the conventional level,
leads to heightened nuclear possibilities. The nuclear backdrop
serves as reminder that escalation could occur, either by accident
or design. The problem therefore has been as to how India should
cope with sub-conventional provocations. It has responded by
leveraging its conventional advantage. This needs to be tempered
by an inbuilt limitation at the conventional level in order that the
nuclear threshold is not breached. This challenge has proven
difficult, with Pakistan attempting to posture a low nuclear
threshold. India for its part has attempted to raise this threshold
by promising higher order nuclear retaliation. This intersection
of the Indian and Pakistani doctrinal postures at the conventional
and nuclear planes has an escalatory potential that could do with

some mitigation.
The monograph makes the suggestion that limitation must attend
both conventional operations (as is indeed the direction of
thinking), and also equally importantly, nuclear operations. Its
chief recommendation is that India’s strategic doctrine should be
informed by defensive realism. The compatible strategic doctrine
is therefore one of defensive deterrence. India’s military doctrine
therefore needs to be tweaked away from the proactive offensive
stance to one more mindful of the nuclear overhang. Merely
acknowledging its presence as the nuclear backdrop is not enough
in light of escalatory possibilities. The deterrence logic has its
limitations. Given this, not only must conventional doctrine be
cognisant of this, but indeed also nuclear doctrine.
Layout of the Study

The introductory chapter sets out India’s Limited War doctrine.
Chapter 2, deals with the doctrinal shift in India’s policy. It
recounts the manner in which India’s strategic doctrine has changed
from defensive to the proactive. The corresponding change in
military doctrine is also described. It traces the doctrinal change
over the past four decades in an historical over view of the evolution
of Indian conventional and nuclear doctrines. Chapter 3 attempts
explain the change in India’s strategic doctrine from defensive
deterrence to offensive deterrence. The discussion is confined to
the structural factor inherent in India’s regional strategic
predicament to explain how India’s land warfare doctrine, in
particular, has adapted to it. The change in threat perception over
time, largely because of Pakistan’s proxy war, is discussed. The
effects of the emboldening of Pakistan following its nuclearisation
are studied for their impact on Indian doctrine at the two levels -
strategic and military. The chapter argues that the structural factor,
interpreted in terms of the changes in the threat environment in
part prompted doctrinal change. There are other influencing factors
also such as the political and institutional factors, but these have
not been covered in the monograph. The concluding chapter makes
an assessment and discusses issues of policy relevance resulting
from the nuclear-conventional interface.
12 | ALI AHMED
Limited War Thinking in India

The strategic protagonists of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan,
having demonstrated and declared their nuclear power status in
1998, have irrevocably entered the era of Limited Wars. India is
currently at the cusp of fulfilling K. Subrahmanyam’s vision in
which the two states, India and Pakistan, can arrive at a modus
vivendi, despite, or perhaps because of the nuclear shadow. He
had suggested that:
If both India and Pakistan were to have nuclear weapons, a
situation of stable deterrence is likely to result in all
probability… This is a perfect though an extremely
unpleasant setting for mutual deterrence. Once that sets in
the Kashmir line of control will become an international
border (Subrahmanyam 1986: 287).
Jasjit Singh describes the change brought on by nuclearisation as

follows: ‘The significant point to note is that in the past, the wars
in the subcontinent were limited (in time, scope, goals etc.) by
choice. But nuclearisation has made wars limited as an imperative
(Singh J. 1998: 311).’ Such a war would be limited in time and
scope. Given the limited time available, positional warfare would
not be able to deliver results. In his opinion: ‘Manoeuvre warfare
is more likely to bring on a nuclear threat (Singh, J. 1998: 312)’.
To him, a war of attrition would also not be a likely option due
to limitations of capital stocks, resupply etc. A stand off or
stalemate would enable the smaller country to achieve an
impression of victory, and can, in the India-Pakistan context, be
seen as not being in India’s interest.
The problems of conventional doctrine and strategy have
understandably been the staple of the Indian doctrine and
planning staff since. In case India was to attempt to prevail, a
nuclear response by Pakistan looms as a possibility, despite India’s
deterrence. In fact, the more India appears to be on the conventional
military ascendance, the greater the nuclear insecurity it would
subject itself to.
Even the remote possibility of a nuclear war outbreak implies Total
War. Sundarji conjures up a scenario in which, ‘When the dust
settles, the damage to India may be grave, but Pakistan as we know

it will cease to exist… (Sundarji 2003: 191).’ However, he stipulates
that, ‘efforts will continue after nuclear use to terminate hostilities
after the lowest possible level of nuclear use (Sundarji 2003: 148).’
In other words, given the possibility of Total War resulting from
the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict, limitation
is required to be built into nuclear doctrine as well - to the extent
possible. Conventional limitation would prevent escalation into
the nuclear domain, while nuclear escalation can be limited by
restricting exchanges to the ‘unacceptable damage’ or ‘lowest
possible level’ rather than annihilation.
It would be imprudent to venture into a war without having an
explicit Limited War doctrine as guide. While a doctrine does exist,
it is also meant for wider conventional war. Given the likelihood
of conventional escalation in the absence of an explicit Limited
War doctrine, the nuclear angle may come to fore rather
unexpectedly. Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur highlight this, stating:
Indian doctrinal changes increase the likelihood that Indo-
Pakistani crisis will escalate rapidly, both within the
conventional sphere and from the conventional to the
nuclear level … In the nuclear realm, India’s Cold Start
strategy would likely force Pakistan to rely more heavily
on its strategic deterrent (Ganguly and Kapur 2010: 77).
Since the nuclear doctrine for its part favours a higher order nuclear
punishment being meted out in case of nuclear first use against
India, the likelihood of nuclear escalation is virtually built into
the doctrine. Consequently, Prakash Menon recommends, ‘India
must move away from the strategy of massive retaliation. Limited
war objectives are inherently incompatible with maximal penalties.
To risk all for modest objectives appears nonsensical (Menon 2005:
160).’ This implies that there is scope for further evolution in terms
of limitation in both conventional and nuclear doctrines.
India’s Limited War Doctrine

India has adopted a doctrine that posits limitation in conventional
operations. This means that an India cognizant of Pakistani nuclear
threshold would ‘pull its punches’ in order not to cross Pakistan’s
14 | ALI AHMED
nuclear red lines. The Indian army’s doctrine has been dubbed
‘Cold Start’. It has been evolved after taking on board its operational
experience and the nuclear context. It enables it to react to Pakistan’s
terror provocations as also allows it to respond to the country’s
internal political compulsions in response to the public demand
for ‘decisive’ action.
As the term, ‘Cold Start’, suggests the strategy is about operations
from a standing start. This is to be achieved, as per the official
Indian army doctrine, through operational ‘readiness’. This is the
closest reference to the term ‘Cold Start’ in the doctrine, with
readiness described as:
Readiness of the Indian Armed Forces to meet national
emergencies is a facet of national level endeavour. It calls
for a synergised effort by all instruments of the Government
to ensure that these forces are moved to their areas of
operations, fully-equipped and within an acceptable
timeframe… On the part of the Armed Forces, they are
responsible for ensuring that they are operationally ready,
troops are in a high state of morale and units are
appropriately trained to execute the missions assigned to
them (ATRAC 2004: 44).
Cold Start is expected to achieve three goals: ‘inflict significant

attrition on enemy forces; retain Pakistani territory for use as a
postcolonial bargaining chip; and, by limiting the depth of Indian
incursions, avoid triggering a Pakistani nuclear response (Ganguly
and Kapur 2010: 76-77).’ The doctrine has been under preparation
since the Kargil War (2010: 28). The idea is to ‘launch a large-scale
offensive against Pakistan, within seventy-two to ninety-six hours
of a moblisation order (2010: 76).’ This is to be done by augmenting
the offensive capabilities of India’s holding formations and shifting
strike corps to bases closer to Pakistan (2010: 76). The logic is that
‘small and few’ and ‘flexible conventional response strategies’ are
better than ‘large and many’ and ‘massive conventional response
strategies’ in conflict with a nuclear backdrop (Kapoor 2010: 4).
In a situation where both India and Pakistan are armed with nuclear
weapons, conflict avoidance is a desirable political objective
(Menon 2005: 160). The military implications are that ‘punitive
strikes and geographically confined skirmishes emerge as the

political preferences albeit with questionable ability to produce
substantial and enduring strategic effect (2005: 160).’ This possibility
of conflict, other than war, has been mentioned in the army
doctrine thus: ‘There may also be other methods of preparation
for war even without ordering general mobilisation (ARTRAC
2004: 44).’ Prakash Menon opines that since restricted conventional
space is available, military preparations must focus on the ‘feasible’
forms of war. This comprises punitive strikes without posturing
of strategic reserves (Menon 2005: 160). It is for this reason he is of
the view that: ‘Limited War in the Indo-Pak context may not have
been born as yet and it is doubtful that whether it will survive its
birth (2005: 160).’
Conclusion
This introductory chapter has attempted to give the background
for the doctrine and the impetus behind it. Despite the
preponderant incidence of Limited War, India’s war doctrine has
been designed for conventional war imagined as a wider, total war.
Apparently, the thinking is that once the worst case is taken care
of, applying the limitations required by political aims is not
difficult. The Kargil War is an instance of Limited War, even though
the then extant doctrine - Fundamentals, Doctrines, Concepts –
Indian Army (ARTRAC 1998) - dealt with a total war and not
with its variant, i.e. Limited War. The Limited War doctrine is
not yet in the form of an explicit document. It has also drawn
critical comment (Raghavan 2001) that requires to be taken on
board in the next edition of the doctrine, generally due after half
a decade of publication. Consequently, lately, there are indications
that there will be an independent articulation, either as a separate
specialised doctrine, as an adjunct to the existing doctrine or as a
fresh chapter in the next edition of the Indian Army Doctrine
(ARTRAC 2004). This is not only for dealing with the nuclear
reality prevailing since 1998, but for coping with the increasing
curbs on the use of armed force because of: international law;
political necessity; diplomatic concerns; grand strategic tradeoffs;
strategic circumstance; demonstration effect of wars elsewhere and
impetus from within the strategic community.
16 | ALI AHMED
2. DOCTRINAL CHANGE
Introduction
The 1971 War is a benchmark for the India-Pakistan strategic
relationship. With a truncated Pakistan, India gained a pre-eminent
position as a regional power. India has since been the status quoist
and stronger power, while Pakistan has been the weaker, revisionist
one. Pakistan’s revisionist aims were identified fairly early by Sisir
Gupta as: ‘to bring about a revision of the political map of the
region, in terms of the distribution of both territory and power
as between the two countries of the subcontinent (Gupta 1970:
423).’ Over the years, the significance of 1971 as a watershed has
become progressively more evident, with Pakistan attempting to
redress the asymmetry. Pakistan, to offset its weakness, resolved,
soon after, to acquire nuclear weapons (Cohen 1984: 152-3) and
has since acquired a delivery capability to help off set power
asymmetry which in its military mediated perception is in India’s
favour (Narang 2009: 156). Pakistan’s army has also been
determined to pay back India for the humiliation of 1971. This
has led to a proxy war, launched ever since the military returned
to political centre stage. The consequent changes in India’s threat
perception led to a change in its strategic orientation. This in turn
furthered doctrinal developments within the military.
This chapter reviews the developments of doctrines both strategic
and military, in India since the 1971 war. The chapter seeks to
highlight the evolution from a defensive and reactive strategic
doctrine to a more proactive and offensive strategic doctrine with
respect to Pakistan. The chapter is in three parts. The first reviews
the development of the strategic doctrine and its influence on
military and nuclear domain in India. It does so by taking a look
at the interplay of strategic doctrines of India and Pakistan decade
wise. This background helps to understand the antecedents of the
‘Cold Start’ doctrine which is studied more closely in Part II.
Lastly, Part III, brings in the nuclear dimension in the form of
India’s nuclear doctrine of 2003 so as to elaborate on the inter-

relationship between India’s conventional doctrine and nuclear
doctrine. It makes the case that there is imbalance between the
two and suggests measures for reconciling the two in the concluding
chapter.
I
Changes in Strategic Orientation
Over the last three decades, India’s strategic doctrine has shifted
focus from defensive to offensive deterrence that borders on
compellence (Basrur 2006: 80-101). The change is marked by three
phases: the first was the shift from the strategic defensiveness of
the seventies to the strategic offensiveness over the eighties; the
second phase was when India’s policy, till the turn of the century
was one of strategic defensiveness; and the third phase is the present
one in which India has taken to strategic offensiveness. Military
doctrines are analysed in the following section.
By the 1965 War, India had learnt its lessons the hard way through
loss in the preceding 1962 War. Not only did India contest the
Rann of Kutch aggression, but it also took over the Haji Pir Pass
in late August 1965 and opened up the Punjab front to off set
Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam in the Akhnoor sector in early
September. This was under the leadership of Lal Bahadur Shastri.
Nevertheless, India agreed to a ceasefire before any substantial gains
could be made and, later, gave Haji Pir pass back to Pakistan. The
offensive approach during the 1971 War was evident in the
premeditated, multi-dimensional offensive involving a multi-
pronged military operation. Thereafter, as the victor in 1971 War,
India was a satisfied regional power.
After an introspective decade in the aftermath of the 1971 War,
Pakistan sought to address the power asymmetry. Its military,
when back in power, has also been trying to avenge itself. In the
later part of the first phase, Pakistan has taken a strategic offensive
posture to the extent of waging a revisionist proxy war in Punjab
and J&K (Koithara 2004: 22). This has been in keeping with its
practice, ever since independence, of employing irregular forces
18 | ALI AHMED
against India e.g. sending tribal lashkars in 1947 (Marwah 2009:

30); the 1965 Operation Gibraltar (Cloughley 1999: 68), itself a
prelude to the more conventional Operation Grand Slam
(Cloughley 1999: 72), which once again witnessed the infiltration
of irregular forces into Kashmir (Joshi 1999: 212). The later
offensive on the sub-conventional plane was enabled by the strategic
opportunity provided by India’s mismanagement of its internal
security, initially in Punjab (Koithara 2004: 41) and later in Kashmir
(Koithara 2004: 43). Taking advantage of the internal problems of
India, Pakistan has sought to tie down India in manpower intensive
counter insurgency operations (Koithara 2004: 86) and in holding
terrain that is of marginal strategic importance such as Siachen
(Cloughley 1999: 291) and later Kargil (Chari et al. 2008: 126).
With India’s regional power ambitions peaking in the mid-eighties,
Pakistan’s attempts, to under cut India through external balancing
also gained momentum.
The second phase beginning in the early nineties witnessed a
defensive India. Hampered by coalition politics and managing the
difficult transition from a socialist to a liberal economy in the
midst of a new emerging world order, eclipsed the strategic profile
after the high point of late eighties. A precipitate drop in the
defence budget was seen post liberalisation and because of an inward
looking polity (Thomas 1992: 36, Joshi 1992: 79, Singh, Jaswant
1999: 219-20). Defence allocation plummeted from a record high
of 3.86 per cent of the GDP in 1986-87 to an abysmal 2.38 per
cent of the GDP in 1995-96 (Mehta, 2004a: 6). The drop in budgets
was due partially to India diverting funds towards the development
of its nuclear deterrent. This was revealed by Narasimha Rao to
the Kargil Review Committee (Verghese, 2010: 428). The apparent
decline in the efficacy of India’s conventional deterrence further
emboldened Pakistan, even though that state was then itself in
dire economic and political straits post the withdrawal of US
support at the end of the Cold War and, later, the sanctions
imposed in wake of the Chagai tests (Haqqani 2005: 247). The
climax of the strategic contest was the Kargil War on the
conventional plane in 1999 and the attack on Parliament on the
subconventional plane in December 2001.
The cumulative impact of these two attacks (Kapur 2009: 202), led
to the formulation of a proactive and offensive Indian strategic
doctrine. Coercive diplomacy was attempted by Operation
Parakram (Rajamohan 2003: 196-203). The resulting hardened
strategic posture then has been compared by analysts to
compellence (Kampani 2002, Chari et al. 2008: 154-55). It has found
expression in military doctrines predicated on proactive offensives,
but with full cognizance of the nuclear reality.
Changes in Military Doctrine

The Seventies
The seventies saw both states in defensive mode. K. Subrahmanyam,
then Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
at New Delhi, outlined the national security policy that required:
‘India to develop and keep at readiness adequate forces to deter
China and Pakistan from launching an attack either jointly or
individually and in case deterrence fails to repel the aggression
effectively (Subrahmanyam 1972: 48).’ On the Indo-Pak front this
involved hunkering down behind newly created canal defences
and ‘ditch cum bandhs (embankments) (DCB)’ (Sood and Sawhney,
2003: 150). This was made possible by the World Bank sponsored
Indus Water Treaty and the loans made available to develop the
respective water systems. Both states started constructing these
canals and undertaking anti-flood schemes in the sixties. These
acquired a pronounced defensive orientation. In the 1965 War it
was the Icchogil Canal that helped save Pakistan in the Punjab
sector. The defensive military doctrine shaped itself along the
artificial geographical features across the Indo-Gangetic watershed
(Thomas and Mansingh 1994: 360-364, 435). The defences,
reminiscent of the pre-World War II Maginot line along the Franco-
German border, and can be likened to the contemporary Bar Lev
line along the east bank of the Suez Canal. This involved, in the
main, holding of territory through the obstacle system by the
infantry with armour spaced out in penny packets to provide
immediate counter attack reserves. At the strategic level two
armoured divisions were available for counter offensives and
offensives if necessary.
20 | ALI AHMED
The seventies were important because of the impact that the loss
of Vietnam war had on the US military in particular and militaries
in general everywhere. The doctrinal effervescence in the US,
alongside the Operational Manoeuvre Group concept of the Soviet
Union, had influenced the thinking in militaries. The Arab-Israeli
wars of both 1967 and 1973 again impacted doctrinal thought with
regard to both the offensive and the defensive. Emulation of
militaries at the forefront of the military profession was possible.
For instance, the TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command)
set up in 1973 (Chapman 2009: 17) was emulated by India in the
setting up of the Army Training Command (ARTRAC). The
organisational innovations in the US army, such as the ROAD
(Reorganised Objective Army Division) to operate as the earlier
Pentomic division in a nuclear battlefield (Chapman 2009: 17) led
to similar thinking in India resulting in the setting up of what was
General Sundarji’s brainchild, the Reorganised Plains Infantry
Division (RAPID). Sundarji had attended a course in the US in
the late sixties. Doctrinally, the TRADOC’s Field Manual (FM)
100-5, the influential outcome of the work of Dupuy, the first
commander of TRADOC and the output on AirLand battle of
his successor, Don Starry, (Chapman 2009: 18-19), was also studied
with considerable professional interest in India, as elsewhere.
Manoeuvre warfare now became the ‘buzzword’.
The seeds of the mechanisation, influenced by changes in the
‘global strategic culture’, can however be traced to India’s
spectacular advance into East Pakistan. Ravi Rikhye commenting
on the changed contours of the new armoured force, wrote, ‘A
new armoured force for India is the only way we can decisively
defeat Pakistan instead of continually being forced to accept virtual
stalemate (Rikhye 1973: 144).’ The idea was to create a breach in
enemy defences with the mechanised infantry and send in the
armour through the gap deep into enemy areas for paralysing the
mind of the enemy commander, besides disrupting, destroying
and defeating the enemy piecemeal (Rikhye 1990: 323). After the
war, India converted its II Corps that had been raised in the run
up to the war and had played a role in liberating Bangladesh, into
a strike corps by raising an armoured division. The 1975 study
group under Lt Gen Krishna Rao, that also included K. Sundarji,
furthered the process in organisational and material terms (Gupta

1997: 49). Sundarji has since been linked to mechanisation, because
of his keen interest in the raising of the mechanised infantry in the
early eighties and thereafter putting the new concepts into practice
during the controversial Exercise Brasstacks (Roy 2010: 165).
The Eighties
In the days of the superpower rivalry, General Zia transformed
Pakistan into a ‘frontline’ state after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. This gave him much more access to military and
economic support from the US than what he had earlier rejected
as ‘peanuts’ (Cohen 1984: 151, Cloughley 1999: 278-87). The
military aid was used for strengthening its military posture against
India (Cloughley 1999: 288) while irregular warfare resources and
know-how from the mujahedeen war were diverted to waging and
sustaining a proxy war first in Punjab and later in Kashmir. Owing
to rising security concerns, inter alia, India embarked on a major
programme of modernisation and mechanisation. The strategic
doctrine, though continuing as defensive and reactive,
unexceptionable for a status quoist and stronger power, was based
on the counter offensive capability of two strike corps. This
suggests a strategic doctrine of deterrence based on a conventionally
administered ‘deterrence by punishment’. Nevertheless, the
aggressive Exercise Brasstacks bordered on compellence, which was
intended to persuade Pakistan to desist from aiding Khalistani
terrorists (Koithara 2004: 42).
The change towards, what is known, as Plan 2000 (Tellis 1997:
27), for an army geared for the turn of the millennium, was brought
about by Exercise Digvijay in 1983 under General Krishna Rao,
with Lt Gen K. Sundarji as the commanding general. The better
known effort was Exercise Brasstacks held under General Sundarji
as Chief in 1986-7 (Chari et al. 2008: 44). The plan was ambitious
and envisaged four strike corps, comprising four armoured
divisions, eight mechanised divisions and seven RAPIDs (Rikhye
1990: 319). An air assault division was also on the cards. Conceptual
innovations under the guidance of Sundarji led to the organisational
change. With two combat divisions in the order of battle of
Southern Command, the Desert (XII) Corps was raised at Jodhpur
22 | ALI AHMED
during the volatile days of Operation Trident, a crisis brought on

by Exercise Brasstacks (Indian Army website, n.d.). Desert defences
were prepared based on the ‘nodal point’ concept, with important
communication centres being as ‘nodes’. These were to be denied
to attacking enemy forces, thereby depriving him of sustenance
and easy movement, so critical in desert terrain. All along the front
at tactical and operational level counter attack reserves based on
armour were held.
At the strategic level were reserves based on the strike corps for
counter offensives (Sood and Sawhney 2003: 150). The response
could be in the form of riposte, close on the heels of the enemy
offensive to force him to retreat. Alternatively, it could be a counter
offensive at a time and place of own choosing. Such formations
could be dual-tasked to also carry out offensives. An offensive
could be a limited offensive or a full-fledged one. A favoured
scenario of the latter kind was bifurcating Pakistan through the
middle by undertaking offensives in the desert sector or striking
at politically important centres (Tellis 1997: 27). The thinking along
these lines was already extant and culminated in the doctrinal
thinking propounded by Sundarji, in the following words (Roy
2010: 169):
The strategy of conventional defence consists of two parts.
The first is a dissuasive part; a strong defensive position,
which can extract a heavy toll from the attacker… The
second part of the strategy is the almost axiomatic counter
offensive, at a time and place of the defender’s choice…
The threat of counter offensive, and the certainty of heavy
damage to the original attacker, is the deterrent part of the
equation (Sundarji 1996: 44).
The Nineties
Pakistan’s response was on two planes, nuclear and sub-
conventional so as to sandwich the conventional plane of India’s
moves. This saw the ‘stability/instability paradox’ in operation.
Stability at the nuclear level after covert nuclearisation was
popularly seen as creating instability at the sub-conventional level.
The concept was articulated in the Cold War by Glenn Snyder
(1965). Snyder was discussing the issue of stability at the nuclear

level, which has arisen because of the MAD (Mutual Assured
Destruction) capability of the two sides. Michael Krepon describes
its working in the Cold War context as: ‘The United States and
Soviet Union managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare
during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in myriad of
ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became
surrogates for direct conflict (Krepon 2003: 1)’ According to the
concept:
…lowering the probability that a conventional war will
escalate to a nuclear war, along preemptive and other lines,
reduces the danger of starting a conventional war; thus,
this low likelihood of escalation, referred to here as
‘stability’, makes conventional war less dangerous, and
possibly, as a result, more likely (Chari et al. 2008: 148, 199).
However, in the South Asian case, stability at the higher levels -

nuclear and conventional – has led to instability at the sub-
conventional level (Bajpai 2009a: 171). Rajesh Rajagopalan highlights
this dichotomy between the Cold War and the South Asian
scenario, and writes that ‘the stability/instability paradox was a
proposition about the relationship between the nuclear and
conventional military balances, not between nuclear and
subconventional conflicts as is mistakenly assumed in much of the
literature about the proposition in South Asia (2006: 5).’ He contests
the applicability of the paradox to the India-Pakistan setting, noting
that, firstly, the instability obtains at the subconventional level as
against the conventional level as posited by the concept; and,
secondly, that the insurgency in Kashmir does not have a direct
link with nuclearisation. The latter is a result of Pakistani
propensity to interfere in India’s internal problems (Rajagopalan
2006: 4, 11).
Paul Kapur in his book Dangerous Deterrent (2007) makes the
argument that it is not the ‘stability/instability’ paradox, but the
‘instability/instability’ paradox that is applies to the situation. His
view is that both states have demonstrated militarised behaviour
since nuclearisation, thus implying there is instability at the higher
nuclear level also (Kapur 2007: 10). While Pakistan sought to use
24 | ALI AHMED
the nuclear cover to launch a risky subconventional proxy war,

India attempted to use the threat of conventional war and thereby
the risk of nuclear war to deter proxy war. Thus, both states were
offensive at different levels: India at the conventional and Pakistan
at the subconventional. This made for instability at all three levels.
For India, the experience of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)
in Sri Lanka and liberalisation-related cuts in defence budgets put
the military under considerable strain (Babbage and Gordon 1992:
14). Fortunately, the draw down of the Cold War led to the exit
of the US from the region, leaving Pakistan without a strategic
lifeline. India created a third strike corps to reinforce its
conventional deterrent. In keeping with the reorganisation of the
Indian army as per Army Plan 2000, a strike corps had to be raised
in the southern theatre. The HQ IPKF was re-designated as HQ
21 Corps in April 1990 (Indian Army website, n.d.). This became
the offensive corps of Southern Command stationed at Bhopal in
July 1990. Plan 2000 appears to have been revised (Badri-Maharaj
2000: 40-41) by the late nineties; perhaps because of the nuclear
developments in Pakistan.
By the end of the decade, India conducted nuclear tests to reinforce
the credibility of its ‘credible minimum deterrent’. Simultaneously,
as a mature nuclear power it attempted to engage Pakistan, through
the Lahore process. The strategic thinking behind this move was
found wanting in as much as it did not take cognizance of the
Pakistani Army being the defining factor in Pakistan’s national
strategy. It mounted a military challenge in Kargil in an attempt
to internationalise the Kashmir issue, among other reasons (Chari,
et al. 2008: 124-128). Unsurprisingly, the decade ended in the
Kandahar hijack, setting the stage for the surcharged context at
the turn of the millennium that culminated in the dastardly attack
on India’s parliament on December 13, 2001.
The 2000s
For over a decade India had been tied down in the proxy war in a
‘bleeding war that cost the army one Kargil every 16 months’
(Mehta 2004a: 6) and Rs. 1000 crores were being spent in the firing
across the Line of Control (LC). These pressures resulted in a
‘reduced conventional advantage over Pakistan from 1:1.7 at 1971

to 1:1.2 at the time of Operation Parakram (Mehta 2004a: 6).’
India opted to respond with ‘coercive diplomacy’ by mobilising
its forces so as to also not be deflected from its economic trajectory.
More importantly, India’s military was unable to bring its
conventional power to bear within a viable time frame. Its doctrine
of employment of strike corps had not sufficiently evolved to
deal with the nuclear environment that had unmistakably dawned.
The outcome of the ‘twin peaks’ crisis of 2002-3 was along two
lines, political and military. The political outcome of which has
been under-appreciated. To Ashok Mehta (2004a: 6), the: ‘CBMs
(confidence building measures) and peace process were a direct
outcome of Parakram.’ He was of the view that Operation
Parakram demonstrated that ‘if pushed beyond a point, India is
prepared in its national interest to do to the brink of war despite
attendant nuclear risks to deter Pakistan from its policy of jehad
(2004b: 6). At the strategic level, Ashok Mehta rued the lost
opportunity largely because the military doctrine had not kept
pace with nuclear developments, noting:
it (India) has lost the strategic space even for limited war
against Pakistan. If the window for limited war under
nuclear shadow has all but closed for good, the
government and the military must do some creative
thinking in rebuilding deterrence and crafting usable
strategies that will impose costs and restraints on Pakistan
(Mehta 2004b: 6).
II
Background
It is widely held that India’s wars have been limited wars (Singh,
Swaran 2000: 2183, Roy 2010: 144). In case of India, the
‘gentlemanly’ nature of the wars on the subcontinent, are taken as
evidence of their ‘limited’ nature in terms, aims, means, extent,
duration and intensity. The subsequent negotiated settlements at
Tashkent and Shimla are seen as clinching the argument. Bharat
Karnad also believes that none of India’s wars have been Total
26 | ALI AHMED
Wars. He attributes their remaining limited to cultural, religious

and historical affinities (Karnad 2005: 243). Indo-Pak wars were
once famously characterised by ‘Monty’ Palit as ‘communal riots
with tanks’!
The limited wars were more on account of limited means in 1962
and 1965. On the contrary, the 1971 War can be taken as a case of
mission-expansion on the Eastern Front. The 1947-48 Indo-Pak
conflict, in being restricted to Kashmir, can be considered as having
been limited. During the 1965 war, there was an expansion to
encompass the Punjab theatre, but no action was taken against
East Pakistan. The restraint was partially because of incapacity.
In 1971, the original aim was nibbling of adequate territory to
implant the Bangladeshi government-in-exile on native soil (Jacob
1997: 66-67, 56; 2000: 1). However, J.N. Dixit maintains that the
broad strategic objective was to see the ‘departure’ of the Pakistan
army after a ‘decisive defeat’ (Dixit 1999: 92). With regard to the
situation on the Western Front, it can be said to be in keeping
with the requirements of Limited War, since theatre aims were kept
restricted. That Pakistan did not attack on this front enabled ending
of the war without expansion. The possible intervention of the
US with the entry of USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal
influenced the decision of the ceasefire (Dixit 1999: 106-07).
The Indian army’s first attempt at reducing doctrine to paper was
in 1998 when Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi was the Army Commander,
ARTRAC (Oberoi 2006: 332). It was published in the form of a
book entitled, Fundamentals, Concepts, Doctrine – Indian Army
(1998). The 1998 document did not favour Limited War. This
owes perhaps to it being written immediately prior to the Pokhran
and Chagai tests. Prior to the Kargil War, the logic was that nuclear
weapons had made war recede as a policy option. The logic served
to propel the Lahore peace initiative in February 1999. That the
military allowed itself to be caught off guard at Kargil indicates
how influential this theory was (Chari et al. 2008: 142). The
Pakistani military, on the other hand - no doubt self-servingly -
discerned that there existed a window of conventional opportunity
between subconventional operations and the nuclear threshold.
This explains their intrusion into Kargil (Chari et al. 2008: 200).
The Kargil War forced India to borrow a leaf out of Pakistani

thinking (Chandran 2005: 39). The main idea was to restrict the
space available to Pakistan at the subconventional level for
conducting its proxy war (Chari et al. 2008: 147). Pakistan was
seemingly emboldened to undertake the intrusion in the belief
that its nuclear capability had neutralised India’s conventional
capability. Limited War thinking was initiated to undercut this
reasoning and bring conventional war back into the reckoning
(Sethi 2009: 307).
The first discussion on Limited War took place on January 5-6,
2000 at a, the IDSA, New Delhi, during a national seminar on
‘The Challenge of Limited War: Parameters and Options’. At the
seminar, the then defence minister, George Fernandes, observed:
‘India has understood the dynamics of limited war after it declared
its nuclear weapons status. Nuclear weapons do not make war
obsolete but simply imposed another dimension on the way
warfare could be conducted (Singh, S. 2000: 2180).’ He initiated
the change of doctrine to the offensive, noting:
India has traditionally pursued a non-aggressive, non-
provocative defence policy based on the philosophy of
defensive defence. This represents the political doctrine of
employing military power. But military efficiency will
continue to demand the pursuit of the principle that ‘offence
is the best manner of defence (PIB: 2000).’
Analysts have picked this up as ‘the first signal of India’s long-

awaited shift from its original ‘defensive defence’ and ‘war
prevention’ military doctrines to a more positive post nuclear war-
fighting doctrine (Singh, S. 2000: 2180).’ This presages one of the
principles of war stated in the doctrine as (ARTRAC 2004: 30):
‘Offensive action is the chief means of achieving victory. It results
from offensive spirit and helps in the seizure and maintenance of
initiative.’
The debate was taken forward by General V.P. Malik (2002), who
put forward the argument that ‘in the changed Indo-Pak strategic
environment, there is a likelihood of limited wars than an all out
war.’ He propagated the view that space for conventional operations
28 | ALI AHMED
existed between the subconventional and nuclear levels of war and

that the ‘escalatory ladder can be climbed in a carefully controlled
ascent wherein politico-diplomatic factors would play an important
part (Malik 2002).’
The Army’s Conventional Doctrine

The Army only released its revised doctrine in 2004 (ATRAC
2004), superseding its earlier document of 1998. It is interesting to
note that Indian Army Doctrine (2004) includes no discussion of
Limited War. It mentions Limited War just once in a diagram on
the ‘Spectrum of Conflict’ (ARTRAC 2004: 19). Yet informed
judgment has it that the doctrine ‘defined an approach to limited
wars in a nuclear environment (Kapoor 2010: 3).’ The doctrine
was released in two parts. The second part is classified. The first
part of the open source document is itsel fin in two parts. The
second part is equally consequential since it deals with conduct of
operations.
In the background briefing to journalists on the release of the
doctrine ‘sources’ in the military hierarchy highlighted certain
facets that have gave the doctrine its name, ‘Cold Start’. News
reports attributed to these sources stated that the doctrine is about
eight rapidly-deployable ‘integrated battle groups’, with support
drawn from the navy and the Indian air force. These groups would
be trained to make swift inroads into the enemy territory. The
source is credited with saying, ‘The idea is that the international
community should not get the opportunity to intervene. Hence,
the need for swift action starting from a ‘cold start’, instead of
slow mobilisation (Pandit 2004).’ This is how the term ‘Cold Start’
came to be used to describe the Army’s new war doctrine in keeping
with the Limited War concept. Sawhney attributes the term to the
army spokesperson, Maj Gen D. Summanwar (2004: 7).
The strategy marked a change from the existing one of the slow
amassing of India’s three strike formations, headquartered in
Mathura (I Corps), Ambala (II Corps) and Bhopal (XXI Corps),
in preparation for war with integrated battle groups (IBGs). There
was an apparent delay in mobilisation during Operation Parakram
(Pant 2007: 248). It had taken the army almost a month to deploy
its three strike corps in ‘launch pads’ along the Indo-Pakistan

border. As per the new doctrine the strikes should be ‘limited’
and ‘calibrated’, to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play.
Some of its tenets on ‘limitation’ are as below:
y Conflict. … Today international mechanisms, including the
influence exercised by major powers, are in place to resolve or
limit conflicts because of their potential to lead to undesired
war (2004: 20).
y The State of War. … Disengagement from war is difficult
because it develops its own dynamics and pace, which in
themselves are unpredictable and could spin out of control
(2004: 20).
y Conventional War. … It may be total or limited in terms of
duration, the range of weapon systems employed, scope,
objectives and its ultimate outcome. Given the prohibitive costs
in terms of human lives and material, as well as the rising
lethality of modern weapons, conventional war may be of short
duration (2004: 22).
y Strategic Perspective. … Understanding the restrictions placed
on military operations based on national policy (2004: 34).
y Exit Policy. Victory may not always be an appropriate term
to describe the desired outcome of an operation; it may have
to be defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilisation
(acceptance of the status quo) or acceptance of an agreed peace
plan…(2004: 37).
y Attacking the Enemy’s Will. Conflict is subject to political,
economic, ethical and moral constraints. These limit the
freedom of military action (2004: 30).
The open source Part II of Indian Army Doctrine has two significant
chapters. Chapter 4 is on ‘Conduct of Operations’, with a section
each on ‘Offensive and Defensive Operations’ and ‘Joint
Operations’. The closest the doctrine gets to a the standing start
of ‘Cold Start’ is in a tangential reference that states that, ‘large-
scale mobilisation of forces would normally follow a firm decision
30 | ALI AHMED
at the highest level to adopt the military option with minimum

loss of time (italics added) (ARTRAC 2004: 47).’ Further it states,
‘All planning should aim to mobilise forces in the minimum possible
time in order to take advantage of the many benefits that such a
step offers (2004: 50).’ At another place there is mention of
mobilisation in the ‘shortest possible time (2004: 54).’ These lend
credence to the term ‘Cold Start’.
Once launched, the forces conduct offensive operations as ‘a decisive
form of winning a war. Their purpose is to attain the desired end
state and achieve decisive victory.’ Decisive operations are defined
as those that ‘force the enemy to submit to one’s will… Enemy
vulnerabilities should be targeted to achieve a clear-cut victory.
Such operations will invariably be joint operations (2004: 51).’
Such victories at tactical level are easy to concede, but gaining such
victories at the operational level is to neglect the nuclear factor.
The doctrine makes a laconic three line mention of the nuclear
factor, ‘Future operations will be conducted against a nuclear
backdrop; all planning should take this important factor into
account (2004: 52).’ Since the doctrine mentions that nuclear
escalation can occur if a state attempts to avoid defeat (2004: 17),
pursuing ‘decisive operations’ for ‘decisive’ or ‘clear-cut victory’
will be out of sync with the strategic context.
There is also a tendency away from limitation in the stipulations
for the pivot corps and strike corps, stated below (ARTRAC 2004:
55-56):
y Employment of Forces. Pivot or holding corps should be
prepared to undertake offensive operations…. and create
‘windows of opportunity’ for development of further
operations…
y Strike Corps. Strike corps should be capable of being inserted
into operational level battle, either as battle groups or as a
whole, to capture or threaten strategic and operational
objective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the enemy’s
reserves and capture sizeable portions of territory.
The term ‘battle group’ used above finds mention in strategic

commentary as ‘integrated battle groups’ (IBG). The strike corps
remains a potent force that can be employed as a whole. This is
antithetical in the nuclear context. This brings to fore the feature
of duality in which there are elements that favour limitation even
as a wider conventional war is not ruled out. Whether the latter is
at all feasible in a nuclear backdrop is questionable. The doctrine
is oblivious to this, with its spectrum of conflict including ‘Total’
and even ‘Global’ War in the category of conventional wars below
the category Nuclear War (2004: 19).
The Logic of Cold Start

The Army’s 2004 document stresses manoeuvre warfare, jointness,
information warfare, net-centric warfare and an ability to operate
in nuclear conditions (Chapman 2009: 91). The aim is to undercut
the impunity Pakistan enjoys at the subconventional level by
catering for Limited War at the conventional level (Chari et al.
2008: 174-75). This injects instability at the nuclear-conventional
level, thereby, in the expectation of the planners, bringing about
stability, through a refurbished conventional deterrence, at the
subconventional level. The doctrine is responsive to the ‘stability/
instability’ paradox.
‘Cold Start’, as the term suggests, is for early application of force
in conflict. Cohen and Dasgupta believe that it is reminiscent of
the European situation during the Cold War in which both armies
were poised for speedy offensives, so as to enhance deterrence (2010:
59). In the Indian case too there is an emphasis on increasing the
speed of mobilisation and launch for deterrence purposes by
suggesting to Pakistan that India is not without options for hurting
it right back. The equivalent term in tactics is ‘attack from the line
of march’ (Bakshi 2010: 46). This being applicable only on the
Pakistan front, it is more strategy of a kind rather than a ‘doctrine’
as such. The ‘Cold Start doctrine’ by this yardstick is a misnomer.
‘Cold Start’ is but a colloquial way of describing the army’s wider
doctrine that attempts to transform it from a lumbering giant, as
was the case in 1999 and 2001-02 to a nimble, surefooted one
(Cohen and Dasgupta 2010: 61).
32 | ALI AHMED
Early mobilization is essentially to prevent Pakistan from playing

the diplomatic card. It would yield operational dividends in terms
of Indian attackers finding Pakistani defences under-prepared,
given the element of surprise and the little time available for
defenders to reach and prepare defences (Malik 2010). This would
enable easier penetration of defences, thereby paralysing Pakistani
response. This could produce the desired political dividend. It could
also facilitate strategic surprise as dwelt on in the Doctrine: ‘Strategic
surprise can herald both the beginning and the end of a war (2004:
45).’ Mobilisation time differentials are seen as being in Pakistan’s
favour because of proximity of cantonments to the border (Kapur
2008: 88). Mobilisation is seen as being problematic in the Indian
democratic context as against the same effort in military directed
Pakistan. The problem, in the words of the Doctrine, is that:
Military mobilisation in the Indian context involves
considerable effort because of the wide geographical spread
of the peacetime locations of our units and formations, the
considerable extent of our borders and the multiplicity of
agencies that need to coordinate their actions in order to
make it effective (2004: 44).
Walter Ladwig writes that, ‘the goal of military operations would

be to make shallow territorial gains … that could be used in post
conflict negotiations to extract concessions from Islamabad (Ladwig
2008: 165).’ According to a news report:
The plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile
‘battle groups’, with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and
upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed
by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into
enemy territory within 96 hours (Pandit 2009: 1).
The perceived advantages are that more alert and agile IBGs would
be off-the-blocks faster. They would not pack much punch and
therefore would keep below the nuclear threshold. They would,
blitzkrieg-style, mentally paralyse the operational level leadership
of the enemy. Lastly, they would present a smaller target for
nuclear attack (Ladwig 2008: 166-167). Gurmeet Kanwal describes
the strategy option in the following manner:
The doctrine was premised on two major elements. Certain

readjustments were carried out to enhance the offensive
operations capability of “Pivot” corps (defensive or ground
holding corps), so as to make it possible to launch offensive
operations virtually from a “cold start” to deny Pakistan
the advantage of early mobilisation… It is believed that the
second element of the Cold Start doctrine conceptualises a
number of “integrated battle groups” (IBGs; divisional-size
forces) launching limited offensive operations to a shallow
depth, to capture a long swathe of territory almost all along
the international boundary. The success achieved by the
IBGs would be exploited by one or more Strike Corps,
where possible, but without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red
lines (Kanwal 2010).
How the doctrine serves limitation will depend on the strategy

for the conflict. This would in turn be subject to political aims
and parameters of limitation. The extent to which Indian troops
would be allowed to penetrate would depend on aims set by the
government and their translation into strategic ends by the
military. This aspect is possibly dealt with in the classified Part II
of the Doctrine, since the nuclear backdrop has not been covered
in Part I. It has been assessed that these would be of necessity
limited to avoid provocation, thereby indicating the influence of
Limited War thinking in terms of the constraints on political aims
and military objectives (Subrahmanyam 2002). The problem of
the nuclear threshold would remain, since war aims are difficult
to arrive at. The difficulty is evident of juggling the two aims -
territory and attrition. Captured territory is expected to act as a
bargaining chip to force Pakistan to wind down its institutional
support to Jihadi elements. The ‘overall aim’ has been assessed as
being to destroy the Pakistan Army’s war waging potential through
the application of asymmetric firepower (Kanwal 2010).
Bharat Karnad’s ‘Sialkot grab’ scenario (Karnad 2002: 677-78,
Karnad 2005: 244) offers clues on how India could resolve the
problem posed by nuclear thresholds. He visualises India cutting
off a 30 mile deep swathe of territory, thereby threatening Pakistan’s
‘centre of gravity’ located in the urban centres in Punjab. To him,
34 | ALI AHMED
this would not entail a nuclear war since it would not threaten
Pakistan’s survival.
Limited War theories in India have a utility for deterrence. They
constricts Pakistan’s strategic space by making war ‘thinkable’.
The publicity attending the release of the doctrine and the later
theorising has had three benefits. One was to prepare public
opinion; second, to build pressure on Pakistan’s security apparatus
by indicating a hardening of Indian resolve; and lastly, it was
directed at the international community, which increased pressure
on Pakistan. A provocatively named exercise, Exercise Poorna
Vijay (Total Victory) under Lt Gen J.J. Singh, later Army Chief,
was deliberately publicised to send the message of the validation
of the new doctrine in the new nuclear backdrop (Shrutikant 2001).
Such posturing can be interpreted in terms of ‘rationality of
irrationality’, contributing thereby to deterrence. In India’s case
this requires an effort, in lthe ight of India’s studied posture
described by Ashley Tellis as ‘passivity and restraint’ (2000: 71).
III
India’s Nuclear Doctrine
Although India’s nuclear doctrine remained unarticulated, through
the nineties a ‘recessed deterrent’ based on existential deterrence
was adopted (Basrur 2001: 95). This implied that the nuclear
capability had not been ‘weaponised’, but was capable of being
fielded in a short time frame. Nuclear weapons were taken as
‘political weapons’ meant only for deterring enemy nuclear use
(Sethi 2009: 205). India stood for NFU and for existential
deterrence. The weapons were to be used in a counter value mode
in case of enemy nuclear first use. The aim was to avoid the
stockpile build-ups that had been done by nuclear weapon powers
in the Cold War. This is the connotation of ‘minimum’ in India’s
nuclear doctrine. The advantages of this posture were: a nuclear
arms race was averted; India’s conventional superiority could
continue to count; and lastly, missile delivery capability could
continue to be built up.
The situation changed dramatically with the nuclear tests, code-
named Shakti, conducted at Pokhran on May 13, 1998. The tests
involved: a fission device with a yield of 12 kilotons; a

thermonuclear device with a yield of 43 kilotons; and a third tactical
device of less than a kiloton. The two tests used devices with yields
between 0.2 and 0.6 kilotons (Joint Statement 1998). In a letter to
the US president –which was leaked - the Indian prime minister
explained that the tests had been compelled by the threat posed
by its nuclear armed neighbours and the collusion in the nuclear
and delivery fields between the two (Text 1998). India
simultaneously attempted to defuse concerns by laying out the
broad principles of its doctrine in a suo moto statement made in
the Parliament by the prime minister on May 27, 1998 (Suo moto
Statement 1998). The expectation appears to have been of peace
having ‘broken out’, in light of the the risks associated with going
to war in a nuclear environment.
The first NSAB of the National Security Council (NSC) system
was set up in 1998 and charged with preparing a nuclear doctrine.
It formulated a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (hereafter Draft) for the
government’s approval in August 1999 (NSAB 1999, Pant 2007:
244-46). The Draft was a unique document in that it was a departure
from the India’s tradition of not articulating its strategic thinking.
It nevertheless generated considerable controversy. Its credibility
was affected when Jaswant Singh, then minister for external affairs,
said, that it was ‘not a policy document of the Government of
India (Rajamohan 1999).’ The great contribution of the Draft was
in the debate that it sparked off and its contribution to strategic
culture. Eventually, the government gave its approval to many of
the provisions of the Draft nuclear doctrine in January 2003 (Sethi
2009: 125).
The CCS met on January 4, 2003 to review the progress made in
operationalising India’s nuclear doctrine (CCS 2003). The key
features of the declaratory nuclear doctrine are as below:
y Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
y A posture of “No First Use”: nuclear weapons will only be
used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory
or on Indian forces anywhere;
y Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed
to inflict unacceptable damage.
36 | ALI AHMED
y Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the

civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command
Authority.
y Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
y In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces

anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain
the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;
Further, it approved the setting up of a Strategic Forces Command

to handle nuclear assets under the control of the Nuclear
Command Authority (NCA). The latter comprises a Political
Council and an Executive Council (Sethi 2009: 160). The Political
Council is chaired by the prime minister. It is the sole body which
can authorise the use of nuclear weapons. The Executive Council
is headed by the National Security Advisor (NSA). It provides
inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority
and executes directives given to it by the Political Council.
The doctrine is taken as being one of ‘Assured Retaliation’ with

the proviso that this would be ‘massive’. In Indian thinking ‘first
strike’ is equated with ‘first use’ or the introduction of nuclear
weapons into a conflict (Ahmed 2008). Thus, any introduction of
nuclear weapons into a conflict would result in ‘massive’ punitive
retaliation. Kanwal articulates the logic thus:
However there can be no doubt that for India’s No First

Use to be credible, India’s strategy should be to target high
value population and industrial centres in adversary
countries with a high level of assurance after absorbing the
full weight of what in all probability be a disarming first
strike. Only then would the adversary be sufficiently
deterred to avoid launching a nuclear strike against India
(2000a:1071).
Thinking through what may constitute ‘unacceptable damage’,

Kanwal had earlier arrived at a number of 8 to 10 cities that require
targeting (2000b: 1062). For the sake of analysis, Manpreet Sethi
believes ‘that unacceptable damage for Pakistan would constitute
no more than four or five 20 kt weapons each on 5-6 major cities…

(Sethi 2009: 251).’
Analysis of the Nuclear Doctrine

It emerges that ‘massive’ punitive retaliation would be a
pronounced escalation of the conflict. The only circumstance it
makes sense is in case Pakistan has provoked it by attempting a
‘first strike’, defined as an attempt to disarm and decapitate. This
is distinct from the term ‘first use’ or the introduction of nuclear
weapons into the conflict. An introduction can be in various ways
- not amounting to first strike. It can involve demonstration
strike(s), nuclear signalling by targeting intruding forces, and a
more potent strike in case valuable objectives are being threatened
with capture. In case of lower order nuclear first use, a ‘massive’
response would be disproportionate and abandonment of Limited
War at one go.
India’s new conventional doctrine envisages a ‘proactive’ India,
implying that it would be taking the initiative at the very start of
the conflict. In accordance with the tenets of its doctrine, the aim
would be limited. Conventional forces thus would not
unnecessarily provoke. However, as the Pakistani nuclear threshold
is not known, nuclear first use cannot be ruled out. Since the
Pakistani military will determine nuclear strategy in war, a military
rather than a political approach may be expected. Thus, thresholds
would be under cumulative pressure from the tri-service and joint
military action of India.
Presently, Pakistan has admitted to four thresholds: territorial;
attrition in military and strategic assets; economic strangulation;
and, lastly, externally induced internal instability (Cotta-Ramusino
and Martellini 2002). Even if the Indian military is fighting within
the politically set limited war parameters, the risk of pushing the
Pakistani thresholds, individually for each service or collectively,
remains. For instance, the first draft of the new air force doctrine
formulated in 2007 revolves ‘around the primacy of airpower in
“shaping” or “customising” the battlefield in such a way that the
army, as also the navy, can carry out their designated tasks (Pandit
2007).’ In view of the experience during the Kargil conflict and
38 | ALI AHMED
Operation Parakram, the navy can be expected to address Karachi

port, the Pakistani navy and enemy shipping. Along with this,
intelligence operations, that Pakistan is most sensitive to in light
of its ethnic vulnerabilities, would be also scaled up. Diplomacy
to insulate Pakistan from US and Chinese support and to pressure
it to concede would also be in full swing. These offensive actions
cumulatively could prompt nuclear use for political and
psychological reasons rather than strategic rationality. This may
happen even if the threshold was ‘high’ to begin with. Since it is
the Pakistani military that is in control of its arsenal and has been
known to privilege military over political considerations earlier,
such as at Kargil, nuclear use is possible.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, though not in the public domain could
be along the lines suggested by Sardar Lodhi. He writes that,
‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine would therefore essentially revolve
around the first-strike option.’ He uses Stephen Cohen’s term and
defines e Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear doctrine, as an ‘option-
enhancing policy’. According to him this would entail a ‘stage-by-
stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step
to deter India from attacking (Lodhi 1999).’ Graduated deterrence
through escalatory steps, is described by Lodhi thus:
The first step could be a public or private warning, the
second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon
on its own soil, the third step would be the use of a few
nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking
forces. The fourth stage would be used against critical but
purely military targets in India across the border from
Pakistan. Probably in thinly populated areas in the desert
or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage (sic). This
may prevent Indian retaliation against cities in Pakistan.
Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter-
value role (Lodhi 1999).
This means that India’s nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive

retaliation and of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ is credible for
higher order nuclear first use. However, it may not be prudent
and proportionate for lower order strikes. There is therefore scope
for limitation even at the nuclear level.
If the introduction of nuclear weapons into conflict is not overly

destructive and is a lower order use such as for targeting tactical
forces – which is the more likely form of first use as against a pre-
emptive attempt at first strike - then for India to go ‘massive’ in
response would be a departure from the Limited War concept.
This is understandable since the war would no longer be a Limited
War, if defined as a non-nuclear war, but a nuclear one. However,
to abandon limitation, even in a war that has gone nuclear, may
prove suicidal. In case Pakistan has a proportion of its retaliatory
capability intact in such a circumstance, then India would be
immeasurably damaged, besides the unforeseen costs to
environment and society. Its economy would suffer a set back
over the longer term, leaving India vulnerable to volatile politics
and attempted takeovers by both the extreme right and left of the
political spectrum. This may not be a price worth paying. Thus,
the disjuncture between India’s conventional war doctrine and
nuclear war doctrine needs to be reviewed. This can be resolved
by movement in either of the two doctrines, discussed in the
concluding chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter has set the stage for discussing the drivers behind
doctrine formulation by attempting to highlight the developments
in doctrine. The current status of the conventional doctrine has
reportedly been articulated by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
thus, ‘A major leap in our approach to conduct of operations
(since then) has been the successful firming-up of the Cold Start
strategy (to be able to go to war promptly) (Pandit 2009: 1).’
However the latest amendment to the Limited War doctrine is
the statement of General V.K. Singh downplaying Cold Start.
The Army Chief stated:
There is nothing called ‘Cold Start’. As part of our overall
strategy we have a number of contingencies and options,
depending on what the aggressor does. In the recent years,
we have been improving our systems with respect to
mobilisation, but our basic military posture is defensive
(Pubby 2010).
40 | ALI AHMED
This remark indicates that the army has registered the criticism
Cold Start has come under. A view has it that, ‘a manoeuvre
doctrine and a limited-war concept face practical questions about
how they relate to India’s broader national security concerns
(Kapoor 2010: 5).’ It is already being questioned as to whether the
army had taken necessary measures to implement it in letter and
spirit such as: remodelling the strike corps, staging forward strike
units closer to the border etc. (Bakshi 2010: 46). Its command and
control methods have not made any appreciable shift towards
Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) based on delegation and ‘recon pull’
(reconnaissance pull). G.D. Bakshi, terming Cold Start a ‘land
power centric doctrine’, rates it ‘poorly on the vital aspects of
escalation dominance and escalation control (Bakshi 2010: 166).
He therefore feels there is a ‘primary need’ to ‘urgently articulate’
an Indian doctrine for Limited War, ‘driven primarily by air and
naval power-centric responses (Bakshi 2010: 167).’
It would therefore appear that even as much has been done to
operationalise the doctrine, what remains undone is equally
consequential while making an assessment. Organisational
restructuring has been undertaken along the Pakistan border by
the creation of 9 Corps and the South Western Command (Ladwig
2008: 184-185). The affiliation of a strike corps to each of the three
commands along the border are indicative of the offensive punch
available with the theatre commanders, along with the offensive
content created by relocating pivot corps resources away from
positional defence. Yet, the doctrine continues to be a ‘work in
progress’ (Kanwal 2010). Ladwig’s conclusion is that, ‘Cold Start
remains more of a concept than a reality (2008: 190).’
The shift away from the doctrine is to enable an appropriate
response to Pakistan’s expansion of the proxy war from J&K
into the rest of India, such as the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack.
Jasjit Singh reflecting on the lack of response in case of the attacks
on parliament and Mumbai suggests a possible direction for India’s
strategy. His view is that the aim of changing Pakistan’s strategic
posture would require greater subtlety of means. He writes:
(O)bviously, our response strategy should be based on
discrete conventional punitive strikes against selected
politico-economic targets (preferably in Pakistan Occupied

Kashmir – POK)… The aim of these strikes would be to
generate effect-based outcome. These no doubt would
generate military effects, but their real goal should be to
create political-economic effects with the aim of influencing
change in the policy and strategy pursued by Rawalpindi
(2010: 16).
The inference from the life-cycle of Cold Start is that the earlier
high profile of Cold Start was during the period when the doctrine
was being firmed up. The pieces having fallen into place, it is possible
to underplay the doctrine now. The higher profile earlier enabled
deterrence, in terms of instilling fear in Pakistan on the possibilities
of Indian reaction. Its present state of operationalisation gives the
military confidence to make it expendable from the deterrence
point of view. The current focus as stated by General V.K. Singh
is on ‘operations’ depending on the ‘contingency’. This re-
evaluation may result in short, sharp military engagements, with
escalation to Limited War possibility being readied for alongside,
if only to deter it.
42 | ALI AHMED
3. THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR

Introduction
This chapter attempts to discern the impact of the structure in
terms of developments in regional security; changes in India’s
strategic doctrine; and, in turn, the evolution of military doctrine.
At the structural level, continuing security threats emanating from
a military-dominated Pakistan negate possibility of the exclusion
of a military response option. There is therefore a continuing
perceived utility of military force in the nuclear age. Conceptually,
this was arrived at during the post-Kargil period as the Limited
War concept discussed in Chapter 2. Operationalisation of the
Limited War concept awaited the formulation of the ‘Cold Start’
doctrine in the post Operation Parakram period. The expectation
is that the resulting offensive posture would reinforce deterrence
and also serves to achieve compellence - if deterrence falls short.
The argument is that while in the seventies, a status quoist India
was content to have a defensive doctrine, an upward trend in
Pakistan’s power position in the early eighties because of US
largesse, led to India making a shift towards a strategic doctrine of
defensive deterrence, based on counter offensive capability. Post
its covert nuclearisation by the late eighties, Pakistan was
emboldened to step up the proxy war and, eventually, after overt
nuclearisation in 1998, launch the Kargil intrusion a year later.
India, finding a deficit in its deterrent posture in the wake of the
parliament attack of 2001 went in for a potentially offensive
doctrine. This is reflected in the offensive intent built into the
military doctrine and, consequently, in the offensive content built
into its forces. Since the doctrine is cognizant of the nuclear
threshold, it is one informed by the Limited War concept.
Part I of this chapter studies India’s changing strategic doctrine
1971 War onwards. In the backdrop of changing threat perceptions
of Pakistan since the 1971 War, it reviews the evolution of its
military doctrine. Part II analyses the implications of military

doctrine at the conventional and nuclear levels to bring out the
consequent tension between offensive deterrence and compellence.
I
The Seventies
Through the sixties, the army had concentrated on building up its
strengths learning from its 1962 experience. Shankar
Roychowdhury, a former army chief, writing of the period, says:
Post 1965, the army reshaped itself into a dual-front
operational structure which incorporated a light, infantry-
intensive post 1962 component for the mountains, and now,
a heavier mechanised-intensive post 1965 one for plains
and deserts (2002: 151).
This set the stage for the seventies. India, having acquired regional
pre-eminence through the vivisection of Pakistan in the 1971 War,
was ready to realistically pursue its interests, without getting into
strategic competition. It would maintain a capability that would
be enough to deter its putative adversaries. K. Subrahmanyam,
outlined the aim and strategic doctrine as: ‘India has to be strong
enough to deter interventionism and aggression by other nations
but at the same time should not adopt a posture which will induce
fears in the minds of other nations (Subrahmanyam 1972: 48).’
The defensive strategic orientation for India that he advocated is
evident from his view that:
India does not want to become a big power in the pejorative
sense and to throw its weight about in international arena.
Our aim is limited to ensuring our own security and that
of our immediate neighbourhood when it affects our security
adversely (1972: 48).
Subrahmanyam required that India have in ‘readiness adequate

forces to deter China and Pakistan from launching an attack either
jointly or individually and in case deterrence fails to repel
aggression effectively (1972: 48).’ With respect to Pakistan,
Subrahmanyam argued that ‘with a clear margin of superiority
44 | ALI AHMED
both in numbers and firepower, it should be possible to deter

Pakistan from contemplating any more aggression against this
country or invoking external political or military support to pursue
a policy of confrontation against this country (1972: 53).’ With
two adversaries to cater for, he outlined India’s aim as being to
hold one and to reach a quick military decision with the other. To
him, it was ‘obvious’ that the latter could only be Pakistan. While
not making a detailed threat assessment, he was sanguine that India’s
ten mountain divisions were adequate against the one hundred
thousand Chinese military men in Tibet. The 15 divisions left for
the Pakistan front did not provide an adequate safety margin (1972:
52). Therefore, he advocated that force requirements include more
manpower, additional firepower, mobility and water crossing
equipment, vertical envelopment capability and ability to operate
in the desert (1972: 53).
However, given that strategic doctrine is a matter of political choice,

there were other opinions in the discourse. Ravi Rikhye advocated
a more offensive strategic orientation for the twin front problem:
We must follow a forward strategy and recognise the

outposts for India’s national security… Our strategy in the
next decade against the twin Pak-China threat has to be
based on the Delbruck-Clausewitz theory i.e. strategy of
annihilation against Pakistan and one of exhaustion against
China (1972: 365).
Politically, there was little incentive for India to adopt an offensive

strategic doctrine. Soon after the 1971 victory, it was beset with
internal problems that acquisition of the nuclear capability in 1974
did little to dispel. These culminated in the Emergency (Verghese
2010: 185-210). The impact on security was minimal owing to
Pakistan itself being beset with internal problems of its own relating
to internal security in Baluchistan and civil-military relations.
According to the ‘secret’ part of the Shimla Agreement, Bhutto
was to take steps to integrate the Pakistan occupied part of J&K
in such a manner as to enable both states to agree to convert the
Line of Control (LOC) into an international border (Dhar 1995).
The LOC, dating back to the Ceasefire Line (CFL) of the Karachi
Agreement of July 1949, had been demarcated, - apart from a few

changes that occurred in 1971 operations- endorsed by both sides
(Armed Forces website n.d.). Mired in internal political problems,
Bhutto fell to a military coup and was hanged. Since both states
were internally preoccupied and were not averse to the status quo,
there was little inter-state security tumult.
The 1971 War had represented a quantum leap in the Indian

employment of the military t, from defensive and restrained
military operations to taking the war into the enemy’s territory.
However, the victory has had its critics. The war outcome was
deemed fortuitous and dependent on the adversary’s poor
handling of his forces (Dasgupta 2006: 95). The 1965 and 1971
Wars had demonstrated that the area under Western Command
was too vast for effective command. Accordingly, in 1971, duplicate
headquarters had been set up at Shimla and Bhatinda. After the
1971 War, the headquarters of the Northern Command were
established at Udhampur, taking over responsibility for Jammu,
Kashmir and Ladakh. Shimla was considered unsuitable for being
the Western Command headquarters. The HQ moved to
Chandigarh with Punjab and northern Rajasthan under its
jurisdiction (Army website n.d.). After its successful showing in
East Pakistan, the II Corps, raised in the run up to that war, was
absorbed into the ‘orbat’ (order of battle) of the Western
Command. This added another strike corps to the pre-existing I
Corps that had participated in operation with questionable success
in the Shakargarh sector of the western theatre. Thus, there were
two strike corps arraigned against Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan
had only one strike corps (I Corps); the second (II Corps) having
a ground holding role (Globalsecurity.org, n.d.).
Doctrinally, refinements to the DCB obstacle concept were
undertaken. A DCB, as the name suggests, constitutes a formidable
obstacle designed to separate the armour from the infantry. The
concept had been inspired in part by the experience of the army at
the Icchogil Canal in the 1965 War (Kapila 1987: 7) and was in
keeping with military thinking elsewhere, such as the Bar Lev line
along the Suez Canal. However, doctrinal thinking that led to the
Sundarji innovations of the next decade was for a more offensive
46 | ALI AHMED
orientation. Speed in operations was taken as necessary to undercut

international pressures for ceasefire. Therefore, an offensive
capability that would bring about gains in a short time frame was
required would be come in useful on the negotiating table.
Carrying the war to the enemy territory required avoiding a frontal
assault on his prepared defences. This meant having manoeuvrable
forces to hit his lines of communication, These ideas figured in
the famous Rao-Sundarji report of mid-seventies (Roychowdhury
2002: 153). The main findings of the report were implemented
when the two became chiefs subsequently.
The Eighties
To the eighties can be traced the strategic dialectic that is continuing
to the present. The hiatus of the seventies in Indo-Pak strategic
equations was broken by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet
Union at the turn of the decade. In the event, Pakistan profited
from its ‘frontline’ status, with implications for the Indo-Pak
security relationship. Pakistan’s perception was that as the ‘guardian
of the Khyber Pass’, it required a powerful military capability.
Indian strategists ‘vehemently disagreed’ with this proposition
(Cohen 1983: 82). Cohen (1983: 82) writes: ‘They (Indian strategists)
saw a strong Pakistan as disruptive; their image of regional stability
envisioned a Pakistan as an Afghanistan: a weak, not a strong
buffer.’
Taking this view seriously, Pakistan, in the period, kept India at
the centre of its strategic cross-hairs. This had its antecedents in its
leaving East Pakistan virtually defenceless in both 1965 and,
compared to the threat, also in 1971. Even during the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, it did not transfer any forces for the defence of its
frontier along the Durand Line (Cohen 1983: 85). Its threat
perception is based on geography. It has its major port, subject to
interdiction or blockade close to the border. Its population centres
in Punjab are also within striking distance of armoured columns.
The bulk of the armed might of the two states is maintained in
ideal tank country in the plains along the border (Cohen 1983:
83). Given its size, location and terrain, it ‘evolved a strategic style
(italics in original) which may be termed as a strategic doctrine’ of
‘offensive defence’ (Cohen 1983: 85; Palsokar 1986: 143). In Cohen’s
description, the doctrine envisages that in time of heightening crisis,

Pakistan would not hesitate to be the first to employ heavy use of
force to gain an initial advantage. It was thought that a short,
sharp, war would achieve Pakistan’s military as well as political
objectives (Cohen 1983: 85). Its lack of strategic depth virtually
necessitates an offensive mindset. It sees war as an opportunity to
bring international opinion to focus on Kashmir, though this
involves a political risk. The doctrine hopes to achieve deterrence
by raising the risk of Indian resort to war in short order, leaving
no time for international pressures to act as Pakistan may prefer.
This doctrine assumes a higher technical threshold and leadership
across the hierarchy.
In the early eighties, to respond to its two-front problem due to

Soviet presence towards its north, Pakistan arrived at a two-pronged
answer (Cohen 1983: 86-87). One was the nuclear checkmating of
India; and, second, fostering of a people’s guerrilla war, experience
for which it was then speedily gaining through the Central
Intelligence Agency’s activities with the mujahedeen. The nuclear
capability would help neutralise an assumed Indian nuclear
capability. The assumptions were that India had several nuclear
weapons; that these were Pakistan centric; and that these could be
used politically to paralyse Pakistani reaction by holding its
population centres hostage in case of Indian action in Kashmir
(Cohen 1983: 84-85). Nuclear weapons capability could also provide
cover under which the Kashmir issue could be reopened by
checking a conventional Indian counter. It could be used to cover
a bold conventional offensive in Kashmir in case the Indian
leadership proved to be ‘weak and indecisive’ (Cohen 1983: 86).
The second prong, guerrilla war, had been resorted to earlier in
1965 with unsuccessful results. The idea of training and arming
friendly populations in the neighbour’s territory would help tie
him ‘down in a hundred places’ or inflict damage a strategy of ‘a
thousand cuts’.
In the light of Pakistani thinking and actions, India broke out of

its defensive mindset. A willingness to use force can be seen in the
conduct of Exercise Brasstacks, the Indian pre-emption of the
Pakistani takeover of Siachen through deployment on the Saltoro
48 | ALI AHMED
ridgeline in 1984, and the military intervention in Sri Lanka in the

form of peacekeeping. The pursuit of mechanisation is also evidence
of this. The development of the AirLand Battle concept in the US
had an influence on such thinking in India. The political constraint
of not losing any territory had forced the fixing of linear defences,
breeding a ‘Maginot mentality’. In the context of the DCB defences
and non-linear desert warfare, striking deep would disrupt attacks
and help preserve territory. Instead of the defensive concept of
‘spoiling attack’ – an attack involving disruption of an enemy attack
at its forming up stage – and counter attack on enemy bridgeheads,
divisional level counter attacks into enemy build up and logistics
areas, suggested an offensive vein.
Offensive operations were further cast in a more aggressive mode.
The usual progress of operations involving breaking the crust of
defences, establishing a bridgehead and breakout were taken as
being operationally unacceptable. Instead, deeper attacks involving
seizure of enemy’s nuclear weapon and stowage sites, area centres
of gravity and terrain choke points were considered to be of equal
import. Such operations required air and heli-borne capability for
attacks on multiple tiers in depth simultaneously with multiple
thrust lines along a wide front.
The head of the College of Combat, in his Commandant’s Note
in the Combat Journal, set out the agenda for mechanisation which
was witnessed through the decade. He sought the creation of a:
…viable strike force capable of being speedily launched into
enemy territory for the capture of objectives in considerable
depth… air mobility… mechanisation of these
formations…and the armour content of the division
increased and greater flexibility provided by the introduction
of at least one more battle group headquarters… to do justice
to the requirement to move fast and strike deep (Tuli 1981: iv).
On defensive operations, the commandant required even holding

formations to ‘introduce and practice with realism the capture of
enemy positions across the border on the outbreak of hostilities;
such actions would go a long way in… furthering our offensive
aims.’ He maintained that:
…unless this is practiced… it will be too much to expect

our troops that are secure in pill boxes to get out to tackle
the enemy defences… if we were to achieve any positive
change in our present defensive approach we must reorient
our thinking and training on a completely offensive basis
(Tuli 1981: iv).
Since the College of Combat performed the function of

disseminating doctrine through training and changing mindsets,
the Commandant’s words made clear the direction in which the
army was headed.
A better alternative to counter attacking the enemy bridgeheads
as per the linear defensive system, whether based on canal or DCB,
lay instead in launching a ‘mini counter offensive’ on the territory
through which the enemy’s offensive forces were transiting into
the bridgehead. The preoccupation with ‘loss of territory’ was to
end, with a temporary loss of ground not seen as a disaster as long
as the aim was to launch a riposte. Thus, the force was being
suffused with an offensive, manoeuvre warfare, orientation; with
defensive operations seen only as a ‘temporary phase’. Thinking
along these lines culminated in Exercise Brasstacks, a brainchild of
General Sundarji to test his mechanisation initiatives.
The military aim of the exercise was to test the new formations
and to ascertain the viability of the new deterrence doctrine. The
political aim of the exercise was to coerce Pakistan to desist from
aiding Khalistani insurgents. The genesis lay in the military support
that Pakistan had obtained from the US by offering itself as a
‘frontline state’ (Ganguly 2002: 85). This aid had emboldened
Pakistan into supporting the Khalistani insurgency in Indian Punjab.
Ravi Rikhye writes that the military aspect was to learn how to
handle multiple strike corps together, while the ‘covert’, coercive,
part was to remind Pakistan that India could sever Sindh in case of
its continued support to Khalistanis. Pakistani moves were an
anticipatory extension of its army exercises Flying Horse and Saf-e-
Shikan and the air force’s Exercise High Mark. Counter moves of
the Army Reserve South (ARS) northwards to threaten Punjab
resulted in the Indian mobilisation, Operation Trident. The other
50 | ALI AHMED
aspect introduced in security calculus in the latter half of the decade

was the nuclear one. It made its first appearance in the open domain
in the famous AQ Khan interview with Kuldip Nayar (Bakshi
2009: 163; Ganguly 2002: 86). The militarised crisis was eventually
defused (Sahni 2008: 27).
The Nineties
There were three factors of significance in the nineties for the
Indian military. One was the intensifying of proxy war by Pakistan,
with Kashmir erupting even as Punjab continued to be on the
boil. The second was pressure of declining defence budgets brought
on by liberalisation (Roychowdhury 2002: 128). The last was the
effect of nuclearisation, initially covert, but requiring the military
to take cognisance of the emerging security situation. These
cumulatively had a retarding effect on the turn to the offensive
seen in the previous decade. Thus, even as the threat grew in terms
of a more aggressive Pakistan, India could not leverage its power.
Pakistan’s acquisition of the nuclear capability rendered India’s
conventional superiority questionable. Therefore the Sundarji era
doctrine of ‘deep strike’ could not be employed. This detracted
from credibility of India’s conventional deterrent and resulted in
its testing by Pakistan in the Kargil War.
Released from a ‘two front’ scenario by the withdrawal and the
later demise of the Soviet Union, Pakistan was single-minded in
addressing the perceived Indian threat (Bakshi 2009 (b): 78). It had
adopted the doctrine of ‘offensive defence’ in Exercise Zarb-e-
Momin under General Mirza Aslam Beg who envisioned a pre-
emptive launch of two strike corps pincers (Bakshi 2009b: 79).
The exercise attempted to incorporate the AirLand Battle concept
(Banerjee 1990: 66) and could be seen as an answer to India’s earlier
Exercise Brasstacks. Irrespective of the Indian ‘threat’, there were
other reasons prompting its proxy war, including revenge for the
1971 break-up of their country and its pre-existing irredentist claims
on Kashmir.
The Cold War had ended and the contours of the new world
order to replace it were unclear. An influential scenario building
exercise - Op Topac - undertaken by an Indian Defence Review
team in mid-1989, had it that Pakistan could repeat its 1965

Operation Gibraltar, only more successfully (IDR Research Team
1989). Infiltration and fuelling a Kashmiri uprising was to be
followed up by a conventional attack in Phase II. The manner in
which events unfolded on the ground in Kashmir lent credence to
this scenario. It was often mistaken as the blueprint of Pakistani
plans (Jagmohan 1992: 140). The conventional response option
was not in the foreground, though its existence did ensure that
Pakistan kept the provocation below the Indian ‘tolerance
threshold’. Despite constrained circumstances, India’s conventional
capability ensured that Pakistan was deterred from escalating its
military support to levels where India would feel compelled to
use its superior military capability. Pakistan persisted with its ‘low
cost, low risk’ operation (Banerjee 1990: 66), with the diplomatic
advantage of ‘plausible deniability’. India’s response was restricted
largely to counter insurgency operations, both in Punjab and
Kashmir.
The conventional reticence was owing in part to declining defence
budgets through the period. However, this was a period in which
Pakistan also faced constraints, primarily withdrawal of US
assistance in October 1990 when President George Bush was not
able to give the necessary certification required under the Pressler
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Lodhi 1998) that
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. Pakistan’s
declining financial position reinforced its proxy war policy, since
being less able to cope increased the seeming need to keep Indian
forces tied down.
Implications of the economic liberalisation through the nineties
proved dire for the army. A former vice chief had it that the lack
of funds for modernisation automatically led to a delay in the
restructuring plans of the services. The army’s mechanisation had
been held up and the overall effect was loss of the technological
edge (Singh V.K. 1996: 21). Kaushik Roy records that the
conventional balance fell from 1.99:1 in 1993 to 1.4:1 in 1997 (Roy
2010: 167). The strategic option during the decade was restricted
to defence. Of its two variants - dissuasion and deterrence - an
analysis had it that declining defence budgets would affect
52 | ALI AHMED
deterrence capability adversely. Even dissuasive capability was

difficult to maintain. A balanced military prefers a mix of both;
the proportion of each depends on the war objectives and the
operational situation. It was assessed that India had a ‘deterrent’
capability with respect to Pakistan and a ‘dissuasive’ one against
China. India’s deterrence was limited to the conventional level.
Since Pakistan was not interested in a conventional tryst, it was
instead emboldened at the sub-conventional level. No further
reduction was thought possible lest it be construed out as an
invitation for hostile action by Pakistan (Banerjee 1996: 46-47).
The third aspect - nuclearisation - necessitated the resort to Bernard
Brodie’s re- conceptualisation of Clausewitz’s classical definition
in light of the impact of the nuclear age. Brodie wrote on the
caveat on understanding Limited War thus:
Clausewitz’s classical definition must be modified, at least
for any opponent who has a substantial nuclear capability
behind him. Against such an opponent one’s terms must
be modest enough to permit him to accept them, without
his being pushed by desperation into rejecting both those
terms and the limitations in war fighting (1959: 313).
The impetus to doctrinal thinking was the emerging threat posed

by the nexus between China and Pakistan in both nuclear and
missile spheres (Perkovich 2002: 410). This was referred to by Prime
Minister Vajpayee in his letter to the US President justifying Indian
tests of 1998(Perkovich 2002: 417).
Through the nineties, the perceived threat grew more pronounced
with Pakistan continuing to pursue its weapons oriented nuclear
programme. Ballistic missile proliferation was another major area
of concern, especially since the technology was acquired by
clandestine means or transfer of technology from external sources
(MoD 1990-91: 2). Pakistan had reportedly acquired M11 missiles
from China with a range of more than 300 Kms and believed to be
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Consequently, on May 11,
and May 13, 1998, India successfully completed a planned series of
nuclear tests, called ‘Shakti’ (Perkovich 2002: 416). As a responsible
nuclear weapons state, it declared that ‘India does not intend to

use its nuclear weapons for aggression or for mounting threats
against any country. Neither does it intend to engage in an arms
race with anyone (MoD 1997-98: 6).’ The aim was to have ‘a secure
and effective deterrent against the use or threat of use of weapons
of mass destruction against India (MoD 1997-98: 2).’ The nuclear
doctrine was termed as ‘recessed deterrence’ (Singh, J. 1998: 318).
The decade ended with doctrinal innovation on both conventional
and nuclear planes. The National Security Advisory Board’s Draft
Nuclear Doctrine was presented to the government in August 1999
(NSAB 1999). As mentioned earlier, the IDSA initiated a move
towards Limited War thinking at a conference on January 6, 2000.
The 2000s
In keeping with Clausewitz’s emphasis on the destruction of the
enemy’s military capability in order to dominate its ‘will’, the
Indian Army Doctrine (ARTRAC 2004) laid down, that ‘military
force contributes by the defeat of an opposing force (ARTRAC
2004: 29).’ It defined ‘defeat’ as ‘diminishing the effectiveness of
the enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate in
combat or, at least, not being able to fulfil his intention (ARTRAC
2004: 29).’ It follows that war strategy is the joint plan employing
the three services to bring about a condition in which the enemy
is disabled and own intent is fulfilled through combat. The goal is
the psychological paralysis of the enemy leadership by application
of combat power for the purposes of pre-emption, destruction,
dislocation and disruption. Causing such attrition to the enemy
to induce it to quit the conflict is understandable in a non-nuclear
scenario. The logic was perhaps that nuclear deterrence,
predicated on infliction of ‘unacceptable damage’, would hold
(Banerjee 1996: 47).
However, nuclearisation, requires a more circumspect attitude to
the use of force. The strategic doctrine that was implicit in the
promise of a refurbished national security system has not been
forthcoming. The expectation that the National Security Council
Secretariat (NSCS) would undertake India’s maiden Strategic
54 | ALI AHMED
Defence Review (SDR) as a preview to formulating the national

security doctrine (Bedi 2000: 27) has been belied (Mukherjee 2011).
While each NSAB that is constituted does submit a strategic review
to the government, not a single one has been released officially.
Consequently, the military propensity for maximising

employment of force needs self-regulation. That an explicit doctrine
on Limited War has not been articulated by the Indian military
suggests otherwise. While the air and naval components of military
power lend themselves to easier insertion, moderation and
retraction in a conflict situation, the land component lacks the
inherent flexibility. There is advocacy for building flexibility into
India’s strike corps through the introduction of IBGs in the
tradition of Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMGs)
(Kanwal 2008: 309; Kapoor 1986: 62-63). It awaits the next iteration
of the Indian army doctrine or a separate report on pu Limited
War as a specialised form of war (Ahmed 2009a).
Since wars have a dynamic of their own and if uncontrolled have

a tendency towards escalation, there has to be a ‘deliberate hobbling’
(Bernard Brodie) of the effort in the nuclear age. This implies a
move away from viewing war as a means to impose one’s ‘will’,
but as a ‘strategy of conflict’ (Thomas Schelling) in which adversaries
bargain through graduated military responses for the attainment
of a negotiated settlement (Cannon 1992:85). The difference that
nuclear weapons make is that only one of the two types of wars as
defined by Clausewitz can be waged. The total defeat of the enemy
of a nuclear armed enemy is not impossible, but may prove too
dangerous and hurtful to attempt. However, a war for bringing
him to the negotiating table then appears as the only option
(Echevarria 2007: 99).
The decade began with worsening terrorism in Kashmir, because

of the inability to control infiltration due to the momentary
diversion of attention from counter insurgency during the Kargil
episode. Thereafter, terrorism also spread in the rest of India,
spurred by Pakistan and due to local roots in a worsening
communal situation. Overt nuclearisation further cramped India’s
conventional might, particularly during Operation Parakram. Jasjit

Singh brings out two aspects of the nuclear overhang. The first is:
The next conventional war that India may be involved in

would have to be a limited war. … But what is clear is that
the presence of nuclear weapons with both our potential
neighbours would certainly be a constraining factor in war
where our own interest would require that as far as possible
nuclear weapons should not be allowed to come into play
(Singh, J. 2010: 14).
The second, is that:
… nuclear weapons must not be allowed to eliminate the

choice of conventional war… a close study would indicate
that there would be adequate strategic space below the
nuclear level that can be exploited for the successful conduct
of a war with conventional military capabilities’ (Singh, J.
2010: 14).
The seeming erosion of India’s conventional power through the

nineties was best evident from Pakistan’s upping of the ante in
launching the Kargil War. An apprehension of the erosion of the
power base has been compensated by the adoption of an offensive
stance. The perception of symmetry with Pakistan is offset by the
suitable leveraging of the military capability. India therefore had
to innovate its military doctrine to bring conventional power back
into the reckoning of the balance of power between the two states.
The resulting doctrines, formulated in the nuclear era, have had
to engage with the implications of nuclearisation.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and the militarised counter

added to the seeming utility of military power brought about by
continuing terrorism. Of significance to its employability,
however, was the presence and action of the US in the vicinity of
Pakistan for waging the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Taking
advantage of this turn of events, Pakistan was back to being a
‘frontline’ state. Its change of policy with respect to the Taliban
regime helped end the US sanctions imposed on it. By the end of
56 | ALI AHMED
the decade, the situation was relatively stable in Kashmir. The

multiple terror attacks in Mumbai 26/11 indicated India’s
continuing vulnerability to terror and continuing limitations of
the military as the preferred instrument of choice in the
circumstance. In wake of the terror attack, various military response
options were considered. These included at the lower end, surgical
strikes, covert action, activation of the Line of Control, raids by
Special Forces and heliborne troops and border clashes. At the
upper end was possible execution of Cold Start. This could be
restricted to the Line of Control or be extended to the plains and
desert sectors. Reservations in the exercise of choice along these
lines, indicates that Limited War has its limitations as a policy
option (TNN 2008).
Terrorism continued to be seen as India’s primary security threat
through the decade (MoD 2003-04: 7). There was no conventional
threat because of Pakistan’s preoccupation with war on terror
being waged in its north since October 2001, however, Pakistani
adventurism cannot be discounted, as the events in Mumbai in
November 2008 reveal. In view of this perception, the key elements
fundamental to India’s security planning have been identified by
the ministry to include: preparation for full spectrum operations;
non-membership of any military alliance or strategic grouping;
requirement of an independent deterrent capability; involvement
in the internal security function, corresponding force structures
and orientation; and a maritime interest requiring a blue water
naval capability (MoD 2003-4: 13-14).
A strategic doctrine is meant to serve the state to navigate in regional
and global power play The Limited War thinking in the early
part of the decade led to the acknowledgment that ‘the importance
of strategic (politico-military) doctrine is much higher for limited
war than those that are full scale, leave alone total wars (Singh, J.
2000: 1212). Jasjit Singh laments that in India’s case, there has not
been a clearly articulated strategic doctrine. The consequence
is that:
In the absence of a well established doctrine, there is a
strong tendency to simply keep building on existing force
levels and structures in what can only be described as an

add-on strategy. Inevitably such an approach tends to be
highly reactive… An overall defensive philosophy only tends
to reinforce this reactive characteristic. This would be a
serious handicap in limited war ( J. Singh 2000: 1213).’
Jasjit Singh has attempted to offer a prescriptive strategic doctrine.

He takes India’s national aim as being the building of a sustainable
peace for ensuring socio-economic growth. The pillars of his
framework include prevention of war, removal of the threat and
risk of war and reduction of the threat perception of potential
adversaries. He acknowledges a ‘fundamental need to move from
the classical paradigm of competitive security to cooperative model
of inter state security ( J. Singh 2000: 1213).’ He requires ‘necessary
precautions’ amounting to deterrence to remain, but alongside
efforts towards détente and strategic stability are to be made.
Broadly, two alternatives emerge: defence through either a strategic
defensive or strategic offensive strategy; and second, prevention
of war through credible deterrence, at a minimum. He is inclined
to favour the second alternative - prevention of war through
deterrence. This would entail quantitative and qualitative
superiority but one tempered by affordability ( J. Singh 2000:
1214-15). He favours air power as an instrument that furnishes
both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, as against
land power that can only deliver the former (J. Singh 2000: 1219).
The doctrine that emerges, as recounted in the previous chapter,
is considerably more offensive (Singh, H 2011: 17).
The diplomatic strand of the grand strategy currently takes

advantage of military self-confidence stemming from an improved
counter insurgency situation, as also the predicament of Pakistan.
On the J&K issue, success is reportedly forthcoming following
the multi-pronged strategy adopted by the security forces being
able to create near ‘normal conditions’ for the state government
to function (MoD 2003-04). This optimistic perspective translated
into India being ready to consider other options, short of redrawing
the boundaries, to find a pragmatic solution. It was prepared to
work out cooperative, consultative mechanisms so as to maximise
58 | ALI AHMED
the gains of cooperation in solving problems of social and economic

development of the region (MoD 2006-07: 4). This built on the
November 2003 ceasefire along the LOC and the Actual Ground
Position Line (AGPL), and the Islamabad Joint Statement of
January 2004 in which President Musharraf made an unconditional
commitment to not allow any territory under Pakistani control
to be used to support terrorism in any manner (Joint Statement
2004).
A number of initiatives were taken to ease tensions, normalise and
improve relations. At the level of the government, the Composite
Dialogue was initiated with the resumption of foreign secretary
level talks in June 2004. At the level of armed forces, a number of
CBMs were envisaged. Upgrading the link between Directors
General Military Operations, new communication links at
division/corps level, annual meetings of vice chiefs of army staff
(VCOAS) and exchanges between the armed forces related academic
institutions (MoD 2004-05: 9, 21). Not all have progressed as
desired; but the pace and direction of progress is itself a pressure
point in the overall two-pronged effort to both incentivise and
pressurise Pakistan into ending its strategy of proxy war.
Expectedly, Pakistan was reluctant to keep to its end of the bargain.
While India reached out to Pakistan even while exercising quasi-
compellence, Pakistan has been prevaricating. The drawdown in
the support to terrorists in Kashmir has not resulted in the rolling
back of the supporting infrastructure. This enabled launch of the
26/11 attacks on Mumbai. This highlights the necessity of
formulating a strategic doctrine, linking it to military doctrine
and communicating the same to the adversary. Under-gridding
the logic of punishment is to end Pakistani impunity by punishing
its military, which is at the bottom of India’s strategic predicament
(Gurung 2011: 39). The idea is that once the Pakistani military is
hurt directly and there are prospects of its losing power, then it
would be more amenable to India’s friendly overtures. Increasing
lethality of modern war has led to the army’s strategy to conduct
war on enemy territory.
II
Implications for Military Doctrines
Conventional Doctrine
The military doctrine reflecting the strategic doctrine is the Indian
Army Doctrine (2004). As noted in the last chapter, the term
‘Limited War’ occurs but once in this publication and that too on
a graphic showing the Spectrum of Conflict (2004: 12). This is
problematic since the graphic in question seamlessly melds Limited
War with the next stage of Total War. Further, it makes a
distinction between Total War and the next higher stage of nuclear
war, indicating that wider a conventional war is possible in a nuclear
environment. Instead, the nuclear overhang virtually negates the
concept of Total War. Even Limited War has escalatory possibilities
(Kumar 2009). An example of this is the employment of India’s
Special Forces (SF). It is reported that:
Eight new battalions will be in the airborne mode and
trained to take out enemy’s N-capabilities. The air borne
would enable the Special Forces to carry out a variety of
sensitive and surgical strikes… the Special Forces would
now have the capabilities to inflict heavy damage on
strategic targets in an enemy country including nuclear
installations…(Dutta 2006: 1).
Such a position has two implications: one, that in the nuclear era
preventing war from turning into Total War is imperative; and
two, that nuclear war could yet erupt even during prosecution of
what is originally intended to be a Limited War. A corollary to
this is that nuclear war is not necessarily a Total War.
While Limited War requires a deliberation that only a separately
articulated doctrine can ensure but more importantly it needs to
be done in keeping the nuclear doctrine in mind. Any change in
one may entail a corresponding change in the other. Therefore,
the doctrinal exercise cannot be restricted to being internal to the
military. It could be ‘military led’, with input and enabling cross-
fertilisation from a wider field under aegis of the NSC system
(Ahmed 2009a).
60 | ALI AHMED
Typically, it was the perceptive General Sundarji (1992: 77) who

had by the early nineties discerned that this was the direction of
the future, writing, ‘Indian conventional operations should be
modulated in scope and depth of penetration into Pakistani
territory so that ingress can stop before Pakistan resorts to the use
of nuclear weapons.’ Manpreet Sethi, writing in the same vein,
states that, ‘Military strikes would need to be restricted in depth
into enemy territory and spread in geographical expanse, or limited
in scope to carry out deeper, narrow thrusts into adversary
territory in order to remain well away from the expressed ‘red
lines’ of the nuclear threshold… (Sethi 2009: 308)’. Bharat Karnad’s
view in his ‘Sialkot Grab’ scenario is:
Converging rapidly on major towns… for shallow but
decisive ingress into Pakistani territory is that it is
doable…and in each case confronts the GHQ with the
dilemma of major proportions of how to stanch the flow…
restricting advance to populated environs… capturing a
string of major towns (Karnad 2005: 8).
Since Limited War would unfold in the nuclear backdrop, its

implications for nuclear the doctrine and the implications of the
nuclear doctrine needs also be factored in. The military has been
seized of this for the last decade. This is a departure from the
earlier situation. The disconnect between the conventional and
nuclear dimension has been a given in the period of development
of nuclear weapons. Describing the situation in the nineties,
General Shankar Roychowdhury writes of the vacuum of
information in which doctrine developed:
Denied any interaction with the national leadership, and
in the absence of any guidelines or directions from the
government, each Service tried to develop individual
doctrines for nuclear warfare. However, as always, personal
mindsets and egos at the highest level in each Service
obstructed the evolution of an inter-Service approach to
the subject. As a result there was little or no movement
towards a common, synergised nuclear doctrine
(Roychowdhury 2002: 276).
He further reveals that the ARTRAC was given the mandate to

prepare an updated manual on nuclear warfare. In absence of any
official parameters, it proceeded on the basic assumption of an
adverse nuclear balance. The only options were restricted to
protective and defensive measures (Roychowdhury 2002: 274). On
the conventional front, the Army Training Command (ARTRAC)
‘was already working extensively on development of concepts
(Roychowdhury 2002: 160).’ Their ‘intellectual basis was essentially
the doctrinal theories of Airland Battle and Deep Attack,
restructured to cater to the subcontinent. The emphasis was on
mobility, long range firepower, deep surveillance, electronic
warfare, secure communications and air defence in the tactical battle
area (Roychowdhury 2002: 160).’ The current situation is greatly
improved, not only because the SFC is no longer a nascent
organisation, but the NSCS with a core group of military men is
also involved in assisting the NSA in his task as head of the
Executive Council of the NCA.
Nuclear Doctrine
The trend in nuclear doctrine favours ‘credible’ over ‘minimum’.
The offensive direction of the doctrine is evident from the caveat
to NFU over chemical and biological weapons use and the use of
the term ‘massive’. Developments in ballistic missile defences and
acquisition of launch capability of multiple satellites in space
technology indicate that India can move to a first use posture in
the future. It would have the submarine deterrent in place with at
least two nuclear submarines operational by mid-decade. The
submarine launched ballistic missile K-15 is undergoing tests as is
the Agni V that will cover the Chinese east coast from peninsular
India. Scott Sagan (2009) and Rajesh Basrur (2006) believe these
developments are enabled by an expansive reading of ‘credible’.
Sagan writes that, ‘India’s nuclear doctrine in 2003 moved, subtly
but clearly, away from the pure form of no first use that was
previously espoused toward a more flexible and potentially
“offensive” nuclear doctrine (2006: 221).’
While the movement is prompted by the perception of China as a
threat over the long term, the implications for the Pakistan front
are in terms of escalation dominance. The desired effect is
62 | ALI AHMED
principally the forcing upwards of the nuclear threshold by

promising nuclear retribution to any form of nuclear first use,
even against intruding tactical spearheads. This was regarding the
alternative to shallow front offensives on the conventional plane
articulated by Gurmeet Kanwal thus: ‘‘Broad Front - Shallow
Objective’ offensive planning is unlikely to dissuade Pakistan…
The only sensible option for India would be to call Pakistan’s
nuclear bluff and plan to launch Strike Corps offensive operations
to ‘Strike Hard- Strike Deep’ (2009: 81).’
Alternatives for nuclear retaliation for enemy nuclear first use also
exist. For Manpreet Sethi, it would be logical to use the weapons
on cities to cause ‘unacceptable’ damage (Sethi 2009: 145). She is
not persuaded by India’s current doctrinal understanding that
unacceptable damage requires ‘massive’ punitive retaliation. Bharat
Karnad has been a strong votary of ‘graduated deterrence or
discriminate deterrence… A nuclear version of ‘flexible response’,
but one that is furthered by a variegated nuclear force structure
(Karnad 2005: 5).’ Unlike Karnad, Sundarji does not believe in
variegated nuclear forces (Sundarji 1992b: 45), but in ‘minimum
deterrence’ (Sundarji 1992a: n.d). The emphasis of late on ‘credible’
is missing from his articulation of a nuclear doctrine for India.
His formulation is more in line with limitation in war, including
one that has for some reason gone nuclear. He wrote: ‘Terminate
nuclear exchange at lowest possible level with a view to negotiating
the best peace that is politically acceptable (Sundarji 1992c: 77).’
This is in line with Bernard Brodie’s view, ‘The main war goal
upon the beginning of a strategic nuclear exchange should be surely
to terminate it as quickly as possible and with the least amount of
damage possible - on both sides (Brodie 1983: 79).’ This does not
require an emphasis on ‘credibility’ at the expense of ‘minimum’.
This is in keeping with a war-deterring as against a war-fighting
posture.
Contention over Strategic Doctrine

Coercion
India’s acquisition programme indicates that the proactive doctrine
has downstream effects. While this programme has been criticised
as ‘arming without aiming’ (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010), it instead

indicates that India is building up muscle to prosecute Limited
War. Yearly imports have jumped by over 50 per cent over the
last three-four years. These deals include the $1.5 billion Admiral
Gorshkov, the $1.1 billion Phalcon early warning radar and
communication system, the $1.7 billion Hawk AJT project with
Britain and the $ 2 billion Scorpene deal with France (Pandit 2004:
5). India expects to spend $100 billion on arms, to not only to
refurbish its obsolete systems, but go in for state of the art systems
as remotely piloted vehicles, net centricity, fifth generation fighter,
nuclear submarines etc. Its defence budget has gone up from $11.8
billion in 2000 to over $ 36.03 billion in 2011. India emerged as
the second largest arms importer, second only to China.
The strategic purpose that can be read into this, is that of increasing
the power asymmetry with Pakistan. This is at variance with Cohen
and Dasgupta’s understanding that, ‘strategic restraint also
contributes to the astounding lack of political direction in Indian
efforts at military modernisation (2010: xii).’ Instead, the ongoing
arming is to the tune of India ending up as the largest global arms
importer (Pandit 2011) is to enable prosecution of Limited War
and for escalation control through escalation dominance. The
assumption behind this could well be to bolster conventional
deterrence and extend it to credibly cover sub conventional war.
But that it has overtures of compellence in light of the proactive
doctrine cannot be denied. The strategy is also reminiscent of the
eighties in the Cold War in which the US exhausted the USSR
through increasing military competition. Even if this interpretation
is erroneous, it is the one that Pakistan will inevitably alight on.
The dimension of security dilemma is discounted and likewise
linked Pakistani actions with India’s security dilemma. Intervention
to break this ‘chicken-egg’ conundrum requires a revisit to strategic
doctrine.
Strategy of Restraint
In so far as an offensive posture is meant to reinforce deterrence
to convey the threat of deterrence by punishment for sub
conventional transgressions, it is in keeping with India’s ‘strategy
64 | ALI AHMED
of restraint’. (Incidentally, the term was used first in the early

eighties by then Major Shamsher Mehta (1980) - later a general
officer- writing in to the Editor of the Combat Journal!) The
strategy of restraint, being itself subject to change due to internal
political compulsions and interplay of strategic partnerships,
indicates that the compellence option is not ruled out. While India
is not an expansive power, it is provoked by Pakistani truculence
into an offensive doctrine so as to acquire the capability to bring
about change in Pakistani attitude and behaviour as necessary.
Offensive posture is to end Pakistani sense of impunity. Thus,
deterrence appears to rely on the capability for compellence. The
moot question is whether this is at all feasible, and wise, in a nuclear
context.
The strategy of restraint can be expected to have been informed
also by budget constraints. The expectation behind the offensive
doctrine has been that it would be suitably materialised by the
GDP that was set to grow in the region of nine per cent. Even if
the military budget is pegged at two per cent, money would not
be a constraint. The China factor, in terms of its spending being
three times that of India, would remain as the rationale. The
implication for the Pakistan front could be a move away from the
strategy of restraint since resources would no longer be a constraint.
With a Limited War Doctrine amenable to operationalisation
through capability development, compellence will figure among
the possible directions of the future. This has been the case in
India’s earlier defensive and conventional deterrence doctrine. Since
Indian military budgets and capabilities have expanded in keeping
with its growing economy, India has sufficient resources to
countenance offensive doctrines. However, the situation has
changed in light of the global financial meltdown and its effects
on India’s economy.
The strategy of restraint, adopted as a doctrine, also implies a
hardnosed cost-benefits based strategic choice for India. Cohen
and Dasgupta (2010: xii) believe, that, ‘The political preference of
restraint has wisely sought to escape the security dilemma rather
than embrace it…’ India wishes for a period of peace and stability
in order to consolidate on its economic gains. This is analogous to
the Chinese doctrine of keeping a low profile so as to further

their development in the early period since reforms began in 1978
(Rajamohan 2003: 153). Even if India can afford a military diversion
with Pakistan in terms of sustaining physical and financial losses,
it would be set back in relation to its larger challenge, that of
China. Indeed, such a setback to India can be taken as part of
Chinese strategy of using Pakistan to tie India down. Therefore
the Indian preference for war avoidance is understandable. It was
sustained despite energetic arguments for a military response to
26/11 (Roemer 2010). However, it would come under considerable
strain in case of another provocative terror attack. This may have
had some impact on Pakistani calculations of sub conventional
restraint, among other factors such as radicalisation in that state
and the unfolding situation in ‘Af-Pak’ (Afghanistan-Pakistan).
The Indian initiative to resume the peace process, that have been
in the pipeline since the Sharm el Sheikh meeting between the two
prime ministers of 2009 (PIB 2009), is to create the space for the
strategy of restraint to continue. The hope is to create the conditions
of trust that would defuse Pakistan’s sub conventional strategy.
This would then keep the strategy of restraint untested, and India’s
economic trajectory on course. The state of the economy, though
valuable in itself, also has the advantage of delivering on power
credentials that under gird military power. Thus, India would be
able to employ the military option, not necessarily for compellence
but for punishment, if required in future. Compellence is difficult
to achieve, however, retribution is easier to administer. The
consequences of such reaction are not necessarily benign and may
result in the need to periodically resort to such military action.
These are the strategic considerations that would inform any
departure from the current strategy of restraint.
There needs being explicit articulation of the Limited War
Doctrine, over and beyond it’s currently being embedded in the
subtext of the doctrine document. Scepticism regarding the basis
of Limited War Doctrine informs the Wikileaks revelation of mail
from the US ambassador in New Delhi to the state department
describing Cold Start (Roemer 2010). The US assessment was
scathing as it said that, ‘The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrine”
66 | ALI AHMED
is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never
be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious
resource constraints.’ This Roemer attributes to the ‘GOI intent
to ever actually implement Cold Start is very much an open
question.’ He believes that the hesitation is because the , ‘Indian
leaders no doubt realise that, although Cold Start is designed to
punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear
response, they cannot be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in
fact refrain from such a response.’
Reacting to the leaked cable, the Army Chief said that Cold Start
does not exist. He is reported to have said, ‘We know what has to
be done … things (are) in place … We practice our contingency
depending on situations. We are confident that we will be able to
exercise the contingency when the time comes (PTI 2010).’ This
implies that Cold Start is not a default option, but one of many.
In other words, it is a Pakistan-centric, situation-dependent strategy.
The ‘operations’ mentioned by the chief are the army’s answer to
the posers regarding dangers of Cold Start. Cold Start is possibly
not an option that India will employ reflexively, but could choose
to do so or be forced into making the choice depending on
Pakistani counter moves to India’s launch of ‘operations’ under
grave terror provocations.
Conclusion
The Indian objective has apparently shifted to forcing Pakistan
‘to do something’ (compellence) i.e. dismantle its infrastructure of
terror. Its earlier position was persuading Pakistan ‘not to do
something’ (deterrence) i.e. conduct proxy war. The capacity for
compellence not only bolsters deterrence but facilitates a switch
to compellence, if necessary. The problem is that compellence lacks
the limits of deterrence and is more difficult to achieve and manage.
This accounts for the advocacy here of spelling out a Limited War
Doctrine. While the Indian military practices its formations on
manoeuvres keeping the nuclear backdrop in mind, there is a need
to do more. A Limited War Doctrine would make the military
doctrine compliant with the nuclear context. It will bring the
military doctrine in line with strategic doctrine. Since the latter is
not articulated, it can be seen in the response to 26/11 as a ‘strategy
of restraint’. For an offensive military doctrine, ‘restraint’ implies

limitation. Therefore, as against the earlier case in which limitation
was built into doctrine through appropriate strategy, the converse
is more applicable now. Whereas the existing version of the doctrine
deals with war, with limitation being worked in by strategy as per
the political aims set, the doctrine could well instead be one for a
Limited War lending itself to escalation as per the dictates of
strategy. Since this aspect is indeed fraught, it needs explication in
a Limited War Doctrine.
The current status of the army’s conventional doctrine is that Cold
Start does not exist as a doctrine, even if it does provide the basis
for a possible strategy against Pakistan in case of terror provocation.
This enables inclusion of a measured politico-military response
not amounting to war into the repertoire. That Cold Start
nevertheless does figure in the discourse was made plain by the
army chief’s remarks on Army Day, ‘A lot has changed since the
days of Op Parakram. If we did something in 15 days then, we can
do it in seven days now. After two years, we may be able to do it
in three days (Pandit 2012).’
68 | ALI AHMED
4. CONCLUSION
Introduction
In the chronological narrative, the doctrine was conceived at a
conference at the IDSA in wake of the Kargil War. The Kargil
War had brought home to the Indian military that there was a
conventional space between the sub conventional and nuclear
threshold for military exploitation. Even as conceptualisation of
the change was underway, the ‘twin peaks’ crisis intervened. The
limitations of India’s ‘all or nothing’ approach, that had hitherto
been dependent on strike corps being launched after mobilisation,
were highlighted. The 2004 document, Indian Army Doctrine, was
an outcome of the ‘lessons learnt’. With a large body of work of
Cold War vintage preceding India’s conscious tryst with the
Limited War concept, it is remarkable that discussion of limited
has been absent from Indian strategic thinking. The implicit
assumption in this is that India has only fought Limited Wars.
The Kargil War was epitome of a Limited War, and understandably
so, since both states had gone nuclear a year prior to then. The
Limited War concept as an intellectual construct overtly arrived
in India only in wake of the Kargil War.
A deliberate psychological movement away from the ‘defensive
mentality’ of the preceding two decades provided a fertile
intellectual space for the proactive doctrine. India had earlier moved
away from ‘deterrence by denial’ or ‘defensive defence’ to
deterrence based on counter offensive capability conferring an
ability to inflict punishment. This had occurred incrementally over
the preceding period since the mechanisation dating to the eighties.
The military mindset therefore was receptive to the doctrine
becoming being ‘proactive’ and offensive. The strategic predicament
posed by Pakistan at the structural level, the churning in strategic
culture by the infusion of political culture into cultural nationalism
at the state level, and the need for the military to adapt to the
nuclearised conflict circumstances were the compelling drivers.
The aims that Limited War helped fulfil in the India-Pakistan

context were to deter Pakistan, to coerce it if necessary, into
reversing provocation to below Indian thresholds of tolerance and,
if that was to fail, to prosecute war for compellence. Such a war
was envisaged as comprising proactive joint offensive operations
across a broad front and involving multiple offensives. These were
to advance to shallow depths so as not to trigger the adversary’s
nuclear reaction threshold. Swift mobilisation and manoeuvre
warfare inspired operations were to ensure speedy end to the
conflict in terms of time. The assumption was that the political
go-ahead at the outset would set off the chain of events. This was
necessary to overcome the mobilisation differential in Pakistan’s
favour because of its cantonments being closer to the border and
its operating on interior lines of communication. This was the
way to get round prepared defences. This did not then require a
full mobilisation of defence potential of the country. The gains
made were to be traded for future good behaviour and to punish
the Pakistan army in particular through attrition, particularly by
air and fire power. Strike corps were to ‘posture’ in the
background, either for exploiting success or to keep the adversary’s
reaction non-escalatory, depending on whether the war aim was
self-effacing or expansive. Naval operations, intelligence and covert
operations, diplomatic and political action would form the
additional prongs operating to suitably influence the mind of the
Pakistani decision makers, in effect, its military apex.
The full implications of the nuclear context to the conflict have
come into the reckoning in response to the criticism the doctrine
has received. For instance, the Indian Army Doctrine states,
‘Offensive operations are a decisive form of winning a war. Their
purpose is to attain the desired end state and achieve decisive victory
(2004: 7).’ The term ‘decisive victory’ ideally should not figure at
all, given that just a page later the doctrine has it that, ‘Future
operations will be conducted against a nuclear backdrop; all
planning should take this important factor into account (2004: 8).’
The term ‘decisive victory’ had figured in the 1998 document,
even though that had been written in a period of recessed deterrence.
The 2004 document does not go into specifics of the planning
required in view of the nuclear backdrop. The doctrine is reported
70 | ALI AHMED
to have a classified second part. This may perhaps be where the

Limited War issue has been discussed. Nevertheless, since doctrines
need not be classified, there is a case for an explicit non-classified
articulation. This indicates that India is still on a learning curve as
a newly nuclearised state.
The Structural Factor

At the structural level, the regional security situation has impacted
India’s strategic posture. At this level the primary threat was the
one posed by Pakistan, India’s revisionist neighbour. Given its
revisionist aims and weak power status, Pakistan went nuclear
covertly. This has accounted for its venturing to prosecute a proxy
war. India was consequently forced to respond with restraint, both
at Kargil and during Operation Parakram. Emulating Pakistan, it
reworked its doctrine to exploit the space between sub-
conventional war and the nuclear threshold for conventional
operations. This was in accord with the tenets of the Limited War
concept. The expectation is that an offensive posture would
reinforce deterrence.
The threat posed by Pakistan has been manifest at the sub
conventional level over the last three decades. In the eighties there
was also the apprehension that Pakistan could follow up its sub
conventional proxy war with conventional war. In response, India’s
strategic doctrine moved from being defensive in the seventies to
deterrence in the eighties with mechanisation. India’s military
doctrine was increasingly in favour of the offensive to the extent
that the first edition of the written doctrine issued in 1998, stated
its intention to fight the war on enemy territory. By the end of
the eighties recessed deterrence was in place. This reduced India’s
mechanised advantage, though the military doctrine did not evolve
correspondingly. This lack of development in military doctrine
was owing to the military being kept out of the nuclear loop; the
assumption that nuclear deterrence based on counter-value targeting
would hold; and an internal fixation with counter insurgency in
the nineties. It was only post over nuclearisation and the Kargil
War that the military was forced to contend with an obsolescent
military doctrine.
This was impelled by a change in strategic posture from deterrence

to coercion and quasi-compellence as demonstrated by Operation
Parakram. It was only in wake of Operation Parakram that the
military formulated the Limited War doctrine, discerning a window
below the nuclear threshold to bring conventional advantages to
bear. The current doctrine is termed the ‘strategy of deterrence’.
This implies a reversion to deterrence, but has been refurbished
by rising defence budgets over the decade. The direction of the
future is a move away from the Limited War Doctrine, since this
is seen as potentially disruptive of the national economic trajectory.
The military is possibly contemplating contingency operations,
with Limited War as a possibility triggered by Pakistani reaction.
There is a case for the move towards a defensive doctrine. The
advantage is that it would not provoke a nuclear reaction. Pakistan
is already suitably deterred -- at the conventional level -- from
attacking India. A defensive doctrine would therefore remain
untested, which by implication means there would be no question
of crossing the nuclear threshold. In such a case a doctrine which
sought to inflict ‘massive’ or ‘unacceptable damage’ is of little
consequence, since ‘push’ would never come to ‘shove’. This was
the case in the early period of covert and recessed nuclearisation.
Nuclear deterrence was based on the city busting notion of
unacceptable damage, in order to ensure that nuclear outbreak
does not take place in first place. The possibility of this transpiring
was remote even then in light of India’s defensive posture of
awaiting a Pakistani attack and then launching strike corps in
counter-offensive.
However, this buffer has been degraded, with India now keeping
its conventional might honed. It is doing this to be able to deter
Pakistan at the sub conventional level from crossing Indian
threshold of tolerance. The coincidence in Pakistan’s acquiring of
a nuclear capability and proxy war outbreak leads India to believe
that Pakistan has utilised its nuclear card to prosecute proxy war.
Overt nuclearisation made the Kargil intrusion possible for
Pakistan. This venturesome attitude of Pakistan requires
countering, for which India is keeping its conventional card handy.
A change at the conventional level may not be readily forthcoming.
Therefore, a change in the nuclear doctrine can be considered.
72 | ALI AHMED
According to India a conflict fought in the conventional domain

should be controlled. On the other hand, it maintains that any
limitation would be abandoned if the nuclear threshold is crossed.
The dichotomy is obvious and is in strategic writings critical of
the formulation ‘massive’. According to Manpreet Sethi:
While the draft nuclear doctrine mentioned ‘punitive
retaliation’, the 2003 official version changed it to ‘massive
retaliation’. But this has not necessarily enhanced credibility
of deterrence because it actually restricts the available
response to an adversary’s first strike to an all-out nuclear
attack. This may appear too drastic for use except in extreme
circumstances… In fact, ‘punitive retaliation’ is credible
enough since it provides alternatives relative to the nature
of strike and level of provocation (2010: 126).
In case the two doctrines are to be reconciled in keeping with

Limited War tenets, a move away from ‘massive’ punitive response
to a ‘flexible’ punitive response is worth considering. ‘Assured
Retaliation’ would remain, even if ‘Assured Destruction’ levels of
retaliation would no longer be the default option. This is to avoid
the counter retaliation in unsustainably destructive levels of
retribution. The shift can be made easily by interpreting the term
‘first strike’ in the nuclear doctrine formulation. The distinction
is made in Lawrence Freedman’s Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
(1989: 139). He indicates that ‘first strike’ is the opening volley
with the intent of crippling the adversary’s means of nuclear
retaliation. Such a strike would amount to nuclear first use of a
higher order and be demanding of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation.
A massive response would be rational, politically acceptable and
legitimate in such a case. However, retaliating to nuclear first use
of lower ‘opprobrium quotient’ with ‘unacceptable damage’ in
return can result in a ‘tit for tat’ response. The adversary, Pakistan
with its 100 plus arsenal, will have enough left to ensure that India
is suffers a major set back. While Pakistan would no doubt be
finished, India’s back would be broken. The trans-boundary
environmental effects and population movement also need to be
factored in. This is a price that India may be loath to pay. Therefore,
a revision of the nuclear doctrine in terms of limitation and making
it compatible with the Limited War concept, makes sense even if
it stretches the definition of Limited War to include Limited

Nuclear War.
Towards Flexible Nuclear Retaliation

The possibility of flexibility was thoughtfully worked into the
Draft (1999) in Para 2.4:
India’s peace time (italics added) posture aims at
convincing any potential aggressor that: (a) any threat of
use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures
to counter the threat; and (b) any nuclear attack on India
and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with
nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the
aggressor.
Interestingly, the term ‘massive’ has not been used in the Draft of
August 1999, but finds mention in the press release of January 4,
2003 issued by the Cabinet Secretariat, that services the CCS (CCS
2003). That it has not been used in the Draft indicates that
retaliation need not have ‘massive’ connotations, so long as its
quantum would make it ‘unacceptable’ to the aggressor. ‘Punitive
retaliation’ to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage does not necessarily
require ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the quantum of
retaliation was left as a matter of political choice to be dictated by
the circumstance. The decision maker is not constrained by the
options available for nuclear retaliation, which could be massive,
while not necessarily so.
This is evident from the fact that the Draft does not mention the
nature of the retaliation during war time, restricted as it is to the
projection of the posture in peace time. It is understandable for
in-conflict deterrence posture to be different from a peace time
and has been factored into the Draft. The nature of the deterrent
posture in war time has not been reflected on which indicates that
other options have not been ruled out. The Draft, in not overly
restricting the government’s nuclear options, had potentially ruled
in ‘flexible nuclear response’. Since the Draft has been a precursor
for the officially adopted doctrine and there is an element of
continuity between the two (Sagan 2009: 246), a questioning of
the doctrine along these lines is possible. Besides, as the Doctrine
74 | ALI AHMED
informs, ‘Military doctrine is neither dogma nor does it replace

or take away the authority and obligation of the commander on
the spot to determine a proper course of action under the
circumstances prevailing at the time of decision (2004: 3).’
Departures in practice are acceptable in theory.
Flexible options, while not ruling out ‘massive’ response, could

include a quid pro quo, quid pro quo plus or a spasmic strike, as
posited by General Sundarji (2003: 146-153). India’s response is to
be dictated by the guiding philosophy given in the Draft as: ‘India
will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond
with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.’ Action, informed
by such intent, while ruling out quid pro quo, could still
countenance a quid pro quo plus response.
In reinterpreting ‘first strike’, India would have a nuclear deterrent

posture that potentially rules in ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation. It is
possible that because India possessed fewer warheads earlier, counter
value targeting was the only option, if ‘massive’ is to be interpreted
in terms of ‘unacceptable damage’ to population centres. But over
a decade since Pokhran II, India is going in for a second strike
capability based on a triad privileging ‘credibility’ over ‘minimum’
(Sagan 2009: 220). Envisaging the possibility of nuclear limitation
would bring the nuclear doctrine in consonance with the Limited
War doctrine and further moderate India’s nuclear trajectory.
The Conventional-Nuclear Interface

Doctrinal divergence with Pakistan is over NFU. While India
adheres to NFU, Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons to deter not
only a nuclear but also a conventional attack by India. Thus, the
assessment of Pakistani nuclear threshold is an important
determinant of India’s conventional military calculus. In case of a
misreading of the threshold, Pakistani nuclear use may result. In
the light of India’s Cold Start doctrine, Pakistani analysts opine
that this would tend to lower Pakistan nuclear threshold (Almeida
2101: 1).
India’s nuclear doctrine posits ‘massive’ punitive retaliation in case

of nuclear first use by Pakistan (CCS 2003). In case of deterrence
breakdown, unless Pakistani nuclear capability is not adequately

down-graded and decapitated successfully by a ‘massive’ Indian
strike, Pakistani response could be in a similar vein. It is however
possible for India to envisage a lower order response that lends
itself to limitation, if ‘flexible’ punitive retaliation is brought into
the reckoning. A Limited Nuclear War would result if escalation
control is brought within the realm of feasibility by prior doctrinal
and structural arrangements.
A critique of this idea would be that by making nuclear war appear
fightable, it would make going nuclear in conflict appealing. The
counter to this is that not trying will lead to avoidable automatic
escalation. Since India cannot legislate on first use by the adversary,
it must think up a sensible response, one predicated on preserving
itself rather than inflicting damage on the adversary (Ahmed 2012).
In India’s case this is essential since its growth makes it not only
more vulnerable but also, since it has more to lose, would be more
prone to self-deterrence. Since limitation is not necessarily to argue
for war-fighting, there is little reason for India to be averse to
thinking through this change. That limitation has not been thought
through in India’s case owes to the nuclear doctrine having preceded
the conventional doctrine. Nevertheless, it can always be upgraded
or else the subsequently released doctrine could have been
formulated taking the nuclear doctrine into account. That this has
not been done is evident from only the tangential and inferential
references to Limited War in the conventional doctrine as against
an explicit mention. If Limited War is one possibility, and that
strategic circumstance would determine the levels of ingress into
Pakistan, then the nuclear doctrine requires rethinking the ‘massive’
punitive retaliation formulation.
Policy Recommendation
The foremost policy relevant conclusion is that India needs to
arrive at an explicit Limited War doctrine. A recent remark by
General V.K. Singh, in his avatar as chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee, gives out the current state of the art:
‘Conceptualisation and promulgation of joint doctrines, including
the visualisation of Limited War against a Nuclear Backdrop, forms
an important facet of our integrated approach (Bakshi 2011).’ This
76 | ALI AHMED
suggests a welcome, top-down initiative in which the concept is

first fleshed out as a joint one and then services can dwell on
respective roles. This is a sign of the maturing of jointness in the
doctrinal sphere, notably absent earlier when each service had set
out its doctrine autonomously.
However joint doctrine must be cognizant of the nuclear-
conventional interface. The military needs to first make the
structural changes necessary, in particular by the creation of the
‘CDS’ (Chief of Defence Staff equivalent appointment). Even so,
it must be mindful that Limited War has its limitations and the
nascent impulse of distancing the military from a default resort to
Limited War, as the term ‘Cold Start’ suggests, should be taken to
its logical conclusion. This is not the place to provide an outline
of such a doctrine and therefore no pointers are provided for such
an endeavour. Suffice it to mention that the finding here is that
this needs doing in the light of the nuclear threats.
The nuclear threat is an offshoot of the conventional-nuclear
interface, rendered untidy by India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine.
The term ‘massive’ in the doctrine needs to be reviewed. Instead,
building limitation into the nuclear doctrine is warranted since
the onus of moving to the nuclear level is on Pakistan, over which
India has only indirect influence. Therefore, instead of a counter
city strategy, a graduated counter military and counter force would
help avoid a spasmic nuclear release. A flexible punitive doctrine
could be considered.
War avoidance is more important, as Bernard Brodie (1946)
reminded right at the beginning of the nuclear age. This implies
taking the promise inherent in nuclear weapons acquisition
seriously: that of the weapons providing a cover under which to
resolve outstanding disputes. This implies working meaningfully
towards: firstly, a detente in the near term and, subsequently, an
entente. To tide over the interim an ‘NRRC plus’ or ‘enhanced
NRRC’ (Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre), and its tasks
appropriately framed for dealing with peace, crisis and conflict
situations, needs to be in place.
India needs therefore to reset its strategic doctrine. It is apparent
that fearing a realist backlash, articulation of a strategic doctrine is
not done by the government; as a result the cardinal downstream

factors in the military doctrine are nebulous. The strategic doctrine
apposite to its internal political and strategic circumstance is best
for the defensive structural realism. This would involve a
reorientation of the inclination towards offensive structural realism
currently discernible in the unarticulated strategic doctrine arising
from the direction taken by India’s defence budgets, acquisitions
and geopolitical posturing.
The implication of a reliance on defensive structural realism is a
return to deterrence with a defensive bias on the Pakistan front.
This would alleviate Pakistan’s security dilemma, making a
meaningful reaching out to Pakistan fruitful. Currently, the
numerous dialogue initiatives go unreciprocated since they appear
incongruous with India’s strategic posture. Given that a ‘carrot
and stick’ policy is unfolding, the stick overshadows the benign
carrot, not only in what India proffers but in what a military
dominated Pakistan wishes to see. The strategic doctrine needs to
rework the balance between the two. Since strategic doctrine is a
political function and the grand strategy orchestration a political
prerogative, the exercise of political control is desirable to this end.
A replacement strategic doctrine could ideally be one of defensive
deterrence. The consequences of this for military doctrine are stark,
with, for instance, proactive offensives on a short fuse in the Cold
Start mould being reconsidered. The current course of moving a
step away from Cold Start is a right start point. Additionally, the
intermeshing of the doctrinal sphere into the dialogue process with
Pakistan is necessary. Institutionalisation of a strategic dialogue
will help to progress from mere confidence building measures to
security building (Ahmed 2010). While doctrinal interplay could
figure in the talks at the start, eventually mutual and balanced
forces reduction may be broached. This extensive agenda is only
seemingly far-fetched. Having counter-intuitively seen in the study
how powerplay unduly risks national security, the inference is
along constructivist lines: that a changed strategic doctrine can
beget a more secure future. The military doctrine would move
further towards making military power less counter-productive.
This would be in keeping with the principal diktat of the nuclear age.
78 | ALI AHMED
Conclusion
The wider lesson is that India’s military exertions have not led to
expected levels of security. In short, the realism-inspired
understanding that power and its application has limitations. The
problem is accentuated in India’s case since not only do challenges
in external security remain unmitigated; but inevitably get
interlinked with its vulnerability in internal security. The
experience over the past three decades has led to the belief that
India needs to ‘do more’ in respect of security. The route of ‘more
of the same’ in terms of bolstering the military instrument and its
nuclear dimension may not be the most appropriate. The
understanding is that India has acquired a strategic culture, resolved
organisational shortcomings substantially and has sustainable
finances to do so. The incentive is there in terms of joining the
‘great power’ club. Its strategic doctrine is one of escalation
dominance, geared to a ‘failing’ Pakistan.
The examination of India’s conventional doctrine has an under-
studied area. While nuclear and counter insurgency doctrines, that
have the aura of urgency, have got some attention, conventional
doctrine has remained unexamined. This study has significance in
terms of tracing the formulation and eclipse of India’s Cold Start
doctrine through the century’s first decade. The doctrine was
conceptualised and brought out in January 2000 and the military
is currently in the process of moving away from the doctrine
towards one that is more suitable to the defining reality of the
period – the nuclear dimension. The study has engaged with a
problem of contemporary relevance and is pitched at the
conventional-nuclear interface. The limitation parameters have
therefore been highlighted with the policy relevant finding being
that limitation needs to attend both the conventional and nuclear
realms of military application. India needs therefore to reset its
strategic doctrine to defensive realism. One implication of the
reliance on defensive realism is a return to deterrence with a
defensive bias on the Pakistan front. This way, the military
doctrine – conventional and nuclear – will be compliant with the
principal diktat of the nuclear age: strategic prudence.
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T he aim of the monograph is to examine the structural factor behind the
development of India's Limited War Doctrine. At the structural level, the regional
security situation has impacted India's strategic posture - primarily the threat posed
by Pakistan, India's revisionist neighbour. Given its revisionist aims and relative lack
of power, Pakistan covertly went nuclear. This has accounted for its prosecuting a
proxy war against India. India was consequently forced to respond albeit with
restraint, exemplified by its response during the Kargil War, Operation Parakram
and in the wake of 26/11. Emulating Pakistan's proactive posture at the
subconventional level, India reworked its conventional war doctrine to exploit the
space between the subconventional level and the nuclear threshold for
conventional operations. This has been in accordance with the tenets of the Limited
War concept. In discussing India's conventional war doctrine in its interface with
the nuclear doctrine, the policy-relevant finding of this monograph is that limitation
needs to govern both the conventional and nuclear realms of military application.
This would be in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear age.
Dr. Ali Ahmed is currently political affairs officer in the UNMISS.

The monograph was completed during his fellowship at the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi in 2010-12.
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,
Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010
Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191
E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in

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IDSA Monograph Series

No. 10 December 2012

IDSA Monograph Series

INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted

INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE: THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR | 7

This monograph is the outcome of my fellowship at IDSA in 2010-

The doctrine has evolved from the military developments of the

Doctrinal development has been driven by the military experience

and nuclear planes has an escalatory potential that could do with

Layout of the Study

Limited War Thinking in India

Jasjit Singh describes the change brought on by nuclearisation as

settles, the damage to India may be grave, but Pakistan as we know

India’s Limited War Doctrine

Cold Start is expected to achieve three goals: ‘inflict significant

strikes and geographically confined skirmishes emerge as the

India’s nuclear doctrine of 2003 so as to elaborate on the inter-

against India e.g. sending tribal lashkars in 1947 (Marwah 2009:

Changes in Military Doctrine

furthered the process in organisational and material terms (Gupta

during the volatile days of Operation Trident, a crisis brought on

(1965). Snyder was discussing the issue of stability at the nuclear

However, in the South Asian case, stability at the higher levels -

the nuclear cover to launch a risky subconventional proxy war,

‘reduced conventional advantage over Pakistan from 1:1.7 at 1971

Wars. He attributes their remaining limited to cultural, religious

The Kargil War forced India to borrow a leaf out of Pakistani

Analysts have picked this up as ‘the first signal of India’s long-

existed between the subconventional and nuclear levels of war and

The Army’s Conventional Doctrine

its three strike corps in ‘launch pads’ along the Indo-Pakistan

at the highest level to adopt the military option with minimum

The term ‘battle group’ used above finds mention in strategic

The Logic of Cold Start

Early mobilization is essentially to prevent Pakistan from playing

Walter Ladwig writes that, ‘the goal of military operations would

The doctrine was premised on two major elements. Certain

How the doctrine serves limitation will depend on the strategy

involved: a fission device with a yield of 12 kilotons; a

y Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the

y Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;

y In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces

Further, it approved the setting up of a Strategic Forces Command

The doctrine is taken as being one of ‘Assured Retaliation’ with

However there can be no doubt that for India’s No First

Thinking through what may constitute ‘unacceptable damage’,

no more than four or five 20 kt weapons each on 5-6 major cities…

Analysis of the Nuclear Doctrine

Operation Parakram, the navy can be expected to address Karachi

This means that India’s nuclear doctrine of ‘massive’ punitive

If the introduction of nuclear weapons into conflict is not overly

politico-economic targets (preferably in Pakistan Occupied

3. THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR

military doctrine. Part II analyses the implications of military

Subrahmanyam required that India have in ‘readiness adequate

both in numbers and firepower, it should be possible to deter

However, given that strategic doctrine is a matter of political choice,

We must follow a forward strategy and recognise the